Слово 2. О том, что несотворенность – не сущность, но обозначение сущности

Uncreatedness is and is understood as the beginning and the cause. No beginning, since it is a beginning, points to anything similar or dissimilar to itself. The word “Uncreated” refers to the created thing, which is not like Him, for it [i.e. e. created] – the opposite [of that]. So uncreatedness is not an essence, but a designation for the fact that [a given] essence does not exist in the same exact way as that [i.e. e. created], to which it is [logically] opposed. OTHER. That uncreatedness is not an essence has already been shown. But perhaps someone will say that although it is not an essence, but a difference, it is such, it will be exposed that he is also speaking ignorantly. After all, if any difference arises around essences, then it would be necessary to look for an essence whose difference would be uncreatedness. For example, [someone] might say that an animal is defined as: “an entity that is animate [and] sentient. Around this essence a difference arises. For one is a rational animal, mortal, endowed with intelligence and knowledge, like man; and the other is a dumb animal, like [for example] a horse. Consequently, essence [logically] precedes, and [then] differences are mentally added to it. So, if uncreatedness is a difference, then let a [corresponding] essence be found, of which it will be a difference, for it is impossible for a difference to bear [in itself] the logos of the essence. OTHER. If uncreatedness is an essence, and not an indication that [that to which this epithet is attached] did not arise [from non-existence], then how will the Son be not like the Father, being born from Him? For if the names do not introduce some kind of opposition to each other, and what is designated by both does not contradict one another, then nothing prevents the Son from being essentially similar to the Father, even if uncreatedness is understood as an essence, like creation. After all, essence in relation to essence will not be opposite, since both of them are essences. OTHER. If every uncreated thing is not like every created thing, then he will be right in saying that every created thing is like every born thing. The Son, being born, does not have the slightest similarity in relation to beings through birth (πρὸς τὰ ὄντα γεννητῶς), for He is above all creation. Thus, the Son, being begotten of the Father, will not be unlike him in essence due to the fact that the Father is uncreated. For just as, being born, He surpassed the likeness (ὁμοίωσιν) of the created, so He did not depart from the likeness (ἐμφερείας) of the uncreated, although He remains begotten. Antipophora 84 as if on behalf of the heretics. In relation to God, they argue, we say that ungeneracy is the essence, and this will be the defining name (ὄνομα ὁρικόν), as if someone defined the essence of man, saying: “a rational animal, mortal, endowed with intelligence and knowledge.” Refuting this. They will be exposed in the fact that this [reasoning] is also proposed ignorantly: after all, if the name “Uncreated” were determinative, it would consist of genus and difference - that is, differences - for without them the definition is never made. And such uncreatedness, not relating to any kind of essence, cannot be a definition. And besides, we see that genera are defined philosophically by philosophers not with one single word, but with more numerous ones, such as [for example] “an entity animate sensually” or “a rational animal, mortal.” And if the affirmation of the name alone is not enough to reveal the essence, then, therefore, [the name] “uncreated” is not determinative. OTHER. If the definition is the name “Uncreated”, i.e. the word (φονή), then it will, of course, allow, according to the nature (σχήμα) of definitions, reversibility, as if someone, defining a person as a “reasonable, mortal animal,” turning this in the opposite direction, says: “If any animal is rational, mortal, endowed with intelligence and knowledge, then This is, after all, a person.” If, therefore, “uncreatedness,” as we have already said, is a definition, then let not the reversibility be rejected: if uncreatedness is essence, then essence is also uncreatedness. But [this provision] is not addressed. For not every essence is necessarily uncreated, but this belongs exclusively to God alone. So uncreatedness cannot be a definition, but only indicates that [God] is not created. A rhetorical figure, a response to an anticipated objection. You might be interested in: