Том I

Cum ergo vivit homo secundum hominen, non secundum Deum, similis est Diabolo. B. A u g u s t i n i de civitate Dei, L. XIV, c. VI. Hinc extitisse duas civitates diversas inter se atque contrarias...quond alii secundum hominem, alii secundum Deum vivant. B. A u g u s t i n i, ibid. 1 This book contains studies and studies written over the past few years and devoted to various issues of a philosophical, sociological, religious-historical, and economic nature 2 . But despite this external diversity of its themes, one thought, one plan unites them and constitutes the spiritual nerve of the entire book. This is a question about the true nature of the cultural and social ideal, about its ultimate basis. For me it is an axiom with apodictic certainty that the true basis of society must be seen in religion 3 . Religion is a social phenomenon, the “base” on which various “superstructures” are erected. In this sense, religion is a universal unifying principle, and man is a social being (… .. And Ristotle), only insofar as he is a religious being. Although in history there are various causes or “factors” of a spontaneous, impersonal nature, but, ultimately, they still serve only as passive material, which is conquered and shaped by the human spirit, the active beginning of history. It remains true that man makes his history, although he does not make it out of nothing, but from inert and resistant material, and history is the arena of the activity of spiritual forces, the struggle of spiritual potentialities that mature and become clear in this struggle. This general understanding of the essence of history can remain valid even with a very realistic, even economic interpretation of specific history, for, no matter what layers of passive matter we uncover during study, the only active, truly creative principle remains the spirit, breaking through these obstacles, overcoming them and in this victory realizing itself, returning to itself. Only through a misunderstanding or complete blindness can one speak of a spontaneous, impersonal, and therefore soulless and material (or “natural”) course of history. What is truly creative in history belongs, of course, to the human spirit in its living and therefore concrete self-determination, and the nature of the spirit is freedom. History in this sense is a free act, labor, and feat of humanity. But, by reducing human history to this source, we thereby bring it to the religious self-determination of the human spirit as the last and deepest self-foundation of spiritual existence, establishing that every spirit is in a free and therefore causally inexplicable act. And just as freedom is an integral property of the spirit, its nature, so religion, as the most basic use of this freedom, is a universal human property. Man is a religious being, there may be non-religious or even anti-religious people, but there are no non-religious people due to the metaphysical nature of man, his spirituality and his freedom, on the one hand, and his created limitations, on the other. If man were an absolute, self-sufficient being, as only the Divine, the Creator, and not a creature, can be conceived of, then he would be above religion; if he did not have a consciousness of his spirituality and freedom and did not have a desire for absolute existence, he would be lower than religion. But in this state, religiosity is a natural and even inevitable feeling. Religion, in its most literal and original meaning, is a feeling of one’s connection with the whole, with the absolute, and the necessity of this connection for the possibility of spiritual life, spiritual self-preservation. A person cannot assert himself only in himself and on himself; such religious solipsism is impossible for him; he takes the center of his existence beyond the boundaries of his self, spiritually leaves himself, considers himself only in connection with the whole, as a part of it, gives up his self in order to restore it in unity with the whole, makes himself in this sense a form that perceives absolute content. Religions are different, but religiosity is universal. The opposite of religiosity is not atheism, or the denial of a personal God, but irreligiosity, or rather, religious insanity, when a person sinks to such a state that for him the center of life really becomes his own self in its empirical shell, or serving his instincts, in the absence of any enthusiasm for good or evil. And from this point of view, the enthusiasm of evil, demonism, that is, religion inverted, representing the hostile and conscious opposite of religion, is far from a state of irreligion, spiritual hibernation. Spiritual philistinism, sluggish indifference, or animal service to one’s lower instincts, a general renunciation of one’s freedom and one’s spirituality - this is what irreligiosity actually represents, and its possibility is carried in the soul of every person, regardless of his beliefs. It constantly pulls him down, crushes the life of the spirit, which is therefore given only in a struggle full of victories and defeats. This reveals the power of the element of sin, the weakness of the flesh, against which the spirit is awake. There are two main paths of religious self-determination, to which their various ramifications lead: theism, which finds its completion in Christianity, and pantheism, which finds it in the religion of man-theism and anti-Christianity. The world, and man in it, goes through stages of extra-divine existence - not, of course, in the sense that it has independence of being and can exist even for a moment by its own power, apart from the will of the Almighty Creator, but in the sense that it has freedom in the consciousness of man to establish itself in God and outside of God. Pure self-divinity, self-affirmation of one’s creatureliness as an absolute is Satanism, a state that is directly inaccessible to humans. The self-affirmation of man outside of God takes on the character of only a conscious deification of creation, pantheism or cosmotheism, and only in opposition to theism is it defined as atheism or even antitheism, anti-Christianity. This pantheism can take various expressions: the materialism of the encyclopedists, the hylozoism of Haeckel, the spiritualistic atheism of Hartmann and Schopenhauer, the economic materialism of Marx, the agnostic positivism of Kant and Spencer. All these varieties are religiously reduced, however, to the same content - pantheism and cosmotheism. But this all-theism or world-theism in religious experience inevitably takes on the features of man-theism. Man is the beauty of the universe, its king and master, humanity is a deity in which every individual human being becomes involved. And just as the world gave birth to man, so humanity faces the task of giving birth to a superman, a god. But humanity exists only in individuals and everything highest in a person necessarily receives personal embodiment, therefore this task in its final expression boils down to the desire to give birth to a single superman, a personal god, that is, the one who in Christianity is called the Antichrist. The developing potential, the inevitable task of man-god is this individual man-god, in whom the entire universe would find its apotheosis; this idea of ​​the Antichrist-superman was explained to modern humanity by Nietzsche 4 . The final meaning of man-theism comes down to appropriating God’s creation for oneself, declaring oneself its god. This is the path of Satan, who, not having his own power of being and in his falling away from God, becoming the spirit of non-existence, can manifest this power only through metaphysical theft, receiving only a ghostly “meteorical” (in Schelling’s words) existence in oscillations between being and non-being, exists only by deception, which will be revealed with complete separation from being and non-being, light and “utter darkness” located beyond the edge (“except”) being. Humanity, embarking on the path of man-theism, although it is also lured onto a false and disastrous path, nevertheless falls into self-deception, which to a certain extent is natural and understandable. It is natural to fall into the deification of humanity because in humanity, even fallen and sinful, divine forces really mature and are revealed, and history is truly progress in their revelation, therefore the temptation of self-deification here is objectively justified, just as the possibility of natural pantheism is based on a genuine perception of the mystical essence of nature. The question is not whether history is a revelation of divine power in man, but whether it is only a revelation about man or a self-revelation of man? Is it human self-creativity, or does it only reveal the forces invested in the creation of man, the “image and likeness”, which in themselves already represent an initial given and only pass in history from a potential, hidden state to an actual one? But in this case, by attributing history to himself in the ontological sense, a person simply wants to steal and appropriate what does not belong to him, the son turns into a rebellious slave. This combination of the obvious divinity of the world and man and the self-legitimacy, independence of the universe contains the possibility, and if we take into account the reality of the evil principle and the universal inclination to sin, then the inevitability of the basic religious antinomy, self-determination towards God and against God, the path of Christianity and man-theism, theism and pantheism. In a religious sense, tertium non datur 5. And this duality determines the entire path of development of Christian Europe (we leave non-Christian countries aside so as not to complicate the issue), shines through its entire culture, and is reflected in the social ideals that dominate minds and hearts. The life of the world in its extra-divine existence leads to the separation of these principles, which takes place in their confrontation. The autonomy of the world is redeemed only by tragedy, and therefore “the basic material of all life and existence is the terrible” (Schelling). The feeling of the tragic is an invariable feature of any deep religious-philosophical view. From it the mysteries of the “suffering god” and the tragedies of the Hellenes were born. The religion of the Cross announced to us about the world as the foot of Golgotha. The religion of the Cross also teaches about “radical evil” in the person of Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer. The tragedy was announced to the nineteenth century by the herald of the Dionysian riot and lamentation of Nietzsche. And if there is progress in history of true and higher humanity, then this is the progress of tragedy, its internal maturation. And overcoming tragedy is partially given only to spiritual feats, prayerful, moral, artistic, like a blood victory, wrested in the struggle and defended from hostile forces, while its cosmic overcoming is transcendental to natural life, will be accomplished only on a new earth and under a new sky, beyond the gates of personal and world death, in the beyond. Therefore, in the life of both an individual and all humanity, this struggle goes on, continuous and tireless, its peaks are illuminated by unearthly bliss, but this is not what is usually called happiness and is sometimes set as the goal of history. Where reconciliation occurs instead of overcoming tragedy, philistinism invariably reigns. The vulgar is a shadow of the tragic, an unrealized tragedy that has resolved itself into a light comedy. This is Gogol’s horror of life, in which he saw the Chichikovs and Khlestakovs, a farce instead of a tragedy. This is Herzen’s despondency when he read on the brow of Western civilization the ominous inscription: philistinism. These are the colors with which images of “earthly paradise” are inevitably cast in various social utopias. Only the religion of the Redemption takes us beyond this hopelessness of life in its promises, fulfilled in the grace of the sacraments. But for cosmotheism and man-theism it is necessary to overcome the tragedy in history, otherwise the kingdom of this world will turn out to be unrealizable, and then the opening abyss of pessimism and despair threatens. Hence the trait of optimism, idyllic complacency, belief in the possibility of self-salvation for humanity and the feasibility of universal harmony on earth through progress. This optimism receives classical expression in the 18th-century doctrines of “natural man,” but it is invariably implied, covertly or openly, in the social teachings of the 19th century, no matter how pessimistic about the present they may seem. Humanity is moving towards the coming hail. His sacrificial path is watered with sweat and blood and is completely alien to any idyll, which is why the dream of the city also takes on a transcendental, religious character. And this is a shield that protects from religious dying, from true irreligiosity, that part of humanity that mistook the mirage of the desert for a pillar of cloud and followed it. And this holy anxiety of seeking, this incessant call somewhere far and high, this irreconcilability to the present is the truly divine in man, which can only be distorted by the infidelity of the path, the falsity of aspiration. History is a tireless striving, an eternal anxiety, a path that has no end. History cannot internally end within history; “bad infinity” is its nature. Only once in his life was Faust able to say to a moment: stop! but this was the moment of his death. The hour hand fell, time ran out, turning to one point. And the entire positive result, the integral of his life, is summed up in the beyond, for which Alles vergängliche Ist nur ein Gleichniss, Das Unzulängliche Hier wird's Ereigniss 6 . But if this unattainable (Unzulängliche), which can be achieved, become “Ereigniss”, only after the fall of the hour hand, that is, when “there will be no more time,” is declared achievable and already achieved in time, then the spiritual gaze is blinded by the mirage of the earthly city, alluring and teasing, but deceiving. The ghost does its job, because it drives you forward, not allowing you to calm down, but this ghostliness penetrates into the soul of a person and fatally leads you to the path of man-theism. Humanity kisses its wounds, worships its passions, measures its difficult path, but already appropriates to itself everything perfect, abandoning God, wants to live “in its own name.” Throughout world history we can observe this spectacle. One after another, these earthly ideals are created, an earthly city is mentally constructed, its plan and drawing are developed. In the ancient world, this dream was expressed most clearly in Plato’s “Politeia,” who built an earthly city similar to a pagan monastery and found the key to the treasured doors in philosophical clericalism. And the same dream, in the form of Jewish chiliasm, blinded the eyes of Jewry and prevented it from recognizing the true Messiah in the King not of this world. It penetrates into the Christian world first in the doctrine of papal hierocracy, from which the entire system of papism grew, culminating in the dogma of papal infallibility. Augustine was given the power to express with genius the entire contrast of the two cities, but only in order to immediately proclaim the earthly church as an already achieved city, the kingdom of God on earth. Augustinism in this sense predetermined the development of the entire Middle Ages, even more so of all Catholicism as papism (of course, in no way can one equate these concepts, for “Catholicism” is the western part of the one universal Christian Church, while papism is its local deviation and new formation, which can be considered completely separately and independently). Throughout the Middle Ages, the Roman Church asserted itself as an earthly city, an earthly theocracy, and only from this is the theory of the two swords and all the claims of papism understandable. Through papism 7 and Jewish chiliasm, the dream of an earthly city was revived in Western Christianity and was the cause of many misfortunes for it. The same poison penetrates into Orthodoxy in the teaching of a mystical autocracy, supposedly called upon to bring about an earthly city. But in Orthodoxy this opinion never acquired the character of a dogma, as in Catholicism, remaining at most in the position of local or private opinion. Caesaropapism for Orthodoxy is only the fruit of abuse, the product of the sinful weakness of the members of the Church, their connivance, but never a dogma 8. Orthodoxy has been preserved from the admixture of Jewish chiliasm; it remains unconnected with a specific ideal of the earthly city, and therefore, no matter how much this apparently contradicts the existing historical state of affairs, Orthodoxy is internally independent, freer than papism, for it remains a kingdom not of this world. The church is not a city. True, it exists in the city and, since it becomes involved in it, it is constantly exposed to the danger of secularization and captivity, “paralysis”; on this basis, historical Caesar-papism arises, but this is not its nature. What papocaesarism was, socialism in its various forms has now become - the dream of an earthly city. Dostoevsky correctly guessed and noted this connection between papism and socialism as products of the same essence, which was classically expressed in Jewish chiliasm. Other versions of this dream of an earthly city are also cited, and, establishing themselves in it, they all fatally take on a more or less anti-Christian character. It is here that this mysterious line passes - between the kingdom of the world and the not of this world. But doesn’t this mean devaluing history, drowning the temporal in the abyss of eternity, depriving history of its religious numen? No way. Christianity itself is a historical religion, the incarnation of God took place in time, and for everything there is the fullness of times, “times and seasons.” By taking the outcome of history beyond the temporal, it does not deprive this temporal process of significance, which cannot be bypassed or jumped over. Everything immanent has a connection with the transcendent, there is its symbol. Just as individual life has absolute significance, so does history, this biography of all humanity. And just as nature is a book of revelation, the unwritten Bible, so in history revelation is made, religious experience is acquired, the world matures internally, and ultimately history is adjacent to the beyond 9. Therefore, by the way, the earthly life of the Church presupposes a constantly occurring revelation; in other words, dogmatic creativity cannot dry up, although it can be temporarily suspended or take on an elusive and indefinable character. Only those who do not believe in the Church can deny this. In this regard, the question arises about Christian chiliasm (in contrast to Jewish) as an ideal projection of religious revelations in the fullness available in history. This is just another formula for the idea of ​​religious revelation in history. But it is possible to grow only from the soil, which determines the continuity and unity of growth, and in order to rush into the future, one must be firmly connected with the past, live by it, know it experimentally. Therefore, there should be no interruptions or revolutions in church life; it all grows on a single vine. And those who talk about new religious creativity in a break with the Church are taking a leap into the void or fatally separating into sectarianism. What has been said here, of course, will not be shared by those who adhere to the Old Belief (in the broad sense), that is, who deny the possibility of movement in church life and elevate immobility to a dogma. Sometimes this stems from the best intentions, as a protest against the groundlessness and frivolity of such reformers who simply do not know and do not know how to appreciate church connections. But if this immobility is elevated to dogma, then this is already an obvious delusion. There has never been a dogmatic definition in the Church that there cannot be new dogmas, and that they are all exhausted by the definitions of the seven Ecumenical Councils. Such a deeply ahistorical view cannot find a dogmatic justification. The Church is life, creativity, impulse. The law of non-stop movement is more valid here than anywhere else 10. So, in history a city is really being built, and this is what its positive content boils down to, but it is being built in parts and the whole does not fit into the consciousness of those building. Moreover, the builders themselves begin their work only one by one, and death observes the correctness of this order. Death is therefore one of the main preconditions of the historical process, and going beyond history is necessarily associated with victory over death. All historical work must be assessed according to a dual criterion: in the light of temporary expediency, the pursuit of the next tasks of history, and in the light of religious consciousness, the sense of eternity living in the soul. The resultant of history goes along a diagonal, determined by these two perpendiculars and closer to one or the other. Finding it is a matter of creative personal life. The antithesis of theism and pantheism, Christianity and man-theism is posed throughout European history. Two souls live and develop, striving to achieve maturity, in this culture, united only in its reification, but dual in its spiritual potentials. Two cities are being built in it. Culture is a means for the spirit. It can be more or less completely technical - hence the difference in the degrees of “culture” of different countries or their different cultural ages, but the coefficient of culture is only the spirit that lives in it, or, more precisely, since there are not one, but two of these spirits, their confrontation and its result. This same confrontation takes place in Russian culture, and it is recognized in the soul of the Russian intelligentsia. The problem of Russian culture therefore inevitably becomes the problem of the Russian intelligentsia. The latter was posed with unprecedented poignancy by the Russian Revolution, this mirror of our entire life, a test of our spiritual, cultural and historical strengths, and it remains the riddle of the Russian Oedipus, riveting his eyes to the terrible Sphinx. In the Russian soul, with its religious passion, combined at the same time with the lack of cultural self-education, the collision of two principles occurs with particular force and devastation and gives rise on one side to the dark, fantastic “Black Hundreds”, mistaking itself for Christianity, and on the other side - an equally fanatical man-theology, leaving only a small quantitatively and historically uninfluential person not involved in this fatal, sterile and fundamentally false antithesis minority. The Black Hundreds speak of the dark forces of the past, its lack of culture, darkness and autocracy. No matter how great the actual influence of this force may be at the present moment due to the historical conjuncture, it is still a force of the past, naturally weakening with the growth of enlightenment and culture, devoid of a future. A practical politician inevitably has to take it into account, but it represents little and only negative interest for Russian culture. Not so the intelligentsia, which, whatever it may be, is a new force; the future of culture belongs to it. And in her soul there is a struggle between the deadening “intellectualism” and the spiritual potential of truly cultural creativity. I would define “intellectualism” as extreme man-theism, focusing only on the intelligentsia, that is, on themselves, in combination with primitive lack of culture, lack of education in culture, understood as a labor, creative process. And this nihilism, reducing the practical usefulness of the cultural leadership class, complicating the process of cultural education of the country, already complicated by general historical and general political conditions, is downright our national disease. But “intellectualism” is not the irreducible essence of the intelligentsia; on the contrary, it is a painful distortion of its face. Numerous critics and denouncers of Vekhi do not want to understand the simple idea that to criticize the “intelligentsia”, to commit crimen laesae majestatis 11 of this idol, which has so many sincere and hypocritical priests, is possible only in the name of love for the intelligentsia and faith in it. And since the criticism sounded this resentment, disturbed complacency, this only confirmed the correctness of the diagnosis. The historical work outlined by Vekhi, one might say, is still at the very beginning. The future of Russian culture largely depends on whether the Russian intelligentsia will conquer the “intelligentsia” within itself and whether it will be capable of organically merging with the nation and creating a national culture. But this requires metavoia 12, with a conscious revision of oneself, self-examination and inevitable self-condemnation, in short, personal and public “repentance”. Our guilt before our homeland lies not only in what we usually see it as and to which we respond with social repentance, like Mikhailovsky’s “repentant nobleman” - after all, even at the same time we can still remain a “nobleman” in our souls - but in personal self-exaltation, an arrogant and patronizing attitude towards the national, historical and ecclesiastical elements. This internal separation from native soil can only be overcome from within. And this admission of guilt - I again emphasize, first of all, personal, and not abstract social - can change the entire social psychology and affect practical activity, for personality, determined in the recesses of the soul and the most intimate experiences of conscience, is still the only creative principle in history. Only here is freedom, and only freedom belongs to creativity. The present era represents in some respects a critical and turning point in Russian history. If the previous decade was primarily a preparatory period for the growth of political consciousness, then the present marks a critical epoch in our cultural consciousness. Of course, we are still far from a satisfactory resolution of the political questions posed by life, but here slow and difficult historical work must do its job, the political pass has already been crossed, we live under new political and social conditions. But this is precisely what puts Russian culture in a new position and requires deepened self-awareness for it. And this tension of the creative forces of the nation is unusually difficult, incomparably more difficult, of course, than a purely political movement. We have to face the powerful Western culture in its full bloom, we need, moreover, to learn from it, to assimilate it in a certain way. But even this assimilation itself is not a purely mechanical process, but requires organic assimilation. And this must be said even more about independent cultural creativity, the weak shoots of which are exposed to the danger of a related, but still alien, graft. Before us again stands the antinomy of Slavophilism and Westernism, only in a new formulation. Then, as now, Westernism, that is, spiritual capitulation to the culturally strongest, remains the line of least resistance, and the desire for cultural originality, of course on the basis of the creative assimilation of world culture and familiarization with it, then, as now, can only be affirmed as a feat of faith, seeming like some audacity. However, wasn’t Fichte also daring in this sense, who delivered his “Speeches to the German People” also in an era of political and national collapse? Russian pain and Russian anxiety for our culture should not weaken in this difficult and responsible time, when the tasks are so enormous, the cultural forces are so scattered and weak, and national self-consciousness is so suppressed. And our hope, our faith, is directed to the future, to the future young Russia. May she finally reach Canaan, return to her spiritual homeland, and may she be happier than our transitional generation, which is destined, perhaps, to perish during forty years of wandering in the sands of the desert. But isn’t the personal life of each of us, as well as of all historical humanity, the same continuous wandering in pursuit of the coming city? In this movement towards a transcendental goal, only a break is possible, but a stop is impossible, according to the words of the Apostle: The imams of the city that abides are not here, but we seek the one to come (Heb. XIII, 14). Moscow, October 30, 1910 Religion of mankind in L. Feuerbach 13 Recently (in 1904) the centenary of the birth of a remarkable thinker was celebrated, who, although he spent most of his adult life in rural hermitage, without betraying him even in the revolutionary year of 1848, nevertheless, with his philosophical ideas, had a deep influence on his contemporaries, which is far from being eradicated to this day. And truly, among the names that express the spiritual image of the 19th century, on a par with the names of Hegel and Darwin, Marx and Og. Comte, Spencer and Mill, we should also mention the comparatively little-known name of the Bruckberg hermit - Ludwig Feuerbach. But if the ideas of Feuerbach are still alive, who, in fairness, can therefore be ranked among the spiritual leaders of modern humanity, then his name is in undeserved neglect and oblivion. The centennial anniversary also brought nothing but a few, in most cases completely insignificant newspaper articles. You can only point to one exception. Currently, through the works of Jodl and Bohlin, two modern Feuerbachians, a new, expanded edition of Feuerbach’s works is being published 14 and, in addition, a work on Feuerbach, written by the same Jodl, has been published in the series “Fromann’s Klassiker der Philosophie” (together with the monographs of Starke and Bohlin, almost exhausting the scanty literature about him). Being a resolute and principled opponent of Feuerbach's worldview in its very foundations, I would, however, especially wish to draw public attention to his ideas and to his writings, because thanks to the enormous merits of the latter, among which the philosophical radicalism and frank straightforwardness of Feuerbach should be placed in the first place, they pose with compelling energy the fundamental questions about the highest and ultimate human values, so often relegated to the background. Feuerbach is one of those thinkers who to a high degree contribute to the conscious self-determination of a person in one direction or another; from him, as from a philosophical crossroads, roads sharply diverge in opposite directions, and it is useful for everyone, before finally entering the winding paths that go deeper into the wilds, to come to this crossroads, from where the initial difference in paths is visible. This is the general significance of L. Feuerbach's philosophy for our time. It is not difficult to understand why Feuerbach receives so little attention from representatives of modern philosophical thought, especially German school philosophy 15. This is explained most of all by the fact that he is too unlike them - the rough, daring, even revolutionary writer is too different from the respectable and decorous representatives of “scientific” critical philosophy, who are shocked by Feuerbach’s militant and passionate atheism, but do not want to see and appreciate in him truly human motives and real human suffering. The fashion for Nietzsche has already arrived, but it has not yet reached, and perhaps Feuerbach’s turn will not reach. The main and root cause of this cold indifference to Feuerbach (it also prevented Nietzsche from being seen for a long time) is that philosophy for Feuerbach is not a matter of school and a school specialty, as for many specialists in philosophy, but a matter of life. Feuerbach lived in his philosophy, hence its excitement, inconsistency and his constant, restless tendency to develop, alter and change his system. In this sense there is something Nietzschean about him. Since philosophy really becomes a matter of life, then this is necessarily reflected in its themes, in its main problems. Problems of a scholastic, propaedeutic, technical nature recede into the background - we will not deny, often to the detriment of accuracy and clarity of thinking (Feuerbach, for example, has absolutely no - horribile dictu 16 - special treatises on the theory of knowledge; when he touches on these issues, he falls into helpless childish sensationalism, accessible to refutation by the average student of philosophy). But all his attention is absorbed by the vital tasks of philosophy, questions about absolute values ​​or the meaning of human life, that is, religious questions. Feuerbach’s religious interest remained dominant all his life, so the characteristic of one of Dostoevsky’s heroes is quite applicable to him: “God has tormented me all my life,” and, despite all of Feuerbach’s atheism, he, in fairness, should be called an atheistic theologian. He himself speaks about himself in lectures on religion, given by him already in his late life during almost his only appearance before the public: “Despite the difference in the themes of my writings, they all have, strictly speaking, only one goal, one will and thought, one theme. This very topic is religion and theology and everything connected with them... In all my writings I have never lost sight of the relationship to religion and theology and have always dealt with this main subject of my thought and life, although, of course, in different ways according to the difference in years” 17. And a quick acquaintance with his works is enough to convince oneself of the validity of this characterization. He made his first appearance in literature with “Thoughts on Death and Immortality”; His main work, which represents one of the most remarkable and characteristic monuments of thought of the 19th century, is “The Essence of Christianity,” to which he wrote a whole volume of additions and explanations. This was followed by: “The Essence of Religion”, “Lectures on Religion”, “Theogony” and many small critical, polemical sketches, even poems (couplets). And this intensity of religious quest, the atheistic passion with which Feuerbach was obsessed, the constant efforts of fighting against God, unable to calm down and finally defeat the “tormenting” God - in a word, this absence of religious indifference, so common in our time, makes Feuerbach a very unique and significant phenomenon in the religious life of the 19th century. And all these features that alienate him from his current compatriots, in a strange way bring him closer to us, to our current quests. We are not disgusted by his lack of rigor in the school sense of the word, for it is not for us to lay claim to it, but on the other hand, this religious fervor, the concentrated isolation of his thought, his religious, albeit atheistic, enthusiasm are so dear and understandable to us. Stirner ironically called Feuerbach a “pious atheist” (frommer Atheist), and in fact Feuerbach was pious in his atheism, although at the same time there was some kind of irreconcilable stubbornness in him (which, in our opinion, is the most characteristic feature in his face in the portrait), some heavy one-mindedness that turned his heart away from God and made him incarnate a contradiction - a “pious” fighter against God. But in sincere and difficult, painful fight against God, perhaps, there really lies a special (albeit, so to speak, preliminary) type of piety. Is it really possible that Feuerbach, Nietzsche, even Stirner (we now have Shestov), like kites, eating their own livers, so alien and far from the balanced and calmed, “sober” indifferentism of the positivists, really will not find a place for themselves in one of the “many abodes” prepared by the Father, and will not finally put their torturing fingers of the unbelieving Thomas into the ulcers nail ones? Will this sincere religious suffering really not be rewarded!? But if Feuerbach is so close to us with his right hand, which we consider the direction of his thought alien to religious indifference, then he receives no less vital significance thanks to his shuytse, which we consider all the positive content of his teaching, his atheistic dogma, and his religious-philosophical doctrine in general. This doctrine lives to this day, and primarily among the masses who profess the teachings of Marx and Engels, for in religious and philosophical terms, both of them are students of Feuerbach, and, moreover, unoriginal students, for their part only having dried up the doctrine of the teacher. Those familiar with the genesis of Marxism know what a huge influence Feuerbach's ideas had here. However, Engels himself talks about this in his pamphlet, which, although it does not have independent philosophical significance, is of great historical interest - “L. Feuerbach and the outcome of classical philosophy." Here we read the following: “...then Feuerbach’s Wesen des Christenthums appeared. With one blow it destroyed the contradiction, without further ado, placing materialism back on the throne. Nature exists independently of any philosophy; it is the foundation on which we grew up; We humans are ourselves a product of nature; Nothing exists outside of nature and man, and the higher beings that our religious philosophy has created are only fantastic reflections of our own being. The spell was broken, the “system” burst and was thrown aside, the contradiction was eliminated, although it existed only in the imagination. It was necessary to experience the liberating influence of this book in order to form an idea about it. There was a general enthusiasm: we all instantly became Feuerbachians” 18. Marx's early writings, dating back to the 40s and now republished by Mehring, reflect this fascination with Feuerbach (Heilige Familie, Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, partly Zur Judenfrage, in Engels - Die Lage Englands). Later, Marx and Engels retreated from orthodox Feuerbachianism, but Engels undoubtedly greatly exaggerates the extent of this disagreement. The materialistic understanding of history and the doctrine of class struggle were only a complement and, so to speak, a concretization of Feuerbach’s general formula, but did not in any way affect its essence. With regard to general philosophical ideas, Marx did not take the slightest step forward against Feuerbach, and the latter’s teaching was the soil on which Marxism grew, and to this day remains its actual general philosophical foundation. Feuerbach's atheistic humanism constitutes the soul of Marxist socialism 19 and is characteristic of it no less than the political-economic doctrine of Marx himself, which can be compatible with a fundamentally opposite general worldview. Bearing in mind this philosophical generation of ideas, we can safely put forward the paradoxical at first glance position that Feuerbach is to a much greater extent the spiritual father of Marxism than Marx himself, who gave only the flesh for Feuerbach’s ideas, and therefore, if we deepen the current social democracy to its general philosophical foundations, then Feuerbach’s ideas will be at its foundation. This connection of ideas, however, is very weakly recognized or not even recognized at all by the participants in the modern Social Democratic movement due to its general philosophical impoverishment, which increases the further we move from the philosophical source. In any case, if one wants to criticize the essence of Marxism, then one must take into account not socialist ideas (which are not yet so characteristic of Marxism as such, for they can also be combined with an opposing theoretical worldview) and not even “economic materialism,” which is only a superstructure over the teachings of Feuerbach, but with the religious and philosophical ideas of this latter. Here is the religious-metaphysical center of Marxism, as well as all materialistic, atheistic socialism in general. For the purposes of religious and philosophical criticism, Marxism should be understood precisely as Feuerbachianism. But Feuerbach lives not only in Marxism, for Feuerbachism is much broader than Marxism, the latter is only a special case of the first, and there may be several such special cases; Undoubtedly, Marxism does not limit the sphere of direct or indirect influence of Feuerbach. It is reflected in the entire new anti-religious-humanitarian movement, in all atheistic humanism, in the atheistic religion of humanity, which characterizes modern times 20 . Here his influence collides and merges with the monotonous influence of Comte, also a preacher of the religion of humanity. What is striking is the coincidence of basic ideas and the simultaneous presentation of two similar thinkers, alien by blood, by language, who hardly knew or heard of each other, but connected by the real unity of pan-European civilization and the spirit of the time. While the hermit of Bruckberg was nurturing his doctrines of the religion of humanity in a Bavarian village, another hermit in Paris was creating his strikingly, mysteriously similar doctrine of “positive politics,” based on the same religion of humanity. Both thinkers share all the difference that exists between the cultures and the character of the countries that gave birth to them. One representative of the exact sciences, with contempt for speculative philosophy and with a very weak acquaintance with it, after scientific research, came to his final ideas, which he gave in the dogmatically clumsy form of some kind of papism without a pope. Another came from Hegel, from the depths of absolute German idealism, the son of reflection and abstraction, who contradicted himself in the confused course of his thoughts and retained to the end the indelible stamp of Hegelianism, a writer about whom Lange, restrained and accustomed to philosophical subtleties, expresses himself as follows: “Feuerbach’s system is distinguished by mystical darkness, which is in no way cleared up by emphasizing sensuality and evidence” 21 . And so different thinkers in different languages ​​at the same time said the same thing: they raised and then resolved to the best of their ability the question of religion without a personal God, but with God-humanity, and gave philosophical expression to the desire of modern humanity, in the words of Dostoevsky, to “settle without God,” moreover, completely and finally. Comte was luckier in our country than Feuerbach; he was more known and respected. But as a thinker, Feuerbach is much deeper, more significant and interesting than Comte, he better introduces the complex problem of man-theism, his argument is subtler and stronger, although due to greater complexity it also reveals a greater number of weaknesses. It was Feuerbach who gave the full and possibly complete expression of the idea of ​​man-theism, the religion of humanity. It is clear to the reader why Marxism is only a special case of Feuerbachianism or Kontism, because, in essence, in the respect under consideration it represents one and the same thing (although this does not prevent Marx from giving Comte, with his usual harshness, a good kick on occasion). Atheistic humanism, or the religion of humanity, finds many forms of expression in modern history besides Marxism. It is a universal, generalizing phenomenon in the spiritual life of modern times, since it is defined outside of Christianity or even in conscious opposition to it. The religion of humanity is the most significant religious creation of modern times. This product of his religious creativity, so contradictory and complex, requires an attentive, conscientious and impartial attitude towards itself, and the importance of its careful study cannot be exaggerated. Feuerbach left a large literary legacy in the form of works on philosophy, history of philosophy and religious philosophy, so that familiarization with these works would require an entire monograph 22 . Moreover, we must not forget that Feuerbach evolved throughout his life, starting with Hegelianism and ending with more or less decisive materialism. In view of this, quite a lot of problems can be raised regarding his philosophical development and teaching, relating to different aspects of his worldview in different eras. We do not set ourselves such a broad task. The fact is that in different aspects of his teaching, Feuerbach is of very different interest. We are of little interest, for example, in his theory of knowledge (if we can talk about it), which veers into sensualistic materialism, moreover, of a vulgar shade. We are also of little interest in his purely philosophical position, although it is very characteristic of the general decomposition of Hegelianism and therefore interesting for a researcher of the fate of Hegelian philosophy. Finally, we can leave aside Feuerbach's direct attacks on the Christian religion with his criticism of the dogmas of Christianity. This criticism is inextricably linked with Feuerbach’s own metaphysics and, despite its superficial and rational character, does not seem in itself so serious that it should be taken into account as such. It receives interest and significance only in connection with his own positive teaching about religion, with his philosophy of religion. In this latter we see the center of gravity and the main interest of Feuerbach’s teaching. He himself saw the main work of his life in the new teaching about religion, which he considered a turning point in history 23. “The task of modern times,” he says 24, “was the reification and humanization of God - the transformation and rebirth of theology into anthropology.” Feuerbach's anthropological teaching on religion, Feuerbach as a preacher of the religion of humanity, as a religious teacher of humanitarian atheism - this is the topic of this essay. In the main provisions of this doctrine, Feuerbach remained relatively motionless; he tried to improve and replenish it, but left its foundations intact, which were already fully defined in the work “Wesen des Christenthums.” Feuerbach developed and deepened the basic thoughts about the essence of religion, expressed in this work, in “Wesen der Religion”, in “Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion”, in “Ergänzungen und Erldüterungen zum Wesen des Christenthums”, etc. At the same time, he burdened the presentation of his thoughts with endless repetitions in different, sometimes even slightly different words, with the persistence of a single-minded person who, in addition, has become somewhat wild in the village. But everywhere, throughout all his activities, one question runs through: what is the secret of religion? Why does man create God for himself? Characterizing his spiritual evolution, the starting point of which was the study of theology, the middle one - metaphysics, and the final point - the philosophy of rationalism, positivism and atheism, Feuerbach says about himself: “God was my first thought, reason was the second, man was the third and last thought.” This often quoted expression of his characterizes the difference in the answers he gave at different times of his life to the same life question, namely the question of God as a subject of religion. God was Feuerbach's first, second, and last thought. A preacher of atheism, Feuerbach not only does not deny religion in general, but sees in it a significant difference between man and animals, which do not have religion 25 . He puts this in connection with the nature of human consciousness, which is characterized by the idea of ​​the infinite - the main feature of religion. “Consciousness, in the strict or proper sense of the word, and the consciousness of the infinite are inseparable; limited consciousness is not consciousness" 26. Feuerbach seeks not to abolish religion, but to humanize it, to bring it down from heaven to earth, to dissolve it in the elemental power of feeling 27 and, most importantly, to present it as a division of man with himself, which, once realized, is subject to abolition and conscious replacement by the religion of humanity. “The absolute being, the god of man, is his own being.” 28. In the preface to the collection of his works, Feuerbach formulates his main idea about religion in the following terms: “The question of whether God exists or not, the opposition of atheism and theism belongs to the 18th and 17th centuries, but not the 19th century. I deny God - this means for me: I deny the negation of man. I put in place the illusory, fantastic heavenly affirmation (Position) of man, which in real life necessarily leads to the negation of man, the sensual, real, and therefore also the political and social affirmation of man, for me the question of the being or non-existence of God is precisely the question of the being or non-existence of man.” “What God is for man is his spirit, his soul, and what constitutes his spirit, his soul, his heart, this is his God: God is the open interiority, the expressed selfhood (Selbst) of man; religion is the solemn revelation of man’s hidden treasures, the confession of his innermost thoughts, the open confession of the sacrament of love” 29. “Religion, at least Christian religion, is a person’s attitude towards himself or, more precisely, towards his being, but the attitude towards his being as to another being. The divine being is nothing other than a human being or, better, a human being, liberated from the boundaries of the individual, that is, the actual, corporeal man, defined (vergegenständlicht), that is, considered and revered as another, different, special being - all definitions of the divine being are therefore definitions of a human being” 30. “Religion is the separation of man from himself; he opposes God to himself as a being opposite to himself. God is not what man is, man is not what God is. God is infinite, man is a finite being; God is perfect, man is imperfect; God is eternal, man is temporary; God is omnipotent, man is powerless; God is holy, man is sinful. God and man are opposites (Extreme): God is an exclusively positive principle, the totality of all realities, man is exclusively negative, the totality of all insignificances (Nichtigkeiten). But man objectifies his own being in religion. Thus, it must be proven that this opposition, this bifurcation of God and man, with which religion begins, is a bifurcation of man with his own being” 31. “You believe in love as a divine property, for you yourself love, you believe that God is a wise, good being, for you know nothing higher above yourself than kindness and reason, and you believe that God exists, that he is, therefore, a subject or being, for you yourself exist, you yourself are a being... God is for you something existing (ein Existierendes), a being on the same basis on which he appears to you wise, blessed, good" 32. On this basis, “to deny man means to deny religion” 33 and “where man ceases, religion also ceases” 34. Thus, “faith in God is nothing other than faith in human dignity, in the divine significance of the human person” 35. “Man is the beginning of religion, man is the middle of religion, man is the end of religion” 36. “Our attitude towards religion,” Feuerbach sums up his conclusion, “is therefore not only negative, but critical; we distinguish the true from the false. Religion is the first self-consciousness of man. Religions are sacred precisely because they are the traditions of the first consciousness. But what is first for religion, God, is in reality second, for he is only the materialized being of man, and what is second for it, man, must be posited and expressed as the first. Love for humanity should not be derivative, it should become original (ursprnglich). Only then does love become a true, sacred and reliable force. If the being of man is the highest being for man, then practically the love of man for man must be the first and highest law. Homo homini deus est - this is the highest practical rule - this is a turning point in world history. The relations of children and parents, spouses, brothers, friends, in general, person to person, in short, moral relations in themselves are truly religious relations. Life in general, in its essential aspects, is of a completely divine nature” 37. So, homo homini deus est is a lapidary formula that expresses the essence of Feuerbach’s religious views. This is not a denial of religion or even atheism; it is, in contrast to theism 38, anthropotheism, and anthropology, by the force of things, turns out to be the role of theology. Feuerbach subsequently added a second floor to this initial teaching. It is in later works (in “Wesen der Religion” and “Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion”) that the essence of religion is still seen in the feeling of dependence (Abhängigkeitsgefühl - the famous formula of Schleiermachepa) on nature and on the original formula: Theologie ist Anthropologie - another addition is made - und Physiologie. Approaching more and more to naturalism and vulgar materialism and fearing that his first formula also sounds too idealistic, Feuerbach hastens to protect it from such an interpretation with a corresponding materialist interpretation. “The essence that man presupposes, with which he is connected by a necessary relationship, without which neither his existence nor his being can be conceived, is nothing other than nature” 39. The divine essence that is revealed in nature is nothing other than nature itself, which is revealed, presented and imprinted on man as a divine being... Nature is not only the first, original object, it is also the abiding foundation, the constantly existing, although hidden basis (Hintergrund) of religion” 40. “My doctrine is expressed in two words: nature and man. The essence of man that I assume, the essence that is the basis or cause of man, to which he is grateful for his emergence and existence, this is and I call it not God - a mystical, incomprehensible, polysemantic word, but nature - a clear, sensual, unambiguous word and essence" (!!!). Feuerbach diligently signs his main drawing: “Behold a lion, not a dog,” - this must be understood materialistically and sensually, but not idealistically and abstractly. A former follower of Hegel, who, one must think, passed through Kant and is generally a philosophically educated person, brushes aside the phantom of religion that haunts him, fences himself off from God with a vulgar-mythological concept of nature, which he accepts without any criticism, without any analysis 41 . If this side of the teaching is of a kind of historical and psychological interest, which is why we could not pass over this later theoretical addition in silence, if only for the sake of the fact that the author himself attached such fundamental importance to it, then these later self-interpretations do not have any philosophical interest or independent significance and we will not dwell on them further, but will turn to a more careful study of the main religious and philosophical idea of Feuerbach, his anthropotheism. Here, first of all, the basic question arises: if a person in reality is or should become the true object of religion, then what kind of person: this one or everyone he meets, me or another, an individual or a species, otherwise, a person or humanity? Anthropotheism or, in the Russian expression of Dostoevsky, man-God can have as its object either individual chosen ones, or the entire human race, be aristocratic, oligarchic and even egoistic (“egotism”) or democratic, spreading in idea to the entire human race. It is precisely this democratic deification of the human race as a whole that characterizes Feuerbach's worldview. Homo homini deus est it should be translated as follows: the human race is God for the individual, the species is God for the individual. “The concept of deity (we read from Feuerbach) coincides with the concept of humanity. All divine definitions, all definitions that make God a god, are the definition of the genus, which, although limited in the individual, these boundaries are eliminated in the essence of the genus and even in its existence, since it has a corresponding existence in the totality of all people. My knowledge, my will are limited; but boundaries for me are not at the same time boundaries for others, not to mention humanity; What is hard for me is easy for someone else; What is impossible and incomprehensible for one time is understandable and possible for the future. My life is connected with a certain time, but the life of humanity is not (?!). The history of mankind consists of nothing more than the progressive overcoming of boundaries, which at any given time are considered the boundaries of humanity and therefore absolute, insurmountable. The future reveals more and more that the supposed boundaries of the genus were only the boundaries of individuals... Thus, the genus is unlimited, only the individual is limited. But the feeling of limitation is painful, from this burden the individual is liberated in the contemplation of a higher being; in him he possesses what he lacks. God for Christians is nothing more than the contemplation (Anschauung) of the immediate unity of the race and the individual, the common and the separate being. God is the concept of the genus as an individual, the concept or essence of the genus, which is the genus as a universal being, as the totality of all perfections, all properties, freed from the real or imaginary boundaries of the individual, but at the same time an individual, special being. “Essence and existence are identical for God.” “This means nothing more than that he is a generic concept, a generic being, directly existing and as a separate being” 42. “The idea of ​​the genus (Feuerbach develops in polemics with Stirner) is necessary, integral to the individual, and everyone is separate. “We are perfect enough,” the One (Stirner) justly and elegantly expresses; but at the same time we feel limited and imperfect, for we necessarily compare ourselves not only with others, but also with ourselves. We feel limited not only morally, but also sensually, in space and time; We, these individuals, exist only in this specific place, in this limited time. How can we heal from the feeling of this limitation, if not in the thought of an unlimited kind, that is, in the thought of other people, other places, other happy times? Whoever, therefore, does not put the genus in the place of the deity leaves a gap in the individual, which must be filled by the idea of ​​God, that is, the personified being of the genus. Only the race is able to abolish deity and religion, and at the same time replace them. (Feuerbach speaks here about the genuine, God-fighting motive that brought his religion of humanity to life.) To have no religion means to think only about oneself, to have religion means to think about others. And this religion is the only one that lasts, for as soon as we have at least two people - a husband and a wife, we already have a religion. Two, discrimination, is the origin of religion - you are God for me, for I do not exist without you, I depend on you, there is no you, there is no me” 43. In the Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft we find the following decisive aphorisms about the divinity of the race: “The individual man in himself does not have the essence of man in himself, either as a moral or as a thinking being. The essence of man is contained only in communication, in the unity of man with man - a unity based only on the reality of the difference between I and you” (No. 59). “Loneliness is finitude and limitation, community is freedom and infinity. Man in himself (für sich) is only man (in the usual sense of the word); man with man – the unity of I and you – is God” (§ 60). Thus, there is no doubt that we are talking here about nothing else but the religious deification of humanity, whether in the person of the first person you meet or the entire human race. Feuerbach constantly oscillates (and this oscillation, as we will see below, follows from the very essence of the matter and is an inevitable property of the philosophical position he takes) between the narrow and broad understanding of humanity as God. In his polemic with Stirner, he even points to the difference between the sexes and the family union as a necessary basis for the religious attitude towards man, so that the church of this deity either narrows to the marital bedroom and the nursery, then expands, covering the arena of life of all historical humanity. In Feuerbach’s worldview, particularistic and universalistic tendencies struggle, and if, keeping in mind the first, Lange designated it with the name of thuism (from tu - you), then, bearing in mind the second, it should be called humanism in the broadest sense of the word. And when Feuerbach was not so pressed against the wall by crushing criticism, as was the case with Stirner, he was inclined to consider the subject of his religion universalistically, revealing even a clear desire to personify the race, to give the idea of ​​humanity not only an abstract, but also a real existence, to feel the Grand-etre 44 about which Og taught. Cont. His judgments about Christ are unusually characteristic in this regard, showing how, despite his knowledge and against his will, some truths of Christianity were still dear and close to those who made the fight against Christianity his life task. We read: “Christ is nothing other than the image in which the unity of the race was imprinted and expressed for the people’s consciousness. Christ loved people; He wanted to unite them all, without distinction of gender, age, rank or nationality. Christ is the love of humanity for itself (!!), as an image (in accordance with the developed nature of religion) or as a face, but a face that (in a religious sense) has the meaning of only a symbol is an ideal face. Therefore, love is presented as a distinctive sign of His disciples. But love, as has been said, is nothing other than the practical realization of the unity of the race in the mood (Gesinnung). Gender is not thought alone; it exists in feeling, in mood, in the energy of love. Rod is what instills love in me. A heart full of love is the heart of the race. Thus, Christ as the consciousness of love is the consciousness of the race. We must all become one in Christ. Christ is the consciousness of our unity. So, whoever loves a person for the sake of a person, who rises to the love of the race, to the universal, corresponding to the essence of the kind of love, he is a Christian, he himself is Christ. He does what Christ did, what made Christ Christ. Where, therefore, the consciousness of the genus as a genus arises, there Christ disappears, although His true essence is preserved, for He was only a substitute, an image of the consciousness of the genus” 45. Despite all the religious misery of these judgments, in which the living Face of Christ, imprinted in the hearts of those who believe in Him, is completely eliminated, they quite clearly express the idea of ​​​​the real, and not just abstract, unity of the human race. Refusing to see this real mystical unity in the God-man, but instinctively feeling all the importance, all the necessity of this unity, Feuerbach is forced to look for it in Leviathan, and humanity, instead of the body of Christ, is declared the body of Leviathan. Inexorable logic punishes the idolatrous atheism of Feuerbach, step by step pushing him, a lover of freedom and a communist, through the Hegelian deification of the state to the Roman deification of the head of state. Having rejected Christ, he makes the head of state the real head of humanity - Divus Caesar! 46 Those who consider this to be slander, we invite you to carefully follow the following statements of Feuerbach: “The subjective origin of the state is explained by the belief in man as a god for man. In the state, the forces of man are isolated and developed in order to establish an infinite being with the help of this division and their new combination; many people, many forces are one force. The state is the totality of all realities, the state is providence for man. In a state, one replaces the other, one complements the other; What I can’t do, I don’t know, someone else can. I am not alone, given over to the accidents of natural force; others exist for me, I am surrounded (umfangen) by the universal being, I am a member of the whole. The true state is the unlimited, infinite, true, perfect, divine man. Only the state is a person who determines himself, who relates to himself, and the absolute man... The connection of the state is practical atheism; people exist in the state because they exist in the state without God, the state is God for man, which is why it rightfully vindicates for itself the divine predicate of “Majesty” (Majestät)” 47. A kind of cult! But let us listen again: “Man is the basic being (Grundwesen) of the state. The state is a realized, organized, revealed totality (Totalität) of a human being. In the state, essential qualities or types of human activity are embodied in various classes, but in the person of the head of state they are again reduced to identity (Identity). The head of state represents all classes without distinction: before him they are all equally necessary and equal. The head of state is the representative of the universal man.” 48 This is the content that the formula “homo homini deus est” ultimately receives: God for man is the head of the state, and all that remains is to resurrect the outer shell of this ancient idea, that is, to restore the sacred images of the head of state, the offering of sacrifices to him, etc. Doesn’t the shadow of one who will one day sit in the church as a god and demand divine honors flash here like a fatal premonition!.. One way or another, this is the religion preached by Feuerbach. For we are talking specifically about a religion that would be able to resist the Christian religion, about a deliberately anti-Christian religion. For Feuerbach, one philosophical doctrine is not enough, as various theories have been until now. “Until now (die bisherige) philosophy could not replace religion; it was a philosophy, but not a religion, without religion. She left the peculiar essence of religion outside herself; she claimed (vindicirte) for herself only the form of thinking (Gedankenform). If philosophy is called upon to replace religion, then it must become religion as philosophy; it must take into itself, in a manner characteristic of it (ihr konform), that which constitutes the essence of religion, the advantages that the latter has over philosophy.” “If practically man has now taken the place of the Christian, then theoretically the human essence should take the place of the divine. In a word, we must express what we want to become in one highest principle, in one highest word: only in this way do we sanctify our life, justify our tendency. Only in this way can we free ourselves from the contradiction that currently poisons our inner being: from the contradiction between our life and thinking and religion, which fundamentally contradicts them. For we must become religious again - politics must become our religion, but this is only possible if we have as the highest in our worldview that which turns politics into religion for us.” “You can make politics a religion instinctively, but here we are talking about a higher conscious (letztem ausgesprochenen) foundation, about an official principle. This principle is nothing more than, to put it negatively, atheism, i.e., the elimination of a god different from man.” 49 Words that are remarkably characteristic of Feuerbach, parting the foggy philosophical curtain and showing both the main engine of his thought and his proud dream: this engine is atheism, more specifically anti-Christianity, the dream of starting a new era, creating a new religion, turning people from “theologians into anthropologists, from theophiles into philanthropists, from candidates for the next world into students of this world, from religious and political valets of the heavenly and earthly monarchy and aristocracy into conscious, free citizens of the earth." 50 There is no god except man, and Feuerbach is his prophet. This is not a small matter, for if Feuerbach’s own opinion is true that periods of history are distinguished by religious revolutions, then Feuerbach wanted to open a new era in history and in the wilderness of his Bruckberg forge a spiritual lever with which humanity could be turned around and put on a new path. It is remarkable how much Feuerbach managed to please the spirit of the times in the words quoted. It was impossible to say anything more in keeping with the modern mood, more pleasing to the wickedness of the prince of this world, than this call to have religion in politics, to make politics a religion. For throughout the entire 19th century to the present day - and the further, the faster - the number of people who do without otherworldly ideals and who completely transferred them here to the “kingdom of this world” is growing, and in fact, for these people, politics has become a religion. Numerous regiments of materialist socialism, constantly multiplying in different countries, live by this religion. Here, by the way, the validity of our introductory remarks is confirmed about the extent to which Feuerbach expresses with his teaching the soul of modern materialist socialism, its religion, the extent to which he penetrates into its most hidden and intimate core. Once the genus is declared to be an absolute and a deity, from here comes the inevitable and necessary conclusion, namely, that “das Maass der Gattung ist das absolute Maass, Gesetz und Kriterium der Menschheit” 51, i.e., that “the measure of the genus is the absolute measure, the law and criterion of humanity.” In the generation are all the law and all the prophets. Although the dogma of the religion of the genus is only briefly and incompletely outlined by Feuerbach, we will nevertheless indicate some of its main dogmas in view of their character for the entire plan and the possible direction of further development. Believers see in God the living embodiment of truth, which is revealed in the historical knowledge of mankind, in the development of scientific and philosophical thought, gradually approaching human consciousness. They see in him, further, the embodiment of absolute moral perfection, a living ideal, about which it is said: “Be perfect, just as your heavenly Father is perfect.” They see in it, finally, the source of perfect beauty, poured into the world and having in its triumph “save the world.” The Divinity is conceived as a trinity of truth, goodness and beauty. Feuerbach's religion of the genus does not abolish this trinity, but it relates it to its deity, makes these definitions predicates of the genus, playing the role of the absolute. (It should be noted, however, that Feuerbach himself did not deal with issues of aesthetics, but it is not difficult to imagine in what direction it could have been developed in general accordance with his basic ideas). Truth, according to Feuerbach, is a function of the genus and is established by the genus consciousness. “Only in communication, only from relationships between people, ideas arise. Not alone, but only together they come to concepts, to knowledge in general. Two people are necessary for the birth of a spiritual man as well as a physical one: communication between man and man is the first principle and criterion of truth and universality. Confidence even in the existence of other things besides me is for me mediated by confidence in the existence of another person besides me. What I see alone, I doubt; only what the other person sees is true” 52. “Truth does not exist in thinking, not in knowing at one’s own expense (für sich selbst). Truth is only the totality of human life and being" 53 . “What is true is that in which another agrees with me - unanimity (Uebereinstimmung) is the first sign of truth, but only because the genus is the final scale (Maas) of truth... what is true is what is in accordance with the essence of the genus, what contradicts it is false. There is no other law of truth" 54. This is the main epistemological thesis of Feuerbach, which at the present time, complicated by Kantianism and Darwinism, expresses the basic epistemological idea of ​​Simmel (partly Riehl). Feuerbach himself, however, recoils from the conclusions arising from the straightforward and decisive application of this thesis, according to which it turns out that it is not Socrates who is right, but his judge, not Copernicus, but the tribunal that tried him, not at all an innovator and revolutionary of thought, but an inert and dark crowd. “The other,” Feuerbach continues, “in relation to me is a representative of the race, a substitute for others in the plural, and it is his judgment that can be of greater importance to me than the judgment of a countless crowd” 55 . Thus, Feuerbach escapes from his own demagogic epistemology, and since in another place 56 Feuerbach notes that the individual represents the race for himself, then Feuerbach’s thesis loses all real meaning and, having freed himself from all the unpleasant conclusions from his teaching, he goes from defense to the offensive: “In a word, there is a qualitative, critical difference between people, but Christianity extinguishes these qualitative differences.” Whether Christianity is guilty or not guilty of this extinguishment, but with such an interpretation, the religion of the race, of humanity, insensitively passes into the religion of the individual-superman, and Feuerbach is transformed into Nietzsche, generally speaking, who is the antipode of Feuerbach precisely at this point. There is not only truth in the genus, but also goodness. “The other is my objective conscience: he reproaches me for my shortcomings, even if he does not directly tell me about it: he is my personified feeling of shame. The consciousness of the moral law, right, expediency, even truth, is confined to the consciousness of others.” 57 However, for a species as an absolute, it is not enough to be an “objective conscience,” that is, a subjective agent of good; this position in itself is not very characteristic of the religion of mankind: it must also be objective good, the embodiment of existing good. The Absolute is an absolute; therefore, holiness also belongs to it as an integral attribute. The sum consists of all the components, and the genus consists of all individuals, which means that I, too, participate in collective holiness with all the indelible stains that my conscience knows, and Messalina, and Caligula, and Borgia, and Chekhov’s “boring”, gray people... Here is your god, fall on your face and pray, pray to yourself, pray to Messalina, pray to “Ionych.” This is a fatal question for Feuerbach and for every religion of mankind: where to put all the weakness and all the depravity of the new god, which in the Christian religion is brought into connection with the fundamental human fall, with original sin and, further, with the dogma of redemption? I ask your attention now - we will see how Feuerbach extricates himself from his difficulty. This reasoning seems to me to be the most important, the most decisive and the most responsible in all the works, in the entire worldview of Feuerbach and, moreover, completely irreducible from it; whoever accepts it will easily accept the rest of the dogma of the religion of mankind, and whoever does not accept only this, does not accept anything. Feuerbach is talking specifically about the dogma of original sin, and, criticizing this dogma, he says the following: “Here there is absolutely no objective view, the consciousness that you belong to the perfection of the self, that people only collectively make up a person, only together they are what a person should be, they exist as he should exist. All people are sinners, I admit this, but not all of them are sinners in the same way; on the contrary, there is a very large, even significant difference. One person is inclined to lie, and the other is not: he would rather sacrifice his life than break his word or lie; the third has a tendency to drunkenness, the fourth to debauchery, but the first does not have all these inclinations, either by the grace of his nature or due to the energy of his character. Morally men complete each other, both mentally and physically, so that taken together as a whole they are what they should be, representing the perfect man.” Thus, to obtain a perfect person, Feuerbach proposes taking the algebraic sum of virtues and vices. He just doesn’t notice that according to this recipe, which teaches how from ten Messalina one can get one Caecilia, from ten Caligulas one can get one Marquis Posa, from ten Chekhov’s types one can get one hero, etc., etc., in the final sum, at best, only zero is obtained, as a result of extinguishing pluses and minuses, and not a “perfect man.” Feuerbach develops his thought as follows: “If even love and friendship from beings that are in themselves imperfect form one, relatively at least perfect whole, how much more do the sins and vices of individual people disappear in the race itself, which has a worthy existence only in all humanity (in der Gesammtheit der Menschheit) ... Lamentations about sin therefore only come into the order of the day when the human individual in his individuality is considered completely absolute, not needing others to realize in himself the species, the perfect person, when the exclusive self-consciousness of the individual takes the place of consciousness of the species, when the individual does not recognize himself as a part of humanity, does not distinguish himself from humanity, and therefore turns his own sins, his boundaries, his weakness into universal sins, into sins, boundaries and the weakness of all humanity. Therefore, where a genus is not an object for a person as a genus, there it becomes an object for him as a god. The absence of the concept of the genus is compensated by the concept of God as a being, free from boundaries and shortcomings that burden the individual and, in his opinion, the genus itself, since he identifies himself with the genus. But this unlimited essence, free from the boundaries of individuals, is precisely nothing other than a genus, which reveals the infinity of its essence in what is realized in unlimitedly numerous and varied individuals. If all people were absolutely equal, then, of course, there would be no difference between the race and the individual. But in this case, the existence of many people would be pure luxury, one would be enough for the purposes of the race... However, although the essence of man is one, it is infinite, his actual existence aims to reveal the endless, mutually complementary diversity, the richness of his essence. Unity in essence is diversity in existence." 58 In this way, Feuerbach deals with the fatal questions of individual consciousness, the tragedy of the spirit, ulcers of conscience, the absoluteness of demands and the powerlessness to satisfy them, with all these antinomies that make a person such a mysterious contradiction, from which metaphysical systems and religious beliefs are born. And there is one answer to everything: the imperfections of the individual are absorbed into the genus, the sum is greater than its parts. The genus is credited with perfection, infinity, a variety of forms of existence and, naturally, the ability for limitless progress in history, which in modern philosophical consciousness is something like a “commission” among bureaucrats: in order to deal with the restless questions of life that persistently require resolution and at the same time insoluble by bureaucratic means, they are handed over to the commission, and in order to deal with the “damned” philosophical questions, they are referred to to progress: he will resolve everything, arrange everything. We also read from Feuerbach in connection with the question of the future life the following: “The conclusion regarding the theological or religious Jenseits, the assumption of a future life for the purpose of improving man, would in this case be justified if humanity were constantly at one point, if there were no history, improvement, improvement of the human race on earth... But there is a cultural history of humanity. Countless things that our ancestors could not and did not know, we can and do know now... Thus, what for us is now only an object of desire will one day come true, countless things that were impossible to the dark guardians and defenders of the current ideas of faith and religious institutions of modern political and social conditions will one day become reality; Countless things that we don’t know now, but would like to know, our descendants will find out. In place of deities, in which only the baseless, whimsical desires of man are fulfilled, we have the human race or nature, in place of religion - education, in place of Jenseits behind our grave - on earth the historical future, the future of humanity." 59 At the same time, Feuerbach is not embarrassed by the question of the death of all living things, everything individual, which fits so poorly into this optimistic picture. We must give Feuerbach justice; he did not remain silent and did not simply brush aside this problem, as is usually customary to do. On the contrary, he always peered intently into the mystery of death, without closing his eyes and trying to come to terms with death and justify it, to create, as Jodl put it, “thanatodicy” (by analogy with theodicy), which is so difficult and so contrary to living and immediate feeling. Several times he returned to the problem of death. His first work, Todesgedanken, was dedicated to her, still imbued with pantheistic Hegelianism, where, next to the death of the individual, the immortality of the whole is recognized (this is one of the most vague and immature works of Feuerbach). “Todesgedanken” therefore represent an optimistically complacent hymn to the death of the individual in the name of the immortality of the whole 60. Later, Feuerbach focuses his criticism on existing ideas about life after death, 61 but this rational criticism is of little fundamental interest. In the end, having become a philosophical materialist, Feuerbach settles on the idea of ​​biological adaptation to death, the naturalness of timely death, anticipating what Mechnikov is currently preaching. In “Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion,” summing up his entire worldview, we therefore read the following judgment on the subject: “Everything has its measure,” says the Greek philosopher, “everything eventually becomes saturated, even life, and man finally wishes himself death. Normal death, in accordance with nature, the death of a complete person who has outlived his life, therefore has nothing frightening. Old people often even sigh about death. The German philosopher Kant, out of impatience, could hardly wait for death; he strove for it not in order to start living again, but out of a desire for his end. Only an unnatural, unfortunate death - the death of a child, a youth, a husband in full force - revolts us against death and makes us desire a new life. But no matter how strange, no matter how sad such accidents are for those who experience them, they, however, do not authorize us to accept Jenseits for the very reason that these abnormal cases - they are abnormal, even if they are now repeated more often than natural death in accordance with nature - also have the consequence of an abnormal other world, a world only for those who died violently or prematurely; but such an abnormal world would be something incredible and counterintuitive.” 62 These judgments completely characterize Feuerbach's general worldview. We can now turn to a critical examination of Feuerbach's worldview. But first we must dwell on one literary episode that is extremely interesting for illuminating Feuerbach’s doctrine and therefore has great importance for its accurate understanding. We are referring to Feuerbach's polemic with Stirner, the famous author of "Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum" 63 . Between both contemporaries, Stirner and Feuerbach, there is both great closeness and irreconcilable opposition. The similarity lies in the fact that both of them are militant preachers of atheism, but the opposite lies in the difference in the ways of understanding this atheism and the content that is invested in it. Feuerbach preaches positive, humanistic atheism, which denies God in the name of man and humanity, and formulates his atheistic religion: homo homini deus est. Stirner understood his atheism in a boldly nihilistic way, sharpening it in the preaching of pure nihilism, the denial of all higher values, of everything holy: “Alles Heilige ist ein Band, eine Fessel” 64. He approached the very edge of the abyss, behind which a yawning abyss opens, he atomized humanity, abolishing all collectivism of its existence and leaving only one thing - his “only” I, for which there is no right, no general norm, no good (Ich bin meine Gattung, bin ohne Norm, ohne Gesetz, ohne Muster u. dgl.), for all these concepts arose and are associated with the idea of recognition of human society, “kind”, equivalence someone else's I to my I. Stirner says in the preface to his book: “The divine is the work of God, the human is the work of “man.” My cause is neither divine nor human, it is not true, good, just, free, etc., but exclusively my own (das Meinige), and it is not at all universal, but is unique (Einzig), just as I am unique. There is nothing higher than me! (Mir geht nichts ьber Mich)" 65. Here are two lapidary formulas expressing two atheisms, Stirner’s and Feuerbach’s: “Mir geht nichts über Mich” and “homo homini deus est.” Could there be a greater contrast, further emphasized by the proximity of the original positions? The clash between these two atheists has enormous philosophical interest, which has so far been somehow unnoticed and unappreciated in literature. Which one is right as an atheist? Which of them is the more genuine atheist, whose atheism is more consistent, more radical, more sincere, more courageous? Note that for people who have made atheism as a specialty, who care about nothing more than being consistent atheists, there can be no greater insult, no worse irony, than accusing them of theology, piety, and religiosity. And this is exactly the accusation that one, bolder, atheist brought against another, who, according to a crude but apt saying, would like to preserve innocence and acquire capital, and would like, with atheistic dogma, not to renounce some conclusions from religious beliefs. Stirner was the first to throw down the gauntlet in his book, which can be said to be one continuous objection to Feuerbach, openly mocking his piety: “After the destruction of faith, Feuerbach dreams of taking refuge in the imaginary bay of love. “The highest and first law must be the love of man for man. Homo homini deus est – this is the highest practical rule, this is the turning point of history.” Actually, only God, the deus, has changed, but love remains: there love became a superhuman god, here love for the human god and homo as the deus. Therefore, man is holy to Me. And everything “truly human” is sacred to Me! Marriage itself is sacred. And the same is true with all moral relations. Holy is and may your friendship be, holy is property, holy is marriage, holy is the good of every person, but holy is an und für sich 66. Isn't there a priest here again? Who is his god? Human. What is considered divine? Human! Thus, only the predicate is turned into a subject and instead of the statement: “God is love,” it stands: “love is divine,” instead of: “God became man,” it stands: “man became god,” etc. This is only a new religion "67. Revolting against the thoughts and concepts of modernity, the egoist ruthlessly commits the most decisive destruction of shrines (Entheiligung). Nothing is sacred to him! “It would be foolish to say that I have no power over my own. Only the position that I take in relation to it will be completely different from the one that existed in the religious age: I will be an enemy of any higher power, while religion teaches us to make it our friend and humiliate ourselves before it. The destroyer of shrines (Entheiliger) strains all his strength against the fear of God. Whether God or man has sanctifying power in man, therefore, something is revered as holy in the name of God or man, this does not change the fear of God, for man is just as successfully revered as a “supreme being,” just as from a specially religious point of view, God as a “supreme being” requires fear and reverence from us, and both of them appeal to us” 68. “Our own fear of God has long been shaken, and more or less conscious atheism, outwardly recognizable by the widespread “unchurchliness,” involuntarily sets the tone. But what was taken from God was given to man, and the strength of humanity (Macht der Humanität) increased to the same extent that piety lost weight: “man” is the external god, and the fear of man took the place of the old fear of God. But since man is only a variety of a higher being, then in reality only a metamorphosis has occurred in the higher being, and human fear is only an unchangeable form of the fear of God. Our atheists are “pious people.” Whether there is one or a triune God, or a Lutheran God, or être supreme 69, or there is no God at all, but since “man” represents a supreme being, it makes no difference to the one who denies the supreme being itself, for in his eyes these servants of the supreme being in the aggregate are pious people: the most ferocious (wuthendste) atheist is no less than a believing Christian.”70 The impression made on Feuerbach by Stirner's criticism was enormous. Before our eyes, Feuerbach simply writhes in pain under the heavy blows of Stirner’s sarcasms. Although he states in a letter to his brother 71 that Stirner in his “brilliant “book” does not get to the point regarding me” and that his criticism is “based either on simple thoughtlessness (puren Unverstand) or frivolity,” but in his answer to Stirner (Das Wesen des Christenthums in Beziehung auf den “Einzigen und sein Eigenthum”) he reveals, in our opinion, not only amazing weakness, but also complete confusion. His theory did not withstand the action of the alkaline acid reagent that the reckless “egoist” appeared to her. Feuerbach first tries to go on the offensive himself: “Ich hab mein Sach auf Nichts gestellt” 72, sings the One. But isn’t nothing also a predicate of God, and isn’t the proposition: God is nothing (which, we note by the way, was never expressed and would not have been expressed by Stirner, who put forward a completely different thesis: not “God is nothing,” but “there is no God, there is no shrine”), is not an expression of religious consciousness?” In a note to this place for scientific visibility, Feuerbach cites a link that the definition “God is nothing” is found not only in Eastern religions, but also among Christian mystics. With this reference, Feuerbach only finally reveals his confusion and powerlessness to object to anything on the merits: needless to say, there is much less similarity between the mystical acosmism of Buddhism and some Christian mystics and the militant nihilism of Feuerbach than even between the teachings of Feuerbach and church orthodoxy. Next, Feuerbach tries to challenge the thesis of the “single” about its “uniqueness” by referring to the existence of sex, wife, children, etc. etc., as if this reference has any significance for the “one” and is capable of inducing him to renounce his “uniqueness”, step down from his nihilistic throne and recognize the rights of these people, and the responsibilities of himself, recognize in them a shrine for himself, and not a means. As if the existence of harems and lupanars does not sufficiently demonstrate that the difference between the sexes in itself is not at all sufficient for a woman to become not a thing that satisfies the whims of her “only” master, but a person about whom one can say: homo homini deus. In his further remarks, Feuerbach is helplessly confused in contradictions, 73 but does not object to Stirner in essence. We think that the reason for this, of course, is not Feuerbach’s accidental weakness, but the very essence of the matter: he really had nothing to object to, because regarding Feuerbach, Stirner is absolutely right. In Feuerbach's language, Stirner is the truth, Feuerbach's secret revealed. The real atheist is Stirner, but Feuerbach remains a truly “pious” atheist, a “priest.” “The moralists,” Stirner reproaches Feuerbach, “have taken the fat off religion by using it themselves, and now they are trying to get rid of the glandular disease that results from it” (Drusenkrankheit). “With the force of despair, Feuerbach grasps at the entire content of Christianity, not in order to throw it away, no, in order to attract it to himself, so that with his last effort he, long desired, but always distant, can be drawn into his heaven and kept with him forever. Isn’t this a struggle of final despair, a struggle for life and death, and isn’t this at the same time Christian longing (Sehnsucht) and desire for Jenseits? The hero does not want to join Jenseits, but wants to attract him to himself, force him to become Diesseits! 74. Hasn’t the whole world since then been shouting, more or less consciously, that we are talking about this light (Diesseits) and that heaven must come to earth and be experienced already here” 75 . In the face of an all-destructive nihilist who stops at nothing, Feuerbach appears to be a real good boy, a pastor, a good-natured sectarian. The whole contrast between two atheists and two “egoists” flaunting their atheism and their egoism will be expressed even more fully, perhaps, if we get to know how they understand their egoism. Let's listen to "The One" first. In response to possible reproaches of selfishness, he declares: “Okay! I don’t want to have anything special in comparison with others, I don’t want to claim any advantage over them, but I don’t measure myself by others and don’t want to have any right at all. I want to be everything and have everything I can. Whether others have the same thing is of no concern to me. They can neither have nor represent the same thing... I consider myself not something special, but the only one (einzig). Of course, I have similarities with others, but this only matters for comparison or reflection; in reality I am incomparable and unique. I don’t want to recognize or respect anything in you, neither an owner, nor a tramp (Lump), nor even just a person, but I want to use (verbrauchen) you... For me, you are only what you constitute for me, namely my object, and since my object, then my property” 76. “Ausser mir giebt es kein Recht” 77, 78. How all this was guessed by Dostoevsky, who, of course, never knew Stirner, but penetrated deeply into the worldview of atheism. After all, the above German phrase in Russian can be directly translated by the fatal formula of Yves. Karamazova: everything is allowed, there is no God, there is no morality. “Wherever I stand, there will now be a holy place.” And next to these truly satanic speeches, Feuerbach babbles his pious speeches, pretending to be a terrible nihilist, although from behind the mask peeks out the tassel of the cap of a homely man in the street, a kind uncle and a favorite of children: “By egoism I mean a person’s love for himself, that is, love for a human being, that love that encourages the satisfaction and development of all those aspirations and inclinations, without the satisfaction and development of which he cannot be and is not a true, perfect person. By egoism I mean love for my own kind - for what am I without it, what am I without love for beings like me? - the individual’s love for himself is the same as any love for an object or being, as direct love for himself, for I can love only that which corresponds to my ideal, my feeling, my being” 79. Such is the loving heart of our good-natured “egoist”, next to which lies a black, dark shadow from the demonic figure of another, clothed in the dark radiance of his prototype, with singed wings and the mark of the curse of eternal loneliness. Is it possible to imagine a more instructive spectacle than this collision of two “egoists”, of which one walked his way to the end and stopped at the pole, while the other raised only his leg, but remained standing on the same, reliable soil, depicting philosophical “running in place.” The ideological clash between Stirner and Feuerbach can in no way be considered a thing of the past. Stirner made only a weak impression on his time and was forgotten with excessive ease 80 . But a new, later and more talented preacher of similar ideas appeared, who begins to exert a powerful influence on the souls of his contemporaries, who had hitherto piously subsisted on the naive religion of humanity of Feuerbach and Comte. With even greater passion and no less boldness, he tried to carry out a “revaluation of all values” and most fiercely attacked the values ​​of humanism, which, as “the fat removed from religion,” remained in the teachings of Feuerbach 81. Nietzsche - we are talking about him - reacted with particular hostility to the doctrine of love, blaming Christianity for it for the corruption of historical humanity, and for Nietzsche, as before for Stirner, Feuerbach, who imagined himself an enemy of Christianity and its destroyer, necessarily finds himself among the representatives of Christianity. In the field of morality, in place of: love your neighbor, it was put: sei hart, “push the falling one.” In place of the democratic doctrine of the ethical equivalence of people, the doctrine of their different values, of the exclusive, highest or only value of selected supermen, aristocrats, for whom the rest of humanity is only plastic material, was proclaimed. Thus, everything is turned upside down. And the most interesting thing is that these ideas, expressed in an exotic form that was attractive to many, made a strong impression on modernity, confused heads, destroyed the spontaneity of previous humanistic beliefs, and became fashionable, while Stirner in his time went almost unnoticed and did not bother anyone. But, having resurrected in Nietzsche, he now casts his voice over the heads of several generations. Atheistic humanism is experiencing an undoubted and deep crisis, since its foundation, its most important democratic dogma, is questioned. And this crisis, in our eyes, is still at the very beginning, the breakdown of the dominant worldview is just beginning, for, as Vl. Soloviev, “from the window of Nietzsche’s superhumanity, an immense expanse opens up for all sorts of paths in life” 82. It has not yet been finally determined what these roads are, but spiritual turmoil has already begun. Stirner and Nietzsche undermine the fundamental dogma of Feuerbach and all atheistic humanism in general: homo homini deus. For indeed, this dogma underlies all its possible shades, constituting a common ground for all of them. Modern scientific theories of social development or progress can differ greatly from each other both in theoretical foundations and in practical or tactical conclusions, but they all recognize one single value - a person in the sense of any representative of a species individually or a genus as a whole. Liberals and socialists, Marxists and populists, any factions will practically agree on one thing: there is no God, but God is man and humanity. This does not always lie on the surface and clearly appears in the mind, but this dogma retains its force even when it is verbally denied. In the last years of his life, Engels was inclined to deny his closeness with Feuerbach, firstly, because he did not like Feuerbach’s use of the word “religion,” as if it was a matter of words and changing the word would change the essence, and secondly, because Feuerbach, with his teaching on love, was sentimental and did not understand the meaning of the class struggle 83. But it is obvious that this last objection can only be explained by the narrowing of the mental horizon of Engels himself, for otherwise he would not have objected to a position that has general, philosophical and religious significance by referring to a particular sociological thesis, which, whether it is true or false, cannot compete with the first. The doctrine of the class struggle answers the question of how, but not the question of what; it does not provide a goal, but only a form and a means, inextricably linked with given conditions and subject to elimination along with them. Class struggle in Marxism has the goal of abolition of classes and, therefore, self-abolition; in this sense, it is also the path of love. Therefore, Feuerbach in his sociology could have been a Marxist just as well as Engels, and Marxists in their philosophy remain Feuerbachians, that is, atheistic humanists. In fact, do they know any value higher than man and humanity, do they practically question the formula of homo homini deus, and don’t all their ideals of the future, the ideals of socialism, a free structure of society, be determined by it? Their atheism is the same anthropotheism as that of Feuerbach, and in this sense, all of its representatives, without distinction of shades, turn out to be fundamentally opposed to the more radical atheists Nietzsche and Stirner, who, in the name of atheism, reject anthropotheism, and while denying the heavenly God, they do not want an earthly deity. “Religion is a person’s relationship to his own essence - this is its truth and its moral beneficial power - but to his essence not as his own, but as another, different from it, even the opposite essence - this is its untruth, its boundaries, its contradiction with reason and morality” 84. The task of Feuerbach’s main work “Wesen des Christenthums” is nothing more than the refutation of the untrue, i.e. theological, essence of religion, by clarifying the true, i.e. anthropological, essence of religion, and this is the title of the two sections into which this work is divided. Feuerbach's attempt boils down, in other words, to freeing the religion of God-humanity, based on faith in the God-Man, from this support and turning it simply into a religion of humanity, while at the same time not impoverishing it in any way, but only removing its theological cataracts. Feuerbach is convinced that the operation he is undertaking is indeed completely feasible and does not cause any significant damage, and the religion of humanity, devoid of any theological support, will hold up better than with its help. With conscientiousness and talent, Feuerbach carefully removes these supports from everywhere, consciously and consistently carrying out a philosophical experiment of enormous, one might say, fatal importance. He takes upon himself the task of a religious prophet, the creator of a new religion. Therefore, here is a decisive and fatal question: does the building, deprived of its former foundation, hold on without cracking, or has it turned into just a pile of rubble? And that “creature” (Wesen) of religion with which Feuerbach performs his operation, is it alive and vital or has it been dead for a long time and only its corpse still retains the former features of a living face, twisted and disfigured by death? And the new god to whom Feuerbach prays, is it a god or a dead idol, or, even worse, an oracle for whom the priest speaks, no longer a prophet, but an impostor? In view of this, so to speak, surgical origin of Feuerbach’s teaching, which nevertheless retains an inextricable connection with the Christianity he denies, or, rather, corrects, our general attitude towards it is naturally ambivalent. It cannot be accepted, but it cannot be completely rejected either. It contains the greatest and most important truths, but taken in such one-sidedness and abstraction that thanks to this they turn into equally great delusions. Those statements that Feuerbach retains from the Christianity he rejected are true, but by accepting these derivative truths, he denies at the same time the much more important truths that ground them, and the result is a strange mixture of monstrosities, contradictions and paradoxes, a labyrinth in which one must look for ways. Two great and important truths are expressed with great emphasis and energy in the teachings of Feuerbach: the first is that man and humanity have unconditional religious significance, otherwise, that man for man or humanity for the individual is and should be a religious shrine, to use Feuerbach’s expression, to be an earthly god, as if an absolute; the second truth is that humanity is a single whole, in which individuals are only separate parts, outside of it losing all meaning and all significance, and this unity is not an abstraction, does not exist only in abstraction, but is quite real, humanity is a living and collective organism. Both of these truths, about the highest dignity of the human race and about its real unity, organically connected with each other, represent the positive part of Feuerbach’s teaching, but the negative side of it is that he puts them in direct connection, seeks to present them as necessary conclusions from the philosophy of atheism, and thereby undermines both teachings at their core. Believing the essence of his worldview in atheism, Feuerbach undermines his humanism, wages a continuous struggle with himself, and is torn by irreconcilable contradictions. Let's take a closer look at this instructive struggle. Let's start with the first thesis, about the religious significance of humanity. In Feuerbach’s language, it is formulated not in the sense that man is divine only in the sense of his potential abilities and ultimate destiny, but in the completely opposite sense: there is no God, and therefore man is God to man, i.e., it is formulated as a conclusion from atheism, as its synonym or the concave side of the relief. But anthropotheism, as a conclusion from atheism, contains an internal contradiction, because in relation to particulars it affirms what it denies in general, namely, by destroying God, it strives to preserve the divine, the sacred. The internal and necessary dialectic of atheism therefore leads from anthropotheism to religious nihilism, to the denial of every shrine, every value, or, what is the same, to the elevation of a fact, just because it is a fact, to the rank of the highest value, to giving religious significance to the fact as such. Atheism accomplished this dialectic during the lifetime of Feuerbach in the teaching of Stirner, the preacher of nihilism, immoralism and “egoism,” the “destroyer of sacred things” (Entheiliger). We have already become acquainted with this significant episode in the history of thought and we know that the winner in this clash of two thinkers should be considered not Feuerbach, but Stirner. For a consistent and sincere atheist, who does not abandon old religious beliefs for practical use, there is no salvation from deadening nihilism, from the murderous emptiness of complete loneliness, and not loneliness in the desert or imprisonment, but loneliness among people, separation from them. And indeed, if the highest, absolute value, the source of all derivative values, is rejected and declared non-existent, then what logical, and even moral, possibility exists of establishing itself on a relative, derivative value, which, like the moon, reflects the light from the sun and goes out along with the latter? After all, humanity, considered in a natural and not religious order, is still only a fact of the external world, a fact of biology, history, sociology, etc., in this capacity not fundamentally different from other facts or objects of the external world, such as, for example, a stone or a mountain, or this table. There is, of course, a huge quantitative difference between these facts, but not a fundamental one, not in value or rank. The deification of a fact, that is, the attribution to a fact of a derivative and relative meaning of absolute value, a predicate of divinity, is the worship of an idol, in ordinary language called idolatry. And if our ancestors and modern savages worship as a deity the objects of the physical world - stone, animal, heavenly bodies, then Feuerbach in the same way proposes to worship humanity, the totality of homo sapiens individuals. And if a modern person, entering an idol, will find nothing there except ugly dolls and figures, then in Feuerbach’s idol a real atheist will also find only idols, albeit of an abstract nature, and will laugh at them. Having removed the head, do not bother the hair, Stirner could have said to the pious atheist Feuerbach - having rejected the absolute, one must leave piety, and not try to preserve all its attributes, attributing them to a being that is obviously non-absolute. The contradiction is not original, there is no need to even insist on this. Stirner is right: atheism and nihilism, no matter what form they take, are synonyms. Either there is a Supreme above me, before Whom I prostrate myself, or I am above myself and know nothing above myself, and ego (and not homo) is deus sum. Idolatry is understandable and natural in the era of the dark and naive consciousness of humanity, especially since then idolatry was not atheism at all and idols had the meaning of truly sacred images. But the position of the thinker of the 19th century, who came from Hegel, is difficult, having, therefore, lost all naivety and spontaneity and forced, due to internal spiritual necessity, to create a known idol for himself, preach its divinity and pray to him, and this idol is not some unattainable luminary or unknown creature, but ourselves, we and our friends, wives and children, their acquaintances, the acquaintances of their acquaintances, our ancestors and our descendants, i.e. e. humanity. Such a person must experience constant tragedy, be tormented by burning contradiction, languish from inner restlessness, and this is one of the reasons why Feuerbach could never stop at the final formulation of his teaching; all his life he processed it, often only repeating old thoughts in other words and, as if with the sound of new words, trying to drown out internal doubts. This anxiety is the whole of Feuerbach, his best, noblest essence, and it is surprising if this struggle and this anxiety are visible behind the mask of dogmatic, militant atheism. Man is sacred, and humanity is sacred, it has an absolute religious purpose. Feuerbach felt this deeply. A special merit - not of logic, but of his human intuition - must be attributed to him for the fact that he spoke specifically about the religion of mankind, that, with all his atheism, he did not deny, but preached religion. In this way, he becomes ten heads taller than those who seek to abolish not only this or that form of religion, but religious deification in general, and at the same time, with an arrogant grimace, turn away from the real destroyer of shrines, Stirner. Wherever there are absolute values, an object of worship, a shrine, whatever it may be - in the abstract idea of ​​​​humanity or in the letter of the Erfurt program - there is religion, and it does little honor to the insight of Engels and Marx that, while maintaining the philosophy of Feuerbach, they diligently - in their atheistic and materialistic fanaticism - eliminate his religion 85. And, of course, the only conceivable form of atheistic religion remains the religion of humanity, the deification of man, as Feuerbach preached. Either God or man – this is Feuerbach’s alternative. Meanwhile, in fact, not only is there no opposition here, either - or, but both of these concepts are inextricably linked, actually uniting in the concept of God-manhood. Faith in God is faith in man, and without this faith man turns into a strange, two-legged creature full of incomprehensible contradictions. But it is impossible to separate these faiths from one another, and any attempt to give a religion to humanity without God is an extra argument a contrario 86 in favor of this truth, and we have a similar attempt in Feuerbach. Man and humanity are the highest revelation of the Divine, for whose sake this world was created, which is the mediator between the Creator and creation, the soul of the world. Only man has the ability to freely and consciously assimilate divine content; only in him does the absolute find its other, its image and its likeness. Because of this, humanity has the potential for endless development, the ability for true progress leading to a real transcendence of itself, and not just empty and pompous claims to superhumanity. The growth of humanity from the dark created element to the bright communion with God and the knowledge of God, from bestial humanity to God-humanity, fills the historical process. For this process, the free human element is equally necessary, actively assimilating the revealed divine content, and this revelation of the Divine, many-part and diverse, is also necessary. The Divine, unchangeable and absolute, has in humanity its own image, its other, which assimilates this absolute content in the historical process; humanity is in this sense becoming absolute. It is obvious that the possibility of revelation of the absolute, the possibility of the divine-human process presupposes in man certain abilities, a certain spiritual affinity, the “image and likeness” of the absolute. If we eliminate this assumption and stand on the basis of deism, which reduces the Divinity, in the beautiful expression of Feuerbach, to the role of Titularursache 87, then we reject all possibility of knowledge of God and revelation of God. Regarding such a God, one cannot even say: he exists, because for the Divine to be means to open up, to give life. God, who does not give life, is a contradictio in adjecto 88. Therefore, deism, the recognition of God an und für sich outside of any relation to man, is only a polite form of atheism. As people, we are capable only of human knowledge, but to be in human language means to manifest our existence, and the position that in general there is a God, but He is not for man, is an absurd contradiction. Therefore, deism, due to inevitable dialectics, turns into atheism both theoretically and historically (during the Enlightenment). This is usually objected to by citing the anthropomorphism of such ideas about the Divine, as if it were unworthy and rude. But accusations of anthropomorphism are based on pure misunderstanding (unless, of course, they concern really crude ideas about God, in which our shortcomings, weaknesses, earthly properties, etc. are attributed to the Divine). What is called anthropomorphism is in fact the only possible and accessible to man, human knowledge of God. By affirming His existence, we at the same time affirm at least some of His cognition for ourselves, and therefore, we attribute to ourselves the organ of this cognition, the ability for such cognition. But knowledge is a deeply intimate act, based only on internal affinity. We recognize, therefore, the divinity of our own nature, that is, the image and likeness of God in ourselves. It has long been pointed out by the great poet, who repeated here an equally great philosopher 89, that we would not know the sun if our eye did not have something solar in itself: 90 Therefore, accusations of anthropomorphism are completely fair insofar as they mark the truth that the existence of God is inevitably the revelation of God, and therefore the Absolute Existing presupposes the Absolute Becoming. If there is a God, then it means that man is divine, and his spiritual powers also have a divine origin and a divine purpose. Thus, what is usually called religious anthropomorphism, i.e., the recognition of the divine dignity and image of man, does not at all serve as an argument in favor of atheism, as which, by the way, Feuerbach also uses it. Feuerbach tries to prove that man creates God in his own image and likeness, as objectified, materialized desires of his heart, as a dream 91. He inverts the statement that man has the image and likeness of God, in the sense that God has the image and likeness of man. But this in no way resolves the question of whether man created God as a product of his imagination, or whether man was created by God and is constantly aware and aware of his God-likeness. The metaphysical-religious question with this instruction of Feuerbach, which he takes as the strongest argument in favor of atheism, even considers the revelation of the secret of religion and the turning point of history, is not only not resolved, but, in essence, is not posed. Feuerbach in “The Essence of Christianity” and Vl. Soloviev in “Readings on God-Humanity” (and Schelling before him) come very close to each other, since the matter is about establishing the godlikeness of man, but then diverge from this common point in diametrically opposite directions. In general, these works have some strange similarity and closeness with the greatest contrast, for both of them, with all the abyss that separates them, are characterized in essence by their answer to one basic and eternal question, namely the question: what do you think about the Son of Man? And in the answer to it lies the answer to another question: what do you think about a person and about yourself? It is not for nothing that Feuerbach originally designed the title of his work to include a call to self-awareness: GUSEY aavrov 92. So, we do not consider Feuerbach’s anthropology, which he considered the most victorious and irresistible weapon in the arsenal of atheism, to be such at all, and it in no way authorizes him to make those religious-metaphysical conclusions in favor of atheism that he himself drew from it. Those data of religious psychology that were noted by Feuerbach also fit into the opposite worldview; this, however, has already been pointed out more than once. Having rejected God, the Absolute Being, Feuerbach had to recognize as God the absolute becoming, humanity being deified. Becoming was equated with complete being, deification was equated with deification. The Absolute, in a process consisting of a mixture of the absolute and the conditional, the eternal and the transitory, was declared unique and final. Hence all further difficulties, all the tragedy of Feuerbach’s situation. From now on, he is doomed to collect the rays penetrating from above into the dark element, and with the help of these rays to illuminate what remains unilluminated. The basic fact of the spiritual nature of man is its inconsistency. Man is a living contradiction and, as such, a living mystery. Heaven and hell dwell in the human soul, this has been said a thousand times. Man is pulled up and down at the same time, torn apart by the struggle of different and opposite principles, which is how human history moves. These irreconcilable contradictions in man do not allow us to accept him as an absolute, as Feuerbach recognizes him. To do this, you need to take the point of view of complete moral anarchy, philistine reconciliation with everything and everyone, but with such a mood there is no need to find absolutes at all. In this case, humanity is deified not for what it is, but simply for the fact that it exists. True, deep democracy is replaced by its opposite - demagoguery, excluding any higher criteria over the crowd and its judgment, and this deceptive appearance gives this view special popularity. The deity is a crowd, the titan is a crowd! - as Nadson exclaims in one of his most heady and false poems. This side of Feuerbach’s views was especially easily accepted by modern times, and idolatry of the crowd, demagoguery, which is the opposite of true, conscious democracy, is the most popular form of modern atheism, and only Nietzsche has recently encroached on this idol. In democracy, as in all human affairs, there are two possible aspects, two paths, two directions: up and down. What leads upward is the consciousness of solidarity, the highest unity of universal humanity and the community of the divine-human cause, in which, although “star from star differ in glory,” there are privates and officers, there are laborers and heroes, but they are all needed and equally indispensable for the universal pan-human and divine-human cause, the creation of the kingdom of God, joint service to the highest ideal. The opposite of this is the tendency to level, to reduce everything to one rank, to recognize as legitimate only what is equally accessible and shared by everyone, to an unconscious desire to bring everything not to a higher, but to a lower level. This attitude towards the masses - an uncritical and even non-critical admiration for the majority, not only in what it is fully competent, that is, in relation to its material needs and interests, but also in matters of spirit - is now very widespread and is usually mistaken for democracy. The absence of higher scales, a consequence of atheism, led to the fact that the scale of quality was replaced by the scale of quantity, and Feuerbach was also guilty of this philosophical fall from grace. This tendency represents an ulcer of modern culture and is a direct result not of its democracy, which is not at all associated with the deification of the crowd, but of its atheism. Feuerbach's formula: humanity is God and the absolute, modernity is practically realized very often in the blind worship of the crowd, the deification of the masses, and most of all, Feuerbach's direct heir, German Social Democracy, sins with this. Having extinguished the torch and lowered the tip of the dividing sword, Feuerbach finds himself forced, instead of the religion of humanity, to preach the cult of mediocrity, both moral and mental. You remember his monstrous, absurd teaching about how the moral perfection of the race is established, which belongs to it in comparison with the individual: different individuals are both virtuous and vicious in different ways, and if you take the algebraic sum, then the pluses will be reduced by minuses and you will get the image of perfect virtue - the race, which in this capacity constitutes the “objective conscience” for the individual. We consider this concept to be a completely obvious absurdity, equally outrageous to both the mind and conscience. You don’t have to criticize it, but only explain it. And the most instructive thing about this is that Feuerbach stooped to this shameful teaching not due to any private mistake or accidental obfuscation, but involuntarily, perhaps against his will, in a struggle with himself: otherwise he would have nowhere to go, and with the honest consistency and courage of thought that distinguishes him, he goes ahead, towards the absurd, reveals the secrets, the “secret” of his atheism, which, perhaps, would have been It’s more prudent and not to push it forward, but to leave it in the shadows. Let someone in painful, fatal moments of mental decline, despondency and despair, when one gives up, faith in man, in human feat, the beauty of the human soul dims, let Chekhov, who was poisoned by “gray people,” be brought to the thought of this amazing idea that “gray people”, considered separately, are, of course, not the first class, but they are “gray” in different ways, and if you take in the sum of all their shades, then they will turn out crimson and bright purple, you will get a hero. Will there be a source of cheerfulness and faith in this conviction, will the clouded gaze be cleared, or rather will the despondent one be refreshed by a memory or a story about some really good deed of one individual person, perhaps the pure smile of a child, not to mention the thought of that Righteous One, the “Only Sinless One,” Who also wore human flesh and grieved with human sorrows. Be that as it may, we can guarantee that this Feuerbachism will be simply disgusting at such a moment. Feuerbach felt the same hopelessness when he wondered about the nature of truth. It is indisputable that the single truth is revealed only to the collective humanity in its historical development, and here, too, different individuals are assigned different roles: some are destined to be pioneers, go far ahead, remaining incomprehensible to their contemporaries, others are destined to immediately find an echo and understanding, some are destined to be creators, others are more or less passive assimilation and guardians of what they did not acquire. It is true, in any case, that the truth is cognized jointly by the human race; here there is a natural and irreducible communism. But for Feuerbach this obvious and indisputable truth was not enough. He needed to recognize that truth is not only learned together, but also created together. To recognize the real truth, which exists before any human knowledge, means to already recognize God - for truth is one of the necessary definitions of deity - means to recognize that knowledge in its essence is revelation, although conditioned by the active self-activity of humanity. True to his atheism, Feuerbach, of course, could not admit any of this and again found himself forced to support the obvious absurdity (even if it was now shared even by such sharp minds as Simmel, but with an excessive predilection for paradox) that “truth is the consciousness of the species.” However, the application of the criterion of a quantitative majority, the cult of mediocrity in this case is associated with obvious inconveniences, even greater than in the previous one, therefore Feuerbach immediately makes a decisive departure from his principle, declaring that an individual person can be a representative of an entire clan and, as such, disagree with the clan. Obviously, this limitation completely destroys the rule itself, and Feuerbach only tried in vain to establish it. So, this is what the great and important truth about the religious dignity and purpose of humanity led to after Feuerbach turned it into an abstract principle and, not wanting to recognize the Supreme Content, deified the external form in which It is revealed - not the source of light and life, but the dark and dead elements. Feuerbach presented himself as a typical image of a philosophical idolater. The second truth of the greatest importance, which forms the basis of Feuerbach's humanism, or anthropotheism, is the idea that humanity is one and that the race, the whole, exists prior to the individual and is a real being. This thought constitutes the Leitmotiv of Feuerbach’s entire philosophy (as well as that of his like-minded and contemporary Og. Comte). He states the connection of the individual with the race, man with humanity, not only in the sense of causal dependence, which connects us with external nature, but giving this fact a fundamental, religious significance. The genus is a deity to whom every member of it, every individual, is sacred. Feuerbach comes surprisingly close and here to the essence of Christianity and its greatest truths. Humanity recognizes itself in solidarity and feels united - this is a wonderful and mysterious fact that lies at the very bottom of human consciousness. We are talking, we repeat, not about external causal dependence, but about much more. Of course, the causal connection between generation and generation lies on the surface and cannot but catch the eye. Generation from generation is in the same exact objective dependence as the type of agriculture is on climate and soil, the color of the skin from the sun, etc. But from this fact of causal dependence it is still impossible to squeeze out this universal human solidarity in question, for this latter contains something much more than a causal connection. It affirms the moral solidarity and unity of the human race, a common conscience, common dignity, common tasks and ideals. We live and act not as individuals A, B, C, and not as a mechanical aggregate or sum A + B + C, but as members or elements of the whole ABC, existing before and independently of A, B, and C, and giving them a certain quality. We say: homo sum et nihil humani a me alienum esse puto 93, and this statement is equally understandable in all languages ​​and in all countries. We have the ability to be proud and ashamed of a person, that is, to feel on behalf of humanity. We feel satisfaction for a person, observing the creative flight of human genius and the beauty of human achievement, and we are ashamed and hurt - again for a person - when we dwell in thought on the downfalls of humanity. “Der Menschheit ganzer Jammer fasst mich an” 94, says Faust, entering the dungeon where Margarita is languishing, and perceiving the suffering of the girl he abandoned again as the sorrow of all humanity. And the higher the spirit and the subtler the consciousness, the more acutely this human solidarity is recognized, the deeper the suffering and sorrow for people, the more clearly the voice of not only individual, but universal human conscience speaks. The vices and sin of humanity belong to it as a whole; One person cannot free himself from sin at his own expense while all of humanity is stuck in evil and untruth, and one individual cannot fall without dragging his fellow humans into the abyss. This is how the doctrine of the original sin of all mankind, which all mankind could have sinned in one person, becomes more and more understandable. This consciousness, this primary and elementary fact of conscience does not lend itself to any rational, or rather, rationalistic explanation. It is rationalistically understandable (if it is still understandable) why I feel guilty for my own actions and their immediate results. But when I feel guilty in cases where this connection does not exist for the visible eye (for example, as in Chekhov’s story, for the death of an unknown suicide - “On business”), or if the guilt in general immeasurably exceeds individual responsibility - after all, for some reason I feel guilty both in the Russian-Japanese War and in the Tsushima disaster - then I have to inevitably admit that in addition to the personal responsibility of the individual for his individual actions, there is also generic conscience, generic sensitivity, not fictitious, but real universal human consciousness, living in every individual. His voice may be more or less intelligible, sometimes, and even often, completely muffled, but it is there, this enigmatic, mysterious voice, and it says: everyone is to blame for everyone and for everything, humanity is united and solidary, and in this single and living whole there is no possibility of drawing a line where the guilt of one or the other ends. This greatest and deepest truth of Christianity in modern times in Russian literature is recognized most of all by Dostoevsky, who became its real preacher (it is very much put forward in the modern theosophical movement and in the doctrine of karma). It is easy to give this feeling even some rationalistic confirmation by pointing out the causal connection of all things and the significance of every smallest individual action for the entire universe. But this theoretical position in itself is not capable of generating such a living, real feeling of universal human solidarity, living pride and living shame and repentance for humanity. This living feeling cannot be rooted only in abstraction, in abstract thought; it is obviously connected with our life, with our true being, although not with that side of it that is naked and lies on the surface of consciousness, where separation, a sense of individuality, and specialness from everything reign. It is connected with the side that is turned to the underground, mystical roots of existence, where the individual really connects with a single humanity, with the world soul, and the mysterious, mystical experience of universal human solidarity is a voice reaching the surface from the depths. The real mystical unity of humanity necessarily presupposes a living, real, individual, and not an abstract center of this unity, which reunites it and transforms humanity into a living spiritual organism. This center is Christ, who inextricably linked Himself with humanity, the God-man, who reunites humanity with the Divine. Being such a living and real center of humanity, He could take upon Himself its guilt and its sins, and His cleansing sacrifice, His feat had and could have real significance for all of humanity, inextricably linked with Him. And as long as the sinful life of humanity, which has not yet been transformed, although it has already been redeemed, continues, we, not even believing in Christ, but nevertheless being in a real connection with Him, feel the pain caused to Him in His humanity, and this feeling is the universal human conscience. And not believing in Christ, but feeling within ourselves a real universal unity, we still try to keep this feeling within ourselves, recognizing it in ourselves as something higher, as a shrine. This is the explanation of the sad paradox that Feuerbach, an opponent of Christianity, preaches its fundamental truth: unity, solidarity of humanity, but unity without a unifying center, holiness without a sanctifying basis. But here, as in other cases, he is doomed to fight with himself, to chase a fleeing ghost. The unity of humanity - not abstract, but real, essential - he wants to rest solely on empirical reality, but this ground is constantly slipping from under his feet, because in its empirical existence humanity is not united, unity exists here for him only as a task, more precisely, as a norm or ideal, which never completely passes into reality and is not realized in it. There is no single humanity, and therefore there is no history of mankind, civilization of mankind, progress of mankind, etc., these are all abstractions and conventions; in fact, there are only individual eras, individual generations, individual estates and classes, and, finally, individuals, and humanity as a whole slips out of our hands like a ghost as soon as we try to grab it. Of the entire spherical surface, which in this case can be likened to the human race, only a few points are illuminated for us and are in our field of vision, and the entire huge sphere above and below is shrouded in darkness. Past generations, with their painful and thankless work, which we, standing on their shoulders, regard, however, for the most part with arrogant and condescending contempt, left us only cemeteries full of the dead and with them we cannot be connected by grateful memory and a living sense of heartfelt connection. The idea of ​​honoring the dead, directly related to the idea of ​​the immortality of the soul and the coming resurrection, does not fit into positive consciousness. They were, but now they are not, nothing remains of their suffering, heartache, struggles and despair. These people manure the future harmony, they worked for us, and let their bones rot in the world. I am not slandering or caricaturing, because, indeed, for positivism there is and cannot be any other attitude towards the past of humanity - abstraction and the ghost of the past cannot be loved, and the growing scientific historical interest, which, however, concerns more institutions than people, has to a large extent the nature of curiosity and addiction to various rarities, purely cerebral inquisitiveness, and not heartfelt participation. After all, now a modern economist can prove in one essay, with one, one might say, spirit, that modern capitalist civilization is based on the extermination of entire tribes, the plunder of entire cultures, drowning in blood, and then in one spirit, boastfully and self-satisfiedly, begins to list all its pleasures and charms with the carefreeness of... cynicism. No, there is no need to dissemble: modern humanity is considered as the goal, and all previous generations are only means for it. But future generations are also a nebula in which the eye does not discern anything definite. It can be assumed that they will treat past humanity with the same indifferent contempt as we do, and we will be viewed as historical dung just as we view our ancestors. It will “leap” safely (if you believe modern prophets) from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom and, looking back, will remember it with the same contemptuous horror with which we remember the times of the Inquisition. And then there will also be only one illuminated point, which will move to another place, but will still be surrounded by darkness above and darkness below. The greatest lie of positivism in general and Feuerbach's in particular lies therefore in its assertion that man is mortal, finite and limited, while humanity is immortal and capable of limitless improvement. With a positivistic understanding of human life, i.e., with the limitation of human existence only to given empirical conditions, there is no humanity, it is only an abstraction, only an algebraic formula. Stirner, also an empiricist and positivist, but more consistent, was right a thousand times against Feuerbach when he told him that he bifurcates man into a real and an abstract being and that the genus is an abstraction. Feuerbach pointed out to him in his objection that the “only” one needs a wife and children, and generally contemporaries. Let it be so, but contemporaries do not constitute humanity, the race as a whole, they are only an illuminated point of the sphere, and there is no and cannot be a whole. There is no humanity, its ghost falls powerlessly before the great equalizer - death and crumbles into separate generations, alternating like waves, and like waves, mutually alien. Thus, the real content of Feuerbach’s formula homo homini deus can only be this: God for me is my contemporaries, my friends, enemies, acquaintances and strangers. One can congratulate oneself on such a deity and such a religion. References to the fact that all of humanity is in an objective historical connection that unites it into one whole will not help either. So be it. Let it be proven, for example, that through the Bible I am in direct connection with the ideas of ancient Babylon. But, firstly, I am in such a causal connection with the entire physical world around me; my well-being is inextricably linked, for example, with the correct operation of the law of gravity; Physically, I am connected by direct continuity with the entire organic world, with pterodactyls, with gorillas and with frogs, perhaps even more firmly than with the Babylonians. Secondly, and most importantly, this reference does not say anything, because we are not talking about an objective causal connection established by science, but about a living sense of consciousness of this connection, about that heartfelt recognition necessary for religion or even simply for a sense of solidarity, which is the only way that united humanity lives. Therefore, we should reject as a euphemism, as a counterfeit coin, the concept: universal human progress, universal human civilization, it is more correct to talk about the civilization of future generations, about their well-being and happiness, but not to use a part instead of the whole, and these generations - we do not know how many there will be, nor what they will be like - should not be called humanity. Modern positivism borrowed all the usage of words and, in part, even the range of ideas from Christianity, not noticing that all this, cut off from the living trunk, dies and withers, turns into an empty sound. The concept of a single humanity contains an irreconcilable antinomy: on the one hand, the consciousness of this unity is given to us in a direct feeling and is a natural and inevitable postulate, the norm of our actions, thoughts and feelings; on the other hand, this unity is mercilessly destroyed by death, which transforms internal unity into an external succession of generations, and the consciousness of connection and solidarity into hereditary traditions of history, into a historical process. The only way out of the contradiction, the resolution of the antinomy is possible only if we recognize that history is not the final form of human life and that the results of the combined activities and labors of all mankind really matter for all mankind. But this view is possible only with the acceptance of the Christian faith in the “future age” and the general resurrection, with which only faith in progress, in the historical creativity of mankind, and not individual, alternating generations, can be associated. Otherwise, it turns into nonsense, into the embodiment of irony: was it really necessary to have centuries of suffering of all humanity in order to bring prosperity to unknown chosen ones for a short time of their lives? Only one winner triumphs - death. Feuerbach felt these contradictions; it was not for nothing that he criticized the idea of ​​personal immortality and praised death so long and verbosely; it was not for nothing that he was ready to save himself from them even at the cost of obvious absurdity. Having rejected the God-man, the mystical center that unites humanity, he began to look for it in the empirical world and, as we know, found it... in the state. The reader remembers that in the end the head of state appears in the role of God's deputy. This absurdity shows that within the teaching itself not everything is going well and is a formidable warning for Feuerbach’s followers. Religious anthropology, the doctrine of anthropotheism, is the key with which Feuerbach tries to unlock all the secret places of religion and Christianity. This critical work of his is of secondary and derivative importance, although there is a lot of wit and brilliance in it, but its fundamental foundations are given in anthropology... And if this universal key turns out to be covered on all sides with rust and breaks in the hands, we consider ourselves entitled to free ourselves here from considering the particulars of Feuerbach’s criticism of Christianity, for the fundamental judgment about it has already been pronounced, while the study of the details can only constitute a special task. If we put aside the individual characteristics that each writer has, then about Feuerbach together with Og. Comte must say that they were given the opportunity to become exponents of the spirit of new times in its most basic, essential and deep characteristics. This characteristic is exhausted by one word: humanism, considered not in the narrow sense of a predominantly literary movement, as it appeared for the first time in modern history (although there is a direct ideological affinity and continuity between medieval modern humanism), but understood as the greatest vital fact of modern times, starting approximately with the great French revolution or even earlier, from the 17th - 18th centuries. Humanism and modern times are synonymous. Modern humanism does not know its Luther, or Zwingli, or Calvin. Leveling and democratic humanism does not need and does not even allow individual leaders to embody or create a movement. The “heroes” of humanism, understanding this word in the Carlylean sense, its “führende Geister” 95, of course, are not those giants, such as, for example, Mohammed or the mentioned heroes of the Reformation, but if this time also has its heroes, then Feuerbach must certainly be named among them. The spirit of the new time, its moods and feelings, perhaps more clearly than those of his more celebrated contemporaries, is reflected in his works. And this is the historical significance of Feuerbach, which is much greater than the purely theoretical and philosophical value of his works. Perfect God-manhood, which, according to the teachings of Christianity, is the Creator’s final thought about His creation, an ideal task resolved in the world and historical process, presupposes the free assimilation of the divine content of life, and therefore eliminates the possibility of suppression of the human element by divine power. Although man assimilates the divine content given to him, he perceives it in free creativity, in the historical process, as a result of the development of his own powers, as the real realization of the image of God in his own being. This assimilation, therefore, cannot in any way be merely a passive perception of alien content; it presupposes a movement from oneself, towards it, an independent, human movement. For this purpose, the human element must temporarily separate from the divine, be conscious to the depths as such, a person must stand on his own feet in order to freely accept and assimilate the divine content of life. Thus, perfect God-manhood is equally impossible both without God and without man. In the historical revelation of the divine-human unity, which is achieved generally dialectically through contradictions, both extremes, both possibilities of a one-sided understanding of the universal idea of ​​divine-humanity were tried: if in the Middle Ages the worldview of divine-humanity without man, or, more precisely, besides man, prevailed, then in modern times the idea of ​​humanity without God or besides God prevails. The basis of the medieval worldview and the practice of life based on it was distrust of man and his powers, of his earthly interests and affairs. Monasticism was considered the most perfect and adequate embodiment of the divine-human idea. Less than anyone, I am inclined to downplay the one-sided truth of this idea: intense idealism, acute experiences of the transcendental, powerful faith - with all these features the Middle Ages accumulated in the soul of humanity a wealth that we have not yet lived through, a stock of high feelings, prayerful moods, idealistic contempt for the transitory goods of this world. In the Russian soul, perhaps even more than in the European soul, these feelings are alive, connected with the common spiritual homeland of European humanity - the Middle Ages (meaning this term not in the sense of a chronological, but a cultural-historical era). And to this day, medieval architecture represents an unsurpassed and even unreached limit of tension in idealistic-religious art (just as the beauty of ancient art remains unsurpassed and unattained for us in a completely different sphere). And in comparison with these majestic monuments to the spiritual life of medieval humanity, modernity with its train stations and hotels seems so petty, prosaic, and philistine. You need to be able to worship this antiquity. And yet, the medieval worldview now represents for us, undoubtedly, the historical past, and, moreover, the irrevocable past. It has been experienced and overcome, its one-sidedness and its untruth are quite clearly realized, and if this untruth is still trying to test its rotten power over modernity, then what naked, deadening violence, without the former charm of the shrine, without the former radiance around the darkened face. The medieval understanding of the idea of ​​God-manhood was historically defeated by a worldview that represented its complete opposite and negation: humanism, the religion of humanity either without God or against God. This either-or contains two possibilities or two different shades, as it were, two registers in which apparently the same music can sound. But we will not touch on this difference now; for now we will dwell on the very content of this melody. Humanism brought forward with extraordinary force the earthly, human side of the historical process, speaking out in defense of humanity against the inhumanity of the Middle Ages. He set out as the first commandment what will be asked of all of us, without distinction of faith: to feed the hungry and give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to visit those in prison, for what other content does the social movement he created have if not the fulfillment of this commandment of Christ? Humanism extinguished the fires of the Inquisition, broke the chains of slavery, which was easily tolerated by inhuman, exclusively otherworldly Christianity, it freed word, thought, conscience from tyrannical oppression, and created a free personality; he is now waging the last great struggle against the social slavery of capitalism, completing the work of emancipation of the individual. May these deeds of humanism always be blessed! The merits of humanism, in particular, here in Russia, are great. And here, in Russia, there occurred the same clash between extra-human God-manhood and godless humanism, medieval and modern worldviews, as in the West. And in our country, the ideas of humanism inspired and continue to inspire the liberation movement. The entire almost revolutionary struggle was conducted under the banner of humanism. Our various social trends, starting with Belinsky’s Westernism, are equally populism, and people’s freedom, and Marxism; all of them, with all their differences, have a common religious and philosophical basis in the ideas of humanism. And before our eyes, now the liberation of Russia was accomplished through the blood, illnesses, torments and labors of those who have their saints not in the Christian church, but in the humanistic pantheon. So, one can say that humanism, which has taken the place of the medieval worldview, is a step forward in the general historical movement of the divine-human process, and, moreover, in a certain sense, in Christian consciousness. Emphasizing the independent significance of the human element, he contributes to the fullest disclosure of the great truth of God-manhood, revealing a new side to it. However, we have already seen and know that this humanism also has another essence, contains a double possibility. The one-sided human principle expressed in him, illegally suppressed in the medieval worldview, first appeared, although without God, but, in essence, in the name of God. In this case, his apparent godlessness is only a protest against the medieval worldview, although, it is true, a protest that does not distinguish form from content, historical abuse from the essence of the matter, but having as its starting point not a rebellion against God, but the defense of human rights. However, an atheistic humanism is possible that is much more conscious and deep, fundamentally hostile to everything that exceeds man. This possibility follows from the very essence of the matter: if God-manhood requires the free participation of man for its existence, then man must be free to turn this freedom against this participation, to be equally free to follow Christ and to Christ, and against Him. In humanism, undoubtedly, there exists - and the further, the more definite - such a consciously anti-Christian movement, in which humanism is, in fact, a means of struggle against Christ. The great world tragedy, the struggle of Christ with the Antichrist, inevitably had to manifest itself under this guise, and, moreover, more acutely and more consciously than anywhere else, for once the general humanistic credo is accepted and understood as a necessary practical application of Christianity, then, naturally, the difference in the last, highest values, on which both the credo itself and its register depends, comes to the fore. Anti-Christian humanism wants to limit the spiritual flight of humanity at the cost of earthly well-being; it, like once a spirit in the desert, proposes to convert - and converts with miracles of technology - stones into bread, but on the condition that it is given divine worship. He wants to finally extinguish that fire of Prometheus, which, after all, burned the Middle Ages, and, dulling the tragic discord in the individual soul, create a kingdom of spiritual bourgeois, cultural philistinism. He carries with him the subtlest spiritual poison, devaluing his gifts and turning them into devilish temptations. And the concepts of humanity, humanity, religion of humanity in this use turn out to be, strange to say, only the mask of the Antichrist, his pseudonym... At its inception, when humanism was just beginning to oppose Christianity, mistakenly considering it the final and complete expression of the medieval worldview, it was still difficult to discern what exactly the hostility related to. But with the further differentiation of ideas and the practical successes and conquests of humanism, especially since the concepts of true God-manhood, which entirely includes the whole truth of humanism, all its concerns about man and the truly human, begin to be increasingly revealed in the minds, two currents should become more and more clearly visible: humanism with Christ and in His name, or against Christ and in its own name. “I have come in the name of My Father, and you do not receive Me; but if another comes in his own name, you will receive him” (John VI, 43). Here is the divided abyss, here is the top and bottom, the right and left sides: in the name of whom? And future historical development will be given the opportunity to finally reveal in religious consciousness two principles, two irreconcilable opposites, still hidden under the general label of humanism. These opposites, revealing the human soul to its true metaphysical essence, are rooted, of course, not so much in the folds of a flexible mind, but in the hidden depths of the heart, in its free self-determination towards good and evil. Therefore, the entire humanistic civilization also has an antinomian, dualistic character, its value lies in the final goal, but this goal can be different and even opposite. This dualism is not accidental and far-fetched, but fundamental, metaphysical, underlying both the entire universe and the human soul. The source of this dualism is freedom, in which our highest dignity is the image of God. Where there is freedom, there is choice and division, there is also struggle, and not for lazy vegetation, but for irreconcilable and non-stop struggle, we were sent into this world, to build the kingdom of God through free struggle. Nevertheless, the necessary foundation of this kingdom of God, in any case, is free humanity, and the liberation of man in history, external human emancipation, which is the main task and main cause of humanism, is a necessary condition for this. Therefore, those who worked in the field of humanism, promoting this divine-human goal - the liberation of the individual, brought their stone for the construction of a new Jerusalem. And among these masons and workers, L. Feuerbach, an inspired preacher of humanism, a “pious atheist”, who, despite his atheism, despised the divine element in man and expressed his insights in a polysemantic and mysterious formula: homo homini deus est, will take his place. Karl Marx as a religious type 96 (His attitude towards the religion of man-theism of L. Feuerbach) The theme of this sketch may cause confusion and therefore requires some explanation. In my opinion, the determining force in a person’s spiritual life is his religion - not only in the narrow, but also in the broad sense of the word, that is, those highest and final values ​​that a person recognizes above himself and above himself, and the practical attitude in which he becomes towards these values. To determine the real religious center in a person, to find his true spiritual core - this means to find out the most intimate and important things about him, after which everything external and derivative will be clear. In this sense, we can talk about religion in every person, equally in a religious person and in a person who consciously denies any specific form of religiosity. For the Christian understanding of life and history, in addition, there is no doubt that the human soul is controlled and history is driven by real mystical principles, and, moreover, fighting among themselves, polar, irreconcilable. In this sense, there are, strictly speaking, no religiously neutral people; in fact, in their souls there is a struggle between Christ and the “prince of this world.” We know that there may be people who do not know Christ, but serve Him and do His will, and, conversely, who call themselves Christians, but are in fact alien to Him; Finally, among the deniers and religious hypocrites there are those who, in their spirit, foretell the coming impostor, who will come “in his own name” and find many adherents. Whose spirit owns this or that historical figure, whose “stamp” lies on this or that historical movement, this is the usual question that has to be asked when thinking about the complex phenomena of an increasingly complex life. And it especially often happens again and again to rethink this question in application to such a complex, contradictory and at the same time significant current in the spiritual life of modern times as socialism, understood precisely as a manifestation of spiritual life, because the economic content of the demands of socialism may not arouse fundamental disputes and doubts. The very historical body of socialism, i.e., the socialist movement, can be inspired by different spirits and belong to the kingdom of light or become prey to darkness. A mysterious line separates light and darkness, which exist in mixture and, however, cannot mix with each other. And when thinking about the religious nature of modern socialism, the thought involuntarily stops at the one whose spirit left such a deep imprint on the socialist movement of modern times, so that it should be considered one of its spiritual fathers - Karl Marx. Who is he? What is its religious nature? What god did he serve with his life? What love and what hatred ignited the soul of this man? To give perhaps a definite, final answer to this fundamental and decisive question of Marxism was also a personal need for the author, who for several years was under the strong influence of Marx, who devoted himself entirely to the assimilation and development of his ideas and then so difficultly and painfully freed himself from the hypnosis of this influence. I want to make ends meet, to check myself one last time and, leaving forever from my former home, to look with a cooled, critical eye at the object of my ardent young passion 97 . To the question posed, the reader does not expect, of course, to receive a truism and simple answer, capable of satisfying only zealous Marxists from the beginning, namely, that Marx’s soul was entirely woven from socialist feelings, that he loved and pitied the oppressed workers, and hated the oppressors - the capitalists, and, moreover, selflessly believed in the advent of the bright kingdom of socialism. If all this were so simple, there would, of course, be nothing to talk about. However, this is both true and at the same time not entirely true, in any case it is immeasurably more complicated and wiser. And first of all, as for Marx’s personal psychology, the way I perceive it, it seems rather doubtful to me that such feelings as love, immediate compassion, generally warm sympathy for human suffering, played such a truly primary role in his mental life. It is not for nothing that even his father, during Marx’s student years, once dropped the phrase in a letter to him: “Does your heart correspond to your head, your talents?” And he, therefore, hesitated before this question. Unfortunately, when characterizing Marx’s personality and the history of his life, we are faced with the complete almost absence of any documentary material. There are almost no characteristics of his personality, made by a subtle and competent observer and not pursuing the goal of necessarily giving a social-democratic “life” (such as the memoirs of Lafargue and Liebknecht). Therefore, in the characterization of Marx there inevitably remains room for subjectivism. Judging by Marx's printed works, his soul was generally much more accessible to the elements of anger, hatred, vengeful feelings than to the opposite feelings - sometimes, it is true, holy anger, but often not holy at all. It deserves all sympathy and respect when Marx hurls thunder at the cruelty of capitalists and capitalism, at the callousness of the current social system, but somehow this is perceived differently when immediately, along with these thunder, you encounter arrogant and malicious antics against those who disagree, no matter who it is - Lassalle 98 or McCulloch 99, Herzen 100 or Malthus, Proudhon or Senior. Marx was unusually easily drawn into personal polemics, and we must admit that in general this polemic is very unattractive, no matter how hard they try to refute it. Marx wrote three whole polemical books (not to mention trifles), and these works are now painful to read, and not only because polemics in general arouse more interest among writers than among readers. One of these books is directed against Vogt and is full of emigrant squabbles and mutual accusations of the most unworthy actions, in particular espionage; the second book is against Marx’s former friend Bruno Bauer, because of whose removal from the Berlin university Marx allegedly abandoned the idea of ​​a professorship, full of mockery and for some reason unnecessarily given a blasphemous title (“The Holy Family”); finally, the third is the most famous and valuable book against Proudhon, the tone of which also does not correspond either to the topic or to Marx’s recent relationship with Proudhon. And how many of these polemical beauties, which were difficult to put up with even at the time of the greatest passion for Marx, are in the bibliographic notes of the first volume of Capital, how many cannon shots there are at sparrows, unnecessary sarcasm and even just rudeness (how else can one define, for example, a note about Malthus and the Protestant clergy and their excessive childbearing: pp. 516 – 518, trans., ed. Struve). The memories of some of his contemporaries from the outside, from neutral circles, coinciding with this immediate impression, portray Marx as a self-confident, imperious person who does not tolerate objections (one must remember the struggle between Marx and Bakunin in the International and, in general, the history of its collapse). It is well known what a sharp characterization of Marx, based on a number of verified facts, is given by Herzen, who, however, did not personally know Marx. (In the new, legal edition of Herzen’s works - see volume III “Past and Thoughts”, chapter: “Germans in Emigration” - Herzen tells here how Marx accused Bakunin of espionage when he was in prison and could not defend himself, as well as a number of attempts to cast the shadow of accusations on Herzen himself, whom Marx did not even personally know.) “Democratic dictator” - this is how Marx is defined. Annenkov (in his famous memoirs). And this definition seems to us to correctly express the general impression of Marx 101, of this impatient and imperious self-affirmation that permeates everything in which his personality is imprinted. A characteristic feature of dictatorial-type natures is their straightforward and rather unceremonious attitude towards human individuality; people turn for them as if into algebraic signs, intended to be a means for one or another, even very lofty goals, or an object for more or less energetic, even the most benevolent, influence. In the field of theory, this trait will be expressed in a lack of attention to a specific, living human personality, in other words, in ignoring the problem of individuality. This theoretical ignoring of the individual, the elimination of the problem of the individual under the pretext of a sociological interpretation of history, is also unusually characteristic of Marx. For him, the problem of individuality, the absolutely indecomposable core of the human personality, its integral nature, does not exist. Marx the thinker, unwittingly submitting here to Marx the man, completely dissolved individuality in sociology, i.e. not only what is truly soluble in it, but also what is completely insoluble, and this feature of it, by the way, has facilitated the construction of bold and generalizing concepts of the “economic understanding of history,” where a funeral song is sung for personality and personal creativity in general. Marx was not embarrassed, did not even make any noticeable impression by the rebellion of Stirner, who was his contemporary and from whom Marx’s teacher Feuerbach 102 had such a hard time; he safely passed, also without any visible consequences for himself, the powerful ethical individualism of Kant and Fichte, whose breath filled the very air of Germany in the 30s (how this influence is felt even in Lassalle!). And even more so, the corrosive criticism of the “underground man” Dostoevsky, who, among other rights, defends the natural right to... stupidity and whim, just to “live according to his own stupid will,” did not seem possible to Marx. There was not the slightest premonition of the rebellious individualism of the coming Nietzsche as he laced life and history into a rib-crushing sociological corset. For Marx’s eyes, people form into sociological groups, and these groups decorously and naturally form regular geometric figures, as if, apart from this measured movement of sociological elements, nothing happens in history, and this abolition of the problem and concern for the individual, excessive abstraction, is the main feature of Marxism, and it thus goes to the strong-willed, imperious mental makeup of the creator of this system. In the memoirs of Marx by his daughter (Eleanor), it is reported that Marx loved Shakespeare's poetry and often reread it. We cannot, of course, suspect the correctness of these indications, all sorts of whims of taste are possible, however, looking for traces of this passion and tangible influence of Shakespeare on Marx in the works of the latter, we must say that such is not noticeable at all. And this is not surprising, because it is simply impossible to imagine an element more alien and opposite to all of Marxism than the world of Shakespeare’s poetry, in which the tragedy of the individual soul and its unexplored destinies are the center. Indeed, it seems that almost the only trace that we find in Marx of Shakespeare is a quotation from “Timon of Athens” about gold and then, no less befitting an economic treatise, a mention of Shylock, but it is the external nature of these references that only confirms our idea that Marx has no internal contact with Shakespeare and the music of their souls does not merge into one at all, but produces a monstrous dissonance. Marx, despite his turbulent life, belongs to the number of people alien to any tragedy, internally calm, least akin to the restless soul of Shakespeare. The main feature of Marx’s personality and worldview that we have indicated, his ignorance of the problem of the individual and the concrete, largely determines his general religious appearance, predetermines his comparative insensitivity to the severity of the religious problem, for this is, first of all, a problem of the individual. This is a question about the value of my life, my personality, my suffering, about the relationship of the individual human soul to God, about its personal, and not just sociological, salvation. That one-of-a-kind, irreplaceable, absolutely unrepeatable personality who flashed through history only once, for a moment, lays claim to eternity, to absoluteness, to an enduring significance that only religion, the living “God of the living” of religion, and not the dead god of the dead of sociology, can promise. And it is this, in addition to religion and outside of religion, an insoluble, even simply inconceivable problem, that gives religious consciousness, religious doubt and religious experiences in general such sharpness, burningness and torment. Here, if you want, is individualistic egoism, but of a higher order, not empirical self-love, but the highest spiritual thirst, that highest affirmation of the self, that holy egoism that commands to destroy one’s soul in order to save it, to destroy the empirical, corruptible and tactile in order to save the spiritual, invisible and incorruptible. And this is not a problem, but the torment of individuality, this riddle about man and humanity, about what is the only real and lasting thing in them, about the living soul, accompanies thought in all its bends, does not allow a person to fall asleep religiously, from it, like from the seed of a plant, religious teachings and philosophical systems grow, and isn’t this need and ability to “search for the heavenly” a clear evidence of the alien origin of man! As we said, Marx remains inaccessible to the religious problem, he is not worried about the fate of individuality, he is completely absorbed in what is common to all individuals, therefore, non-individual in them, and this non-individual, although not non-individual, generalizes into an abstract formula, relatively easily discarding what remains in the individual minus this non-individual in it, or with a calm heart equating this remainder to zero. This is what the notorious “objectivism” in Marxism consists of: individuals are extinguished into social categories, just as the personality of a soldier is extinguished by the regiment and company in which he serves. Vlad. Solovyov once expressed himself regarding Chicherin that this is a primarily “managing” mind, that is, doctrinaire in the true sense of the word, and Marx also possessed such a managerial mind. Therefore, the real aroma of religion remains inaccessible to his spiritual sense of smell, and his atheism remains so calm, non-tragic, and doctrinaire. He has no doubts that the sociological salvation of humanity, the prospect of the socialist “Zukunftstaat” 103, may turn out to be insufficient for the salvation of man and cannot replace the hope for religious salvation. The torment of Ivan Karamazov about the hopelessness of historical tragedy, his questions about the price of historical progress, about the cost of future harmony, about the “tear of a child,” which are dangerous for faith in the sociological salvation of mankind, are incomprehensible and alien to him. To resolve all issues, Marx recommends one universal remedy - the “practice” of life (die Praxis); It is enough to deafen yourself with the hubbub and noise of the street, and there, in this hubbub, in the worries of the day, you will find the solution to all your doubts. To me, this invitation to treat philosophical and religious doubts with the “practice” of life, in which there would be no time to breathe and think, as an outcome precisely from these doubts (and not for the sake of the special, independent value of this “practice”, which I do not think of either denying or diminishing), seems something tantamount to an invitation to drink yourself into insensibility and thus also become insensitive to your mental pain. The invitation to wallow in the “thickness of life,” which has recently become the last word of street philosophy and a recipe for resolving all philosophical questions and doubts, also plays the role of the ultima ratio of philosophy in Marx, although not in such a naked and vulgar form, of course. “Philosophers have sufficiently interpreted the world, it’s time to set about its practical reconstruction,” this is Marx’s motto, not only practical, but also philosophical. Although Marx was insensitive to the religious problem, this does not at all make him indifferent to the fact of religiosity and the existence of religion. On the contrary, internal alienation, as often happens, does not cause indifference, but direct hostility towards this alien and incomprehensible world, and this was precisely Marx’s attitude towards religion. Marx treats religion, especially theism and Christianity, with fierce hostility, as a militant and militant atheist, striving to liberate and cure people from religious madness, from spiritual slavery. In Marx’s militant atheism we see the central nerve of all his activity, one of its main incentives, the fight against religion is, in a certain sense, as will become clear in the subsequent presentation, the true, albeit hidden, practical motive of his most important, purely theoretical works. Marx fights the God of religion and his science and his socialism, which in his hands becomes a means for atheism, a weapon for the liberation of humanity from religion. The desire of humanity to “settle without God, and, moreover, forever and finally,” about which Dostoevsky wrote so prophetically and soulfully and which was the subject of his constant and painful thoughts, among others, received one of the most vivid and complete expressions in the doctrine of Marx. This internal connection between atheism and socialism in Marx, this true soul of his activity, is usually either not understood 105 or not noticed, because in general there is little interest in this side of him, and in order to show this as clearly as possible, one must turn to the history of his spiritual development. What, in fact, was Marx’s general philosophical worldview, and to what extent is it even appropriate to talk about it? A whole legend has been created on this score, which says that Marx came out of Hegel and was initially under his determining influence, and was, therefore, in a sense, also a Hegelian and belongs to the Hegelian “left”. This is how Marx and Engels themselves were apparently inclined to understand their philosophical genealogy in later times. We know, at least, the flattering self-characteristic that Engels gives in 1891 to German socialism, i.e., Marxism (in the mouth of Engels these are, of course, synonyms), in the inscription on his portrait: “We, German socialists, are proud that we come not only from Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen, but from Kant, Fichte and Hegel." Here, direct continuity is established between classical German idealism and Marxism, and the recognition of such a connection has become a common place in social and philosophical literature 106. Although there are no biographical materials regarding Marx’s youth, elucidating the question of the actual course of Marx’s philosophical development is now made easier at least by the fact that through Mehring’s works we have a complete edition of Marx’s old, inaccessible works, 107 which are especially valuable because they date back to his early years and the time when he had not yet become a Marxist, although he was already on his own feet, but had not yet developed his own doctrine. And so, reviewing the literary and scientific activity of Marx in its entirety, from the philosophical dissertation on Democritus and Epicurus to the last volume of Capital, we come to a conclusion that is quite sharply at odds with the generally accepted: there is no successive connection between German classical idealism and Marxism; the latter grew up on the basis of the final decomposition of idealism, therefore, only as one of the products of this decomposition. If some, albeit weak, connection between socialism and idealism still existed in Lassalle, then it was finally broken precisely as a result of the influence of Marx. The pinnacle of German idealism ended with a sheer cliff. Shortly after Hegel’s death, an unprecedented philosophical catastrophe occurred, a complete break in philosophical traditions, as if we were returning to the age of “enlightenment” (Aufklärung) and French materialism of the 18th century (to which Plekhanov dates the genesis of economic materialism, and this, in any case, is closer to reality than the opinion about Marx’s Hegelianism). The opinion about the significance of Marxism as an “exodus” or the liquidation of classical idealism is refuted first of all, in our opinion, by the fact that Marx himself remained alien to its influence, and although during his student days he made outward concessions to him - in the spiritual atmosphere of the University of Berlin in the late 30s this was almost inevitable - but he got rid of them very quickly. There is no reason to classify Marx as a member of Hegel’s “school” in the same sense as the representatives of its “left” wing, Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, Strauss, etc., belong to it. All of them actually grew up in the spiritual bosom of Hegel and forever retained traces of this spiritual closeness to him, which can be stated. Nothing similar can be said about Marx. His Hegelianism does not go further than a verbal imitation of the peculiar Hegelian style, which so appeals to many, and a few completely random quotations from him 108 . But what do we find in Marx that spiritually unites him with Hegel beyond this external imitation? First of all, the chapter on the form of value in Volume I of Capital was written “under Hegel’s standards” – to the fear of beginning readers. But Marx himself later admitted that here he was “coquettish” by imitating Hegel, and we will also add that he did it completely in vain. Given the generally meager ideological content of this chapter, which is essentially unnecessary for presenting the economic system of Capital, this deliberate pomposity rather makes one doubt the author’s literary taste than to believe on this basis that the author is spiritually close to Hegel or is a serious expert on him. They further say that Marx is brought closer to Hegel by the notorious “dialectical method.” Marx himself wrote on this occasion that “my dialectical method in its basis not only differs from Hegel’s, but is also its direct opposite.” We are of the opinion that one simply has nothing to do with the other, just as a degree on a thermometer scale is not “the complete opposite” of a degree on a geographical map, but simply has nothing in common with it except the name. Hegel’s “dialectical method” is in fact the dialectical development of a concept, i.e., first of all, it is not at all a method in the usual sense of the word, or a method of research or proof of truths, but is an image of the internal self-disclosure of a concept, the very being of this concept, existing in movement and moving in contradictions. Marx, however, does not have any special dialectical method at all, which he himself presupposes, moreover, different from that of Hegel. If we assume that he understands it in the sense of one of the logical methods, i.e. method of research, finding scientific truths, then such a method does not exist at all at the disposal of inductive, experimental sciences. What Marx (and his school after him) mistakenly called his method was in fact only a manner of presenting his conclusions in the form of dialectical contradictions, a manner of writing “like Hegel” (a predilection for antitheses generally distinguishes Marx’s style). The contradictions of modern economic development are a conclusion from actual study, and not at all a deliberate method of such study. Marx’s special “dialectical method” is, in any case, a pure misunderstanding, no matter whether logic is understood in Mill’s sense, i.e., the methodology of the experimental sciences, or in Hegel’s sense, i.e., as a metaphysical ontology. That is why the following tirade in the preface to the second edition of the first volume of Capital sounds so strange from the lips of Marx: “I openly admitted that I was a student of this great thinker and flirted even in some places in the chapter on the theory of value, resorting to a peculiar Hegelian manner of expression. The mystification that dialectics experiences in the hands of Hegel does not in the least eliminate the fact that he was the first to comprehensively and consciously reveal the general forms of its movement. She is standing upside down. We need to turn it over to find the rational grain in the mystical shell.” As the reader can see, Marx here declares himself a student of Hegel, but in this one has to see either a continuation of the same “coquetry” as in the chapter on value, or a direct mockery of Hegel, or simply complete philosophical insanity and, of course, least of all reverence for the “great thinker.” Having declared as a “mystification” everything that, in fact, only made Hegel Hegel, and projecting to somehow “turn his system upside down,” Marx at the same time declares himself his disciple and claims to defend his memory and honor against his detractors. If you trust only direct impression and, so to speak, purely artistic intuition, we can say that it is the above triad that in itself is the strongest proof of Marx’s entire alienness to Hegel, and after it all further proof of this becomes unnecessary. Traces of Hegel's influence in Marx are finally seen in his evolutionism. However, the idea of ​​evolution in its positivistic understanding is again deeply different from the dialectics of the concept in Hegel, insofar as the external alternation of events and states, although occurring naturally, or an external fact, differs from the disclosure of internal, given and complete content, only emerging in a series of successive and internally connected stages and positions, or from the unfolding idea. Despite their external similarity, dialectics in Hegel and evolution in the sense of natural science of positivism are complete opposites. Of course, the idea of ​​historical and, in particular, economic evolution could appear in Marx and under the external impression of Hegel, but it could also be completely independent, especially since it was generally in the air, almost simultaneously appearing in Saint-Simon, and Comte, and Darwin, and L. Stein (however, under the impression of Hegel), and among various socialists, both French and German (Lassalle, Rodbertus). Therefore, on the basis of Marx’s evolutionism, his genealogy with Hegel cannot be established with any sufficient basis. In general, we can say that a gifted student at the University of Berlin in the 30s, while remaining internally alien to Hegelianism, could assimilate even more of its external features than we find in Marx. Internal, more serious signs of closeness not only to Hegel, but also to classical idealism in general, to Kant, Fichte, Schelling, the indelible signs of this philosophical school, are completely unnoticed in Marx, even to the point of amazingness. It is hard to believe that, having come into contact with the problems and teachings of classical idealism, one could remain so unaffected by them; this can only be explained by an internal repulsion from them, by incompatibility with these problems, so one can only wonder why it was necessary to establish a non-existent historical connection between Marxism and classical idealism. It is especially striking that Marx remained completely alien to any epistemological doubts and critical caution, was not at all affected by epistemological skepticism and criticism of knowledge by Kant, but is a pre-critical dogmatist and, as the most naive materialist, puts forward the following thesis as his main position (in the preface to the “Critique of Political Economy”): “It is not the consciousness of people that determines the forms of their existence, but, on the contrary, the social existence of their forms.” consciousness." Or another thesis in the preface to the second edition of volume I of Capital: “For me, the ideal beginning is only a material beginning that has passed through the brain (sic!).” It is clear that these dark and inarticulate propositions, full of such ambiguous and requiring explanation terms: being, consciousness, ideal, material, could not come from the pen of a person touched by Kant, whose criticism represents the only entrance into the edifice of all classical idealism. What kind of continuity can we talk about here! Marx says about the general initial course of his scientific studies: “My specialty was jurisprudence, but the study of it was subordinated and went alongside the study of philosophy and history” (preface to “Critique of Political Economy”). In later years, according to Marx’s own statements and the content of his printed works, his studies focused exclusively on political economy (though Engels, who firmly believed in the universality of Marx’s genius, mentions his intention to write both logic and the history of philosophy along with plans for natural science, mathematical and economic works; however, not confirmed, on the contrary, refuted by the facts, this statement of a devoted friend does not seem to us to be based on anything more compelling than fleeting thoughts or distant dreams). In view of the fact that the time of Marx’s most intensive studies in philosophy can only relate to his early years, we must look in them for the key to understanding the real philosophical appearance of Marx. Unfortunately, we know very little about Marx’s student years, but even during these years it is impossible to state his significant closeness to Hegel. Marx spent one year at the University of Bonn (judging by his father's letters, without much results for his studies), and from October 1836 to 1841 he was a student in Berlin. The list of courses he took here for 9 semesters (cited by Mehring in his comments on the publication of Marx’s early works) does not indicate that even then studies in philosophy, as well as history, played a primary role: of the 12 courses, more than half relate to jurisprudence, only one to philosophy, two to theology (!), one to literature and not a single one to history 109 . Mehring wants to weaken the evidence of this list, which contradicts Marx's later statement about the progress of his studies, by citing the fact that after the invention of the printing press, listening to lectures generally lost its importance. Of course, Carlyle’s saying that the best university is books is true, but even now this is not entirely true, and in the 30s of the last century, and even regarding the departments of the University of Berlin, which attracted students from all countries, this was not at all true. And, in any case, the choice of subjects for listening, given the existence of academic freedom, still indicates the dominant direction of interests. What did Marx do besides lecture? We have only one, and even very early, evidence of this: namely, Marx’s letter to his father, written at the end of his first year as a student (November 1837). This letter aims to justify himself before his father, who reproached Marx for idleness, and contains a long, one might say, colossal list of everything read, studied and written during this year. The overall impression of this overly intimate letter is that, although it testifies to the outstanding inquisitiveness, diligence and efficiency of a 19-year-old student, but, written under a certain mood, it should not be taken too literally, and this is impossible. It talks about two systems of legal philosophy (one of which is 300 pages!), which the young author composed during this year in order to immediately become disillusioned with them, about an entire philosophical dialogue, two dramas, poems for the bride (which Marx sent more than once), etc. In addition, it contains a very long list of books read and studied, which even with good abilities would not be enough for a year. Youthful ardor together with youthful narcissism, great diligence, however, with some scatteredness, were clearly reflected here, but this is precisely what makes us treat this letter with caution, which, by the way, not only did not calm down, but even more irritated the old man Marx 110. In any case, in this letter we see Marx with great demands, but not yet established tastes, in Sturm und Drangperiod 111. We know nothing about Marx’s further student years, except for the list of lectures. In 1841, Marx received his doctorate for a dissertation on a philosophical topic: “The Difference in the Philosophy of Nature between Democritus and Epicurus” (published by Mehring). It differs little from the usual type of doctoral dissertation and provides little material to judge the philosophical individuality and general philosophical worldview of the author (we leave the assessment of special research to specialists in the history of Greek philosophy). Judging by the dedication (to his future father-in-law), Marx is here a supporter of “idealism,” although it is unclear which one exactly. Hegelianism is not seen here either (except in the preface, Hegel’s “History of Philosophy” is respectfully mentioned). In any case, we can say that those exaggerated expectations that could have arisen on the basis of the youthful letter were not realized here. Marx, however, at this time dreams of a department of philosophy, but soon abandons this idea under the impression of the expulsion of his friend Bruno Bauer from the university for freethinking. We think, however, that judging by this ease of refusal from the department, this removal was rather a pretext, and the reason was his undoubted internal dissimilarity to this type of activity. The philosophical uncertainty of Marx’s appearance, together with the vague student “idealism,” soon, however, disappears, and after two or three years Marx emerges as himself, that materialist positivist and student of Feuerbach, under whose general influence he remained all his life. Marx is a Feybachian, who later only slightly changed and supplemented the teacher’s doctrine. It is impossible to understand Marx without focusing on this basic fact. Marx himself did not call himself a student of Feuerbach, which in reality he was, preferring for some reason to call himself a student of Hegel, which he was not. After the 40s, the name of Feuerbach no longer appears in Marx, and Engels mentions him as a hobby of the past and sharply contrasts himself with him. And yet, to use Feuerbach’s favorite expression, it should be said that Feuerbach is Marx’s unspoken secret, his real solution. It is easy to understand that, having adopted Feuerbach's worldview, Marx must have completely and forever lost his taste for Hegel, even if he had ever had one. It is known what role the struggle with Hegel plays for Feuerbach, and this struggle is not at all a symptom of the further development of the system in the hands of the student, although moving away from the teacher, but continuing his work, but a real rebellion, the final negation of speculative philosophy in general, which was then personified in Hegel, a fall into the crudest materialism in metaphysics, sensualistic positivism in the theory of knowledge, hedonism in ethics. All these traits were adopted by Marx, who thereby put an end to the philosophical past that he had. Feuerbach stood between classical idealism and Marxism and forever separated them with an impenetrable wall. That is why Marx’s unexpected inclusion of himself among Hegel’s students in 1873 is some kind of whim, perhaps coquetry, historical reminiscence - nothing more. We know 112 that the central place in Feuerbach's philosophy is occupied by the religious problem; its main theme is the denial of the religion of God-manhood in the name of the religion of man-theism, the atheistic militant atheism. It was precisely this motive that had the greatest resonance in Marx’s soul; From all the abundance and variety of philosophical motives that were heard in this era of the disintegration of Hegelianism into all sorts of directions, Marx’s ear singled out a religious motive, and specifically an anti-God one. In 1848, Feuerbach’s “Das Wesen des Christenthums” was published, and this work made such an impression on Marx and Engels (according to the latter’s stories) that both of them became Feuerbachians. In 1844, Marx, together with Ruge, edited the journal “Deutsch-Franzsische, Jahrbücher” 113 in Paris, from which, however, only one book (double) was published. Here Marx placed two of his articles: “Zur Kritik der Hegeischen Rechtspilosophie” and “Zur Judenfrage”, which are of great, primary importance for characterizing his worldview. In both articles (as well as in the “Heilige Familie” dating from the same time), Marx appears as an orthodox Feuerbachian. One can only note a peculiar shade in the perception of Feuerbach’s teaching on religion, which has, so to speak, two fronts. Feuerbach not only criticizes Christianity and all theism, but at the same time preaches the atheistic religion of humanity, wants to be the prophet of this new religion and even reveals a kind of “piety” in this role, which Stirner so mercilessly ridicules in him. It is this “piety” of Feuerbach, his touching desire to worship something sacred, even if it were the crudest logical idol, that is completely alien to the soul of Marx. He takes only one side of Feuerbach's teaching - the critical one - and turns the sharp edge of his criticism against any religion, probably making no exception in this regard for the religion of his teacher. He strives for the complete and final abolition of religion, for pure atheism, in which no sun no longer shines either in heaven or on earth. However, let us better give the floor to Marx himself. The article “On a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” 114 begins with the most decisive statement: “For Germany, the criticism of religion is essentially complete (!!), and the criticism of religion is the presupposition of all criticism. The basis of non-religious criticism is this: man makes religion, not religion makes man. It is religion that is the self-awareness and well-being of a person who either has not found himself or has lost himself again. But man is not an abstract being standing outside the world. Man is the world of people, the state, society. This state, this society produces religion, a perverted consciousness of the world, because they themselves represent a perverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritualistic point d'honneur 115, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn fulfillment, its universal basis for consolation and justification... It is the fantastic realization of the human essence (Wesen is Feuerbach's usual term), for the human essence has no true reality. The struggle against religion is directly, therefore, a struggle against that world, the spiritual flavor of which is religion. Religious squalor (Elend) in some is an expression of real squalor in others, it is a protest against real squalor. Religion is the sigh of an oppressed consciousness, the mood of a heartless (herzlosen) world, and also the spirit of a soulless era. She is opium for the people. The destruction of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is a requirement for their real happiness. The requirement to eliminate illusions regarding one's existence is the requirement to eliminate a state that requires illusions. Thus, criticism of illusions in the essence of the matter is a criticism of the vale of sorrow, in which religion is the ghost of holiness. Criticism plucked imaginary flowers from chains, not so that a person would carry chains devoid of fantasy, consolation, but so that he would throw off the chains and begin to pluck real flowers. Criticism of religion disappoints a person, so that he thinks, acts, defining the surrounding reality, like a disappointed, come to his senses, so that he moves around himself, therefore around his actual sun.” This is all a presentation of Feuerbach’s main points, made almost in his own words. But Marx expresses the practical, revolutionary application of this “criticism of religion” much more clearly. “Criticism of heaven,” he says, “turns into criticism of earth, criticism of religion into criticism of law, criticism of theology into criticism of politics... The weapon of criticism, of course, cannot replace the criticism of weapons, material force must be overthrown by material force, but theory also becomes a material force once it embraces the masses. A theory can reach the masses if it can demonstrate ad hominem, if it is radical. To be radical means to take things at their roots. The root for a person is the person himself. The obvious proof of radicalism for German theory, and therefore for its practical energy, is its departure (Ausgang) from the decisive positive elimination of religion. The criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest being for man, therefore, with a categorical imperative it overthrows all the conditions in which man is a humiliated, shackled, abandoned, despicable being.” In this article, in conclusion, one hears the “music of the future,” the main motive of Marx’s sociological doctrine: “The only practically possible liberation of Germany is liberation from the point of view of a theory that declares man the highest being for man (i.e., the teachings of Feuerbach! - Author). The emancipation of the German is the emancipation of man. The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat. Philosophy cannot be realized without the elimination (Aufhebung) of the proletariat, the proletariat cannot be eliminated without the implementation of philosophy.” The cause of philosophy, that is, the teachings of Feuerbach, namely the theoretical liberation of humanity from religion, and the cause of the proletariat are united here into one whole - the proletariat is entrusted with the mission of the historical implementation of the cause of atheism, that is, the practical liberation of man from religion. This is where the real Marx is, this is where the real “secret” of Marxism, its true nature, is revealed! This passage is usually quoted to confirm the imaginary connection between Marxism and classical philosophy, as Engels also wanted to establish. The reader sees, however, that nothing of the kind can be seen in him. On the contrary, such a connection is rather rejected here, since classical idealistic philosophy was invariably connected with one or another religious ideas, 117 since, in addition, the teaching of Feuerbach, which in fact is taken for granted here, denies idealistic philosophy at its core. In accordance with this worldview, in the language of Marx, “human emancipation” at this time means precisely liberation from religion. This point of view is especially clear in the dispute with Bauer on the Jewish question. He points out here the insufficiency of purely political emancipation, because religion still remains with it. “The question is: how does complete political emancipation relate to religion? If, even in a country full of political emancipation, we find religion not only simply existing, but also thriving, then this proves that the existence of religion does not contradict the completeness of the state. But since the existence of religion is connected with the existence of a certain defect (Mangels), the cause of this defect should be sought in the very essence of the state. Religion no longer appears to us as a cause, but only as a manifestation of non-religious (weltlichen) limitation. We therefore explain the religious narrow-mindedness of the citizens of a free state by their general (weltlichen) narrow-mindedness. We do not claim that they must free themselves from religious limitation in order to free themselves from general (weltlichen) limitation. We affirm that they are liberated from their religious limitation only by liberation from their general limitation. We don't turn worldly questions into theological ones, we turn human questions into worldly questions. History has already been dissolved enough in superstition, we are dissolving superstition in history. The question of the relationship between political emancipation and religion becomes for us a question about the relationship between political emancipation and human emancipation... The limits of political emancipation are manifested precisely in the fact that the state can free itself from a certain limitation without a person becoming free in this regard, that the state can become a free state without a person becoming a free person. Members of the political state are religious because of the dualism between individual and tribal life, between the life of civil society and political life, religious because a person treats state life, which is otherworldly for his actual individuality, as his true life, religious because religion is the spirit of bourgeois society, the expression of the separation and removal of man from man. Political democracy is Christian, because in it man - not man in general, but every man - is considered a sovereign, supreme being, moreover, man, in his uncultivated, non-social form (Erscheinung), in a random (!) form of existence, man, as he is in life, man, as he is corrupted by the entire organization of our society, is lost, detached from himself, given over to the domination of non-human elements and elements - in a word, man who is not yet a truly generic being (Gattungswesen). The actual image, the dreams of a dream, the postulate of Christianity, the sovereignty of man, but as an alien being, different from the real man, in democracy is sensual reality.” It is not difficult to recognize here Feuerbach's idea of ​​Gattungswesen 118, of the human race as the final, highest authority for man. In Marx, this “love for the distant” and the not yet existing turns into contempt for the existing, “neighbor”, as spoiled and lost, and Christianity is reproached for the fact that it professes the equality of all individuals, teaches us to honor the individual in every person. Here again Marx's characteristic disdain for the individual emerges. The real man will appear only under the following conditions: “Only when the real individual man absorbs into himself (in sich zurucknimmt) the abstract state citizen and as an individual man in his individual position, in his individual labor, in his empirical life becomes a species being, only when man has recognized and organized his forces propres as social forces and therefore no longer separates the social forces from himself in the form of a political force - only then will human emancipation be accomplished.” So, when a person abolishes his individuality and human society turns into either Sparta, or an anthill or a beehive, then human emancipation will be accomplished. With the ease with which Marx generally steps over the problem of individuality, and here, in the name of human emancipation, that is, the destruction of religion, he is ready to dissolve this emancipated personality in the dark and thick fog from which this “generic being” is woven, presented to the imagination of Feuerbach and melting into the air with any attempt to touch it. But this judgment also reflects the characteristic impotence of atheistic humanism, which is unable to hold both the personality and the whole at the same time and therefore constantly falls from one extreme to the other: either the personality, through its rebellion, destroys the whole and, in the name of the rights of the individual, denies the species (Stirner, Nietzsche), then the personality is abolished by the whole, some kind of socialist Sparta, as in Marx. Only on a religious basis, where the highest manifestation of individuality unites and unites everyone in super-individual love and common life, only the union of people through Christ in God, i.e. the Church, a personal and together super-personal union, is able to overcome this difficulty and, affirming individuality, preserve the whole. But the idea of ​​a church, or religious, public is so far from modern consciousness... We cannot pass in silence Marx’s judgments on the Jewish question, in which his harsh straightforwardness and peculiar spiritual blindness are revealed with particular sharpness. With the same ease with which he drowns personal individuality in the “tribal being” in the glory of “human emancipation,” he abolishes national self-consciousness, the collective national personality, moreover, of his own people, the most durable and insoluble in the waves and hurricanes of history, this axis of all world history. The Jewish question for Marx is the question of the interest-bearer - the “Jew”, which resolves itself with the abolition of interest. What Marx wrote on the Jewish question makes the most repulsive impression on me. Nowhere has this icy, blind, one-sided rationality manifested itself in such naked form as here. But let us cite better the original judgments of Marx 119: “The question of the ability of the Jews to emancipate turns into the question, what special social element must be overcome in order to eliminate Jewry? For the ability of present-day Jews to emancipate is the relation of Jewry to the emancipation of the present world. This attitude is necessarily determined by the special position of Jewry in the present oppressed world. Let's look at a real, ordinary (weltlichen), not a Sabbath, but an everyday Jew. What is the secular basis of Jewry? Practical need, self-interest. What is the secular cult of the Jews? Money-broking (Schacher). What is his secular god? Money. So, emancipation from business and money, and therefore from practical, real Jewry, would be the self-emancipation of our time. An organization of society that would destroy the preconditions for mercenary business would also make Jewishness impossible. His religious consciousness would have dissipated like a rare fog in the actual vital air of society... The emancipation of Jewry in this sense is the emancipation of humanity from Jewry. What was the very basis of the Jewish religion? Practical need, egoism... Money is the jealous god of Israel, next to which no other god can exist... The God of the Jews has become worldly, he has become a worldly god. The bill is the actual god of the Jew. His god is an illusory bill. What lies abstractly in the Jewish religion - contempt for theory, art, history, man as an end in itself - this is a truly conscious point of view, the virtue of a money man (Geldmenschen) ... Chimerical nationality is the nationality of a merchant, a money man in general.” Why did the son raise his hand against his mother 120, coldly turn away from her centuries-old suffering, and spiritually renounce his people? The answer is absolutely clear: in the name of rationalism and hostility to religion, in the name of consistent atheism. Br. Bauer put forward the assertion, with which Marx polemicizes in his article, that the Jewish question is fundamentally religious, a question about the relationship between Jewry and Christianity. I fully share this opinion, and from the point of view of Christian beliefs, any other understanding of the fate of Jewry is impossible. The historical and spiritual destinies of Jewry are connected with the relationship of Judaism to Christianity. We do not mean to go deeper into this question here, but for us there is no doubt that it is precisely religious affirmations and negations, attraction and repulsion, that fundamentally determine the historical destinies of Jewry. “Schacher” 121, the global role of Jewry in the history of capitalism, is only the empirical shell of the unique religious psychology of Jewry. Despite all the atheism of a significant part of modern Jewry, all its materialism, both practical and theoretical, under all these historical layers there still lies a religious subsoil, which the religious genius Vlad was able to feel and so amazingly discover. Solovyova. But Marx, of course, could not come to terms with the religious understanding of the Jewish question, and in order to pursue a consistently anti-religious point of view here, he had to sacrifice his nationality, blaspheme it and fall into a peculiar, not only practical, but even religious anti-Semitism. So, we see that already from the forties, Marx was completely alien to that fundamental indifference in matters of religion, which found its official expression in the program position of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and Austria that “religion is a private matter” (Privatsache). Of course, on the part of the party this is conditional hypocrisy, caused by tactical considerations, mainly by the conditions of agitation in the countryside. A superficial acquaintance with the literature and the general mood of the party of followers of Feuerbach and Marx is enough to be convinced of the insincerity of this statement, for, of course, this is still a party not only of socialism, but also of militant atheism. Marx never made a secret of this at all. In his famous critical commentary on the draft Gotha Program, Marx protests against the demand for “freedom of conscience” put forward there, calling it bourgeois and liberal, due to the fact that freedom of religious conscience is implied, while the workers’ party, on the contrary, must free the conscience from religious phantoms. It may be objected to us, however, that we became acquainted with Marx’s philosophical and religious worldview in statu nascendi 122, in an era when Marx himself was not a Marxist, having not yet developed that peculiar doctrine that is usually associated with his name in political economy and sociology. Without denying this last fact, we assert, however, that in the “Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher” of 1844, Marx appears to us in a religious and philosophical sense as finally formed and determined. After this, he did not experience any fundamental changes or revolutions in his philosophical faith. In this sense, the general spiritual theme of his life was already given; its main religious and philosophical motive was fully understood. It could only be a question not of what, but of how, and this how was Marxism, which in our eyes is only a special case of Feuerbachianism, its special sociological formula. The originality of Marxism belongs to a completely different area than the philosophical one that interests us here - it is a complication, if you like, an enrichment, a further development of Feuerbachianism, but not its religious and philosophical overcoming. Engels, in his pamphlet on Feuerbach 123, extremely exaggerates this difference, turning it into a fundamental one. Perhaps Engels was guided here by the idea of ​​defending the originality of Marx even in a field where he was completely unoriginal, namely in philosophy, so he presents here “economic materialism” as something fundamentally superior to Feuerbachianism. Meanwhile, this doctrine indicates only a well-known sociological substrate for that historical process, which has the final result of the implementation of the Feuerbach-Marx postulate: “human emancipation,” i.e., the emancipation of humanity from religion through its practical socialization, its transformation into “Gattungswesen” on the basis of a socialist economy. In all further works of Marx there is nothing that would cancel or limit the religious and philosophical program developed in the articles of the “Deutsch-Franzsische Jahrbücher”. We have to believe that these articles represent, so to speak, the philosophical maximum for Marx, the highest point of tension in his purely philosophical thought. Subsequently, remaining faithful to what was accepted and learned in his youth, he deviates more and more from philosophical problems, so as not to return to them at all, obviously due to the complete inner peace that is given by the consciousness of his rightness and the absence of doubts in the accepted dogmas. It turns out to be a paradoxical conclusion that for getting to know Marx and judging him from the side that interests us, and, moreover, the most essential, the greatest material is provided precisely by the era when Marx was not yet a Marxist, when his true spiritual appearance was not yet obscured by the details of the special studies with which he made a name for himself. So, the world-historical task of human emancipation arose in the consciousness of Marx. It was necessary to find an appropriate means to resolve it. Such a means was “scientific socialism,” the system of which Marx began to develop in his scientific work. And from that time on, the range of his theoretical interests and activities, as far as we can determine it from his writings and his own testimony about himself, narrowed and concentrated primarily, not to say exclusively, on political economy and current politics. However, the most curious thing is that at this time Marx’s theoretical claims were by no means limited to political economy, but extended to the universal field of philosophy of history. At this time, he developed a “materialist understanding of history,” which claims to provide the key to understanding the entire historical existence. No matter how we feel about this famous “discovery” of Marx, 124 what interests us here is how it was actually made, what its psychology is, its inner motive. We know that during this time Marx was not engaged, at least to a noticeable extent, in either history or philosophy 125 . This means that the “discovery” did not appear as a consequence of a new theoretical deepening, but as a new formula, dogmatically put forward and accepted on faith, a kind of artistic intuition, and not the fruit of scientific research (as, incidentally, many of the truly scientific discoveries will be born). The elements from the combination of which a materialist understanding of history was formed are easy to distinguish: on the one hand, this is the same Feuerbachian doctrine of militant atheism that we already know, on the other, a strong impression received from the facts of economic reality through studies of both political economy and current politics. Consequently, the new doctrine does not lead beyond the old worldview, although it complicates it. In particular, as for religion, its philosophical interpretation becomes even cruder, although it does not change in essence. It is declared, together with other “forms of consciousness,” to be a “superstructure” over the economic “base.” In the first volume of Capital we encounter the following judgment about it, which essentially does not take us any further than the articles on Hegel and other works of the 1940s: “For a society of commodity producers, whose social production relation consists in the fact that they treat their products as commodities, i.e. as values, and in this material form they relate their private works to one another as identical human labor - for such a society Christianity with its cult of the abstract man, especially Christianity in its bourgeois form - Protestantism, deism, etc. - represents the most suitable religion" 126. This is Feuerbach translated only into the language of political economy and, in particular, the economic system of Marx. The further general judgment about religion sounds like an echo of Feuerbach: “The religious reflection of the real world can disappear altogether only when the conditions of the practical everyday life of people present to them every day quite clear and reasonable relationships of man to man and to nature. The social process of life, that is, the material process of production, will only throw off its mystical veil when it, as a product of freely united people, comes under their conscious and planned control” 127. We see from the example of these judgments - and this is all that can be found in Marx during this period - that Marx’s religious thought from the adoption of the dogma of economic materialism did not become any more complicated or enriched; it still repeats the provisions learned from Feuerbach. This dogma does not force us to abandon or revise anything, but leaves everything as before, giving only a special formula that makes the special subject of new scientific studies - political economy - the science of all sciences, declares it the key to all “ideologies,” that is, to the entire spiritual life of mankind. In conclusion, let us touch upon the unique imprint that socialism received from Marx. And here we must state that the deepest, determining influence of Marx on the socialist movement in Germany, and later in other countries, was manifested not so much in his political and economic program, but in his general religious and philosophical appearance. The Social Democratic Party, in general the political form of the labor movement in Germany, was created not by Marx, who, in fact, made an unsuccessful attempt to divert it onto the wrong path of international organization (the Communist Manifesto also calls for it), but by Lassalle, who founded and finally put the labor party on the rails. Its further development and fate were determined by the specific conditions of the Prussian-German regime and subsequent historical events, but not by the influence of Marx. True, with his economic works, Marx determined the worldview of social democratic theorists and, through them, the official credo of the party. However, this theoretical credo is by no means so inextricably linked with the actual program, which is not theoretical Marxism, but the so-called minimum program, more or less common to all democratic parties, regardless of their relationship to Marx. The tangible influence of Marxism is reflected here only in the fact that its dogma still binds the party’s legs on the agrarian question, and even here the urgent need of life forces us to completely neglect this dogma, as Russian Social Democrats have already done, and German Social Democrats do too. In addition, it should be obvious to every economist how far behind the developing life and social science the purely economic doctrine of Marx has already fallen behind due to time; revealing more and more new flaws and simply becoming outdated, it is increasingly of purely historical interest, relegated to the shrine of the history of political economy, where the name of Marx, of course, should be ranked among the host of honorable names of Quesnay, Smith, Ricardo, Liszt, Rodbertus and other creators of political economy. So, no matter how risky such an assertion may be and no matter how contrary it may be to the prevailing opinion, we still consider it very plausible that even without Marx the labor movement would have taken its current political form, a Social-Democratic Labor Party would have been created with approximately the same program and tactics as the existing one. But Marx left on it the indelible stamp of his spirit (and consequently, the spirit of which he himself was an instrument) in a philosophical-religious relationship, and through Marx and Feuerbach. The general concept of socialism developed by Marx, of course, is imbued with this spirit and meets the needs of militant atheism; he gave it the tone that, as they say, makes music, turning socialism into a means of combating religion. No matter how clear the general historical tasks of socialism may seem, the specific forms of the socialist movement, we know, can differ greatly in their spiritual content and ethical value. It may be inspired by high, purely religious enthusiasm, since socialism seeks the realization of truth, justice and love in social relations, but it may be distinguished by the predominance of feelings of a different, not so high order: class hatred, selfishness, the same bourgeoisness - only in reverse, in a word, those feelings that, under the form of a class point of view and class interests, play such a dominant role in the preaching of Marxism. Indignation against evil is, of course, a lofty and even holy feeling, without which a living person and public figure cannot do without, but there is a subtle, almost elusive and yet extremely real line, crossing which this holy feeling turns into something not holy at all; we understand all the ease, naturalness, even imperceptibility of such a transformation, but the predominance of feelings of one order or another determines the spiritual physiognomy of both a person and movements, although in our practical age it is not customary to be interested in the inner side, unless it has immediate practical significance. The entire doctrine of Marx, as it flowed from his main religious motive - from his militant atheism: economic materialism, and the preaching of class enmity b outrance 128, and the denial of universal human values and universally binding norms outside the boundaries of class interest, and finally, the doctrine of an impassable abyss separating two worlds - the proletariat, endowed with a higher mission, and the “common reactionary mass” of its oppressors - all these teachings could act, of course, only in the direction of coarsening, grounding, giving a more prosaic and economic character to the socialist movement, making the notes of class hatred more audible in it than the notes of universal love. We by no means attribute the introduction of this shade into the movement to the influence of Marx alone; on the contrary, this spiritual temptation is too great for the socialist movement without it and, of course, has found and is finding many ways both before and now (and here in Russia), but Marx was its powerful instrument. Marx’s personal influence in the socialist movement was reflected most of all precisely by the strengthening of that anti-religious, God-fighting element that rages in it, as in our entire culture, and which will not say its last word without receiving an adequate, albeit final, embodiment. With great wisdom and a deep understanding of the true nature of the anti-religious element, striving to take over the socialist movement and seduce it, Vladimir Solovyov in the story about the Antichrist portrays him, among other things, as a social reformer, a socialist. And in socialism, as in the entire line of our culture, there is a struggle between Christ and Antichrist... “Thy Kingdom come! Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven!” This is our prayer. This is also the ultimate goal of the world and historical process. This should be the highest and only criterion for assessing human actions, defining them as a plus or minus in the universe, giving them an absolute and final, i.e. religious, coefficient. Have we used the powers given to us by God to build the Kingdom of God, which we have been given not only to expect, but also to prepare to the best of our ability, at least as the last and insignificant masons - there is nothing insignificant in this matter - or have we wasted these powers in vain, in shameful idleness and laziness, or, finally, have we used them for work “in our own name,” alien and hostile to the goals of the Kingdom of God? In the life and activity of everyone, in different combinations, there are elements of all these three categories, and no one dares to draw the overall balance and pronounce the final verdict about his neighbor: he is an enemy of the cause of God! But this impossibility of a final assessment, which belongs only to the righteous judgment of God, in no way frees us from the duty to peer with an inquisitive gaze into life, where evil, as we know, wages an irreconcilable struggle with good and, what is most dangerous, sometimes appears in this struggle under the guise of good, differing from it not by external, but only by internal signs. And, true to this demand, although by no means daring to draw a general conclusion, we must discern in Marx, along with the work of God, an energy of a completely different order, ominous and dangerous - it mysteriously and terribly doubles. The socialist activity of Marx as one of the leaders of the movement aimed at protecting the disadvantaged in capitalist society and transforming the social system on the principles of justice, equality and freedom, according to its objective goals, it would seem, should be recognized as work for the creation of the Kingdom of God. But the fact that he wanted to make this movement a means for destroying the sacred in man and putting himself in its place and was guided by this goal in his activities, from a religious point of view, should receive a negative assessment; here we have precisely that subtle and most dangerous temptation when good and evil differ not from the outside, but from the inside. What outweighs here - plus or minus - we will know only when our own balance is drawn up, and we ourselves must leave the question open. However, to express here what, after many years of intense peering into the spiritual face of Marx, we saw in him and what many others do not see, we considered it our moral duty, a matter of conscience, no matter how accepted it may be by those who are akin to precisely this dark, shadow side of Marx’s spirit. National economy and religious personality 129 (Dedicated to the memory of Ivan Fedorovich Tokmakov) Political economy currently belongs to the sciences that do not remember their spiritual kinship. Its beginnings are lost in the quicksand of 18th-century Enlightenment philosophy. At its cradle stand, on the one hand, representatives of natural law teachings with their belief in the integrity of human nature and pre-established natural harmony, and on the other hand, preachers of utilitarianism - I. Bentham and his disciples, proceeding from the idea of ​​society as a collection of disparate atoms, mutually repelling representatives of various interests. Society here is considered as a mechanism of these interests, social philosophy turns into “political arithmetic”, the creation of which Bentham dreamed of. Political economy learned from him an abstract, one-sided, simplified idea of ​​man, which to a large extent still reigns in it. Thus, by the way, there was formed the premise of classical political economy about the “economic man” (economic man), who does not eat, does not sleep, but considers everything as interests, striving for the greatest benefit with the least cost; it is a counting ruler, reacting with mathematical correctness to the external mechanism of distribution and production, which is governed by its own iron laws. Already Hell. Smith based his research on a conditionally methodological distinction between the altruistic and egoistic instincts of man, and he studied the influence of some in the “Theory of Moral Sentiments” in the department of morality, and the influence of others in “The Wealth of Nations” in the department of political economy. The latter began, therefore, with a fractional value instead of a whole one. But later the conventionally methodological character of this distinction was forgotten by Smith’s successors. Classical political economy, represented by Ricardo, accepted Bentham's teaching as a dogma. Thus, a worldview developed that received the name Manchesterism in history. The living psychological personality was crossed out here and replaced by a methodological premise: the “economic man”; society turned, as it were, into a bag of atoms, which just should not be interfered with in their mutual movement, and these atoms remain mutually impenetrable. Although socialism constituted, as it were, an antithesis to both the classical school of political economy and Manchesterism, in its fundamentals it only continues the spiritual tradition of Bentham in the person of Robert Owen in England, Lassalle and especially Marx in Germany in general in the most widespread form of materialist concepts of socialism. It mechanizes society to the same extent and eliminates the living human personality and the inextricably linked idea of ​​personal responsibility and creative will, just like Manchesterism. For illustration, let us recall at least the teaching of R. Owen that human character is formed entirely from external circumstances, and therefore there is no personal responsibility and freedom, and, based on this fatalistic idea, in obvious contradiction with himself, in practice he still considered it possible to call people to social reforms, appealed to their conscience, to their freedom. A similar idea of ​​personality forms the basis of economic materialism, and socialism, which is based on it, suffers from the same contradictions. Since socialism spiritually remains here on the basis of Manchesterism, it is the same Manchesterism inverted, or counter-Manchesterism, with the difference that instead of a solitary individual, here there is a social class, i.e., a collection of individuals with a common interest - the same economic man, but not an individual, but a group, class 130. Economic categories are like masks covering a living face, or buskins of a Greek tragedy. They turn people, as it were, into characters of medieval moralite, wholly personifying only individual qualities. Only a geometric drawing of human relations is given, only the most general contours and silhouettes are sketched. An example of this peculiar stylization can serve us at least in the characterization of capitalists as representatives of the desire for accumulation, which we find in Marx: “A capitalist has historical significance and a historical right to exist only to the extent that he personifies capital; but since he personifies capital... the stimulus for his activity is not use values ​​and their use, but exchange values ​​and their multiplication. As a fanatic for the creation of new values, he, without paying attention to anything, encourages humanity to produce for the sake of production, therefore, to develop social productive forces and create the material conditions of production... In this sense, he shares with the treasure collector the passion for enrichment for the sake of enrichment, for the sake of increasing value. But what for one is an individual mania, for another is the result of the action of a mechanism, one of the wheels of which he represents... At the beginning of the capitalist mode of production, the only passions are the desire for enrichment and stinginess... At a certain height of development, a conventional degree of extravagance, which at the same time serves as a means of showing wealth, and therefore useful for obtaining credit, becomes a business necessity for the capitalist... But at its basis lies dirty miserliness and careful calculation... Accumulate, accumulate! Here are Moses and the prophets! Accumulation for the sake of accumulation, production for the sake of production” 131. Similar masks are put on the faces of the workers, transformed into abstract “proletarians of all countries” without distinction and inspired, in a stylized depiction, only by a fierce hatred of capital. Remember that classic part of Capital, where the last scene of the capitalist drama is depicted and where they act like some kind of iron masks. “Together with the ever-decreasing number of magnates of capital who steal and monopolize all the benefits of this process of transformation, poverty, oppression, enslavement, humiliation, exploitation increase, but at the same time the indignation of the working class increases, which is constantly growing and constantly learning, uniting, organizing itself by the mechanism of the capitalist production process. The monopoly of capital becomes an obstacle to the mode of production that has developed with it and under its influence. The concentration of the means of production and the socialization of labor reaches such a degree that they can no longer endure their capitalist shell. She's torn. The hour of capitalist private property is striking. Those who expropriate are expropriated." Which Marxist did not know these lapidary lines by heart and did not repeat them with a beating heart! And yet nowhere has Bentham’s stylization, the simplification of real life, in which all its colors are erased, been taken so far as here. Generally speaking, such a method of political economy is both correct and incorrect: it is correct and acceptable as a methodological convention, as a technique of artificial simplification for research purposes. Political economy does here what every science does: in order to find out something, it forgets about everything else, acts, as they now say, “pragmatically.” The mistake begins only when all the conventions of this technique are forgotten and when “pragmatic” stylization is taken for genuine reality, and instead of living people, these methodological ghosts are substituted. This partly explains the predominance of a kind of economism that poisons the spiritual atmosphere of the 19th century. An equal sign is put between “economic man” - a convention of political economy and man in general, and that which does not fit into the intended frame is either curtailed or forcibly squeezed into it; Of course, in this case, everything individual and concrete that opposes this is mercilessly exterminated. However, we must never forget that political economy is a historical science, that is, a science about the historical and, therefore, about the concrete, and the fact that “theoretical” economy allows itself only for the purpose of simplification does not at all correspond to living historical reality, or rather, it corresponds only partly to it. In reality, the “economic man” of political economy is only one, albeit very important, aspect of the life of the human person, a manifestation of the active “I”. The national economy is the result of individual activity of individuals, and the development of productive forces is the creativity of the people in economic terms, and to a certain extent is also a phenomenon of their spiritual life. Hell. Smith once made an unfortunate distinction between productive and unproductive labor, calling productive (in the economic sense) labor expressed directly in material goods, in “things,” and unproductive - any other labor; With this, although also only a methodological, distinction, he drew a deep and completely illegal line separating economic and spiritual activity, and this distinction, despite all its conventionality, still confuses economic thought, already suffering from excessive mechanization of the economy. Of course, it cannot be denied that the economy is also a mechanism, and especially the modern national and world economy, but at the same time it is not and can never be only a mechanism, just as a person is not just a counting line of interests, but a living creative principle. Based on one idea of ​​the mechanism, it is impossible to even fully understand economic life, without personal initiative, without a creative attitude towards it, without various volitional impulses - with routine alone, or with selfish interest alone, it is impossible even to maintain the economic status quo, and even more so, economic progress, necessary even due to the constantly occurring population growth, is impossible - with the threat of Malthus. The human personality is an independent “factor” of the economy: in some branches of labor this is clearer, as, for example, in agriculture, in others it is less obvious, as in industry, but it is a fact. The economy is the interaction of freedom, the creative initiative of the individual and the mechanism, iron necessity; it is the struggle of the individual with the mechanism of nature and social forms in order to adapt them to the needs of the human spirit. In a word, the farm is run by the owner. Here we come to the topic of this essay. Various motives, both self-interested and ideal, are combined in the human soul, and political economy should in no way exclude motives of the second kind from its circle of attention. When determining this type of motive, ideal values ​​should also be taken into account, in particular, factors such as a general worldview and religion. Religion as a factor of economic development, since it is a factor in the formation of the individual, is thus introduced into the circle of study of economic life. Until recently, the dependence of economic life on religious factors has been studied very insufficiently, thanks to the dominance of economism in science. We can say that attention to these issues in science is only awakening recently. For a historian of economic life and economic ideas, and no less for a religious philosopher, this topic seems very tempting. From this point of view, the history of countries covered by Buddhism, with its delaying and depressing influence on all aspects of life and, in particular, on human economic activity, represents a special world. Therefore, the question of the connection between economic stagnation and the caste structure of the countries of the East and Buddhism is a topic for a completely special study. In the same way, the attitude of the ancient world to economic labor, insofar as it was determined by the general religious and philosophical attitude to the world, along with social reasons, should also be a subject of high scientific interest. A new, European attitude towards economic labor is introduced into history by Christianity, and in this sense, it is in it that the national economy and the science of the national economy are potentially born. A further turning point in this development in Western Christianity is introduced by the Reformation, and modern research has long been striving to understand and take into account the significance of this turning point. Finally, the prevailing mood of modern times, with its economic materialism and mechanical worldview, is also a factor in economic life that influences its character. We will feel the core of our question by focusing on the various motivations of human labor. Economic labor can be performed solely under the pressure of necessity, like labor by the “sweat of the brow” for food; but this only rarely exhausts a person’s attitude towards his work. Labor is not only a forced burden, but in most cases also includes a certain ethical element: it can also be considered as the fulfillment of religious or moral duties. In connection with religious ideas, work, although in the “sweat of the brow,” is imprinted, for example, in the consciousness of the Russian peasantry, as a special religious activity (as far as can be judged from various studies, among other things, from that collection of agricultural sayings and signs expressing the worldview of our peasantry, which we find in Ermolov’s four-volume work). A religious and moral attitude towards work is generally characteristic of eras with a predominance of a religious worldview. Labor is included in the system of general asceticism. Asceticism in its practical meaning is an attitude towards the world associated with the recognition of higher, supramundane, transcendental values, and individual assessments are established here in relation to these values. It takes us beyond the immediate, immanent reality of this world. But precisely because of this, as it were, negation of the world, it can be, and with a certain degree of tension, even inevitably turns out to conquer the world, like any other deep idealistic inspiration. A modern German scientist rightly notes: “Asceticism in itself is not only mortification of the flesh and dualistic contemplation, but also positive work for the benefit of the whole, a means in the service of the Corpus Christianum and, with the arousal (Entfesselung) of religious feeling, at the same time the emotional aesthetic enlightenment of the world. Such asceticism did not and could not prevent the development of culture” 132. The so-called “medieval” and “monastic” worldview is distinguished by asceticism. Asceticism receives the most expressive formulation in its relation to economic labor in the monastic practice of both Western and Eastern Christianity: work is generally considered here as a means of ascetic exercise, as obedience, the meaning and value of which, at least in part, lies outside the labor process itself. Let's give a few examples. St. Benedict called idleness “the enemy of the soul,” and “therefore you should at certain times engage in manual work.” Pope Gregory the Great says: “If anyone wants to achieve the solid value of contemplation, he must first train in the field of work.” Bernard of Clairvaux judges this way: “She who serves Christ must always pray, read or work, so that the spirit of temptation does not unexpectedly take control of the inactive mind. Sensual lusts are overcome by labor. When you stop reading, you must work so that you never remain inactive, for idleness is the enemy of the soul.” The Carthusian Prior Guigo says: “A serious, prudent character is always ready to work. He does not dissipate through it, but, on the contrary, concentrates, since he always has in mind not so much the work itself as the goal for which he works, namely the achievement of the highest perfection” 133. The primary medieval authority of Western Christianity, Thomas Aquinas, judges in this way. In the atmosphere of the medieval monastery, the formula so beloved by Carlyle was formed: laborare est orare 134, i.e., that work in a certain respect corresponds to prayer. To characterize Eastern monasticism in this regard, we present the judgment of St. Theodore the Studite, whose charter received guiding significance for eastern monasteries (Philokalia, IV, 27): “All of you,” he exhorts the brethren, “are novices for each other, like living members of one body. If the eye does not guide the hands, if one hand does not support the other, if the foot does not step in the same way as the good of the whole body requires, if in general each member begins to act according to its own will, then they will not only not maintain their strength, but with their own disorder they will upset the whole body. Therefore, let everyone rejoice when he has to work harder for others, enduring cold, rain and heat... We do not shed blood like martyrs; Our members are not cut off, our bones are not broken; but if we add to our light and few labors the renunciation of our will with the desire to please and serve our brothers with love, then through this we become like the long-suffering martyrs and even the Lord Himself, who endured crucifixion and death for us. Be grateful and work!” Thanks to this view, which determined the entire structure of life, monasteries were and, as far as they do not betray their calling, remain, first of all, a school of labor, where, in the words of one Western monk, “everyone should be his own ox.” The biographies of saints, both Eastern and Western churches, provide numerous evidence of the educational significance of monasteries in this regard (it is enough to recall the place of work in the life of St. Sergius). Thanks to their ascetic labor discipline, monasteries played a huge role in the economic development of Europe in those eras when colonization and cultivation of wild areas were accompanied by particular difficulties. To the extent that the present stands on the shoulders of the past, in general we can say that our present economic life, our national economy, rests, as its foundation, on the ascetic labor of monastic medieval Europe. “The monks contributed greatly to the clearing of the vast and dense forests that covered central and northern Europe, and the transformation of primeval forest and swampy soil into fertile field and meadow lands. In particular, they were engaged in growing gardens and vegetable gardens... They turned the banks of the Seine, the valleys of the Rhone and Moselle and the desert areas of Normandy into gardens and vineyards. Thus, the strictest ascetics were at the same time the most hardworking workers" 135. Let’s talk about the same significance of Russian monasteries in the history of Russian colonization in the words of Prof. Klyuchevsky: “Three quarters of the desert monasteries of the 14th and 15th centuries were such (agricultural) colonies, formed by the eviction of their founders from other monasteries, most of them deserted. The desert monastery cultivated in its brotherhood, at least in its most receptive members, a special mood, a special view of the tasks of monasticism was formed; its founder once went into the forest to escape in silent solitude, convinced that in the world, among human rumors, this was impossible. The same seekers of silence gathered to him and set up a desert. The severity of life, the glory of exploits attracted here from afar not only pilgrims and investors, but also peasants who settled around the richest monastery as their religious and economic support, cutting down the surrounding forest; They also set up villages, cleared fields, “distorted the desert,” as the life of St. Sergius of Radonezh. Here monastic colonization met with peasant colonization and served as its involuntary guide. So, on the site of a lonely hermit’s hut a populous, rich and noisy monastery grew up. But among the brethren there often turned out to be a disciple of the founder, burdened by this non-monastic noise and wealth: true to the spirit and tradition of his teacher, he, with his blessing, left him for the untouched desert, and there, in the same order, a new forest monastery arose. Sometimes the founder himself did this more than once, leaving his monastery in order to repeat his previous experience in a new forest. So, concludes Prof. Klyuchevsky, “from isolated isolated local phenomena a broad colonization movement was formed, which, starting from several centers, over the course of four centuries penetrated into the most inaccessible bearish corners and dotted the vast forest wilds of central and northern Russia with monasteries.” Turning to modern capitalism, we must say that the influence of the iron mechanism here, of course, is much more noticeable than in simpler forms of natural economy with weak exchange. But he also presupposes his own special psychology. Modern capitalism is also associated with a special capitalist spirit corresponding to this complex economic mechanism. Sombart considers the main feature of this capitalist spirit to be economic rationalism, the methodical application of means to ends. We currently see this rationalism of economic life already established. But how did it develop, what initially formed its basis, what are the spiritual prerequisites of this capitalist spirit, and to a certain extent, capitalism itself? Capitalist rationalism comes closest in appearance to the “economic man” of the classical school, but does this “economic man” trace its origins back to Bentham and political arithmetic, or does it have a completely different genealogy? Several scientific studies have addressed this issue in recent years. The first place here should be given to the thorough research of Prof. Max Weber 136: “Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus” (The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism). Under the impression of these studies, the latest work of Prof. Schulze-Gevernitz 137 . In these studies, the genesis of the spirit of capitalism is brought into connection with the spirit of Protestantism and Protestant asceticism. The roots of the modern national economy are revealed not only in the economic needs of our era, but also in the spiritual life of human individuals. A particularly important role in this genesis is played by certain currents of the Reformation, and above all by Calvinism in England, which took the guise of Puritanism. The main feature of the modern history of England is that here the Reformation merges with the Revolution, and the main achievements of the liberation movement, as well as its ideas (in particular, ideas about human and civil rights, about freedom of conscience and speech), are inextricably linked here with the religious movement of the Reformation. But the economic fate of England is also connected with it. The origins of English capitalism are connected not only with the enclosure of fields and the industrial revolution, but also with the spirit of Puritanism. As is known, Calvin himself, the “Protestant pope,” as his contemporaries called him, during his reign in Geneva contributed greatly to the economic prosperity of the republic 138 . Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the Laws, notes that “in three important things the English are superior to all the nations of the world: in piety, in trade and freedom,” thus inextricably connecting these three features. Indeed, the connection between Calvinistic piety, merchant enterprise and love of freedom is noted everywhere in its history. Economic history researcher Gottgein notes: “Whoever looks for traces of capitalist development, no matter what country in Europe it may be, will always come across the same fact: the Calvinistic diaspora is at the same time a breeding ground for capitalist economy. The Spaniards expressed this with bitter reflection in the following formula: heresy promotes the commercial spirit." 139 What is this internal connection that is historically established between capitalism and Calvinism? The point is this. An essential property of the “spirit” of capitalism is that the “ideal” capitalist considers himself obligated to his property and its increase through productive costs recognizes as his duty; the highest good for capitalist ethics is to increase wealth, considered as an end in itself. The peculiar idea of ​​capitalist ethics about professional duty to property establishes this special capitalist spirit, without which modern capitalism would be impossible, just as it was, for example, psychologically (and not just economically) impossible in the depths of the Middle Ages. Its origin is therefore connected not only with a number of objective economic and partly technical changes, but also with a new direction of creative initiative and personal energy. Industrial innovators are usually attacked: legends, sometimes of terrifying content, are formed around their name, and comparatively less often they notice how strong character and outstanding self-control, in a word, certain personal ethical qualities are actually important for the formation of these types. These features are largely lost by representatives of modern capitalism, who are often guided either by grossly selfish interests or simply by habit, concern for the family, etc. However, the ideal capitalist has little in common with such types, just as with sons who squander the savings of their fathers; he also has certain ascetic features in his character. In German, the word “Beruf” and even more English “calling” have a religious connotation, denoting a religious calling to a given secular profession. On the contrary, the Latin Catholic peoples, as well as Russian, as well as classical antiquity, do not have a corresponding word found among all Protestant peoples. This word in current use is borrowed from Luther's translation of the Bible 140. The concept "Beruf" expresses the central dogma of all Protestant confessions. Protestantism, in contrast to medieval Catholicism, starts from the fundamental destruction of the opposition between the church and the secular or worldly, and worldly occupations, civil professions, activities in the home, in an enterprise, in a position are considered as the fulfillment of religious duties, the scope of which expands, thus, to all worldly activities. At the same time, he proclaims the autonomy of worldly life and seeks to remove this life from the influence of the church, that is, the papal hierocracy. This expresses the Protestant secularization of Christianity, accompanied, however, by the religious ethicization of worldly life 141. Those Protestant sects in which these ideals of religious-ascetic regulation of worldly life were especially strong play the greatest role in the history of capitalism in the development of the capitalist spirit, such as: Calvinism in the Reformation, Pietism in Lutheranism, Methodism in Anglicanism and, finally, from the sects that grew out of Anabaptism - Quakerism; Calvinism, especially in its British variety, Puritanism, has the greatest significance in the history of capitalism. Why did it get such importance here? We know that the main dogma of Calvinism was the doctrine of predestination: according to an eternal and completely incomprehensible act of the Divine will, some are predestined to eternal destruction, others to salvation 142. This fatalistic teaching, it would seem, should have completely paralyzed the will and personal responsibility; Meanwhile, in practical application, these dogmas, on the contrary, turned out to be most conducive to the development of character and personal energy. In the mood of people brought up on this teaching, it should have been reflected, first of all, by “the feeling of the unheard-of inner solitude of the individual” (M. Weber, 1. p. 11), to develop a pessimistically colored individualism, alien to any illusions: everyone in himself and for himself, people are separated from each other as if by a glass, transparent, but impenetrable partition, an act of pre-eternal pre-election. The state of being chosen cannot be determined by any external or internal signs, just as it cannot be achieved by anything, but it is expressed in certain behavioral traits. Everyone should consider themselves chosen, in the absence of the opportunity to prove the contrary, and the very doubt about this should be driven away as a devilish obsession; You can check the state of being chosen only by monitoring your behavior, vigilant self-control, and constantly “feeling your pulse”; methodical discipline of life, expressed primarily in tireless professional work, is the first practical conclusion from the teachings of Calvinism. The God of Calvinism demands that He be glorified in the world by a holy life: daily life must be methodically determined by ascetic discipline. What was considered obligatory only for monks and in monasteries is presented here as a general requirement and, moreover, as applied to secular professional life. Those passionate, serious and concentrated natures who previously gave monasticism its best representatives, in Calvinism remain in the world and actively manifest themselves in it. In this idea of ​​the necessity of establishing one's faith in a secular profession, Calvinism gave a positive motive for its development and connected practical ethics with the doctrine of predestination. Instead of a spiritual aristocracy outside the world and above the world, he placed a spiritual aristocracy of those chosen by God, saints from eternity in the world. A similar character of secular monasticism or worldly asceticism is distinguished, although to a lesser extent, by Pietism, Methodism, and, in particular, Quakerism, which played such an outstanding role in the social and political history of England and the United States (W. Penn). The brevity of this essay does not allow us to dwell on individual features of these teachings 143. All these sects have this common feature that they require an ascetic lifestyle from their members. As Weber says about them, “Christian asceticism entered the market of life, locked the doors of the monastery behind itself and began to saturate with its methodology precisely mundane, everyday life in order to transform it into rational life in the world, but at the same time not of this world, or not for this world.” Hence the constant passionate preaching of persistent physical and spiritual work - both as an ascetic means and as an end in itself. And it is not work in itself, but rational, methodically measured professional work that is required here from the individual. And among the signs of the usefulness of a business or profession and even its pleasing to God is its profitability. “If God shows you a way,” says the Puritan preacher Bexter, “in which, without injury to your soul or to others, you can earn more by lawful means than in another way, and you reject it and choose a less profitable way, then you cross out one of the purposes of your calling, you refuse to be a steward of God and accept His gifts, so that you can use them for him if he wills it. Of course, not for the purpose of carnal pleasure or sin, but for God you must work in order to get rich” (Baxter, I, 378, quoted in Weber). Wanting to be poor, as has often been argued in these circles, is the same as wanting to be sick. Thus the view developed that God blesseth the trade; and the Old Testament mentality, generally characteristic of Puritanism, was also associated with the Hebrew view regarding the reward for virtue in this life. Therefore, the favorite book of the Puritans became the book of Job, where Jehovah is so formidable and powerful, but where the final reward of the righteous is indicated, still here on earth (although, of course, this end for us now in the book of Job represents only a minor detail). Particular emphasis was placed in the Old Testament on places relating to formal honesty; It is not for nothing that Puritanism was often called English Jewry (Englisch Hebraism), meaning its assimilation of the Old Testament spirit, with its self-righteousness and sober legality. In Puritanism, the belief characteristic of Jewish messianism that the Anglo-Saxons are the chosen people of God, called to rule over other peoples for the sake of their own salvation and enlightenment, also awakened with tremendous force. This, by the way, constitutes the spiritual basis of English mercantilism, which, outside of this belief, has the features of shameless national egoism. Cromwell and his “saints” were imbued with it, and this heightened national consciousness, the roots of which go back to the Reformation, and especially Puritanism, distinguishes England at the present time. As Prof. Schulze-Gevernitz 144, and now “the merchant sitting at the desk fills the place to which God has assigned him and not anyone else, he can feel like a small and yet important wheel in the amazing economic cosmos. The same merchant at his desk also serves the interests of British power; if he is engaged in maritime trade, he lays the foundation for the English navy to defend Protestantism." Thus, Puritan asceticism turns out to be not only an economic, but also a political virtue 145. Of particular importance for the origin of the capitalist spirit is its feature that, while encouraging the motives that encourage accumulation, it binds consumption. The admission of joy from pure aesthetic or even sporting pleasure always has one limit in Puritanism: it should not cost anything. Man is only a steward of the benefits given to him by the grace of God: he must, like the wicked servant in the Bible, give an account of every penny. The idea that a person has duties to the property entrusted to him, to which he is subordinate as an employee-manager or as a machine for acquisition (Erwerbmaschine), falls with all its chilling weight on life; The larger the property, the heavier the feeling of responsibility for it, in order to preserve it for the glory of God and further increase it with non-stop work. Little by little, the business capitalist fetishism that is now so familiar to us is being developed. Worldly Protestant asceticism, - this is how we can summarize all of the above, - acting with all its strength against the careless use of property and binding consumption, especially luxury goods, frees accumulation from the obstacles of traditional ethics, it breaks the ascetic bonds to accumulation in the name of asceticism, not only legalizing the desire for enrichment, but also considering it directly as a matter pleasing to God, ad majorera Dei gloriam 146 . Thus, Puritan asceticism stands at the cradle of modern “economic man” operating on the stock exchange and market. The era of the 17th century bequeathed to its utilitarian heiress, first of all, an unusually calm, - we can safely say - a pharisaically calm conscience when making money, if it is only done in a legal form. A specifically bourgeois professional ethic emerges. Through the power of religious asceticism, sober, conscientious, unusually efficient workers, attached to work as a godly goal of life and feeling their responsibility to them, workers, the fathers of the modern “proletariat,” were brought up for the bourgeois entrepreneur. “The Puritan wanted to be a professional,” Weber concludes, “we have to be one.” Now the economic space does not need supports; he forcibly, even without any special internal motives or justification, forces one to submit to that division of labor, that excitement, which often takes on the character of uncontrollable passion and sport. But even now the new colossal building rests on the old foundation. “From the school of Puritanism,” notes Schulze-Gevernitz, “the Anglo-Saxon world brought out sexual, national and social discipline, which constitutes a counterweight to the capitalist spirit. England achieved dominance, among other things, because it surpassed its competitors in purity of family life, willingness to sacrifice out of love for the fatherland, and a sense of social responsibility. The superiority of the Anglo-Saxon type is based on capitalist, sexual, national and social discipline" (1. pp., pp. 46 - 47). The consciousness of the Puritan understanding of entrepreneurial duty has still not completely died out in modern representatives of Anglo-Saxon capitalism 147. These are the general conclusions of the latest researchers of the early history of capitalism. One cannot help but express regret that this kind of research is almost completely absent regarding Russian economic life, in particular, the history of Russian industry. “Economism,” equally characteristic of our populism and neo-Marxism, was not conducive to the study of the spiritual factors of economic development. Material for such research in family archives, historical and statistical data, one would think, would be found in abundance. Research from the history of Russian industry in connection with spiritual biographies and the entire everyday environment of Russian pioneer entrepreneurs would reveal the religious and ethical foundations of the psychology of Russian industry. It is known, for example, that Russian capitalism has a particularly close connection with the Old Believers, to which representatives of a number of the largest Russian companies belong. Clarifying the nature of this connection, and generally studying the influence of religious differences on the economy would be very interesting. It is possible, however, in advance, it seems to me, to establish that the connection between religious consciousness and economic activity should be confined not only to a certain dogma, but also even more to the practical conclusions of religion and especially to its exactingness at a given historical moment. What is important here is the way its spirit penetrates life, its direct influence, so to speak, the degree of religious-ascetic attitude towards life. Of great importance, of course, is the external position of this or that confession: persecution and persecution, weeding out the weak, develop steadfastness and integrity of character, which is revealed in all areas of life, and in particular the economic one. On the contrary, a privileged external position (nationalization of the church) weakens the degree of influence of the religious factor on life, regardless of even one or another religious doctrine, at least in intensity, if not in extension. It would be especially interesting to specifically clarify the economic potential of Orthodoxy, but this would require an extensive religious, philosophical and historical excursion, far beyond the scope of this essay. Fundamentally different in its attitude to the world from Puritanism and Protestantism in general, it, in the discipline of ascetic “obedience” and “walking before God” (just like the Old Believers, which is not dogmatically different from it), has powerful means for educating the individual and developing a sense of personal responsibility and duty, as essential for economic activity as for all other types of public service. And if now the influence of the religious discipline of Orthodoxy in the economic creativity of the Russian people is becoming less and less noticeable and often turns out to be weaker than dissidence, then this serves as another revelation of the sad decline of Orthodoxy at this historical moment. (This, however, is partly the fate of all the “broad churches” with their numerous and motley composition, in comparison with the small but inspired sects). At the present time, however, as always, two attitudes to the world in general and to economic life in particular are fighting among themselves: the mechanical-utilitarian and the religious. In the first case, different interests and their struggle come to the fore - the moment of consciousness of responsibilities and public service remains relatively in the shadows; in the second case, the consciousness of responsibilities is emphasized, and the understanding of social life itself as a system of mutual responsibilities is affirmed. In the 19th century, both of these worldviews received sharp and separate expression from different social thinkers, in different socio-economic systems. The 19th century gave birth on one side to Bentham, R. Owen, Marx, but along with them Carlyle, Ruskin, Morris, Kingsley, Tolstoy, Vl. Solovyova... In particular, on the issue of economic life and entrepreneurial activity, along with the doctrine of the class struggle as a universal, comprehensive principle of its explanation, we have the doctrine of class duties, of class service, especially clearly expressed in the ideas of Carlyle and Ruskin about the “leaders of industry.” Carlyle, as we know, wants to see entrepreneurs not as self-interested servants of accumulation, but as duty-bound “captains of industry” 148. Both of these views struggle in life, and to the extent that ideas, public opinion, and the general spiritual atmosphere generally influence the human personality, the predominance of one or another view influences economic life. The dominance of utilitarianism and the decline of personality threaten to undermine economic development, as is already beginning to be feared in relation to England 149 and even more so in relation to France with its economic stagnation. The national economy requires the spiritual health of the people. In Russian society, among the intelligentsia, the development of productive forces (an expression so often repeated by Marxists) as a unique religious and ethical task, as a type of public service, is still very insufficiently appreciated. In our views on economic life, especially on the course of industrial development, extreme Benthamism in one form or another (most often in its Marxist variety) dominates in our country, and the fiction of “economic man” is accepted without analysis or criticism. The predominant attention is focused on the moment of distribution, understood as the result of competition, class struggle; The significance of the development of productive forces as a creative task - the growth of the entire national economy as the combined efforts of human wills - is relatively less recognized. This attitude was especially expressed in the formulation and solution of the issue of agrarian reform in our country. The agrarian question is, as is obvious from all statistical and economic data, primarily a question of the development of productive forces, and only in the second and relatively minor instance the redistribution of land. Meanwhile, in our public consciousness so recently, it unusually quickly and easily turned into the question of black redistribution and the destruction of private ownership of land. The development of productive forces and, in general, the success of productive labor, despite all its socialist exaltation, in essence, is far from sufficiently appreciated in our social consciousness, and is met with an arrogant, disdainful attitude. The desire for the development of production and creative initiative in this area are too often considered exclusively from the point of view of class Benthamism, as “bourgeoisism”, the desire for profit, and, conversely, intellectual professions, no matter how dependent they are on industry, on “capital” (bar, literature, technology, etc.), are usually assessed on a completely different scale, as something higher, ideological, most worthy. The development of new branches of labor in the consciousness of our society seems to be a matter of a far lower order than all kinds of intellectual professions. This prejudice has real bad consequences, since the dominance of such assessments in public opinion morally drives representatives of industry into a corner, demoralizes them, degrading them in public opinion, condemning them on credit, thereby, as it were, removing moral responsibility from industry leaders in advance, subjecting them to moral and social boycott. At the same time, the national and national economic whole is hopelessly split into various social classes, separated from each other by impenetrable partitions. We need to understand that the fate of our industry, like agriculture, in general the entire development of the productive forces, for which capital is a necessary means, is our vital national concern, in which the entire nation is interested. Benthamism (original or later, i.e. Marxism) also in relation to working people turns out to be extremely unsuitable for their social education. Although the capitalist economy is inextricably linked with the antagonism of social classes representing various aspects and interests of production, it is dangerous and harmful to reduce all social relations to one production process and build them only on this antagonism, on centrifugal forces, forgetting about centripetal ones. Each class has its place in the production process, its duties and its social responsibility, from which it cannot and should not exempt itself in the name of its interests. What instills in citizenship is not a consciousness of interests, but a consciousness of social duties, and Benthamism, in the pedagogical sense, if its influence on the working masses becomes profound, in a purely economic sense turns out to be a corrupting and harmful principle, since it affects the attitude of individuals to their duties, since it destroys the ethical self-discipline that underlies any professional work, for consciousness of interests alone is not enough for the self-discipline of an individual. Meanwhile, the demands of economic life in relation to the individual, primarily as a “factor of production,” are increasingly increasing due to the force of things. The social progress of our time is inextricably linked with the growth of the individual, and, consequently, with an increase in personal responsibility and self-discipline. What in political economy is designated as the transition from an economy of low wages to an economy of high wages, that is, an increase in productivity and labor intensity that economically justifies an increase in wages, is inextricably linked with the self-discipline of labor representatives. But this discipline is not feasible on the basis of mere naked interests: it presupposes recognition of the highest ethical and, ultimately, religious values, moral responsibilities in the sphere of professional work. And, of course, in the direct experience of life, and not in Bentham’s theory, which extinguishes all the differences between the conscientious and unscrupulous, suitable and unsuitable worker in every branch of labor. Benthamism strives to raise the consciousness of its special interests, which are completely legitimate, natural and ineradicable in the existence of class antagonism, making it the subject of special and ardent preaching. Moving beyond its legal limits, becoming an exclusive, determining principle, as Benthamism wants to make it, it becomes a factor that lowers the moral qualities of representatives of labor, retards the development of productive forces, increases social hostility, but at the same time deprived of creative forces. And this education of the individual in the spirit of Benthamism, the cult of one’s interests, capitalists or workers, is erroneous even from a socialist point of view. Socialism, if it wants to be a truly higher form of economy, not losing what has already been achieved, but capable of developing productive forces further, can put up with Benthamism to an even lesser extent; on the contrary, it requires such personal responsibility and self-discipline that are not feasible in the name of personal interests alone, but presuppose a high ethical culture. Historical research, freeing thought from oppressive prejudice and one-sidedness, increasingly reveals the psychological roots of economic activity and clarifies the economic significance of those religious foundations by which the living human soul is determined. In the particular example we have considered, namely the question of the origin of the capitalist spirit, one can most clearly see how psychologically complex the origin of “economic man” is, which is taken in political economy as something simple, elementary, indecomposable. This specter of "economic man" dissipates in the light of historical research. We need to free ourselves from many ideological phantoms, including “economic man.” It is necessary to understand that economic activity can also be a public service and the fulfillment of a moral duty, and only with such an attitude towards it and by educating society in such an understanding of it, the most favorable spiritual atmosphere is created both for the development of production and for reforms in the field of distribution, for economic and social progress. An elastic will and a keen eye are now too rare in our educated society, and, thanks to this low quality of the human personality, along with, of course, other external reasons, there is a slow but sure and inevitable (if everything remains unchanged) economic conquest of Russia by foreigners. In order to rise higher in the field of intense economic competition, we need, among other conditions, a different assessment of economic activity than intellectual disdain or a lordly and condescending attitude towards this prose of life. For the Russian revival, national self-education is also necessary, which includes, as one of the applied conclusions, a healthier, sober and, I will add, more honest attitude to the question of the development of the productive forces. There seems to be a keen interest in economic issues in our society. The economic needs of Russia are so obvious and urgent that they do not require explanation, and yet proper assessments of economic activity and an understanding of the development of productive forces as a public matter are still insufficient in our society. Public opinion is one of the weightless, spiritual factors of historical development and economic life; especially if you compare it with such a tangible influence of the iron economic mechanism of the world market, you can come to a complete denial of it or complete disregard for it. However, modern natural science sometimes recognizes weightless forces as the most powerful - and public opinion and, in particular, those beliefs and convictions that guide it, serve as a similarly weightless, but real and powerful factor in economic development. For, let us repeat this again, the national economy is not only a mechanism, but also the active activity of human individuals, and social life is not only the struggle of classes, but also a complex system of mutual responsibilities of these classes. And if an individual, playing the role of a factor in economic development, develops under the determining influence of his ethical and religious beliefs, then, therefore, this or that religious self-determination of an individual and religion in general, as having an impact on all areas of life, is also one of the important factors in the development of the national economy. Therefore, while pursuing the goal of economic recovery and renewal of Russia, one should not forget about its spiritual prerequisites, namely the development and corresponding economic psychology, which can only be a matter of public self-education. Christianity and the Social Question 150 Chapter six of the Gospel of Matthew (parallel to chapter 12 of the Gospel of Luke) contains the Savior’s speech about wealth. He teaches in it to acquire “treasure” not on earth, but in heaven, for “where your treasure is, there will your heart be also,” and not to make yourself a master out of “mammon,” for “you cannot serve two masters.” “Therefore I say to you, do not worry about your life, what you will eat or what you will drink, nor about your body, what you will wear. Is not the life more than food and the body than clothing?” The Lord invites us to look at the birds of the air, which do not sow, do not reap, and do not gather into barns, and at the lilies of the field, which do not toil or spin, and yet are dressed more beautifully than the great king. “Therefore, do not worry and say, “What shall we eat or what shall we drink?” or what to wear? Because the pagans are looking for all this, and because your Heavenly Father knows that you need all this. Seek first of all the Kingdom of God and its righteousness, and all these things will be added to you.” This teaching can cause confusion and confusion to many. How can we understand it in connection with the rest of the teaching of the Gospel and Christianity in general? Is the Savior really inviting His followers here to completely abandon labor and economic activity, following the example of birds who do not sow and who do not spin lilies? Or does he teach to tempt God by demanding continuous miracles in order to abolish the natural order of nature established by Him, which represents a genuine and greatest miracle? Is it really possible that the formidable commandment given to Adam during his expulsion from paradise, on the threshold of world history, is being canceled here: “in the sweat of your brow you will eat your bread, the ground is cursed for you, with sorrow you will eat from it all the days of your life, it will produce thorns and thistles for you and you will eat the grass of the field”? Is it possible that the ap. Paul forgot this speech of the Savior when he wrote to the Thessalonians about himself as an eternal worker, the following: “We did not riot among you, nor did we eat anyone’s bread for free, but we labored and labored night and day, so as not to burden any of you... When we were with you, we bequeathed this to you: if anyone does not want to work, then do not eat. But we hear that some of you act disorderly, do nothing, but are fussy; We admonish and convince such people by our Lord Jesus Christ, so that they, working in silence, eat their bread” (II Sol. III, 7-12). Finally, if we pay attention to the content of that very sixth chapter of the Gospel of Matthew, then in it we will come across places that seem to be in contradiction with the speech about wealth. At the beginning it talks about “alms,” which should mean all sorts of forms of help to those in need, but this, of course, presupposes conditions inextricably linked with economic concerns and property relations. Also, the obligation to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, visit the prisoner in prison, which is asked of all people, presupposes a particularly attentive attitude to the economic side of life and, therefore, to economic labor. But, what is especially striking, in the same sixth chapter of the Gospel of Matthew, we find the Lord’s Prayer, in which, next to the universal, all-encompassing petitions, it directly stands: “Give us this day our daily bread.” This highest sanctification of economic care, its inclusion in the prayer of prayers, all the petitions of which are such that, demanding help from above, they also presuppose our active work in accordance with the divine-human character of the entire historical process, speaks for itself. Praying for our daily bread, we ask for God's blessing on our economic activities and economic care, on all private and national economies. The apparent contradiction of these two points of view on economic activity, in our understanding, is explained by the fact that they belong to different planes and reflect the basic religious antinomy of the world and human life. If we believe in the Heavenly Father, whose holy and all-wise will reigns in the world, then life and peace should appear to us as the revelation of this protective will. And the penetration of this faith should instill in the soul extraordinary calm and the absence of worldly worries, and only one concern should fill the whole life, take control of the whole soul - the concern to do the will of the Father, always and in everything to seek “first of all” the Kingdom of God, to which everything else is “attached”. With such a purely religious attitude towards the world, everything loses its impenetrability, is freed from the heavy, deadening veil of iron necessity, and lives in direct communication with the Heavenly Father, just as our ancestors lived, who directly heard the voice of God. In “paradise” there is no place for those economic worries that alienate a person from God, and a similar state of freedom from economic necessity and worries is depicted in the Apocalypse regarding the New Jerusalem, the City of God (chap. XII, 1 - 5), as the end of history. And such an attitude towards the world is the highest norm and ideal of its religious perception - the conviction that a hair does not fall from the head without the will of the Father, and He knows what we need, and will send what we need in time, should constantly fill the soul, color our lives! There is no tedious daily worry, no this painful fear of life, no irreparable misfortune! Whoever lives in such a mood, whose soul is full of these feelings, already lives in that kingdom of freedom, of which we are all called to be citizens, true bliss and tranquility are available to him, wings grow, the lost connection with the cosmos and with all living creatures is restored. This is the state of holiness. The life of St. gives us a captivating image of such an existence. Francis of Assisi - this is what it means to live without worries, like ravens and lilies of the field (it should be noted that, according to the Gospel story, the Savior addressed these commandments precisely to his closest disciples, and not to the crowd surrounding him at that time). From a worldly point of view, this can be seen as utopianism or blindness, since ordinary conditions of life are not noticed and ordinary reality is considered a ghost. Such people live in this world, although obeying its laws, but not noticing them, internally not bowing to the oppressive necessity that exists and is terrible only for those who are timid before it. There cannot be any other religious norm of attitude towards the world, towards wealth, towards the material conditions of life other than that given in the teachings of the Savior. But this norm, which corresponds to the ideal reality of a sinless or saved world, in which it is the only possible and natural law of life, in the present world, on the land of damnation, is only an ideal that denies bad reality and requires us to struggle with it and with ourselves, since it has power in us too. Once a person’s direct, open and normal relationship with the world is broken and evil has appeared in the world, a heavy cover of necessity, the laws of dead nature, falls over everything. We no longer hear the voice of God in nature, we have lost the royal dignity of freedom and have become slaves. Slaves received slave commandments, slave duties, and slave virtues. To cultivate the land by the sweat of your brow in order to defend your very existence, to carry the torch of civilization through the jungle of barbarism and primitive savagery has become a new historical commandment, a new task. Since we are doomed to live in this world, we are “guilty of its work”, bound by the laws of nature, the laws of history, and the laws of economics. We know from the experience of life and from political economy what economic necessity, all this menial cultural work that puts forward ever new tasks, costs people. We are called upon not only to protect and support life, but also to be creators of history, to create culture, without becoming like lazy and crafty slaves who buried their talent in deep barbarism. This relative worldly region also knows its truth and untruth, straight and crooked road, right and left, and this distinction is necessary for the purpose of conscious participation in historical creation. But entering the difficult and flinty path of historical necessity, we are already wingless slaves, moving within the boundaries determined by the mechanism of cause and effect, and in order to act in this world, we must, to a certain extent, recognize it, obey its laws and reckon with them. This is not only a necessity, but also an obligation. Thus, a person is called to live simultaneously in two worlds: in the kingdom of necessity and the kingdom of freedom, carrying in his soul a constant riddle, contradiction, antinomy, which determines a worthy struggle, calling for constant feat. There are always two paths before a person, well or badly distinguished, the path of liberation from the world by the power of its negation and the path of enslavement to its empty and dead elements. A free slave or an enslaved king, a bound spirit or spiritualized matter - this is what a person is in this sense. Not being able to finally overcome this inconsistency, get away from this antinomy, and gain the desired integrity, man is doomed to constant compromise and constant struggle, and this spiritual tragedy of the bound Prometheus is irremovable, since it testifies to the highest dignity of man, albeit in a state of sinfulness. Given into the slavery of the elements, a person should not internally become its slave, maintaining the belief that this necessity is only apparent and illusory and that the Higher Will is accomplished in it. To overcome this necessity is a feat of faith. At the same time, the temptation to believe in this element more than in God, to recognize its visible power is stronger than His will, to deify the mechanism of nature, acquires special power. We fall into such paganism, imposed on us by our natural position in the world, whenever we “rely on wealth” and allow “mammon” to reign in our soul; we then act like “people of this world” or “pagans.” In addition to practical paganism, there is also religious-theoretical, the same temptation, but already accepted by consciousness as a dogma of philosophy or science. This is philosophical materialism, which teaches that food and drink are greater and more important than the soul, for it is determined (“der Mensch ist, was er isst” 151), and clothing, that is, the external conditions of life in general, is more important than the body as the organ of embodiment of the free spirit. “Economic materialism,” so widespread these days, gave this view a complete expression, declaring that all spiritual culture is determined by an economic basis; there is nowhere to go further than this philosophical “mammonism.” The Gospel, written for all times and peoples, warns not only against practical, but also against theoretical paganism. In relation to this deviation of human thought and feeling, the Savior’s words become especially clear. However, the innermost movement of the heart in one direction or another does not free a person from the conditions of his empirical life. The farmer must plow and sow, reap and thresh, although he is fully aware that he himself, by his own will, cannot add a single cubit of height, nor grow a single ear. It seems that Herzen has a remark that every prayer asks for a miracle, in the sense of breaking the laws of nature; in fact, this is completely wrong, because it is possible and even obligatory for a believing consciousness to religiously perceive that which is in accordance with the laws of nature, which also represents an everyday miracle. That is why, sitting down at a ready table or throwing grain into the plowed ground, you can pray: give us our daily bread today, and really believe that God gives us the dinner prepared by the cook and the bread cut in the field. We do not depend on the dead elements, but on what stands behind them, for which they serve only as a means. In the religious order, only this essence of phenomena matters. But all this does not cancel the obligation - in empirical terms - to work hard, to bear the economic responsibility of common labor. The cultivation of the “earth,” that is, the forces of nature (which includes, of course, not only agriculture, but all types of industrial labor), constitutes the natural task of mankind, and it would be strange to assume - from both a religious and a human point of view - that man solves this task in isolation. Political economy teaches us quite definitely that the economy, the process of production, by virtue of natural necessity, is conducted by man socially, and this social labor of mankind is objectified in economic forms, in the economic skeleton, which political economy studies. Just as after the discovery of Copernicus we can no longer look at the starry sky with the same eyes as in the time of Ptolemy, just as after the latest discoveries of geology and biology we can no longer understand the narrative of Moses in the exact natural scientific sense, although we retain all its religious content, so after the discoveries of the latest social science, which has revealed to us a whole new world, showing all the complexity of the social fabric, we cannot look at the phenomena of wealth and naivety with primitive innocence and naivety. poverty. And if the commandment about the universal obligation to work and help those in need of material support was previously understood exclusively as an obligation of personal behavior, now, after what we know from the social sciences, it alone cannot calm the conscience; in addition, the obligations of social behavior become clear to us. We also learned that in order to pluck from the earth not only thorns and thistles, which promise humanity hunger and disease, little hard work is required, but a number of measures are needed that ultimately lead to economic progress, and this latter is inevitable, even if only in view of the fact of constant population growth, not to mention the constantly growing needs of culture. True, this economic progress has been made an idol in our time, it has blinded and deafened modern humanity, and this is the sin of the latter, modern humanity “relies” too much on its wealth and in the pursuit of it often loses its conscience, but this is an abuse that does not in the least speak against the necessity and legality of this progress. Political economy has also opened our eyes to the social responsibilities arising from the Gospel commandment of love and help to one's neighbor, and it provides very definite guiding norms for social order. The first norm is that everyone must work to the best of their ability and ability; this commandment of labor excludes social idleness and forces one to strive for a labor economy, with, if possible, converting all rental income into labor income. The second norm is concern for the weak and oppressed, that is, for those numerous layers of the people who have been crushed and crushed by our civilization. From the point of view of these principles, a social system seems normal in which there would be no place for social idleness, there would be a general obligation to work according to inclinations and abilities, and in which there would be no current distinction between rich and poor, those who have a lot and are tempted by their wealth, and those who have nothing, suppressed by this poverty. In common usage this system is called socialist. Not only living people, but also human institutions, also the result of human activity, a crystal of the human spirit, serve truth or untruth, love or hate. Just as slavery and serfdom now represent a clearly sinful institution for us, so modern capitalism, based on the exploitation of labor, class antagonisms, contrasts of wealth and poverty, contains the sin of misanthropy. Christianity does not allow reconciliation with any social system based on violence and hatred; it can only bless a system that embodies the principles of love, freedom and equality, and as long as social untruth remains, it always calls forward, to social progress, to the cleansing of society from these vices, preaches not only personal, but also public repentance 152. Again, here the Gospel also warns against turning socialism into a panacea, into a spiritual idol, as our modern times do. But this abuse and religious perversion of the ideas of socialism does not at all destroy the relative truth that they undoubtedly contain. So, undoubtedly, there are responsibilities for Christians in economic life, in the field of economic and social policy. However, religious teaching in this area gives instructions only regarding the goal, leaving it to human creativity to find the appropriate means in each particular case, regarding the latter, and Christians are obligated to consult political economy, in general, so to speak, social technology, to resort to the help of scientific thinking, just as to build machines one should study mechanics, houses - the art of construction, etc. Here, in the field of practical actions, we enter the field of mechanical causality and mechanical calculations, the free flight of inspiration is replaced by prosaic craft work. It is possible that people of the same mood will differ in their assessment of means in the field of social mechanics and, as a result, find themselves in different (albeit, of course, close) groups. On this occasion we have to say in the words of St. Augustine: in necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas 153. Everyone must be given freedom of social conscience - only with such centralistic clericalism as we have, for example, in the party of German Catholics, an order from the center replaces the free conscience and thought of its members, but such clerical fetishism is a temptation of Rome, a replacement of the church by the pope and the clergy, which cannot be set as an example. It is curious that the beginnings of what we now call social policy existed in an undifferentiated form already in the first centuries of Christianity. Prof. Hell. Harnack, in his famous work on the mission and spread of Christianity in the first three centuries, states, among other things, that among Christian communities, along with various forms of charity in the narrow sense of the word (alms, support for teachers, widows and orphans, the sick and incapable of work, care for prisoners and those languishing in mines, for the burial of the poor and generally for the dead, for slaves, help in major misfortunes, care for visiting brothers and poor or affected communities), there were the makings of what we would now call social policy and even in a rather modern form: namely, something like the organization of the search for work (Arbeitsnachweis) and the recognition of the right to work within Christian communities 154. When discussing ways of Christian participation in economic and social policy, the following question is naturally raised: should we not strive to create a separate, Christian or church-communal economy? Could there not be a special church socialism, a direct church economy? We answer this extremely important question with full conviction and with all our energy in the negative. Can the church, as a union of faith, prayer and love, organically introduce farming into its life? Then why not the state, not the police? After all, the Gospel indicates only one religious norm regarding the economy, which is valid for the communication of souls at the moment of their religious overshadowing and real contact in the church: do not worry about what you eat and drink and what to wear, look at the birds of the air and the lilies of the field. The Lord Himself ate and drank during His earthly life, among His disciples there was even a treasurer (although the fate of the latter confirmed all the dangers of economic temptation), but this remained only an external fact of the life of Him and the apostles, and the Lord did not give a covenant to the community of His followers to establish an economic commune (although the example of the communist sect of the Essenes was before our eyes). Not only did he not want to connect the church with any economic organization, but he expressively and decisively dissolved this connection in the same way as he dissolved the union of the church and the state, although he equally did not reject either one or the other as conditions of life. We therefore deny the very idea of ​​church economic communities, which we did not know even in the first centuries of Christianity, and this is what the apostle teaches about this. Paul, who demanded that everyone remain in the rank in which he was called (I Cor. VII, 2), left slaves as before as slaves, and masters as masters. The idea of ​​making entry into Christianity a means of liberation from slavery or entry into the socialist phalanstery was completely alien to the apostle, who warned Timothy against people “who are strangers to the truth, who think that godliness is for gain” (1 Tim. VI, 5). We know how polluted the ranks of Christians became when, after the edict of Constantine the Great, conversion to Christianity became a means of making a career. That is why we have such a negative attitude towards the idea of ​​​​various religious and economic hermitages, whether it be a Tolstoy colony or a non-Plyuev “brotherhood”, based on a solid economic basis in the form of land and monetary donations from its “guardian”, or, what is the same, a rich monastery, spiritually exhausted from its wealth, or, finally, various sectarian socialist communes that were founded in America. Thanks to the combination of piety and “profit,” such undertakings carry within themselves the beginning of their decay. The idea of ​​such church socialism against the background of the general dominance of the capitalist system is not only religiously false, but also contradicts the requirements of philanthropy, and practically leads to church egoism. In fact, let us imagine that such a phalanstery exists, therefore, it has enough funds to comfortably support the working community. Within its boundaries, that precious advantage will be realized that humanity does not know under the rule of capitalism - the right to work. At the gates of such a community, of course, an entire army of poor, hungry, unemployed people will inevitably crowd, who will ask not for alms, but for work, not for handouts, but for attention and self-love. What is left for such communities to do? Will we be asked to help only a Christian, and not every Person who needs it? No, such isolation directly contradicts the spirit of Christianity. Christians should strive to improve the social order for all, but not create privileges for a select few. Finally, such an idea is completely untenable from a business, political and economic point of view, at least for our era of national or even world economy, which places all cultural humanity in mutual economic dependence thanks to the network of exchange - Providence itself made the plan of separation in economic life impracticable. Given the existence of a national and international division of labor and commodity exchange in the Christian phalanstery, several branches of production can be organized on a cooperative basis, but they must be in exchange relations with the rest of the capitalist world. Productive cooperatives, even from a purely economic point of view, raise fair objections against themselves for the very reason that they drive a wedge into the working class, creating a privileged group of small capitalists, but even if such associations are considered worthy of encouragement, it is strange to make religious beliefs a condition for joining them. One lie will not fail to soon give rise to another - deception and hypocrisy, “piety for the sake of profit.” Any possible misunderstanding should be cleared up. We do not at all deny the need for property rights for the church union, for the church as a legal entity. The church union is the external, so to speak, earthly side of the church: for the worship, maintenance of the clergy, schools and to satisfy some material needs, it needs funds, just as any society or union needs them. One can argue about whether these funds are more or less, how they are obtained, but this no longer concerns the fundamental resolution of the issue, which can only be affirmative. This need to have church property for the church union is the source of the constant temptation to turn the means into an end, to identify the real interests of the church with the property interests of the church union (no matter how its property is created, from public or private donations). This creates the possibility of a constant drift towards clericalism, and one must always be on guard against this danger. But we do not intend to dwell on this issue now. The stated view contradicts the view that true Christian love necessarily leads to the “community of property” and the destruction of all “property”, in a word, to direct communism, a leading example of which is provided by the practice of the first Jerusalem community, about which the following is described in the “Acts of the Apostles”: “But all the believers were together and had everything in common: they sold estates and all property, and distributed it to everyone, depending on the need of each” (II, 44 - 5). Some see this as generally the norm of the economic system for the Christian community. However, thinking carefully about the content of this place, we must come to the conclusion that it is not the economic norm that is contained here and that an exceptional holiday in the history of Christianity is described here, and what is natural on a holiday is not entirely applicable on weekdays. The meaning of the norm, of course, is the feeling of love that burned brightly in this community and, under these circumstances, had an economic impact. consequence of the described form of communication of assets. But this form itself does not represent anything absolute. Taking a closer look at it, we see that in this case no new order or economic system is being introduced, much less a new organization of production. On the contrary, apparently, at this time the Christian community was not engaged in any economic activity at all, “constantly” being “in the teaching of the Apostles, in fellowship and the breaking of bread and in prayers.” What took place here was not the organization, but the liquidation of the economy; what other meaning did the “sale of estates and private property” have in order to generate money given to the community for subsistence. Obviously, we have here purely consumer communism, which presupposes a community not of production, but of consumption and, in addition, implying the usual course of the economy outside the community (for the sale of estates presupposes buyers, and the purchase of consumer goods presupposes a commodity market). We do not have accurate data on how long and widespread the existence of such consumer communism was 155. There is no doubt that already in the epistles of St. Paul is not there: there is talk about mutual support of churches with collections, about charity, but the existence of consumer communism is completely invisible. On the contrary, as we know, ap. Paul calls for remaining in the same rank, and therefore warns against liquidating the household. The attitude of the apostle is extremely instructive. Paul to the question of slavery, which was the greatest social ulcer of the ancient world, but at the same time was the economic foundation of the entire ancient culture. Christianity saw slavery in full bloom. How did it relate to individual slaves and slavery? Sometimes the very successes and spread of Christianity are explained by the fact that it was the religion of slaves and the socially disadvantaged. Of course, there can be no doubt that there is no force more radically denying slavery than the teaching of Christianity about the infinite dignity of the human person and the equality of people before God, but the extinction of slavery occurred only in a long historical process. Christianity raised this imperative in history (together with others), but did not make it an immediate task of the moment. It did not raise slaves to revolt, to a social revolution, although this was quite possible, judging by the examples of former uprisings. It did not even demand the direct liberation of Christian slaves from Christian masters, without, therefore, making the adoption of Christianity a payment for freedom and without turning it into a privilege; it did not directly touch the existing system, leaving its transformation to its degenerative work in history 156. Many are shocked, surprised, and even discouraged that the apostles demand from slaves obedience to their masters, and not only to the kind and meek, but also to the obstinate. They indicate only the mutual duties of slaves and masters, but that’s all. At ap. Paul we read: “Slaves, obey your masters according to the flesh with fear and trembling, in the simplicity of your heart as to Christ, not with only visible servility, as people-pleasers, but as servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the soul, serving with zeal as the Lord, and not as men, knowing that everyone will receive from the Lord according to the measure of the good that he has done, whether slave or free. And you, gentlemen, do the same with them, moderating your severity, knowing that above you and above them there is a Lord in heaven, with whom there is no partiality” (Eph. VI, 5-9). The Apostle especially warns (and, obviously, not without reason) that belonging to Christianity should not serve as a reason for the slave to skimp on responsibilities: “Slaves who are under the yoke must consider their masters worthy of all honor, so that there is no blasphemy against the name of God and the teaching. Those who have faithful masters should not treat them carelessly, because they are brothers; but we must serve them all the more because they are faithful and beloved and do good to them” (I Tim. VI, 1-2). “Admonish slaves to obey their masters, to please them, not to contradict, not to steal, but to show all good fidelity” (II Tim. I, 9-10). At the same time, the apostle turns to the rich, reminding them of their responsibilities: “Admonish the rich in this age, so that they do not think highly of themselves and do not trust in unfaithful riches, but in the living God, who richly gives us everything for our enjoyment, so that they do good, become rich in good deeds, be generous and sociable” (I Tim. VI, 17-9). What does all this mean? Doesn’t it really mean that the apostles internally reconciled with the institution of slavery, treating it with fundamental indifference, not feeling all its inconsistency with the teachings of Christianity and lagging behind some pagan Stoic philosophers in humanity? Oddly enough, we find a similar assessment even from such a competent researcher as Prof. Harnack, who says 157: “The ancient church did not regard the right of masters over slaves as sinful, but rather saw slavery as a natural state. Changes in this regard do not stem from Christianity, but from general moral and philosophical considerations (?) and economic needs.” We consider this characterization, at least when applied to the apostolic teaching, to be absolutely incorrect. An indifferent (not to mention positive) attitude towards slavery seems incredible because liberation aspirations lived among the slaves themselves who were part of the community; they were inclined, obviously, even to consider the transition to Christianity as a path to liberation, and, keeping them from harsh and hasty actions, Christianity could not help but deny slavery with all its preaching and at its very basis. And yet his direct relationship to modern slavery is much more complex than its simple denial. While denying a given social system, slavery, serfdom, capitalism, in its very foundations, it is possible, however, to admit its relative historical necessity in the sense that at the moment it cannot be directly eliminated without endangering the very existence of society. This is the point of view of the so-called realpolitik, which, given the breadth of tasks, knows how to find the limit of their feasibility at a given moment. This sobriety is opposed to utopianism, which, like Tolstoy, calls for a personal feat to overcome not only individual, but also social historical ulcers in oneself, for example, to immediately achieve a socially righteous life through simplification, or which, in a “revolutionary” (in a narrow and specific sense) way, wants to immediately make a leap from one historical era to another, snatch from history a premature fruit, forcibly unfurl an unopened bud. History, like nature, has its own laws, not established by us, and, just as in medicine, if you want to provide real help, and not to cast spells and witchcraft, you need to take into account the properties of the human body, determined by science, so in social policy it is necessary to take into account the limits of the elasticity of the social fabric, so as not to rupture it or break the skeleton in the name of the desire to give the social body a new form. In the words of the apostle we see authoritative support for historicism, socio-political realism, which denies straightforwardness and abstraction, so common among both religious doctrinaires (Tolstoyites) and revolutionary Jacobins. If we, albeit in the form of a compromise, reconcile ourselves with the relative necessity of a given system, recognized as abnormal and improper, if we, willingly or unwillingly, recognize it as an inevitable condition of historical life at a given moment, we cannot treat it only externally, as a fact foreign to us. By participating in it, we must, to a certain extent, accept it on our conscience and see in it also an arena of good and evil, no matter how they are refracted in a given historical environment. We must establish Christian responsibilities here too, because while we are alive, we cannot only passively tolerate the social environment that we ourselves create and maintain, we are called to actively participate in social activities with a full consciousness of responsibilities, rights and obligations. Therefore, even if we deny slavery in principle, living in the age of slavery, we can admit that there are good and bad slaves or slave owners, just as we now know that there are good and bad capitalists, conscientious and unscrupulous workers. Moreover, perhaps it is precisely the Christian attitude towards one’s duties in “every rank” (except, of course, for those that cannot be justified at all for a Christian, for example, the profession of an executioner), in that sense one could talk about the Christian duties of a slave and a slave owner, at least the apostle spoke about them. Paul, we can also talk about the Christian duties of the worker and the capitalist. Ap.'s words Paul regarding the duties of slaves and the rich and slave owners can be applied with appropriate modifications to our capitalist era. In this attitude, others will see “opportunism.” With this name they readily brand in our country an indication of not only mutual rights, but also responsibilities that is alien to enthusiasm and loudness. In essence, such irony, of course, is without any basis. There is a fundamental difference in the attitude towards a person in walking radicalism and Christianity. Christianity does not and cannot share the prevailing determinism, according to which a person is entirely determined by the external conditions of life, whether social forms or production relations, so that there is no actually sane and free human personality, but only the resultant of these external influences! According to the teachings of Christianity, there is something in the human soul, moreover, the most essential thing in it, in which it is determined not by the external conditions of life, but only by itself, by its own free will. And if a person is bound by the law of causality in his empirical self-determination, in the manifestation of his will outside himself, then in this basic determination of will he is free and without the assumption of this freedom, all the basic teachings of Christianity about salvation, faith and love would lose all meaning. And in this sense, the salvation of the soul remains a personal matter, which one cannot perform for another and which does not depend on external forms. Christianity, like any religion, inevitably requires personal achievement; it is a personal, intimate matter; this is its inherent irreducible individualism, which is replenished, but is by no means destroyed, by the Christian community and churchliness. To the extent that the individual soul in its personal experience turns to God as the Supreme Good and the Universal Father, and at the same time encounters the same experiences of other individual souls, and merges with them in this experience, in this common faith, prayer and love, it thereby finds itself in the church in which Christ is present and really unites everyone. For such a union and for such communication there are no obstacles that are insurmountable by will, and there are also no impenetrable barriers created by differences in social status. Social barriers, remaining in their historical rigidity and immobility, are overcome from within, and slave and slave owner, worker and capitalist gain the ability to look beyond these external and, in this sense, random restrictions into each other’s soul and see in it a reflection of the radiance of heaven and the common thirst for God. A Christian yields to the inevitability, independent of him, of the impossibility of moving the mountain of the social system by individual effort, but, without abandoning this as a task of historical development, he cannot, however, make religious life and religious communication dependent on the facts of external necessity and wait for this to occur for the social and legal equality of all people. Christ founded the church without waiting for this time, which means that these partitions cannot hinder church communication. Usually people with a materialistic worldview say that we must first resolve the social issue, remove social barriers, and in the meantime not interfere with this serious and important matter with such trifles as religion; when all this is arranged, then, along with other entertainment, religion can be allowed. But, of course, this can only be reasoned by people who believe in the matter and elements of the world as higher powers, at least in theory. The apostolic sermon read: “Everyone remain in the rank in which he was called. Whether you are called to be a slave, do not be embarrassed; but if you can become free, then use the best. For the servant who is called in the Lord is the freeman of the Lord; likewise, he who is called free is a servant of Christ” (I Cor. VII, 21-22). For Christian freedom, no chains of slavery serve as an insurmountable obstacle, and no external freedom in itself gives internal, Christian freedom. Entry into Christianity creates universal adoption to God, in which neither gender, nor origin, nor social status are distinguished: “You are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus; all of you who were baptized in Christ have put on Christ. There is no longer Jew or Gentile; there is neither slave nor free; there is neither male nor female: for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. III, 26 – 28). By contrasting the external and internal in this way, we do not want, however, to destroy any connection between them. Of course, the Christian slave owner inevitably had to lose the traits of voluptuousness of power and cruelty, which were so easy to develop in his position. In general, everyone gains the strength to more successfully fight those peculiar temptations that are characteristic of his external position: the capitalist - with the spiritual temptation of wealth, power and luxury, the proletarian - with the spiritual temptation of poverty, envy and bitterness, the ruler - with the temptation of arbitrariness and power-hungry despotism, etc. By defeating these temptations and temptations to the best of his ability, trying to respect his “title” and position as a service, seeing in it for himself, first of all, duties, and not rights, he gains the ability to carry out this service in a Christian way, and among his tasks and responsibilities he introduces the further transformation of the social system itself in the spirit of justice and freedom. This brings us back again to the question of the Christian attitude towards property or wealth. Property, like wealth, in this case can have a dual meaning: ethical or religious and socio-economic (we leave aside the issue of the legal qualification of property here). By property in the first sense we mean not the right of ownership or its object, but the feeling of ownership - attachment to it, greed, covetousness, egoism, which is peculiarly manifested here, separating a person both from other people and from God, spiritual captivity to one’s own property. Victory over property in this sense may not be economic, but only moral; it must take place in the recesses of the soul, in the invisible experiences of conscience. It is possible (albeit difficult) to have extensive property and be spiritually free from it, to have a very poorly developed sense of property, and, conversely, it is possible (and extremely easy) to be a poor person, having almost no property and burning with feelings of covetousness, greed and envy of those who have. It is possible that such a feeling will not only not be defeated by the acquisition of property (if this poor man somehow suddenly becomes rich), but will inflame even more, like the passion for gold in the “Stingy Knight”, so that the only real victory over him can be achieved not from the outside, but from the inside. In view of the possibility of such a discrepancy between the feeling of ownership and its availability, one can imagine the development and even aggravation of this feeling under the socialist system, in which the right of ownership in the precise sense no longer exists, and only the right to use consumer goods remains: and such a right provides sufficient scope for this feeling of egoistic self-affirmation, and in that sense, no external reform, even a socialist one, is capable of eliminating the selfish feeling of ownership. It is precisely this sense of property, its spiritual poison, the voluptuousness of mammon, that is irrevocably condemned by Christianity as fundamentally contrary to the basic commandment of love 158. As for property in the objective sense, that is, the historical fact of ownership, it can have different meanings and is in connection not only with the organization of consumption, but also with the organization of productive labor, production, and in general in connection with the economic organization of a given society. The meaning of property is determined precisely by the nature of this organization, for example, property has one meaning under capitalism, another in small peasant or handicraft farming, a third in slave-owning, etc. The raison d'etre 159 of a given form of ownership is determined by the relative historical necessity and expediency of a given form of production, one of the details of which it is. In this sense, the question of property is not a separate, independent question; it is resolved in connection with the general question of a given form of production. The capitalist's ownership of a factory does not mean that he owns it as an item of personal consumption, for example, clothing, food, housing, but that by owning it, he is in charge of this branch of social production. If we properly understand the meaning of property in this sense, then it is as much a right as a duty, and an important and responsible function is associated with it. The question of liberation from such property is not at all resolved as simply as with regard to consumer goods, where the simple renunciation of the owner in favor of others and consumer communism completely exhausts all difficulties. As long as a certain economic system, in this case capitalism, remains unshaken and represents the general condition of historical existence, such property imposes very serious and responsible responsibilities to society on the one to whom it belongs. And it is possible (although, of course, difficult) to have such property without a special development of proprietary feelings, “class interests,” the dominance of which, although in fact, due to human weakness, constitutes a general rule, does not represent a limit, and cannot be surpassed. And Christianity, with its historicism, which opens up the field for realpolitik, cannot demand an immediate and actual renunciation of this kind of property, because this would mean a demand for the immediate introduction of socialist production. That capitalist, who in his “title” would be imbued with a truly Christian spirit, could in his personal life and needs remain any kind of ascetic and unmercenary, giving away all his income to others or even spending it entirely on the cause of socialism (there were such examples), but he would not have the right to free himself from responsibility for the fate and welfare of his workers by selling his “property” to some kulak, even for the purpose of distributing this money to the “poor.” Wealth in the social sense, social power and authority, obliges its bearers like any power 160. Not being able to single-handedly jump out of their social era straight into the realm of socialism, they must bear at least their “property” as a burden, but carry it conscientiously and honestly 161 . However, there still remains, of course, the outcome: to transfer the factory to the ownership of the workers, thereby turning them into small owners, but the big question is whether this would benefit them both spiritually and economically, as evidenced by the history of productive cooperatives. It is much easier to divide and distribute land, but this also depends on the circumstances. In these considerations we do not take into account the exceptional case when personal inclinations lead us away from all sorts of “business” activities to that calling, which will always remain, of course, above any such harness - to the path of free and selfless religious service - the path of prophecy. We can never, under any system, imagine Francis of Assisi even as the manager of a factory; we can only imagine him as a voluntary beggar, who is all joy, prayer and inspiration, and who, himself being human joy, serves people the best and highest service. But only such prophetic (in the broad sense) and priestly service can free a person from responsibilities to the prose of life. Ownership of the means of production, or “capital,” is the most important form of ownership in our time, determining our social system. After deducting it, what remains is ownership of consumer goods, income in the precise and strict sense of the word, which reflect the dominant form of production from the “distribution” side. These incomes, of course, cannot be socialized without a corresponding socialization of the means of production. Therefore, the implementation of the communication of property as a universal and permanent institution outside of this socialization also cannot be realized. Such a requirement, sometimes put forward as the basic norm of Christianity in the field of economic life, does not have any specific economic content at all, if we do not mean here random help to each other. In addition, it is hardly rational to put forward even this requirement on your own, because the attitude towards it serves only as a symptom showing the presence and living power of Christian love, its thermometer, and one cannot strive, as an independent goal, to obtain a certain reading on the thermometer scale, when this entirely depends on the temperature. “The Kingdom of God is not food and drink,” and to expect from it, first of all, the arrangement of property relations and the elimination of property disorders, means falling into the same temptation with which the apostles were tempted throughout the earthly life of Christ, leaning towards the bias along which modern materialist socialism comes to identify the tasks of the Kingdom of God with the organization of a socialist economy. We must fundamentally reject this temptation and say that Christianity does not promise a direct solution to practical problems in the form of “community of property” and that any specific Christian and church-communal socialism does not exist and should not exist. There should only be a Christian preaching of the tasks of socialism and a Christian interpretation of its actual goals (Christian ethics and philosophy of socialism), but socialism itself as an economic fact, as a set of external objective legal and economic institutions can only be the same for all members of a given society, both for Christians and pagans. Therefore, in order to actually transform the existing system on the principles of socialism and bring it closer to the embodiment of justice and love in economic relations, Christians must become part of the common harness of history, by no means becoming isolated or aristocratic, without shying away from working together with the “pagans”, to the extent that they, pursuing general humanistic tasks, want to do the work of Christ. Of course, like everything that Christians do, they must imbue this work with the spirit of Christ and wage an irreconcilable struggle against those pagan and anti-Christian temptations that exist here, they should not get lost here, but remain a united detachment of the militant church. However, when contrasting where there is a deep and irreconcilable opposition between the Christian and pagan attitudes towards socialism, one should not, unless absolutely necessary, disunite in what unites and is common, and in the pursuit of such objective tasks one should go in the harmonious army of progress, in the general ranks of socialism, because socialism as an economic organization contains the Christian idea, the organizing principle of social love is laid. We understand that here lies a considerable danger of secularization and even the loss of what is most precious - religious individuality, and one must always be on guard against this danger. However, to evade danger in this case means the same as to evade life, from a living cause, from the feat of love. And by avoiding life in the name of this danger, are we not exposed to a much worse danger - to harden and become dead in disgusting indifference to the “sinful” world and become like that barren fig tree, the fate of which may each of us pass by! (About what was in it and what was not. Experience of characterization) I. On the historical study of Christianity. - The task of the essay. With love and respectful inquisitiveness, thought dwells on the first times of Christianity. At its historical cradle stands a long, ever-increasing line of scientists and thinkers who bring here the fruits of their labor, thoughtfulness, and observation. They strive to capture in memory everything, even the smallest features, that can only be established regarding the history of early Christianity. Study methods are being refined to the point of virtuosity. They want, as far as possible, to recognize and describe every stone of the sacred land, to study in detail its historical topography, exploring for this the world that stretched beyond its borders and surrounded it. Our rationalistic and unbelieving age, represented by the most rationalist-minded Western, predominantly German, historical science is erecting and, in part, has already erected a massive monument to its piety, its love for Christianity, shown not in word, but in deed. It is gratifying to think that this historical work, attracting first-class scientific forces, is at full speed, and now, in the last years of our 10th anniversary, it seems to be becoming even more fruitful and gaining even greater scope. Classical philology and epigraphy, history and archaeology, the history of religions and Orientalist linguistics in friendly cooperation contribute to shedding new light on the historical situation of early Christianity. In modern times, excavations carried out in Egypt and other places have brought new materials on scraps of papyrus, on shards, on metal and stone, awaiting further development, but which have already yielded some valuable results. The study of Eastern religions, which has been developing so successfully in recent times and poses a number of new questions about the relationship between Judaism and Christianity and the mysterious East, from which the Chaldean stargazers came to worship the Divine Child, provides yet another new insight into the same issue. As a result, the historical era of early Christianity, despite all the scarcity and fragmentation of materials, the insufficiency of direct sources, is taking on more and more specific shapes, approaching our eyes from the foggy distance of historical perspective and schematic stylization. If little new can be learned about early Christianity itself beyond what we have in the New Testament books and meager monuments of ancient Christian writing and what can be gleaned from their comprehensive study (although here, too, recent decades can boast of some discoveries), but the historical environment in which early Christianity was born and developed becomes clearer, a rich historical background is created against which individual features of the picture already known to us. I know that in some quarters there is distrust of this historical work, supposedly because its results are destructive to faith; Reason for such fear is given by the opinions of many of its representatives (although in this regard one cannot help but note recently a certain, albeit slow, turn among representatives of the critical direction towards a return to church tradition, conditioned by the very development of science). I do not share this attitude towards historical research, as far as it remains within the boundaries of strict science 163. Of course, in order to regard some of the results of this research without embarrassment for faith, one must once and for all abandon the view according to which the entire extra-Christian world is doomed to nothing but the darkness of error and its entire history is a meaningless wandering in it. For Christianity as a theanthropic religion, the natural, human side of religious development, and therefore its historical paths, should in no way be ignored. Christ came when “the times and seasons were fulfilled,” when historical humanity was sufficiently mature for this. And if they find similarities and closeness between biblical teachings and, for example, Babylonian beliefs, or look for connections between individual features of the Jewish and then Christian apocalypticism with the religions of Iran and Babylon, then such similarity, this existence of points of contact between Christianity and “paganism,” even if it were finally proven, does not at all undermine the religious significance of the biblical narrative and even its “divine inspiration,” but testifies only that certain aspects or features of the truth, combined, however, usually with many errors and perversions, can be found in “natural” religions 164. Obviously, scientific discoveries of this kind, insofar as they can be considered firmly established and strictly verified, and are not the fruit of hasty and frivolous generalizations prompted by unbelief, should prompt an expansion and some modification of our old ideas about the religious path of mankind; religious philosophy of history must understand the meaning of natural revelation, but in order not to consider them dangerous to the foundations of faith, both scientists themselves and the general public must firmly remember the boundaries of historicism. Historical research is completely incompetent to give a decisive answer about the highest religious values ​​that make up the content of the dogmas of faith. For the latest truths and foundations of faith stand - higher or lower - but in any case outside of scientific proof, and therefore, of historical research. After all, for example, it is impossible to scientifically prove that Christ is the God-man; this can only be revealed by personal religious experience, direct intuition, for it is not “flesh and blood” who reveal this according to the word of the Lord Himself to Peter who confessed Him. Belief is a free, truly miraculous act, like new birth. And what cannot be scientifically proven cannot be scientifically refuted. And if the historical (“Richlian”) school in Germany currently denies the God-manhood of Christ, it is not on scientific-historical, but on religious-metaphysical grounds, due to its very special understanding of Christianity and the religious experience that stands in connection with it. The best representatives of historical science recognize these boundaries of historicism, one might say, the further, the more clearly. And the most conscientious and subtle of modern historians, sensing these boundaries, sometimes even in scientific research itself recognize the insufficiency of the powers of natural explanation. True to their scientific duty, they strive to carry the natural scientific explanation to its conclusion, but do not shy away from admitting where it is inapplicable. In this sense, the best representatives of historical science will often come across a statement that although the reasons for the spread of early Christianity can be seen in various natural facts, its origin remains mysterious and miraculous 165. Due to the peculiarities of the subject in the history of Christianity, personal faith, personal religion, personal intuition are of paramount importance, because the entire history of the emergence of early Christianity is presented in a completely different light for those who believed in Christ or for those who did not believe in Him, but who believed only in His Father (the modern German school of Richlean theology), or for those who did not believe in either the Son or Father. This explains, by the way, the amazing religious, and at the same time the historical blindness of unbelieving researchers who find it possible to explain Christianity without Christ, in general, apart from any influence of religious individuals, from any natural, elemental, for example economic, factors; this is as if someone began to write the history of music not only not understanding, but also having an aversion to music. It is clear what kind of history can be expected from such a researcher. Here we should remember the wonderful words of Professor Zom. What he says to lawyers applies to all students: “A new world surrounds the lawyer, a world of Christian life by faith, a world in which he is unable to see anything with the eyes of a lawyer and grasp anything with the hands of a lawyer. Take off your shoes, because the ground you're standing on is holy ground! Christianity entered the super-earthly, super-worldly world. You will never understand this if you yourself have not drunk from a wonderful cup, the contents of which quench the thirst of the soul. Drink and you will never thirst. Drink, and you will open a new world, never before visible to you, a spiritual world that covers the earthly world like a vault, pouring rays of light on it.” 166 As the basis for the characteristics of early Christianity (Urchristentum), the era covering the so-called apostolic and post-apostolic centuries, that is, extending approximately to the middle of the 2nd century, I believe not those features of it about which there is a dispute and the opinions of various researchers or different faiths are divided, but what constitutes, as far as I can judge, unshakably established historical facts, which are now against Neither historian nor theologian will argue. It goes without saying that in order to find such common features, to feel such reference points, it is necessary, firstly, to limit ourselves to a few and summary strokes, and secondly, to take a broad historical perspective, in which everything detailed would merge, but the sharp and fundamental would stand out 167 . Modern man, with his questions and torments, anxieties and worries, strives with his soul for the shrine of early Christianity, when the Lord was so close, when the outpouring of the gifts of the Holy Spirit was so abundant, when the saints lived and taught. the apostles, when they shed their blood to St. martyrs, when the foundations of the church structure and teaching were formed. He strives here with his pains and his torments, in the hope of receiving an answer to his current needs. And many believe that there, in the promised land, they will find their golden age, resolution of their questions and peace from their current worries. For all of Christianity, and especially for modern Christianity, Early Christianity has the meaning of a model, an example, a norm, and together it is the seed from which the historical plant develops. What can we currently learn from early Christianity, in what ways can it still serve as a model for us, and in what, on the contrary, cannot it? For what needs of the soul will modern man find a guiding norm, and for what needs will he not find it at all? Or: what was and what was not in early Christianity? II. To characterize the state of the ancient world. One of the most important acquisitions of the latest historical research 168 is that we now have a much more complete, vivid and accurate image of the spiritual state of the world in which Christianity was born, of the fermentation vat into which its new leaven was thrown. Now it is no longer possible to be content with a simplified and tendentious depiction of the ancient world around R. X. as having outlived its strength, exhausted its potential and collapsed due to its rottenness. To reduce the strength of the defeated enemy - for the ancient world was nevertheless defeated by the new faith - does not at all mean to exalt the winner, especially if this is bought at the price of historical truth, and one cannot help but be grateful to the latest philologists and historians for the fact that through their works the ancient world is taking on more and more living and significant, not at all dead, features. It cannot be denied that spiritually this highly cultural era, like the present one, is no longer distinguished by its original freshness; the traits of fatigue and decadence, epigonism and despondency clearly lie on it, although this applies mainly to the highest cultural classes, who lived their own special and, apparently, even more isolated life than now, but is less applicable to those middle and lower classes, among which the main This is how Christianity developed at first. The culture of this era was distinguished by a very high level in all important areas. True, it was already a culture, so to speak, of the second grade, not Hellenic, but Hellenistic, no longer possessing the language of Plato and Demosthenes, but a significantly modified dialect, the so-called universal, Koine, in which the books of the New Testament were also written. But this Koine was the language not of a small Greek state, but of the entire cultural world, welded together by Alexander the Great and again soldered together by the Roman emperors. Throughout the entire world of that time (ecumene), this language was generally recognized and well known, just as there was one government, the same laws; the former boundaries of isolation and particularism were destroyed, and many peoples were absorbed into a single state. This external unification, improved means of communication, etc., of course, greatly facilitated the preaching of Christianity. (An inscription has been preserved on the grave of one Phrygian merchant who traveled to Rome 72 times - a clear sign of how secure internal relations were.) The firm policy of the imperial power in the person of Augustus marked the beginning of a calmer and more secure position for the provinces, which were especially monarchically minded and, in this regard, revived their old memories of the religious adoration of eastern despots in order to apply this to the cult of the Roman emperors 169. Augustus, as is known, was first called god and savior (Σωτήρ) on one of the inscriptions in Asia. The culture of the ancient world had not yet reached complete decline and had not yet said its last word; on the contrary, it was rich in creative forces. In literary terms, this era can name a number of outstanding masters of poetry and prose (Caesar and Horace, Virgil and Tacitus, etc.). Literature in general distinguishes this era, which created its own new forms (by the way, the philosophical diatribe); Since the reign of Vespasian, the time has come, now called the second sophistry (Wendland). Eloquence was highly valued and was taught in schools in the same way as rhetoric. “Writer” and “speaker” were almost as honorable titles (among cultural circles) as they are now. The philosophy of this time dealt with issues of a predominantly moral, practical nature and, along with the frivolous skepticism and militant atheism of some, gave rise to sublime religious sentiments in others. In Stoicism we have an indelible monument to the greatness of the spirit of ancient man; the writings of Epictetus or M Aurelius, Plutarch or Seneca still make an impression and sometimes amaze with their approach to Christian morality, recognized and noted by Christian writers and sometimes expressed in direct borrowings from them. Stoicism developed the ideal of a philosophical righteous man, an ascetic - a servant of truth, and, undoubtedly, by deepening moral consciousness, Stoicism prepared the success of Christianity. With his preaching of universal humanity and brotherhood, he contributed to the mitigation of slavery. At the same time, his already intense individualism intensified and interest was focused on the problem of the personal self, which at that time occupied the best minds with irresistible force. Although historians have a lot of material to characterize the deep moral decline of the imperial era and its moral perversions (as evidenced in the Epistle to the Romans and the Apostle Paul), however, this characterization cannot but make a number of limitations. The very presence of such high moral teachings and moral judgments and assessments based on them among Roman society makes us consider the moral state of the ancient world not so hopeless. At this time, one can find (for example, in Seneca) discussions about the dangers of much knowledge and the powerlessness of science to answer final questions, reminiscent of the current talk about the bankruptcy of science. It cannot be said that this time did not know science in the form of precise knowledge, emancipated from philosophy. In the Hellenistic era (in the 3rd century BC in Alexandria), it was the exact sciences that achieved unprecedented improvement in their methods. Mathematics and astronomy, geography, mechanics, optics, medicine receive special development, although closer to the Christian era independent scientific creativity is already weakening (Wendland, 26 – 27). The fact that the power of Greek thought had not yet been exhausted is best evidenced by the school of Neoplatonism, which worthily crowns the development of Greek philosophy. A distinctive feature of the mood and thoughts of the best people of this time was religious anxiety and the search for God. Philosophy itself, by the nature of its problems, is increasingly becoming theology, and religious philosophy then, as now, often turned out to be a surrogate for religion. The thirst for revelation, for a real experience of the Divine instead of philosophizing about Him, is widespread in society. This was also facilitated by the state of religion at that time. Greece and Rome's own religion had largely decayed. Initial polytheism, under the influence of philosophy, gradually degenerates into monotheism, and the gods receive a symbolic, allegorical interpretation. The influx of cults from all the countries that became part of the empire erases the individuality of the old national gods and levels them into abstract images, and together gives rise to religious syncretism unprecedented in history. Eastern religions and cults with their mysterious, eccentric, orgiastic features had a strong influence: Egypt (Serapis and Isis and Anubis), Syria (Adonis), Phrygia (Cybele), Babylon and Persia (the cult of Mithras) transferred their gods and their cults to the Roman state. They led with their magic, astrology, sorcery, sorcery 170. To this must be added the revival of mystical movements in the Hellenistic religion; the Orphics with their sacraments, the Order of the Pythagoreans, the cult of Dionysus 171 - all this sought to destroy the barrier between man and the transcendental world, in everything the thirst for revelation, salvation, and redemption was expressed. In this sense, the world was ready to meet the Herald of eternal, immortal life, to accept the Redeemer. It is worthy of note that at the same time the religion of man-theism said its last (or first?) word in the form of the cult of emperors. This latter, which should be considered in connection with the entire view of antiquity on the possibility of the deification of man, generalizes and summarizes what was previously expressed separately and in hints. Mankind, organized and living a state and cultural life, and the state as the organization of this life, personified in the Caesars, and above all the “savior” Augustus, is the deity before whom the philosopher, the simpleton, the pious pagan, and the skeptic bowed and sacrificed. The imperial cult is the dome that crowned the ancient world. So, the ancient world in the era of the advent of Christianity, although it was sick, was not yet going to die immediately. On the contrary, much of what modern man loves and appreciates in his culture - literature, philosophy, science, art, politics - he will find here too. In ancient history there are many basic elements of our current culture (except for the development of exact knowledge and applied science and the industry based on them, and, consequently, our socialism associated with it). Christianity stands before the “world” and culture from the very beginning. Christianity entered the world at a time when it was at its cultural zenith, and ancient culture stood on the shoulders of the ancient lost cultures of Babylon and Egypt. How did it enter, what did it adhere to, what did it rely on, how did it determine itself? III. The entry of Christianity into the world. – The historical lack of weapons of its first preachers. – The power of their preaching. Christianity entered the world in unearthly ways. It did not use any means taken from the historically established environment; it appeared as a completely new and special force, extracultural and ahistorical, denying crooked and broken historical paths. It turned not to the historical shell of a person and not even to the mind, but to his heart, took his will, ignited a new life in him. Ap.'s words Paul about his preaching, that it is carried out “not in convincing words of human wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and power,” can serve as a characteristic of the entire early Christian mission. What came out to preach was not philosophers in the manner of those Stoics who at that time wandered around with philosophical teaching, not scientists (Paul alone was affected by rabbinical science, but this was not at all the Hellenic wisdom of the age) and not writers who were so highly valued in this literary age. Is it necessary to say a lot about the non-literary nature of Christianity, when it is known that the apostles were people “unbooked and illiterate” (as they are called in Acts. Apostle). the apostles Peter and John - agrammatoi kai idiwtai), hardly all of them knew how to read, these provincials who grew up in a remote corner of the Roman Empire - Palestine, which, although it was not closed to Hellenistic influences, still retained its special theocratic disposition among the culture of that time. About a century passed before the first writers appeared in Christianity 172 . The sacred books of the New Testament also did not appear immediately 173. The first Christian generation was content with oral tradition, stories about the life and teaching of the Savior from His apostles. Our canonical Gospels arose not at all as literary works, but as teaching readings for religious edification. Most of the apostolic epistles were also initially private letters to various communities, which only later acquired the significance of church-wide property. The earliest monuments of Christian writing date back to the second century, and one must see how far they are in their content and form from purely literary works of the same time, how simple, unpretentious, childishly pure, but also childishly naive these writings are, completely alien to issues of culture and history, occupied only with issues of faith and religious teaching. Against the background of this modest writing both in quantity and quality, the miracle of the Four Gospels with the Face of Christ reflected in it, this miraculous image in the word, stands out even more sharply, and that criticism that tries to explain the Gospel without Christ must stop powerlessly before this fact. It is impossible to create an image of Christ; it is beyond human power, and even more so it cannot be attributed to such humble writers as the authors of the New Testament books 174. Later, when Christianity, represented by apologists, begins to use for its preaching, in addition to its direct impact on the soul, also the means of human teaching, to appeal to reason, to rely on philosophy, it borrows these means from the school of pagan philosophy, from Stoicism and Platonism, in a word, it takes from the surrounding culture created by history and to that extent loses its ahistorical originality and enters into history. And look how weak, pale, and often contradictory this defense is in the age of apologists right up to Origen. If one could think that the strength of early Christianity lies precisely in this philosophical frame, then one would be afraid that its cause is lost and that it cannot withstand the battle with pagan philosophy, on which, moreover, it relies. Reading the apologists, you involuntarily recall the characterization of Christian preaching by the apostle. Paul that “we carry this treasure in earthen vessels, so that the superabundant power may be attributed to God and not to us” (II Cor. IV, 7). Finally, the predominant contingent of the first Christians was recruited, as can be concluded from the apostolic epistles and other sources, mainly from the middle and lower uneducated classes 175, rich and educated people constituted a minority, and those pagan philosophers who theoretically seemed to stand closer to Christianity than others (Stoics, Platonists) at first simply did not notice it, and later treated it rather hostilely and believed empty and stupid fables, spread about Christians. Christianity, in all its natural human equipment, was powerless and helpless. It challenged the whole world, neglecting all human means and turning directly to the heart with an insane, monstrous, paradoxical sermon about the crucified and risen Christ. To accept such a Messiah and Savior of the world was equally difficult and disgusting for both the Jews, who were expecting a Messiah, but not such a one, and the pagans, whose prejudices on the part of aesthetics and philosophy, and nationality, and current morality opposed recognizing the crucified Jew as the Savior of the world. Believing in Christ was then just as difficult, and if you want, just as easy as now, because the word about the cross was proposed and accepted - then and now - not by reason and not by reason, which can only recognize the already accomplished fact of this acceptance and one way or another comprehend and justify it, but by some mysterious, internal experience - inexplicable, because irrational, or rather, superrational, like something new. birth, like life, like death, like love. This exceptional mysterious character of the origin of faith and this position of the preachers of Christ in relation to the world with its human wisdom and human assessments received an immortal, divinely inspired characterization in the words of St. Paul, which the Church reads at one of the greatest moments of its liturgical circle at Vespers of Good Friday, when the worshipers stand, as it were, before the cross of Calvary with the lifeless body of the Divine Sufferer. This is the triumphant hymn of victory over the world, which will always resonate in the hearts of believers. Looking at the modest community, the fruit of his preaching in Corinth, one of the centers of the then enlightenment, the apostle says: “Christ sent me... not to preach the gospel in the wisdom of speech, so as not to make the cross of Christ abolish. For the word about the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is written: I will destroy the wisdom of the wise and the understanding of the prudent (Is. 29:14). Where is the sage? Where is the scribe? Where is the questioner of this century? Has not God turned the wisdom of this world into foolishness (Isa. 33:18). For when the world through its wisdom did not know God in the wisdom of God, it pleased God through the foolishness of preaching to save those who believe. For both the Jews demand a miracle, and the Greeks seek wisdom; and we preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block to the Jews, and foolishness to the Greeks, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ, God's power and God's wisdom, because the foolish things of God are wiser than men, and the weak things of God are stronger than men. Look, brothers, who you are called to be: not many of you are wise according to the flesh, not many of you are strong, not many of you are noble. But God has chosen the foolish things of the world to shame the wise, and God has chosen the weak things of the world to shame the strong things; And God chose the base things of the world and the things that are despised, and the things that are not, to bring to nothing the things that are, so that no flesh should boast before God” (I Cor. I, 17-29). Can a more decisive challenge to the world be made than in these words? And after these words, is it necessary to ask the now usual question: how did the ap. Paul to the culture around him, to science, to art? No way. It is enough just to pose this question to feel that it is directed at the wrong address and that there can be no answer to it 176. Ap. Paul, and with him all of early Christianity, in its religious basis, stands outside the world, outside history, and therefore, outside culture. This basic feature of it is established not only by direct religious instinct, but also by modern historical science 177 . It was exclusively and, according to others, one-sidedly religious. It taught and was interested in the relationship not to the world, but to God (and only in God to the world), taught to be saved from the “world lying in evil” in God. Ap. Paul, as you know, said about himself that he wants to be “resolved” in order to be with Christ, and only love and care for his flock makes him value life. With this religious fullness, with such a reality of communion with God, which once forced the apostle to say about himself that he “does not live himself, but Christ lives in him,” all the songs of the earth seemed boring in comparison with this music of the heavenly spheres that rang in the soul. The wall between this world and the other world was, although not for long, removed, the staircase between earth and heaven was finally restored. In order to win a soul, it was necessary not to convince, but only to introduce it to this life of grace, not to prove, but to show Christianity, for “The kingdom of God is not in word, but in power” (I Cor. IV, 17). (Unfortunately, we have now lost this power and are left with only words, which is why modern preaching is dead and lifeless). Earthly life was considered and valued only in relation to the “future age” and did not itself arouse independent interest. It had to be passed, but only because it was impossible to do without it. IV. The meaning of eschatology in early Christianity. And besides, the early Christians did not believe in the strength and duration of this world; on the contrary, they expected its quick, almost immediate end. All modern historical science unanimously confirms the exceptional significance of eschatology (the doctrine of the end of the world) in the mood of early Christianity 178 . Traces of this conviction that “the end is near” and “the image of this world is passing away” are scattered in the Gospels, and in the apostolic epistles, and in all early Christian writing, and what we now, in the 20th century, interpret in the broader sense of the internal necessity of the end of history, slowly maturing, was then understood in the sense of its immediate proximity. Remember that ap. Paul had to reassure the Thessalonians who had abandoned their studies in anticipation of the second coming. In the Montanist heresy of the half of the 2nd century, in an era when eschatological aspirations generally began to fade significantly, these sentiments were reflected in an exaggerated and partly caricatured form: the prophet Montanus with the prophetesses Prisca and Maximilla lead a crowd of their followers towards the coming Christ. As you can see, the Adventists, who made it their specialty to determine the times and dates of the second coming, are by no means new in the history of Christianity; on the contrary, almost every significant page of Christian history has its representatives (it’s enough to recall the Anabaptists, Independents, Quintomonarchists, etc.). We must not forget here the influence of the historical environment in which early Christianity grew up - the apocalyptic sentiments of Judaism. The latest research on the religion of Jews in the New Testament era has revealed with particular clarity the development of apocalyptic ideas and apocalyptic literature in Judaism 180. No matter how you look at the Apocalypse and no matter how you interpret it, undoubtedly, it is also a historical monument testifying to the mood of the early Christian era. The final prayer of the Apocalypse “Yes, come Lord!” was, apparently, one of the first prayers of Christianity. Not only those righteous people spoken of in the Apocalypse (chapter 6, vv. 9-10), but also many Christians prayed for the acceleration of the coming in glory. In one of the earliest texts of prayers that have survived to us, given in the “Teaching of the 12 Apostles,” the Eucharistic prayer contains, among other things, the petition: (“Let the image of this world pass away.” Apparently, the words of the Lord’s prayer “Thy kingdom come” had the same content. Only in Tertullian at the end of the 2nd and beginning of the 3rd century do we find a mention of the prayer de mora finis, that is, about slowing down the end (however, along with the prayer de adventu 181, which never disappeared from liturgical use, obviously, the mood at this point had time to change significantly). The idea of ​​the second coming for some was associated with the general end of the world, for others it bore the bright features of a sensual Jewish apocalypticism, that is, an earthly thousand-year kingdom, the so-called chiliasm. In one form or another, the idea of ​​an imminent world cataclysm penetrates the sparse Christian literature of the 1st and 2nd centuries. In The Teachings of the 12 Apostles, an early second-century monument rediscovered only in 1883, the final chapter speaks of the second coming, before which the Antichrist will appear. “And then the sign of truth will appear: first, the sign of an opening in heaven, then the sign of the sound of a trumpet, and thirdly, the resurrection of the dead, but not of all, but as it is said: the Lord will come and all the saints with him. Then the world will see the Lord coming on the clouds of heaven." 182 The Epistle of Pseudobarnabas (late 1st century), highly revered and widely read in early Christianity, expresses the attitude towards life in this way: “I am greatly consoled, awaiting my liberation.” It also speaks of the proximity of the Antichrist (“the last temptation has come near”), “of the last days.” “The day is near in which all will perish with the wicked. The Lord and His reward are near.” In the first letter of Clement, Pope of Rome, also around the year 100, as a motive for the exhortation to be in peace and love, it is said: “Soon, in truth and suddenly, the will of the Lord will be accomplished, according to the testimony of Scripture itself: soon will come and will not delay and suddenly come to His church, the Lord and Holy One, for whom you are all waiting.” In The Shepherd of Ermus, a semi-apocalyptic, semi-educational work of the mid-2nd century, widely read in the Roman Church and even revered as canonical, the fate of the church is revealed to the author in a number of visions. In one of the visions, the church is depicted as a tower under construction, nearing completion. “The tower is still under construction... but it will soon be finished,” and this confidence permeates the entire work. Ignatius the God-Bearer at the beginning of the second century in his letter to the Ephesians says: “These are already the last times.” The early apologists, who replaced the so-called apostolic men in Christian writing, had the same motives. Justin the philosopher (half of the 2nd century) in his “Conversation with the Jew Tryphon” says: “Meanwhile, times are approaching the end of the century and the One who will utter blasphemous and impudent words against the Almighty is already standing at the door,” etc. Later, Justin paints a completely sensual chiliastic picture. An even more sensual picture of the thousand-year kingdom is painted by St. Irenaeus, bishop Lyonsky, famous for his fight against Gnosticism (as is known, some Gnostics, heavily infected with Eastern dualism and a negative attitude towards the flesh, were therefore hostile to chiliasm and allegorically interpreted the corresponding passages of the prophets and the Apocalypse. Irenaeus fights this interpretation). The extent to which Christians felt like “wanderers and strangers on earth” is eloquently illustrated by the term used in the First Epistle of Clement to indicate the address of the community: wandering community (zharopsoaa) in such and such a city. But enough quotes. There is no doubt that any picture of the early Christian sentiments will be incorrect and incomplete if at the center of it is not placed this fiery confidence in the nearness of the end, an impatient and passionate expectation of it and an impulse towards the Coming. In this impulse, early Christianity rose above the earth and separated from it, making itself indifferent to earthly values. Everything will soon burn, the heavens will pass away with noise, the wicked Babylon will fall, the hymn is already sounding in the sky: “Babylon is fallen, Babylon is fallen” (Apoc.), we must strengthen ourselves against the latest temptations, which, by the way, were not long in coming in the form of the persecutions that had begun. It is not without reason that the image of the first persecutor Nero is found in the apocalyptic beast and the “beast number” (666 or, according to other manuscripts, 616) is deciphered as the sum of the numbers of his name 183. That is why in the ideas of the early Christians there was no place for history at all in our current sense. Their ideas about the end remained external, and their expectation remained passive. Waiting for the end, they did not think that their descendants would have to settle and rebuild on this boring land and that history was just beginning its new chapter. Just as in the distant perspective all intermediate points merge and only the limits are visible, just as two mountains, separated by abysses, cliffs, deep valleys, merge into one from afar, so among the first Christians the historical path of mankind was projected on one plane, and thanks to this lack of a sense of historical perspective, they thought that everything was over on earth, they were sure that the world was already ripe for this end. They fell into the deception of historical vision, we must now say with loving respect, but absolutely firmly. For us - not by conclusions and sentiments, but by the direct experience of the 19th centuries - it became clear that there is a history with its own tasks and problems. We now stand under the sign of historicism, and we also consider the eschatological worldview of the first Christians historically and therefore must take it into account in all its weight when understanding the history of early Christianity. V. Early Christianity and the pagan “world”. The above-mentioned attitude of the early Christians to the world around them, which stemmed from the intensity and completeness of their religious experiences, is also explained by the fact that this entire world seemed to them to be in the power of demons. It was a pagan world, where idolatry reigned, and the culture was pagan in its very origin. Christian communities felt like islands, lost in the boundless sea of ​​paganism with its perversions, like fragile boats floating on the waves of the ocean. This world, therefore, initially could not even evoke inquisitiveness, much less sympathetic attention. It was necessary to take care of self-preservation, and for this we had to put ourselves in a position of distrustful and irreconcilable opposition and struggle towards the pagan world. Reading the 17th chapter of Acts. Ap., which tells about the sermon of St. Paul in the Athenian Areopagus and where the direct contact of the apostle with the pagan world is especially vividly felt, one cannot help but be struck by the weak and one-sided impression the capital of Hellas makes on him, even the ruins of which now speak so much to our hearts. There are no traces of admiration for the beauty of the statues, for the elegance of the architecture, no, it is said here only with stern laconicism: “...Paul was troubled in spirit at the sight of this city full of idols” (XVII, 16). All the seductive, enchanting beauty of the pagan city and cult turned pale at the thought that these are idols, they are prayed to instead of the true God... After all, even some of us, with all our religious relaxation, would lose the taste for the Venus de Milo or another ancient statue, the beauty of which we now admire, if it stood not in a museum, but in a church and served as an object not of aesthetic contemplation, but of religious worship. One can therefore understand the intransigence and sometimes bitterness with which subsequent Christians treated not only idolatry, but also the idols themselves. At the same time, before the gaze of the Christian, unarmed in the human sense and strong only by his faith and otherworldly strength, stood this Babylon, sparkling and seductive, in purple and luxury, threatening to swallow up the new birth. Paganism and atheism permeated all life around, and yet the first Christians had to live in this world. He covered them in a tight ring. After all, just pay attention to the constant worries of the ap. Paul, in order to protect their communities from what was natural and ordinary around them. Roman Christians are surrounded by unnatural sexual perversions, an incestuous man has appeared in the young Corinthian community, mixed marriages with pagans, the consumption of meat sacrificed to idols, appeals to pagan courts, etc. are arousing new alarm. Not content with this passive, but always the most powerful resistance, paganism went on an active offensive both through measures of violence - in the persecution of Christians, and in spiritual struggle. In the latter area, pagan writers attacked from the outside (Lucian with satire, Celsus with philosophy), but the enemy from within turned out to be even more dangerous when he covered the pagan essence from the outside with Christianity, starting in the 2nd century). We mean that pagan attempt to falsify Christianity, to leave from it almost only an appearance, which bears the general name of gnosis 185. This serpentine whisper of Eastern syncretism framed by Greek philosophy represented a terrible danger for the church, incomparably greater than the superficial, unsystematic, sometimes cruel, but in general not so devastating persecutions. Thus, the doctrine of a world lying in evil, in addition to metaphysical and religious justification, also had immediate historical foundations; it was nothing more and nothing less than preserving one’s spiritual being from being absorbed by the hostile and alien elements of the pagan world. Such a “military” situation, of course, could not remain unchanged for all times; this exceptional modus vivendi 186 with the world had to change due to the simple fact of the quantitative successes of Christianity, as well as the growing confidence in its strength. Moreover, when Christianity wanted to express its teaching by human means, to present and formulate it as the truth of reason, as philosophy, it had to turn to the arsenal of human means, and it could and did find them in ancient philosophy. When the era of development of Christian theology, and then Christological and Trinitarian disputes, begins, Christian dogmatics in its formulations undoubtedly rests on the shoulders of Greek philosophy. Harnack and his followers therefore speak of the “acute Hellenization of Christianity” and see in it the beginning of a substitution and distortion of the originally simple and adogmatic essence of Christianity. One can completely disagree with this assessment of “Hellenization” and argue about its limits, but one cannot deny the fact that the attitude of Christianity towards pagan philosophy is gradually turning from negative to positive, sometimes reaching the point of direct borrowing from it, starting with apologists. 187 VI. Early Christianity and the State. The “world” surrounding the early Christians was an organized state, enveloping the entire then universe with a steel ring. And this state, as an organization of order, economic life, culture, religion, everything that humanity of that time lived with, as the totality of all its values, recognized and proclaimed itself the highest principle in the world, a deity. And this religion of ancient theology, which Feuerbach and Comte dreamed of in the 19th century, found fruition in the cult of emperors. “The content of this faith is grandiose,” says the latest historian 188, “for all the gifts of culture, from the preservation of physical life to the highest pleasures of the spirit, are gifts of the deity, which is immanent in the state and at the moment receives its fulfillment in the emperor or his genius, or his destiny... From here it is quite consistent that the refusal to make a sacrifice to the emperor is high treason, and Christians refuse this in full consciousness that they refuse “basileia tov KOSMOV” (kingdoms of this world), they feel like citizens of another kingdom. It is just as consistent that they turn out to be άζεοι (atheists), for together with the state cult they deny all gods, which only exist by the grace of the state.” On this religious (and not political) basis, Christianity collided with the Roman state and began an unequal struggle with it, which ended, although not in the victory of the Roman state, but by no means in the complete victory of Christianity, which put on the chains of statehood. Christianity could not and did not recognize the state as such a higher principle, organizing life, arranging it to the end and resolving all issues, that is, organized by measures of external coercion and in this organization self-sufficient humanity, “the kingdom of this world.” To admit this would mean to bow before the prince of this world for his bread, for his power, for his signs. It responded to the cult of state man-theism with the Apocalypse, a book in which, with fiery words and fiery images, the destruction of the beast and his kingdom, held together by violence and false signs, was predicted. It contrasted the power of the “savior” Augustus with the power of the Savior of the world, the “kingdom” of Caesar – the “Kingdom of God”, the power of the “autocrat” (autocrat) – the omnipotence of the “Almighty” (pantocrator), the reign of Caesar – the power of our Lord I. Chr. “The eschatological revolutionary nature of the Apocalypse, which undermined the very foundation of the pagan state, which realized itself as the highest and final beginning life, was apparently clear to the hostile side, for from the second century A.D. we know that the authorities prohibited the reading of works of an apocalyptic nature under penalty of death 189. And yet, with all their irreconcilability towards the pagan state as a religious institution, as the kingdom of the beast and the Antichrist, the first Christians could not be further from political revolutionism, and even the Apocalypse calls for patience and abstinence from the sword and violence and exhorts to expect a world catastrophe in the hope of its proximity. “He who testifies to these things says: Hey, I am coming quickly! Amen. Yes, come, Lord Jesus." This is the final chord of the Apocalypse. And in all of early Christian literature you will not find anything resembling political utopias (however, some historians believe that the frequent calls to obey the authorities in Christian writing indicate precisely the nervousness and restlessness of the political mood, but this conclusion is at least controversial). Let us not forget that in the first century Palestine was gripped by a passionate desire for political liberation. These motives play a role in the Gospel story during the condemnation of Jesus, and even before the crucifixion, when the people were given a choice, the terrorist Barabbas 190, almost a political murderer, was preferred to Him. Palestine of the first century AD was the scene of continuous revolutions and uprisings, ending in the unprecedented extermination of the Jews and the destruction of Jerusalem. The Jerusalem community of Jewish Christians, generally closely connected with their fellow tribesmen at least by visiting the church and observing the law, according to the legend preserved by Eusebius, before the revolutionary outbreak that ended with the destruction of the holy city, having received a prophetic warning, they moved to Pella, and this indifference of Christians, along with religious reasons, made them so hated by the Jews that During the last uprising of Bar Kochba, many Christians were killed by the rebels. This was the case in the most turbulent place, and even more so in other areas of the Empire, where Christians were in an insignificant minority. For those who lived in hope and confidence in the imminence of the greatest world catastrophes under the influence of a Higher Power, political revolutionism seemed an uninteresting palliative. To this we must also add the above-mentioned general passivity of early Christian eschatology. However, until the world cataclysm came, it was necessary to live in the state, it was impossible to escape from it. The early Christians did not leave. They accepted the state, but not as a deity, but as an order of things designed to protect the possibility of existence. Only in the matter of making sacrifices and preaching Christianity, which was a forbidden or unauthorized religion, for Christians the words of the apostles, spoken by them to the members of the Sanhedrin in response to the prohibition to preach about Christ, served as the norm for Christians: “We must obey God more than men” (Acts Apostle V, 29), and they decisively preferred the things of God over Caesar. Otherwise, Christians considered themselves obligated to loyal behavior before the authorities: they paid taxes, showed obedience, and generally considered authority as an instrument of goodness and order, as a divinely established institution, according to the well-known definition of St. Paul (Rom. 13:1–7). Also, calls to pray for the king and for the authorities, “that we may live a quiet and quiet life in all godliness and purity,” are repeated more than once in the apostolic epistles (I Tim. 2:1–3, Tit. 3; I Peter. 2, 13 – 17). And all this acquires all the more significance because it was written in the era of persecution, in the era of Nero, Domitian, Trajan, Hadrian 191. In the literature of apostolic men and apologists, we often find mention of prayer for authorities. The Hieromartyr Polycarp, a disciple of St. John the Theologian, who only recently led Ignatius the God-Bearer to Rome to be torn to pieces by wild beasts, writes in his letter to the Philippians: “Pray also for kings, for powers and princes, even for those who persecute and hate you, and for the enemies of the cross.” And in one of the oldest prayers of the Roman community at the end of the 1st century, preserved for us in the 1st Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, we see how this admonition of the apostles was fulfilled, and it should be noted that this prayer dates back to the end of the reign of Domitian, which was marked by severe persecution of Christians. About a quarter of the entire rather extensive text of the prayer refers to the emperor 192. Prayer for the emperor survived despite the difficult trials that the growing church experienced in the 2nd and 3rd centuries. “We cannot make sacrifices before the images of emperors, but we pray for their good” is an answer often repeated in acts of martyrdom of later times 193 . Although the testimony of apologists is sometimes somewhat suspect due to the special task of apology - to protect Christians from persecution, their agreement with the evidence we have given confirms its reliability 194. So, we can say that the early Christians were, or at least wanted to be, loyal, loyal subjects and recognized the duties of citizens 195. But for all that, they were, of course, bad citizens of the Roman state, and in their own way the Roman patriot Celsus was not entirely wrong, who exclaimed to these “anarchists”: “If everyone acted like Christians, the emperor would soon be left alone and isolated, the course of affairs on earth would soon fall into the hands of the most savage and disgusting barbarians.” Early Christianity relates to the Roman self-deifying state with at most only passive connivance, but in this passivity indifference offers it greater resistance than direct rebellion and revolution. For Roman statehood was a religion, it required the activity of the will and mind, the whole person, and for a true Roman patriot, the sight of “atheists and anarchists” denying the religion of statehood, although they prayed for the sovereign, had nothing attractive and aroused growing anxiety in him. The practical participation of Christians in public life was determined by a state of passive indifference. Here the commandment of the apostle had force. Paul that everyone should remain in the rank in which they are called. History has preserved for us only a few names of Christian government officials (the most prominent of them, Titus Flavius ​​Clement, was accused of atheism and contemptissi mainertie 196). There could not have been many of them, for initially Christians were recruited from the lower class and only later, in the 3rd century, did they appear at all levels of social status 197 . Particularly interesting and burning is the question of the attitude of Christians to military service, 198 aggravated by idolatry and extortion of troops from the population. Apparently, there was no special “soldier question” in early Christianity for the simple reason that there was no universal compulsory military service; of course, there was no need for a Christian to take this path of temptation voluntarily. For those, however, who converted to Christianity while in military service, the position of the apostle remained valid. Pavel about remaining in the same rank. Material regarding Christians in the army exists only from 170, i.e., towards the end of our period, and the presence of numerous Christians in the army (precisely in the 12th legion of Marcus Aurelius - fulminata Melitensis) is already an undoubted fact, and the increasing number of Christians in the army, as Harnack noted 199, for the first time resolved the issue of the victory of Christianity over paganism and the public recognition of the rights of Christian religion. Tertullian, who himself testifies to the presence of Christians in the army, still raises the question of whether a Christian can be a soldier, and resolves it with his usual rigorism in the negative, in contrast to Clement of Alexandria, who warns Christian soldiers only from fulfilling orders that are contrary to religion. In any case, life had already resolved this issue at that time in a positive sense. The internal attitude of early Christianity towards the state was determined mainly by the imminent expectation of the end and submission to Providence. “Eschatology,” Harnack rightly notes in this regard, “has thus become a quietistic and conservative principle” 200. Not believing in the duration of the existence of this world, the early Christians could not be particularly interested in its affairs, but only patiently and passively bore the burden placed on them as obedience. “Look,” warns “Shepherd” Erma, “like a wanderer on a foreign side, do not prepare for yourself anything more than what you need for life; and be prepared so that when the lord of this city wants to expel you from it because you do not obey his law, go out to your fatherland and live according to your law carefree and joyful” (Similarities, sub. 1st). The state was everything for the ancient man: home, homeland, church, but for the Christian it moved from the center to the periphery, for he found a new home, and not only outside this world, but also on earth. This is an ecclesia, a church, a community. Under Imperial Rome, an underground world (Roma soterranea) was created, undermining it; all the threads of the heart connected the Christian with this world. His definitions, and not the state ones, had decisive power for him; here he found the highest standard of personal and public life. A new idea, a new commandment, a new, highest ideal of human communication was born, not in an earthly human-divine state, but in a divine, theocratic, ecclesiastical union. And to this day these two planes of life, these two orders of relationships are painfully struggling and colliding, permeating and tearing apart the human soul and creating an apparently insoluble problem - about the relationship between church and state 201. But Providence made this painful task easier for the early Christians. After all, they were a banned, persecuted, small sect that could not have any influence on the affairs of the state, and therefore were free from responsibility for it. Early Christianity did not carry the state on its conscience; it could treat it from the outside, as an outsider, alien to the world, sometimes hostile, like an apocalyptic “beast,” sometimes friendly, like “God’s servant,” and, in any case, considering its stay in it short-lived, transitional. And only when, having received a majority in the state, Christianity was declared the state religion, and the state itself, if it could not become Christian, then became a state of Christians (at least in name), when eschatological expectations finally faded and history began, when it was necessary to settle for a long time and firmly on this sinful earth, then the question of the relationship between the church and the state loomed with inevitable and ominous force. Christianity had to accept on its conscience and responsibility the statehood that vested it. The “world” lying in evil, which the early Christians had outside themselves, now entered inside, and the struggle with it inside became by no means easier, but much more complex and deeper than when it was outside and tortured those who denied its cruel yoke. The early Christians were simply freed from this tragic discord by their childish, joyful belief that everything would soon end and that the world was not worth worrying about; they were freed from it by their position as an irresponsible, persecuted minority. Like springs in narrow crevices of rocks, they kept their waters pure, like a tear of rain, with which we quench our thirst even now, but the more their level rose and the more surface they flooded, the more they became colored with the colors of the environment and the more they absorbed foreign elements. A cloudy, seemingly insoluble mixture was formed. This remains the case to this day... VII. Early Christianity and the social question, its relation to slavery. Let us turn to the question of how Early Christianity related to the social and economic needs of its time. Without going into details, we will limit ourselves to the most general features 202. As is known, early Christianity had to face the social question in the most acute and terrible form in which it had ever been posed - with the existence of legalized and widespread slavery, this economic foundation of the entire ancient civilization. Although slavery was softened under the influence of the Stoics and philosophical preaching in general, and partly under the humanizing influence of Hellenism and the economic needs of the time, it was still very harsh and, perhaps, was experienced even more difficult due to the heightened awareness of the injustice of this institution. Slave uprisings, tamed by the most brutal measures, accompany him. Needless to say, how much slavery contradicts the whole essence of Christianity, and it would not have been necessary to prove this to the sensitive conscience of early Christianity. And yet, as everyone knows, Early Christianity did not engage in a direct and immediate fight against slavery as an institution. It recognized it as a historical fact, as a historically given situation that must be taken into account, just as we now recognize the force of fact behind capitalism. And it is hardly possible to imagine such a radical revolution as the immediate abolition of slavery, without a grandiose revolution, which, in addition to its futility (as the slave uprisings turned out to be fruitless), would completely deviate Christianity from its immediate religious task. In addition, it looked at slavery with a somewhat eschatological-quietistic view: the end is near, we must endure to the end. Do not begin a complex restructuring of the social structure when it is known that it will soon perish anyway, and do not divert forces aimed at one goal - the preaching of Christianity, accelerating the onset of universal deliverance, the end of the world. Social revolutionism, as well as political one, turns out to be unnecessary and simply uninteresting in view of the impending eschatological revolution. For the immediate religious purpose of preaching Christianity, slavery did not at all represent an insurmountable obstacle; in the religious sense it was unimportant, just as all external differences before God will always remain unimportant. Early Christianity addressed itself not to social status, not to class, but to the individual, to the inner man, and, moreover, addressed itself with the preaching of immediate personal conversion, repentance, rebirth. This is accessible to everyone and equals everyone. “In Christ Jesus there is neither Greek nor Jew, barbarian and Scythian, slave and free.” There are no social differences in the Eucharistic breaking of bread, in the prophecy of the prayer meeting. Grace does not take into account external conditions. Slaves sometimes occupied high places in the ecclesia (Bishop Pius, brother of Erma, apparently, was a slave; Pope Callistus was previously a slave), and universally revered martyrs emerged from slaves, revered as saints (suffice it to recall the martyr Blandin). The difference in the position of masters and slaves did not and could not constitute an obstacle to the preaching of Christianity; it made the most impenetrable social barriers permeable. And it is clear that, without changing its main task - purely religious preaching, Christianity could not at that time take on the complex and time-consuming task of radical social reform outside. The social maximalism of the moment remained completely alien to him. The social position of each person, not accidental, but providential, was considered as imposing its own special duties. Hence it should not seem strange that in the apostolic epistles (especially in St. Paul) so often advice is given to slaves to patiently endure their bitter lot and to fulfill their duties conscientiously, and similar admonitions are given to masters. The latter, moreover, are not exhorted immediately to abandon their position and disband their slaves, but these are warned against using the unity of religion as a means to improve their position, for “piety is not for profit.” We find the same position of the question in the post-apostolic age among the apostolic men (the teaching of the 12 apostles, the letter of Barnabas, Ignatius the God-Bearer). And it is remarkable that early Christianity, which included so many slaves, so that it is not without reason that one can speak of its “proletarian” or, more precisely, slavish character, remained completely alien to the features of the social revolutionary movement, into the mainstream of which it was so easy for it to fall. Nevertheless, Christianity, of course, had a huge impact on improving the situation of slaves. After all, naturally, if a slave and an owner met on religious grounds as completely equals, this brotherhood in Christ could not but affect their mutual relations, the softening of morals, the restrained and attentive, humane attitude towards each other, which the apostles and apostolic men call for. The best illustration of how this was and could be is the message of St. Paul to a certain wealthy Colossian Christian Philemon, with whom the apostle was close. Paul. Philemon's slave Anisim escaped, whom the ap. Paul “gave birth in his chains” during the Roman imprisonment, and sends his master with a request to accept him “as his own heart,” “not as a slave, but higher than a slave, a beloved brother.” “Rest my heart in the Lord,” the apostle prays and expresses confidence that “you will do more than I say.” This genre picture, a touching example of apostolic love and care, best demonstrates how powerfully Christianity was supposed to influence the mutual relations of slaves and masters, removing their severity from them. Although the church did not make the liberation of slaves a universal duty, it considered it a commendable matter 203. And sometimes she did this from the community treasury, however, as an exception (Ignatius the God-Bearer, in his letter to Polycarp, warns slaves: “Let them not seek to obtain freedom at the common expense, lest they become slaves of passion”). Regarding property and wealth, early Christianity was guided by the same motives. Striving for a general redistribution and equalization of property was contrary to the eschatological mood of early Christianity, for this would have tied attention too closely to the land and would even have implied such attachment. Differences in property and attitudes towards it were therefore looked at exclusively from the point of view of personal morality. Wide and multifaceted, although little systematic, charity was a natural expression of mutual love. In some cases (as in the Jerusalem community) this took the form of more or less complete communion of property, unity of the treasury in the hands of the apostles and deacons, in other cases - assistance to the poorest and voluntary collections, which the apostle so touchingly cares about in his epistles. Paul. If the poor were encouraged to endure their lot patiently, for the ideal of voluntary poverty and its generally high value were alive in early Christianity, then the rich are constantly invited to share their wealth, to look at it as an opportunity to help others. “Do not turn away from the needy, but have fellowship with your brother in everything,” we read in the “Teaching of the 12 Apostles,” “and do not call anything your property, for if you are partakers in imperishable things, much more in perishable things.” However, these socialist-sounding judgments in reality do not have a socialist character at all; they contain only exhortations addressed to personal conscience regarding the correct use of wealth, but not advice to replace the institution of private property with a socialist institution 204. In early Christianity there are even the beginnings of social policy (finding a job), but in general the question of wealth and poverty was not raised here except within the framework of personal charity. And therefore, talk about “early Christian communism” (for example, Kautsky) is based on a misunderstanding 205. VIII. Early Christianity and dogmas. Was there a developed, complete dogma in early Christianity in the sense of a definite doctrine, consisting of clearly formulated and logically interconnected dogmatic provisions and formulas? Was there a theological science, a dogmatic theology? The scientific formulation of the question of the “history of dogmas” constitutes the greatest merit of church historical science of the 19th century, which, in the person of numerous researchers of different schools, shed a lot of light in this area (however, as most often happens in historical science, it raised more problems than received answers). If at the same time scientifically established facts received a kind of “Tübingen”, “Richlian” and so on. coverage, then the reason for this is not only in the story itself, but also in the way of its interpretation and evaluation, determined by philosophical and religious, even confessional prerequisites. Be that as it may, what is beyond dispute is the basic fact that there was no theologically developed dogma that could be formulated in the creed and in the catechism. Sharp logical edges, sharpened definitions, thought out and worked out to the last iota of religious and philosophical thought, began to be sought later. This was the work of a number of generations of theologians, starting with Origen, continuing during the era of the Ecumenical Councils and, according to our understanding, continuing after them and having to continue until the end of history. Early Christian theologians, in their attempts to give a rational, more or less accurate theological formulation of the basic dogma of Christianity about the God-manhood of Jesus Christ, not only fell into disagreement among themselves, but sometimes also into contradiction with the later dogmatic definition of the church. Review with an impartial eye what is available on Christological issues from Justin, Tertullian, Irenaeus and other lesser apologists, and you will see how overwhelming the Christological problem was for their theological thought. As one German researcher noted, “this helplessness” of the still “wrong steps” of ancient Christianity in the field of philosophical thought contains something “touching” 206. And if this has to be stated even in relation to a later era, the more powerful this judgment is in relation to an earlier one: neither the New Testament nor the early Christian writings deal at all with rational theology, they do not philosophize, but establish religious facts and events, evangelize, proclaim revelation as “God’s power and God’s wisdom,” without caring to give it philosophical processing and an adaptive form. And, however, from this it is by no means possible to conclude that early Christianity was adogmatic, alien to dogmas in its very essence, as modern Protestant scientists and other moralizing simplifications and correctors of Christianity are inclined to think. In a certain sense, Christianity in the first times of its existence was no less dogmatic than it later became in the era of ecumenical councils, and it was never only morality. All those dogmas or self-definitions that the church later explicitly accepted, implicite 207, in grain, were evident in the earliest Christianity, starting from that world day when the sermon of the apostle was first heard in Jerusalem. Peter: “God raised Jesus, breaking the bonds of death, because it was impossible for it to hold Him”; “He, having been exalted by the right hand of God, and having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, poured out what you now see and hear”; “God made this Jesus, whom you crucified, Lord and Christ” (Acts II, 24, 33, 36). In order to understand this, you just need to remember what dogma is and what it is based on; Many anti-dogmatic prejudices rest on a misunderstanding of this (however, not without the fault of not only opponents, but also other defenders of dogmas). Dogma is a reflected, living religious experience expressed in logical or philosophical concepts, a fact of religious experience or their totality, the content of a living, not only theoretical, but also practically experienced faith. This faith, strictly speaking, relies only on itself; it accepts its truths not as proven, but as revealed - believed and experienced. Religious experiences (like any other experience, for that matter) are irrational and immediate, to a certain extent they are even inexpressible in words except symbolically; They do not go under the anatomical knife alive; rationalizing reflection comes only later. A series of exceptional and original experiences associated with a series of believed positions and ideas is a new revelation, this is what a new religion primarily represents, regardless of how the reflective observer relates to it, that is, whether he sees in it an illusion, a collective hallucination, or whether he himself shares this belief. In this sense, dogmatic theology is, more precisely, should be an experimental science, based on the data of experienced religious consciousness and analyzing them philosophically (just like aesthetics, in this sense, can only be an experimental science based on the experience of beauty, because outside of it there is no object). So, if early Christianity was adogmatic in the sense of the absence of an elaborate formulation of dogmas and religious philosophy, then it was vitally determined by dogmas as experimental truths. It was even more dogmatic than the later era of dogmatic development, since it was more religious and, therefore, more alive, more fully, more directly perceived the vital force of all the dogmas of Christianity. And if we wanted to check this position and compare the main features of the religious life of early Christianity and the dogmas established later at the 7 ecumenical councils or formulated at least in our Nicene-Constantinople Creed, we will be convinced that they add absolutely nothing to the religious fullness of the experiences of early Christianity, although they significantly enrich the consciousness of Christianity on the part of it distinctness and clarity. For the preaching of early Christianity was a preaching about Christ crucified and risen, Savior and Redeemer, God and man, the Coming Judge and Resurrector. And those who believed in the Son were thereby led to faith in the Father, Creator and Almighty, whose will the Son did. And it was natural to believe in the Holy Spirit, the promised Comforter, whose gifts were abundantly poured out on those who believed and were directly felt by them. It is natural, therefore, that the completely super-rational dogma of the trinity of the One God, which philosophy is only trying to adapt to itself and make the most not unthinkable, appears at the very beginning of the Christian gospel: “Go and teach all languages, baptizing them in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.” Early Christianity did not need to reflect much in order to develop a doctrine about the sacraments, about charisms, about the church and about church catholicity. After all, it is enough to take a quick glance at how the life of the early Christians developed to see to what extent the church and the need for church unity were a fact for them, and not a problem. Therefore, dogmatic formulations represented only an inventory of what was available. IX. Early Christianity in relation to hierarchy and cult. Early Christianity is sometimes portrayed not only as adogmatic, but also anarchic, that is, devoid of that hierarchical organization that was undoubtedly established already in the 2nd century. Without delving into this controversial and difficult issue, 208 which has the most acute significance for the Protestant-Catholic discord, but in essence is not at all so burning, we can state that, indeed, early Christianity apparently did not have that developed organization of the clergy with a bishop at the head, which later distinguishes the church. The abundance of spiritual gifts in the primal church, apparently, did not require, and perhaps did not allow, a strictly regulated clergy based entirely on the idea of ​​charismatic succession. The episcopate, apparently, had a slightly different, more official purpose than it had already received since the 2nd century (Sohm, Harnack). The “Teaching of the 12 Apostles” speaks of three categories of charismatics: apostles (and this concept expands in scope to include professional preachers in general), prophets and teachers, along with the secular office of bishops and presbyters, and, apparently, the difference between zhrearshrog and vscbrspoi 209 then had no charismatic meaning, but was based on the duration of membership in the community and partly age. However, there is no doubt that from the very beginning, in accordance with its essence, as one German scientist aptly put it, 210 the church organization became neither aristocratic nor democratic, but charismatic. And the natural development of the charismatic organization soon, already in the 2nd century, led to the identification of a clergy vested with special, priestly powers based on the charismatic succession of ordination. What has been said regarding the organization of the clergy should also be applied to the order of worship, which, naturally, could not immediately acquire a general uniform character. This was prevented at that time by the intensity of religious enthusiasm, which found expression in unusual manifestations; Our attention is stopped, for example, by the so-called glossolalia, that is, the utterance in a state of ecstasy of words and phrases of mysterious content that is not always understandable to the person himself, which was then specifically interpreted by these persons themselves or by others who had the gift of interpretation. The abuse of these ecstatic speeches sometimes led to confusion, which the apostle warns against. Paul to his Corinthian community (I Cor. XIV). Along with glossolalia, which was incomprehensible without interpretation, “prophecies” were common, understandable to everyone. Then the service included teachings, extemporaneous prayers, and “psalms.” To get a picture of free and inspired worship, rich in spiritual gifts, it is enough to re-read chapters 12–14 last. to the Corinthians. Among other gifts, the gifts of healings, miracles, and discerning of spirits are mentioned here. No matter how we now relate to the issue of miracles and healings, we cannot erase or weaken the fact that early Christianity lived in an atmosphere of miracles, and even St. Irenaeus of Lyons (mid-2nd century) speaks of miracles, including the resurrection of the dead, performed by Christians. However, we should not forget, even with the fullest faith in the gifts of miracles, that the concept of the miraculous was then determined by completely different, not so much natural science as religious criteria, and in this regard it is much more correct than now, so that, for example, the natural healing of a patient, accomplished with prayer, was also apparently considered a miracle. Every tangible action of God's will was considered a miracle, no matter how it manifested itself. The atmosphere of the miraculous characterizes this entire era, “miracles” (more precisely, “signs”) were performed by heretics, for example, Gnostics (see the same St. Irenaeus of Lyons), and pagan magicians, and Christian writers do not reject this at all, but only explain these miracles by demonic power. Direct experience convinced us that after baptism all Christians become to a greater or lesser extent charismatics, receive the Spirit to a tangible extent, and become pneumatics 211. And this inanimateness, this religious inspiration was vigorously expressed at prayer meetings, 212 either with improvised doxology, or with ecstatic and sometimes disorderly glossolalia, seductive for outsiders, 213, or with intelligible prophecy for everyone. Early Christianity knew two types of prayer meetings - some accessible to the uninitiated, of a prayerful and teaching nature, and others only for the baptized (or “faithful”), Eucharistic meetings. The latter, according to disciplina arcani 214, remained secret, which explains the possibility of the appearance of absurd fables spread by pagans regarding communion with the blood of a murdered child and the sin of death, with which apologists have to deal so much. Only in Justin (around the second half of the 2nd century) do we find a description of the Eucharist (Apol. 65 – 67) and Tertullian, among the differences between heretics, points out that among them “it is not known who is the catechumen and who is the believer.” As far as can be judged from the First Epistle to the Corinthians and the “Teaching of the 12 Apostles,” the Eucharist was initially celebrated in conjunction with a common dinner, the supper of love (agape), and only around the middle of the 2nd century did these two separate acts begin to separate 215. In the original usage of words, the expressions “Eucharist, agape, breaking of bread” are used without precise distinction. Ancient Christian writing, unfortunately, has preserved few ancient Christian prayers for us. In addition to the Lord's Prayer, which was in general use (the "Teaching of the 12 Apostles" prescribes repeating it three times a day), and those passages from the New Testament books, for which it is easy to assume their early liturgical use 216, the texts of the most ancient prayers have been preserved for us by the letter of I Clement to the Corinthians, which lifts the edge of the veil over how the Roman community prayed around the end of the 1st century, and from the beginning of the 2nd century, "Teaching The 12 Apostles" preserved for us the Eucharistic prayers, which were probably in wide use. These prayers represent the most precious pearl of ancient Christian writing in their majestic simplicity and sublimity. Perhaps their text will allow the sensitive soul, better than all the characteristics, to feel the mystery of early Christianity, which was so jealously guarded from the uninitiated, to breathe it with a prayerful atmosphere 217. If we add to this a few more fragments of the dying prayers of the martyrs, preserved for us by the “acts of martyrdom” (and among them in the first place is the prayer of St. Polycarp), then we will exhaust the entire meager supply of surviving written evidence about the prayer life of this era, the inspiration of which has no equal in history. The general content of Christian prayers to St. Justin in his Apology defines it as thanksgiving “for what we have been created, for all the means to our well-being, for various kinds of works, for the changes of times” and “petition that we may be resurrected to incorruption according to our faith in him” (I Apol. 13). X. Christianity and morality. – Joy in early Christianity. Christianity did not come into the world with a new theoretical teaching - philosophers preached enough of them! - but with the beginnings of a new life. And his victorious power could and should have been reflected precisely in the ability to survive, to bring to new life the old, decaying society. If it had not shown and did not manifest this power, it would have shown itself to be a human matter, albeit a lofty one, but it - contrary to all natural calculations - turned out to be a renewing, life-giving and constructive principle 218. The followers of the new teaching, the “disciples,” felt themselves to be “a new creation,” “the chosen people,” “the people of God,” “chosen,” and began to call themselves, in contrast to the world around them, “servants of God,” “saints,” “brothers,” “faithful,” “Church of God” 219 . In Antioch the name “Christians” appears for the first time (Acts Apostle XI, 26), and the more the internal unity of the Christian communities grew, the more the pagan world felt their alienation and repulsion from them, and a blind popular hatred of Christians was created, ready to believe any legend, blame them with any guilt. In the depths of the old world, a new world was created, not a new school, but new people. “If there are those who do not live as Christ taught,” says St. in his Apology. Justin, - those, let it be known, are not Christians, although they pronounce the teachings of Christ with their tongues” (I Apol., 17). “I can show you many of ours who changed from being arrogant and ferocious, having been defeated either by seeing in their companions a wonderful tolerance of insults, or by learning from experience the morals of those people with whom they came into contact on business.” A careful study of the details relating to the life of the early Christian communities, according to the monuments of early Christian writing and New Testament books (especially the apostolic epistles), no longer allows us to support a simplified or, better yet, highly stylized image of the life of the early Christian communities as an impeccable, untainted embodiment of the ideal of Christianity. Historical concretization 220 clothed them in flesh and blood and thereby deprived them of that abstract, bloodless holiness, the aura of which surrounded them. If we collect impressions from all the reproaches, warnings, denunciations that we find here, we must admit that moral height was not given to them for nothing, not without a struggle with themselves and with the world, and not without defeats in this struggle. And yet this image, against the rather dark historical background against which it appears and from which it should not be torn away, still remains very bright and is a living testimony to the power and influence of Christianity. The distance between the ideal and reality remained here, as in all earthly affairs, and yet both the height of the ideal and the height of life that corresponded to it remain exceptional. More than one researcher (Geffken, Wendland) has noted that among apologists, for all their philosophical helplessness and lack of independence, the places where they - sometimes in exaggeratedly bright colors - paint the life of Christians and its norms are marked by absolutely exceptional freshness and spontaneity, and this constitutes their strongest side 221. “We represent wisdom,” says the Roman apologist Minucius Felix in the dialogue “Octavius,” “not in outward appearance, but in our soul; We do not speak loftily, but we live like this, we boast that we have achieved what those philosophers sought with all their effort and could not find.” These words express, perhaps, the main motive of Christian apologetics, to the extent that it is based not on abstract considerations, but on practical life. “You forbid adultery, but commit it, and we only know our wives; you punish for crimes committed, but for us it’s a sin to even think about them; you are afraid of third-party witnesses, and we are even afraid of our own conscience, without which we cannot exist. Finally, the prisons are overcrowded with yours, and there is not a single Christian there, except one convicted for his religion or an apostate” (XXXV). What confidence in the strength of one’s position one had to have in order to pose such a challenge to a hostile world, and how low and deep have we now fallen in comparison with the bright times of the beginning of Christianity! One could also cite a long series of evidence concerning the strictness of morals and the purity of relations between the sexes, the height of understanding of marriage 222. Against the background of extreme sexual promiscuity, the purity of Christian life stood out very sharply. Already in the apostolic and post-apostolic centuries, ascetics appeared and virginity was highly valued (and, by the way, the quickly degenerated but interesting institution of cohabitation between ascetics of different sexes arose). Without intending to dwell in more detail on what could be called the problem of sex and sexual love in early Christianity, we will only note the unique and specifically Christian motive of asceticism. This is not a denial of the flesh, as with the Gnostics and Eastern ascetics, but its highest affirmation, recognition of the potential holiness of the flesh, in which asceticism is the path to its sanctification. For a Christian, the flesh is the church of God, the body of Christ; it is not subject to destruction, but to transformation 223. In Athenagoras, a Hellenic by birth and upbringing, we encounter, among other things, the view that sodomy and debauchery in general “offends the most beautiful and most graceful bodies and dishonors the beauty created by God, for beauty on earth does not occur by itself, but is sent by order and according to the thought of God” (Pros., 34). Before the purity of the life of Christians, before their mutual love, about which so much evidence is scattered among apologists, and before their courage, the pagans also stop with bewildered respect, with all their contempt and hostility towards the Jewish sect. Thus, the famous philosopher Epictetus notes the fearlessness of Christians in the face of the threats of tyrants. The famous physician Galen (mid-2nd century), speaking about Christians, wants to give them high praise, recognizing that Christians act “like true philosophers” 224. And even the satirist Lucian, who ridiculed both the Stoics and Christians in his Peregrinus, is forced to admit the high qualities of the latter 225. To extort such recognitions and assessments from hostile and prejudiced persons (Celsus gives the best idea of ​​the strength, character and motives of this prejudice) 226 meant a lot. We would miss a very significant line in this cursory and incomplete description of early Christian sentiments if we did not mention religious joy, this greatest gift of God that is given to people. Christians felt God, and the risen Christ was their life. And isn’t feeling God the highest joy, “perfect joy”? Look into the faces of St., shining with this unearthly joy. Seraphim of Sarov, who greets all the rejoicing with the greeting: “Christ is Risen!”, Francis of Assisi, or even lesser ones, and in the reflection of their joy, which will shine in your dark, gloomy, “embarrassed by the malice of the soul-evil world” (in the words of the funeral canon) soul, you will feel this joy of the early Christians. Collect in your soul the memories of short and fleeting moments of religious enlightenment, and your ear will open, perhaps, to this hymn of religious joy, which rings in the book of the Acts of the Apostles 227. The world is redeemed, Christ became incarnate, suffered and rose again. Behind the motionless darkness of the night, the fiery rays of resurrection and transfiguration began to appear. What for later Christian ascetics was only the fruit of their long and severe struggle, here was a gift of grace, as a pledge and a firstfruits. And whoever does not see and feel this in early Christianity, who does not hear here this victorious and jubilant hymn: “Christ is Risen!”, he will not understand why Christianity won, with what faith it conquered: Christ is risen, He is here, nearby, He allows Himself to be touched, He allows Himself to be tasted, and from Him the heart burns with love. Is it possible now to tell in disobedient and dead words what was experienced at the Eucharistic suppers, when the obedient word of the participants themselves became exhausted and stormy glossolalia erupted like a waterfall, like poetry. Again, in order to come closer to understanding this, one should turn to the descriptions of religious experiences among Christian mystics and ascetics, to their hints about what living and genuine communion with God is... I believe that it is most correct to reveal this most intimate side, the holy of holies, the secret of early Christianity, through the works of men of at least no less religious experience: St. Macarius of Egypt, Isaac the Syrian, Simeon the New Theologian, from such witnesses we can more accurately learn a living understanding of the living early Christianity, its “essence,” than from Harnack and other scientists from whom we learn its external history. Based on their experience, one can understand the commandment given to the Thessalonian community by St. Paul: “Rejoice always. Pray without ceasing. Give thanks in everything” (I Thess. V, 16 – 18). “However, brethren, rejoice, be improved, be comforted” (II Cor. XIII, 11), he ends his letter to the Corinthians. And the main definition made by Paul says that “The kingdom of God is not food and drink, but truth, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit” (Rom. XIV, 17) 228. By pointing out the full significance of joy in early Christianity and Christianity in general, I hope I will not cause any misunderstanding in the sense that this diminishes the significance of repentance, sorrow for sins, and in general the hardships of the path along which a Christian ascends to heights. But there, on high, is God, and God is love, and His kingdom is joy. And the struggle with the world and the desire for God is a struggle with its tragic ulcerations, with its sorrow, victory over the world is a breakthrough to joy, not private, objectified, isolated, but universal, “the joy of the Holy Spirit.” And from struggle, defeats and victories, at least short-term, incomplete, inconclusive, but cutting through the darkness with the rays of their lightning, religious life is made up. XI. Early Christianity and martyrdom. It is impossible, when speaking about the primacy of Christianity, to go through martyrdom in silence, for the primacy church is a martyr’s church. Although the persecution of Christians did not have a general and systematic character (according to some, 229), the Roman authorities simply overlooked and missed Christianity, grasping at it when it was already too late and when more systematic persecution could not help), however, Christians were completely powerless and defenseless and surrendered to torture and execution, according to apologists, often for one name. Confessing oneself as a Christian and refusing to sacrifice to the image of the emperor were sufficient reasons to send him to execution for “atheism and anarchy.” And in the insufficient and not always accurate information that we have in the so-called acts of martyrdom (Acta martyrii), we learn how the nature of Christianity was manifested in this case. Of course, it is impossible at present to place Christianity on the exclusive plus of the very presence of martyrs in its midst. As Boissier rightly noted, 230 the church lost the right to this claim after it not only had martyrs itself, but also made others into them. In addition, the sacrifice of life because of convictions or for the sake of other people, although not common, is in any case a widespread phenomenon both in the pre-Christian and non-Christian world at different times: we see enough examples of political martyrdom, moreover, without consciously religious motives, and every war, even the last one, gives us many examples of freely sacrificing one’s life for others, and on both sides. Not the actual fact of martyrdom, but its psychology interests us here. In this regard, early Christianity has its own specific characteristics arising from its properties. For in his living faith, death is defeated not by a convulsive effort of human will aimed at suppressing the natural fear of death, but with all mystical reality. The mood of reconciliation and forgiveness, prayer for enemies and for those who kill, which is characteristic only of early Christianity, is well known. In the foreground stands the figure of the first martyr Deacon Stephen, bathed in heavenly light. Before execution, he sees the open sky, the glory of God and Christ; stoned, he prays: “Lord, accept my spirit!” and dies with a prayer on his lips: “Lord! Do not impute this sin to them.” In this story, piously transmitted and preserved orally before it was written down, the idea of ​​the early Christian community was preserved about how it was typical for Christian martyrs to die, as their first and best representative, who saw Christ before his death, died. In more definite and concrete outlines another, later, image of the Christian martyr, St. Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, nicknamed the God-Bearer. We have a vivid self-portrait of him in his messages, which are a pearl of ancient Christian writing. A Syrian by origin and temperament, Ignatius, who stood in close proximity to the apostolic men (for example, St. Polycarp, a disciple of John the Theologian, and perhaps to the apostles), he ruled the Church of Antioch for 40 years. When Emperor Trajan decided to eradicate Christianity and began persecution, Ignatius, while he was in Antioch, came to him in order to either avert the persecution or be awarded martyrdom himself. As a result, the emperor ordered Ignatius to be taken in chains to Rome and there to be devoured to wild animals. The path of St. Ignatius, led by 10 warriors, whom he calls “leopards for their cruel treatment, who only become more evil from the benefits shown to them,” was, as it were, his apotheosis during his lifetime. When he was passing through Asia Minor, he was met in Smyrna by Bishop. Polycarp and a deputation from the churches of Asia Minor, through their bishops, presbyters and deacons, testified to their love for the prisoner and asked for his instructions and blessings. We have these instructions in the form of pastoral letters of the bishop led to the beasts, in which he gave a wonderful expression of his love and care for the flock of Christ. But what is most interesting for us here is his message to the Roman community, regarding which he received information that it was striving to free him from martyrdom. He asks her not to deprive him of his martyr's crown and in this request he pours out his soul with all his passion 231. Next to Ignatius, history has preserved for us the spiritual image of another martyr, St. Polycarp Bishop of Smyrna, "teacher of Asia, father of Christians", burned in 166. This is less expansive and not so sanguine, but in the simplicity of its greatness no less expressive image 232. It would be possible to cite a number of similar features from the narrative about Christian martyrs and martyrs, but the tone would be general. Courageous and believing, they died with joyful hope; martyrdom was for them the desired apotheosis, the surest path to immortality. Here again the main eschatological feature of Christianity is evident, its uncontrollable and passionate impulse towards another world. Read Tertullian’s “Epistle to the Martyrs” (217) and see with what motives he exhorts courage and patience: “Is your prison dark? The world is even more covered with thick darkness, weakening the mind. Are you in chains? The world wears the heaviest chains that wear down the soul. Is your home contagious? The world is full of harmful fumes, incomparably unbearable: these are the temptations and debaucheries of voluptuousness. Are you compared to criminals? The world contains more guilty people, I mean, the entire human race... What a happy battle you have to fight! God will be your rewarder and the Holy Spirit your guide. Your laurels will be an immortal crown.” Victorious tones of triumph and joy break through where they are most difficult to expect - and it is not surprising if the history of the persecution of Christians, of course, along with cases of weakness, all too natural and understandable, also knows examples of defiant behavior on the part of Christians, the search for martyrdom, with which local churches sometimes even had to fight 233 . XII. What is the secret of early Christianity? Looking over in your mind the main features of early Christianity, you involuntarily ask yourself: what is the secret of early Christianity, what is its “victory that conquered the world,” what is the strength of the success of the early Christian mission? Based on what has been said so far, it is still possible, if not to answer, then at least to approach the answer to this question, which has always been and continues to be equally a mystery for the historian and a problem for the religious thinker. And first of all, it should not be denied at all that there was a whole series of natural conditions, political, cultural and economic, that facilitated the spread of Christianity. But the point, of course, is not only them, for neither one of them individually, nor all of them together were capable of giving birth to Christianity, of creating this new historical force. And this power did not rely on any instruments of earthly influence and power - we saw how unarmed and defenseless in the worldly sense early Christianity was, how ahistorically it reasoned and felt, considering for itself all external self-determinations in a certain sense unimportant, resolving the most intricate questions of life with some kind of divine, but also - I will not stop admitting it - childishly naive simplicity, half noticing them and not delving into them. For a non-religious observer it is easy to mistake this simplicity for elementaryness, lack of culture, and the way for the newest deniers in this regard was already paved by the ancient critics of Christianity, the same Celsus or Lucian. We think that in order to understand what early Christianity was strong about, and therefore for a correct scientific understanding of its history, Detailforschung 234 any kind of conscientiousness is not enough, for all this will only be a conscientious vivisection that does not lead to knowledge of a living organism; Religious intuition is also necessary, based not only on personal experience, but mainly on the historical experience of all Christianity in its greatest religious representatives. And from this side, between early Christianity and living Christianity of all times and peoples, not only is there no opposition, but there is inevitably an identity, for He who is “the way, the truth and the life” for Christianity is identical, faithful and unchangeable. What was there in early Christianity that was not preserved and could not be conveyed in its writings, that is only hinted at and guessed from its short and chastely restrained language, alien to literary and rhetorical falsehood? This is that the first Christians had a genuine, direct experience of the Divine, they felt themselves in real and direct communion with Christ, they burned with the joy of worshiping the Risen One... I stop, because I feel like I am approaching here the border of what can be expressed in words and what is permissible to touch on in literature. To lift the veil and bring closer to yourself what is usually so far from us, look carefully at the faces of those who were in living communication with heaven, in whom you felt this incomprehensible power. In their brief, shy and restrained descriptions of what they experienced, in their religious experience, you will recognize the power of early Christianity. And even leaving these heights illuminated by heavenly light, to which only the chosen ones rise, and turning to religious everyday life, it is enough to look around you more carefully to see here, although weak, torn, but still the same spots of light. Who has not observed, somewhere in a dark corner of a church or even in the diversity of everyday life, living faith and devotion to God in simplicity, humility and tears? And it will not be insolence if even each of us, religiously powerless, turning to the meager experience of our lives, highlights in it those bright moments when, for him, faith was not a theoretical postulate, but a living reality, when the heart trembled and burned with the feeling of God. And all this - great and small, strong and weak, holy and sinful, since it is turned to heaven - is one and the same, differs quantitatively, not qualitatively. And this is what early Christianity was. There is no opposition, no gap, no qualitative difference here, and it cannot be allowed if one seriously believes that the source of light is one, no matter how diverse and different its refractions and reflections may be. How deep and how simple is this essence of early Christianity! Modern Protestant historians speak with fair emphasis about the “simplicity and deepening” of religion that distinguishes it (although they themselves, due to their biased anti-dogmatism, take this simplification further than it should). It is thanks to this simplicity that the Gospel speaks about this simplicity and at the same time universality, all-humanity: “Truly I say to you, whoever does not receive the kingdom of God like a child will not enter into it” (Mr. 10:15; Matt. 18:3; Luke 18:17). These words, like the entire preaching of the Gospel, are addressed to everyone, apart from all random empirical differences: to learned and unlearned, young and old, rich and poor, smart and stupid. All of them must feel in the depths of their hearts that they are simple, trusting children if they want to come to Heavenly Father. XIII. Early Christianity and asceticism. The early Christians fixed their gaze on the sky and paid little attention to the earth. Is this asceticism? In what sense can we talk about the asceticism of early Christianity, as of all living Christianity in general? The question is posed here about asceticism not as the beginning of ethics (for in this sense it seems to me completely irreducible from Christian, and indeed from any serious ethics in general, from Plato to Kant), but as about the beginning of metaphysics, about the nature of the worldview. Yes, in a certain sense, early Christianity was undoubtedly ascetic. The practical consequence of early Christian eschatology was an ascetic weakening of interest in the affairs of this world, which, to use a vulgar comparison, seemed like a station with a short stop. However, this acuteness of eschatological expectations is only a special historical form of that feeling of fragility and, most importantly, incompleteness of the current state of the world as a becoming one, which is inherent in the very essence of the Christian religion, and cannot be eliminated from it. God, not as a pantheistic mind or beauty diffused in nature, not the impersonal natura sive Deus 235 of Spinoza, but a living personal God, the Creator, the God of religion, and not just philosophy, science or art, is revealed to us only in opposition to the world and in the struggle with it. An autonomous, self-contained, self-sufficient world is godless, atheism is its natural state. This does not mean, of course, that there is no God in the world and the world would not reflect Him on itself as His creation - we are far from this absurdity and blasphemy - but the world is autonomous, it is given an independent, self-legitimate, so to speak, natural-scientific existence, which, according to the famous expression of Laplace, does not need the hypothesis of God, and one cannot recognize a personal God in it unless one comes to Him by breaking through the world (transcensus) the mystical, direct path of religion, an act of boldness of faith. Only then does the world come to life, its dead mask is removed, the laws of nature become the thoughts of the Creator, the beauty of the world His robe, history His living revelation. To rise above the world, to break through the world, to seek the miracle of faith - for every living faith is wonderful as unlawful, free - this is essentially required by every theistic religion, and this ascetic feat is required by Christianity. There is no other way to God and to Christ than through inner renunciation of the world, through an inner and completely intimate act of self-determination in love: to love Christ more than all that is dearest. And the stern, terrifying word of the meek and loving Savior inexorably sounds: “If anyone comes to Me and does not hate his father and mother, and wife, and children, and brothers and sisters, and indeed his own life, he cannot be My disciple” (Luke 14:26). Love for the world is enmity against God - “do not love the world, nor the things in the world” (I John 2:15), this, of course, cannot be scraped out of Christianity by any interpretation. As long as the world goes through the present stage of its state, the ongoing but not completed incarnation and transfiguration, while it remains, although divine in purpose, but self-willed and self-legitimate in existence, this world tragedy introduces an inevitable gap between man striving for God and the world, and to that extent asceticism is founded. This tragedy is objective, cosmic, associated with the sinful state of the fallen world, in which God is not immanent to the world, does not appear as “all things in all,” but is transcendental and in this sense is opposite to the world. And this state of the world creates religious antinomy in the soul of a religious person, tearing it apart in ascetic confrontation with the world, for the sake of the highest religious love for it. The meaning and basis of asceticism in early Christianity, as in the subsequent history of Christianity, at the highest points of its religious mood, as in various manifestations of human creativity, is the same. Not to merge with the world completely, to the point of indifference, to always carry a sense of distance in your heart, to walk not on the earth, but above the earth, no matter how close to it, but always above it - this is what Christianity demands. And this objective tragedy of the world necessarily becomes the tragedy of personal life. And this latter, no matter how comfortable, no matter how prosperous, in addition to the dull and continuous tragic discord, contains one basic disharmony - the death of loved ones, loved ones and personal death, external incompleteness and internal infinity of life, this fatal ellipsis. But this same motive can at the same time be harmonizing if it is colored eschatologically: beyond the grave awaits the resolution of the tragedy, death is followed by resurrection, personal and world, new life, eternal life. It can be affirmed positively that when the early Christian eschatology turned pale and the feeling of immediate expectation of a world cataclysm became dulled - and it became dulled from the end of the 2nd century throughout Christianity, becoming aggravated only in individual individuals, or in exceptional moments of history - then the place of eschatology in the spiritual economy of personal life began to be played by the idea of personal death, inevitable and always unexpected. “Memory of the hour of death” in ascetic literature plays the same role as eschatology in early Christianity, and vice versa, the psychology of atheism drives nothing so much as the thought of the inevitable end and the inevitable - like it or not - transcensus 236 to an unknown, new state. Therefore, those who do not like to think about it began to call Christianity the religion of death. So, in the sense of a feeling of inner alienation from the world and the impossibility of completely merging with it without losing one’s religious personality, early Christianity was ascetic. It saw the sky too clearly, which in contrast highlighted all the shadows, gaps, and crevices of the world more sharply. Early Christianity was ascetic, like Christianity in general. And yet, what is least consistent with this asceticism is the widespread, vulgar idea of ​​it as a gloomy, evil attitude towards the world or as continuous sadness. The means and the path are taken for the end, a harsh feat is considered an end in itself, repentance, in which a person is born spiritually and comes to Christ (“Repent, for the kingdom of God is at hand”), makes one forget about the joy of forgiveness and adoption. And finally, as for the world: the soulless desert and the terrible mechanism in which the dead wheels of the universe rotate are considered more joyful than the cosmos, proclaiming the glory of God. The impulse towards God requires renunciation of the world, but it is rewarded in abundance. The world comes to life, becomes beauty, wisdom, a work of art 237. This sky is a silent abyss in which dead worlds revolve, oh, how scary it is with its dead infinity, but how beautiful it is, close to us, if we see the Throne of the Creator in it. Truly the joy of the world is given only by religion with its asceticism; it brings us closer to the world, connects us to the heart of the world. One could easily confirm with evidence from ancient Christian writing how responsive the soul of the early Christians was to the beauty of this world. And their indifference or even a hostile and suspicious feeling towards ancient art, inextricably linked with the pagan cult, has its own historical reasons, briefly indicated above, and cannot be traced to religious grounds. A historical paradox full of the deepest meaning and at the same time the apotheosis of ancient Christian asceticism is the victory of early Christianity over the world. It was only because it felt and knew the sky so strongly that it conquered the earth. And not only in this case, but always in history, only the rise above reality, the ascetic rejection of the lower reality for the triumph of the higher, self-denial for the sake of the ideal gave victory in history, and not immersion headlong in the muddy waves of life. Asceticism wins by renunciation - this is the law of life. Christianity could not have been born without opposing itself to the whole world, to this entire complex culture, to the pagan state, to all past and future centuries, without this consciousness of its super-worldliness, without this ascetic feat: to reject the soul in order to save it, to condemn the world in order to breathe into it new life, new strength... XIV. The normative meaning of early Christianity. It is not out of idle, even scientific, curiosity that we fall to the sacred soil of early Christianity, on which the feet of the apostles walked. No, in it we want to know and understand ourselves, with the light lit from the lamp that glowed in the catacombs, to illuminate the darkness of our current state. We need not study, but teaching, and after it our time comes to the sources of those waters that centuries of history have so polluted, covered with sand and, if only they could, would have completely fallen asleep. So, what can we now learn from early Christianity? In what ways does it remain an unattainable model and norm for us? What is the normative meaning of early Christianity? Early Christianity was the seed from which the many-branched tree of historical Christianity grew. It is clear that even if only in embryo, in a simple and undeveloped form, it must contain in itself that which is essential for the Christian religion in general. At present, with the complexity of its spiritual culture, we have religious philosophy, religious history and an endlessly growing literature about religion. And we often mistake our desire to have a real living religion or our ideas about it, or, in the absence of such, at least our words about it, for genuine religion, losing the ability to distinguish a counterfeit banknote from a full-fledged coin. And a comparison of early Christianity, with its simplicity, but also great truthfulness, and modern philosophy clearly shows what the difference is between religious philosophy or science, no matter what height they stand, and religion, between a bloodless, abstract theory and a living, immediate fact. At its core, religion is not a theory, but life, the experience of the divine, religious experience; Strictly speaking, this religion cannot be learned by assimilating known ideas; it is taught only by life itself. If there is this grain, that is, religion, there is a trunk around which a tree can grow, but if it is not there, then there is nothing, just dry leaves, noisy, but dead. This personal experience and then the combination of many personal experiences into a collective, church experience is essential for Christianity, only this was the case, but to the highest degree in early Christianity. And in this religious immediacy it is the norm for us, the promised land, the joyful dawn of a new day. But, on the contrary, its historical flesh, especially the external setting of its manifestation, belongs to history, that is, to the changing flow of events, and therefore cannot have normative significance for all times. If we briefly formulate the whole difference that exists here between early Christianity and all historical Christianity, it boils down to the fact that for early Christianity there was no history and there was no historical concern in our current sense, while we feel ourselves in history and drawn into the circle of its tasks. We differ from early Christianity, in addition to everything else, by our historical age. The later hour inevitably differs from the earlier, and even more so the first hour in the history of Christianity. First of all, this difference concerns what can be called the eschatological worldview. It cannot be eliminated from Christianity, just as the idea of ​​an end, the idea of ​​a goal, cannot be eliminated from any rational, purposeful process. Prayer: “Hey, come, Lord!” will not be silent until it is fulfilled. But nineteen centuries of life experience have not passed without a trace. The passive expectation of the end as a sudden world revolution, as a deus ex machina 238, has largely dissolved for us with an active sense of history, a sense of the historical process and only through it the internal maturation of the world towards its intended renewal. If it has faded in brightness and spontaneity (although more than once in history the immediate expectation of the end has been revived with the onset of historical crises, so one German scientist 239 rightly called this feeling the arrow on the dial of history), but it has become more relevant for us. History has become in our worldview like a bridge leading from time to eternity. The absolute, religious meaning of history, its noumenon, whose phenomenal vestment we know, remains unknown to us, we can only guess about it. But the immediate content of history also captivates us with its interests; we feel like workers in the historical field, bearing historical obedience, each in his own furrow. We recognize ourselves as sons of our century, nationality, state, social system, culture. We feel caught up in this powerful flow that carries us, but not without our will and participation. And in this our historically colored sense of well-being differs from the early Christian one. However, for him, eschatology did not obscure the immediate tasks of life. With all its intensity, early Christianity fulfilled its historical task of the initial preaching of Christianity. And this work amazes the historian with its success and energy. The early Christian mission, sealed by the blood of martyrdom, the suffering of confession, and the labors of apostleship, is the greatest historical feat. The early Christians, so ahistorically inclined, did their job in the field of historical work and commanded all future generations to follow their example, each in their own historical turn. “And Jesus, approaching, said to them: “All authority has been given to Me in heaven and on earth. So go and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit and teaching them to observe everything that I have commanded you, and lo, I am with you until the end of the age. Amen.” (Matthew 28: 18 - 20). In this parting commandment of the Lord given to the eleven disciples, to the entire Christian world, the norm of Christian activity in history is indicated. Teaching all peoples the true faith and observing the commandments of Christ, introducing new life and a new spirit into all life - this is the creative task of Christian history, the preaching of the faith, its apologetic defense, which, of course, relates not to one early Christian era, but also to all others, is necessarily accompanied by the revelation of the truths of Christianity by the natural forces of man. to him and to Christ. Human philosophy, science, culture, as if blind in the pre-Christian world, become sighted, receive their logos, revealed in their natural historical development, and also become an instrument of “teaching.” No less comprehensive is the commandment of “observing” the commandments of Christ, for it opens up endless prospects both for the improvement of the individual with his inner world, and for the correction of external human relations, that is, for what we now call political and social progress. Christianity does not provide programs, does not indicate a panacea, but it strongly invests its content in spontaneous, instinctively formed forms of life, creating a new person. A new theme of world history has appeared - the human personality, and all of it can, in a certain sense, be considered as the development of this theme, as the search for an autonomous personality liberated by Christianity for appropriate forms of external life. The problem of a free personality is the axis around which the thought of modern times turns. In relation to this problem, the latest social science, political economy, state science, is only a technique that, based on the study of the laws of social life, resolves the tasks assigned to it, but does not have an independent ideal, which is given by a religious attitude towards the individual. Many are now renouncing Christianity, but none of those renouncing the tree have renounced the fruit that grew on it. Christianity, restoring the ideal dignity of the individual in the consciousness of his sonship with God, also gives the highest norm of communication of these individuals in the ideal of the church, internal unity and brotherhood in Christ in the image of the Trinitarian God, the absolute unity of the three hypostases, the consubstantial and indivisible Trinity, in whose name those who enter the Church are baptized. Thus, the Christian consciousness faces the task of successively working on the historical flesh of humanity in order to transform it in the spirit of Christian sentiments and commandments, while it is destined to grow and mature, until the “fullness of times.” But the way through which Christianity directly influences the world is still the inner man, his heart, his living spirit. He is the creative energy in history, but not the dead elements of nature or the social body. The greatest spiritual danger of our time lies in the enslavement of historical flesh to these elements, in the languageization of the individual, in the immersion of the spirit in the created world with oblivion of the Creator. And against this earthing of man, early Christianity again and again raises its quiet, yet audible voice across the distance of centuries. Like a distant message of good news, it calls up the downcast ones. In the historical stream of the great migration of peoples, ancient civilization with its charms and its powers did not survive, the old flesh of history did not survive, only the new soul of history was preserved - the early Christian church. And this spiritual force, arising in the depths of a religious personality and transforming it in feelings, moods, deeds, transforms the new flesh of history, the historical face of the world. This igniting, purifying and regenerating power of religious fire, the first spark of which is ignited in individual souls, but which then flares up into a world-historical bonfire, is spoken of in the saying of the Lord, preserved for us by tradition: “Whoever is near Me is near the fire,” or, as it is said in the Gospel of Luke: “I came to bring down fire on the earth, and how I would that it should already be kindled” (XII, 49). As epigraphs for the entire book, S. N. Bulgakov chose two quotes from Book VI of the famous work of Augustine Aurelius “On the City of God”: “So, when a person lives according to man, and not according to God, he is like the devil”; “Two different and opposing cities were formed because some live according to man, and others according to God” (Augustine Aurelius. Creations. Part 5 Library of the works of the Holy Fathers and Teachers of the Western Church, published at the Kyiv Theological Academy. Book 14. Kyiv, 1882. P. 7: 8), - and a quote from “The Essence of Christianity” by L. Feuerbach: “Man is God to man” (Feuerbach L. Selected philosophical works. M., 1995. T. II. P. 308). This did not include everything I published during these (1904 - 1910) years, in particular, a number of articles in “Questions of Philosophy and Psychology”, “Questions of Life”, “Moscow Weekly”, in various collections, as well as journalistic articles in newspapers were not included. In this respect, this book is directly adjacent to my previous collection, “From Marxism to Idealism,” St. Petersburg, 1904. Having started out as a pure social activist, but having examined the basis of social ideals, I recognized that this basis is in religion. “Is there Good, is there Truth? In other words, it means: is there a God? (Preface, XVIII). This is the form in which the problem of the public appeared to me here. From this it follows, by the way, how wrong it is to see in the Antichrist, this last and ultimate expression of pantheism and man-theism, an irreligious phenomenon; on the contrary, he only becomes understandable on a religious and mystical plane. The extreme falling away of man from God in the personal man-god is, undoubtedly, a consciously religious act, deeply and soulfully mystical. The Antichrist is not the libre-penseur of enlightenment, he is a mystic to the bottom of his soul, but he does not believe in God, preferring himself to Him, as Vl. Soloviev in “Three Conversations”. Everything is fleeting - Symbol, comparison. The endless goal is within reach. A distinctive feature of Vl.’s church worldview. S. Solovyov is his revaluation of papism, thanks to which he thought of the union of the western and eastern parts of a single universal church in no other way than in the form of recognition of the Roman high priest as the legitimate and infallible head of the Church on the part of the Orthodox East. Perhaps, here Solovyov hides the temptation of Jewish chiliasm, which he did not experience in the usual form of political and social utopianism, although he was not fully conscious of it. On this basis, I completely reject the mystical connection between Orthodoxy and autocracy. To the extent that it exists, it has a church-historical and religious-psychological character. It was created by history and, before our eyes, it is - slowly but surely - being destroyed. This is deeply felt in the teachings of N. F. Fedorov, for all its strangeness. Vl speaks about this perfectly. Soloviev: “No, there will never be and there should never be peace for the human spirit in this world. No, there cannot and should not be such an authority that would replace our reason and conscience and would make free research unnecessary. The Church, like the homeland, like the biblical “wife of youth,” should be for us an internal force of tireless movement towards an eternal goal, and not a pillow of comfort.” (Collected works, VIII, 307). A crime consisting of lese majeste, i.e. insulting a crowned person: king, czar, etc. (lat.). Published in the magazine “Questions of Life” for 1905 and published separately in the publishing house “Free Conscience”, M., 1906. In recent years, some of Feuerbach’s works have appeared in Russian translation, such as: “The Essence of Christianity”, “Thoughts on Death and Immortality”. Even in a special treatise on the history of philosophy of religion, prof. O. Pfleiderer devoted only a few completely colorless pages to Feuerbach. Prof. Otto Pfleiderer. Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie von Spinosa bis auf die Gegenwart. Dritte Ausgabe. Berlin, 1893. S. 447 – 454. Scary to say (lat.). Vorlesungen ü ber das Wesen der Religion, constituting the 8th volume of the old collected works, published by the author himself, p. 6. F. Engels. L. Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen Philosophie, 10 – 11. (Since these lines were written, several Russian translations of this brochure have already been published.) Cf. a similar story by Herzen about the impression made on him by reading “Wesen des Christenthums” (“Past and Thoughts”). Masaryk rightly notes. In our country, N.G. Chernyshevsky, who was the conductor of his influence in Russian society, became a follower of Feuerbach. Lange. Geschichte des Materialismus. 6 Ausg. hrsg. von Cohen, II, 73. This is partly the case with Jodl’s book “L. Feuerbach" (St. Petersburg, 1905). Grunds ä tze der Philosophie der Zukunft (1843). In the second volume of the new edition of Jodl and Bohlin, § 1. Feuerbach quite rightly states that “the periods of humanity differ from each other only in religious changes” (Philosophische Kritiken und Grunds ä tze. Article “Nothwendigkeit einer Reform der Philosophie”, 1841. S. 216, according to the new edition of the second volume). Engels objects to this position from the point of view of his historical materialism (L. Feuerbach etc. 28 – 29). Wesen des Christenthums. S. L. Ibid., S. 2. Italics here and in further quotations from Feuerbach’s works belong to the original. Characterizing the emotional side of religion and one-sidedly reducing religion to one feeling (as if Feuerbach himself, dealing exclusively with the metaphysics of religion, does not thereby show how metaphysical problems cannot be eliminated from it), Feuerbach says: “God is a pure, unlimited, free feeling. Every other god is a god imposed on your senses from the outside. Feeling is atheistic in the sense of orthodox faith as one that connects religion with some external object, it denies an objective God, it itself is God. The denial of the exclusive rights of feeling (des Gef е hls nur), from the point of view of feeling, is the denial of God. You are too timid or limited to express in words what your feelings affirm in life. Bound by external considerations, unable to understand the spiritual greatness of feeling, you are frightened by the religious atheism of your heart and in this fear you destroy the unity of your feeling with yourself, imagining an objective being different from your feeling, and with necessity you rush again to the old questions: does God exist or not... Feeling is your internal and at the same time different from you force, it is higher than you in you: it is your most authentic (eigenstes) being, which, however, embraces you as another creature, in short - your god; How else do you want to distinguish from this being in you as another objective being? (ibid., 13). Already from the first quotes, the reader can discern some of the main features of Feuerbach’s style: his verbosity and manner of repeating the same idea in different words, the philosophical imprecision of the language and, most importantly, the constant, unbridled and illegible use of the word “Wesen”, with which you simply do not know what to do when transmitting it into Russian. With the help of this word, Feuerbach constantly falls into hypostatization and mythologizing of concepts. Ibid., 54. “Faith in God, at least the God of religion, is lost only where, as in skepticism, pantheism, materialism, faith in man is lost, at least as he exists for religion.” “Theism, the belief in God, is completely negative. It denies nature, the world, humanity: before God, the world and man are nothing, God is and was before there was the world and people; he can(?!) live without them; he is nothing for the world and man” (Vorlesungen ü ber das Wesen der Religion. S. 367). Wesen der Religion, Collection. op. T. VII, 416. Let us give the full definition of nature given by Feuerbach: “I understand by nature the totality of all sensory forces, things and essences that man distinguishes from himself as non-human; In general, I understand by nature... an essence (Wesen), acting in accordance with the necessity of its nature (nota bene: the definition closes in an obvious logical and even verbal circle - nature acting with the necessity of nature!), but it is not for me, as for Spinoza, God, i.e. at the same time a supernatural, supersensible, abstract, secret, simple, but diverse, publicly accessible, real, reality perceived by all senses. Or, speaking practically: nature is everything that directly appears to man, regardless of the supranatural whisperings of theistic faith, directly, sensually, as the subject and basis of his life. Nature is light, electricity, magnetism, air, water, fire, earth, animal, plant, man (to the extent that he is a non-free and unconsciously acting being) - nothing more, nothing mystical, nothing humane, nothing theological, I mean in the word “nature”. I appeal to feelings with this word. “Jupiter is everything you see,” said ancient times; nature, I say, is everything that you see and that does not come from human hands and thoughts,” etc. in the same way (Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion, 116 - 117). Wesen des Christ., 184 – 185. Das Wesen des Christenthums in Beziehung auf den “Einzigen und sein Eigenthum”. Band VII, 303. Das Wesen des Christenthums, 324 – 325. divine Caesar (lat.). Philosophische Kritiken und Grundsätze, article “Nothwendigkeit einer Reform der Philosophie” (1841). Bd. II. S. 219 – 220. Vorlüfige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie (1842), Bd II, S. 244. Vorlesungen, 29. Compare Kirillov’s reasoning in Dostoevsky’s “Demons”: “God is the pain of the fear of death. Whoever conquers pain and fear will become a god himself. Then a new life, then a new man, everything new... Then history will be divided into two parts: from the gorilla to the destruction of God and from the destruction of God to... to the change of the earth and man physically. Man will become a god and will change physically.” Wesen des Christenthums, 20. Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft. Collection op. T. II, 304, § 41. “A person thinks, that is, communicates (conversirt), speaks to himself. An animal cannot perform the function of the genus without another individual outside itself, but a person can perform the genus function of thinking and speech, for thinking and speech are the real functions of the genus, without another. A person is for himself, together I and you, he can put himself in the place of another precisely because his subject is his species, his being, not only his individuality” (Wesen des Christenthums, 3). We read here, for example, the following praise of death: “Oh, death! I cannot tear myself away from the sweet contemplation of your meek being, who has so intimately merged with my being! The mirror of my spirit, a reflection of my own nature! From the disintegration of the unity of nature with itself, the conscious spirit arose, this universal, self-contemplating light flared up, and, just as the month shines with the light of the sun, so you, in your gentle radiance, reflect only the burning solar fire of consciousness. You are the evening star of nature and the morning star of the spirit: sensual fools mistake one star for two different stars. You shine for the wise from the land of dreams to the birthplace of the true savior of the spirit. Fools imagine that only after death and through it do they enter the spirit, that spiritual life arises only after death, as if sensory negation could be the basis or condition of the spirit. They do not see that death already presupposes the actual existence of the spirit, follows only the spirit and, as a sensory end, is only a manifestation of the spiritual and essential end. The morning star does not bring morning with it, it itself is only a manifestation of morning” (Gedanken ьber Tod und Unsterbichkeit. Collected works. T. I. P. 71. This passage is characteristic of the style and tone of this entire work). To characterize this argumentation of his, we present the following passage: “Just as the desire for eternal life, the desire for omniscience and unlimited perfection, is only an imaginary desire, and the unlimited desire for knowledge and perfection, which is presented as the basis of this desire, as daily history and experience shows, is only attributed to man. A person does not want everything, he only wants to know what he has a special inclination and preference for. Even a man with a universal desire for knowledge, which is rare, does not in any way want to know everything without distinction; he does not want to know all the stones, like a mineralogist by specialty, or all the plants, like a botanist; he is content with what is necessary because it suits his general spirit. Also, a person does not want to be able to do everything, but only what he has a special desire for; he strives not for a limitless, indefinite perfection, which is realized only in God and the infinite Jenseits, but for a definite, limited perfection, for perfection in a certain sphere” (Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion, 36l). “The One and His Property” (German). Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum, ed. 1884, p. 220: “Everything holy is bonds, fetters.” In yourself and for yourself (German). Supreme Being (French). Presented in: Bolin. Ludwig Feuerbach, sein Wirken und seine Zeitgenossen. Stuttgart, 1881. I founded my business on Nothing. (German). Here, for example, are two of Feuerbach’s judgments on the question of the divinity of the individual, which are separated by a distance of two pages: Feuerbach’s “theological view” is that it “splits us into an essential and inessential “I” and a “species”, man in general (den Menschen), an abstraction, an idea as our true being represents in contrast to the actual individual I, as inessential.” "The only one!" Have you read “Wesen des Christenthuras” in its entirety? It can’t be, because what exactly is the main theme, the grain of this work? The only and exclusive elimination of the division into essential and inessential self is deification, i.e. affirmation (Position), recognition of the whole person from head to toe. Isn’t the divinity of the individual openly proclaimed at the end as the revealed secret of religion?.. “In this work Feuerbach reveals the truth of sensuality, only in it did he understand the absolute being as a sensual being, and the sensual being as an absolute being. Thus, the entire individual is divine, from head to toe. A little lower we read: “The individual for Feuerbach is an absolute, that is, a true, real, being. Why doesn't he say: this exceptional individual? Because then he would not know what he wants, then he would return to the point of view of religion, which he denies. This is precisely the essence of religion, at least in this respect, that it selects from a class or genus a single individual and contrasts him as holy and inviolable with other individuals... To abolish religion therefore means nothing more than to show the identity of its illuminated object or individual with other worldly individuals of the same genus.” Here the divinity of the individual “from head to toe”, which was established two pages above, is already denied. Extraneous, this light (German). Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum, 35. There is no right beyond me (German). In recent years, it has become fashionable in Russia, where several translations of “The One and His Property” have appeared. Wed. a detailed essay by Mr. V. Savodnik, Nietzschean of the 40s. Max Stirner and his philosophy of egoism. M., 1902. The idea of a superman. Collection op. T. VIII, 312. Engels. L. Feuerbach etc. 26 – 35. In the forties, Engels was an unassuming and naive Feuerbachian, and no significant change in his philosophical worldview occurred to him. In the article “Die Lage Englands” (Aus dem literarischem Nachlass von K. Marx, F. Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle, erster Band, 486 – 487) he says: “The godlessness of our age, about which Carlyle complains so much, is precisely its religious completeness (in the original there is a play on words: Gottlosigkeit and Gotterfulltheit). Until now, the question has been: what is God? And German philosophy decided the question this way: God is a man. A person needs to personally know himself, measure all life conditions according to himself, evaluate them, transform the world in a truly human way, in accordance with the requirements of his nature. One must seek truth not in otherworldly, non-existent areas, not outside space and time, not from a “god” living in the world or from the other world, but much closer, in a person’s own chest. Man’s own being is much loftier and more majestic than the imaginary being of all possible gods, who are only more or less vague and distorted reflections of people themselves.” Wesen des Christenthums, 238. Wed. next essay: “K. Marx as a religious type." Argument from an opposing (counter) judgment (lat.). The bearer of the rank, title (German) = “wedding general.” Contradiction in definition (lat.). Not everyone knows that these verses of Goethe represent a paraphrase of the saying of Plotinus (Enneads, I, 6, 9). Schelling had a well-known dispute on the topic of anthropomorphism of ideas about God with Eschenmeyer (see about this: K. Fischer, Historical modern phil., vol. VII, art. 718, 720). If our eyes were not sunny, who would admire the sun? Do not let the spirit of God live in us - Who has been captivated by the divine? In addition to this alternative, that either God exists or is only a product of fantasy, it turns out that a third is also possible, according to which God does not yet exist, but he will be created by humanity. This philosophical invention, which, in our opinion, is the most godless and wicked invention of the entire 19th century, belongs to the aesthetic skeptic and mental gastronomer Ernst Renan. Read the following exchange of opinions in his Philosophical Dialogues. I am a man, and nothing human is alien to me (lat.). An expression from the comedy of the Roman playwright Publius Terence (c. 195–159 BC) “The Self-Tormentor” (I, 1, 25). All the sorrow of people has accumulated over me (Goethe I.V. Collected works. M.; L.; 1947. T. V. P. 248). Published in the Moscow Weekly in 1906 and in a separate publication (D. E. Zhukovsky. St. Petersburg, 1907). I assume here that the external facts of Marx’s biography are known and I have in mind not a biographical, but a psychological interest. Look at the first page of Volume I of Capital at Marx’s attack against his colleague and friend, who was already long dead: instead of giving Lassalle his due here, Marx only accuses him, albeit in confusing terms, of plagiarism. Here’s an example: “One of the virtuosos in this pretentious cretinism, McCulloch... speaks with the affected naivety of an eight-year-old child” (“Capital”, vol. I, 363, note 216). In general, in the notes of Capital there are epithets “vulgar, ridiculous” and the like. are found at every step, and this bad taste was, unfortunately, adopted by the followers of Marx, and in particular it took root in our literature. There was a rude and tasteless trick addressed to Herzen in volume I of Capital, in the first edition, which was subsequently eliminated by the author himself from other editions. Georg Adler in his book “Die Grundlagen der Karl Marx'sehen Kritik der bestehenden Volkswirtschaft” (Tubingen, 1887) quotes an interesting passage from a letter from the democrat Trekhov, who visited Marx in London. Trekhov here, among other things, formulates his personal impressions of him: “Marx impressed me not only of rare mental superiority, but also of a significant personality. If he had as much heart as brain, as much love as hatred, I would be ready to go into the fire for him, despite the fact that he not only made me feel in various ways, but in the end openly expressed his complete disdain for me. He is the only one and the first among us to whom I would entrust the right to rule and not get lost in trifles during great events. I regret only for the sake of our common goal that this man, along with his outstanding mind, does not have a noble heart. He laughs at the fools who piously repeat after him the catechism of the proletarians, as well as at the communists a la Willich, as well as at the bourgeoisie. The only people he respects are aristocrats, real aristocrats, with full consciousness of this. To remove them from power, he needs strength, which he finds only in the proletarians, which is why he brought his system to them. Despite all assurances to the contrary, perhaps precisely thanks to them, I received the impression that his personal domination was the goal of all his actions” (283, note). Of course, we do not at all think of accepting what is said here a la lettre, but the general tone is consistent with what both Annenkov and Herzen report. State of the future (German). Pointing out this connection is, among other things, the merit of Prof. Masaryk in his famous book on Marxism, ch. XI. For example, even a researcher who has so carefully and extensively studied the literature on the issue as Prof. Masaryk, in his book (Die philosophischen und soziologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus. Wien. 1889) also confirms that “Marx’s socialism grew mainly out of German philosophy”, that “Marx’s philosophical foundations, his, so to speak, philosophical skeleton, is the philosophy of Hegel, Hegel shaped the spirit of Marx”, and finally that “Marx appeared for the first time in literature as a Hegelian, an adherent Feuerbach" (S. 22 and passim). If we take into account that although Feuerbach himself was once an adherent of Hegel, he then became an irreconcilable and bitter antipode of him, we will understand what a sad philosophical confusion is contained in these words: a Hegelian, an adherent of Feuerbach. After all, this is almost the same as saying: a Marxist, a follower of Tolstoy, or something like that. Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle. Herausgegeben von Franz Mehring. Erster Band: Gesammelte Schriften von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels von Marz 1841 bis Marz 1844. Zweiter Band. Gesammelte Schriften von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels von Juli 1844 bis November 1847. Mehring gives his comments to these articles, into which, despite their inevitable bias, a lot of work and knowledge was invested. Those who wish to check the validity of these words can easily do this with the help of the literary index attached to the translation of Volume I of Capital, edited by Struve. Here it is easy to see how outwardly and casually Marx quotes Hegel, as if for the sake of mentioning his name, rather than for the essence of the matter. Marx listened to lectures: pandects - from Savigny, criminal law and Prussian local law - from Hans, church law - from Heffter, criminal procedure with ordinary German civil procedure - from Rudolf Erbrecht, in addition, lectures on philosophy, theology, philology, logic - from Gabler, about Isaiah - from Bruno Bauer, about Euripides - from Gennert, general geography - from Ritter and, finally, anthropology - from Stephens. Even for Mehring, who tries to take every word of this letter literally, the size of the manuscript of 300 pages seems dubious, and he suggests a typo or error here. "German-French Yearbook" (German). It was also published in Russian translation. In relation to a given person (lat.). Engels in the same magazine in the article “Die Lage Englands” (written about Carlyle’s “Past and Present”) is also a follower of Feuerbach. Here we read: “Until now, the question has always been: what is God? And German philosophy (i.e., again, only Feuerbach. - Author) resolved the question in this sense: God is man. Man only needs to know himself, to measure by himself all his life circumstances, to discuss them in accordance with his essence, to truly humanly arrange the world in accordance with the requirements of his nature, and then he solves the problem of time. Not in otherworldly non-existent areas, not outside of space and time, not in a “god” living in the world or the opposite of it, one should look for truth, but much closer, in a person’s own breast, more sublime and more royal than the being of all possible “gods”, which themselves are only a more or less obscure and distorted being of man.” Marx's article "On the Jewish Question" from the "Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher", as well as the chapter on the Jewish Question from "Die heilige Familie" are translated into Russian, unfortunately, not entirely satisfactorily: Karl Marx. On the Jewish Question. St. Petersburg: Publishing house "Hammer", 1906. Translation by G. Radomyslsky, ed. A. Lunacharsky. It is curious that F. Lassalle, who in his adolescence dreamed of fighting for the rights of his people (in his diary), in later letters to Solntseva also reveals an extremely negative attitude towards his tribe, and this despite all his nationalism regarding Germany. We note only this psychological riddle, without dwelling on it here. Profiteering, huckstering (German). In a state of generation (lat.). I believe that the last word has not yet been said about it, because here a problem of colossal importance is posed for religious and philosophical thought. It is noteworthy that even in the polemical work against Dühring, which, of course, does not represent a philosophical work of the first rank, Marx wrote only an economic chapter; nevertheless, the philosophical chapters belong to Engels. Capital. T. I. P. 41. Per. edited by Struve. Right there. Volume I of Capital even allows for the possibility of not only explaining existing religious ideas from life, but also deductively, a priori constructing them from the facts of reality. This is the place: “Technology exposes man’s active relationship to nature, the direct process of production of his life, and at the same time his social life relations and the spiritual ideas arising from them. Even any history of religion that does not take into account this material basis is devoid of critical foundation. Of course, it is much easier to find the earthly essence of religious ideas through analysis than vice versa, that is, to derive their religious forms from given real relationships. The last method is the only materialistic one, and therefore the only scientific method” (p. 300, note 89). It would be better if Marx showed this “materialistic”, and in our opinion, simply fantastic, method in action, instead of just talking about it in a footnote - the most suitable place for such scientific “discoveries”! To the extreme, mercilessly (French). From a report at the Moscow Religious and Philosophical Society on March 8, 1909. Published in the Moscow Weekly (1909. No. 23 – 24). I once made this same comparison back in Marxist coverage in the essay “The Classical School and the Historical and Ethical Direction in Political Economy” (Novoe Slovo. 1897, IX). Capital. T. I, 516 – 517 (according to the old translation). E. Troeltsch. Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, XXVII B., I H., 1908. S. 59. Harnack in a study on monasticism (“Das Monachtum”, published in his “Reden und Aufsatze”. Bd. I, 84 – 85) says: “All movements of the soul (Gemuthes) we encounter the most passionate and tender in this world of renunciation. Art, poetry and science were diligently cultivated there, so that the beginning of the civilization of our fatherland is only a chapter in the history of monasticism." Examples taken from the book by Prof. Aiken "History and system of medieval worldview." To work means to pray (lat.). Archiv für Socialwissenschaft und Socialpolitik. 1904, I; 1905, I. Imperialismus und englischer Freihandel. Leipzig, 1906. The 400th anniversary of Calvin's birth in 1909 prompted the appearance of a number of monographs about him and editions of his letters and writings. For a brief and informative essay about him by Stahllin, see: Realenzyclopedie für prot. Theol. u. Kirche, herausg. von Hauck u. Herzog, 3–te Ausg., also in the Religionsgesch series. Volksbucher: A. Baur. Johann Calvin. Tubingen, 1909. For a characterization of the ethics of Calvinism, see: Theobald Ziegler. Geschichte der christlichen Ethik. Strassburg, 1902. Gothein. Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Schwarzwaldes, I, 674 (Quoted in: Sombart. Der moderne Kapitalismus). Having given this judgment, Sombart himself adds that “Protestantism, especially in its varieties - Quakerism and Calvinism - significantly contributes to the development of capitalism, is too well-known a fact to require further justification” (I. e., 380 - 381). It was when transmitting the text from the book of Jesus Sirach XI, 20 – 21. (The corresponding place in the Russian translation: “believe the Lord and continue in your work [=Beruf]”). According to Gothein, “the emancipation of the state and the national economy from the influence of the church constitutes an essential part of Luther’s life work” (Article “Renaissance und Reformation” in the Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften). Harnack notes: “The civil profession, the humble activity in the house and in the yard, in the enterprise and in the office, is considered not as an occupation distracting from heaven, but a truly spiritual occupation... Luther proclaimed the freedom and responsibility of the workers... He restored in its meaning all professional work...” (Harnack. Reden und Aufsatze, I, 162, speech about Luther). In ch. 3, § 3 of the Westminster Confession of 1647, adopted at this point by the Independent and Baptist Confessions, we read, among other things: “God in the revelation of his majesty has predestinated some men ... to eternal life, and some foreordained to eternal death.” § 5: “Those of the human race who were destined for life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to His eternal and unchangeable plan and secret decision and according to the discretion of His will, chose in Christ to eternal bliss, and this by purely free gift and love, not because the foreknowledge of faith and good works or stability in this or that, or anything else in creation, prompted Him to as a condition or cause, but entirely at the cost of His majestic mercy.” § 7: “God has pleased the rest of the human race, according to the unsearchable decision of His will, by which He may or may not show mercy as He pleases, for the magnification of His unlimited power to dispose of His creatures, and to condemn them to dishonor and wrath for their sin... God gives the chosen ones the strength and desire to do His will, but He blinds and hardens the condemned, giving temptations over to the power of Satan.” “Let me go to hell, but such a God will never force respect from me,” Milton said about this teaching. For all but the mentioned articles by M. Weber, see the condensed but extremely informative essays in Realenzyclopedie f. prot. Theol. u. Kirche, hrsg. von Hauck und Herzog, 3–te Ausg. In particular, on Quakerism, in addition to the article in R. E. Robert Buddensieg, see also Weingarten, Die Revolutionskirchen Englands (there is a Russian translation), as well as Schneckenburger. Vorlesungen über die Lehrbegriffe der kleineren protestantischen Kirchenparteien, hrsg. von Hundesgagen, Frankfurt a. M., 1863. For a description of the social significance of Quakerism, see Schulze-Gevernitz: Britischer Imperalismus etc., 61 – 62. It is worth mentioning that the first to formulate the theory of surplus value and thereby deserve special sympathy from Marx (“the phenomenon of bourgeois political economy”) was the Quaker J. Bellers. His fundamental point of view, so deeply alien to Marx, who received his economic ideas, is this: “It is sad to see that the body of many poor people, which can and should be a church for the dwelling of the Holy Spirit, turns out to be a receptacle for such vice and sin.” His main treatise, where he develops the ideas of cooperation that are so important for our time, is called: “Proposais for raising a college of industry for all useful trade and industry” (1695). Also: “Essays about the poor, manufacture, trade plantations, immorality and of the Excellency the Divinity of the inward light” (1699). Even the social democratic researcher Ed. Bernstein admitted (regarding the Quakers) that “der Asketismus ist burgerliche Tugend, namentlich vor dem Aufkommen der eigentlichen grossen Industrie, wo neue Kapitalien in der That oft genug durch Sparen gebildet sind” (Bernstein. Sozialismus und Demokratie in der grossen englischen Revolution, 2–te Aufl. 1908. S. 32l). “To the greater glory of the Lord” (lat.). The famous American billionaire Carnegie (Andrew Karnegie. Kaufmanns Herrschaft - empire of business. Berlin, 1904, S. 93, 96 - 97) in his credo formulates the duty of saving as follows: “Saving is the first, most important duty. Thrift is the most necessary condition of all progress. Without savings there are no railways, canals, courts, telegraphs, churches, newspapers, in a word, nothing that is always so large and expensive... For a person, the first duty arises - to acquire sufficient wealth for himself and become independent. His further duty is to do something for his needy neighbors, his duty is to do something for the good of the society to which he belongs... To strive to leave the world better than we found it means to pursue the noble goal of life.” “The leaders of industry are essentially the leaders of the world; if there is no nobility in them, then there will never be any more aristocracy... Let the leaders of industry retire into their own hearts and solemnly ask: is it possible to discover anything there except a wolfish hunger for fine wines and boasting of servants and gilded carriages... The working world, just like the warring world, cannot be led without the noble chivalry of labor and the laws and certain rules flowing from it... You must achieve sincere devotion of your valiant military armies and labor armies, they must and will be ordered; they should naturally be granted a fair share in the victories won under your leadership; they must be united to you by true brotherhood, sonship, by completely different and deeper bonds than the temporary bonds of daily wages... Look around you! Your world armies are all in revolt, in confusion, in disintegration; they are on the eve of fiery death and madness! They will not go further for you for 6 pence on the principle of supply and demand... You must bring them into order, into fair subordination: noble loyalty in retribution for noble leadership... Not like a brutal, brutal crowd, but like a strong, organized army with true leaders at their head, these people will come forward. All human interests, combined human aspirations and social growth in this world, at a certain stage of their development, required organization; and labor, the greatest of human interests, demands it now. God knows that this task will be difficult, but not a single noble task is easy” (Carlyle. Past Present / Translation by N. Gorbov, chapter “Leaders of Industry”). For an objective analysis of the qualities required of industrial leaders, of the “capitalist entrepreneur,” see the essay by Werner Sombart. Der kapitalistische Unternehmer, especially ch. VIII. Unternehmernaturen (Arch. f. S. u. Sozialpol. XXXIX, 3, November-Heft, 1909). Wed. generally cit. op. Schulze-Gevernitsa. Published in the collection “Questions of Religion” (Moscow, 1906. Issue 1). A man is what he eats (German). - words of L. Feuerbach from his critical article about the book by J. Moleschott “Physiology of Food Products”. In the Old Testament, especially in the prophets, as well as in the New Testament, there are many passages full of righteous social anger and seemingly directly directed against the abuses of modern capitalism. “If your brother and sister are naked,” we read from St. Jacob, - and do not have daily food, and one of you says to them: go in peace, keep warm and eat, but he will not give them what they need for their body, what good is it? (II, 15 – 16). “Listen, you rich people: weep and howl for your troubles that are coming upon you. Your wealth has rotted, and your clothes are moth-eaten. Your gold and silver have rusted... Behold, the wages that you withheld from the workers who reaped your fields cry out, and the cries of the reapers have reached the ears of the Lord of hosts. You have lived luxuriously on earth and enjoyed; nourish your hearts as for the day of slaughter. You condemned, you killed the righteous, he did not resist you” (V, 1 – 5). Is it possible to more strongly expose the social ills of at least the modern economic system! In need there is unity, in doubt there is freedom (lat.). “We have long had evidence from which we can conclude that in ancient Christianity, along with the recognition of the rights of every Christian fellow to demand an Existenzminimum (living wage (German)), there was also an obligation for communities to provide this minimum either through seeking labor or with help. Thus, we read in the pseudo-Clementine homilies (cf. dem. 8): “work is for the able-bodied, compassion is for the incapable.” Cyprian (cf. 2) also takes it for granted that the community, if it prohibits a teacher of dramatic art from this activity, should take care of him, and if he, in addition, does not have a profession, provide him with Existenzminimum. But until now we did not know whether this duty was truly universally accepted. But since we have the “Teaching of the 12 Apostles” this has changed. It states here (p. 12) that no able-bodied brother should receive support from the community for more than two or three days. There is, therefore, a right for the community to send away such a brother. But this right has the reverse side of an obligation: “If a brother knows a craft, then let him practice his craft and eat. And if he does not know, then see to it that not a single Christian among you lives in idleness. And if he does not want to do this (that is, to carry out the work entrusted to him), then he belongs to the number of those who sell Christ (χριστέμπορος). Beware of those." Based on this, it is certain that a Christian brother in the community can demand work and she must give it to him. Therefore, not only the duty of support bound the members - this was only the ultima ratio - but in this sense they were also working communities, so that the communities, where necessary, had to provide work for the brother" (Adolf Harnack. Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christenthums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten. I Ausg. Leipzig, 1902. S. 127 - 128). Prof. Harnack says the following about this: “A lot has been written about ancient Christian “communism.” It never existed on the basis of the great Church of Languages, for such a partial phenomenon as a semi-pagan Carpocratian sect with its communism does not belong here. Monastic communism is called that only ex abusu (erroneously, incorrectly (Latin)), and does not apply here at all. There was also no communism on Judeo-Christian soil, therefore, the example of the Essenes remained without imitation.” Ullman judges correctly: “It is impossible to imagine the communication of property more erroneously, if by this we mean some kind of institution, like that that existed among the Essenes and Therapeutics. It is much better to imagine this state as the absence of any institutions” (Harnack, op. cit, 109, note). Prof. Harnack formulates the practical attitude of ancient Christianity on the issue of slavery in the following paragraphs. Ad. Harnack. Die Mission etc., 124. This basic idea was clearly expressed in the work of Clement of Alexandria “Quis dives salvetur”. Meaning, reasonable basis (French). Wed. previous essay “National Economy and Religious Personality.” It is to such cases of “unrighteous wealth”, which is difficult to refuse, or an inevitable actual compromise, that we generally attribute the mysterious parable of the Savior about the unfaithful steward (Luke XVI, 1 – 12). This unfaithful steward, in order to improve his affairs, losing his place, forced the owner’s debtors to reduce the amount of debt in order to earn their favor and support, and for this he received praise from the owner himself for his resourcefulness. “And I say to you (the Savior continued): make friends for yourself with unrighteous wealth, so that when you become poor, they will receive you into eternal abodes. He who is faithful in a little is also faithful in much, and he who is unfaithful in a little is also unfaithful in much. So, if you have not been faithful in unrighteous wealth, who will trust you with what is true? And if you have not been faithful in what belongs to others, who will give you what is yours?” This is immediately followed by words about the impossibility of serving God and Mammon. Read (with abbreviations) at a meeting of the Moscow Religious and Philosophical Society in memory of V. S. Solovyov on October 31, 1908. Published in “Russian Thought” (1909. No. VI – VII). Wed. about this interesting work by Prof. Ernst Troeltsch "Die Absolutheit des Christenturas und die Religionsgeschichte" (1902). In general, one of the most urgent needs of modern religious consciousness is the philosophy of mythology, as it originated in the brilliant mind of Schelling (his “Philosophie der Mythologie” retains its significance to this day), but brought into connection with the achievements of modern science. Here, for example, are the final words of Prof. Geffken in his work “Aus der Werdezeit des Christentums” (Leipzig, 1904. S. 135): “Aber vielleicht ist auch alles dies nur Klugelei, und gehort der Sieg des Christentums zu den historischen Wundern, deren Ursachen uns stets ein “Ignorabimus” bleiben, ein Geheimniss, immer wieder lockend, immer wieder sich verhullend, wie das Wesen Jesu Christi selbst.” Wed. similar review by prof. Dobschutz in his “Problemen des apostolischen Zeitalters” (Leipzig. 1904. S. 11): “Unser Problem gehort zu denen, die im letzten Grunde listorisch unloslich sind.” Rudolf Som. Church system in the first centuries of Christianity / Trans. A. Petrovsky and P. Florensky. M., 1906. P. 7. (The first chapter of Som’s famous work “Das Kirchenrecht”, 1892) is translated in this book. In addition to authentic monuments of ancient Christian writing, the works of apostolic men and apologists, the material for compiling the essay was the numerous, mostly German, recent literature on the history of Christianity. In addition to special monographs cited in their place, from general works we will name: on the history of ancient Christian literature - the classical works of Harnack (on the history of dogmas, ancient Christian mission and literature) and Bardengever, also Loofs (history of dogmas). K. Weizsacker. Das apostolische Zeitalter; Knopf. Das nachapostoliche Zeitalter; Wernle. Die Anfange unserer Religion. 1904; Deissmann. Das Licht vom Osten. 1908; Heinrizi. Das Urchristentum. 1902; Dobschutz. Urchristlichen Gemeinden. 1904; Problemen des apostolichen Zeitalters. 1904; Julicher, Harnach, Bonwetsch and others in “Die Christliche Religion” (in the publication “Die Kultur der Gegenwart”); Hatch. Griechentum und Christentum; Sohm. Kirchenrecht; Pfleiderer. Urchristentum. I; Duchesne. Hist. anc. de l'eglise. 1908, series "Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbucher" hrsg. von M. Schiele (on various issues). Relevant articles from Realenzyklopedie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, 3–te Aufl.; K. Kautsky. Der Ursprung des Christentums. 1908. See also the Russian works of prof. Spassky “History of dogmatic movements”, prof. Gidulyanov “Metropolitans in the first three centuries of Christianity.” Wed. summarizing and excellent research by prof. Paul Wendland "Die Hellenistisch-Romische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum". Tubingen, 1907. Wed. also 5 essays (by Cornille, Dobschutz, Herrmann, Stärck and Troeltsch) in the series “Wissenschaft und Bildung” under the general title “Das Christentum” (1908). Wed. See also: Ludwig Friedlander. Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms in der Zeit von August bis zum Ausgang der Antonine. 7–te Aufl. 1902. See: Wendland, 1. p., ch. VII; § 2 et seq. Wed. excellent essay by Wendland: l. With. 77 ff. There are also abundant bibliographical notes. Wed. also: Fr. Cumont. Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain. Paris, 1907. Compare: E. Rohde. Die Psyche. J. Leipoldt. Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons. Erster Theil. Die Entstehung, Leipzig, 1907. S. l etc. For my purpose, I need not enter into a consideration of the intricate and complex questions about the history of the canon of New Testament books and the so-called “New Testament criticism.” Not to mention the fact that this work, due to its complexity, requires special research, it does not have in our eyes the fundamental significance that is increasingly gaining in Protestantism and especially in Richlean theology, based on the denial of the doctrine of the Divinity of I. Christ. Only with this dogmatic premise do the arguments of “biblical” criticism receive such strength and decisive importance, which they do not have at all for a positive religious view. Wed. A. Reville about this. Jesus of Nazareth. T. I / Preface. prof. F. F. Zelinsky. St. Petersburg, 1909. Wed. The following essay, “Early Christianity and Modern Socialism,” is about this. V.V. Rozanov is absolutely right that, symbolically speaking, ap. It is impossible to imagine Paul not only in the pagan theater of that time, but also in our theater, even the Art Theatre. (Cf. his essay “About the Sweetest Jesus”). But is it possible to imagine now and even the most ordinary person in the theater at such moments when his soul burns with prayer, with the feeling of God, as it apparently burned incessantly with the apostle? Here are a few reviews as an example: “Early Christianity is aloofly opposed to Greco-Roman culture. Christianity and world culture are quantities that initially do not have an internal relationship. Almost until the middle of the 2nd century this direction, alien to culture, reigned” (Wendland, l. p., 127). “If you ask yourself what is common in the expressions of Christianity of the 1st century in Paul, John, James, then this is the highest tension of religious feeling. Religion is everything to them. A lot of questions of human life: the problem of culture, state, law, science, etc. do not exist for them at all... This early Christian enthusiasm is characterized by a powerful supra-worldliness (Ueberweltlichkeit), even extra-worldliness (Unweltlichkeit).” (Dobschutz. Probl. d. apost. Zeitalters. Leipzig, 1904. S. 112 – 113; cf.: his in “Das Christenthum” S. 47). Wed. also: Knopf. Das nachapost. Zeitalt. S. 120 – 122. The number of these reviews can be significantly multiplied, because we are talking about an indisputable phenomenon, accessible to historical observation and regardless of its religious prerequisites. See generally: L. Atzberger. Geschichte der Eschatologie innerhalb der vornikäischen Zeit. Freiburg i. Br. 1896. Wed. also: H. Gunkel. Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes nach der popularen Anschauung der apostolischen Zeit etc. Gottingen, 1899. S. 53; H. Weinel. Die Wirkungen des Geistes und der Geister im nachapostolischen Zeitalter bis auf Irenaus. Freiburg, 1899. S. 42 – 43; Harnack. Dogmengeschichte, I. S. 158; his name: Militia Christi. 1905. S. 50. About it, in addition to manuals on the history of dogmas (Harnack and others), see: Adolf Hilgenfeld. Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristenthums. Leipzig, 1884. About this, see below the essay “Apocalypticism and Socialism. (Religious and philosophical parallels)". Based on the Russian translation by K. Andreev, collated and corrected from the original in the edition of Gebhart and Harnack. Deissman. Das Licht von Orient. S. 199 – 200. Tertullian's treatise de idolatria (203) eloquently testifies to the difficulties that Christians encountered at every step and in every deed when touching the pagan world. On Gnosticism, see the history of dogma and ancient Christian literature, especially Hilgenfeld (op. cit). The last monograph on Gnosticism was written by W. Bousset (Hauptproblemeder Gnosis. Gottingen, 1907). The question of ancient Christian art would require special attention. Let me briefly note that here, too, the first steps, for example, of catacomb painting and ornament, are marked, on the one hand, by a captivating simplicity of content, and on the other, they are characterized by complete dependence on ancient forms. The very idea of ​​decorating with ornaments (flowers, geniuses) both places of eternal peace and household utensils, as well as the technique of these decorations, is of Greek origin. The motifs of this painting are also antique: Christ in the form of Orpheus or a genre image of a young shepherd, or a dragon in images of Jonah (Dobschutz. Das Christentum. S. 53, 63; Boissier. Catacombs. S. 45 - 57). Christian symbolism acquired a more original and independent character from the very beginning. Willamowitz-Moellendorf. Geschichte der griechischen Religion. 1901 (quoted from: Harnack. Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums. 2 Aufl. S. 248 – 249, Note. Geffken. Aus der Werdezeit des Christentums. S. 26. Wed. text of the gospel story: Matt. 27, 16 – 17, 20 – 21; Mr. 15, 7 – 11; Luke 23, 18 – 19; John 18, 39 – 40. Prof. Weinel sees in the persistence of these exhortations a fight against the revolutionary radicalism of apocalyptic sentiments. According to this researcher, these admonitions translated: “Rome is not so bad after all: anything but a revolution” (Weinel, Die Stellung des Urchristentums zum Staat. 1908; his: Die urchristliche und die heutige Mission. 1907. S. 12). “You, O Master, gave them the power of Your reign with Your majestic and inexplicable power, so that we, in the consciousness of the honor and dignity given to them by You, would obey them, without in any way contradicting Your will. Give them, O Lord, health, peace, harmony and constancy, so that they may freely carry out the rule entrusted to them by You. For You, Heavenly Lord, King of Ages, give to the sons of men honor and dignity and power over everything that is on earth. Thou, O Lord, direct their minds to that which is good and acceptable before Thee, so that in peace and simplicity they may piously exercise the power given to them by Thee and be worthy of Thy mercy. "Das Gebet in der altesten Christenheit"; 1901, appendix). Knopf. Das nachapostolische Zeitalter. S. 108. St. Justin the Philosopher (2nd century) in his apology says, for example: “Although we worship God alone, in other respects we ourselves willingly serve, recognizing you as kings and rulers of people and praying that you, under royal power, will be gifted with healthy judgment” (Apol. 17). Particularly interesting is the testimony of Tertullian, a straightforward African by temperament, known for his rigorism on the issue of military service and the pursuit of various professions. “We pray to the eternal God for the health and prosperity of the emperors... From Him they receive both power and life... The Emperor is great because he recognizes the God of heaven and earth as his Lord... Through Him he is an emperor, and before he became an emperor, he was and is a man. He received the royal crown from the same God from whom he received life. We ask God for the emperors' prosperity, peaceful reign, security of their home, courage of the army, loyalty of the Senate, good behavior of the people, peace of the whole world" (XXX). Added to this is another interesting argument, showing how pale eschatological sentiments and the impatient expectation of the end had become by the beginning of the 3rd century: “We know that the end of the world, with all the horrors that accompany it, is postponed due to the existence of the Roman Empire. Therefore, while we pray for the removal of this terrible revolution, we also pray for the continuation of the Roman Empire” (Apol. XXXII), “we pray for the emperors, for their ministers, for all powers, for peace, for the welfare of the whole world, for the postponement of the end (pro mora finis)” (XXXIX). According to the testimony of the apologist Athenagoras, Christians even prayed for the continuation of the dynasty. Example app. Paul, who referred to his rights as a Roman citizen, says quite eloquently that, in times of need, civil rights were also protected. Dismissive inaction (lat.). In 217, Tertullian (probably not without exaggeration) writes in his Apology: “We have existed, so to speak, since yesterday and are already filling everything: your cities, islands, castles, suburbs, councils, camps, tribes, decuries, court, senate, forum: we provide you only with churches.” In the same Apology, Tertullian defends Christians from the accusation that they are “useless for the connections of social life.” “We are not like the Indian Brahmins and gymnosophists, we do not live in forests, we do not run away from people... You and I are in the square, in markets, in baths, in shops, in hotels, at fairs, in all places necessary for communication with others. You and I sail along rivers and seas, carry weapons, cultivate the land, trade, use the same arts” (XLII). See generally: Harnack. Militia Christi; Weinel. Das Verhaltniss des Urchristenthums zum Staate; Bigelmair. Die Beteiligung der Christen am offentlichen Leben in vorconstantinischer Zeit. Munchen, 1902. On the irrationality of the relationship between church and state, see Ernst Troeltsch. Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche etc. Tubingen, 1907. S. 56. Cf. also our essay “Church and State” in the collection “Questions of Religion” (Moscow, 1906. Issue I). Wed. The next essay is “Early Christianity and Socialism.” Wed: Harnack. Die Mission. I. S. 147 – 148. See especially: Allard. 1. p., livre III. This is especially clear in Ermus, where the relationship between rich and poor is depicted by a comparison with an oak tree and a vine leaning on it, with one mutually helping the other, the first with help and the second with prayers. However, Tertullian mentions the sharing of property among Christians (Apol. XXXIX). Definitely communist ideas are attributed only to the Gnostic heretic Carpocrates, who allegedly tried to implement Plato’s communion of property (cf. the description of various Gnostic teachings by Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons). Geffken. Aus der Werdezeit des Christenthums. Distinctive features of the Christology of apologists are noted in Spassky: History of dogmatic movements in the era of ecumenical councils. 1906. Т. I, гл. I. Ср.: Harnach. Dogmengeschichte. B. I. Openly, obviously; in a latent state, implicitly (lat.). We have the latest summary of historical material related to this in Harnack’s article “Kirchliche Verfassung und kirchliches Recht im 1. und 2. Jahrhundert” (in: Realenzykl. f. rg. K. 3–te Aufl. Bd 20. Leipzig, 1908). Wed. также: Harnack. Die Lehre der 12 Apostel. 1884; R. Sohms. Das Kirchenrecht; Harnack. Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten; Weizsаcker. Apost. Zeitalter; Knopf. Das nachapostolische Zeitalter; P. V. Gidulyanov. Metropolitans in the first three centuries of Christianity. М., 1905. Elders (“elders”) and converts (Greek). Weinel. Die Stellung des Urchristentums zum Staat. S. 37. The facts related here are collected in citations with all the sobriety of historical analysis. comp.: Weinel. Die Wirkungen des feistes und der Geister im nachapost. Zeitalt, bis Irinaus. 1899; Guncel. Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes, etc. 2. Aufl. 1899. The value of both works increases because these scientists belong to the left wing of the liberal movement in Protestant theology and can least of all be suspected of superstitious mysticism. For a description of the general belief in the miraculous in the pagan world of this era, see: Wendland, l. s., ch. VI – VII. On ancient Christian prayer, see monograph v. d. Goltz "Das Gebet in der altesten Christenheit" (Leipzig, 1901). See also: Weizsacker, 1. p.; Knopf, 1. p., Zahn, 1. p.; Weinel, I. p. Glossolalia was also not a feature of only church communities; at least, we know glossolalia among heretics. A record has apparently been preserved of the glossolalia of the Gnostics (see: Schmidt. Gnostische Schriften in koptischer Sprache. Leipzig, 1892. Quoted from Weinel, 1. p., 80). On agapes, see in Russian the study by Pyotr Sokolov “Agapes, or love suppers in the ancient Christian world” (Sergiev Posad, 1906). Such, for example, are the song of the Mother of God, the prayer of Zechariah, Elder Simeon in the Gospel of Luke, or some hymns and prayers from the Apocalypse (according to Weissecker, V, 9 - 10; IV, 11; V, 12, 13; XV, 3; XI, 17; XII, 10 - 12; XIX, 1 - 8), epistles to Timothy (I Tim. III, 16, II Tim. II, 11 et seq.). Both prayers obviously date back to the time when the Eucharist and agape were celebrated together. “And as for the Eucharist, give thanks in the following way, first regarding the cup: “I thank You, Our Father, for the holy grapes of Your servant David, which You showed to us through Jesus Your servant. Glory to you forever!” And regarding the broken bread: “We thank You, our Father, for the life and knowledge which You have shown us through Jesus Your Servant. Glory to you forever! As this broken bread was scattered on the hills and joined together, so may Your Church be united from the ends of the earth into Your kingdom, for Yours is the glory and the power through Jesus Christ forever.” After being satisfied, give thanks like this: “We thank You, Holy Father, for Your holy name, which You have instilled in our hearts, and for the knowledge, and faith, and immortality, which You showed us through Jesus Your Servant. Glory to you forever! You, Lord Almighty, created everything for the sake of Your name; You gave food and drink to people for enjoyment, so that they would thank You, because You are omnipotent. Glory to you forever! Remember, Lord, Your Church, deliver her from all evil and perfect her in Your love and gather her, sanctified from the four winds, into Your Kingdom, which You have prepared for her, because Yours is the power and glory forever! May grace come and may this world pass away! Hosanna to the Son of David! If anyone is holy, let him come here, and if not, let him repent. Maranatha! Amen". We have already drawn attention to the eschatological end of this prayer, a sign of its deep antiquity. “Maranatha!”, a liturgical formula in Aramaic, used by the ap. Paul (I Cor. XVI, 22), meaning “The Lord has come,” can, with a different division of words, mean: “Come, Lord!” (Zahn, 318). Compare: Dobschutz. Die urchristlichen Gemeinden, conclusion. chapter. For a comparison of these names, see: Harnask. Die Mission etc., ch. III. Such a detailed historical study was recently carried out by Prof. Dobschutz, to whose research: Die urchristlichen Gemeinden. Sittengeschichtliche Bilder. Leipzig, 1902 (also available in Russian translation); Probleme des apostolischen Zeitalters. 1904, - and we send the reader. See also: Weiszacker, op. cit. and Knopf, op. cit. In order not to be unfounded, we must force the ancient Christians themselves to speak for themselves. We will spare no space to cite at least a little of the many. Here is Clement of Rome at the end of the 1st century sending a message to the very Corinthian community that the apostle “planted.” Paul protected with his fatherly hand from many temptations. He calls them to correction, reminding them of what they were before. “You were all humble and free from vanity, you loved to obey rather than command, and to give rather than to receive... everyone was given a deep and wonderful peace and an insatiable desire to do good, and there was a complete outpouring of the Holy Spirit on everyone. Full of holy desires, with sincere zeal and with pious hope, you stretched out your hands to Almighty God and begged him to be merciful if you had unwittingly sinned. Day and night your struggle was to take care of the entire brotherhood, so that the number of His chosen ones would be saved in good nature and unanimity. You were sincere, sincere and did not remember any anger towards each other. Any rebellion and any division was disgusting to you. You cried about the misdeeds of your loved ones: you considered their shortcomings as your own. We were not bored with doing good, ready for every good deed” (St. Clim. I last, to Cor. II). “And each of us,” says Athenagoras, “which he took according to the laws established among us, has only for childbearing. Just as a farmer, having thrown seeds into the ground, waits for the harvest and sows no more, so with us the measure of desire is procreation.” In the pseudo-Justinian “passage on the resurrection” we encounter the following argument: “If she does not rise, then why do we restrain her and do not allow her to indulge in lusts, why do we not imitate, as they say, doctors who, having a desperate sick person who has no hope of recovery, allow him to fulfill all his wishes? They know he will die. This is also done by those who hate the flesh and deprive it, as much as depends on them, of its inheritance: that is why they dishonor it, as if it had to be a corpse. If our physician, Christ, distracting us from our lusts, prescribes to our flesh the chaste and abstinent way of life characteristic of it, then it is clear that He preserves it from sins as having the hope of salvation, just as a doctor does not allow sick people who have the hope of salvation to satisfy their whims.” In this passage the whole difference is clear between pessimistic asceticism, stemming from undefeated dualism and enmity towards the flesh, and optimistic, eschatologically colored Christian asceticism, based on love and respect for the flesh, which the incarnate God deigned to bear and deify. For we see before our eyes that they despise death, and also that, driven by a certain chastity, they renounce the pleasures of love. For among them there are women and men who abstain from sexual intercourse all their lives. Further, there are those who, in self-control and mastery over their soul and in the greatest effort about this, go so far that they are not inferior to truly philosophizing (vere phlosophantibus).” Quote by Knopf. Das nachapost. Zeitalter. Tubingen, 1905. S. 132 – 133). “Their first legislator instilled in them the conviction that they were all brothers with each other; they develop incredible responsiveness; if anything happens that affects their common interests, then they do not regret anything.” Wed. his very interesting and malicious, but obviously not without factual basis, characterization of the methods of Christian mission in pagan homes (Quoted from Harnack. Mission etc., 248 – 249, Note). Wed. a short but extremely informative excursion into “Lukas und die Freude” in the latest study: Harnack. Die Apostelgeschichte. (Leipzig, 1908. S. 207 – 210). Never before has the tendency of scientific historical research to converge with church tradition received such vivid expression. Ever since the times of the Tübingen people, it has been considered a sign of good critical tone to reject the historical value of Acts. Ap.” and the possibility of Luke's authorship. And here is the venerable head of church historical science himself, who previously also shared a prejudice against the historical value of “Acts. Apostle", on purely scientific historical and philological grounds, returns to the church tradition and goes towards everything that was considered indisputable in critical science. Eloquent evidence of the instability of historical and exegetical conclusions that modern church historical science so boasts of, and the impossibility of basing one’s religious opinions and beliefs entirely on the data of this science! A curious view of the mid-2nd century, expressed in Ermus’s “The Shepherd,” is that “sadness is the most evil of all spirits and the most harmful to the servants of God... Every rejoicing person does good and thinks about good and despises sadness. But a sad person is always angry, firstly, because he insults the Holy Spirit, which is given to a joyful person; and, secondly, because he commits iniquity by not turning and confessing to the Lord. The prayer of a sad person never has the power to ascend to the throne of God” (Shepherd, II, second commandment). Compare, for example, Geffken, op. cit. Gaston Boissier. The fall of paganism. M., 1892. “Do nothing more for me than for me to be sacrificed to God now that the altar is ready, and then form a choir of love and sing a song of praise to the Father in Jesus Christ, that God has deigned to call the bishop of Syria from the East to the West. It is wonderful for me to fall from the world to God, so that I may shine in Him... Ask God for external and internal strength for me, but so that I do not only speak, but also wish, so that I am not called only a Christian, but actually be one... I write to the churches and tell everyone that I voluntarily die for God... Leave me to be food for animals and through them to reach God. I am the wheat of God: let the teeth of the beasts crush me, so that I may become the pure bread of Christ. It’s better to caress these animals so that they become my coffin and leave nothing from my body, so that after death I won’t be a burden to anyone. Then I will truly be a disciple of Christ, when even my body will not be seen by the world... Now I am just beginning to be a disciple. Neither visible nor invisible anything will stop me from coming to Christ. Fire and the cross, crowds of animals, dissection, dissolution, crushing bones, cutting off members, crushing the whole body, the fierce torment of the devil will come to me - if only I could reach Christ... I am writing to you alive, burning with the desire to die. My love has been crucified, and there is no fire in me that loves matter, but the living water speaking within me calls to me from within: “Go to the Father.” For me there is no sweetness in food that perishes, nor in the pleasures of this life. I desire the bread of God, the bread of heaven, the bread of life, which is the flesh of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, born in recent times from the seed of David and Abraham. And the living drink of God - His blood, which is imperishable and eternal love... Remember in your prayer the Syrian church: instead of me, it now has God as its shepherd. Jesus Christ alone will preside over it and your love. And I am ashamed to be called one of its members, for I am unworthy as the last of them and as a monster. But if I reach God, by His grace I will become something.” We have nothing to add to this speech, in which, against the background of the Syrian temperament and Eastern speech, the early Christian martyrdom is evident. An elderly man, almost a hundred years old, incurred the fanatical hatred of the mob. In view of the threatening danger, about which he was warned supernaturally, at the insistence of his loved ones, he left Smyrna and retired to the village, where he spent time in prayer, as was his custom, “for all people and for the communities of the whole world.” Detectives came to arrest him and, although he could have escaped, he came out to them, greeted them warmly, ordered them to be fed and asked for an hour of time to pray. Not one, but two whole hours passed in prayer, during which the elder “commemorated all the people he had ever met, great and small, famous and unknown, and the entire Catholic Church on earth.” Sentenced to be burned and already standing at the stake, he offers his last prayer. In it, he praises God for the fact that He has honored him with this day and hour, “that I, among the martyrs, participate in the hosanna of your Christ for the resurrection for eternal life in soul and body.” “Therefore I praise You for everything, I glorify You, I glorify You through the eternal and heavenly high priest I. Christ” (see: Zahn, l. p., 318 - 320). Geffken, l. p., 31. On the unreliability of “acts of martyrdom” as a historical source, see here. But even if we admit strong stylization in them, the very nature of stylization, the mood and worldview that was expressed in it, remains instructive historical evidence. Rigorous research (German). If they want to understand how dear it is for Christianity to defend the world and the flesh, let them only pay attention to the terrible and most dangerous struggle for the church that it had to endure with Gnosticism. A feature of most Gnostic teachings, obviously inspired by the dualism of the Iranian religion, was the recognition of the creator of the world - the Demiurge - as a blind and evil instrument who creates the world as a captivity for the spirit. And it was this attempt at religious rejection and condemnation of the world and its creator that Christianity overcame on its way. Those who speak so easily and confidently about world denial in Christianity should think better about the meaning and significance of this desperate life-and-death struggle of Christianity with Gnosticism, which sought to transform Christianity into precisely that ascetic acosmism that is attributed to it. Christianity defended the “peace” against Gnosticism, and to a certain extent, also Neoplatonism. God from the machine (lat.), in a figurative sense - a denouement due to an unforeseen circumstance. Weingarten. Die Revolutionskirchen Englands.