Second Epistle regarding Barlaam

In the essay “Second Epistle regarding Barlaam” (32 chapters) St. Gregory Palamas defends the Orthodox teaching about Divine uncreated energies, contrasting it with the rationalistic and scholastic views of the monk Barlaam of Calabria. The divine essence, according to Varlaam, is absolutely incomprehensible, and every religious experience is only a manifestation of created phenomena. He denied the possibility of man's real communion with the Divine. In the message, the saint substantiates the difference between the unknowable and unparticipated Divine essence and the knowable and participatory uncreated Divine energies. St. Gregory shows that God can be said “that He is” and “that He is one” through His uncreated energies, manifested in creation and in mystical experience (cataphatic theology). It is impossible to comprehend “what He is” or “what He is” in His incomprehensible essence (apophatic theology). The confusion of these two aspects leads to the denial of both the real knowledge of God and the possibility of spiritual transformation (deification) of a person. Varlaam, denying the possibility of knowing God through energies, actually denies Him as the Cause of all things and distorts the meaning of the patristic statements. St. Gregory Palamas emphasizes that uncreated energies are not accidents (random properties) or creations, but there is God Himself, revealing Himself outside His essence, allowing believers to join His Divine Light (for example, the Light of Tabor, which the apostles saw). This communion with Divine energies fills hesychast ascetics with the spirit of wisdom, reason, advice, strength, knowledge, piety and fear of God, transforming them and granting real communion with God. A native of Constantinople, Gregory Palamas was of noble family and in his youth received a solid education designed for a political career. But at the age of 20, he broke with secular culture, becoming a monk on Mount Athos, where he stayed for 25 years. There he delved into reading the Bible and the works of the Fathers of the Church, especially in studying the practice of “heartfelt prayer,” this “art above all arts,” of which he became a teacher (hesychasm). Against his own will, he was forced by circumstances to defend this spiritual teaching in writing. Some Western humanists, known for their Thomist and nominalist views - and most notably the monk Barlaam of Calabria - having gained access to the emperor and patriarch (John XIV) of Constantinople, turned the dispute between themselves and Gregory Palamois into an extremely bitter struggle. Gregory was accused of heresy, and spent several years in prison in Thessalonica (1341–1345), where he later became a bishop. During his imprisonment, Palamas wrote some of his most famous treatises. He emerged victorious from this dispute, which was of great importance for the renewal of Greek Orthodoxy. Varlaam's criticism concerned primarily the so-called uncreated energies. Speaking about them, we can distinguish between the divine essence, inaccessible to human consciousness and reason, and the revealed divine light, to which the believer can partake through exercise (ascesis). It is the energetic fullness of this divine light that allows us to achieve what, for example, the prophet Isaiah speaks of as being filled with the spirit of wisdom and reason, the spirit of advice and help, the spirit of knowledge and piety, the spirit of the fear of God. It is this Spirit that descends and fills the “silent” (hesychasts) with light, which can sometimes be seen with bodily eyes. Palamas' teaching was “mystical”, i.e. inaccessible to reason, unconvincing to a believing heart. Even today, Western theology for the most part is skeptical about Palamism. But within Greco-Russian Orthodoxy, this worldview, going back to Plato, occupies approximately the same position as Thomism, going back to Aristotle, in the Roman Church. 22. Τί δὴ τὸ ἐκ τούτων συναγόμενον καὶ τὸ ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ὁμόλογον τῇ Γραφῇ προσμαρτυροῦν; Ὅτι καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, καθ᾽ ἕτερον ἕτερον τρόπον· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὃ ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῶν θείων γινώσκεταί τε καὶ ἀποδείκνυται, τὰ δ᾽ ἀπερινόητά ἐστι καὶ ἀνεξιχνίαστα ? τῶν θείων· ἔστι γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ὧν, καὶ ἔστιν ὥς. Ὡς γὰρ ἡ ἐνανθρώπισις τοῦ Κυρίου ὑπὲρ φύσιν τέ ἐστι καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ λεγομένη ἄρρητος μένει καὶ νοουμένη ἄγνωτος, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπὲρ φύσιν, ὡς ἡ τῆς παρθένου κύησις, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς ὁ τῆς νηδύος ὄγκος μετὰ σύλληψιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀποδεικτόν τέ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀποδεικτόν· ἀμερίστως μέντοι μεριζόμενον τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν τρόπων, ἐπεὶ „καὶ διὰ γνώσεως "" ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ὅτι ἕν ἐστι καὶ γινώσκεται καὶ ἀποδείκνυται, τί δέ ἐστι καὶ τί γε ἓν ἀπερινόητόν ἐστι παντάπασιν. 23. Αλλ᾿ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀκούων Διονυσίου τοῦ μεγάλου λέγοντος ὡς „ἡ θεότης καὶ μονὰς καὶ Τριὰς ὑμνουμένη οὐκ ἔστι οὐδὲ μονὰς οὐδὲ τριὰς ὑπό τινος τῶν ὄντων διεγνωσμένη» οὕτω πως ὡς ἔοικεν ἐνόησεν ὡς ὑπ᾿ οὐδενὸς ὅτι ἔστι μονὰς ἐγνώσθη ὁ δὲ μέγας ἐκεῖνος οὐ τοῦτό φησιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι μὲν ἔστι μονὰς ????? οὖσιν ἐναρίθμων μονάδων, αἵ γε οὐδὲ μονάδες ἂν κυρίως εἶεν, εἴ γε ἡ μονὰς οὐκ ἀριθμός, ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἔγνωσται μονὰς καὶ μόνον, ὅ, τι μὴ δι’ ἀριθμοῦ τε καὶ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς γνωρίζεται· ἡ γὰρ κυρίως οὐκ ἀριθμός· μονὰς οὖν ἡ θεότης, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι διεγνωσμένη, καθάπερ καὶ Γρηγόριος ὁ θεολόγος εἰπὼν „τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ φύσιν ἄληπτόν τε καὶ ἀπερίληπτον“ εὐθὺς ἐπάγει, τῆς τοῦ ῥητοῦ διανοίας ἐρμηνεὺς γινόμενος· „λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὅτι ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἥτις ἐστίν“. Ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος οὗτος ἄληπτον ἐπίσης καὶ ἀναπόδεικτον τίθεται καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἐστί, καὶ ἡ σεμνὴ πρόφασις αὐτῷ τὸ δι’ ἀποδείξεως δεικνύειν ὅτι πάντα τὰ θεῖα ὑπὲρ ἀπόδειξιν. 24. ... ἐστὶ δημιουργός; Οὐδὲ γνωστὰ ἐστί τινα τῶν ἀοράτων ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρωμένων; Οὐδὲ τὸν θεῖον Παῦλον δέξῃ μαρτυροῦντα ὅτι „τὰ ἀόρατα τοῦ ", ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν ἐπαφὴν καὶ γνῶσιν πάντ’ ἐρεῖς τὰ θεῖα; 25. …Σὺ δ’ ὅμως καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν ἡμῖν ἐκφήναις, ὁ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν ὅ, τι ἂν ἐθέλοις λέγων, καὶ μάρτυρα ἡμῖν σοι παρέξεις θαυμαστὸν λέγοντα· „Θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν χαλεπόν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον“. Ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ, τί γε ἐκεῖνο ὅπερ οὐκ οἶδ’ ἤ τοι περὶ σαυτοῦ ἢ κατὰ σαυτοῦ προοιμιαζόμενος πρὸς τοὺς Λατίνους γράφεις, ὅτι “πλείω λέγεις ἢ νοεῖς”; Ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἔστι δημιουργὸς κατανοῶ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργημάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι εἷς ἐστι καὶ νοῶ καὶ ἀποδείκνυμι· πάντα γὰρ ὁρῶ μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς βουλήσεως καὶ σοφίας καὶ δυνάμεως δεόμενα γενέσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντων μία δὲ βούλησις ἅμα καὶ σοφία καὶ δύναμις μιᾶς φύσεώς ἐστιν· εἷς ἄρα τῇ φύσει ὁ δημιουργὸς Θεὸς ἡμῶν. 26. ἀνάλαβέ σου τὰ ἀμυντήρια, προβαλοῦ τοὺς Ἀριστοτέλους ? ὅμως μεῖνον καὶ ταῦτά σοι προθήσομεν εἰς ἐξέτασιν. Νῦν δ᾽ ἴδωμεν διὰ τίνων κατασκευάζει μηδαμῶς εὔλογον εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν ἕνα λέγεσθαι. „Κατὰ μετοχήν“ φησιν „οὐκ ἔστι, καθ’ ὕπαρξιν οὐκ ἔστι, κατ’ ". Τὴν μὲν οὖκ μετοχὴν καὶ ὕπαρξιν παρεῖναί μοι δοκῶ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἠγνόησεν ὅτι μὴ κατὰ μετοχὴν ἔστι τι Θεῷ, τὸ δὲ οὐδεὶς ἐζήτησε τί ἐστι καθ’ ὕπαρξιν Θεός. Κατ’ αἰτίαν δὲ πῶς οὐκ εὔλογον ἕνα τὸν Θεὸν λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἔχω συνιδεῖν, οὐ μόνον ὅπως οὐκ εὔλογον, ἀλλ’ οὐδ᾽ ὅπως ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν, σαφῶς τοῦτο τῶν ἁγίων διαγορευόντων. Ἀλλ’ εἰ κατ’ αἰτίαν τὸν Θεὸν ἓν οὐκ εὔλογον εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς αἴτιος ἔσται, καὶ γὰρ ὧν ἐστιν αἴτιος, ἀπὸ τούτων ἔχει τὰς προσηγορίας· εἰ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Θεὸς αἴτιος, ? ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον ἕν ἐστιν ἢ γένει ἢ εἴδει ' αὐτὰ διαφορᾷ, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἓν εἴη· τὸ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι στοιχειωτικὸν καὶ συνεκτικὸν καὶ συστατικὸν ἁπάντων. Ὥσθ’ ὁ τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ ὤν αἴτιος οὐδενός ἐστιν αἴτιος. 27. „Ἀλλ’ εἰ ὡς αἴτιός“ φησι „τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕν ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, οὐ "" τοίνυν ἕν, τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ τὰ πολλά, καὶ ὡς ὁ Θεὸς ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ μένων καὶ τὰ πολλὰ προάγει, καὶ οὐ προάγει μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ γινώσκει, τοῦ ἑνιαίου μὴ πληθυνομένου τὰς ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσι διαφοράς· ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ μᾶλλον ὁ Θεὸς ἓν ἢ πολλά, διατί εἷς μὲν Θεὸς λέγομεν, πολλοὶ δὲ οὐ λέγομεν; Διατί δὲ πολυώνυμον αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῖς ὀνόμασι συνδιαιροῦμεν; „Ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἶπόν“ φησιν „οὐ μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ πολλά, ἀλλ’ οὐ μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ οὐχ ἕν“. Εἰ οὖν ἔστιν, οὐχ ἓν δέ ἐστι, πολλὰ ἂν εἴη. 28. „Πῶς οὖν“, φησί, „Διονύσιος ὁ μέγας περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ φησιν ὡς οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν“; Ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐπ᾿ ἀναιρέσει τοῦ ἑνός, ὦ βέλτιστε· παράγγελμα γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ μὴ οἴεσθαι τὰς ἀποφάσεις ἀντικειμένας εἶναι ταῖς καταφάσεσιν ἐπὶ Θεοῦ. Σὺ δ᾽ ἐπ᾿ ἀναιρέσει τοῦ ἑνὸς προφέρεις τὸ οὐχ ἕν, τὴν ἀσυνείκαστον ἐκείνην αἰτίαν προστιθεὶς ὡς εἰ κατ’ αἰτίαν ἔστιν ἕν, καθ᾽ ὕπαρξιν οὐκ ἔσται ἕν, ὥστε φησὶν „οὐ μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ οὐχ ἕν“. Τί δή σοι βούλεται τὸ καθ᾽ ὕπαρξιν τοῦτο, ὦ διαλεκτικὲ σὺ καὶ ἄφυκτε; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι, πῶς τὸ κατ᾿ αἰτίαν ἓν οὐκ ἔσται αὖθις οὐδαμῶς ἕν; Αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷ εἶναι ὁ Θεὸς ἓν ὑπὲρ τὸ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἓν καὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἑνὸς αἴτιος καθίσταται, ἀκλίτως ἵν᾿ οὕτως εἶπω ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδιδοὺς καὶ τῆς οἰκείας ἑνότητος ἀγαθότητι μεταδιδοὺς καὶ ἀμεθέκτως μετεχόμενος. Εἰ δὲ τὸ καθ᾽ ὕπαρξιν τοῦτό σοι βούλεται ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸ ἓν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ εὔλογον ἕνα λέγειν τὸν Θεόν, οὐδ᾽ ὁ ἥλιος λοιπὸν εἷς ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ τὸ ἓν οὐσία· εἰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν τοῦ αὐτοενὸς εἷς ἐστιν ὁ ἥλιος, οὐ μᾶλλον εἷς ἢ οὐχ εἷς, ἐπεὶ καθ᾽ ὕπαρξιν οὐκ ἔστιν εἷς. 29. εἰκότως. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ αὐτοὲν οὐ μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ οὐχἓν κατὰ τὴν σὴν σοφίαν, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὅσα τῷ μετέχειν τούτου ἕν οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς δὲ μόνον, ἀλλὰ κἀπὶ τῶν δύο ἢ τριῶν καὶ παντὸς ἀριθμητοῦ· τοῦ γὰρ ποσοῦ μηδέποτε οὐσίας ὄντος, τὰ δύο οὐ μᾶλλον δύο ἢ μὴ δύο· καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατ᾿ ἀριθμὸν δύο, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ὕπαρξιν οὐ δύο πάντως. Ὥστε οὐ τὸν Θεὸν οὐχ ἓν ἀπέδειξεν ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἓν οὐκ ὄν, εἴπερ οὐ μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ οὐχ ἕν, καὶ ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀριθμὸν ἀνεῖλε. Τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν, ἵνα κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φῶμεν ἐπιστήμην, ?? γεννάδας χρῆται, δι’ οὗ καὶ σοφισάμενος, πάντα ἀριθμὸν ἀνεῖλεν ῥᾳδίως δ᾽ ἂν οὕτω τις καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων μὴ μᾶλλον ὂν ἢ μὴ ὂν ἐλέγξειεν. 30. ἐπιλάμπει ἥλιος ἡμᾶς, πλείους δὲ φωστῆρες, πλεῖστοι δὲ ἀστέρες, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ γε ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔψευσται· εἷς γὰρ ὤν, οὐχ εἷς ἐστι ταῖς διαλέξεσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλος καὶ ἐναντίος ἑαυτῷ. Ὁ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μὴ καθ’ ὕπαρξιν ἓν εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν ἰσχυριζόμενος, ἀκούσατε τί λέγει ἀνωτέρω· „ἅ ἐστι ταῖς ἄλλαις οὐσίαις τὰ καθ’ αὑτὸ αὐταῖς λεγόμενα, ταῦτα καὶ τῷ Θεῷ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν λεγόμενα ὑπάρχει· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται εἶναί τε καὶ μή· εἴ τις οὖν ἔροιτό σε“, φησί, „ταῦτα ἃ φῄς περὶ Θεὸν εἶναι ἀνυπόστατά ἐστιν ἢ μετέχει τινὸς ὑπάρξεως: καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐσίαι εἰσὶν ἢ συμβεβηκότα; "; 31. Τί οὖν ἐστιν ὅ φησιν; Ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἢ οὐσία ἢ συμβεβηκός, τὰ δὲ περὶ Θεὸν συμβεβηκότα οὔκ εἰσιν, οὐσίαι ἄρα τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰσιν· εἰ οὖν τούτων τί τις φαίη γινώσκειν, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἄρα λέγει τοῦ Θεοῦ γνωστὴν εἶναι καὶ ἀποδεικτήν. Ὁ γοῦν μηδὲν εἶναι λέγων τὸν Θεὸν καθ᾽ ὕπαρξιν, πάντα νῦν αὖθις λέγει τοῦτον εἶναι καθ᾽ ὕπαρξιν τῷ συμπεριληπτικῷ τῆς διαιρέσεως ἀναγκαίως πρὸς τοῦτο συνωθῶν ἡμᾶς ὡς γ’ οἴεται. Ἐνῆν μὲν οὖν δεῖξαι ὡς οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντα πάντα τῇ διαιρέσει ταύτῃ ???? τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ ὃν συμπεριειλῆφθαι τῇ τῶν ὄντων διαιρέσει· ὑποστάτης γὰρ κατὰ τὸν μέγαν Διονύσιον τούτων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὑπὸ τούτων συνέστηκεν αὐτός, οὐδέ τι συντελοῦσι τὰ περὶ Θεὸν εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὸ Θεόν, οὐδὲ γνωστή ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις, ἵνα καὶ διαφορὰν οὐσιώδη σχοίη, καθὰ καὶ Βασίλειος ὁ μέγας λέγει. Κυρίως γὰρ ὢν καὶ προὼν καὶ μόνος ὢν καὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἑνιαίως ὤν, διαφορᾶς οὐδεμιᾶς δεῖται εἰς τὸ εἶναι· τοῖς γὰρ μετ’ ἐκεῖνον πολλοῖς οὖσι δεῖ διαστολῆς· ὐσίαι τῶν περὶ αὐτόν. 32. Ἧι μέν ἐστιν αὐτὸς οὐσία, ἄρρητός τε καὶ ἀπερινόητος, ᾗ δέ ἐστιν οὐσία τῶν ὄντων, καὶ ζωὴ τῶν ζώντων καὶ σοφία τῶν σοφιζομένων καὶ ἁπλῶς πάντων τῶν τοῦ εζναι καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι μετεχόντων ὀντότης, ἵν’ οὕτως εἴπω, καὶ δύναμις καλλοποιός, καὶ νοεῖται καὶ λέγεται καὶ ἀποδείκνυται, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐστίν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπάρξεώς τινος μετέχει τὰ περὶ Θεόν, οὐχ ὡς οὐσίαι, οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἀνυπόστατα, καθάπερ δικαιοῖς αὐτός, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐνέργειαι οὖσαι τοῦ Θεοῦ· εἰ δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἀποτελέσματά τις εἴποι, καὶ τούτων οὐσίαι μὲν ἔστιν ἅ, θεῖαι δ’ οὔμενουν. Justification of the concept of uncreated divine energy (Second Epistle concerning Barlaam, 22–32) In this polemical message, Gregory, criticizing his opponent Varlaam, defends his own metaphysics of light, using a pronounced Platonic-genological argument, drawn primarily from the “Parmenidean” philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite. Central to this tradition is the distinction between apophatic (negative) and cataphatic (affirmative) theology, the former focusing on the divine essence and the latter on divine energy. 22. What is made up of this, irrefutable and in agreement with Scripture, can we bring as evidence that He is and He is not, each in a special way. This means what we say, that one of the divine is known and proven, while the other is unthinkable and unseen. It is erroneous, therefore, to say that proof is impossible in relation to anything divine; for in relation to some questions it is possible, and perhaps so. After all, just as the incarnation of the Lord is above nature, and in accordance with nature, and remains called ineffable and conceivably unknowable, since one thing here is above nature, such as the pregnancy of a virgin, and the other is in accordance with nature, such as the volume of the mother’s womb after conception, so the divine is both provable and unprovable. Indivisible, of course, is the Divinity, which is divisible in various ways, since “God is known both through knowledge and through ignorance” 1 . For what He is, and that He is one, is both known and proven, but what He is is completely incomprehensible. 23. But the philosopher (Barlaam), hearing that the great Dionysius said that “divinity, praised as Unity and as Trinity, is neither one nor trinity in the understanding of any of the existing ones,” somehow thought, it seems, that no one knows that He is One. That great Dionysius does not say this, but that He is known and glorified as a Unit, but not in the number of units co-identified in the composition of other numbers in existence, which in fact would not be units if it were not for the Unit of non-number. So through this it was mainly understood that He is the One and the One - because He is not known through number and, at the same time, among numbers, for in essence He is not a number. So, divinity is one, but not from among what is known in existence, just like Gregory the Theologian, having said: “God’s nature, inaccessible and incomprehensible,” he immediately added, becoming an interpreter of the expressed thought: “I mean not whether it exists, but what it is” 2. And this philosopher believes that it is equally inaccessible and unprovable that He is and that He is, and this serves him as an excellent basis for showing with the help of proof that everything divine is above proof. 24. ...For what proof can there be that there is a Creator, apart from creatures? And is not something of the invisible known through the visible? And will you not agree with the divine Paul, who testified that “the invisible things of God, which were thought by the creatures from the creation of the world, are visible” (cf. Rom. 1:20), and will you say that the divine is above all touch and knowledge? 25. ... You, however, would explain to us what, in every possible way, you would like, saying that you will present us with a wonderful witness in your favor, saying: “It is difficult to think about God, but it is impossible to say” 3 . But if it seems so to you, then what is it - I don’t know, whether for yourself or against yourself - you write in the introduction, addressing the Latins, that “you say more than you think”? As a creature, I not only understand that there is a Creator, but also that He is one, I understand and affirm. For I see that everything owes its emergence from non-existence to one and the same desire, wisdom and strength. The same desire, wisdom and strength belong to the same nature. Thus, the Creator, our God, is one in nature. 26. Take your means of defense again, display your favorite Aristotelian canons, ask tricky questions and wait a little, we will present them to you for consideration. Now we see that with the help of some people, quotes (?) he constructs the statement that it is by no means blessed to say that God is one. “Neither by virtue of participation,” they say, “neither by being, nor as a cause, God is one.” Participation and being do not help the cause. It seems to me that there are no people who do not know that something with God does not exist by participation, and secondly, no one has investigated what God is by being. Why it is unblessed to say that God is one as a cause, I cannot understand, not only why it is unblessed, but also why he dared, so to speak, when the saints clearly affirm this. But if it is not blessed to call God one as the cause, then He will not turn out to be the cause of one, for what He is the cause of, that is why He has nicknames; if God is not the cause of unity, then He is not the cause of anything that exists. For if the One exists, then everything exists, and for each of the existing things one is either genus, or species, or number. And each of these specific differences would not have existed if it were not for the One. It is, after all, primary, all-encompassing and part of the 4 of everything. So that which is not the cause of one is not the cause of anything at all. 27. “But if,” he says, “there is one God as the cause of the one, then the one is not greater than the many, and yet He is also the cause of many” 5. So, it is needless to say that with many the one is not destroyed at the same time, but with the one the many are destroyed; and that God, being in one, produces many things, and not only produces, but also knows, and the one does not multiply the differences inherent in the multitude. But if God is no more one than many, why do we say that God is one? Why do we call Him by many names, but at the same time we do not separate Him by names? “But I did not say,” he says, “that He is not more one than many, only that He is not more one than not one.” If, then, He exists, then not as one, but, perhaps, as many. 28. “How,” he says, “does the great Dionysius say about God that He is not one”? 6 But he does not reject the one, O best one! He teaches that we should not assume that negations, when applied to God, are the opposite of affirmations. 7 But you, on the basis of the rejection of the one, declare that God is not one, presenting this indescribable Cause as if if in the sense of cause He is one, then in being He will not be one; That’s why he says: “no more one than not one.” What do you want this to be in existence, oh resourceful dialectician? After all, if we mean being in general, then why, in the sense of cause, will in no way be unified in another respect? After all, by being itself, God is one in a sense that exceeds the meaning of the one in existence, and is the cause of the one in existence, inflexibly bestowing Himself and transmitting the benefit of His own unity and being unparticipated. If you want it to be by being, because the essence of God is not one, and therefore, they say, it is not blessed to call God one, then the sun is not one, since it has more than one essence. If the sun is one by the participation of the unit itself, then it is no more one than it is not one, since in being it is not a unit. 29. The same applies to everything that participates in one, and quite rightly. For if the one in itself is not more one than the non-one, according to your wisdom, then much more is that which is one by participation; and this is true not only for one, but also for two, or three, and for any number. For if quantity is never an essence, then two is no more than two than not two; and although in number it is two, in being it is not two at all. So the philosopher not only proved that God is not one, but that the number one does not exist, since one is not more than not one; and thus he simply destroyed every number. This, to tell us about his learning, is a paralogism, meaning ignorance of refutation; it is used by the noble one among theologians, thanks to which the wise one has destroyed all number (for it is not for the same reason that He is one and not one); so someone could easily expose each of the existing ones as no more existing than non-existent. 30. No, but if he would talk nonsense about everything else, the sun alone shines for us, many shine, and the stars multiply in number, but regarding himself he was not mistaken: being one, in his reasoning he is not one, but different and opposite to himself. For here, trying to prove that God is not one in existence, listen to what he writes above: “What other entities call “in itself,” exists also with God, called “with Him.” It is impossible to be and not to be. So, what if,” he says, “someone asks you: is what you call existing “with God” devoid of its own foundation, or is it involved in some kind of being? And if so, is it an essence or an accident? How to avoid calling the divine essence unprovable? 8 31. What is he saying? Since everything is either an essence or an accident, and “with God” there are no accidents, it follows that essences belong to God. If someone calls any of this knowable, then he speaks of the essence of God as knowable and demonstrable. And whoever says that God is nothing in being, immediately at the same time calls everything as such in being, and by the scope of the classification it is necessary to include us in this, of course. So, according to this classification, everything that exists is not encompassed by one. And if it is encompassed, then that which is above being is not so necessary to be included in the classification of being. For the hypostatus (foundation) of such, according to the great Dionysius, is God, and He is not constituted as such, and nothing that exists “with God” has the completion of the existence of God, and His nature is unknowable, so that there is an essentially (substantial) divorce between natures, as Basil the Great says 9 . For the Lord is existing and pre-existing and the only existing and simply and uniquely existing and does not need any distinction in order to be; and for those who are “with Him,” which are many, discernment is required. So God’s essences are those “with God,” and He Himself is the essence of those who are “with Him.” 32. Since He Himself is an essence, ineffable and inconceivable, since He is the essence of those who exist, the life of the living, the wisdom of those who sage, and in general all those who participate in being and good being, so to speak, the essence and good-creating power, He is thought and named and revealed, although He does not “since” exist. If that which is “with God” participates in some kind of being, then not as an essence, and not as something devoid of foundation, but in exactly the same way as He gives to the worthy, but as the energy of God existing. If someone says that this is the result of actions (energies), then they also have essences that are in no way divine. Dionysius the Areopagite. On divine names, 7, 3. Three technical terms of Aristotelian and Stoic logic. Varlaam. First letter to Palamas. P. 259. Dionysius the Areopagite. On divine names, 13, 3. Dionysius the Areopagite. On mystical theology, 5. Varlaam. First letter to Palamas. P. 255.