ЧАСТЬ II. ТРУДНОСТЬ XLI: ЕЕ ΣΚΟΠΟΣ , ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОНЯТИЯ И ИСТОЧНИКИ

We can now move on to the main part of the study: the analysis of Difficulty XLI itself. And first of all, let’s answer the question of what its content and purpose are. 2.1. What is commented on in Difficulty XLI? Sometimes, without thinking deeply about the text of Difficulty XLI, but starting from the phrase of Gregory the Theologian commented on in it, “natures are renewed,” they believe that Maximus the Confessor is talking about the sacrament of Baptism. In fact, the searched words belong to the Word on the Holy Lights of Gregory, i.e. sermons on the feast of the Baptism of Christ. However, speaking about the “renewal of natures,” Gregory the Theologian meant the Nativity of Christ. There are deep historical roots in the fact that in his sermon on Epiphany Gregory remembers Christmas, and that even today “renewal” is spoken of both at Epiphany and at Christmas. These holidays are connected from the very beginning. At the dawn of Christianity, both the birth of God in the flesh and His baptism, at which His divinity was indicated by a voice from heaven, were understood as the Epiphany, which was celebrated on January 6 or 10. A separate celebration of Epiphany first appears outside the Church, among the Gnostics 166. Different Churches continued to celebrate the single feast of Epiphany for quite a long time. For example, when John Cassian writes around 400 about the peculiarities of the church celebration of Epiphany in Egypt, he notes the existence of a mixed tradition, saying that this day “in this province the priests consider either the Baptism of the Lord, or His Birth according to the flesh, and therefore they celebrate not with a double celebration, as in the West, but on one day” 167. In Alexandria, the holiday of Christmas on December 25 was introduced only in 432. 168 This connection between the holidays continues to this day 169 (at the same time, if we compare the texts of modern holiday services, on the feast of the Epiphany there are approximately twice as many references to the renewal of human nature as on the Nativity of Christ 170). For the Cappadocian fathers, Christmas and Epiphany have already become (including through the personal efforts of Gregory the Theologian) different holidays. Nevertheless, these celebrations were closely connected with each other, so it is no coincidence that when speaking about Epiphany, both Gregory remember Christmas 171. When asked why Gregory connects Christmas with Epiphany, Maxim answers as follows. Man was created in the image of God, and had to acquire likeness to God in order to become the son of God and be deified by grace through the Spirit. The first man neglected this, which entailed psychophysiological changes: God replaced his free, passionless, voluntary and pure birth with a passionate, slavish, restrictive birth, replacing the honor of living with God with the dishonor placed in material equality with irrational beasts. Desiring to return humanity to its divine heritage, the Logos not only became incarnate, i.e. underwent a sinless physical birth, but also voluntarily subjected Himself to another birth leading to spiritual adoption: he accepted baptism in order to cancel the physical birth. Baptismal birth is a cancellation and liberation from bodily birth. Breaking the bonds of bodily birth within himself, God the Word gave us through spiritual birth the power to become children of God, instead of children of flesh and blood, if we believe in His name. The Savior through baptism was born in the Spirit, which Adam initially neglected, for the sake of man’s salvation and restoration by grace, or rather for the sake of his true re-creation (ἀναπλάσεως) 172. So, speaking about the “renewal of natures,” Gregory the Theologian meant the Nativity of Christ, and the Incarnation is the sacrament that is discussed in Difficulty XLI of Maximus. 2.2. Basic Concepts Difficulty XLI In the first part of our study, an outline of the main terms of the system of Maximus the Confessor was given. Let's look at the concepts that are involved in Difficulty XLI. In relation to divisions, Maxim uses derivatives of the verb διαιρέω, “to divide” (12 times) and the noun διαί ρεσις, “division” (11). Accordingly, the adjective αδιαίρετος “inseparable” (8) (including an adverb from this stem) and the substantivized participle τὰ δι ῃ ρημένα, “divided” (5) are repeatedly used. Thus, words from this stem are the most frequent (36). μερίζω, “to dissect” and διακρίνω, “to distinguish” are used once each. In addition to “division,” the idea of ​​difference is conveyed through διαφορά (9) / ἀδιάφορον (1), διάστημα (1) / τὰ διεστῶτα (1). Maxim speaks three times about species differences in a logical sense (1312C, D (2)). In relation to the division into male and female, “difference” and “division” are used as synonyms 173, the same is observed regarding the division of the earth into ecumene and paradise 174. Apparently, this reflects the ambivalence of his understanding of this dissection: on the one hand, it is “wrong,” on the other, even if in anticipation of the Fall, it was created by God 175. Separation is opposed to ἕ νωσις (9), “unity” / “union”. The most common here are ἕ ν, “single” (17) 176, ἑνόω, “to connect” (11) and others (one time each: ἑνίζω, ἑνότης, ἑνικός, ἑνιαῖος ). Only 41 words from this stem. In addition, the idea of “bringing together” is described by the verbs and phrases συνάγω (3), εἰς ἕ ν ἄγων (1), συνωθέω (1), nouns σύνοδος (1), σύνεσις (1), σύννευσις (1). Gathering leads to the “whole” and “wholeness” described by ὅ λος (6), ὁλότης (1) 177 . The idea of ​​connection and binding is important. Hence συνδέω, “to bind” (1), συνέχω, “to hold” (2) 178. It is repeatedly spoken of “connection”: hence σχέσις, “connection” (3), σύνδεσμος, “brace” (1) (once there are σχετικ ῇ ς, “fastening”, ἄσχετον, "irrelevant, abstract"). 179 The idea that the higher embraces the lower is realized through the opposition “embracing” / “encompassed” (περιέχων, 3) and the corresponding verb (περιέχω, 2), as well as περιλαμβάνω 180 (1). There is a contrast between the limit and the infinite: δρος (2), πέρας (2), αόριστος (1) and άπειρος (1). The idea of ​​“universality”, “universality” is conveyed through καθόλου (9) 181 and καθολικός (3), although the meaning “common” 182 and “whole” 183 is also possible here. The general is opposed to μερικόν, “particular” in the logical sense (2). In contrast, μέρος, “part” (11) is evaluatively neutral 184 . Each entity has its own special properties: hence ἴδιος, “its own”, “special” (1), ἰδικός (1), ἰδιότης (3). An important role in Maximus is played by the idea of ​​complete interchange of properties, introduced in Christology, but extended by him to the created world. Such a “round dance” of properties, their “circular movement” is described by the verb περιχωρέω (1). The idea of ​​reciprocity is emphasized by the repeated use of ἀλλ ή λων (3), ἀλλ ή λοις (6), πρὸς ἄλληλα (4), 13 in total. They are used to describe both the mutual connection and the separation of parts in relation to each other. The completeness of interchange is emphasized by calling it “whole” through the phrases δι ΄ ὅ λου, ὅ λος ὅ λ ῳ, ὅ λον ὅ λοις, ὁλικῶς % 185. The meaning of the phrase τ ῶ ν ὅ λων συνεκτικώτατον ἐργαστήριον (1305 Α 14–15). Translating this phrase is difficult due to the polysemy of each of its three constituent elements. Let's start with τών δλων. For the fathers and for Maximus himself, τὰ ὅ λα means “everything,” “the whole world,” being synonymous with τὰ πάντα and τὸ π ᾶ ν 186. The adjective συνεκτικ ό ς is used in the stable phrase συνεκτικὴ αἰτία, “meaningful reason.” Both philosophers and theologians called the “substantive cause” that which holds a being in being, so that when the cause is eliminated, the given thing is destroyed 187 . In cosmology, συνεκτικὴ αἰτία was understood as the cause that gives existence and keeps created things from decay. So, for example, in the psalm - Aristotle (1st - mid-2nd century AD), for whom a similar reason is God or divine power: about the meaningful cause of everything... about the most important thing in the cosmos... Everything was made up from God and through God, and no nature in itself is self-sufficient if it is deprived of support coming from God... The ancients were able to give the proper concept of divine power, but not of its essence 188. Wed. in the same context Gregory the Theologian: What I call incomprehensible is not that God exists, but that He is... God is the creative and meaningful cause of everything... For the universe (τὸ π ᾶ ν) how could it be realized and composed if it were not for God who realized and contained everything? ...For us, the power that creates, moves and preserves what has been created is clear, although it is not comprehended by thought 189 . The meaning of “embracing and holding” made it possible to apply the desired adjective to ideas (Proclus) 190, to talk about the connecting and meaningful power of the Good (Porphyry) or the power of the Creator God (Basily the Great) 191. Proclus, in a context close to that of Difficulty XLI of Maximus, speaks of essences that “connect opposites” and themselves are reduced to one beginning, so that “the most recent is connected with the first through the middle ones” 192 . Less commonly, τὸ συνεκτικόν could mean “that to which everything converges” 193 . However, the superlative degree of the adjective συνεκτικός is dominated by the meaning “most important”, “fundamental”, while the meaning “binding” and “holding” is practically never found 194 . However, the meaning “fundamental” also implies the meaning “universal”. It is no coincidence that Sextus Empiricus repeatedly contrasts the particular and secondary with the general and essential 195. In Maxim one can find both συνεκτικός and συνεκτικ ώ τατος. He uses συνεκτικός to mean “comprehensive” and “connecting” in a context that coincides with that of philosophers 196 . But συνεκτικ ώ τατος cannot be clearly interpreted. In one of the contexts, in relation to the Word of God, it means “the most important,” although the translation “universal” is acceptable in the sense of “containing everything,” “encompassing everything” 197 . The same duality remains in relation to the phrase in question. Let's consider the noun ἐργαστήριον, which can simply mean any workshop where a craftsman works (workshop of a tanner, blacksmith, woolen craftsman) 198. Such a “forge” can also be understood in a figurative sense: they talked about the “forge of virtue”, that “Alexandria is the forge of education” 199, that “the head is the forge of sensations” 200. Basil the Great calls the world “the forge of divine creation” 201. The phrase ἐργαστήριον τῆς φύσεως, “workshop of nature”, as a euphemism for “womb”, “womb” (δελφύς, μήτρα, ὑστέρα) 202. Maximus the Confessor uses ἐργαστήριον both in physiological and figurative meaning 203, but the “workshop” is always a place where something arises and is born. Now we can make assumptions about possible translation options for the phrase τῶν ὅ λων συνεκτικώτατον ἐργαστήριον. In the context of the binding of all separated extremes into unity and wholeness carried out by man, the translation “all-encompassing forge of wholes” seems tempting. However, in our opinion, this makes the text more philosophical than it actually is. Based on the above, τῶν ὅ λων here is “all” or “universal”. In relation to συνεκτικώτατον, Maxim most likely neglects the fact that in the previous tradition συνεκτικός was applied not to man, but to higher powers and God, and the meaning of συνεκτικώτατον was limited "most important". From the spectrum of meanings, he singles out “binding.” Moreover, for him this is not in accordance with the tradition of “binding the edges by a higher cause through embracing them,” but the mediation of extremes by man as the “middle.” Thus, the phrase in question means “the workshop in which the binding of the whole world is most accomplished.” 2.3. Sources and contexts of Difficulties XLI 2.3.1. Gregory the Theologian. Words 38 to 39 The first and obvious context comes from the chapter title. As already mentioned (section 2.1), it is a commentary on the phrase of Gregory the Theologian “Natures are new, and God becomes man.” For Maximus's reasoning, the Words of Gregory the Theologian are important: Homily 38 (for Christmas) and Homily 39 (for Epiphany), dated December 25, 380 and January 6, 381. The phrase “new forms are created, and God becomes man” belongs to Homily 39, however, section 13 in which it is found 204 tells about the Nativity of God the Word in the flesh. In the same Word 39 there are references to the previous Word 3 8 205. It can be shown that the starting texts for Maximum Difficulty XLI are Homily 39, section 13 and Homily 38, sections 3–4, 9–12. Indeed, in these texts of Gregory there are a number of parallels to Difficulty XLI. For example, in Word 38: 1) mention of being and well-being 206; 2) a phrase about bright Goodness inventing a bright mental world, and then a sensual world 207; 3) man is represented as a connector of the sensory and the intelligible. He is one of two (of the invisible and visible nature); he is a kind of second world - great in small; he is a fan of both worlds, earthly and heavenly, temporary and immortal, visible and intelligible; he is the mean (μέσον) between greatness and baseness; he is deified through attraction to God (τῇ πρὸς Θεὸν νεύσει)" 208; 4) Gregory notes that earthly flesh was given to man after the Fall: when man sinned through the envy of the devil and was expelled from paradise and from God, he put on leather garments (δερματίνους χιτῶνας), i.e. into earthly flesh... 209 (cf. the concept of introducing the division into male and female in Maxim).. In the next Homily (39, 13) Gregory repeats what was said in the previous sermon, saying: “since it was necessary that the worship of God should not be limited to those on high, but there should also be some worshipers below... for this purpose man was created...” When he sinned through the envy of the devil, God did not despise him. “What is happening? What is the great mystery about us? – New natures are created, and God becomes man... For this purpose the unmixable is mixed; not only God with becoming (γενέσει), mind with flesh... but also birth with virginity (παρθενί ᾳ γέννησις)... immortal with perishable” 210. Thus, Gregory the Theologian outlines the main themes of Difficulty XLI - the creation of the world by the Goodness of God; the creation of a person who connects two worlds; the Fall, which entailed expulsion from paradise and putting on “skin garments”, i.e. earthly flesh; The Incarnation of God, renewing nature, uniting the incompatible. However, although formally we have before us a commentary on Gregory the Theologian, there are other equally significant sources for Difficulty XLI. 2.3.2. Nemesius of Emesa. On the Nature of Man I Regarding reunions, L. Thunberg 211 pointed to an important source for Maxim - the first chapter of the treatise On the Nature of Man by Nemesius of Emesa. In Nemesius's reasoning there is an interpenetration of anthropology and cosmology, characteristic of Maximus. In On the Nature of Man, the idea of ​​man as a microcosm is associated with the divine task of uniting the opposites of the world. It is not only the human structure, which reproduces the structure of the universe, that allows us to consider it a microcosm. God placed man at the center of the world to fulfill the task of mediating extremes. His calling becomes to collect within himself the things of the world, correlating opposites: mortal with immortal, rational with unreasonable, etc. 212 According to Nemesius, the Creator adapted different natures to each other so that all creation was one and related. He united the existence of separated individuals, assimilated and combined with each other all 213; connected all beings as a whole with some innate and natural connection, harmoniously combined them. And in this, an important role is assigned by God to man, who “enters into communication” and “comes into contact” with beings at all hierarchical levels, having something in common with inanimate things, with plants, animals and angels. As having a soul and a body, man is placed on the boundary between the intelligible and the sensible; having come into being, he became the middle term through which God brought together the intelligible and the visible. Actually, the entire universe arose for the sake of man. Nemesius writes that man was created last not only because everything that came into existence had to serve him, being intended for his use, but also because connections between intelligible and visible existence had to arise, so that the universe would be one, interconnected and not alienated from itself 214. Among the provisions that allow us to speak about the influence of Nemesius on Maximus are the following. As a being standing on the border between the spiritual and the physical, man has two kinds of virtues. Some belong to both the soul and the body, and some belong only to the soul; such are piety and knowledge of existing things. Man was originally created neither completely mortal nor immortal. God deliberately placed him at the boundary between the corruptible and incorruptible natures, so that if a person indulges in bodily passions, he would undergo bodily changes, and if he prefers the goods of the soul, he would be awarded immortality 215. Perhaps, says Nemesius, man was created mortal, but, gradually improving, could achieve immortality, i.e. was created immortal in possibility... Having lost perfection, man also lost immortality, which is subsequently, however, restored by the grace of the Creator. Be that as it may, only a person’s body, being mortal, becomes immortal. In conclusion, Nemesius once again repeats that man unites within himself the mortal with the immortal, the rational with the unreasonable. Man carries in his very nature the image of all creation and is therefore called the “small world.” Man is honored with such great providence of God that for his sake everything exists - both the present and the future, for his sake God became man, so that man passes into incorruption and avoids mortality. Man, created in the image and likeness of God, reigns in heaven, lives with Christ as a child of God, possessing every principle and power. 2.3.3. ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite. On the Divine Names XI, 1–5 One can point to another direct source of Maximus’s teaching on compounds - a fragment from the treatise of Dionysius the Areopagite (On the Divine Names XI, 1–5). Let us recall that in addition to the works of Gregory the Theologian, the Areopagite Corpus is also the subject of commentary in the Difficulties. The idea present in Ps.-Dionysius of binding everything that differs and contradicts each other with Jesus, who in this case appears as the Pacification, as well as drawing together “the edges through the middle with the edges” 216, is exactly what Maximus writes about in Difficulty XLI. Divine Names XI, 1–5 discusses the epithet Tranquility (ἡ εἰρ ή νη) applied to God 217. One of Dionysius's sources at this point appears to be Ignatius of Antioch, the first Christian author to speak of "unity" 218 . Dionysius says that the object of the connecting action of Pacification is the “disunited multitude”, which, having stopped the internecine war, is united into a homogeneous cohabitation. As if connecting the separated with some kind of bonds, Peace gives a limit and boundaries to everything 219, connects everything with each other in an unmerged unity 220, in which everything, inseparably and indissolubly united, remains, however, intact 221 in its characteristic form, not distorted by a mixture with the opposite 222. Peace unites everything, but at the same time keeps everything unfused, unmixed and co-dissolved. The same thing happens in the realm of the intelligible: minds unite with their thoughts and what is thought by them, and then ascend to an unknown union with what is above the mind; souls, having united and reduced their various logoi to a single intellectual purity, move in their proper path and order through immaterial and part-free thinking to the super-conceivable Unity. This is how the inextricable weaving of everything together, agreement, unanimity and fusion of everything takes place. The one-creating power of Peace connects everything, connecting the edges 223 through the middle with the edges in the conjugation of love (φιλίαν), including the most distant limits of everything 224. Peace pours out through Christ’s love for mankind, by which we learn to no longer fight, but to cooperate in accordance with the providence of Jesus, who produces “all in all” and brings about from eternity the predestined ineffable peace, reconciling us with Him in spirit, and through Him and in Him with the Father. That the indicated passage of the Divine Names is one of Maximus' sources in On Difficulties XLI is confirmed by the fact that at the end of his discussion Maximus first directly mentions Dionysius and quotes ch. XIII (“On the names Perfect and One”), and then gives a free paraphrase of the passage we considered from Chapter XI, preserving its key words: Jesus Christ... holds the integrity of existence... embraces their constituent parts, as the Creator and Provider of everything by nature, through Himself bringing to Unity what has been dispersed, ending the battle [going on] among beings and uniting in reconciliation, love and indivisible like-mindedness everything that is in heaven and on earth, as the Divine Apostle says (Col 1:16, cf. Eph 1:10). 2.3.4. Apostle Paul. Ephesians I An important context for Difficulty XLI is the first chapter of the Apostle Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians, significant not only for Difficulty XLI but for Maximus' theology as a whole. The message influences not only directly, but also indirectly, being the source of the above-mentioned sections of BI XI, 1–5. Like Dionysius, Christ is presented in St. Paul as Peace (the term εἰρ ή νη is used 5 times). He makes one, eliminates enmity, He must reconcile (ἀποκαταλλάξ ῃ) humanity with the Father 225. As in Maximus, Christ makes a new man, assimilates man to God. The Apostle speaks of predestination and election in Christ before the foundation of the world, the fullness of terms, the gift of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of God. Mention is made of such key concepts for Maximus’ theology as advice (βουλὴ) and will (θέλημα) of God the Father, the mystery of His will. In addition, the apostle speaks of the eternal intention (πρ ό θεσις) of the Father, fulfilled in Christ (3:11), contrasts the old and the new man (4:22–24) 226. Like Words 38 and 39 of Gregory the Theologian, the ideology of this text underlies the entire argument of Maximus. On app. Paul Maximus very likely hints at the beginning of the chapter when he mentions “companions and ministers of the Word.” And at the end of the first "discretion" of Difficulty XLI, Eph 1:10 is directly quoted. Let us indicate two more works that Maxim knew and which could influence his reasoning, but which cannot be classified as direct sources of Difficulty, XLI. A striking attempt to remake ancient cosmology for the needs of Christian philosophy was the system of Origen. Origen's multi-level system of the cosmos is vaguely reminiscent of what we see in the passage of Maximus under consideration. To Origen, like the Platonists, it seemed natural that in the course of the world process, as all beings ascend to God, coarse material layers would gradually be eliminated, so that in the end all existing things would reach the purest and lightest, i.e. spiritual, state 227. However, Origen does not speak directly about the reunification of world gaps and here we can only talk about parallels. 2.3.6. John of Scythopolis. Scholium to the Areopagitica A significant context of Difficulty XLI is the doctrine of the genads of simple beings, present in the ps.-Dionysius, but presented in a more articulate form in the scholia of John of Scythopolis to the Areopagite Corpus 228. In the era of Maximus, the doctrine of the gened of simple souls (in the form in which it was developed by the followers of Origen and Evagrius) was condemned. Maximus himself refutes this doctrine in Difficulty VII 229. However, in the scholia of John of Scythopolis, compiled before the V Ecumenical Council, which condemned Origen and Evagrius, there are no characteristic Origen ideas about the falling away of minds from the original geneda, there is no theory of the preexistence of souls, no doctrine of the clothing of souls in bodies as punishment for sins. On the contrary, for John, henada is a simple unity of minds, to which the saints must still strive. John writes more than once about the genads of minds, meaning by them deified saints. God-like minds, i.e. theologians - prophets and apostles - achieve union with angels. When they, having ceased all earthly activities, become deified, then, like the angels, they achieve union with God. Moreover, for them, as for eternal and disembodied minds, even the achievement of silence and peace does not mean extinction, but wakefulness and activity, contributing to their genetic perfection 230. By saying that the minds of the saints become one and merge into a gened, John means that they have “one heart and one soul” (Acts 4:32). One of the scholia says: “After this ascent [the initiates] advance to simplicity, thanks to the resurrection becoming equal to the angels (ἰσάγγελοι) and, according to the apostle, no longer have a “spiritual” body, i.e. composed and moved by the soul, but “spiritual” (1 Cor 15:44), because through the all-holy Spirit, abundantly poured out on them, they are freed from the complex diversity of thoughts and feelings, and thereby, being led, are united in a genea of ​​simplicity” 231. This is close to what Maxim writes about in Difficulty XLI “Having made his life in every way identical with the angels in virtue, as far as this is accessible to people... a person would become light in spirit and would not be drawn to the earth by any bodily weight and would not be held back from ascending to heaven due to the complete blindness of his mind to these things, devotedly striving towards God and wisely making... the ascent (ἐπ ί βασιν)" 232. Both texts speak of the ascension of saints, equality with angels, and the spiritual body. Saying that after the resurrection the saints will become equal to the angels and their body will change from the spiritual to the spiritual, John of Scythopolis significantly deviates from Dionysius, for whom the angels are deprived of bodies and represent pure minds. However, his idea of a light body is shared by Maximus the Confessor. It is important to emphasize that the scholia of John are not just some text that we took on the basis of external parallels. This is an essay that Maxim carefully read and thought through. Let me remind you that the treatise On Difficulties is a commentary on Gregory the Theologian and the Areopagitica. A study of the manuscript tradition shows that the Areopagite corpus almost never existed without scholia, so every reader of the Areopagitica inevitably turned to them in the hope of finding an explanation of this complex text. Moreover, sometimes Maximus reacts more to the wording of the scholia than to the actual text of the ps. - Dionysius. Let us make an intermediate summary regarding the sources of Difficulty XLI. The above excerpts from ap. Paul, Nemesius of Emesa and ps.-Dionysius form a group of textual fragments that not only demonstrate numerous lexical parallels to Difficulty XLI, but are close to it in spirit and logic of reasoning. On the contrary, the mentioned teachings of Origen and John of Scythopolis, certainly known to Maximus, provide only a background influence that was indirect, and the extent of this influence cannot be assessed (the exception is the above quotation from John, which demonstrates textual proximity). Well, of course, the starting point for Difficulty XLI is Words 38 and 39 of Gregory the Theologian. Now we will look at two more sources of Maxim. The first of them affects conceptually, and the second - pointwise and at the lexical level. As will be shown below, the discovery of these sources of Difficulty XLI makes its main intention clear. 2.3.7. Gregory of Nyssa. About the structure of man XVI-XVII Difficulty XLI begins with the following words: Saints - who have received many divine secrets passed on to them by succession (κατὰ διαδοχὴν) through their predecessors from those who happened to be companions and servants of the Word (ἐκ τῶν οπαδῶν καὶ ὑπηρετῶν γενομένων τοῦ Λόγου), and therefore from those directly initiated (μυηθέντων) into the knowledge of beings 233 - they say that the hypostasis of everything that has arisen is divided into five divisions. Of these, the first, according to them, is that which separates from uncreated nature all created nature, which receives existence through emergence (γενέσεως) 234. This introductory period points to another important source for Maximus 235. And since here is the starting point for Maximus’s entire subsequent discussion of divisions and unions, the significance of this source is comparable to the theme of the new order of natures stated in the title. Moreover, awareness of this source allows us to reveal Maxim's initial intention, the main subject of his concern, which otherwise remains unrecognized. We are talking about chapters XVI and XVII of Gregory of Nyssa’s treatise On the Structure of Man, where Gregory, like Maximus, begins with distinguishing the properties of uncreated and created natures 236 and then sets out his doctrine of the separation of the sexes, as a phenomenon that does not correspond to God’s original plan for man. He writes that if there had been no Fall, people would have multiplied like angels, without needing marriage for this. However, in anticipation of the Fall, God invented the division of the sexes for man, so that after expulsion from Paradise, when life in the likeness of angels becomes impossible for people, they could reproduce. One of the paragraphs of Gregory of Nyssa's treatise is especially rich in parallels with what is said in Difficulty XLI Since one is always self-identical, and the other arose through creation and began with a change in being, having a change akin to this, then He who knows everything before its origin (Dan 13:42) ... foretelling with foreknowledge that to which it will incline ... the movement of human will ... invents (ἐπιτεχν ᾶ ταί) for the image [of God] the distinction between male and female, which no longer refers to the divine prototype, but... assigned to dumb nature. The reason for such an invention can only be known by eyewitnesses (αὐτ ό πται) of Truth and ministers (ὑπηρέται) of the Word 237. Here, in addition to the actual teaching about God’s creation of the separation of the sexes in anticipation of the Fall, attention is drawn to Gregory’s repeated contrast between created and uncreated natures, as well as a quote in which “ministers of the Word” are mentioned. The latter is not accidental: Gregory notes that the teaching he sets out exceeds human understanding, and only the “servants of the Word” can know the truth here, by which, obviously, the apostle is meant. Paul, since below Gregory repeats: “but here again the true meaning, if it can be found, is only by those who, like Paul, were initiated (μυηθεῖσιν) into the ineffable secrets (τὰ ἀπ όῤῥ ητα) of Paradise” 238. The introductory period of Difficulties XLI and the section On the Structure of Man XVI-XVII contain parallels, the concentration of which does not allow us to speak of a simple coincidence. Gregory writes about the difference (δια φορά) between created and uncreated natures, Maxim - about their separation (διαίρεσιν), Gregory - about the secrets (τὰ ἀπ όῤῥ ητα) of Paradise, Maxim - about the divine mysteries ( τῶν θε ί ων μυστηρ ί ων ); both mention "ministers of the Word" (ὑπηρετῶν τοῦ Λόγου) and "devotees" (μυηθέντων). Gregory's use of the word ἀπ όῤῥ ητα is echoed in the second paragraph of Maximus, which says that the saints left the first division "ineffable" (ἄ ῤῥ ητον, 1305A 8). All these echoes - not counting the actual theme of the separation of the sexes due to the Fall (fundamental in the chapters of Gregory and Maximus under consideration) - indisputably indicate that the mentioned sections of the treatise On the Constitution of Man formed the basis of Difficulty XLI. Thus, already from the opening lines of Difficulty XLI, one can read its σκοπός, intention: the theme of the Incarnation, which reorganizes human nature, will be discussed by Maxim in connection with the unnatural division of man into two sexes, which is a sign of the decay of human nature. For Gregory, the division into male and female is a direct consequence of the main difference between the Creator and the creature - between unchangeable and changeable natures. Despite the fact that the division of the sexes closes the list of Maximus, being the fifth in a row, it is the driving goal of the entire exposition and thus in importance for Difficulty XLI is comparable to the division between the uncreated and the created. This overlap is facilitated by the interpenetration of cosmology and anthropology, characteristic of Maximus’s thought, as well as the influence of the discussed text of Gregory of Nyssa. In general, the introductory paragraph can be understood in such a way that Maxim is going to expound the teachings of such saints as Gregory the Theologian and Gregory of Nyssa, who received the divine secrets from their predecessors - the ap. Paul and Dionysius the Areopagite. 2.3.8. ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite and John of Scythopolis Consider the fragment that immediately follows the introductory period of Difficulty XLI [The saints] claim that God by goodness created a bright dispensation (διακ ό σμησιν) of all things 239, but since from it (αὐτῇ) [dispensation] it did not become immediately obvious who He is, nor what He is like 240, then this is ignorance (ἄγνοιαν), What distinguishes creation from God in relation to what has been said, they called division. Therefore, this [division], which naturally separates these [creatures and God] from each other, never allowing [their] union into one essence, as incapable of accepting one and the same logos, they left inexpressible” 241. Maxim writes that according to his predecessors, God, by his goodness, created the orderliness of the world. However, from the order of the cosmos one can only conclude about the existence of some Cause or Creator that exceeds the cosmos. The creature cannot find out anything about the nature of the Creator. Therefore, Maxim calls natural the division separating the creature from the Creator. As for the words that division does not allow the union of the Creator and the creature into one entity, then “division” means the totality of the Creature and the creator, which is difficult to talk about within the framework of orthodox theology. This hypothetical totality, Maxim says here, does not have a single logos, i.e. meaning 242. Unexplained, however, remains the phrase about the saints who call the division of ignorance (ἄγνοιαν) the creature's essence of God. Since the idea mentioned is unusual, its source is relatively easy to identify. “Ignorance” is twice explicitly called “division” in the Areopagite Corpus. In both cases, John of Scythopolis comments on this in his scholia: ps.-Dionysius: “Ignorance is something that separates (διαιρετική) those who are mistaken” 243; John of Scythopolis: “For ignorance separates (διαιρεῖ) from God) 244. ps.-Dionysius: “knowledge unites (ἑνωτικὴ) those who know and the known, and ignorance for the ignorant is the cause of eternal change and division (διαιρέσεως) in itself” 245; John of Scythopolis: “ignorance divides, splits and shakes with one or another doubts those who do not know what should be known” 246. As you can see, Ps.-Dionysius teaches about dividing ignorance in relation to the lack of unity of opinion between people or in relation to spiritual duality. His scholiast John of Scythopolis once follows him in this understanding, but in another place he writes a phrase that perfectly suits Maximus: “ignorance separates from God.” As already mentioned (section 1.8), Maxim has internalized this idea and uses it in his other works. What is important for understanding passage 1304D-1305A of Difficulty XLI is how ps.-Dionysius understands “ignorance” in the passages that served as the source for Maximus. Although, as shown above, in the Areopagitica there are two passages suitable for Maximus (BI IV, 6 and VII, 4), only in the second case the context of the argument of the ps.-Dionysius is similar to that in Difficulty XLI. Like Maximus, Dionysius argues that God is unknowable by nature. However, He can be understood as the Cause of the world by starting from the study of creation. Here both Ps.-Dionysius and Maximus follow the ap. Paul: “His invisible things have been seen since the creation of the world through meditation (νοούμενα) on the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). The reasoning of Ps. Dionysius begins in a similar way: We know God not from His nature... but from the order (διατάξεως) of all things that came from Him (ἐξ αὐτοῦ προβεβλημένης) 247 and possessing certain images and likenesses of His divine prototypes, going back to to that which is beyond everything... through the negation of everything and the transcendence of everything in the Cause of everything. Therefore, God is known in everything and beyond everything 248. Dionysius further refers to cataphatic and apophatic theology as knowledge and ignorance: “God is known both through knowledge and through ignorance. Thought, word, scientific knowledge belong to Him... and [at the same time] He is not thought, not expressed, not named... He is “all in all” (1 Cor 15:28) 249 and nothing in nothing, and from everything He is known by all, and by none from nothing..." Finally, Dionysius postulates the highest form of knowledge: And there is also the most divine knowledge of God, cognizable through ignorance according to a unity that transcends the mind, when the mind, having retreated from everything that exists, then leaving itself... is illuminated by the undetectable depth of Wisdom...” Thus, the highest knowledge turns out to be a special type of ignorance. This is no longer ignorance as a lack of knowledge, not the ignorance of negative theology, but an ignorance that exceeds thinking itself. The mind comes out of itself, ceases to be itself, pre-mentally uniting with the radiance of divine Wisdom 250. Dionysius explains what “unity transcending the mind” means: “The Logos is a simple and truly existing truth, around which, as the pure and undeluded knowledge of all, there exists divine faith, the constant affirmation (ϊδρνσις) of believers, in immutable identity affirming them in the truth, and the truth in them. So believers have a simple knowledge of the truth. After all, if knowledge unites those who know and are known, and ignorance is for the ignorant the cause of eternal change and division in himself, then nothing will drive him who has believed in the Truth according to the sacred Word from the hearth of true faith, in which he is able to maintain the constancy of immovable and immutable identity” 251. "Divine Faith" by Proclus At first glance, it is strange that a Christian thinker so deeply immersed in Neoplatonism, like Ps.-Dionysius, identifies faith and knowledge. In the pre-Iamblichian philosophical tradition, faith, like opinion, belongs to the sphere of lower, sensory reality 252. However, the faith that Ps. Dionysius writes about here is to a lesser extent the faith of St. Paul 253, and to a large extent the faith of Proclus. And most likely it is no coincidence that Dionysius writes not just about faith, but about “divine faith.” In Neoplatonism there was a triad of “faith, truth, love” 254, adopted from the Chaldean oracles. According to Proclus, through these three principles everything is saved and combined with the first causes. Love provides love madness for this, truth provides divine philosophy, and faith provides theurgic power, “which is better than all human prudence and science” and includes ... everything done in divine possession 255. Proclus explains the functions of each member of the triad. Love (ὁ ἔρως) connects with divine beauty and assimilates it 256. Truth elevates existence to divine wisdom and affirms it 257. It is characteristic that “those who strive to come into contact with the good feel the need, first of all, not for knowledge or action, but for affirmation and tranquility 258. Finally, divine faith inexpressibly unites gods, demons and blessed souls with the Good. At the same time, good should not be sought at all through knowledge: it is necessary, by surrendering to the divine light and, as if closing one’s eyes, to establish oneself in the unknowable and hidden gened of beings. It is precisely this kind of faith that is more honorable (πρεσβύτερον) than cognitive action, not only among us, but also among the gods 259. At the same time, Proclus specifically separates faith, which precedes knowledge, from that which follows it - from divine faith. He calls not to consider such a faith identical to a delusion related to the sensual, i.e. not to be identified with opinion: the latter is lower than science (ἐπιστήμης) and, of course, lower than the truth of existence. And divine faith surpasses any knowledge and, like the highest unity, combines what follows with what precedes 260. Divine faith remains united and calm, since it is completely established and rooted in goodness 261. Here Proclus gives a definition of faith: theologians call contact and unity with the good 262 faith. Proclus persistently and repeatedly asserts the superiority of “divine faith” over prudence and science, research through knowledge. She is the highest unity, she is uniform and calm, she is affirmed and rooted in goodness. Connecting with the Good, it gives divine possession. If we read the passage of the Divine Names under consideration, which mentions knowledge of God, divine faith, and affirmation in truth, then its Neoplatonic roots will become clear. It is no coincidence that Dionysius, like Proclus, contrasts such faith, which gives unity with the Truth, with error (πλάνη), and also speaks of obsession: “He who is united with the Truth knows well that he possesses it, even if many admonish him as [out of his mind] frenzied (ἐξεστηκ ό τα). As befits, it remains hidden from them that, thanks to real faith, he has emerged from error into truth, and he himself truly knows that - contrary to what they say - he is not possessed (μαινόμενον) 263, but is freed from the fickle and changeable wandering in all possible varieties of error through the truth, simple and always abiding one and the same." Like Proclus, the mind united with the truth retreats from error, which is identical to ignorance. At the same time, he rises above himself, so that he seems possessed. This is the tradition that Maximus the Confessor touched on when he mentioned the ignorance that separates creation from God. Establishing the source of Maximus' ideas about ignorance-division is significant for the interpretation of the “first division” of Difficulty XLI (see below 3.6). Dionysius writes about three types of ignorance: (1) about ignorance as the absence of knowledge, (2) about ignorance of apophatic theology, (3) about ignorance as the highest knowledge achieved in a union that exceeds the mind. Of these three, Maximus, at the beginning of Difficulty XLI, accepts only the first type - ignorance as a lack of knowledge, but completes his reasoning by speaking of the “reason of faith”, which corresponds to the third type of ignorance - “learned ignorance”. The first mention of the feast of Epiphany that has come down to us is found in Clement of Alexandria (Stromata I, XXI, 145, 6–146, 2), who notes that some authors indicate not only the year, but also the day of the Savior’s birth, and the followers of Basilides celebrate (ἑορτάζουσι) and the day of His baptism. The attention of the Gnostics to Baptism is understandable: they professed Docetism, and therefore the carnal birth of Jesus was not significant for them; the birth of Christ as the Son of God occurred only at His baptism. Collationes X, 2 (PL 49, 820–821). D. Bernard Botte, O. S. V., Les origines de la ΝοέΙ et de VEpiphanie. Etude historique (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont C6sar, 1932), p. 9–31; Claudio Moreschini, Introduction, Grdgoire de Nazianze, SC 358, p. 16–22; Susan K. Roll, Toward the Origins of Christmas (Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1995), p. 77–79; 189–192; Archim. Cyprian (Kern). Liturgics. Gymnography and Eortology (Moscow, 1997), p. 106–115. Compare: Anthony, Metropolitan. Sourozhsky, Sermon on the Epiphany of the Lord (January 19, 1973): “Christmas is a moment... when human flesh is permeated by the Divine, when it is renewed, becomes eternal, pure, radiant, that flesh which, through the Cross, Resurrection, Ascension, will sit at the right hand of God and the Father. But on the day of the Baptism of the Lord... The man Jesus Christ brings this flesh as a sacrifice and as a gift not only to God, but to all humanity, taking on His shoulders all the horror of human sin... The waters of the Jordan, bearing all the heaviness and all the horror of sin, by touching the body of Christ, the sinless body, all-pure, immortal, permeated and shining with the Divine, the body of the God-man, are purified to the depths and again become primary, primeval waters of life, capable of cleansing and washing away sin, renewing a person, restoring incorruptibility to him..." Wed. also akathists: if in the Akathist to the Epiphany of the Lord more than a dozen times it is said about the renewal of man, then in the Akathist to the Nativity of Christ once. Thus, in the Word for the Day of Lights, on which our Lord was baptized (223, 12–14 Gebhardt; PG 46, 580ВС; Russian translation. Works of St. Gregory of Nyssa, part 8, TSO vol. 45, p. 3) Gregory of Nyssa writes: “So, Christ was born, as if a few days ago... Today He is baptized by John.” See also note. 205 About difficulties XLII (1345CD – 1349A). Compare: 1305CD: Starting from his own division, man had to gather all things to God. To do this, he had to shake off the male and female uniqueness from his nature in order to become only a person, not divided into man and woman, according to the logos, not fragmented into the divisions that now exist in human nature; 1309A: Christ rejects the distinction and division of human nature into male and female; 1309D: Christ freed people from the distinction between male and female, eliminating this type of division. 1309B: Thanks to Christ, the ecumene has lost its difference from paradise, its logos is deprived of division in accordance with the mentioned difference. Wed: Natural breaks in the universal nature of the world (1308D). More than once it is said about “one and identical”: τὸν ἕ να καὶ τὸν αὐτόν (1305A); ἕ ν καὶ ταὐτόν (1308V; 1312C). Man is a workshop of wholes (τῶνὅ λων, 1305A); Christ revealed in Himself the descent of all creation (τῆς ὅ λης κτίσεως, 1309C), man had to replace / exchange himself for himself and the whole God (ὅ λον αὐτόν ἀντιλαβ ὼ ν ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Θεόν, 1308В), the integrity of existence (τῇ ὁλότητι τής ὑπάρξεως) of the entire creation (1312В), in relation to the genus, the individual is seen as the whole (ὅ λον, 1312D). For example, 1313B: by the power of wisdom Christ contains the whole of existence (καθόλου τῶν ὅ ντων συνεχών). 1305B: Man is called a natural anchor, mediating the extremes [of the world] ( ἄκροις ). Compare: 1312 A: Christ embraces (περιλαβών) together with us and for our sake the entire totality of creation. Wed: Breaks in the universal nature of the world (τῆς κατὰ τὸ π ᾶ ν καθόλου φύσεως, 1308D); Christ reveals the original (all) general logoi (τούς καθόλου λόγους, 1308D), the complete unification of everything (τῆς καθόλου τῶν πάντων ἑνώσεως 1308D). Compare: “More general” and “most general” logoi, 1309С. Compare: “The whole (τὰ καθόλου), encompassing and generic” is opposed to “divided, particular and proper” (1312C); the logoi of everything divided and partial are encompassed by the logoi of the whole (τῶν καθόλου) and generic (131ZA); Christ contains all things (καθόλου τῶν ὄντων, 1313B). It talks about parts of man (3), earth, world. Human beings are entirely formed in the likeness of Christ (δι᾽ὅλου, 1312A); the generic is present in those subordinate to it as a whole (ὅ λον ὅ λοις, 1312С); as a whole, the whole person would be “interchangeable” with God (ὅ λος ὅ λ ῳ περιχωρήσας ὁλικῶς τῷ θέῷ, 1308 Β). Compare: Basil the Great, Conversations on the Sixth Day I, 2, 9–12: “For those who did not know God did not admit that the origin of all things depends on a rational cause, but in accordance with this initial ignorance they concluded about other things”"; Maxim, VO I, 173–178: “the soul... will comprehend a simple knowledge that connects everything with each other in the original Word of Wisdom, after which... it will experience a preconceived union with God Himself”; LX, 27: "To the Creator of all things" (τῶνὅ λων). Chrysippus, Fr. 351 apud Clement of Alexandria, Stromata VIII, 9, 32, 7: “Of the causes, some... are containing (τὰ συνεκτικά), others are co-causes, others are contributing... A containing cause is one in the presence of which the result is present, and when removed [which] disappears. They synonymously call the containing cause “self-sufficient,” since it is capable of independently and by itself causing the result”; Sextus Empiricus, Three Books of Pyrrho's Propositions III, 4, 15 (III, 15, 1–5 Mutschmann): “Of the causes, some are those containing (συνεκτικὰ)... with the existence of which there is also an action, and with the destruction of which [it] is destroyed, and by diminution, it decreases...” Leontius of Byzantium, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos II (PG 86/1, 1329D): “nothing [that comes] from a containing cause tends to persist in the caused, unless [that] cause is present.” Ps.-Aristotle, On the World VI, 397b 9. Gregory the Theologian, Homily 28, On Theology 6, 1–13 (PG 36, 32C, Russian translation pp. 394–395). Compare: He, On Providence (Carmina dogmatica, PG 37, 430, 2–5, Russian translation p. 127): “away from me are those who deny the Divinity, who do not attribute this inexpressible goodness in the universe to any creative and meaningful cause of all kinds.” Proclus, In Parmenidem 969, 18: “the third Species embrace everything (συνεκτικὰ τῶν ὅ λων)..”. Philo, On the Creation of the World 101, 2: “In the intelligible, the week reveals the motionless and impassive, and in the sensible, a great and all-encompassing (συνεκτικωτάτην) force [moving the seven planets]”; Porfiry, In Tim. II, 28, 31–32: “[Goodness is] a force that binds (συνεκτικὴ) every body in the cosmos”; Basil the Great, Conversations on Shestodnev, I, 9 (Russian translation p. 16): “Pillars J 92 (Ps 75:4) is the name given to the strength that supports (συνεκτικὴν) [the earth].” Proclus, In Tim. I, 90, 29 – 91, 2: “All the causes of the world order and everything that connects (συνεκτικὰ) opposites go back to one beginning and the latter is connected with the first through the middle. Dionysius the Areopagite, Heavenly Hierarchy 15, 3 (PG 3, 332C): “the backbone [means] that which contains (συνεκτικὸν) all the life-giving forces.” Philo, On the Order of the World 8, 2: Moses knew “the most important things (συνεκτικώτατα) in nature”; this passage is quoted by Eusebius in Praeparatio evangelica VIII, 13, 2, 2-3; Philo, On the structure of the world 162, 2: “the most important and most important (συνεκτικώταον) goal”; On the cherubim 88, 5: The Sun and Moon are “the most important (συνεκτικώτατα) heavenly [bodies]"; 88, 8–89, 1: “the most important cause” [of weather changes]; On the virtues 73, 2: “Heaven and Earth are the most important parts of the cosmos”; Iamblichus, On the Pythagorean life XXXII, 226, 9–10: [The Pythagoreans kept secret] “the most important and most important of theirs.” teachings"; Basil the Great, On the seventh psalm 9 (PG 29, 237, 8-9, Russian translation p. 200): "the most necessary and important thing in teaching." holding. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists I (IX, 1, 10 Mutschmann, Russian translation vol. 1, p. 244): “[academics refute] the most important and most general (συνεκτικώτατα)”; IX, 3, 5–6: “shaking everything partial on the basis of the most general (συνεκτικωτάτων)”; XI, 257, 1–2 (vol. 2, p. 50): “The most important points (τὰ συνεκτικώτατα) of ethical issues.” Maximus the Confessor, VO 13, 16–17: “Providence that embraces (συνεκτικὴ) existing”; Chapters on love III, 25: “four divine properties that bind, protect and save (συνεκτικ ὰ καὶ φρουρτητικ ὰ καὶ διασωστικ ὰ ) existing”... Compare: Proclus, Platonic Theology I, 123, 1–15: “Of those arising from two principles, some turn out to be... creating, protecting and connecting ( συνεκτικὰ )"; He, Fundamentals of Theology 139: “in every category, everything corresponding to the gods must be connecting (συνεκτικὰ) and saving in relation to the secondary”; Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names I, 7: “[The cause of everything is] the basis of everything, the beginning, leading to perfection, connecting, protecting, the hearth, turning everything united to itself...” Mystagogy XXIV, 110 (Russian translation p. 179): “gathering together many and various logos and raising them to the most primary (συνεκτικώτατον) Logos.” Compare: Origen, Against Celsus III, 26, 19. Gregory the Theologian, Sermon 7, 6, 2: παντοίας παώεύσεως ... ἐργαστήριον. He, Word 40 (PG 36, 413, 42, Russian translation p. 569): κεφαλὴν ... τὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐ ργαστήριον . Basil the Great, Conversations on the Six Days IV, 1, 19–26: “Let us not encircle the fox... this... workshop of God's creation ... and shall we not consider the structure of the universe?” Clement of Alexandria, Stromata III, 12, 83, 2: “the reception [of the seed] by the uterus leads to conception, when in the workshop of nature (ἐν τῷ τῆς φύσεως ἐργαστηρί ῳ) the seed is formed into an embryo”; IV, 23, 150, 2, 3: “[Man] is not created formless and unsettled in the workshop of nature, from where all humanity mysteriously comes.” On female infertility: John Chrysostom, Discourses on Genesis 38, 2 (353, 45): “the deadened workshop of nature, which has become incapable of childbearing”; 41, 6 (383, 38): “workshop damaged”; 56, 4 (491, 58): “The Lord of nature... can open the workshop of nature; about the seed in the womb: Gregory of Nyssa, On the structure of man XXIX (PG 44, 240, 7–10): “that which, having been expelled from the living body, is put into [it] for the generation of a living being, does not enter the workshop of nature dead or soulless.” In the Troparion of the Theotokos of the Coptic Orthodox Church we read: “We magnify you, the church (ἐργαστήριον) of inseparable union, in which nature (φύσις) is gathered without confusion into one single hypostasis (ύπόστασις),” op. from the book: Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol. 2. Part 4: The Church of Alexandria with Nubia and Ethiopia after 451, trans, by. O.C.Dean (London: Mowbray, 1996), p. 255. Maximus the Confessor, Quaestiones et dubia 1, 6: “Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Word of the Father, was incarnate in the workshop of our nature”; VO 62, 334: “In the secret workshop of the heart I hear God telling me this”; VO LII, 177–181 (p. 149): “When the human mind is enlightened by thoughts about the divine, the body will be adorned with tropos of thought divine logoi, which will make this body a rational forge (λογικὸν ἐργαστήριον) of virtues by rejecting innate passions"; but: XV, 52 (p. 50): “a foolish heart is like a forge of evil thoughts.” Gregory the Theologian, Word 39.13 (PG 36, 348.42–349, 14, Russian translation p. 538–539). Ibid., 39, 14 (349, 25–40, Russian translation p. 539): “However, earlier we [already] properly celebrated the Birth, and I am the initiator of the holiday, and you...” Compare: Homily 38, 6 (317, 4–6): “If you wish, I, who is now the master of the feast for you (ἑστιάτωρ ὑμῖν) ... will offer a word about this.” Actually, Homily 39 itself begins with Gregory announcing that we will be talking about another sacrament, i.e. no longer about the Nativity, sung in the previous sermon, but about the Baptism of the Lord: “Again my Jesus, and again the sacrament... For the holy day of lights, which we have reached, and which we are honored to celebrate now, has its beginning with the baptism of my Christ” (Slovo 39, 1, 336, 3–11, Russian translation, p. 532). Ibid., Word 38, 3–4 (PG 36, 313, 39–41, Russian translation p. 523): God became incarnate, “so that He who gave being would also give well-being.” Ibid. 38, 9 (320, 36–321, 4, Russian translation 526): “since it was not enough for Goodness to move only in contemplation of Itself, but it was necessary for the good to spill out and go further... after all, this is the highest Goodness, then She invents... angelic and heavenly powers... So the second lordships came into being, the servants of the first lordship, you know under them are either intelligent spirits, or a sort of immaterial and incorporeal fire, or whatever other nature is closest to what has been said... [Such are] those who exist around God (περὶ Θεὸν) and are the first to be illuminated by God.” Gregory the Theologian, Sermon 38, 11 (PG 36, 321, 45 – 324, 13, Russian translation p. 527). Ibid. 38, 12 (324, 39–52, Russian translation, p. 528). Ibid. 39, 13 (348, 42–349, 14, Russian translation, pp. 538–539). Nemesius, On the Nature of Man I (PG 40, 529B). Here Nemesius, almost in the Darwinian (and in fact, in the Aristotelian) paradigm, describes how gradually, without breaks - if you slide your gaze along the ladder of being - living organisms become more complex. Compare: Maximus the Confessor, On Difficulties XLI (1305B 13 – C 4): “For this purpose, man, who, like some natural connection, mediates with his parts the limits of the whole world and in himself brings together that which by nature is distant from each other at a great distance, was added last to the number of beings, so that, starting first of all from his own division, he could begin a unification that gathers all things to God, as to The reason." Compare: Theophilus of Antioch, To Autolycus I, 27. In the scholia to this place it is explained that the indicated phrase designates the sensual, and the internecine war refers to the opposition of elementary qualities: hot and cold, wet and dry. On the Reconciliation in Dionysius, see Ysabel de Andia, L'union ὰ Dieu chez Denys l'Areopagite (Leiden, New York, Koln: Brill, 1996), Ch. IX: LaPaix, p. 183–189. Compare: Ignatius of Antioch, Ephesians 13: “There is nothing better than reconciliation, in which every battle between things in heaven and on earth is destroyed.” By heavenly, Ignatius means the demons and angels who inhabit the air (cf. Eph 2:2), and by earthly, heretics who dissect Christian unity. Compare: A. Lemonnyer, “L'air comme s έ jour d'anges d'apr ὲ s Philon”, Revue de Sciences philosophiques et theologiques I (1907), pp. 305–311; L. Gry, “S έ jours et habitats divins d'apr ὲ s les Apocryphes de l'Ancien Testament", Ibid. 4 (1910), pp. 694–722; P. Benoit, "L'horizon paulinien de l'Epitre aux Eph έ siens", Revue Biblique 46 (1937), p. 346 sqq. It is characteristic that Ignatius uses the term ἔίνωσις, which is not found in either the Old or New Testament. See: T. Preiss, “La mystique de G imitation du Christ et de Tunit έ chez Ignace d'Antioche,” Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses 3 (1928), p. 197–242. T. Preiss writes: “Unity (unit έ) or union (union) is not just a word from the category dictated by circumstances, but the basic category of his [Ignatius’s] thought, a theme whose effect can be seen at all levels of his mysticism,” op. based on the book: Ysabel de Andia, Op. cit., p. 23. In the scholium, which is attributed to John of Scythopolis (392, 3 to 218, 4 (949A), in the book: P. Rorem, J. C. Lamoreaux, John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus, p. 239), it is said that here Dionysius refutes the “Hellenic philosophers”, some of whom said that everything is born thanks to discord and war, through opposition and battles; and others - that everything was created only by love and harmony. On the contrary, it is God who is the Creator and Gatherer of everything, and by the internecine war of everything one should understand the natural dissonance of the incorporeal, immaterial and intelligible in relation to the corporeal, material and perceptible by the senses. God pacifies the heavenly and earthly, thanks to which he unites the forces that serve love in love for those subordinate to them, and returns everything to Himself. The scholiast notes that a connection is called when something, even being dissimilar, comes to being composed. In the scholium to this place it is said that although the elements enter into confusion and inseparable interweaving with each other, their qualities do not lose their perfections, for example, heat, moisture, etc., in the mixture of those that belong to different species. The scholiast explains that by mixture we must understand here not such as a mixture (φύρασιν) of liquids, destroying the constituent parts (τὰ ὑποκείμενα), but unanimity and reciprocity, keeping in harmony both the composed and the constituent parts, i.e. the intelligible and the sensible, as well as the opposites themselves, which are in reconciliation with each other, such as water and earth, sky and ether. Perhaps the end of the scholia at this point belongs to Maximus, since it coincides with his reasoning both in thought and in vocabulary: “The upper (in relation to the lower) edge is the intelligible; in turn, the lower (in relation to the upper) edge is this earthly thing. They adjust to each other through means...". The scholiast notes: “[Dionysius] calls the most distant limits of everything inanimate entities, i.e. those in which neither any plant or nutritional movement, nor anything else is observed... Unity differs from union: the first reveals the own and unmixed nature of each, while union is mixing with another or simply participation.” On reconciliation with God the Father, see also: Col. 1:20; Rom 5&11; 2 Cor 5:18,19,20. Compare: 2 Cor 5:17: “If anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation; the ancient has passed away, now everything is new.” Compare: Origen, On the Beginnings II, 3, 7: “three opinions about the end of everything and about the highest bliss... [the essence] is as follows. Either rational beings will lead an incorporeal life... Or... the corporeal substance itself, uniting with the best and purest spirits... will pass into the ethereal state and shine... Or the form of the visible will pass away, all corruption will be destroyed and purified, and this entire state of the world, with its planetary spheres, will end and cease to exist; on top of the sphere, called motionless, the residence of the pious and blessed will be located, as if on the good earth and on the land of the living...” See: V.V. Petrov, “Body and corporeality in the eschatology of John Scott,” Cosmos and Soul, p. 669–674 (633–756). Compare: BI I, I (109, 13, 588B): “Genad, making every genad one,” as well as the scholia of John of Scythopolis to this place: “[Dionysius] calls God a genad, but one who creates [other] genads, i.e. creator of simple beings, such as angels and souls" (PG IV, 189CD). Wed. scholium: 193 (5) D-196A to BI I, 4 (112, 13, 589D). Scholium 204ВС 1 to I, 5 (to BI 116, 14, 593В: “god-like minds”): “god-like minds, being aware of us, achieve, as far as possible, union with the holy powers, which he previously called angels. We must understand here our theologians, I mean the prophets and apostles... Being deified after the cessation of all worldly activities, they achieve, as far as possible, an angelic union with God. After all, among those who comprehend the intellect, every movement, every activity and every rest is active, and directs towards the one-creating perfection... means action... favorable to serenity and perfection in the Genad.” Scholium 193AB 1 to BI 1.3 (111, 17–112, 1, 589C). Maxim, TI XXXVI (PG 91, 1305D-1308A). Compare: Clement of Alexandria, Stromata VI, 7 (61, 1): “Since Christ himself is called Wisdom and this action of His [is revealed] through the prophets, [action] through which the Gnostic tradition is learned (γνωστικὴν παράδοσιν), as He Himself taught after His coming ( ἐδίδαζεν) of the holy apostles, then this wisdom is gnosis, being true and accurate knowledge and comprehension of the present, and the future, and the past, which is transmitted and revealed by the Son of God. Maximus the Confessor, On the Difficulties XXXVI (1304D). Compare: Luke 1:2: “as those who from the beginning were given to us as eyewitnesses and ministers of the word”, αὐτόπται καὶ ὑπηρέται γενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου. We first noted it in V.V. Petrov, “Connections and divisions..,” p. 53–55. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Structure of Man XVI (PG 44, 184, 39–45): “uncreated (ἄκτιστον) nature is immutable and always the same, but created (κτιστήν) cannot be composed without change. After all, the very passage from non-existence into being is a certain movement and change of non-existence into being, changed by divine will.” Ibid., 184, 54 – 185, I. Wed: Ibid. XXII (205, 9–11): “in the divine and blessed nature there is no difference between male and female, but transferring to man the peculiarity (τὸ ἰδίωμα) of the dumb dispensation, He gave this race a method of reproduction not according to the sublimity of our creation.” Ibid., 185, 25–28. Compare: 2 Cor 12:4. We, Gregory says about ourselves, “imagine the truth in guesses and images, διὰ στοχασμῶν τινων καὶ εἰκόνων φαντασθεντες” (185, 11–13). It seems that here we have an allusion to words from another epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians: “Now we see as if through a glass,” (1 Cor 13:12). Compare: TI XXX (35, 97, 1288D-1289A), where Maxim comments on the phrase of Gregory the Theologian “it was not enough for Goodness to move only by contemplation of Itself, but goodness had to be poured out” (Homily 38, 9, PG 36, 317B), and there he quotes BI IX, 2: “according to the endless gift of outpouring goodness, bringing beings from non-existence and [giving them] to come into existence... According to Dionysius the Areopagite, who said: it is fitting to sing of God as the One who is outside everything, who through goodness brought into being every structure (διακόσμησιν) of the intelligible and the splendor of the visible.” Wed. also: ps.-Dionysius, NI IV, 1 (20, 9–11): “the super-essential God, having realized by goodness all the essences of existence, led them to being.” Compare: ps.-Dionysius, BI VII, 3 (197, 17 – 198, 3, 869C-872A). Compare: Maximus, TI XXIX (34, 96, 1288B): “the concept of what He is is incomprehensible and completely inaccessible to any creature, both visible and invisible.” TI XXXVI (1304D11–1305A8). Compare: 2 Cor 12:3. However, in another place in a similar context, Maximus suggests the presence of a certain supernatural logos corresponding to the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in the God-man, see: VO XLVIII, 66–78. Dionysius the Areopagite, BI IV, 6 (150, 8–9; PG 3, 701B). John of Scythopolis, Scholium PG 4, 252B. BI VII, 4 (199, 8–9, 872D). John of Scythopolis, Scholium PG IV, 353C. Another scholia (356B), missing from Phocas’ Syriac translation, reads: “He here calls fragmentation the instability and multiple divisibility of the will (gnomes).” In the Neoplatonic tradition, the participle προβεβλημένος (“outgoing”, lit., “thrown out”) means an emanation from a higher being. Compare: Proclus, in P arm. 717, 21: “the powers of the gods emanating (προβεβλημέναι) from the first [principles] reveal to those below them the singular, uniform and inexpressible existence of these [first principles]...”; Plato's Theology III, 47, 19. Thus this passage of the Areopagitik represents another manifestation of the tendency to reason in terms of emanations inherent in ps.-Dionysius. The reaction of Maximus the Confessor to this reasoning of the ps.-Dionysius is IN XXXII, 12sqq.: “Whoever does not determine the nature of visible [things] by feeling alone, but with his mind wisely seeks the meaning in each creature, he finds God and learns from what has come (προβεβλημένης) [from Him] the greatness of beings [to know] their Cause”, cf. the same “cosmic” context in his: Quaestiones et dubia 191, 53: “the universe proceeding (προβεβλημένη) and receiving being from God” (κοσμουργία). ps.-Dionysius, BI VII, 3 (197, 17–198, 3, 869C-872A). Wed. the scholium of John of Scythopolis (PG IV, 349С-352В) to this place: “God’s nature, what it is, has never been known by anyone in the created world, either by [scientific] knowledge, or by secret vision (ἐποπτιχῶς)... However, God is known from the order of creation. After all, if, according to the divine apostle (cf. Rom. 1:20), the beauty of the created reveals the Creator of being, i.e. the Creator of those who are in the process of becoming, then it is true that the order of beings is the knowledge of the Establisher of order...”; and also John of Scythopolis, Scholium 429 3 B-431A to TB V: “[Dionysius] says that existing things do not know God, who caused everything. But it is obvious destruction to not know God. He soon clarified this by saying “as She is,” i.e. that nothing that exists knows God as He is; meaning - His inconceivable and super-essential essence, or existence, as He exists..." Compare: Proclus, Fundamentals of Theology 103: “Everything is in everything.” Also cf.: 1 Cor 9:22: “I have become everything to everyone.” This is the so-called docta ignorantia, adopted in the Latin West by John Scott, and now associated mostly with the teaching of Nicholas of Cusa. There is a scholia for this reasoning of Ps.-Dionysius, which is absent in the Syriac translation of Phocas bar Sergius, and therefore cannot certainly be attributed to John of Scythopolis, although it contains a number of terms characteristic of John: “God, of course, is known by all creatures, as an artist by the creations of his art. In essence, He is in all respects separated from everything, and therefore, being unknowable to the creatures of His art, He is known through this ignorance, but also through scientific reflection and knowledge of creations” (Scholia 2 PG IV, 352BC to BI VII, 3). In general, the scholia to this place only repeat the thought of Dionysius, without developing or explaining it: cf. scholia of John of Scythopolis – 352CD; and others - 352D-353A and 353A. BI VII, 4 (198, 21–199, 12). Plato, Republic 511e; Timaeus 29s5. Hebrews 11:1: “Now faith is the substance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen”; 1 Cor 13:13: “faith, hope, love.” Compare: Hans Lewy, Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy. Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire. Nouvelle Edition par Michel Tardieu, Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978, 144–145. Proclus, Plato's Theology I, 25 (112, 25–113, 10). Ibid., 108, 24–109, 1. “Rootedness”, ἵ δρυσις, is a frequent term not only among Neoplatonists, but also among the ps.-Dionysius and Maximus. Ibid., 112, 1–6. On the Neoplatonic faith, see also: John M. Rist, Plotinus: The Path to Reality (1967), ch. 17, per. E.V. Afonasina, I.V. Berestova (St. Petersburg: Oleg Abyshko Publishing House, 2005). Wed: 1 Cor 14:23; 2 Cor 5:13.