Письмо XV. Об общем и особом, то есть о сущности и ипостаси, Косьме, богоугоднейшему диакону Александрии

Poor Maxim wishes to rejoice at the most godly Mr. Deacon Cosmas. Since we are conducting lengthy speeches about the Divine Incarnation, which also touched upon those complex issues of piety, about which you, the man of God, asked my wretchedness to say what is general and universal and what is particular and special, so that from this the whole logos of the union would become clear to us, then I will not say anything at all on my own behalf, and what I learned from the Fathers, I say, without in the least changing their teaching about these things. The general and universal, or generic, according to the teaching of the Fathers, is essence and nature; they say that both are identical to each other. What is special and particular is hypostasis and person; because in their opinion they are identical to each other. And the great Basil explains this to Terentius and writes: “If we must briefly express our opinion, then we will say that in what relation the general is to the particular, in such is the essence to the hypostasis. After all, each of us is involved in being according to the general logos of essence, and according to our own qualities there is such and such” 203. And he, explaining the same thing to Amphilochius, says this: “Between essence and hypostasis there is the same difference as [314] between the general and the individual. This is how an animal treats such and such a person” 204. And further: “Those who claim that essence and hypostasis are one and the same must necessarily recognize only the persons as different” 205 . And he, while teaching a certain novice (κανονικήν τινα), writes to her, interpreting the meaning of the word “consubstantial”: “This very expression even corrects Sabelli’s evil. After all, it eliminates the identity of hypostasis and introduces a perfect idea of ​​persons; for nothing is consubstantial with itself, but with one another. So it is good and pious, because it distinguishes the peculiarity of the hypostases and establishes the immutability of nature" 206. Again, in his second letter to the neo-Caesareans, he teaches: “After all, you should know that just as one who does not recognize the essence as general falls into polytheism, so one who does not allow the particularity of hypostases returns to Judaism” 207. And also in that epistle in which he persuades Eustathius of Armenia 208 to subscribe, he writes, it seems clearly: “So we must clearly confess that we believe according to the words set forth by our Fathers in Nicaea, and according to the common sense denoted by the words. There are, after all, some people who, even in this faith, cheat with the word of truth and attract the understanding of doctrinal words to their plan. So Marcellus dared, thinking blasphemously about the hypostasis of our Lord Jesus Christ and interpreting Him as an empty name, to declare that his vile concept of consubstantiality originates from them. And some of the followers of the Libyan Sabellius, believing that hypostasis and essence are one and the same thing, from here, with a stretch, derive the grounds for inventing their blasphemy - from what is written in the doctrine: “And if anyone says that the Son of God is of a different essence or hypostasis, he will be anathematized by the Holy Catholic Church.” Those 210 did not say that essence and hypostasis are one and the same. After all, if both words expressed the same concept, what was the need for both? But it is clear that some deny that the Son is from the essence of the Father, others claim that 211 is from some other hypostasis [315] - so they rejected both of them as alien to church thought. For in explaining their thought, they said that the Son is from the essence of the Father, but they did not add “from hypostasis.” So one word is used to eliminate evil understanding, while the other expresses saving teaching” 212. In accordance with this, as we know, Gregory, who received his nickname from theology, speaks in his first theological word: “By affirming the middle, I express the truth, which only needs to be looked at, rejecting both the unsuitable fusion and the even more absurd division, so that by compressing the reasoning into one hypostasis due to the fear of polytheism, we are not left with only empty names, since we consider the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit to be one and the same.” 213. And a little later: “Because it is necessary to keep God as one, and to confess three hypostases, or three Persons, each with its own peculiarity. God will remain one, in my understanding, if the Son and the Spirit, being raised to a single source, will neither be combined nor merged, and the three hypostases will be conceived without any fusion, or decomposition, or confusion, so that the whole is not destroyed by an excessive desire to exalt unity. And according to the unity and identity of Divinity, so to speak, there is one movement, and one will, and identity of essence” 214. And in the farewell word again: “We believe in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, consubstantial and equal in glory, in Whom 215 baptism is completed, which - know, the initiate - is the denial of godlessness and the confession of the Divine; and thus we improve, cognizing unity in essence and inseparable worship, and trinity in hypostases, or persons” 216. And in the Word about lights, he says the same thing: “When I speak about God, you are illuminated (περιαστράφθητε) 217 ​​with one triple light; tripartite in characteristics, or hypostases, if anyone wants to call it that way, or Persons (after all, we will not quarrel over names as long as their syllables lead to the same concept), and one - according to the logos of the essence, or Divinity” 218. Such agreement in the Divine teaching is established by our fathers [316] theologians Gregory and Basil, who affirm exactly the same thing: nature, as general and universal - by essence, and hypostasis - person, as special and particular, without at all confusing the concepts presented by their transition into each other or merging. For they both conveyed the right profession of faith to the nations through the action of the same Spirit. In agreement with them, as you will see, all those who are entrusted with the governance of the Church by the grace of the Spirit preach the right teaching of the pious faith, and do not deviate in the least from the same understanding. A proof based more on nature and establishing that nothing that exists is identical to another in essence and hypostasis, and some things are identical in essence, but different in hypostasis, while others are identical in hypostasis, but in essence are completely different Since essence and nature are one and the same, and person and hypostasis are one and the same, it is clear that things of one nature and one essence are necessarily other-hypostatic. And in both respects, that is, in essence and in nature, nothing that exists is identical to anything else. Therefore, things that are united with each other by the same nature, or essence, that is, having the same essence and nature, will in no way be united by the same hypostasis, or by the same person, that is, they cannot have one person and one hypostasis; and those who unite according to the same hypostasis, or the same person, will in no way unite according to the same essence, or nature, that is, they will not at all turn out to belong to the same essence and nature. But things that are united by the same nature, or essence, that is, having the same essence and nature, differ from each other by hypostases, or persons, as is the case with angels and people, and with all created beings contemplated in form and genus. After all, an angel differs from an angel, and a man from a man, and a bull from a bull, and a dog from a dog in hypostasis, [317] but not in nature and essence. Reason will dare to assert even more: even in the beginningless First Cause, which created existing things, we do not see nature and hypostasis as identical to each other, if in fact we know that one essence and nature of the Divine exists in three hypostases, differing from each other in their characteristics, and the three hypostases - in the same single essence and nature of the Divine. After all, our worship is to the Unity in the Trinity, and the Trinity in the Unity; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God; and neither the Son is the Father, but is what the Father is, nor the Holy Spirit is the Son, but is what the Son is; for all that the Father is, except the unbegottenness, is the Son, for He is begotten; and everything that the Son is, except birth, is the Holy Spirit, for He proceeds. However, unbornness, birth, and procession do not dissect into three unequal or equal essences and natures the single nature and power of the ineffable Deity, but mark the persons, that is, the hypostases in which it exists, or rather, which are the single Deity, or essence and nature; and those things that are united by one and the same hypostasis, or person, that is, they belong to one hypostasis and constitute one person, are distinguished by the logos of essence, or nature, as is the case with the human soul and body, and in general with those things that have come together by hypostasis. After all, such things are not consubstantial with each other. So, things that are united according to the same essence, or nature, that is, belonging to the same essence and nature, are certainly consubstantial with each other and other hypostatic, but consubstantial according to the logos of an essential community, invariably seen in their natural identity, which is why one is and is called what is, no more than the other - after all, they are all endowed with the same definition and logos of essence. They are other-hypostatic according to the logos of the personal otherness that distinguishes them, which is why one is different from the other, and they do not coincide with each other in the features that mark the hypostases, [318] and each, with its own set of special properties, introduces its own logos of hypostatic particularity, which is why it does not accept community with those of the same nature and essence. Things that are united by one and the same hypostasis, or by one and the same person, that is, constituting one and the same hypostasis by union, are one and the same hypostasis and are of a different essence. They are one-hypostasis according to the logos of the indivisible personal singularity, formed from them by union, which is why the features that distinguish each thing from the essential community, simultaneous with the emergence of the union with each other, become signs of the single hypostasis formed from them, in which mutual identity is seen, not containing any difference, as in the human soul and body. After all, the features that delimit someone’s body from other bodies and someone’s soul from other souls, converging in connection, simultaneously identify and delimit from other people the hypostasis made up of them, say, Peter or Paul, and not the soul of Peter or Paul from some common body. For soul and body are mutually identical according to the logos of the single hypostasis constituted by their union, because neither one nor the other existed in themselves separately from the other before they were combined with each other to generate the species. At the same time, both emergence and addition occur, and at the same time the composition of the species by the addition of both. They are other-essential according to the logos of mutual natural otherness, which is why they do not at all accept the definition and logos of each other in essence, but each thing represents a different logos of its own essence, which does not coincide with the logos of the other, why, while maintaining the essential difference of soul and body, we do not produce confusion in the hypostasis consisting of them, which would be destroyed by the change and transformation into each other of those parts, or natures, from which they were composed. And if by the simultaneous convergence of soul and body for the emergence of a species, it is characteristic of each individual person to be created, [319] who, according to the logos of the natural community of his parts, retains consubstantiality with other people, and according to the logos of their features, maintains otherness in relation to other people, by the natural community of his parts uniting with other people, with whom he has the same nature of the species, but differing in the hypostatic peculiarity of his parts from other people, in comparison with whom he has hypostasis with a different and different face; and by what logos he is different from other people, by this he maintains the unity of his own personal inseparable unit completely without distinction, and by what logos he tends to unite with other people, by this he preserves, without merging, the difference of the essential otherness of his parts - then from this we understand without any confusion the logos of the incarnation, or incarnation, of One of the holy, consubstantial, and worshiped Trinity - God the Word. The fact that Christ, in essence uniting extremes in Himself by the commonality of His parts with them, preserved the difference of the parts among themselves, and through the characteristics of the parts showed the hypostatic identity of the whole, common to both... ... clearly teaching us that God the Word, being perfect in nature and essence, by which he is identical with the Father and the Spirit and consubstantial, and in Person and hypostasis, by which he differs from the Father and the Spirit, without merging, preserving the difference of Persons - having become incarnate from the Holy Spirit and the Holy Mother of God and the Ever-Virgin Mary, he became fully human, that is, he became a perfect man, of course, by the adoption of flesh, possessing an intelligent and rational soul, which in He assumed nature and hypostasis, that is, being and existence, simultaneously with the very conception of the Word, since God the Word Himself was instead of the seed, or rather, deigned to be the seed of His incarnation, and He Who is simple and uncomplicated by nature, by hypostasis became complex, in the immutability of parts, from which [320] He was composed, remaining one, still the same, unchangeable, inseparable and unmerged, in order to mediate according to hypostasis between the parts of which it consists, connecting with Himself the distance separating the extremes, establishing peace and by the Holy Spirit reconciling human nature with God and the Father (Eph. 2:15-16); being truly God in essence and truly becoming a natural man by dispensation, He is both undivided, despite the natural difference of His parts, and unformed, despite their hypostatic unity, but according to the logos of the essential community of the parts from which He was composed, He is naturally united with the Father and Mother, preserving the mutual difference of the parts of which He is composed; according to the logos of the hypostatic peculiarity of His parts, differing from the extremes - that is, from the Father and Mother - he contains, without any distinction, the unity of his own hypostasis, completely united by the perfect mutual hypostatic identity of His parts. After all, the essential community of each of the parts with the extremes in the unity of one hypostasis, preserving without merging the difference with the nature of the other part, does not allow the pious to recognize the one nature of both from the union, so that the emergence from their whole by the addition of one nature would not become a complete essential destruction of the parts: after all, such an emergence cannot in any way maintain the natural affinity of the extremes with the parts, will not preserve the mutual essential difference of the constituent parts after connection, but will reveal from the connection one composite hypostasis, preserved due to the natural existence of the parts of which it consists. And the hypostatic peculiarity of each of the parts, the addition of which forms Christ as a whole, thought together with the essential community, creates a common attribute of the parts, which marks the single hypostasis that has arisen from them. We affirm that the flesh and the Divinity have become common, through an ineffable union, into one hypostasis of Christ, formed by their descent through a natural, or true and real, union. I call it common, because it is one and the same, the most proper hypostasis of the parts, arising from the union, or rather, one and the same hypostasis of the Word now and before; [321] only before it was causeless, simple and uncomplicated, and then, due to the adoption of intelligently animated flesh, it became, without changing, truly complex; according to it, Christ, delimiting himself from extremes - I mean the Father and Mother - becomes one with Himself, not at all containing difference in Himself, so that the emergence of a hypostatic difference of parts does not become a complete destruction of the hypostatic identity of the parts, tearing in two the hypostatic unity of the person and unable to preserve the mutual identity of the parts in relation to the Persons, which is dismembered by the hypostatic difference into two persons. That the hypostatic commonality of the parts delimits the whole, that is, Christ, from the extremes, and the essential commonality of the parts with the extremes essentially connects Christ as a whole with the extremes After all, it is not by those characteristics by which it is distinguished from other people that the flesh maintains its distinction from the Word; again, and not by those features by which it differs from the Word, it is distinguished from us. But by those who are separated from us, they retain hypostatic union or identity with the Word; and with those who are naturally united with us, those, of course, maintain an essential difference with the Word. Likewise, God the Word: by what features he is distinguished as the Son and Word from the general Divinity, by those he retains a hypostatic union, or identity, with the flesh, and by those, as God, he maintains a natural difference with the flesh, by those, essentially one with the Father and the Spirit, he variably shows difference and identity with himself and with extremes (1), by the commonality of parts uniting with the extremes by nature, and by the characteristics of the same parts, of course, differing from extremes in hypostasis; in the hypostatic identity of His own parts He shows the preservation of the difference between the extremes with Himself, and in the essential otherness of the parts He acquires the natural identity of the extremes with His parts. Once the common parts are connected to the extremes, and the peculiarities of the parts (2) are delimited from extremes, it is clear that what unites with extremes, the same preserves the natural difference of parts from each other. What differentiates Himself from extremes is what reveals the hypostatic identity of His parts. This means that in each of the parts from which He was composed, Christ contains both the general and the particular: the general - in the logos of the essential identity of the extremes with His parts, according to which even after the union He retains the difference between the parts, and the special - in the logos of the hypostatic identity of the parts, according to which He is delimited from the extremes, preserving the unfused difference from them. Indeed, with the simultaneous convergence for the emergence of a certain whole, the true hypostatic union of parts converging with each other to form a certain whole, accepting each of their features, which delimits the part from the essential community, together with the general, shows it to be hypostatic, and not a hypostasis, because it does not exist separately on its own, delimited from homogeneous things, or from what is in connection for the emergence some whole coexists with it; and this is precisely what is characteristic of hypostasis. After all, what exists separately in itself is hypostasis (3), if hypostasis is an essence with its characteristics, distinguished by number from things of the same kind (4), and hypostasis is something that in itself does not exist at all, but is seen in another, as a species in the individual things that fall under it, or as combined with something else, different in essence, for the sake of the emergence of a certain whole; and to the extent that what is hypostatic differs by the features that delimit it from things that are homogeneous in essence, to the extent it is united and identified with what is hypostatically analogous. After all, it is not by the same features by which it is delimited from homogeneous things that it differs from its counterpart and coexistent by connection, but by what delimiting features it is distinguished from things of the same essence by the same ones that by union it preserves the identity of the hypostasis with its counterpart, maintained in the perfect unity of the person, as the mind teaches the truth about the Divine dispensation, or incarnation. After all, by what features the flesh is delimited and distinguished from us, by those it has a hypostatic identity with the Word, and by what features God the Word differs from the Father and the Spirit, being delimited as the Son, by those it maintains a hypostatic unity with the flesh, which is in no way separated. Therefore, the flesh of God the Word is not a hypostasis. After all, never at all, even for a quick moment of a flashing thought, did it at all exist on its own, separated by the features that delimited it from homogeneous things, or had a feature shared with the community with the Word of hypostasis, but was always hypostasized, since in Him and through Him it received the beginning of being, and became His flesh through the union and united with Him by hypostasis by the logos of the peculiarity that distinguishes it from other people. And, speaking more clearly, by hypostasis it became the own property of God the Word Himself, just as in essence it is common to Him, whose flesh it truly became a union. That Christ, being fully God and fully human, in what He is, contains the general and the particular, by which He is united with the extremes and differs from them, by the union of the extremes with Himself, certifying the preservation of the two natures of which He is composed, and by the difference of the extremes from Himself, establishing the unity of His own hypostasis Since God the Word, being God by nature, became man without change through the adoption of intelligently animated flesh, it is clear that, having become one from both and truly showing Himself as both in one, He contains both the general and the particular, by which He is united and distinguished from the extremes: by the natural difference of its own parts among themselves, He is essentially united with the extremes, and theirs, that is, of the parts, is distinguished by their identity in hypostasis from the extremes. And if He contains both difference and identity, then it is clear that He is both one and two. He is one according to the logos of his own inseparable hypostatic unity, and two are according to the logos of the mutual essential [324] otherness of his own parts, which persists even after the union (5). After all, difference is a logos according to which the mutual otherness of signified things is observed and which expresses the image of being (6). Identity is a complete coincidence, according to which the logos of the signified has perfect unity, in no way knowing any difference. A Brief Discourse on Distinction, Showing that the Essential Quantity of Combining Things is Preserved This means that since the mutual essential difference of the parts from which He is composed is preserved in Christ after the union, it is clearly proven by the pious that in essence the number of the combined things remained undiminished after the union, without coincidence preserving in the whole composed of them the definition and logos of the essence of each part in contrast to the other. If the hypostatic identity of the whole with its own parts, or, more clearly, of the parts with each other in the whole composed of them, is also preserved, then it is clear that the parts in relation to the single hypostasis composed of them are in no way different from each other. And then it is impossible to prove by any reasoning that what is different in essence merges, nor that what is united in hypostasis is divided. A more extensive and more nature-based discussion of difference, quantity, and the number that expresses them This means that if we affirm that in Christ after the union there is a difference, and with any difference it is necessary to introduce quantity, which, as we know, is expressed by number, then we, rightly using number only to explain the difference of different things after the union, do not at all separate the signified things by number, but explain that the existence of the united things is preserved, because any number tends to express only quantity, but not division. After all, what does not act and does not undergo, how can it determine any relationship? [325] when action belongs only to the essence, as well as to undergo - to the incidental, or quality, from which relations arise and from which arise, as those who practice this kind of reasoning say. Or rather, if we look more precisely, it is not they, that is, not essences and not incidental things, that create relationships, but the cause and power that created everything, giving each emerging thing the constituent logos of being, establishing the natural affinity and alienation of some things in relation to others. If indeed essence is not the creative cause of relationships, then number is even less so, because, not being an essence, it is not capable of creating at all, and not being an incidental or quality, it cannot endure. And since number is not characteristic of either creating or undergoing, it means that it is a sign denoting quantity, but in no way indicating the relationship in the quantity being explained, because it is not a genus to which things can be attributed, but a sign, as I said, indicating the genus to which things are classified. And since number is neither capable of creating nor undergoing, it is clear that since it does not create, it does not explain any relationship, that is, union or division - after all, this, as I said, refers to another logos, and since it is not capable of suffering, it is not divided. After all, any number in itself is inseparable, because it does not accommodate the movement of change, which is a property of quality, nor contraction and expansion, which is characteristic of essence, nor increase and decrease, which is a property of quantity. And since quantity, and not ratio - quantity is only simply, and not with an explanation of the mode of existence - is designated by number, then it is clear that neither division nor combination can by nature be produced by number, but only by the expression of quantity when we think of its presence. After all, as I said, the essence belongs to the action, and to the incoming, or quality, the undergoing; and neither one nor the other is a number. If it were an essence, then it would have independent existence, not needing anything else for being; [326] and if it were incidental, or quality, then it would either introduce a specific difference (τὴν ἰδιαίτατην διαφορὰν ἐποίει), and would constitute a definition of the countable, combined with the gender, and the species would explain, and not quantity, or, combining with species, would introduce difference in general and produce a difference from one to another in separate things raised to the same species, or would create a difference in the proper sense within the accumulation of all the properties of one thing, and not only another in relation to another, but also would show the thing designated by it to have a different quality. And since in general no one uses number to define things, then number is neither an essence nor a quality. And since number is neither one nor the other, it is clear that it is not characteristic of it either to act or to endure; and since number cannot act and undergo, then, of course, it does not connect or divide at all, as something acting, and is not divided at all, as something undergoing, and, expressing only the quantity of things, does not in any way affect their relationship. And since only quantity, but a relation in no way conceivable in itself, is expressed by number, then number is rather, so to speak, a kind of word and a name accompanying quantity. This means that whoever affirms the difference in Christ after the union certainly thinks of quantity along with the difference of different things. After all, what is completely simple does not accept differences, because it is completely self-identical and one, and completely and completely irrespective, as something that cannot be attributed to the quantitative genus (7), and therefore it cannot be counted in any way; and whoever, along with difference, also thinks of quantity - it is impossible to cognize a difference that is completely unrelated to number - and uses number for the sake of expression alone, and not for dividing what is conceivable with the difference of number, does not deviate from the truth, denoting by means of number the quantity necessarily conceivable with the difference, since, as I said, with any difference affirmed in any way, quantity certainly arises; and number, as we have learned, by nature expresses it and does not divide it. [327] If, then, he cares even more earnestly for the truth, who designates the quantity that is necessarily conceived with difference in the composition of the mystery by number, so as not to preach the confusion of united things, should not, for the same reason, be considered fair, following the opinion of some people, to confess the essential quantity of natures, preserved unfused in Christ after the union? since difference, as lengthy reasoning has shown, is characteristic of number, not division. And if after the union the essential logos of each of the united natures remained unchanged, without moving closer to the essence of the other, then it is obvious that the Divinity of Christ remained essentially Divine, without moving closer to the essence of the flesh, and on the other hand, His humanity remained essentially humanity, not allowing a change towards the nature of the Divinity. And since neither the Divinity of Christ nor humanity passed into each other due to the hypostatic union, and both natures, according to the teachings of the great Cyril, remained unfused, then it is clear that after the union there is a difference in the natures preserved in Christ, and there is nothing to object to this. And if, after the union, there is a difference of natures, unfusedly preserved in Christ, and the difference cannot be recognized completely separated from quantity, let the number of different things be used for the sake of explaining the difference, so that we are not suspected of preaching an imaginary and not a true difference. After all, reason considers any difference to be imaginary if it does not actually contain the truth about the different things. So, we, without ever asserting that hypostasis and nature are one and the same in the proper sense (8), according to the teaching of the Fathers, as was proven above, piously see in Christ identity and difference. The first is according to the logos of one hypostasis, according to which we confess God the Word as identical with our own flesh, so that the most holy Trinity does not receive the addition of a person and becomes a quaternity. The second is according to the logos of the essential otherness of the parts that make up Christ, according to which they in no way turn into each other in Him. Divinity and humanity will never become identical in essence, so that nothing created by union becomes one in nature and consubstantial with the Divinity. Because we know that to affirm the coexistence of one nature with another is a sign of a demented mind. After all, one nature is never of the same nature and consubstantial with another. For the one-nature and one-essence can only be affirmed in separate things that belong to the same genus and can be traced to one essence. That he who denies the identity of nature and hypostasis piously affirms in Christ union and difference, believing in the first by hypostasis, and in the second by nature Our confession is such that we do not deny the differences of natures, from which Christ was one, after the union, believing that the natures remained without fusion, nor do we reject the hypostatic union, confessing one Christ as a holy, consubstantial, and worshiped Trinity. But we also express the difference of the parts of which Christ consists, truly preserved in Him after union without dissection and fusion, by means of number, for the sake of eliminating the Apollinarian and Eutychean fusion, and, having recognized the hypostatic unity, we loudly expose against the Nestorian division the single nature of God the Word, embodied in intelligently animated flesh - equally avoiding the fusion of Apollinaris, who denies natural difference united parts after union and teaching that due to fusion, the flesh is by nature identical with the Word, and the division of Nestorius, who proclaims the hypostatic difference in Christ and dissects the hypostatic identity of the flesh with the Word. That Sevier, affirming the identity of nature and hypostasis, turns union into fusion, and difference into division, which shows that the logos of the Trinity expands into a quartet of persons, and the mystery of the Unity [329] dissects into a duality of deities, and blasphemously casts out Christ from all essential being Sevier, asserting the complete identity of essence and hypostasis, nature and person in the Divine Incarnation, does not know either an unfused union, although he pretended to assert it, or an inseparable difference, although he chatteringly boasted about it, but made the union a merger, following Apollinaris, and the difference - alienation, following Nestorius. After all, if hypostasis and nature are one and the same thing, then in no way will his flesh be either identical with the Word or different from Him. For if he affirms in Christ after the union the difference as in a natural quality, 219 it will turn out that he, together with Nestorius, himself shares the union, introducing after the union the hypostatic difference of the flesh with the Word, because in the natural quality he cannot conceive of the difference as anything other than a difference in the hypostatic quality, since nature and hypostasis are identical. After all, whoever affirms difference as a natural quality inevitably has to introduce also difference as a hypostatic quality in order to show hypostasis to an identical nature. If he begins to deny the hypostatic difference after the union, avoiding separation, then let him reject the natural difference after the union, if only he decides to be consistent and tries to observe the rules that he has determined for himself, since he has seen the mutual identity between nature and hypostasis according to logos and definition. If, according to both - I mean, by nature and by hypostasis - the flesh does not, as Sevier seems, differ from the Word, then let it clearly be consubstantial and one-hypostasis with Him, in accordance with the absurd fabrications of Apollinaris. If the flesh is consubstantial with the Word, then it will be consubstantial with both the Father and the Spirit, and it will turn out that the Trinity has become a quaternary, since consubstantial things do not allow hypostatic coincidence with each other. And if the flesh is one-hypostatic with the Word, then there will be a different essence. After all, things that are one-hypostatic have logoi of essence that are necessarily completely different [330] from each other. If the flesh is of another essence to the Word, as being one-hypostatic with Him after the union, then Sevier’s Christ will turn out to be dissected after the union into two natures, unless number really, as he believes, always has the ability to divide. So, everything that opposes the truth easily refutes itself and collapses. And if, by asserting the single complex nature of Christ after the union, he believes to give it a difference as a natural quality, then, firstly, since nature is complex, Christ will not be consubstantial with anything existing at all, unless Christ is one and only in essence and nature. Nature, as has already been said, cannot be completely consubstantial with nature. And not being consubstantial with anything that exists, He will not be completely either God or man, or, if God, then the one who preaches this will come out as a polytheist, because it turns out that by attributing to God the Father and the Holy Spirit an uncomplicated, as if simple, nature, and attributing to Christ God a complex nature, as if not simple, he proclaims two deities - one simple and one complex. Then, if he who asserts the difference as in a natural quality says that the natures to which the qualities belong are subject to different qualities, then it turns out that he, too, discovers two natures after the union, against which he fought, and is involuntarily forced to agree. And if he says that difference refers to empty qualities, devoid of reality, then let him declare the connection to be the same. After all, it is obvious that the difference after the connection and the connection itself refer to the same things - and so he introduced in a few syllables the spontaneity (τὸν αὐτοματισμόν) of Epicurus 220 and the false fabrication of Mani 221, since in truth he does not have Christ in reality, but exists only in ghostly qualities, and Christ will be God only in quality, not in action. After all, immortality and mortality, between which he asserts the difference after the union, belong to natures, but are not the essence of nature. Where is mortality, if there is no one who dies, or immortality, if there is no nature that is not touched by death? But wickedness is truly unreasonable, and the desire to appear wise tends to create great stupidity. And it is more useful for prudent people [331] to answer them with silence than, by refuting them, and themselves appear to be mocking the mystery. And Sevier, who thought so about Christ, truly died along with his teachings. A Brief Statement of the True Confession of the Fathers, with Correct Reasoning We don’t think like that, we don’t believe like that, and “this is not Jacob’s lot,” says the One who spoke (Jer. 10:16), but we confess that from two natures, each perfect according to its own logos of being—I’m talking about Divinity and humanity—one Christ was formed, or His one hypostasis, and we believe that these natures remained unfused and without any division after the union. For in believing in the existence of Christ, we have confessed that the natures from which He was composed are preserved after the union. And therefore, what is natural in Him - relating, of course, to the parts from which He is composed - we preach difference, because Divinity and humanity are not identical in essence, but hypostatic identity, for in hypostasis the flesh is clearly identical with the Word. So, knowing the actual difference of the natures from which Christ was made up after the union, we also know the hypostatic identity, since the naturally different parts of Christ do not differ from each other in the hypostasis of the whole, as it were, composed of them, because according to the logos of the whole, it is not at all common for the constituent parts of the whole to differ from each other. By natures, it means that we confess Him to be two, recognizing Him together as God and man, since we actually apply to Him not empty and meaningless names. We believe that He abides in two natures inseparably and unmerged after the union, and we preach that He is fully in the Divinity and He is fully in humanity, as a whole in parts. For He is known as a whole after the union in those parts of which He is composed, because both being, and indestructible existence, and the proper naming of Christ are revealed in nothing other than in the continuation of the natural existence of the parts from which He was composed, after the union, since not only does He consist of them, but also exists in them, or rather, [332] Christ is they; Let us count the parts of which Christ consists after the union, without dividing - let this not happen! - nature, but only expressing the difference between them, which persists after the connection. We confess the union, following Saint Cyril, as a natural descent, that is, genuine and real, and we proclaim the Most Holy Virgin to be truly and truly the Mother of God, not just like that, but as truly having conceived God the Word Himself, before all ages ineffably begotten of God the Father, and in an ineffable way giving birth to the one incarnate from Her. We exalt Him in miracles and suffering, as one, of course, Christ, performing both Divine and human deeds: Divine - in a carnal way, for with the flesh, not devoid of natural action, He realized the power of miracles, and human - Divine, for without violence over nature, by free consent, He took upon Himself the test of human suffering. We glorify Him with the cross, and death, and burial, and resurrection, and ascension into heaven, from which He descended disembodied and, in no way covered by existence, did not move, changing place after place. After all, he is free from any limitation, but out of natural love for mankind he appeared in the flesh, becoming, as he wished, included in our existence by actual birth from a woman. Therefore, we offer one worship with the Father and the Spirit to the Incarnate One. And if with our soul and lips we truly call the Holy Virgin the Mother of God and confess the hypostatic union, and believe that the union was accomplished by the convergence of natures, and preach one Lord, Christ and Son and one incarnate nature of God the Word Himself, and believe in Christ as one of the Persons of the Holy Trinity, worshiped and counted with the Father and the Spirit, how can they reproach Are we in separation people who know no fear and dare to commit any lie, simply because we utter the empty expression “number” solely for the sake of explaining, as has already been said many times, the difference of natures that persists after union? If in fact the number [333] necessarily divides the number of things, let someone prove it - and we will love this slander as the truth. If they only insult with slander those who preach the true doctrine of mystery, because they themselves are tormented because of it by a thirst for glory, then on the day of judgment they will give an account to God, according to the word of the Apostle (Rom. 14:12), for those whom they have led into error - if they have already completed the course of real life. And those who are still alive, may God correct them and bring them to the knowledge of the truth with which they are now at enmity. So it’s useful to speak according to the commandment that commands us to pray for those who curse (Matthew 5:44). So, I briefly outlined to you my reasoning about what you asked, for the sake of your complete conviction, not thinking one thing in my soul, as some adherents of Sevier divulge here and there, and telling their interlocutors something else; Don’t think so, but as I have been taught, and I think, and I believe, and have received it from the Fathers, I say so. Or rather, my very thoughts are embodied in my speeches. And if my word is false, from now on I will not receive bliss, but as the fruit of deception I will reap alienation from the promised benefits. For the sake of my obedience, in return, honor me with your prayers, so that Christ, our God, salvation to those who fear Him, will heal the wounds of my soul through the power of the mystery of life-giving suffering, which for our sake He endured, Who alone is glorified forever with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Amen. 1. In the definition, he says, the community of things that are identical in essence is seen. 2. He says that the properties that distinguish a complex hypostasis are common to its parts. 3. The exact definition of hypostasis. 4. Definition, or description, of the hypostatized. 5. Definition of generic differences. 6. Definition of generic identity. 7. A genus is a quantity that is expressed as a number. 8. He said “in the proper sense” because one’s own definitions do not transform into each other. After all, which things have more than one definition, they do not have one logos, and which things have more than one logos, they have a different way of being, and which things have a different way of being, they do not have complete [334] identity. This means that nature and hypostasis are not identical, because they really do not have the same image of being, logos and definition. This means that in the improper sense and in relation to something, and not in the proper sense, we will talk about hypostasis. Basil of Caesarea. Letter CCXIV (To Terentius Comite), 4, 6–11 (Courtonne). – Approx. resp. ed. Basil of Caesarea. Letter CCXXXIV (To Amphilochius), 6, 1–3 (Courtonne). – Approx. resp. ed. Right there. 6, 22–23 (Courtonne). – Approx. resp. ed. Basil of Caesarea. Letter LII (To the Nuns), 3, 1–6 (Courtonne). – Approx. resp. ed. Basil of Caesarea. Letter of the CCX (To the Neo-Caesarean Scholars), 5, 25–28 (Courtonne). – Approx. resp. ed. Eustathius (c. 300–377 or 380) – Bishop of Sebastia (c. 357), Metropolitan of Roman Armenia. Basil the Great urged him to "subscribe" to the Nicene Creed. – Approx. lane That is, from “these words.” – Approx. lane That is, the fathers of the First Ecumenical Council. – Approx. resp. ed. At St. Maxim, the words of St. are missing here. Vasily: “...He is not from the essence, but... (οὔτε ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλ῾).” – Approx. resp. ed. Basil of Caesarea. Letter CXXV (Confession of Faith), 1, 16–42 (Courtonne). – Approx. resp. ed. Gregory the Theologian. Word XX, PG 35 1072 14–20. – Approx. resp. ed. Right there. PG 35 1072 42–1073 8. – Approx. resp. ed. At St. Maxim, the words of St. are missing here. Gregory: “...in these names and subjects... (ἔν τε ὀνόμασι καὶ πράγμασιν).” – Approx. resp. ed. Gregory the Theologian. Word XLII, PG 36 476 44–477 5. – Approx. resp. ed. In the pre-revolutionary Russian translation of the Words of St. Gregory - “illuminate yourself” (Gregory the Theologian. Collection of works. T. 1. Minsk; Moscow, 2000. P. 651 [First ed.: M., 1851]). – Approx. resp. ed. Gregory the Theologian. Word XXXIX. PG 36 345 39–45. – Approx. resp. ed. The expression “difference as in natural quality” is a philosophical term. – Approx. lane See: “Epicurus taught... that the whole has being spontaneously (ἐζ αὐτοματισμοῦ εἶναι τὰ ὅλα)” (Epiphanius. Panarion, Heresy 6 (8) (Epicureans) I, 186, 12–14 [Holl]). Apparently, it was the testimony of St. Epiphany was in this case the source for St. Maxima. – Approx. resp. ed. On the Adoptianist understanding of Christ in Manichaeism, see: Kefalaya, I, 12; about docetic - see: Epiphanius. Panarion. Heresy 46 (66) (against the Manichaeans), III, 27, 2–11 [Holl]. On the intersections between Manichaean ideas about Christ and corresponding ideas common in Christian heretical teachings, see: Lyman R. Arians and manichees on Christ / The Journal of Theological Studies. 40, 1989, pp. 493–503. – Approx. resp. ed. You might be interested in: