Заключение. Нравственный смысл жизни в его окончательном определении и переход к теоретической философии

Our life receives moral meaning and dignity when an improving connection is established between it and the perfect Good. According to the very concept of perfect Good, all life and all being are connected with it and in this connection have their own meaning. Is there no meaning in animal life, in its nutrition and reproduction? But this undoubted and important meaning, expressing only the involuntary and partial connection of an individual being with the general good, cannot fill a person’s life: his mind and will, as forms of the infinite, require something else. The spirit is nourished by the knowledge of perfect Good and multiplied by its doing, that is, by the implementation of the universal and unconditional in all particular and conditional relations. By internally demanding a perfect connection with the absolute Good, we show that what is required has not yet been given to us and, therefore, the moral meaning of our life can only consist in achieving this perfect connection with the Good or in order to improve our existing internal connection with it. In the request for moral perfection, the general idea of ​​absolute Good is already given - its necessary characteristics. It must be comprehensive or contain the norm of our moral attitude towards everything. Everything that exists and that can exist is morally exhausted by three categories of dignity: we deal either with what is above us, or with what is equal to us, or with what is below us. It is logically impossible to find anything else fourth. According to the internal evidence of consciousness, the unconditional Good is above us, or God and everything that is already in perfect unity with Him, since we have not yet achieved this unity; Equally with us by nature is everything that is capable, like us, of independent moral improvement, that is on the path to the absolute and can see the goal in front of itself, that is, all human beings; Below us is everything that is not capable of internal self-improvement and that only through us can enter into perfect connection with the absolute, that is, material nature. This threefold relationship in its most general form is a fact: we are in fact subject to the absolute, whatever we call it; in the same way, in fact, we are equal to other people in the basic properties of human nature and are in solidarity with them in a common life destiny through heredity, history and community; in the same way, we actually have significant advantages over the material creation. So, the moral task can only consist in improving the given. The triplicity of the actual relationship must be transformed into a triune norm of rational and volitional activity; fatal submission to a higher power must become a conscious and free service to the perfect Good, natural solidarity with other people must turn into sympathetic and harmonious interaction with them; actual advantage over material nature must be transformed into rational dominion over it for ours and for its good. The real beginning of moral improvement lies in three basic feelings inherent in human nature and forming its natural virtue: in the feeling of shame, which protects our highest dignity in relation to the grips of animal instincts; in the feeling of pity, which internally equates us with others, and, finally, in the religious feeling, which reflects our recognition of the highest Good. In these feelings, representing the good nature, which initially strives for what it should (for inseparable from them is the consciousness, even vague, of their normality - the consciousness that one should be ashamed of the immensity of carnal desires and slavery to animal nature, that one should pity others, that one should bow before the Divine, that this is good, and the opposite of this is bad) - in these feelings and in the accompanying testimony of conscience there is a single, or, more precisely, the triune basis of moral improvement. A conscientious mind, generalizing the motives of a good nature, elevates them to law. The content of the moral law is the same as that given in good feelings, but only clothed in the form of a universal and necessary (mandatory) requirement or command. The moral law grows from the testimony of conscience, just as conscience itself is a feeling of shame, developed not from the material, but only from its formal side. Regarding the lower nature, the moral law, generalizing the immediate feeling of modesty, commands us to always dominate all sensual attractions, allowing them only as a subordinate element within the limits of reason; here morality is no longer expressed (as in the elementary feeling of shame) by a simple, instinctive repulsion of the hostile element, or retreat before it, but requires a real struggle with the flesh. – In relation to other people, the moral law gives the feeling of Pity, or sympathy, a form of justice, requiring that we recognize for each of our neighbors the same unconditional importance as for ourselves, or treat others as we could without contradiction want them to treat us, regardless of one or another feeling. – Finally, in relation to the Divine, the moral law asserts itself as the expression of His legislative will and demands its unconditional recognition for the sake of its own unconditional dignity or perfection. But for a person who has achieved such pure recognition of God’s will as the all-one and complete Good itself, it should be clear that the fullness of this will can only be revealed by the power of its own, internal action in the human soul. Having reached this peak, formal or rational morality enters the realm of absolute morality - the good of rational law is filled with the good of divine grace. According to the everlasting teaching of true Christianity, consistent with the essence of the matter, grace does not destroy nature and natural morality, but “perfects” it, that is, brings it to perfection, and in the same way, grace does not abolish the law, but fulfills it and only by force and to the extent of actual fulfillment makes it unnecessary. But the fulfillment of the moral principle (by nature and by law) cannot be limited to the personal life of an individual for two reasons - natural and moral. The natural reason is that man individually does not exist at all, and this reason would be quite sufficient from a practical point of view, but for strong moralists, for whom it is not existence that is important, but obligation, there is also a moral reason - the discrepancy between the concept of a separate person, separated from everyone, and the concept of perfection. So, on natural and moral grounds, the process of improvement, which constitutes the moral meaning of our life, can only be thought of as a collective process, occurring in a collective person, that is, in a family, people, humanity. These three types of collective man do not replace, but mutually support and complement each other and, each in their own way, move towards perfection. The family is being improved, spiritualizing and perpetuating the meaning of the personal past in a moral connection with ancestors, the meaning of the personal present in a true marriage and the meaning of the personal future in the upbringing of new generations. The people are improving, deepening and expanding their natural solidarity with other peoples in the sense of moral communication. Humanity is improving by organizing goodness in the general forms of religious, political and socio-economic culture, more and more consistent with the final goal - to make humanity ready for an unconditional moral order, or the Kingdom of God; religious goodness, or piety, is organized in the church, which must improve its human side, making it more and more consistent with the Divine side; human goodness, or just pity, is organized in the state, which is being improved, expanding the area of ​​truth and mercy regarding arbitrariness and violence within the people and between peoples; finally, physical good, or the moral relationship of man to material nature, is organized in an economic union, the perfection of which is not in the accumulation of things, but in the spiritualization of matter as a condition for normal and eternal physical existence. With the constant interaction of personal moral achievement and the organized moral work of a collective person, the moral meaning of life, or the Good, receives its final justification, appearing in all its purity, completeness and strength. The mental reproduction of this process in its totality - both following history in what has already been achieved, and preceding it in what remains to be done - is the moral philosophy expounded in this book. Bringing all its contents to one expression, we will find that the perfection of Good is finally defined as the indivisible organization of triune love. The feeling of reverence, or piety, first through fearful and involuntary, and then through free filial submission to a higher principle, having cognized its object as infinite perfection, turns into pure, all-encompassing and boundless love for it, conditioned only by the recognition of its absoluteness - ascending love. But, in accordance with its all-encompassing object, this love embraces everything else in God, and first of all those who can participate in it on an equal basis with us, that is, human beings; here our physical, and then moral and political pity for people becomes spiritual love for them, or an equation in love. But divine love, assimilated by man as all-embracing, cannot stop here either; becoming descending love, it also acts on material nature, introducing it into the fullness of absolute goodness, like a living throne of divine glory. When this universal justification of good, i.e., its extension to all life relations, becomes in fact, historically clear to every mind, then for each individual person there remains only the practical question of the will: to accept for oneself such a perfect moral meaning of life or to reject it. But while the end, although close, has not yet come, until the rightness of good has become an obvious fact in everything and for everyone, a theoretical doubt is still possible, insoluble within the limits of moral or practical philosophy, although in no way undermining the binding nature of its rules for people of good will. If the moral meaning of life essentially boils down to the all-round struggle and triumph of good over evil, then the eternal question arises: where does this evil itself come from? If it is from good, then isn’t the struggle with it a misunderstanding; if it has its origin apart from good, then how can good be unconditional, having outside itself a condition for its implementation? If it is not unconditional, then what is its fundamental advantage and the final guarantee of its triumph over evil? Reasonable faith in absolute Good is based on internal experience and on what follows from it with logical necessity. But internal religious experience is a personal matter and, from an external point of view, conditional. Therefore, when a rational faith based on it passes into general theoretical statements, theoretical justification is required from it. The question of the origin of evil is purely mental and can only be resolved by true metaphysics, which in turn presupposes the solution of another question: what is truth, what is its reliability and how is it known? The independence of moral philosophy in its own field does not exclude the internal connection of this field itself with the subjects of theoretical philosophy - the doctrine of knowledge and metaphysics. It is least fitting for believers in the absolute Good to be afraid of philosophical investigation of truth, as if the moral meaning of the world could lose something from its final explanation and as if union with God in love and agreement with the will of God in life could leave us uninvolved in the Divine mind. Having justified the Good as such in moral philosophy, we must justify the Good as Truth in theoretical philosophy. Application. The Formal Principle of Morality (Kant) – Presentation and Evaluation with Critical Comments on Empirical Ethics 185 The task of philosophical ethics cannot consist only in expressing in a brief formula the total number of moral actions, then ascertaining their reality and, finally, reducing them to one fundamental fact, which is recognized in the prevailing systems of empirical ethics as the fact of sympathy or compassion. That there are just and humane actions and that their internal natural basis lies in compassion or sympathy - simple everyday experience and ordinary common sense are enough to convince oneself of this; therefore, the philosophical study of morality cannot have only this task. It requires not a statement of these well-known and undoubted facts, but their explanation. In fact, we are given two types of human activity. One of them, namely the one in which the good of others is meant, we recognize as morally good, should be, that is, normal; the other, precisely the one in which our exclusive good is meant, we recognize, on the contrary, as morally bad, improper, or abnormal. 186 This is the real Datum of ethics, ότι, - that which remains to be explained; Its quaesitum, that is, the required explanation of this given (given (Lat.); because (Greek); sought-after (Lat.)), this fact, should obviously consist in showing the rational, internally obligatory basis for such an actual distinction, that is, showing why the first type of activity is supposed to be, or normal, and the second is not. This is the real διοτι - why ethics. The very empirical basis of ethics, the closest source of moral activity—compassion—is again only a fact of human nature. The same and even more powerful fact is egoism - the source of anti-moral activity. If, therefore, both activities are equally based on the fundamental facts of human nature, then it is not yet clear why one of them is normal and the other abnormal. A fact in itself, or as such, can be neither better nor worse than another. Since egoism, or the desire for exclusive self-affirmation, is the same immediate property of our mental nature as the opposite feeling of sympathy or altruism, then from the point of view of human nature (empirically given) egoism or altruism, as two equally real properties of this nature, are completely equal, and, therefore, that morality that does not know anything higher than the actual human nature cannot give a rational justification for the advantage that is actually given to one property and resulting from his activity before another. But, they say, there is no need for any rational justification, no theoretical justification for a moral principle. The immediate moral feeling or intuitive distinction between good and evil inherent in man is sufficient; in other words, morality as an instinct is sufficient; there is no need for morality as a rational conviction. Not to mention the fact that such a statement is obviously not an answer to the main theoretical question of ethics, but a simple denial of this question itself; in addition, the reference to instinct in this case is devoid of even practical meaning. For it is known that for humans, general instincts do not at all have that unconditional, life-determining meaning that they undoubtedly have for other animals, which are under the unlimited power of these instincts, which does not allow any evasion. In some of these animals we find a particularly strong development of the social or altruistic instinct, and in this respect man is far inferior to, for example, bees and ants. In general, if we keep in mind only immediate or instinctive morality, then we must admit that most of the lower animals are much more moral than humans. Such a proverb as “a raven cannot peck out a crow’s eye” has no analogy in humanity. Even the general public of man is not a direct consequence of the social instinct in the moral altruistic sense; on the contrary, for the most part this external community, in its mental source, is rather anti-moral and anti-social in nature, being based on general hostility and struggle, on the violent and illegal enslavement and exploitation of some by others; where the public actually represents a moral character, this has other, higher grounds than natural instinct. In any case, morality based on direct feeling, on instinct, can only take place in those animals in which the abdominal nervous system (which forms the closest material lining of immediate, or instinctive, mental life) decisively prevails over the cephalic nervous system (which forms the material lining of consciousness and reflection); but since in man (especially in the male sex), unfortunately or fortunately, we see the opposite phenomenon, namely, a decisive predominance of the cerebral nerve centers over the abdominal ones, as a result of which the element of consciousness and rational reflection necessarily enters into his moral definitions, then exclusively instinctive morality turns out to be unsuitable for him. This intuitive or instinctive morality itself refuses any mental significance, since in its very principle it denies the main mental requirement of ethics - to give a reasonable explanation or justification for the basic moral fact, and recognizes only this fact in its immediate, empirical existence. But, on the other hand, as has just been shown, this morality cannot have any practical, real meaning due to the weakness of a person’s moral instincts (corresponding to the relatively small development of his abdominal nerve centers and the abdominal part in general). But if, therefore, this intuitive morality can have neither mental interest nor practical force, then, obviously, it cannot have independent significance at all, but should be accepted only as an indication of that instinctive, or immediate, side that exists in all moral activity, although it does not have a determining force in a person for the reasons indicated. So, leaving this immediate or instinctive morality ad usum bestiarum (animals (lat.)), to which it rightfully belongs, we must look for a rational basis for human morality. The main newest representative of the doctrine being analyzed, Schopenhauer, also agrees with this, who turns to some speculative idea to reinforce his empirical principle. That which is in itself, Ding an sich, or metaphysical essence, is inseparable, one and identical in everything and in everyone, while the multiplicity, separateness and alienation of beings and things, determined by the principio individuationis (indivisible principle (Latin)), that is, the beginning of separation, exist only in a phenomenon or representation according to the law of causality, realized in matter, in the conditions of space and time. Thus, sympathy and the moral activity flowing from it, in which one being is identified or internally united with another, thereby affirms the metaphysical unity of existence, while, on the contrary, egoism and the activity flowing from it, in which one being relates to another as completely separate and alien from it, corresponds only to the physical law of the phenomenon. But what follows from this? The fact that the fact of sympathy expresses the substantial identity of beings, and the opposite fact of egoism expresses their phenomenal multiplicity and separateness, does not yet constitute the objective advantage of one over the other; for this phenomenal multiplicity and separateness of beings is absolutely as necessary as their substantial unity. It is logically clear that all beings are necessarily identical in substance and just as necessarily separate in appearance; these are only two sides of the same being, which, as such, do not have any objective advantage over one another. If these two sides excluded each other, then, of course, only one of them could be true, and the other would necessarily be false, but at the same time this latter would be impossible. This would be the case if it were a question of applying two opposite predicates, such as unity and plurality, to the same subject in the same relation; then, according to the logical law of identity, a dilemma would occur, i.e. one would have to accept one of the predicates as true and the other as false. But since in our case unity and plurality are affirmed not in the same relation, but in different ones, namely unity in relation to substance, and multiplicity in relation to phenomenon, their exclusivity is thereby denied, and the dilemma does not exist. In addition to this logical consideration, the very reality of both sides of existence shows that they are generally compatible; and therefore, if, as a result of the necessary law of historical development, various religious and philosophical teachings alternately stop at substantial unity, then at phenomenal multiplicity, sacrificing one to the other, then this is an error that is historically necessary, but not unconditional. From the fact that the human mind had to go through this error, it does not follow that it should remain with it. Of course, the logical and physical compatibility of universalism and individualism, sympathy and egoism does not exclude the moral inequality of these two principles. But in order to positively affirm such inequality, it is necessary to show what it consists of, what is the internal advantage of one over the other. In order to show the falsity or internal inconsistency of egoism, it is not enough to assert, like Schopenhauer, that every particularity, as existing only in imagination, is a ghost and a deception, that the principium individuationis (the beginning of particularity) is the cover of Maya, etc.; for such statements are either figurative expressions without a definite logical content, or they say too much. Namely: if the world of multiple phenomena is a ghost and a deception because it is a representation, and not a Ding an sich, and the representation determines both the object and the subject (that is, by the correlation of these two terms, the subject, as such, is possible only in representation), then in this case both the active subject, as well as those in whose favor he morally acts, are only a ghost and a deception, and, consequently, moral activity itself, which strives to affirm the ghostly existence of others subjects, is a ghost and deception no less than the opposite egoistic activity, striving to confirm the ghostly existence of the character himself. Thus, from this metaphysical point of view, moral activity is no better, no truer or more normal than immoral or egoistic activity. When you, out of compassion, help someone, save someone from danger, do a good deed, you are affirming the individual, special existence of this other subject, you want him, as such, to exist and be happy - he, this individual, and not a single metaphysical entity that cannot need our help. Consequently, moral activity, which generally strives to affirm and develop the individual existence of all beings in their plurality, thereby, according to Schopenhauer’s concepts, strives to affirm the ghost and deception, therefore, it is abnormal, and, thus, the metaphysical idea of ​​monism, instead of justifying morality, turns against it. And from this it follows that we must look for other rational foundations for ethics. Consideration of the generally accepted formula of the moral principle of action, to which Schopenhauer refers, will lead us to the same conclusion, namely: do not harm anyone, but help everyone as much as you can - neminem laede imo omnes, quantum potes, juva. This supreme moral rule is not limited to the negative requirement “do not harm anyone,” but also contains the positive requirement “help everyone,” that is, it requires from us not only that we ourselves do not cause suffering to others, but also, mainly, that we free others from any suffering that is not caused by us, that does not depend on us. This is only a feeling of sympathy, or compassion, raised to a principle, and since there can be no internal limitation here (for here, obviously, the more the better, the limitation quantum potes, “as much as you can,” refers only to the physical possibility of fulfillment, and not to the moral will), then the final meaning of this positive moral principle, indicating the final goal of normal practical activity and the highest moral good, or goodness, can be more accurately and definitely expressed as follows: strive for the liberation of all beings from any suffering, or from suffering as such. But in order for this requirement to have real meaning, it is obviously necessary to know what the essence of suffering is and how it is possible to get rid of it. Suffering in general occurs when the actual states of a known being are determined by something external, alien and disgusting to it. We suffer when the inner movement of our will cannot achieve fulfillment or fulfillment, when aspiration and reality, what we want and what we experience, do not coincide and do not correspond. So, suffering consists in the dependence of our will on an external existence alien to it, in the fact that this will does not have in itself the conditions for its satisfaction. To suffer means to be determined by another, external, therefore, the basis of suffering for the will lies in its heteronomy (alien legality), and, therefore, the highest, final goal of normal, practical activity is to liberate the world will, that is, the will of all beings, from this heteronomy, that is, from the power of this being alien to it. Thus, the essence of morality is determined by the autonomy or self-legitimacy of the will, and the direct task of ethics is to show the possibility of this autonomy, the conditions under which it can be valid. The definition of these conditions will include an explanation of the basic moral difference between what should and should not, since the normality of moral activity directly depends on the conditions of its self-legitimacy. Such a task, obviously, lies beyond the boundaries of any empirical ethics, for in experience we know only will, bound by an existence alien to it, manifesting itself according to the laws of necessity external to it, an alien lawful will. Thus, through experience we can only obtain the conditions of heteronomy of the will, therefore, the sought conditions of its autonomy can only be found by pure, or a priori, reason. The reader familiar with philosophy sees that with the concepts of heteronomy of the will and its autonomy, determined a priori, or from pure reason, we unexpectedly moved into the sphere of Kant’s moral ideas. Thus, the last result of empirical or material ethics naturally turns into the requirement of purely rational or formal ethics, to which we now turn. The empirical, material basis of the moral principle turned out to be insufficient in itself, because, having as its content one of the actual properties of human nature (compassion, or sympathy), it cannot explain this property as a universal and necessary source of normal actions and at the same time cannot give it practical force and dominance over other, opposite properties. True, the last requirement - to give the moral principle practical force and dominance - can be rejected by a philosophical moralist as being outside the means of philosophy in general. But the first requirement for a reasonable justification or explanation of the moral principle as such, that is, as the beginning of normal actions, must necessarily be fulfilled by ethical teaching, since otherwise it is not clear what the general purpose of such a teaching could be. It is necessary to distinguish ethics as purely empirical knowledge from ethics as a philosophical doctrine. The first can be content with classifying moral facts and indicating their material, factual foundations in human nature. Such ethics is part of empirical anthropology or psychology and cannot claim any fundamental significance. The same ethics, which puts forward a certain moral principle, must inevitably show the result of this principle as such. Empirical morality in all its forms reduces the moral activity of a person to certain aspirations or inclinations that constitute the actual property of his nature, and in the lower forms of this morality the main aspiration, from which all practical actions are derived, has an egoistic character, but in the highest, final form the main moral aspiration is determined by the nature of altruism, or sympathy. But any activity based only on a certain natural inclination, as such, cannot have a strictly moral character, that is, it cannot have the meaning of normal, or should be, activity. In fact, not to mention those lower expressions of empirical morality, which are generally unable to indicate any permanent and definite difference between normal and abnormal activities, even in the highest expression of empirical ethics, although such a difference is indicated, it is not at all justified. If a person acts morally only insofar as his actions are determined by a natural desire for the good of others, or sympathy, then, recognizing in this sympathy only the natural, factually given inclination of his nature and nothing more, the question arises: what is for him, I do not say practical obligation, but the theoretical, objective advantage of such activity over any other? Why won't he or shouldn't act in other cases immorally or selfishly, when egoism is the same natural property of his nature as the opposite desire, sympathy? Both types of activity are equally normal, since both have their source equally in the natural properties of man. Meanwhile, in fact, when we act morally, we not only demand from ourselves always and everywhere to act one way and not another, but we make the same demand on all other human beings, without asking at all about these or other properties of their nature; Consequently, we attribute to the moral principle, as such, an unconditional obligation, regardless of whether we currently have in our nature the empirical conditions for the actual implementation of this principle in ourselves or others. So, the formal moral character of activity, namely its normality, cannot be determined by one or another natural inclination, but must consist in something independent of empirical nature. In order for a certain type of activity to have a constant and internal advantage over others, it must have signs of universality and necessity, independent of any random empirical data. In other words, this type of activity must be absolutely obligatory for our consciousness. 187 So, the normality of an action is determined not by its origin from one or another empirical motive, but exclusively by its internal obligation. A moral action becomes such only insofar as it is recognized as an obligation, that is, as the necessity of action out of sheer respect for the moral law. Only through the concept of duty does morality cease to be an instinct and become a rational conviction. From what has been said, it is clear that the moral law, as such, that is, as the basis of some obligation, must have absolute necessity in itself, that is, have unconditional significance for all rational beings, and, therefore, the basis of its obligation cannot lie either in the nature of one or another creature, for example, a person, or in the conditions of the external world in which these creatures are placed; but this foundation must lie in the a priori concepts of pure reason, common to all rational beings. Any other prescription, based on the principles of one experience, can be a practical rule, but can never have the meaning of a moral law. If the moral dignity of an action is determined by the concept of duty, then, obviously, it is not enough that this action be only in accordance with or in accordance with the duty, but it is necessary that it be performed out of duty, or from the consciousness of duty, for an action that is in itself consistent with the duty, but which has in the acting subject another source besides the duty, is thereby devoid of moral value. So, for example, it is a duty to do good deeds whenever possible, but besides this there are those who do this out of simple natural inclination. In this case, their actions, although they cause approval, do not have any actual moral value. For any inclination, as an empirical property, does not have the character of necessity and constancy, can always be replaced by another inclination and even turn into its opposite, and therefore cannot serve as the basis for a universal, or objective, moral principle. In our example, that person who does good deeds out of natural inclination may, due to special personal circumstances, due to, for example, great grief and misfortune, which harden his character and, filling his soul with the consciousness of his own suffering and worries about himself, make him insensitive to the suffering and needs of others, he may, as a result of these circumstances, completely lose his inclination to compassion. But if, despite this, he continues to do good deeds, but now without any inclination, but solely out of obligation, then his actions will receive a true moral value. Moreover, let us imagine a person, although honest, but without any special sympathetic inclinations, cold in temperament and truly indifferent to the suffering of others, not because of the brutality of his moral nature, but perhaps because he himself endures his own suffering with patience and stoic indifference; such a person, doing good not out of inclination, but out of unconditional moral obligation, will always do it and completely independently of any empirical conditions; thus, although nature did not create him as a lover of humanity, he will find in himself a source of much greater moral dignity than the dignity of a good temperament. 188 Further, an action performed out of obligation has its moral dignity not in the goal that is achieved by this action, but in the rule by which this action is determined, or, more precisely, by which the determination for this action is determined. Consequently, this moral dignity does not depend on the reality of the object of the action, but exclusively on the principle of the will, according to which this action is performed independently of any objects of natural volition. 189 The will is in the middle between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its empirical motives, which are material. It is, as it were, at a crossroads between them, and since the moral will in this capacity cannot be determined by material motives, as having no moral value, and, nevertheless, it needs to be determined by something, then, obviously, it has no choice but to obey the formal principle. 190 Based on the above, the concept of duty is defined as follows: duty is the necessity of action out of respect for the moral law. In fact, since the word “respect” (Achtung) expresses our attitude towards something recognized as higher, and the moral law, as unconditional and purely rational, is something higher for man, as a limited and sensual being, then our attitude towards this law should appear only in the form of respect. I may have an inclination towards an object, as the result of my own action, but not respect, precisely because it is only a product, and not an activity of the will. In the same way, I cannot have respect for any inclination, my own or someone else’s: I can only approve in the first case, and sometimes love it in the second. Only that which is connected with my will as a basis, and not as an action, that does not serve my inclination, but prevails over it as the highest, that excludes it in the choice, that is, the moral law in itself, can be a subject of respect and, therefore, have obligation. If, therefore, action from duty must exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of desire, then nothing else remains determining for the will except the law on the objective side and pure respect for this moral law on the subjective side, i.e. the rule 191 to follow such a law, even in contradiction with all my inclinations. So, the moral price of an action does not lie in the result expected from it, and, therefore, not in any beginning of activity that would have this expected result as its motivation, for all these results, reducible to one’s own and others’ good, could be achieved through the action of other reasons, besides the will of a rational being, and in this will of a rational being lies the highest and unconditional good. Therefore, moral good can only consist in the representation of the moral law itself, which can only take place in a rational being, since his will is determined by this representation, and not by the intended action, and, therefore, this good is already present in the acting person, and is not expected only as a result of the action. 192 But what kind of law is this, the representation of which, even apart from any expected results, must determine the will so that it can be recognized as unconditionally good in the moral sense? Since we have deprived the will of all empirical motives and all particular laws based on these motives, that is, we have deprived the will of all material content, nothing more remains than the unconditional lawfulness of action in general, which alone must serve as the principle of the will, that is, I must always act in such a way that I can at the same time desire such an order in which the rule of this activity of mine would become a universal law. Here the principle of the will is one regularity in general, without any specific law limited to certain actions, and so it should be, unless duty is an empty dream or a chimerical concept. 193 This ethical principle is not drawn from experience. It is even impossible to indicate in experience at least one case in which one could confidently assert that the rule of action is actually this principle, and not some empirical motives. But this circumstance, obviously, does not in any way diminish the importance of the moral principle in itself, since it should express not what happens, but what should be. Nothing can be worse for morality than to deduce a principle from empirical examples, for every such example must itself be evaluated according to the principles of morality in order to see whether it can serve as a genuine moral example, so that the very moral significance of the example depends on already certain moral principles, which are thus already presupposed by this example and, therefore, cannot be deduced from it. Even the personality of the God-man, before we recognize it as the expression of a moral ideal, must be compared with the idea of ​​moral perfection. He himself says: “Why do you call me good - no one is good except God alone.” But where do we get the concept of God as the highest good, if not from the idea of ​​moral perfection, which reason constitutes a priori and inextricably connects with the concept of free, or self-legitimate, will. 194 From what has been said, it is clear that all moral concepts are completely a priori, that is, they have their place and source in reason, and moreover in the most ordinary human reason, no less than in the most speculative, that, therefore, they cannot be abstracted from any empirical, and therefore random knowledge, and that in this purity of their origin lies all their dignity, thanks to which they can serve us as the highest practical principles. 195 Everything that exists in nature acts according to its laws, but only a rational being has the ability to act according to the representation of the law, that is, according to the principle, and this ability is called will itself. Since reason is necessary to derive actions from laws, then, consequently, the will is nothing more than practical reason. When reason determines the will immutably, then the actions of such a being, recognized as objectively necessary, are also subjectively necessary; that is, the will in this case is the ability to choose only what the mind recognizes, regardless of inclination, as practically (morally) necessary or good. If reason in itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if it is still subject to subjective conditions (i.e., some motives) that do not always agree with objective ones, if, in a word, the will itself does not completely agree with reason (as we actually see in people), then actions recognized objectively as necessary are subjectively random and the determination of such a will in accordance with objective laws is compulsion. That is, the relationship of objective laws to a not entirely good will is presented as a determination of the will of a rational being, albeit by the foundations of reason, but which, however, this will by its nature does not necessarily follow. The presentation of an objective principle, in so far as it is compelling to the will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of a command is called an imperative. All imperatives are expressed by a certain obligation and show through this the relation of the objective laws of reason to a will that, by its subjective nature, is not determined with internal necessity by these laws, and such a relation is compulsion. 196 These imperatives say what it would be good to do or what to abstain from, but they say this to a will that does not always do something because it seems to it that it is good to do it. Practically, what is good is that which determines the will through the representation of reason, therefore, not from subjective reasons, but from objective ones, that is, from such reasons that have significance for every rational being as such. Thus, the practically good or practical good is distinguished from the pleasant, which has an influence on the will only through sensation, for purely subjective reasons, valid only for one or the other, and not as a rational principle binding on all. A completely good will is also under the objective laws of good, but cannot be represented as being forced by these laws to act according to law, because it itself, by its subjective property, can only be determined by the representation of good. Therefore, for the divine or generally for the holy will, no imperatives matter; obligation is inappropriate here, since the will itself necessarily agrees with the law. Thus, imperatives are only formulas that determine the relationship of the objective law of the will in general to the subjective imperfection in the will of one or another rational being, for example. person. The concept of imperative generally does not have exclusively moral meaning, but is necessarily presupposed by all practical activity. Imperatives generally command either hypothetically (conditionally) or categorically (indicative). The first represents the practical necessity of some possible action as a means to achieving something else that is or may be desirable. The categorical imperative is one that represents some action as objectively necessary in itself, without relation to another goal. Whatever is possible to the powers of any intelligent being can be represented as a possible end of some will, and therefore there is an infinite number of practical principles, insofar as they are represented as necessary for the attainment of this or that possible end. All sciences have a practical part, consisting of problems and rules, or imperatives, indicating how the solution of these problems can be achieved. Such imperatives can be called imperatives of skill or dexterity. Moreover, the question is not whether the goal is reasonable and good, but only what needs to be done to achieve it: an instruction for a doctor on how to best cure a person, and an instruction for a compiler of poisons on how best to kill him, have from this side the same value, since each serves to fully achieve the intended goal. But there is a goal that is not problematic, which is not just one of many possible goals, but is assumed to actually exist for all beings by virtue of natural necessity - this goal is happiness. The hypothetical imperative, which represents the practical necessity of action as a means to achieve this, always real goal, has an assertoric character. Since the choice of the best means to achieve the greatest welfare, or happiness, is determined by prudence, or practical mind (Klugheit), this imperative may be called the imperative of prudence; it is still hypothetical, that is, it has only a conditional or relative, although completely real, meaning, because the action it prescribes is not prescribed for its own sake, but only as a means to another goal, namely happiness. Finally, as has been said, there is a third kind of imperative, which directly prescribes a certain course of action without any relation to any other intended goal. This imperative is categorical and, in its unconditional, internal necessity, has an apodictic character. Since it does not relate to the material and external objects of the action and not to the results of the action, but to its own form and to the principle from which the action follows, and the essentially good in the action it prescribes must consist in a certain mood of the will, whatever the result of its action, then this imperative is strictly moral. The essential difference between these three imperatives corresponds to the inequality in the degree of their coercive power for the will. The first kind of imperatives are only technical rules of skill; the second kind are pragmatic instructions of prudence; Only the third kind of imperatives are real laws, or moral commands. Technical rules apply only to possible targets, chosen at will, and therefore have no binding force. The instructions of prudence, although they relate to a real and necessary goal, but since the very content of this goal, namely happiness, does not have a universal and unconditional character, but is determined by subjective and empirical conditions, then the instructions for achieving these subjective goals can only have the character of advice and instructions. Only a categorical, or moral, imperative, not determined by any external conditions and objects, thus representing the nature of internal unconditional necessity, can have its own internal binding force for the will, that is, serve as the basis for duties as a moral law. 197 What, exactly, is this unconditional moral law, or categorical imperative? When I have imagined any hypothetical imperative in general, I do not know in advance what it will contain, I do not know until I am given the conditions that determine it. When I think of the categorical imperative, I thereby know what it contains. For since the imperative, in addition to the law, contains only the necessity of the subjective rule to be consistent with this law, the law itself does not contain any condition by which it would be limited, then there is nothing else left except the universality of the law in general, with which the subjective rule of action must be consistent, which conformity alone represents the imperative as necessary. Thus, there is actually only one categorical imperative, namely: act only according to the rule by virtue of which you can at the same time want it to become a universal law. Since the universality of the law according to which action occurs constitutes what is actually called nature in the most general sense (formally), that is, the way of being of things is called nature, since it is determined by universal laws, then the universal imperative of duty can be expressed in this way: act as if the rule of your activity through your will should become a universal law of nature. 198 It is necessary that we can want the rule of our activity to become a universal law: this is the law, or the norm of moral assessment of this action in general. Some actions are such that their rules could not be thought of as a universal natural law, without internal contradiction. These rules are those by which unjust actions are determined. If the rule of unjust action became a universal law, that is, if, for example, everyone began to deceive each other, then, obviously, no one could be deceived. This rule would destroy itself, since the possibility of deception in a particular case depends only on what is accepted as a general rule not to deceive. With other subjective rules, although this impossibility does not exist, that is, although it is possible to imagine that they would become a universal law, it is impossible that we would want this, since such a will would contradict itself. These rules are those that do not agree with the duties of love, or philanthropy. So, for example, one can imagine an order in which no one would do positive good to others, no one would help others, but it is obvious that we cannot want such an order, because under it we ourselves would lose; since if it were a universal law not to help others, then we could not count on anyone’s help. The categorical imperative, therefore, excludes both of these types of actions, and two types of duties follow from its application: the duties of justice and the duties of philanthropy. 199 If the moral principle defined in this way is a necessary law for all rational beings, then it must be associated with the very concept of the will of rational beings in general. Will is thought of as the ability to determine oneself to act in accordance with the representation of known laws, and such an ability can only be found in rational beings. That which serves for the will as an objective basis for its self-determination is a goal, and if this goal is given through reason alone, then it must have the same meaning for all rational beings. What, on the contrary, contains only the basis for the possibility of action, the result of which is the goal, as achieved, is called a means. The subjective basis of desire is attraction; the objective basis of the will is motivation. Hence the difference between subjective goals based on drives and objective goals based on motivations that matter to every rational being. Practical principles are formal when abstracted from all subjective ends; they are material when they base themselves on these goals and, consequently, on certain drives. The goals that a rational being sets for itself arbitrarily, as desired results of activity (material), are all only relative, because only their relation to a well-defined desire of the subject gives them a value, which thus cannot justify any universal, for every rational being, or even for every desire, obligatory principles, that is, practical laws. Therefore, all these relative goals give rise to only hypothetical imperatives. But if we assume something whose existence in itself has an absolute value, which as an end in itself can be the basis of certain laws, then in it, and only in it alone, will there be the basis of a possible categorical imperative, that is, a practical law. But there is no doubt that man and, in general, every rational being exists as an end in itself, and not as a means only for the arbitrary use of one or another will. In all the actions of a rational being, it itself, as well as any other being towards which its actions are directed, must be taken as the goal. All objects of inclinations have only a conditional price, for if these inclinations themselves and the needs based on them did not exist, then their objects would not have any price. The inclinations themselves, as a source of needs, have so little absolute value that not only cannot they be desired for themselves, but, on the contrary, to be free from them should be the universal desire of all rational beings. Thus, the dignity of all objects that can be achieved by our actions is always conditional. Further, beings whose existence is based not on our will, but on nature, have, however, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as a means and are therefore called things. Only rational beings are persons, since their very nature determines them as ends in themselves, i.e. as something that cannot be used as a mere means and, therefore, limits any arbitrariness (and is a subject of respect). These are, therefore, not subjective ends, the existence of which, as the product of our action, has value for us, but objective ends, that is, something whose existence is an end in itself, and, moreover, one in whose place no other end can be put, for which it would serve as a means, for without this there would be nothing at all that has an absolute value. But if everything were only conditional and, therefore, accidental, then no supreme practical principle could be found for reason at all. If, however, there must exist a supreme practical principle, and in relation to the human will a categorical imperative, then it must, by virtue of the idea that necessity is an end for everyone, constitute an objective principle of the will and, thus, serve as a universal practical law. The basis of this principle is thus this: rational nature exists as an end in itself. This is how a person imagines his own existence, and to that extent it is a subjective principle of human actions. But in exactly the same way every other rational being imagines its existence on the same rational basis, which is valid for me; consequently, this is at the same time an objective principle, from which, as from the supreme practical basis, all laws of the will must be derived. Hence the practical imperative receives the following expression: “act in such a way that humanity, both in your person and in the person of everyone else, is always used by you as an end and never only as a means.” 200 That from this second expression of the categorical imperative the duties of both justice and philanthropy naturally follow - it is self-evident. This principle, which defines humanity and any rational nature in general as an end in itself - which constitutes the highest limiting condition for the freedom of action of every being - this principle is not taken from experience, firstly, because of its universality, since it applies to all rational beings in general, and secondly, because in it humanity is not set as a goal for a person subjectively (that is, not as an object that is arbitrarily posited as a real goal), but as an objective goal, which, like a law, should constitute the highest limitation of all subjective ends that we could have, and which, therefore, must flow from pure reason. Namely: the basis of any practical legislation lies objectively in the rule and form of universality, which gives the principle the ability to be a natural law; the subjective basis lies in the goal. But the subject of all ends is every rational being as an end in itself, according to the second formula. From here follows the third practical principle of the will, as the highest condition of its agreement with universal practical reason, namely the idea of ​​the will of every rational being as a universal legislative will. According to this principle, all subjective rules that cannot be reconciled with the will’s own universal legislation are rejected. The will, thus, is not simply subject to the law, but is subject to it in such a way that it can be recognized as self-legitimate and only for this reason, precisely subordinate to the law (of which it can recognize itself as the source). 201 The concept of every rational being, which in all the rules of its will must look at itself as giving a universal law, in order from this point of view to evaluate itself and its actions - this concept leads to another, very fruitful concept - the “kingdom of ends”. By kingdom I mean the systematic union of different intelligent beings by means of general laws. Since laws determine ends according to their universal significance, then, abstracting from the personal differences of rational beings and from the entire content of their particular goals, we obtain the totality of all goals in a systematic combination, that is, the kingdom of goals, consisting of all rational beings as ends in themselves, as well as those goals that are set by each of them, insofar as these latter are determined by a universal law; for rational beings are all under the law, according to which each of them should never treat themselves and all others as mere means, but always at the same time as independent ends. A rational being belongs to this kingdom of ends as a member when, although it has a general legislative significance, it is itself subject to these laws. It belongs to this kingdom as its head, when it, as legislative, is not subordinate to any other will. This last meaning, that is, the meaning of the head in the kingdom of goals, can thus belong to a rational being when it not only submits to the universal moral law or makes it the law of its will, but also when it has no other motives in its will that would contradict such submission, making it compulsory, that is, when it has no subjective limitation, no inclination and need. Thus the meaning of a head in the realm of ends cannot belong to a finite being as such, or while it remains finite. 202 In the realm of goals, everything has either a price (Preis) or a dignity (Würde). Something that has some value can be replaced by something else of equal or unambiguous value (equivalent); that which is above any price and, therefore, does not admit of any equivalent, has its own dignity. 203 The three expressions of the supreme principle of morality presented are only different aspects of the same law. Every rule has, firstly, a form consisting of universality, and from this side the formula of the moral imperative is expressed as follows: one must act according to the rule that could be desired, as a universal natural law. Secondly, the rule has some end, and on this side the formula expresses that a rational being must, as an end in itself, be the limiting condition of all relative and derivative ends. Thirdly, a complete definition of all goals in their interrelationship is necessary, and this is expressed in the formula that all rules, by virtue of their own legislation, must be coordinated into one possible kingdom of goals, which in implementation would also be the kingdom of nature. Here the transition is made through the category: unity in the form of will (its universality), multiplicity of the content of objects (that is, immediate goals) and universality or integrity in the system of these goals. 204 Acting according to its own internal law, the will is self-legitimate or autonomous. Thus, morality consists in the relation of action to the autonomy of the will. A will whose rules are necessarily or by nature consistent with the laws of autonomy is a holy or unconditionally good will. The dependence of a non-unconditionally good will on the principle of autonomy (moral compulsion) is a duty, which, therefore, cannot apply to an unconditionally good will, or to a holy being. 205 Will is a special kind of causality of living beings, since they are rational, while freedom is that property of this causality by which it can act independently of foreign causes that determine it, while natural necessity is a property of the causality of all irrational beings by which they are determined to act by the influence of extraneous causes. This concept of freedom is negative and therefore fruitless for comprehending its essence; but a positive definition of it, more meaningful and fruitful, also follows from it. Since the concept of causality includes the concept of laws according to which something called cause posits something else called effect, then freedom, although it is not a property of the will determined by the laws of nature, cannot, however, be completely devoid of law, but, on the contrary, must be determined by completely unchangeable laws, although of a different kind than physical laws, for otherwise freedom of the will would be something unthinkable. Natural necessity is heteronomy (alienity) of efficient causes, for every action performed by natural necessity is possible only according to the law that something else determines the efficient cause to act. In this case, what else can free will be if not autonomy, that is, the property of the will to be a law for itself? But the proposition “the will is a law unto itself in all its actions” denotes only the principle - to act only according to a rule that can have itself as an object as a universal law; but this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and the principle of morality. Thus, free will and will under moral laws are one and the same; and, therefore, if we assume free will, then morality with its principle follows by itself from a single analysis of this concept. 206 Having reached this pinnacle of Kantian ethics, where it already turns into metaphysics, we can make a general assessment of this moral teaching in connection with other ethical views. The basic datum of any morality is that between all human actions a certain difference is established, according to which some actions are recognized as proper or normal, while others are considered improper or abnormal; in short, the basic datum of any morality is the difference between good and evil. What, exactly, is this difference between good and evil and on what is it based - that is the question. Such a formulation of the basic moral question will not be contradicted by the remark that perhaps this difference between good and evil is only subjective, that it does not correspond to anything in the intrinsic essence of things, that, as the ancients said, μόνον (not good and evil by nature, but only by position). This possible assumption still does not eliminate the question of the foundations of moral difference, because in this question it is not stated that the difference between good and evil is objective. Even if it is only subjective, then it still exists and forms the basis of the moral task, without which no rational ethics, no moral teaching makes sense at all. As a result of ethical research, it may turn out that good and evil are only apparent, relative and purely subjective definitions. But in order for this to happen, they must first be subjected to research. So, what is good (for the positive concept of good and good gives us the opportunity to define the opposite concept of evil as purely negative)? The first elementary definition is given by the ethics of Idonism, which defines good as pleasure or pleasantness. And indeed, every good, as achieved or realized, gives pleasure (in the broad sense of the word) or is pleasant for the subject. But it does not follow from this that goodness itself is identical with pleasure, since this latter is only a general sign of every satisfied desire, both good and evil. All kinds of actions, both those that we call good and those that we call evil, equally and indifferently give pleasure to the subject who wanted to perform these actions and achieved his goal; because pleasure or pleasure is nothing more than the state of the will that has achieved its goal, whatever, however, this will itself may be and whatever its goal. The same can be said about more complex concepts - happiness and benefit, which define the moral teachings of eudaimonism and utilitarianism. These concepts, just like the concept of pleasure or pleasure, do not have any strictly moral character. Practical activity, as such, has as its object other beings on which or in relation to which the subject acts. Therefore, if, as has been said, the moral dignity of an action cannot be determined by its subjective results for the actor, such as pleasure, happiness, benefit, etc., then isn’t this dignity determined by the attitude of the actor to other subjects, as objects of action? From this side we get a new definition or a new answer to the basic moral question, namely, that morally good actions are those that have as their goal the own good of other subjects who constitute the subject of the action, and not the exclusive good of the acting subject. Thus, the difference between good and evil comes down to the difference between altruism and egoism. This principle is much more consistent than the previous ones, since it indicates a certain specific difference between two types of actions, coinciding with the generally accepted difference between good and evil. But what is the basis for this difference? Empirical ethics, which can seek its foundations only in the facts of human nature, which can therefore have only psychological foundations, points as the source of morally good action to the natural tendency of human nature to identify itself with others, to compassion, or sympathy. There is no doubt that this is where the main psychological source of the moral connection of people lies, but this does not give us an answer to the basic question of ethics, which requires not an indication of the factual basis of this or that activity, but a reasonable explanation or justification of the very difference between normal and abnormal, or morally good and evil actions. Although moral actions stem psychologically from sympathy, it is not sympathy, as a natural inclination, that gives them moral significance, for if a natural inclination in itself could serve as a moral justification, then selfish or evil actions, as based on another similar inclination of human nature, would have the same justification and, therefore, the difference between good and evil would again disappear. Doing a good deed out of inclination, I nevertheless realize, if only I attach moral significance to my action, that I should have done it even without this inclination, and that in the same way every other subject, whether he has or does not have this inclination, must act this way and not otherwise, and it makes no difference how he actually acts. Thus, by giving moral significance to certain actions, I thereby give them the character of a universal, internally necessary law, which every subject must or must obey if he wants his activity to have a moral value; Thus, this moral price for the subject is determined not by inclination, but by duty or obligation. From here, of course, it does not follow that a certain action has no moral value simply because it is performed out of inclination. It has no moral value only when it is committed solely out of inclination alone, without any consciousness of duty or obligation, for then it is only an accidental psychological fact, having no general, objective significance. Consciousness of duty or obligation and a natural inclination can be combined in the same action, and this, according to the general consciousness, not only does not reduce, but, on the contrary, increases the moral value of the action, although Kant, as we have seen, holds the opposite opinion and demands that the action be performed solely out of duty, and the inclination to good actions can only reduce their moral value. Since duty or obligation determines the general form of the moral principle, as universal and necessary, while the sympathetic inclination is the psychological motive of moral activity, these two factors cannot contradict each other, since they relate to different aspects of the matter - material and formal; and since in morality, as in everything else, form and matter are equally necessary, then, consequently, the rational principle of morality, as an unconditional duty or obligation, that is, a universal and necessary law for a rational being, is completely compatible with the experimental principle of morality, as a natural inclination to sympathy in a living being. The moral principle, expressed in the first formula of Kant's categorical imperative, determines only the form of moral activity, as universal and necessary. This formula follows analytically from the very original concept of moral action, as normal or one that, in contrast to immoral action, is what should be. In fact, the difference between good and evil, as normal and abnormal, obviously presupposes that the first, that is, normal, is universal and necessary, while the second is only particular and accidental. Hence the expression of the moral principle: act in such a way that the rule of your activity can become a universal and necessary law in your will. But the concept of universality already presupposes many agents: if the rule of my activity must be universal, then, obviously, there must be other agents for whom this rule must have the indicated meaning. If this subject were the only moral figure, then the rule of his activity would have a single meaning and could not be universal. And my very activity, as such, already necessarily presupposes other beings as its objects, and, therefore, the moral form of this activity cannot be indifferent in relation to these objects; and if the general form of moral activity, as such or in itself, consists in universality, then in relation to the objects of action this form is defined as follows: I should have as my own object of activity, as moral, only such things that themselves have a universal and necessary character, which can be ends in themselves, and not only means. Hence the second formula of the categorical imperative: act in such a way that all rational beings, as such, are an end in themselves, and not just a means of your activity. According to Kant, only rational beings can be such a goal; but this limitation stems only from Kant’s one-sided rationalism and is devoid of any objective grounds. And, firstly, what is a rational being? In this case, that is, regarding a moral question, it is obviously not theoretical or speculative reason that can matter, but only practical reason or moral will; and in fact, Kant in his ethics always understands a rational being as a being possessing practical reason or moral will. But should we understand here actual possession, in an act, in implementation, or only potential, in possibility or ability? In the first case, rational beings, which constitute the only object of obligatory moral activity, would be understood only as those in whom the moral law is actually implemented, that is, the righteous, and, therefore, we could have a moral obligation only towards the righteous. But such an assumption, firstly, leads to absurd consequences, too obvious to dwell on; secondly, it represents a hidden logical circle, since here the moral law is determined by its object (rational beings as independent goals), but this object, in turn, is determined only by its actual compliance with the moral law; finally, thirdly, this assumption directly contradicts the formal principle of morality as absolutely necessary. In fact, if, according to the above assumption, we had the obligation to act morally only in relation to persons who realize the moral law in themselves, that is, to the righteous (and in relation to others we would have the right according to the proverb: “With wolves, like a wolf howl”), then if there were not a single righteous person in the sphere of our activity (which is not only possible, but also quite plausible), then any moral duty or obligation would thereby be abolished for us. Thus, the binding nature of the moral law for given subjects would depend on the random empirical fact of the existence of other subjects who implement this law and through this can be the subject of our moral activity. Meanwhile, according to the general form of the moral principle, it must be an unconditional duty for every subject, completely independent of any empirical data, by the way, regardless of whether this duty is fulfilled by anyone, including ourselves; for the fact of non-fulfillment of the moral law concerns only empirical subjects, and not this law itself, as such. Not to mention the fact that, as Kant noted, there is generally no way to determine whether given actions are actually performed by virtue of one moral principle or by other, extraneous motives, that is, whether they actually have moral dignity or not; and from this it follows that we can never decide whether a given active subject has the character of righteousness or not, that is, we cannot distinguish the righteous from the unrighteous in empirical reality, and therefore, we cannot even assert with certainty that there are any righteous people in this activity. So, actual possession of practical reason or moral will is unthinkable as a condition determining the exclusive object of moral activity, and in fact Kant limits himself to the requirement of potential possession alone. In this sense, rational beings, who constitute as independent ends the only true object of moral activity, are defined as having the capacity of practical reason or moral will, that is, as being able to be or become moral (for since the possibility or ability by its very concept is not exhausted by a given reality, the possibility of being is always the possibility of becoming), which, as we know, comes down to the ability of autonomy or freedom. But the question is: on what basis can we divide beings regarding this ability, that is, recognize that some of them possess it and some do not, that some are rationally free beings and others are not? There are two possible points of view here. The first of them, empirical, considering all beings as phenomena in the necessary connection of their actual, existing existence, subjects them all, without exception, to the same law of natural necessity and, therefore, not only does not provide any grounds for the specified division, but directly excludes it. On this side there is not a single being that is free in anything, and therefore obligated to something. Everything that is done is necessary, everything done is an equally immutable fact that could not help but happen, therefore, under the given conditions, what it is must be, but unconditional obligation has no meaning. Here, therefore, there is no place at all for the formal principle of morality, as unconditional and non-empirical. Another point of view, on which only formal ethics can rely, recognizes that all beings, being undoubtedly phenomena or facts from the empirical side, are at the same time not only phenomena or facts, but something more, namely, they have their own internal essence, they are things in themselves (Dinge an sich), or noumena; in this intelligible essence, they cannot be subject to external, empirical necessity and, therefore, have freedom. This latter, therefore, belongs to all beings without exception, for nothing that really exists can be devoid of an intelligible essence, since otherwise it would be a phenomenon without an appearance, that is, nonsense. If, therefore, from the first point of view, all beings are equally subordinate to natural necessity, and from the second, they are all equally free, then, consequently, from the empirical, and from the intelligible, and from the physical, and from the metaphysical side, there appears to be a fundamental homogeneity of all beings in the indicated relation, and there is no division between them, and, therefore, there can be no grounds, either empirical or speculative, to contrast unconditionally rational beings with unreasonable ones and limit the moral sphere to one first. So, freeing the second expression of the formal moral principle from uncertainty and internal contradiction, we obtain the following rule: the moral will, as such, must have as its true object all beings, not only as means, but also as ends, or in the form of an imperative: act in such a way that all beings constitute an end, and not only a means of your activity. In this form, the second formula of the categorical imperative obviously coincides with the highest principle of empirical ethics, namely: “harm no one and help everyone as much as you can.” The expression of the categorical imperative gives only formal logical certainty to this principle. It is obvious, in fact, that, treating other beings as mere means, I can also harm them if this is necessary for the purpose for which I use them as means; recognizing other beings as goals, I must in no case harm them and am always obliged to act in their favor. Consequently, the rule of harming no one and helping everyone is only a more external and empirical expression for the rule of looking at all beings as ends and not means. In addition to the general form and immediate objects of action, moral activity must have a certain general result, which constitutes its ideal content or the last, final goal. If a moral agent is each subject, and all others are for him objects of action, as ends in themselves, then the general result of the moral activity of all subjects will be their organic union into the kingdom of ends. The kingdom of ends is an ideal system where each member is not only a material or a means, but is itself an end and in this capacity determines the activities of all others, thus having universal legislative significance. From here it is clear that each individual being constitutes the actual object or goal of moral activity, not in its particularity or separateness (for in this case moral activity would not necessarily have the form of universality that belongs to it), but as a necessary member of the universal kingdom of goals. This concept of the kingdom of ends defines the third and final expression of the categorical imperative. It is clear that all three expressions relate only to the form of moral activity, and not to its content. The first expression defines this form in itself, in its abstractness; the second defines this form in relation to the objects of moral action, and the third – in relation to the general and final goal. The last two expressions are necessary applications of the first. From some of Kant's remarks one might conclude that he attaches exclusive importance to the first expression of the categorical imperative. The moral dignity of an action, he says, relates exclusively to the form of the action, and not to its objects or purpose. But the very fact that Kant did not limit himself to the first expression of the categorical imperative, relating exclusively to the form in itself or taken abstractly, but added two others, this circumstance shows that these remarks should be considered Kant’s personal passions, stemming primarily from the formal nature of his mind and which he tried to eliminate, yielding to the objective necessity of the matter itself. From the dissertation “Critique of Abstract Principles,” which is no longer in circulation. The part of this book reproduced here (with amendments) was written about 20 years ago, when the author, in purely philosophical matters, was under the predominant influence of Kant and partly Schopenhauer. In addition to actions that are morally indifferent, which do not belong here at all, the areas of religious and ascetic morality are also not touched upon here, to which neither empirical nor purely formal ethics give due place. Schopenhauer rebels against the imperative mood in ethics. But this is only a question of words. To recognize (as Schopenhauer does) the unconditional internal superiority of moral activity over immoral activity, of love over egoism, means thereby recognizing the objective obligation of the former, and then, whether this obligation is expressed in the form of a command or in some other way, this does not in the least change the essence of the matter. What is important about Schopenhauer's ethics is not what mood she uses to express her principle, but that she does not justify it properly. See Grundlegung zur Metaphisik der Sitten von Immanuel Kant, vierte Auffage. Riga, 1797. Pp. 10, 11. “The rule (Maxime) is the subjective principle of volition; the objective principle (i.e., that which would also serve as a subjectively practical principle for all rational beings, if only reason had complete power over volition) is a practical (moral) law.” In other words, the moral law, which is an objective principle for the will of a rational being as such, may not be a subjective rule of our actions, since we yield to physical desires and random desires, the implementation of which we set as the rule of our activities. In the normal state of a moral being, that is, when reason dominates lower aspirations, the objective principle of practical reason is at the same time a subjective rule of personal will. Here, of course, the compulsion is internal. Kant, ibid, 97, 98. It is clear that Kant here means freedom not in the sense of unconditional arbitrariness, but in the sense of the ability to be determined by purely moral motivation, which is compatible with determinism in general (see above in my Introduction).