Linguistic argument in the polemic of St. Basil against Eunomius
Языковой аргумент в полемике святителя Василия против Евномия
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One of the final episodes of the Trinitarian period of Church history, which occupied most of the 4th century, was the theological polemic of St. Basil the Great and his followers, especially his younger brother St. Gregory of Nyssa, with Eunomius and his supporters. The latter was a representative of Arianism of the latest formation - the so-called Anomaeanism 1, which declared itself in 357. As Bernard Sesbouillet, a researcher of this episode in the history of the ancient Church, writes, “never before have theological disputes reached such a level of rational thinking and entered into problems of language” 2 . The essence of the polemical episode was briefly formulated by Saint Basil himself. In a letter to Western Christians, he writes that his opponents “just spin words, but do not theologize” 3 .
Many arguments were used in this debate. One of them was an appeal to the nature of language. Eunomius was the first to express some thoughts on this matter, which forced his opponent Saint Basil to speak, among other things, also in the field of linguistics. Of course, in this case, as in others, the opponents resorted to the resources of late antique science and general education, which they possessed to varying degrees and which they used in accordance with their own objectives. This article is devoted to identifying these resources.
Issues of language are raised by Eunomius in connection with the substantiation of his main theological thesis - about the ungeneracy of God and the non-divinity of the Son. “We say,” writes Eunomius in his first Apology, “that the Son is a generation, meaning by this that the essence is not one thing, but what is signified by the name is something else, different from it, but what is signified by the name is the essence itself, for the name in truth corresponds to the essence” 4. “And one Son,” continues Eunomius, “the Only Begotten, about whom I could imagine the sayings of the saints, proclaiming that the Son is generation and creation, and by the very difference of names indicating the difference of essence” 5 . “When there is a difference in names, one should also recognize the difference in essences” 6.
Saint Basil attributes this idea of the nature of language to “dishonest reasoning,” in which the difference in names also proves the difference in essence 7 . Eunomius, according to Saint Basil, is misled by the teachings of his teacher Aetius: “The petty attentiveness of these Arian heretical people to syllables and sayings is not without cunning, as another would think, and does not lead to a small evil, but contains a deep and hidden plan against piety. They try to show the dissimilarity of the expressions used about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in order to have in this a convenient proof of their difference in nature. For they have a long-standing false mentality, invented by the leader of this heresy, Aetius, who in one of his letters expressed it this way: “what is not the same in nature is not expressed in the same way; and vice versa, what is not expressed in the same way is not the same in nature. Therefore,” Aetius asserts, “how these sayings relate to each other, so should the natures they signify.
But the saying of Imzhe is not the same as the saying of Negozhe; therefore, the Son is not the same with the Father." 8
The entire body of linguistic material in Eunomius consists of two mutually exclusive types of words - fictitious, invented by man, and created by God; in fact, this name is the only one that expresses the essence of God - the unborn. In the first case, Eunomius is indeed an extreme nominalist, but in the second his position is diametrically opposite: he is a complete realist 9. The exclusivity of the name unborn creates insurmountable ontological obstacles for other names and their bearers – the Persons of the Holy Trinity. The special position of the name of the Father puts out of brackets both all His other names and the names of other Divine hypostases. In Eunomius, the language model comes down to the identification of two elements - the name and the named, the first in the theological system of Eunomius is the definition of God as an unborn being. Theological conclusions from this linguistic-ontological system substantiate Arian dogmatics in its most consistent expression.
American researcher of the life and works of St. Basil the Great, Philip Rousseau 10 compares Eunomius' understanding of the nature of language with the technology of cinema - words here are a kind of frames, a sequence of instant images, although devoid of volume and movement. But, being set in motion in the process of human communication, they can present a completely complete picture of reality. This expressive comparison brings to mind the famous image from Henri Bergson’s “Creative Evolution”, designed to illustrate the work of our cognition - “We can say that the mechanism of our ordinary cognition is of a cinematic nature” 11.
Eunomius is guided in this case by a specific understanding of the purpose of language, when its performative function is put forward as the main one 12. This understanding of the nature of language is close to various mystical worldviews, which in their extreme expression can acquire magical and occult features. In this regard, one can cite one characteristic fragment from the first book of Origen against Celsus 13, where the Alexandrian didascal claims that God's names contain a mysterious power in the syllables themselves: “On the issue of names, it must also be said that, according to the testimony of people who have the art of spells, the same spell formula in the native language produces exactly what it promises, while translated into any other language, it no longer produces any effect and turns out to be completely powerless. Consequently, it is not in the objects themselves, designated by names, but in the properties and characteristics of sounds that the internal force that produces this or that action lies.”
At the same time, the distinction between sound, concepts and things (fwna... – shmainТmena – prЈgmata) is preserved, which will be discussed below. The famous researcher of Origen's heritage, Marguerite Arles 15, brings parallels to this place from Corpus Hermeticum 16.2, as well as from Iamblichus' treatise “On the Sacraments” (De mysteriis 7.4–5).
For Eunomius, the name he chose for God, being the perfect expression of the nature of God, is directly related to knowledge. Such a convergence of the theory of knowledge and the theory of language has parallels in the history of late antique philosophy. In the study of Jean Trouillard 16 uvres – Gen-ve, 26–31 aoЌt 1974. P. 239–251. questions of the nature of language were specially studied in connection with the word-creative activity of man in late Neoplatonism and, in particular, in Proclus, whose activity dates back to the 5th century A.D. Proclus, in his famous commentary on Plato’s “Cratylus,” states that “there is a certain unity of mental and word-creative activity” 17. According to the teachings of Proclus, language is a specific human activity, and there is nothing random or arbitrary in it, since it is involved in the divine. In the ability to create words, with which man is gifted, the deity finds for itself a certain intermediary link for the implementation of its will in the sensory world. In this perspective, J.
Trouillard considers language, on the one hand, as a function inherent in man, and on the other, as the activity of a deity. The author of the study emphasizes 18 that Proclus is careful not to confuse the mental and ontological series. He does not identify the world of reality with the world of our ideas about reality. Proclus writes that language has two purposes, one is designation and communication of thought, which could be called communicative; the other is the discernment and realization of the essence of things, which we would call theurgic. In the deity these functions are united, whereas in man they are separated. The deity scattered throughout the cosmos certain signs and traces 19, which must be perceived and reflected in certain statues of the deity 20. Therefore, the ability to name is demiurgic, and man realizes it in theurgy. “To name,” concludes J. Trouillard, “means to simultaneously produce and pronounce.
That is, to create an internal and external word. This ability comes from the deity. We give names through the gods; at the same time, it is true that the gods name and themselves receive names through us.” 21 Therefore, Proclus’s word-creative activity is “cyclical,” closing the world of the divine and human within itself.
It is obvious that the linguistic ideas of Proclus are inscribed in the strict philosophical system of late Neoplatonism and are subordinated to its specific tasks. This explains the practical use of language that is found in Platonic theurgy. In the polemic between Eunomius and the Cappadocians, questions of language are of a more abstract theoretical nature.
The interpretation of the purpose of language proposed by Eunomius is completely alien to Saint Basil. In his Word on the 32nd Psalm, the Saint very definitely counters such relapses of paganism. He says that it is not in the words or names of the sacrament that the power of sanctification is contained. And yet, they - the words of sacred rites - are called holy, since every attribute of God and, therefore, every concept about Him is holy and pure. In another of his works, in the Rules, briefly stated, the Saint asserts that in prayer and all other words and expressions related to God, there is benefit only when these words are understandable 23 .
At the same time, this understanding is characteristic not only of St. Basil or his closest friends: the Apostle Paul writes in the first Epistle to the Corinthians: If I come to you, brethren, and begin to speak in unknown tongues, what benefit will I bring you if I do not express myself to you either by revelation, or knowledge, or prophecy, or teaching? So if you utter unintelligible words with your tongue, how will they know what you are saying? You will be talking into the wind. For example, there are so many different words in the world, and not one of them is without meaning. But if I do not understand the meaning of the words, then I am a stranger to the one who speaks, and the one who speaks is a stranger to me. For when I pray in an unknown tongue, although my spirit prays, my mind remains unfruitful (1 Cor 14:6, 9-11, 14).
The nature of language is determined by its main task, which St. Basil reveals as “communicative.” Language is a means for communicating the content of thought to those who need it. First of all, this concerns man: “God, who created us,” begins St. Basil’s sermon, a masterpiece of homiletics on the words from Deuteronomy, listen to yourself (Deuteronomy 15:9), “gave us the use of the word so that we would open heartfelt conferences to each other and so that each of us, by the sociability of nature, would convey our thoughts to our neighbor, as if from some treasury, carrying them out from the secret places of the heart. If we lived, having a soul that was not covered by anything, they could immediately understand each other by thoughts alone. But since thoughts are produced in us by the soul, covered with a veil, that is, by flesh, then in order to discover what is hidden in the depths, words and names are needed. Therefore, as soon as our thought receives the sound that signifies it, it is transported in a word, as in a boat, and floats through the air, from the speaker to the listener” 24 .
Saint Basil conveys the process of word formation in this way: “First, an image of objects is born in thought, then, after imagining them, choosing the meanings characteristic and corresponding to each object, a person expounds, and then, transferring what is thought to the production of verbal organs, thus, through the concussion of the air, necessary for the articulate movement of the voice, he makes clear his secret thought” 25. According to Saint Basil, the significance of a name or word for knowledge of things is extremely great - it is the word that completes the formation of the idea of an object. At the same time, one should not exaggerate this meaning, as Eunomius does, since the name does not denote the essence of the named object, but only its attribute: “Names,” he writes, “serve to designate not essences, but special properties that characterize each one” 26 . They are consistent with the various actions and manifestations of the Creator in relation to creation 27 .
Confronting Eunomius’s statement about the natural origin of the name, St. Basil writes: “The nature of things does not follow names, but on the contrary, names were invented after things” 28 . In this regard, St. Basil is close to what Aristotle writes “On Interpretation” 16a: “Names have meaning by virtue of agreement, because by nature there is no name. But a name arises when it becomes a sign, for although articulate sounds express something, as, for example, in animals, not one of these sounds is a name” 29 .
Thus, language directly depends on a person’s ability to cognition, being its result. Moreover, language is limited by the capabilities of human knowledge, which, according to the Saint, is flawed and insufficient. This limitation is briefly expressed in the fact that integral, perfect and complete knowledge about any subject is impossible. A person has access to only partial and relative knowledge, which is based on knowledge of only some aspects or facets of the subject. Thus, in theology, knowledge of the essence of God is impossible, knowledge of some of the properties of God is available to man, and only those of them that are commensurate with the scale of our existence: "There is not a single name that, having declared the entire nature of God, would be sufficient to fully express it. But many and different names, taken in the proper meaning of each, constitute a concept, of course, dark and very meager in comparison with the whole, but sufficient for us. Of the names predicated about God, some show that in God is, and others, on the contrary, are not in Him.
For in these two ways, that is, by denying what is not and confessing what is, a kind of impression of God is formed in us” 30.
The widely known work of Jean Danielou 31, devoted to the study of the origins of the linguistic ideas of Eunomius and the Cappadocians, contains the following conclusions. Drawing on St. Gregory's view that Eunomius was influenced by Plato's dialogue Cratylus, 32 J. Daniélou concludes that Eunomius followed Cratylus's position on the natural origin of language, which the French scholar identifies with the Neoplatonists, while the Cappadocians adhered to the views of another character in the dialogue, Hermogenes, on the conventional origin of language as a matter of contract. More recent studies have been critical of this issue.
Thus, Georges de Durand, the French publisher of Eunomius' Apology in the famous scientific series Sources chretiennes 33, pointed out, firstly, a much more complex understanding of the nature and origin of language among the Neoplatonists 34 than the opinion expressed by Plato by Cratylus, and secondly, drew attention to the fact that, according to the Cappadocians, names, although invented by man, are in close agreement with the nature of things.
The Italian researcher Marina Silvia Troiano 35 believes that the question of the origin of names and words - existing by nature (by Divine will) or as a result of agreement between people 36 - is the main one in the dispute between Eunomius and the Orthodox authors, St. Basil and St. Gregory. The questions of language raised in theological polemics were in a certain context of late antique ideas about its nature. All the most important philosophers of antiquity spoke on this matter. The basic concepts – φύσει θύσει – received their form back in Plato’s “Cratylus” and formed the subject of further philosophical reflection 37 . Marina Troiano 38 identifies the three most important views on the subject of the origin of language: 1) names are a product of nature; 2) names were introduced by a person in accordance with the nature of the designated objects; 3) names are entered by a person by agreement 39 .
As far as can be concluded from the fragments that have come down to us, 40 Epicurus adhered to the first view. Origen also testifies to this in his treatise “Against Celsus”: “As Epicurus teaches, names correspond to the nature of things, but in a slightly different sense compared to how the Stoics think about it, namely, that the first people allegedly caught certain sounds from objects” 41.
The third view was expressed by Sextus Empiricus: "If names arise by nature and each of them has a meaning not by institution (qљsei), then it would be necessary for everyone to understand everyone: Greeks - barbarians, barbarians - Greeks and barbarians - barbarians. However, this is not the case in any case. Consequently, names do not have a meaning by nature (fЪsei), so that grammarians cannot assert this. The criterion of good and bad speech will not be any scientific and grammatical reasoning, but ingenuous and simple observation of custom” 42. In his books on Pyrrho’s principles, he also writes: “Words have meaning by definition, and not by nature (otherwise everyone would understand everything signified by sounds alike, both Hellenes and barbarians, and besides, it is in our power to clarify and designate what is signified by any words, and, moreover, different ones)” 43 .
Marina Troiano believes that the second position - names are introduced by man in accordance with the nature of the designated objects (fЪsei - qљsei) - was very common in antiquity. The Cappadocians also adhered to it in their polemics against Eunomius. According to their understanding, words and names are invented by man (qљsei) in accordance with the nature of the named objects (fЪsei). According to Troiano, this position reconciles the ideas about the nature and origin of language of both Plato (Cratylus 427cd) and Aristotle (On Interpretation 16a) 44 . The scientific basis for this understanding of the nature and origin of language was provided by the ancient Stoics. Diogenes of Babylonia defined the nature of language this way: “Language is a sound originating from thought, which denotes an object” 45. “To express in a word means to utter a word that denotes a conceivable objectivity” 46. Despite the different ways of expression, the same thought can be conveyed in any language. The main purpose of language is to communicate the signified; in this regard, the position of the Cappadocians is rightly compared by the researcher with the Stoic.
The same study reproduces a remarkable passage from the late Platonist Ammonius 47 summarizing these views. Ammonius is best known for his commentaries on Aristotle's logical treatises. This case describes the most common views on this issue and indicates the arguments of their supporters. According to Ammonius, those who recognize the natural origin of language do not actually name objects, but merely pronounce them. This position, according to Ammonius, is held by Heraclitus and Cratylus from the Platonic dialogue of the same name. The other extreme is held by Hermogenes from the same dialogue - words are attributed to every thing by each person as he pleases, in accordance with his position (qљsei). And finally, names are invented only by the onomathet (namer), who, having comprehended the nature of things, ascribes names to them in accordance with it. In this case, the names come from application, but they are applied not by nature, but by the understanding of the rational soul 48.
As the Italian researcher notes 49, Ammonius in the latter case comes to the conclusion that both provisions - fЪsei - qљsei - find their productive application when the creator of names attaches names to an object in accordance with and in connection with its nature. This site from Ammonium has been identified differently by different scholars. Max Pohlenz 50 saw here a reproduction of some unidentified Stoic context, G. Steinthal 51, on the contrary, saw here a certain mixture of the ideas of the grammarians and the Stoics, who laid the philosophical foundation for them. M. Troiano concludes 52 that the Cappadocians owe most of their linguistic arguments to the Stoics.
The teaching of St. Basil the Great is fully consistent with the linguistic model of the so-called semantic triangle 53: object - concept - word, or, if we resort to more modern scientific terminology, denotation - significatum - sign. Saint Basil directly borrows the Stoic teaching on internal and external speech 54 . In his early sermon on the prologue of the Gospel of John, he distinguishes between the internal and external word 55 . The mental word is contained in our heart. The external word, after being uttered, dissolves in the air 56. The spoken word has the instability characteristic of the physical, material world; as soon as it is said, it immediately disappears 57. Given the certain inconstancy and illusory nature of the existence of the spoken word, there is a need for written recording of speech, for which various signs are used 58. At the same time, entire systems of signs cannot change the nature of the signified objects 59.
St. Basil's idea of the threefold structure of language had predecessors both in the philosophical tradition and among Christian authors of antiquity. We have at our disposal a source of high reliability, by analyzing which we can restore the picture of Vasily’s interests at the beginning of his creative career. We are talking about a compilation of fragments from the works of Origen, called “Philocalia” 60. Several chapters deal with issues of language. These are chapters 4, 12 and 17. In the 4th chapter, among other things, a model of language is mentioned, consisting of three elements: the signified, its sound expression and the object itself (prЈgmata). The most essential element that makes this semantic model three-dimensional is the signified. The most characteristic expression of this factor of human language and consciousness is, in our opinion, the Stoic doctrine of lekton.
The dialectical section of Stoic philosophy is associated with the concept of lekton. In its proper sense, the dialectic of the Stoics is the doctrine of the connection between three factors - the sign denoted by the meaning and the real object of the designation. In the conditions of the total materiality of the Stoic cosmos, the sign and the designated object are bodily realities, while the meaning of the sign is immaterial and, therefore, has no existence as such. The Stoics' definition of lekton is “a lekton is something that arises in connection with a rational idea” 61, in other words, it is a certain intellectual content of thought, an object of speech that can be communicated through words or other sign systems.
As Diogenes Laertius testifies, the concept of lekton includes the entire set of mental facts expressed in speech; lekton is a signified in the broadest sense. This concept includes “sections on ideas and judgments arising from them, on subjects and predicates, on direct and converse statements, on genera and species, on reasoning and, finally, on sophisms” 62 . A.F. Losev defines the Stoic lekton this way: it is pure meaning or, more precisely, “This is the meaning of the designated objectivity in the word. This is a verbal semantic construction” 63. Lecton is the subject of utterance or verbal objectivity 64, denoting the object that we mean when we use its designation 65. Here we note the exceptional flexibility of the concept of lekton, which manifests itself in language: "The Stoic lekton is formulated in such a way as to precisely reflect all the smallest shades of language and speech in the form of a certain semantic structure. This is a huge and unprecedented merit of Stoic linguistics" 66 .
In Sextus Empiricus we read: “Three elements are combined together: the signified, the signifier, and the object, and the signifier is a word, such as the word “Dion.” The signified is the thing itself, revealed by the word; and we perceive it as established in our minds, but the barbarians do not understand it, although they hear the word. The object is something that is outside, like, for example, Dion himself. Of these two elements, two are corporeal, namely the sound designation and the object, but one is incorporeal, namely the thing designated and the verbally expressed, which can be true or false” 67.
Apparently, it was the ancient Stoics who were credited with consciously consolidating the tripartite semantic model, which was destined to have such a rich future in the subsequent history of European philosophy. In this regard, one can recall Gottlob Frege with his semantic triangle. The latter is the stoic lekton.
In the vast philosophical and theological writings of ancient Greek, one can find several more examples of the reproduction of the tripartite model of language. For example, in Philo of Alexandria in “Allegories of Laws” 68: names - signified - subject. We encounter some features of it in Clement of Alexandria.
In church writing in Latin, the most significant evidence is in favor of the tripartite semantic model of St. Augustine. His views on language should be considered through the prism of his semantic theory, which is reflected especially in two of his treatises: “On Dialectics” (belongs to the category of early and, moreover, controversial works), “On Christian Science”. In the first mentioned work, Blessed Augustine writes: “Words are primary signs to the extent that they can be compared with visual signs: the banners or gestures of actors are a kind of words; a word in relation to any thing is a sign that is pronounced by the speaker in such a way as to be accessible to the perception of the listener” 69. In his famous treatise “On Christian Science,” he clarifies: “Words are signs whose sole purpose is to designate” 70 .
Despite the limitations that are imposed on the capabilities of language by the very fact of the fundamental inferiority of human cognitive abilities, St. Basil insists on the principle of the relevance of speech 71: as is the hidden, so is the revealed, he says in his early sermon on the beginning of the Gospel of John. Saint Basil resorts to an expressive image: the heart is a source, and the spoken word is a stream. The spoken word reflects our entire concept in its entirety. What was thought in the heart was said, since what was said is a reflection of the content of the thought. The limitations of language are compensated by the ability to express a lot in little 72.
In the general classification of the names of St. Basil, some names are used on their own (without reference) and denote the named objects themselves, others are used in relation to something and denote the relationship between objects 73 . The saint takes into account the general school logical hierarchy of concepts from the most general to those denoting a specific person or thing: some names, for example, a being - a general name, and through a sequence of increasingly private names - animal, man, husband, Peter, we come to the concept of a specific person. A general concept is represented only in the mind and, not having an independent existence, affects many subjects 74. Here it is easy to see the reproduction of the genus-specific classification according to Aristotle’s “Categories”. The inclusion of linguistic material in Aristotle’s Organon turns out to be a completely natural phenomenon.
In particular, the connection between language and logical categories in late Neoplatonism was studied in detail and presented in the article by Philip Ofman “Categories and language according to Simplicius” 75 uvre, sa survie. Actes du Colloque international de Paris (28 Sept. / 1 Oct. 1985) / Jd. par I. Hadot. B.; N.Y., 1987. P. 61–90.. Clarification of the main subject of Aristotle’s “Categories” constitutes the essence of the philosophical problematics of language - this is the main conclusion of this expert on the late Platonic tradition. The later commentators of Aristotle's Organon - Ammonius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus, Elias - and with them Simplicius 76 report that the commentary tradition consists of three directions, depending on the definition of the main subject of the Categories: everyone knows that this treatise deals with ten kinds of being, but for some the Stagirite speaks about words, for others - about realities, for others - about concepts. These subjects correspond to three sciences - grammar, ontology and the doctrine of the soul. Taken individually, these interpretations are insufficient. The real subject of the “Categories,” writes F. Ofman, is a synthesis of these three factors 77 .
Another researcher of Neoplatonism, L. Westerink 78, believes that Iamblichus was the first to introduce such an understanding of the subject of “Categories” - “about words denoting objects with the help of thoughts,” although, if we follow Simplicius 79, there are many supporters of the “synthetic” interpretation of the subject of “Categories” (in particular, he names Alexander of Aphrodisias), and most of them lived and taught before Iamblichus. According to all the indicated comments on the “Categories”, words have a conventional origin, arose as a result of an agreement between people. And the “Categories” themselves are designed for a beginning philosopher who has not yet ascended to the level of the World Soul, Mind or the One.
F. Ofman extremely convincingly shows, using the material of Aristotle's late comments, that the threefold scheme - thing, concept, word - is a universal model of any type of knowledge; in this case, any element of the “triangle” can be taken as a reference point. Any of three elements can be chosen as a mediator for analysis: not only the sign between the object and the meaning, but also the meaning between the object and the sign and the object between the sign and the meaning. Simplicius calls this phenomenon the word interconnection 80. Olympiodorus clarifies that things are produced by God, concepts by the mind, and words by the soul 81.
In accordance with the Neoplatonic worldview, these three elements are arranged in an axiological hierarchy: things - concepts - words (God - mind - soul). As F. Ofman writes 82, the appearance and functioning of language is intended to show adherents of Neoplatonic philosophy a dynamic picture of the universe: the fall of souls into bodies, the appearance of language, its role in returning to the connection with the Mind by erasing and overcoming the boundaries between words, concepts and things. The sign structure is the result of the rupture that the soul has undergone. The role of language, thus, turns out to be fundamentally important for the conversion of the soul into the One, as a result of which the need for language will disappear.
The main goal of our research was to identify the context in which the thought of St. Basil is formed. Obviously, this context is heterogeneous. On the one hand, by its origin, the theology of the Saint is an integral part of the extensive patristic literature developed in Greek. On the other hand, Saint Basil is fluent in the general philosophical discourse of late antique education. To discover possible sources of our author’s argumentation, we proposed to compare his expressed views on the nature and purpose of language with philosophical concepts close in time and environment.
In his philosophical argumentation, Saint Basil demonstrates not just familiarity with the basic philosophical ideas of late antiquity, but also a masterly mastery of them, although he does not belong to any philosophical school of antiquity and does not feel bound by any obligations to any of them. At the same time, philosophical argumentation itself does not exhaust its positive meaning only by its effectiveness in the context of the polemical episode with the Arians. The philosophical arguments given by Saint Basil are of the nature of necessity and universal significance, which is confirmed by their repeated reproductions in the subsequent history of thought. However, the opponents of the Cappadocians fell into false creeds, because on rational approaches to them they allowed a distortion of meaning. On the contrary, Saint Basil and his Cappadocian friends did not allow such violations in the rational foundations of their theology.
The Anomeans were Arians who proved the inequality of the Son to the Father, expressed in the dissimilarity of Their natures.
Sesbou- B. Saint Basile et la Trinite: un acte théologique au IVe si-cle... Paris, 1998. P. 12.
Basilius. Epistula 90.2 // Saint Basile. Lettres. T. 1/Ed. Y. Courtonne. Paris, 1957. P. 196.
Eunomius. Apologia, 12 // Eunomius. The Extant Works / Text and translation by R. P. Vaggione. Oxford, 1987. P. 48; Russian text: Saint Basil the Great. Refutation of the defensive speech of the evil Eunomius (hereinafter - Against Eunomius) // Works like the saints of our father Basil the Great, Archbishop of Caesarea of Cappadocia. Part 3. M., 1993. P. 69.
Eunomius. Apologia, 12. P. 46–48; Russian text: Saint Basil the Great. Against Eunomius. C. 61.
Eunomius. Apologia, 18. P. 56.
Basilius. Adversus Eunomium II.3.28–30 // Basile de C-sar-e. Contre Eunome / Introd., trad. et notes B. Sesbou- . T. 2 // Sources chretiennes. No. 305. 1983. P. 18.
Basilius. De Spiritu Sancto 2.4.8–18 // Basile de C-sar-e. Sur le Saint Esprit/Ed. par B. Pruche // Sources chretiennes. 17 bis. 1968. P. 250; Russian text: Saint Basil the Great. About the Holy Spirit // Creations... Part 3. pp. 235–236.
Nominalists and realists are two controversial trends in medieval philosophy; nominalists believed that the names of things are independent of their essence, and realists believed that names deeply reflect the essence of things. Below the author mentions that a realistic approach to naming can open the way to the occult. – Ed.
Rousseau P. Basil of Caesarea. Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1994. P. 109.
Bergson A. Creative evolution / Transl. V. Flerova. M., 2001. P. 293.
Performatives are a content-limited group of verbs, the meaning of which comes down to the act of uttering them, for example, I promise, I swear, I apologize, I congratulate. – Ed.
It is noteworthy that this fragment was reproduced in an ancient compilation from the works of Origen, called “Philocalia” (chapter 17), although, judging by the title and context (one should not lose heart when one encounters dark and incomprehensible passages in the Holy Scripture), the authors of the collection were not interested in language problems in this case, but in the questions that arise when reading the Holy Scripture.
Origen. Against Celsus, 1.25 / Trans. L. Pisareva. M., 1996. P. 51.
M. Harl. Introduction et notes // Orig-ne. Philocalie, 1–20 Sur les Ecritures // Sources chretiennes. No. 302. 1983. P. 449. Note. 5.
Trouillard J. L'activite onomastique selon Proclos // De Jamblique ... Proclus / Entretiens prepares et presides par H. Dorrie. Vand
Proclus. In Platonis Cratylum commentaria, 71/Ed. G. Pasquali. Leipzig, 1908. P. 33.
Trouillard J. Op. op.P. 240.
Proclus. In Platonis Cratylum commentaria, 71, pp. 29–35.
Trouillard J. Op. op.P. 250.
Basilius. Homilia in Psalmum 32 // PG 29, 349.
Basilius. Regulae brevius tractatae, 278 // PG 31, 1277; cf.: God does not listen to the language, but to the thoughts of the speaker. – Homily 18 On the martyr Gordius // PG 31, 504A.
Basilius. Homilia 3 In illud: attende tibi ipsi // L’homelie de Basile de Cesaree sur le mot “Observe-toi toi mme” / Id. par S. Y. Rudberg. Stockholm, 1962. P. 23; Russian text: Saint Basil the Great. Conversation 3. On the words: listen to yourself // Creations... Part 4. M., 1993. P. 30.
Basilius. Hexaemeron III.24; Russian text: Saint Basil the Great. Conversations on the Sixth Day // Creations... Part 1. P. 39.
Basilius. Contra Eunomium II.4; Russian text: Saint Basil the Great. Against Eunomius. P. 65.
Right there. I.7.16–17. A little lower, Saint Basil says that calling God Father is a designation of His activity, not His essence. - There. I.24.13–15.
Ibid.II.4.35–37; Russian text: Ibid. P. 66.
Aristotle. On interpretation, ch. 2 // Aristotle. Essays. T. 2. M., 1978. P. 94.
Basilius. Adversus Eunomium I.10.1–10. P. 204; Russian text: Saint Basil the Great. Against Eunomius. P. 31.
Dani-lou J. Eunome l’arien et l’exeg-se neoplatonicienne de Cratyle // Revue des Études Grecques. 69. 1956. P. 412–432.
Gregorius. Adversus Eunomium II 404 // Gregorii Nysseni Opera T. I / Ed. W. Jaeger. Leiden, 1960. P. 344.
de Durand G. M. Eunome // Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques. T. 3 / Publie sous la direction de R. Goulet, avec une Preface de P. Hadot. Paris, 1989, pp. 330–331.
In particular, Proclus actually believes that some names are revealed by God and correspond to the nature of their bearers; at the same time, he admits that some gods are too exalted to be named by anyone. Between the system of Eunomius, this researcher concludes, and the systems of the Neoplatonists, there is a deep and fundamental difference. - There. P. 331.
Troiano M. S. I Cappadoci e la questione dell’origine dei nomi nella polemica contro Eunomio // Vetera Christianorum. 17. 1980. R. 313–346. See also another work by the same author, published somewhat earlier and representing a report given at a conference in Messina, which took place on December 3-6, 1979 and dedicated to the 1600th anniversary of the death of the Saint: Troiano M. S. La polemica sull’origine dei nomi nell’ Adversus Eunomium di Basiliö l’epinoia // Basilio di Cesarea. La sua eta, la sua opera e il basilianesimo in Sicilia. Atti dei Congresso (Messina, 1979). Messina, 1983, pp. 523–531.
It is noteworthy that this very question was also the subject of a dispute at the end of the 18th century between I. Hamann and I. Herder. The first insisted on the Divine origin of language, and the second - on the fact that language is the result of an agreement between people. See Herder I. G. Research on the origin of language // The beginning of language. Research on the origins of language. Vol. 1. 1906.
Gellius Aulus. Noctes Atticaë Quaeri enim solitum aput philosophos.
Troiano M. S. I Cappadoci e la questione... R. 341.
In the well-known work on ancient linguistics and philosophy of language by G. Steinthal, the designation superstitious-mystical is proposed for the first position, and skeptic-sophistic for the third. – Steinthal H. Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Romern. I Berlin, 1890 (repr. 1961). S. 340–341. For the second position, Jean Danielou’s definition is quite suitable – as scientific. – Dani-lou J. Eunome l’arien... P. 412–432.
Epicurus. Epistula ad Herodotum, 75/Ed. G. Arrigetti. Turin, 1973.
Origen. Against Celsus. P. 49.
Sextus empiricus. Adversus mathematicos I. 9.145, 153 // Sexti Empirici opera / Ed. H. Mutschmann and J. Mau. V. 2 & 3. 2nd edn. Leipzig, 1961; Russian text: Sextus Empiricus. Works in two volumes. T. 2. / Per. A. F. Loseva. M., 1976. S. 83, 85.
Sextus empiricus. Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes 2.19 / Ed. H. Mutschmann. Vol. 1. Leipzig, 1912. P. 214; Russian text: Ibid. P. 306.
Thoughts close to this are expressed by the Neoplatonist Proclus in his commentary on Plato’s Cratylus. – Proclus. Decree. op. 17.
Diogenes. Testimonia et fragmenta / Ed. J. von Arnim // Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. III.20. Leipzig, 1903 (repr. Stuttgart: 1968).
Chrysippus. Fragmenta logica et physica / Ed. J. von Arnim // Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. II.167. Leipzig, 1903; Russian text: Fragments of the early Stoics. T. II. Chrysippus of Sol. Part 1. Logical and physical fragments / Transl. A. A. Stolyarova. M., 1999. P. 83.
Ammonius. In Aristotelis librum de interpretatione commentarius, 33–35 / Ed. A. Busse // Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (hereinafter – CAG) 4.5. Berlin, 1897.
Troiano M. Cappadoci e la questione... P. 339.
Pohlenz M. Die Begrundung der abendlandischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa. Gottingen, 1939. S. 61.
Steinthal H. Geschichte... S. 321.
Troiano M. Cappadoci e la questione... P. 346.
Also called Frege's triangle; see Frege G. Meaning and denotation // Semiotics and computer science. Vol. 35. M., 1997.
A. A. Stolyarov defines the first as “meaning”, the second as “denoting a sound or a written word.” – Stolyarov A. A. Standing and stoicism. M., 1995. P. 70.
Basilius. Homilia 12 In illud: In principium erat Verbum // PG 31, 477.
Basilius. Homilia 16 In principium erat Verbum // PG 31, 477A.
Basilius. Homilia 24 Contra Sabellianos // PG 31, 601B.
Basilius. Epistula 333 // Saint Basile. Lettres. T. 3. P. 203.
Basilius. De Spiritu Sancto XVII.43.29–31 // Ibid. R. 400.
For the best critical edition of the text, equipped with a lengthy introduction, see: Orig-ne. Philocalie, 1–20 (Sur les Ecritures / Introduction et notes M. Harl // Sources chretiennes. No. 302. 1983); 21–27 (Sur le libre arbitre / Texte, trad. et notes J. Junod // Sources chretiennes. No. 226. 1976).
Chrysippus. Fragmenta logica et physica II, 181; Russian text: p. 96.
Diogenes Laertius. Vitae philosophorum VII.43.44/Ed. H. S. Long. Oxford, 1964 (repr. 1966); Russian text: Diogenes Laertius. About the life, teachings and sayings of famous philosophers / Transl. M. L. Gasparova. M., 1986. P. 260.
Losev A. F. History of ancient aesthetics. Early Hellenism. M., 1979. S. 87–91, 99–121, 101–109.
Sextus empiricus. Adversus mathematicos VIII, 11–12 / Ed. H. Mutschmann and J. Mau // Sexti Empirici opera. V. 2 & 3 (2nd edn.). Russian text: Sextus Empiricus. Works in two volumes. T. 1 / Per. A. F. Loseva. M., 1975. P. 153.
Philo. Legum allegoriae 2.15 // Legum allegoriarum libri i-iii / Ed. L. Cohn. Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt. Vol. 1. Berlin, 1896 (repr. De Gruyter, 1962).
Augustinus. De dialectica 5 // PL 32, 1411.
Augustinus. De doctrina christiana I.2.2 // Biblioth-que Augustinienne. uvres de saint Augustin 11/2. La doctrine chrétienne. Texte critique du CCL, revu et corrige / Intr. et trad. de M. Moreau, annotation et notes complementaires d’I. Bochet et G. Madec. Institut d'études Augustiniennes. Paris, 1997.
Basilius. Homilia 16 In principium erat Verbum // PG 31, 477BC.
Basilius. Homilia 3 In illud: attende tibi ipsi // L'homelie de Basile.. . P. 23.
Basilius. Contra Eunomium II.9 // Ibid. R. 36.
Basilius. De Spiritu Sancto XVII.41.9–22 // Ibid. R. 392–394.
Hoffmann P. Categories et langage selon Simplicius – la question du “scopos” du traite aristotelicien des “Categories” // Simplicius. Sa vie, son
Ammonius. In Aristotelis categorias commentarius 8.21–9.1 / Ed. A. Busse // CAG 4.4 (Berlin, 1895); Joannes Philoponus. In Aristotelis categorias commentarius 8.27–29 // CAG 13.1 (Berlin, 1898); Olympiodorus. In Aristotelis categorias commentarius 18.23–31 // CAG 12.1 (Berlin, 1902); Elias. In Aristotelis categorias commentarius 129.7–13, 130.14–131.14 // CAG 18.1 (Berlin, 1900); Simplicius. In Aristotelis categorias commentarius 9.5–13.26 // CAG 8 (Berlin, 1907).
Hoffmann P. Categories et langage... P. 67.
Westerink L. G. Introduction // Prolegom-nes ... la philosophie de Plato / Texte et. par L. G. Westerink, et trad. par J. Trouillard, avec la coll. de A. Ph. Segonds. P., 1990. P. LXXI-LXXII.
Hoffmann P. Categories et langage... P. 71–73.
Simplicius. Decree. op. 13.11.
Olympiodorus. Decree. op. 18.26–27.
Hoffmann P. Categories et langage... P. 84.