Слово 7. К предлагающим [вопрос]: «Невольно или по изволению родил Сына Отец?»

The question seems to be on behalf of heretics So, did the Father involuntarily (ἀβουλήτως), and at random (ἀσκέπτως) beget, that is, create, the Son, or according to His will? If, therefore, He involuntarily gave birth to Him, then He suffered something of what [happens] against the will (παρὰ γνώμην); and if by will (κατὰ βούλησιν), then it is necessary that the thought of them preexist in relation to the emerging [creations of the Lord], [and] this means that the Father was before the Son, and the birth was mediated by the will of Him. Where did you, oh heretics, learn to say that the Son was born “willingly or involuntarily,” and in general, to ask those you meet such questions, from what Scripture? Which of the saints said that He came from the Father either by will or involuntarily? Who exactly are these words from? For we learned from divine Scripture that He was and is God’s Word. And what is involuntary or not - we only heard from you. The Father reveals the Son from heaven and says: “This is My beloved Son” 168; and through David he says: “My heart will vomit out the good Word” 169; and the wisest John says: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was to God, and God was the Word” 170. The psalmist, as if [addressing] the Father, again says: “With You is the source of life; in Your light we will see light” 171. Paul calls [the Son] the radiance 172 and the image of the invisible God 173 . And not one of them is found saying that the Son was born “involuntarily” or “by will.” But, having said “be” and “is,” they do not give any beginning in time to the Creator of times. Where do you say such [things] from? Speaking from your heart, as the prophet says, and not from the mouth of the Lord 174. OTHER. If you say that the Son was begotten by will, and insist that the will for Him pre-exists in relation to His birth, then why does Scripture not say the same about Him as it does about other creatures? For as for those things created by God, they are preceded by will (θέλησις), as in [the words]: “Let us create man” 175 and “Create whatever you please” 176. And as for God the Word, the will (θέλησις), that is, the will (βούλησις), is nowhere shown to be prior, but we only hear that He “be” and “is.” And, so to speak, his natural place is the Father. So, if in relation to all creatures in Scripture it is said that the will precedes them, but in relation to the Son we do not find anything like that in him, then, therefore, He is not one of all, and was not created by will, like all [beings], [but] came from the Father and from the essence of the One who gave birth, existing pre-eternally. OTHER. Nowhere does Paul say about our Savior Christ that He is God’s wisdom and God’s power 177 . So, if the Word that exists from Him and in Him is the Wisdom and Power of the Father, then It is That in Which [the Father] wills, and through which He does everything. How, then, was He created by will, in whom the will of the Father abides? For we will have to invent for ourselves another wisdom, in which, having willed, [the Father] created the Son, as you say; otherwise, if the two are not the other, but He alone is the Wisdom of the Father, He, therefore, is also the will. After all, all things in wisdom [are] willed by God. And [therefore] your word is absurd, and your conclusion is unfounded. OTHER, about the same thing. God’s will is not seen to be fulfilled in the created ones (οὐσιωμένη φαίνεται), but there is something different in relation to what is created through it. Therefore we say that the heavens were created by the will of [God], and not that they themselves are the will. So, if God willed in wisdom, and since He, as you say, wanted to beget the Son, and the Son is the Wisdom of the Father, then it is necessary that the Father should have another wisdom, in which He willed to beget the Son. If it is impious to say this (since God has one Son, and not two, [and this] is God’s Word, which is the Wisdom of the Father), then He is the One through whom the will is accomplished (γίνεται) for all [beings]. OTHER. Everything that is created in time is preceded by something being willed about them. So, if, in your opinion, the Son was created by will, then He [i.e. e. Father] has a preliminary will regarding Him, as well as about creatures. And at one time [it happened that He, that is, the Son] was not. And John lies, saying about Him: “In the beginning was the Word” 178. For if He [once] was not, then how can the words of the evangelist, who attributed “be” to Him, be true? But not you, but him, I believe, must be trusted. Be means, according to his words, the Son, and [the words] “was not” in relation to Him are empty and false. OTHER. If those created by purpose are preceded by the time in which the thought of them arose, even if we consider it something small and insignificant, then how will the Son be the Creator of times if the purpose precedes His birth? But He is the Creator of times. Be means [the essence of truth], and nothing exists before His birth. OTHER. If the Son is the Wisdom of the Father, as He actually is, then what time was there when there was no wisdom in Him? If [the Son] is ever present in the Father (for the Father is ever wise), then how will anything precede the ever existing? How will the will enter between [the Father and the Son], introducing the once non-existent Son, co-essential with the Father as His Wisdom? OTHER. If the will precedes the Son, and it is necessary that the thought of Him arise in time, even if it is small and very brief, then how will [the Son] be the Creator of all [times]? Or how can we believe the Scripture, which says that all the same was 179, when before Him there appears to be a time in which the will of Him was accomplished, whereas [from Scripture it follows that] there were no times before Him? OTHER, as if from the objection of heretics. If, says [the heretic], the Son of God was not created by will, then, therefore, out of necessity and without wanting [it], the Father had a Son. And who is this greater than Him and who assigned this necessity to Him? For what happens without intention (παρὰ γνώμην) happens out of necessity. Rebuttal to this. We should answer the question of the anti-Christ fighters, and through those [arguments] that they ignorantly offer us, we should object to them, bringing an equal counterargument. Tell us: is God good and generous, merciful and holy by will, or apart from will? If from will - and will in every way precedes what it is about - then there was a time when God was not like that, even [only] thinking about it. If He is involuntarily good and merciful apart from [His] intention, then this will be out of necessity. And who is it who assigned this necessity to Him, in your opinion? So, your question turns out to be full of stupidity and does not carry any positive meaning. OTHER, in narrative form. In relation to what is by nature, will does not precede, but is directed only towards what is outside the essence of the will. For example, does someone plant a vineyard or build a ship, having previously deigned about them; and a child is born from a person by nature without any previous will. If someone suddenly says about one of the people that he, in addition to his will, had a son, then let him not immediately rush to [the conclusion that this happened] out of necessity - after all, [the one who gave birth] did not get the need from someone - but it is better to see that what is by nature is not preceded by will. For they give birth voluntarily, without any prior consent. So, voluntarily and involuntarily (θελητώς καὶ ἀβουλήτως) the Word also dwells in the Father, just as the child [born] from him also dwells in man. OTHER. If by nature God and the Father is good, it is not by will, lest there be a time when He was not such, in which [the time] there was will. He does not beget the Son by will, but by nature. For this is more fitting for Him. OTHER. Christ-fighters should be asked: does the Father of the Word Himself exist by will, or apart from his own will? If from will - and will must necessarily precede existence - then I am silent about the offensiveness [for God of such an assumption]; if, apart from will, then it means that He is of necessity that by which He exists. And who assigned this necessity to Him? If the Father exists neither from will nor apart from will, then the same must be artlessly adhered to in relation to the Son. For it is not in accordance with [the nature of the human mind] to investigate such things rashly. Rather, it is appropriate, when hearing about God, to know that He is the One who has accepted a certain beginning of being, but who Himself has become the beginning of being for others. OTHER, in narrative form. It is very inappropriate and dangerous to say in relation to the Son: “So was He born by will, after all, or apart from will?” For He who abides by God is not by [any external] will, nor does the Word come from His essence by will, but by nature. For this is how His image and mark will be 181 not false. OTHER. If will and thought (σκέψις) precede the existence of the Son, and the Son is the Wisdom and Word of the Father, then how do you think God willed, being dumb and unwise? After all, the Son did not yet exist when the thought of Him was made. How absurd would it be to introduce the Father, who decides about Himself (βουλευόμενον) whether He should generally have Wisdom and the Word or not? Therefore, it is necessary to reject the ignorant questions of Christ-fighters and not try too hard to object to them. OTHER, in narrative form. It has already been shown in many words that creation was preceded by will. From one thing everything is known. As for the dispensation of man, “let us make man” 182, [as] “let the firmament be” 183, and “let there be” such and such 184 [in relation to other things], could be an indication of God’s advice regarding each of the creations, although the matter seems to follow immediately [behind the word]. So, if the will precedes creation, and everything came into being through the Son, then outside of everything is He, in Whom all things were 185. And if He is different from those [of those that exist] to whom purpose precedes, then [the Son] will not be created by purpose, as they are. For He is the living Will (βουλὴ) of the Father, in Which He creates all things (ἐργάζεται). The Psalmist also calls Him the Will of the Father, saying: “Thou hast instructed me in Thy will.” 186 OTHER. If the Will and Desire (βουλὴ καί θέλημα) of the Father is the Son, as in reality it is, then how will desire (θέλησις) precede His existence? For He will [then] be the one who created Himself. And having not yet arisen, He, according to the Christ-fighters, turns out to be willing for Himself. If it is absurd to say so, then it means that He was not brought into being by will, like all creations, but as the Will of the Father was in Him, being a genuine property (αὐτὸ τὸ ἵδιον) of the essence of the One who gave birth. OTHER. Christ says nowhere: “I am in the Father, and the Father in Me,” 187, pointing only to the Father, as if to some place containing Himself, and also [to Himself], as if the Father were only in Him. So, if His will in the Father is something different in relation to the Son, then how will he who affirms this speak the truth? For before the existence of the Son, according to the madness of the anti-Christists, the will of the Father, according to which [the Son] was created, as they say, is found. If [Christ] speaks the truth when he says that He is in the Father, and also that the Father is in Him alone, then where will the will be, when there is no place in the middle? If so, then He was not created by will, but He Himself is the Father’s Will. OTHER. If both the creations were preceded by will and the existence of Christ, then why are those who have the same beginning of becoming and those created by the same will so different in nature from each other that One is Lord and God, and the others are slaves and creatures? But it is obvious that the Son, united by nature with the Divinity of the Father, is called and is the Lord, and the creation is a slave, because it is outside the essence of the Creator and outside the natural connection with the Father. So it is necessary that what has such a difference in relation to each other should not have the same beginning. But some, like creatures, arose from will. And the Son, as Himself being the Will, was always in the Father. OTHER, in narrative form. It was necessary for the Christ-fighters, who dared to ask whether the Father begot the Son by will, to say this: in reason (φρονήσει) 188 did the Father beget the Son? After all, will and reason seem to be one and the same. Since whatever anyone wishes, he means 189 [to do]; and also vice versa - what he intends, he wills. After all, we find the Savior binding them to Himself [together] as equivalent and saying: “My advice 190 and affirmation, My mind, My strength” 191. For just as affirmation and strength are one and the same, so are advice and reason. So if they believe that the Father begot unreasonably, then let them ask whether He begot the Son in reason. If they tremble even to hear this, then how would it not be wicked to ask and say in relation to the Son: “He was born by will, or not?” – causing such a great insult to the Word? OTHER. Blessed Paul, showing the immutable likeness that the Son has in relation to His Father, writes about Him: “Who is the radiance of His glory and the image of His hypostasis” 192. So, if the Son is the image and mark of the One who gave birth, and He was born, in your opinion, with a will that preceded Him, then it is absolutely necessary that the Father should be the same as His image and radiance, so that He also had a will that preceded Him. If this is wicked (for the Father’s essence and hypostasis do not exist by will), then it is absolutely necessary to philosophize about the Son and say that He is not of will. OTHER, as if from the objection of heretics. And how, says [the heretic], it will not be necessary to agree that the Son is undesirable to the Father, that is, involuntary, if He did not arise from will and desire? Rebuttal to this. May the Savior, who speaks of Himself: “The Father loves the Son” 193, put to shame the insolent language of the Christ-fighters. After all, as has already been said, by goodness and mercy He [i.e. e. The Father] possesses, but not from will, and yet these [qualities] exist [in Him] not involuntarily. So He begot the Son, although He did not by will, but He did not have Him involuntarily. For [the Father] desires the Son and loves him, as it is written. And just as the Father is the desirer of His own hypostasis, not being what He is by anyone’s will, so the Son, who came from the essence of the Father, is not unwanted by Him, although the will is by no means prior to birth. OTHER. If the Son is the radiance and image of the Father, but was produced by desire, in your opinion, then there was a time when He was not, during which [the time] the desire for Him was brought into action by the Father. Consequently, there was once [a time] when God was without radiance and without image. And if the distinctive property (τὸ ἴδιον) of the essence of the Father is the Son, and He once, in your opinion, did not exist, then this is the same as saying that the essence of the Father was not once fertile, but as if from some change it came to this, giving birth to the Son. If it is wicked to think and say, then let not some ask about the Son: “Will it be or not?” For just as the Father is good by nature, so is he who begets by nature. OTHER, in narrative form. If every will that arises in someone does not arise without a word (for will is a word that invisibly turns to the heart), and the Son is the Word of the Father, then He, of course, is His will. Then, how is will formed within will? Or is the Word in the Word? So, the Son is everything to the Father—Will, Word, and Wisdom—and there is nothing in the Father before Him. OTHER, similar. Man by nature has the ability to become the father of children, and not just as he [becomes] good or evil by choice, so also [is] a father. But this is by nature, otherwise it is by will. And we have power over one, and nature has the other as an immutable law. So, just as we do not have by will to be fathers [of children born] of us, but by nature, so God the Father is not Father by will, but by nature. And just as those who are born of us are in every way similar to us in essence, so the Son, who was not joined to the Father from outside, but truly came from His essence, is in everything similar to the One who gave birth. And just as He is not the Father by will, so the Son does not exist by will, but being by nature the radiance and image of Him who begat Him. OTHER. The objection seems to be from [the person] Eunomius. One should ask, he says, those who believe that they are rightly philosophizing, whether the Father begot the Son by will, or involuntarily? For if the Son was in the essence of the Father, being different in relation to him, then [the Father] did not give birth by will (προαιρέσει). For there was a need to give birth to what was in nature. If [the Son] was not in the Father, and was born when the Father willed, then it is necessary that His will preexist. Therefore, He was not co-essential with the Father. Rebuttal to this. Those who rush uncontrollably towards any kind of blasphemy deserve, first of all, surprise, as well as reproach for their great ignorance. For they are not ashamed to subordinate God Himself to necessity, and, as if we were talking about bodies, to say that something is contained in the essence of the Father, or that the Son is in the Father, like a vessel within a vessel. We, those who try to philosophize rightly and fairly, say that the essence of God is above all necessity; and also - that the Son abides in the Father, not as a body encompassed by [another] body, but as inseparable from His essence and originating from it according to the law of [Divine] nature. If they think to offer something wise, saying: “Was He created by choice or involuntarily?” - then let them hear from us: “Does fire give birth to warmth [derived] from it by will, or involuntarily?” But they will have nothing to say to this. For what comes from nature admits neither volition nor involuntariness. And in relation to the external and that over which we have power, volition and involuntariness have power. So, just as we do something by volition, but we give birth from ourselves, and there is no place for volition or involuntary here at all, so God creates the external by volition, and begot the Son from Himself timelessly, without any volition or involuntariness taking place here, although He is not weak-willed (ἀθέλητος). For “The Father loves the Son,” 194 as it is written. OTHER. As if from an objection [on behalf of] Eunomius. If, he says, the Father did not beget the Son by will, but has Him by nature, then, of course, not having knowledge of Him Himself, he also has Him by nature. Therefore, He learned that He would also have a Son, and that He would do everything with Him; and [thus] the knowledge of the Son came to the Father, which His own nature had taught. If this is absurd, then by will, knowing that [the Son] would be, [the Father] brought Him into being (προέβαλεν αὐτὸν), and [thus] will in every way precedes birth. Rebuttal to this. As if we confessed that the Father first learned what the Son would be, and then begot Him in this way, this man, skilled in such [questions], builds a [logical] position, not knowing that since there is no gap in the middle separating the existence of the Father and the birth of the Son, then there is no room for foreknowledge of Him. After all, if He first willed and learned beforehand, and all this happened in time, then the Son is below time. If He is the creator of times, then why does [this man] chatter in vain about the Divine nature, introducing [the opinion] that it learns from [created] nature, as he says, [things] to come, and without learning anything else [distinctive] to man in comparison with God who is above all? So, when the birth of the Son lies above centuries and times, it would indeed be irreverent and ignorant to say that the Father previously willed something about Him or learned something. For the Father is perfect in knowing everything, and before the Son there is no place at all for the will of Him. OTHER. If the Father recognized Himself as the ever-existent Father, then He in every way has the knowledge of the Son in Himself. For in that He knows what He Himself is, He also bears the knowledge of Sonship: for He is Father and is called in relation to the Son. And also vice versa: the Son knows the Father 195, knowing what He Himself is. For from Sonship is implied Fatherhood; and vice versa: from Fatherhood - Sonship. Indeed, [if] God was always the Father; [then] there was always a Son. It is offensive [towards God] to say that the Father does not know the Son from Himself, but learned from nature, whereas it is obvious that Each of Them, from what He Himself is, has knowledge of the Other. However, the nature of God would not be [something] different in comparison with Himself, because He is simple and uncomplicated. OTHER. As if from an objection [on behalf of] Eunomius. So, by will, he says, that is, by judgment (κρίσει), did the Father beget the Son, or by nature? If only by nature, and not also by will or judgment, then [the Son] will be born reluctantly and recklessly (ἀκρίτως). If both (τὸ συναμφότερον), then you make God complex by attributing to Him both nature and judgment. For how can the one put together of these [two] be simple? Rebuttal to this. The birth of the Son is beyond judgment and will. For to will and to judge are all related to time, and the Son is the Creator of times. How will creation be before the Creator? And if you think that God becomes complex due to the fact that he has nature and judgment, that is, will, then pay attention to this: the Father has the ability to beget naturally (φυσικῶς), but he also has the [property] to create (τὸ κτίζειν) through the Son creatively (δημιουργικῶς), and, despite this, is not complex, for such [properties] are the fruit of one nature. The same applies to goodness, incorruptibility and invisibility, and everything that is inherent in the Divine nature. OTHER. As if from an objection [on behalf of] Eunomius. Tell us, he says, what do you mean by calling the Son the radiance of the Father? The nature of the question is this: light, that is, fire, say, abiding in a lamp, illuminates the external, but does not fill everything with itself, but resides in a [certain] place, and in the external, as we said, illumination arises from it (φωτισμὸς). So, if you call the Father the light, and the Son the radiance from the light, then it is necessary to say that the essence of the Father cannot fill everything, so that the radiance He emits from Himself has a place and can be directed somewhere. And if the Father fills everything, then where will the essence of Generation go? Rebuttal to this. If he places the Father in [a certain] place and wants Him, like some body, to be contained by [it], then the Generation will also need a place. If the essence of the Father is not in [any] place - for the Divine is not contained in [any] place - then he examines in vain what does not contain any problem, and dares to say: “Where will the essence of Generation go, if the Father fills everything?” The Father shows Himself and abides in the Son, and the Son in the Father, not as being one and the same, and not as one in number. For the Father exists in His individual particularity, and the Son exists in His own individual particularity (ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἰδιότητι), having it as its only difference in relation to the One who gave birth; after all, the Father exists in Himself, and is not the Son; and the Son exists by Himself, and is not the Father. But, only in this, having a difference in relation to the Father, He bears [in Himself] the same property (ἰδίωμα) of the Fatherly nature and, again, abides in the Father, just as the radiance emitted from the sun comes out of it and is something different in comparison with it, being by nature one. For this is the sun, and this is the radiance. So, being the Father, He emitted [from Himself, like a ray] the Son - the most accurate imprint and image of His nature. 2 Cor.4:4; Col. 1:15; Phil.2:6. St. Cyril uses two words, “καὶ μορφὴν, καὶ εἰκόνα,” which are both translated “image.” We assume there is a typo in the original text and instead of “εἵη” we read “εἴη”. Ps.73:24. In the Slavic Bible, “Ἐν τῇ βουλῇ σου” is translated as “by Your advice.” In the present context, it would be more logical to choose the meaning of “intention” for “φρόνησις”, but we translate it as “mind”, referring to the following quotation from Scripture. Wed: Matthew 11:27; Luke 10:22. You might be interested in: