Книга девятая

1. But Eunomius moves on to more sublime speeches and, rising upward and inflating like an empty bubble, begins to say something worthy of the magnificence of God. This is what he says: “God, being the highest good, the most powerful of all and free from all necessity...” Well, this brave man directs his word, like some ship without a load, arbitrarily carried by the deceitfulness of the waves, to the pier of truth. God is the highest good, the most beautiful confession! But, of course, he will not accuse the great John of writing illegally, when in a lofty sermon he proclaims the Only Begotten God, who “begot God” and is God (John 1:1). So, if John is a reliable preacher of the Only Begotten Divinity, and God is the highest good, then the enemy of his glory himself testifies that the Son is the highest good. But since this same name also befits the Father, then, as the most superlative degree of the expression “the highest good” shows, it does not admit of any comparative decrease or increase. Having taken this testimony from our enemies to prove the glory of the Only Begotten, let us add, in defense of sound teaching, his following words: “God, encountering neither obstacles in nature, nor compulsion from any reason, nor the urgency of need, gives birth and creates according to the superiority of his own power, in his will having sufficient power for the arrangement of existing things. So, if every good thing happens according to His will, then He not only determines the good into existence, but also when the good should happen, because a sign of weakness is to do what you do not want.” It is still possible for us to accept, in order to confirm pious dogmas, the speech of our opponents, garnished with unclean and, in any case, confusing expressions. For if, by the superiority of his own power, having in his will sufficient power to create what exists, He who created everything, without encountering any obstacles in nature or compulsion from any reason, not only determines the good into being, but also when the good should happen, and the Creator of everything, as the Gospel preaches, is the Only Begotten God, then when He willed, then He created creation, when He willed, then the substance of the sky, circular in its essence, embraced the entire world enclosed within the circle, when it found it good, then it opened the dry land, then it closed the waters in deep places, when it seemed opportune for the wisdom of the Creator, then plants and fruits appeared, then animals appeared, and man was formed. If the One who created everything (I will return again to the same word) is the Only Begotten God, who created “the ages” (Heb. 1:2) (since what exists is preceded by the continuation of centuries), then this time-meaning expression cannot be applied to Him: then He willed, then He created. When there was no century, and in the Divine nature, alien to quantity and measure, the concept of any measurability is unthinkable, then it is necessary to completely abolish all expressions meaning time; so we can say about creation that, by the will of the wisdom of the Creator of everything, it was given a temporary beginning, but to mentally imagine the Divine nature itself with a certain extent of distance is characteristic only of the disciples of the new wisdom. I will not readily talk about the content of what Eunomius said above, I hasten to what is presented and what I will read here again to prove the deceit of this writer. “The Highest God,” he says, “having existence before all else, whatever happens, has his own power.” These words were literally inserted by our writer into his own speech from the Jew Philo, and whoever likes this will find evidence of the abduction of Eunomius in the very works of Philo. And in the present case, I noticed this not so much in order to reproach our writer for the poverty of his own words and thoughts, but rather wanting to show readers the affinity of Eunomius’ teaching with Jewish concepts. Because Philo’s words could not agree to the very letter with his concepts, if there were not some affinity between the minds of both. So in a Jew you can find these words: “God is first of all, no matter what happens,” and the following ones: “has his own power,” added from the new Jewish teaching. A study of this expression will clearly show how absurd there is here. “God,” he says, “has his own power.” Tell me: what is He and what does He have? Is He something else, different from power, but has His own power as something else? So, strength is subject to powerlessness, for what is other than strength is, of course, not strength; Thus, it turns out that He only has power because He Himself is not power. But God, being a power, should again have another power in himself, and this one should have a different power. And what a struggle and disagreement there will be if God, having thus divided his inherent power, uses one part of his power to overcome the other! For he could not overcome his own strength if some other, greater and stronger force did not help him in the fight against it. Such is the God of Eunomius, some kind of two-natural or polysyllabic, dividing into himself, having in himself a force that does not agree with the force, so that one tends to disorder, and the other prevents the error of movement! Let him explain why God voluntarily restrains the force that strives for birth, fearing that something bad might happen if birth is not prevented, or, better yet, let him first explain that by its nature it is restrained? What he is talking about indicates some kind of self-directed and voluntary movement, which must be considered in itself separately, for, of necessity, something else is a possessing principle and another is a possessed one. So, God has a power that belongs to some spontaneous nature or something else, a power either tending to action or resting. But if it assumes that it is at rest, then what is at rest has no need of a restraining force; if it says that it restrains, then it is obvious that it restrains what is moving and striving; and he, of course, will say that it is different in nature from the One who possesses it. So, let him explain to us what he means by this? Does this power represent anything other than God in His being? But how could there be anything else in God that is alien to Him? Does it represent it as some non-independent property in the Divine nature? But he cannot say this, because what does not have essentiality does not exist, and what does not exist can neither be restrained nor allowed. So, what is this force, restrained and forbidden in its own action until the time came for Christ to be born and left the force to strive unhindered for natural action? What is this delaying reason why God delayed the birth of the Only Begotten, believing that it was not yet time to become the Father? What is this mediation that is introduced between the life of the Father and the Son? It is neither time, nor place, nor the concept of any distance, nor anything like that. So, what does Eunomius, directing his sharp and penetrating eye, see the distance between the life of the Son and the life of the Father? Pressed from everywhere, he must and must himself agree that there is no mediation between one and the other. 2. But, although there is nothing in between, he does not allow direct and close communication, but condescends to the measure of our knowledge and himself reasons with us humanly, like one of us, little by little admitting the weakness of his thoughts and resorting to an argument that Aristotle and his followers did not teach. He says: “Then it was good and fitting (for God) to beget the Son when He willed; hence no question will arise among the intelligent: why not before? How, Eunomius? And you, who blamed us so much for the fact that we decided to write without logical thoroughness, are delirious, like us simpletons, and, abandoning skillful phrases, you yourself resort to unreasonable agreement with us? You, who said about Vasily that he, recognizing the impossibility of people to give an account in spiritual concepts, denounces his own ignorance and, in another place, that he makes his own impotence common to everyone, declaring what is impossible for himself impossible for everyone; You, who have said this and the like, how do you satisfy the ears of those who ask about the reason why the Father delays being a Father? You think that in response it is enough to say: then he gave birth when he wanted, and there should be no question about this. Has your imaginative insight for constructing dogmas weakened? Where are the double-edged conclusions? Where is the compelling evidence? How did the terrible and inevitable conclusions of skillful inferences disappear from you, scattered as empty and untenable? “Then He begat a Son as He desired.” And there should be no question about this. Such is the end of many efforts, such is the end of arrogant promises! What was the question? If it is fitting for God to have a Son, then why cannot one believe that He always had with Him what was fitting for Him? What is the answer that Eunomius gave us from the very depths of philosophy, securing his speech with an indestructible argument? Then He created the Son when He wanted, and there should be no question about why not before? If the question were asked about any of the dumb animals acting on some natural impulse, why did it not first do a well-known thing, for example, a spider - a web, a bee - a honey cell, a turtledove - a nest, then how else would you say? Wouldn't the most convenient answer be that it did it when it wanted, and there shouldn't be any question about it? The same can be said about some sculptor or painter, who reproduces through imitative art whatever they please, either in paintings or in sculptures, when, without being subordinate to any authority, they carry out their art in practice; I think that the same answer would be appropriate here, if anyone wanted to know why the artist did not apply his art to business earlier; not forced by necessity, he arbitrarily determines the time of action. For people, because they do not always want the same thing and for the most part, together with the desire, do not have the strength to fulfill it, then they only do what is in their mind when their arbitrariness is inclined towards the deed, and there are no obstacles from the outside. But to speak of a nature that is always identical, in which there is no good that would be acquired later, in which there is no place for any difference of desires, which arises, on the contrary, from any error and ignorance, in which, due to variability, nothing happens that it does not already understand as good from the beginning - to speak about this nature that it did not always have good, but then decided to have something that it did not want to have before, is characteristic only wisdom incomprehensible to us. Because we have been taught that the Divinity is always full of all good, or, better, that It itself is the fullness of good and, not needing any increase for perfection, by its very nature it is the perfection of good, and what is perfect is equally alien to increase and diminution. Therefore, we say about the perfection contemplated in the Divine nature that it is always the same, and wherever we extend our thoughts, we always find it the same. So, the Godhead is never devoid of good, but the fullness of all good is the Son; therefore, He must always be contemplated in the Father, whose nature is perfection in every good. But, he says, there should be no question of why not before? To this we will say: it is another thing, sage, to positively prescribe any opinion, and another thing to rationally convince of something that is the subject of perplexity. So, until you present some reason why it is pious to say that the Son was subsequently born of the Father, your injunction (to think so) has no meaning for sensible people. Thus Eunomius brings the truth to light by artificial detour. We, as is our custom, will use his words to affirm the true dogmas, so that from here it will be clear that our opponents, forced from everywhere by the truth itself, unwittingly themselves agree with our teaching. If, as our opponent says, the Father then begat the Son when He wanted, and He always wanted the good, and with His will the power to have it is always connected, then it follows that the Son must always be understood together with the Father, Who always wants the good and can have what He wants. If it were necessary to bring his subsequent words to the truth, then it is convenient to agree with our teaching and his expression that for reasonable people there should be no question of why not before. The expression “before” contains some indication of time and is contrasted with the expressions “after this” and “then”; if there was no time, then the names of distances of time completely disappear along with it; but the Lord is before time and ages. So, for those who have an understanding regarding the Creator of the ages, the question of “before” and “after” is useless. For such expressions are devoid of any meaning, since they are not spoken about time. Since the Lord is before his time, the expressions “before” and “after” are completely inappropriate regarding Him. 3. Perhaps this is enough to overthrow what, even without our attack, falls by itself from its own powerlessness, for who is so free from everyday worries as to indulge for a long time in listening to the idle talk of opponents and our struggle against empty things? But since those who are prejudiced by wickedness have an indelible lie, like some kind of indelible paint, ingrained into the very depths of their hearts, let us dwell a little more on his words and see if we can’t somehow wash away this bad stain from their souls. Having said the previous thing and adding to it, following the example of his mentor Prunik, some discordant and awkward insults and insults, Eunomius moves to the pinnacle of conclusions and, leaving the incoherent presentation of vulgarity, again arming his word with the sting of dialectics, syllogistically, as he thinks, prepares an absurdity against us. His words are as follows: “since every birth does not extend to infinity, but reaches some end, then it is quite necessary for those who receive the birth of the Son to recognize that what is being born someday ceased to be born, and not to treat with disbelief the fact that what ceased to be born had its beginning; so that cessation assures the beginning of both birth and birth; It is impossible not to recognize this on the basis of both nature itself and Divine laws.” Since Eunomius, following the wisdom of those skilled in these things, having proposed a general principle, by means of deduction from it, tries to establish what he means in a general position, including proof of the particular, we will first examine the general position, then we will test the strength of what is deduced from it. Is it pious to judge from every birth the eternal birth of the Son? Can ordinary nature be represented as a model of the existence of the Only Begotten? I did not expect that anyone would reach such madness as to imagine something like this about the Divine and incorruptible birth. Every birth, he says, does not extend to infinity. What does "birth" mean here? Is he talking about carnal and bodily release from a burden or about the arrangement of inanimate things? But the infirmities of bodily birth are too clear for anyone to transfer them to Divine birth. And so that it does not seem that we are lengthening our words by describing the affairs of nature, we will pass over them in silence, since, I think, everyone with intelligence himself knows the reasons why birth occurs, which has a beginning and an end; It would be long and unnecessary to describe in detail the copulation of those giving birth, the formation of what is born in the womb, the pains of childbirth, birth, place, time, without which the birth of the body cannot take place. All this is equally alien to the Divine birth of the Only Begotten, because if one of these is allowed, then everything else will have to follow along with it. Since the Divine birth is pure from any concept of passion, then in it we should not understand a continuation measured by time. For what begins and ends, of course, appears to us in some continuation, and every continuation is measured by time; when there is no time with which we could designate the end and beginning of birth, then it would be in vain to think of the end and beginning in continuous birth; since we will not find any concept that would mean how it begins or how it ends. If he means inanimate creations, then in them too the origin is accomplished by the combined action of time, place, matter, preparation, the strength of the artist, and much more like that. And since the continuation of time is necessarily connected with everything that happens, and with everything that is created, whether animate or soulless, the thought of preparatory reasons for origin is connected, here one can clearly find both the beginning and the end of formation, because both the supply of matter, and the determination of place, and the succession of time are the beginning of the dispensation. All this determines the beginning and end of what happens, and no one will say that this has anything in common with the pre-eternal existence of the Only Begotten, and will not, on the basis of such visible phenomena, conclude about the beginning and end in that birth. Having thus distinguished both births, let us again pay attention to the words of the enemy. “Every birth,” he says, “does not extend to infinity, but reaches some end.” Since what is meant by the word “birth” can be understood in one or the other sense, then whether he wants to signify with this name the bodily release from a burden or the creation of creatures (inanimate), his position turns out to fall short of the intended goal, since neither one nor the other has anything to do with incorruptible nature. For from the fact that every creation and birth reaches some end, it is not at all “completely necessary,” as he claims, for those who accept the birth of the Son to limit it to two limits, allowing for a beginning and an end in it. For only that which is determined by any quantity has a beginning of being and ceases with its end. The measurability of time, which is subject to what is born in its quantity, separates the beginning from the end by an intermediate distance, but how to measure or divide something that has no quantity and extension? What measure to find for the infinite or what distance for the non-extended? How can the limitless be limited to a beginning and an end? For the beginning and the end are the names of the limits of distance, but when there is no distance, there is no limit, but in the Divine nature there are no distances; being unextended, it has no limit, and what does not have a limit is, and is called infinite. So, it is absurd to limit the infinite to a beginning and an end, for the limited cannot be infinite. How then does this Plato Phaedrus clumsily attach to his theses what Plato, philosophizing, says about the soul there? For just as he speaks there of the cessation of movement, so he wished to speak of the cessation of birth, in order to deafen those inexperienced in this with Platonic eloquence. And “it is impossible not to recognize this,” he says, “on the basis of both nature itself and Divine laws.” But from what has been said, it is clear to us that nature cannot be the source of reliable teaching about the Divine birth. And no one can offer the world itself as an example of what we are talking about, because, as we know from the description of the universe in Moses, the creation of the world is accompanied by a measure of time, so that the origin of each kind of beings, according to a certain order and sequence, is measured by certain days and nights, which regarding the Hypostasis of the Only Begotten is not allowed even by the very teaching of opponents who profess the existence of the Lord before eternal times. It remains to consider the defense of the above position by the Divine laws, in which both the end and the beginning of the birth of the Son are promised. “To the end of creation (God) attributed the day that certifies its beginning, for not the first birthday, but the seventh, on which he rested from work, He appointed for the remembrance of creation.” Will anyone believe that what was just said was written by him, and not inserted by us out of a desire to slander his work, so that he would seem ridiculous to the readers, dragging out to prove his position something that has nothing to do with the content of the question. For the question was: to prove, as promised, that a Son was born who did not exist before, that what was being born received the beginning and end of birth, as if some disease of childbirth delayed the birth for a while. What's the answer to this? According to the law, the Jewish people keep the Sabbath on the seventh day. What agreement the evidence has with the preceding thought! Since the Jew honors the Sabbath with rest, this proves that the Lord, as he says, received the beginning of birth and then ceased to be born! How many other pieces of evidence our writer omitted to support this, confirming his opinion with no less force than the above! Circumcision on the eighth day, week of unleavened bread, mystery of the fourteenth day of the course of the moon, sacrifices of purification, observation of lepers, ram, calf, young woman, scapegoat, kid. All this is far from the intended idea, and how it relates to the matter, let the zealots of the Jewish sacraments say. Because we, considering it indecent and unmanly to attack what is proposed, examine what is written in order further: is there anything there that could make the fight against it more difficult. Everything that he says further, revealing the idea that no medium should be allowed between the Father and the Son, we will omit as somewhat consistent with our teaching, because it would be unreasonable and at the same time dishonest not to distinguish between the innocent and the criminal in what he says. Since, fighting with the Jews, he does not follow their teaching and says that there is no medium between the Son and the Father, and does not allow a connection, and thinks that there was nothing before the Only Begotten, and guesses about the existence of the Son, but defends the idea that the bearer was born first, then, stopping a little on this, since what has already been said is already sufficiently prepared for our speech, let us turn to the subject of our reasoning. 4. It is not the same thing to believe nothing higher than the Hypostasis of the Only Begotten and to say that He did not exist before He was born, but that He was born when the Father willed. Because the words “then” and “when” actually and naturally have the meaning of indicating time, both according to the general custom of those who speak sensibly, and according to their meaning in Scripture. “Then they speak among the nations” (Ps. 125:2). “When you sent messengers” (Luke 22:35). “Then the kingdom is likened” (Matthew 25:1). And thousands of similar passages can be cited from Scripture to prove the idea that these particles of speech in Scripture usually signify time. So, if there was no time, as our opponent agrees, then at the same time it is completely destroyed and the meaning of time; when it does not exist, then at the same time the concept of eternity is absolutely necessary. For with the word “not to be,” the word “when” is undoubtedly implied, because if one says about something: “does not exist” without the word “when,” then one must not allow the expression “now exists.” If, allowing the expression “now,” he rebels against eternity, then, of course, he does not mean complete non-existence, but non-existence ever. Since this expression has absolutely no validity, if it is not connected with the designation of time, then it is completely reckless and absurd to both say: “nothing happened before the birth of the Son,” and to assert that the Son did not always exist. For if there is neither place, nor time, nor anything else created, in which the Word, which existed in the beginning, is not, then it is completely alien to the teaching of piety to say: once there was no Lord. So, not to us, but to himself, Eunomius contradicts himself, asserting that there was no Only Begotten, and He was, for recognizing that the union between the Son and the Father is not divided by anything, of course, testifies that eternity also belongs to Him. If he says that the Son is not in the Father, then we will not object to these words ourselves, but we will contrast Scripture, which says that the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son, without attaching to these words the expressions: “once,” “when,” or “then,” but with such an affirmative and decisive statement testifying to His eternity. And to assert, as he does, that we call the Only Begotten God unbegotten means the same as saying that we honor the Father as begotten; both are equally absurd, or, better yet, blasphemous. So, if he managed to slander, then, without sparing us at all, let him add this other accusation, which could irritate the listeners against us even more. If, due to the obviousness of slander, he does not bring this accusation against us, then let him leave the rest, because, as we said, it is equally wicked to call the Son unbegotten and the Father begotten. So, if in what we have written there is any expression by which the Son is called unborn, then we ourselves will pronounce a decisive verdict on ourselves. If he arbitrarily composes false accusations and slander and, through slander, ascribes to our teaching what is not in it, then perhaps this will serve as proof of our piety for sensible people; because, since the truth is for us, he puts forward a lie to accuse our teaching, condemning wickedness, to which our word is alien. But these accusations can be answered briefly. For just as we consider the one worthy of damnation who calls the Only Begotten God unbegotten, so let him curse the one who teaches that in the beginning there was no such thing as Being. In this way it will be revealed who is making accusations based on truth and who is slandering. If we deny the accusation, and, naming the Father, with this name we also think about the Son, and, naming the Son, we recognize as the truth that He truly is what He is called, shining through birth from the unborn Light, then is it not obvious slander of those who divulge that we call the Only Begotten unborn? But by saying that He has existence through birth, we do not thereby admit that He ever did not exist. For who does not know that the words “existent” and “non-existent”, which are opposite in meaning, do not admit of anything in between, so that the recognition of one of them is certainly a denial of the opposite? And just as being is the same throughout all the time in which something is supposed to exist (for the sky, and the stars, and the sun, and other beings are no more present now than they were yesterday, before, and in all previous times), so that which is signified by non-existence is equally in all respects non-existent, whether we talk about the previous or the subsequent (the time of non-existence). For it is impossible to say about something that it is no more now than it was non-existent before, but the same concept of non-existence is applied to everything that does not exist during any continuation of time. Therefore, in relation to animals, although we mean the resolution of what existed into non-existence and non-appearance into being by different names expressing non-existence, we say that something either did not exist from the beginning, or, having been born, died, but with both expressions we equally represent non-existence. Just as the day is embraced by the night on both sides, but the parts of the night that embrace it are not called the same, but about one we speak “after the evening,” about the other “before dawn,” but with both expressions we mean night; in the same way, if, in correspondence with being, someone begins to think of the non-existence opposite to it, he, although he will call differently the non-existence before the creation of something and after the destruction of the structure, but what is signified by both names will be understood by the same thing - equally non-existence both before the dispensation and after the destruction of the structure. For not to be, not to be born, to die, except for the difference in names, are the same thing (we are not talking here about the hope of resurrection). So, since Scripture teaches us that the Only Begotten God is the head of life, and life itself, and light, and truth, and everything that is venerable in name and in thought, we say that it is absurd and impious in the truly Existing to contemplate anything conceivable as the opposite of the existing - permission into incorruption or non-existence before the dispensation; but, directing our minds from everywhere to the pre-eternity of existence, we do not allow any thought of non-existence, considering it equally wicked to limit the Divinity to non-existence at any time. It is the same thing to say: immortal life is mortal, truth is false, light is dark, and to say: existing does not exist. So, whoever does not admit that the Son will ever not exist will not agree with the fact that He ever did not exist, and will, as we said, avoid both of these absurdities in the same way; for just as death does not interrupt the endless life of the Only Begotten, so any previous non-existence does not limit his life going into infinity, so that the truly Existent is from everywhere pure from communication with the non-existent. Therefore, the Lord, wanting to remove the disciples from such an error, as if they, looking for something preceding the Hypostasis of the Only Begotten, did not stop with the thought of non-existence, says: “I am in the Father, and the Father in Me” (John 14:11), not like the one who is in the Existing or the Existing in the non-existent. And the very order of words explains the pious understanding of the dogma. Since the Father is not from the Son, but from the Father, the Son says first: “I am in the Father,” showing that He is not from another, but has existence from Him; then he says the other way around: “and the Father is in Me,” meaning that in idle curiosity, one who goes further than the Son at the same time loses the thought of the Father, for what exists in something cannot be found outside of what it is in. So it is senseless for anyone who, without contradicting the fact that the Father has existence in the Son, imagines anything from the Father to be found outside the Son. And in vain our opponents are exhausted in an empty struggle with us, misled by the expression “unborn.” In order to further bring to light the absurdity of their words, let them allow us to spend a little more time discussing this subject. If they say that the Only Begotten God was born subsequently after the Father, then it necessarily turns out that into the unborn itself, whatever it may be when, according to their dreams, they introduce the concept of evil. For who does not know that just as the existent is opposed to the non-existent, so to every good object and name is the opposite in thought, as, for example, good is evil, truth is false, light is darkness, and everything that is similarly related to each other is opposite? Who does not know further that there is no middle ground between opposites, that it is impossible to allow the same existence of two opposites in the same object - one with the other, but that the presence of one of them destroys the other, and with the removal of the other, the appearance of the opposite occurs? When this is recognized in this way, it is clear to everyone that, as Moses says, before the creation of light there was darkness (Gen. 1:2-3), and regarding the Son, if, according to the teaching of heresy, then the Father created Him when He wanted, it must be admitted that before His creation there was not that light that is the Son; and when there was still no light, one cannot but agree that there was the opposite of light. Moreover, from other (places of Scripture) we know that the Creator does not bring anything into existence in vain, but through creation, what is lacking is replenished in what exists. From here it is absolutely clear that if God created the Son, he created it because there was a deficiency in the nature of beings. And just as then, when there was still no sensory light, there was darkness, and if light had not come, then darkness would have completely reigned, so then, when there was no Son yet, there was no true light Himself, and everything that is the Son, for what exists, even according to the heretics, has no need of origin. So, if the Father created, he created something that did not exist at all. Thus, in their opinion, before the Son came into being, there was obviously no truth, no intelligent light, no source of life, or in general the nature of all beauty and good. But the absence of each of these presupposes the existence of that which is conceivable as its opposite. When there is no light, there must be darkness, and in the same way with respect to other concepts, instead of each understood as superiority, when it does not yet exist, one must certainly assume its opposite instead of what is missing. So, it is absolutely necessary to say that when, according to the teachings of the heretics, the Father still had the desire to create the Son and when there was nothing that the Son is, then in Him there was everything opposite - instead of light - darkness, instead of truth - lies, instead of life - death, instead of good - evil; for the Creator creates what is not, because what exists, as Eunomius says, has no need of origin. When imagining objects that are opposite, we can only admit the non-existence of the better than through the existence of the worse. So, this is what the wisdom of the heretics brings as a gift to the Father, taking away part of eternity from the Son, through this, before the appearance of the Son, it attributes to God and the Father a whole series of evils. And no one should think to refute the absurdity of the teachings of opponents, proven by such arguments, by pointing to a different creation. Perhaps someone will say that just as when there was no heaven, there was nothing contrary to it, so also when there was no Son, who is the truth, there is no need to admit the existence of the opposite. To this it must be said that there is nothing opposite to heaven, unless someone calls non-being the opposite of its being. But good is completely opposed to evil, and good is the Lord, so that when there was no heaven, there was nothing, and when there was no good, there was the opposite of this. So, he who says that there was no good must involuntarily fully agree that there was evil. But the Father, says Eunomius, is all goodness, and life, and unapproachable light, and everything that is lofty in thought and in name, so that there is no need, when there was no Only Begotten Light yet, to understand in Him by contrast, the other - darkness. But this is my word that there has never been darkness, for there has never been a time when there was no light, but in the light everything is light, as the prophecy says (Ps. 35:10). If, according to the heretics, one thing is the unborn Light, which is from eternity, and another is the light that came into being after this, then it is absolutely necessary to admit that with eternal light there can in no way be the existence of that which is opposite to it, for with the eternal radiance of light there is no time for darkness to act in it. And as for the light that happened, as they say, after that it is impossible for this light to shine except from darkness, so that the eternal light and the light that subsequently happened will be separated by the environment of darkness. For there would be no need to create subsequent light if what was created was not useful for anything, and the only benefit of light is its dispersal of the prevailing darkness. So, the uncreated Light for itself is what It is by nature, and the created, of course, occurs for something. So, darkness must first exist, to dispel which light is created. And no word can convince us that darkness does not precede the appearance of the born light, just as it is quickly recognized that the light was created after. But to think so is beyond all wickedness. So, from here it is clearly revealed that the Father of truth did not create Truth that did not exist before, but, being the source of light, and truth, and all that is good, the Only Begotten Light of truth shone from Himself, through which the glory of His Hypostasis is always displayed (Heb. 1:3). Thus, the blasphemy of those who say that the Son was subsequently born to God through creation is exposed on all sides. You might be interested in: