Слово 8. К говорящим, что не Отцу, а изволению Его подобен Сын

With sufficient grounds, the one who believes in those who call the Son similar (ὅμοιον) to the will of the Father, and not to the Father Himself, would have been found guilty of the great recklessness (ἀβουλίαν) of the anti-Christ fighters, or the Savior Himself would not have made such a determination about Him, and the Savior Himself did not say: “He who has seen Me, I see the Father’s will” 196. Really, it was necessary for Christ, who said: “I am the Truth,” 197 not to liken Himself to the Father by nature, but rather to His will, if things really are as they say. But, not mentioning will anywhere, but calling Himself the image of the Father, He clearly refutes their fiction. OTHER. One should ask the Christ-fighters: is this the will of the Father, about which you say that the Son is like him, is there a certain essence, and does it exist in itself or not? For if you admit that it is essential and hypostatic, then how will the Son be the Only Begotten, being the third from the Father? After all, it turns out that a certain hypostatic and living will mediates in His birth, according to your position. If, rejecting this, you agree that will is not understood according to hypostasis and is not an essence living and existing like the Son, then do not look - very ignorantly and rudely - for the likeness without offering two essences. For how the hypostatic will be similar to what is not, or how it has not received essence (τὸ μὴ εἰς οὐσίαν ἐνεχθὲν) 198 will be compared with the [hypostatically] existing (τῷ ὑφεστηκότι) for similarity? OTHER. And who, having intelligence, would not agree that the living is similar to the living, and the non-living is similar to the non-living? For what is heterogeneous and naturally completely devoid of connection with each other, no one of good wisdom will compare with each other, and neither this is similar to this, nor can this be called by that. Let’s say, let’s say [we have] a person or any other existing thing that falls under the definition of living; let there be knowledge or wisdom, or will, or something else from what is not in itself hypostatic, but exists in some of the existing ones: for example, in people or angels. So, if someone begins to say that a person or some other living [creature] is similar to knowledge or to wisdom, or to will, then will he not justly incur ridicule and reproaches of stupidity upon himself, trying to test [subjects] that are not at all similar to each other [for similarity] and compare them? Consequently, being hypostatic, the Son of God will in no way be similar to the non-hypostatic will. Or let them then decisively say that He is not like the Father, and be hated as obviously blasphemous; or, if it is really necessary to recognize the likeness of the Son in relation to the Father, then it is absolutely necessary that He should not be like the will, but rather like Him who gave birth. For it has been proven that [those contemplated] in essence and hypostasis in relation to those incarnate and hypostatic (τὰ ἐνούσιά τε καὶ ἐνυπόστατα) retain similarity according to this [character], and not to a foreign one (τὰ ἑτερογενῆ) and having existence in others, as, for example, wisdom is in the wise, and good will is in the willing. OTHER, through reduction to absurdity. If, in your opinion, the Son is similar to the will of the Father, and is not like the One who gave birth, then in every possible way it is necessary to say that the will is not at all like God and the Father, being the image of which, the Son, in your opinion, is not like the Father. Then the Father will not be like his own will. For this wickedness is deduced from [your] speech. And if you say that will is something hypostatized, then there will always be something in the essence of God that is not like Him. For the logic [of your words] will force you to agree with this too. But here it is necessary to examine the image of dissimilarity that the will has in relation to the Father. After all, if it, as something less than Him, has no similarity in relation to Him, then what came from the essence of the Father will be worse than Him and lesser; For the will of the Father was not from without, nor did it come, but from Him and in Him. It is not common even for those who have a created nature to give birth to the worst [of themselves]. After all, neither man will give birth to anything other than what he himself is, nor any other dumb animal. If, which is not permissible to say, having striven to have something greater than the Father, His will in this sense bears [in itself] dissimilarity in relation to Him, as less or in something worse, then how would it not be impious to say that it is something greater and better than the Father? If you do not agree to either this or that, and confess the will to be unhypostatic and understood in the same way as [it is understood] with us, then how will you then consider the will to be not similar to the Father? After all, if this is so, then He will have willed [something] not befitting Himself, which is extremely absurd to even imagine. OTHER. Logic will force those who listen to you to recognize the similarity of the Son in relation to the Father. For it is [clearly] shown that it is very absurd to believe that God willed [something] not befitting Himself, since in every possible way it is necessary to call His will befitting Him. So if the will is like the Father, and the Son like the will; then every Third will be similar to the First. For the will that is in the middle, having received in itself a natural likeness (φυσικὴν ἐμφέρειαν) with Him who begat Him, [transferred] it to the Son, according to your words. Thus, the Son, even against your will, will turn out to be like the Father. Since there is nothing between the Father and the Son, then everything said about the will will not matter, and since nothing else mediates [between Them], the Son will be immediately (προσεχῶς) by nature similar to the Father. OTHER. It is written: “Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God” 199. So, if the will of the Father characterizes His power and wisdom, that is, the Son, then it is in every possible way necessary to call him not dissimilar to the Father, so that the Father does not appear to have power and wisdom dissimilar to Himself. If so, then let the Christ-fighters realize the scale of their folly (ἀβουλίας). For, refusing to call one Son like the Father, they agreed to speak of two [like sons], if only they really affirm that will is something hypostatic. If it is non-hypostatic, then it will not be an image of the [hypostatically] existing (τοῦ ὑφεστῶτος) not existing (τὸ μὴ ὑφεστηκὸς) for the very reason that it did not exist [hypostatically]. For none of the beings in relation to the foreign and other-essential will be endowed with exactly the same powers and actions, but those who have received one nature as their lot will enjoy only equal distinctive properties; and those who have one commonality in essence will, as a result of this, be given the ability to resemble each other in everything. So, if the Father and the Son have one action, and the same power [with Them] is seen in everything, then the Duo is not alien to itself. If so, then the Son will in every way bear in Himself the likeness of the Father, as one in essence, and will not be an image of will. OTHER. If, however, what God and the Father wills, the Son also wills - for there will never be any opposition or disagreement in the one and most pure Trinity - then what place will there be for the hypostatic will, showing the third Son, closely adjacent to the Father, due to which He [is precisely] the Son, having nothing mediating in His birth? Therefore, He Himself is the living and essential will of the One who gave birth. OTHER. They lie about the Son, that He is the image and likeness of the will of the Father, and not the Father Himself. Therefore, we should again ask the anti-Christists: is the Father consistent with His will or not? After all, if he is not like, then he has a will not like Himself, and I will remain silent about this blasphemy; and if He has a will similar to Himself, of which [will], as you say, the Son is the mark and image, then, therefore, [the Son] is, thanks to this, similar to the Father. How then will [the Son] be not like Him in essence, being - through likeness to will - His image? After all, if this is so, in your opinion, then the Son will be composed of similar and dissimilar, in one way resembling the Father, and in another way alienating from the similarity in relation to Him. Then, what logic will allow something that is one in essence and number, as, for example, Paul or Peter, to become at the same time two, opposite in essence? For no one can say: “I am verbal and dumb”; nor, again, will fire be called hot and cold, for it is necessary, if [in something] one of the designated [properties] is present, to deny the other. So, it is impossible for the Son to have both likeness and unlikeness. Since the divine Scripture certifies His likeness in relation to the Father, and He Himself says: “Whoever sees Me, sees the Father” 200, then we do not accept the dissimilarity, being guided by these [testimonies] to the most true and appropriate [understanding]. Again, since He did not say: “He who has seen Me has seen the will of My Father,” we will confess the Son not in the image of the will, but [in the image] of the Father Himself [we consider Him] as the Son. OTHER. That which has departed from mutual contact with each other (συναφείας) or natural similarity and is isolated, in the sense of an essential quality, is distant [one from the other], being separated either by space or by mental ideas alone (ἐπινοίαις). So, those having a bodily composition are separated by space from contact with each other, and some of them are also separated by verbal definition (λόγῳ), according to the essential difference, like [for example] a man from a horse. And those that have a different manifestation (δήλωσιν) and the result [resulting] from them (τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποτελούμενον) turn out to be separated by only one word and thought, like [for example] health and illness. And among those who are separated by one word and the opposite result [arising] from them, some things are called immediate (ἄμεσα) 201 by those practicing in the philosophical sciences, and others are called mediated (ἔμμεσα) 202. Non-mediated ones are, as I already said, health and illness, since there is nothing in between them. For if any of them suddenly happens to a person, then it will be all one in him. After all, one is either healthy or sick, and there is nothing in between being sick and not being sick. Righteousness and unrighteousness are called mediated, because not every person is either completely righteous or unrighteous. For it is possible to find, as it were, some kind of intermediate region, when someone is partly righteous and not completely unrighteous. So, when these [things] have been carefully examined by us in this way, and the dissimilarity in them has been examined in relation to every thing, let us see in what sense of the listed the Son departed from the likeness of the Father. After all, no one will say that He is separated by space, since He is not the body; After all, it is common for bodies to be separated by spatial distance. What remains, then, is the division according to logos: I mean - according to logos according to nature. But since the Father is by nature God, and the Son by nature is God, what is His Logos [i.e. e. the Son] separates [from the Father]? Who will not agree that that which belongs to the same essence also has a similarity in relation to each other? And besides, the Father will not possess anything as opposed to the Son, as the so-called immediate ones. For [the properties of the Father and the Son are not opposite to each other, like health and illness, and not as in people, where the logic of things requires that one of all of the above be preserved, so in relation to the Father and the Son. For the Father dwells in someone, and the Son also dwells [at the same time]. And not like those [i.e. e. health and illness], incompatible and not co-present in the same thing - so are the Father and the Son; for behold, says Christ: “I and the Father will come in and make our abode with him” 203 . But even in this way it will not be a mediated thing in relation to the Son, such as, for example, righteousness. For the Father will not be less than the Father, and the Son will not be less than the Son, so that some intermediate place will arise that contains the diminution (ὑπόβασιν) of the essence, as was said about righteousness and unrighteousness. Consequently, since there is no space separating the Son from the likeness in relation to God the Father, it is unnecessary to say that He is rather likened to the will, and not to the Father Himself who emitted Him. OTHER. Those who have the same logos must, of course, be of the same species (ὁμοειδῆ) and similar to each other in nature. As, for example, the definition (λόγος) of a person, being such - “a rational animal, mortal, capable of thought and science” 204 ​​- in relation to anyone, shows them to belong to the same essence. And those in relation to whom this will be true - I mean what is said in the definition (τὰ ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ) - it shows in every way as people. For if there is a rational animal, mortal, capable of thought and science, then what else will be designated [by these words] if not human? So, if the name “God”, “Lord”, “Incorruptible”, “King”, and if anything else besides this is said about the Father, will be true when applied to the Son, and if He not only has such glory in words, but actually is such by nature, then what logos will separate the Son from natural likeness in relation to the Father? After all, they have one definition (ὅρος) of essence, and everything that is inherent in the One who gave birth will be true in relation to the One who was born. If anyone dares to say that the Son is a falsely named God and does not possess anything greater in comparison with those who by grace are called to divinity and sonship, having fallen into the [false] teaching of Paul of Samosata, then, in fairness, he will hear from us: “If you do not believe, you cannot understand.” 205 For it is impossible for those who do not believe that Christ is by nature God to understand the similarity that He has with the Father by nature. So, being like the Father, not contained in anything else (ἐνυπάρκτου) will, the Son, who existed before the ages, bears the image. Lit.: “not brought to essence.” Those. not having a middle term with another. Those. having a middle term with another. John 14:23. The quote is not given verbatim: “εἰσελευσόμεθα ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ, καὶ μονὴν παρ’ αὐτῷ ποιήσομεν”, while in the Gospel: “ἐλευσόμεθα καὶ μονὴν παρ’ αὐτῷ ποιησόμεθα.” Sextus Empiricus. Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes, 2, 26. A definition that became classic in patristic writing; also found in Nemesius of Emesa, Athanasius of Alexandria, Basil the Great, John Chrysostom, Gregory the Theologian and later authors. You might be interested in: