The problem of the objectivity of human ideas about God in the theology of St. Maximus the Confessor using the example of Ambigua 19 and Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59

Contents Part 1 Introduction 1. Created thinking and the uncreated God: philosophical and theological foundations of the problem of the unthinkability of God 2. Formation of ideas about God 2.1. Prophetic visions Sources and literature Literature Part 2 2.2. Discursive theology 2.3. The Relationship of Discursive Theology and Prophetic Visions Conclusion Sources and Literature Sources Literature Abstract: The purpose of the article is to show how the problem of the objectivity of human ideas about God is solved in the theology of St. Maximus the Confessor. To resolve this problem, the first part of the article proposes an analysis of Ambigua 19 prp. Maximus the Confessor, where the saint considers three types of prophetic visions: “daytime vision” (ἡ ἡμερινή φαντασία), “unfalse night vision” (νυκτὸς ἀψευδὴς ὄψις), “the seal of the sovereign” (τύπωσις τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ). The analysis of Ambigua 19 is accompanied by an analysis of the concepts of “idea” (φαντασία) and “mind” (νοῦς) in the context of the anthropology of St. Maximus the Confessor. A direct turn to the analysis of Ambigua 19 is preceded by a consideration of the philosophical and theological foundations of the problem of the objectivity of human ideas about God. The analysis showed that with all the listed types of prophetic visions, the prophet does not perceive from the outside any sensory symbols, images, sounds or spoken words created by God. But with the “daytime vision” and the “non-false night vision”, God Himself influences the “idea” (φαντασία) of the prophet and “forms” (διατυποῖ) in him an “idea” (φάντασμα) about Himself or about the revelation He communicates. Communicating Divine revelation, God influences not only the “idea” (φαντασία) of the unreasonable soul, but also the “mind” (νοῦς), i.e., the “sovereign”, in which He also Himself forms a certain “imprint” (τύπωσις), corresponding to the goals of Divine revelation. About the author: Vadim Evgenievich Elimanov Master of Theology, senior lecturer at the Department of Theology of the Moscow Theological Academy. E-mail: elimanov202@gmail.com ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000–0002–6779–8104 For citation: Elimanov V. E. The problem of the objectivity of human ideas about God in the theology of St. Maximus the Confessor using the example of Ambigua 19 and Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59 (Part 1) // Christian reading. 2023. No. 3. pp. 12–31. The Problem of the Objectivity of Human Conceptions of God in the Theology of St. Maxim the Confessor by the Example of Amb. 19 and Quaest. ad Thalas. 59 (Part 1) Abstract: The purpose of this article is to show how the problem of the objectivity of human conceptions of God is dealt with in the theology of st. Maximus the Confessor. To resolve this problem, the first part of the article offers an analysis of Ambigua 19 of st. Maximus the Confessor, where the saint considers three kinds of prophetic visions: “day imagination” (ἡ ἡμερινή φαντασία), “truthful vision in the night” (νυκτὸς ἀψευδὴς ὄψις), “an imprint made on the governing power" The analysis of Ambigua 19 is accompanied by a parsing of the concepts of “imagination” (φαντασία) and “mind” (νοῦς) in the context of the anthropology of st. Maximus the Confessor. The direct appeal to the analysis of Ambigua 19 is preceded by an examination of the philosophical and theological foundations of the problem of the objectivity of human conceptions of God. The analysis has shown that in all the above kinds of prophetic visions the prophet does not perceive from outside any sensual symbols, images, sounds or spoken words created by God. But in the “day imagination” and the “truthful vision in the night” God Himself influences the prophet's “imagination” (φαντασία) and “forms” (διατυποῖ) in him a “representation” (φάντασμα) of Himself or of the revelation He communicates. In communicating Divine revelation, God influences not only the “imagination” (φαντασία) of the unreasonable soul, but also the “mind” (νοῦς), that is the governing power, in which He Himself also forms a certain “imprint” (τύπωσις) corresponding to the aims of Divine revelation. About the author: Vadim Evgenievich Elimanov MA in Theology, Senior Lecturer at the Theology Department at the Moscow Theological Academy. For citation: Elimanov V. E. “The Problem of the Objectivity of Human Conceptions of God in the Theology of St. Maxim the Confessor by the Example of Amb. 19 and Quaest. ad Thalas. 59. Part 1.” Khristianskoye Chteniye, 2023, no. 3, pp. 12–31. In modern Christian theology since the 19th century. There is a strong tendency to consider human knowledge and ideas about God to be relative and lacking objectivity 1 . The impossibility of both an objective description of the transcendental God and an objective transmission of Divine revelation by means of limited, inexpressive human language is affirmed. The basic methodological principle of this attitude is the doctrine of the inaccessibility of the human mind to know God and the impossibility of objectively describing Him. In order to resolve the problem of the objectivity of human ideas about God in the context of Orthodox theology, this article offers an analysis of two texts by St. Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 19 and Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59, in which he considers the way of transmitting Divine revelation through prophetic visions, as well as the possibility of objective discursive theology as such reasoning about God, which presupposes a special Divine influence on the thinking and mind of the theologian. A direct turn to the analysis of Ambigua 19 and Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59 is preceded by a consideration of the philosophical and theological foundations of the problem of the objectivity of human ideas about God. As a philosophical introduction to the problem, an appeal to the general provisions of Aristotle’s teaching on knowledge is proposed, since in general the theological thought of St. Maximus the Confessor reveals quite strong parallels with the philosophy of Stagirite [Moreschini, 2006, 105–124; Bradshaw 2004, 187–207; Searby, 1998, 59–61]. The theological problematization of the topic under consideration is carried out with the involvement of the texts of St. Maxima, St. Gregory Palamas and the Areopagite Corps. 1. Created thinking and the uncreated God: philosophical and theological foundations of the problem of the inconceivability of God According to the axiomatics of empiricism as a special epistemological position, “the source and justification of all knowledge is sensory experience” [Lektorsky, 2001, 438]. This position was first philosophically substantiated by Aristotle, who stated that the idea of ​​a thing is nothing more than an “imprint” (σημεῖον) of this thing in a person’s memory [De Sensu et Sensibili 436a 7–11, Aristotle, 1995, 71]. This view of the nature of the act of cognition is still the most common. In his treatise “On the Soul,” Aristotle makes the following comparison, illustrating the process of forming an idea about any object: just as wax takes the shape (imprint) of a ring without taking in its matter, so every human sense organ perceives the form of a perceived object without its matter 2 . Thus, the organ of perception becomes new matter for the form of the object. Further, the forms of objects, which were separated from the objects themselves by separate organs of sensation, are transmitted to a certain “general sense” (κοινὴ αἴσθησις). This general feeling is such an ability of the soul, located in the heart (see: [Mesyats, 2005, 396]), which, collecting all the forms delivered by the senses, connects them with each other and forms a single and integral “idea” (φάντασμα) about the object as a whole 3. Consequently, this same general feeling is, firstly, an organ of representation (φαντασία) 4 in which “ideas” (φαντάσματα) about objects 5 arise, and secondly, an organ of memory in which these ideas are stored, being imprinted in its substance. It is these ideas (φαντάσματα), located in the general sense, that the mind (νοῦς) contemplates when it thinks about any sensory or intelligible objects: “When the mind contemplates, it necessarily contemplates a certain idea (φάντασμα), because ideas are, as it were, objects of sensation (αἰσθήματα), only without matter... 6 The mind reasons with the help of ideas (φαντάσμασιν) or thoughts (νοήμασιν) located in the soul, as if seeing them with its eyes” 7 . It follows from this, as S. V. Mesyats emphasizes, that “according to Aristotle’s conviction, our thinking is always thinking in ideas” [Mesyats, 2005, 396]. In addition to what has been said, an important position of Aristotle’s epistemology is the thesis according to which everything that can be thought of must initially always be given in the experience of sensation (αἴσθησις): “What is comprehended by the mind (τὰ νοητά) is always given in sensually perceived forms (εἴδεσι): this also includes the so-called abstract, and all the properties and states of the sensed. Therefore, a creature that does not have sensations (μὴ αἰσθανόμενος) will not learn anything and will not understand anything. When one contemplates with the mind, it is necessary that at the same time one contemplates in ideas, because ideas (φαντάσματα) are like objects of sensation (αἰσθήματα), only without matter” 8 . Even such “abstract” objects of thought as geometric figures or numbers can be imagined by a person only thanks to the ability of sensation. For example, when we think of a triangle, we seem to draw it in our imagination (idea) from angles and straight lines, the concepts of which we glean from sensory experience given thanks to the ability to sense the world around us (see: [Mesyats, 2005, 396]). Moreover, thanks to sensation, a person can imagine something that he has never seen or that does not exist in reality. The process of mental representation (agglutination) is carried out by the mind and involves the creation of a new representation from elements of other representations that already exist in human memory and have their referents in the sensory or intelligible world. Thus, a person can imagine a centaur thanks to the mental operation of connecting the body of a horse with the head and torso of a person. But a person can create a new idea only from the ideas of those objects that were given to him directly in the experience of sensory sensation, therefore it is impossible to think or imagine something that, in principle, does not consist of elements of the sensory or intelligible world around us 9. Thus, the process of forming an idea (φάντασμα) about an object in Aristotle’s epistemology, firstly, is inextricably linked with the experience of sensory perception (αἴσθησις) and is impossible without it, and secondly, it presupposes the activity of both the general sense in the formation of the idea and the mind (νοῦς) contemplating this idea. However, God, as St. Maximus the Confessor, in principle, cannot be thought or represented, since it cannot be given in the experience of sensory perception (αἴσθησις), like, for example, the things of the sensory world. This is the position according to which God cannot be conceived in any way, St. Maxim repeats this many times in his writings. So, for example, in Ambigua 10/30 he writes: “God surpasses all power and energy of the mind, leaving absolutely no imprint (τύπος) in the thinking that tries to think [Him]” 10. With these words, the saint clearly makes it clear that the Aristotelian model of knowledge is not applicable to the knowledge of God: when God unites with a person during mystical illumination, then He, as completely foreign to the human mind, cannot leave an “imprint” of Himself in it, just as sensory objects leave an “imprint” in the mind 11 . The rational soul of man, as St. Maximus the Confessor, thinks only that which “can be thought by nature,” that is, all things “sensible and intelligible,” in other words, “created” (κτιστοί) 12. However, God, according to St. Maxim, - “uncreated” (ἄκτιστος) both in His energies (ἐνέργειαι) and in essence (οὐσία) 13, therefore He “is not something of the conceivable (νοουμένων) or predicable (λεγομένων), so that the soul could have any thinking (νόησιν) about Him in any relation (κατά τινα σχέσιν)” 14; “God surpasses [everything], remains completely inaccessible (ἀψαύστου), and no speculation (νόησιν) comprehends Him” 15. The soul does not know God either with the mind (νοῦς) or with reason (λόγος): the soul, having become “above the mind, reason and knowledge, is unknown, inexpressible and by simple touch (κατὰ ἁπλῆν προσβολὴν) (ἑνωθήσεται) with God, without thinking at all or reasoning about God” 16. Moreover, as stated by Rev. Maxim, “the wise [men] say that it is impossible for understanding regarding God (τὸν περὶ θεοῦ λόγον) to exist together with experience (τῇ πείρᾳ) of God, and thinking (νόησιν) regarding Him - with sensation (αἴσθησιν) Him" 17 . The problem of the unthinkability of God is formulated most clearly by the author of the Areopagite Corpus. Starting to write the treatise “On the Divine Names,” he asks the question: “And if It [i.e. super-essential radiance (ἡ ὑπερούσιος ἀκτίς)] surpasses every word and all knowledge and remains above any mind and essence, embracing everything that exists, uniting, combining and embracing in advance, while itself being completely incomprehensible for everything, not perceivable by any sense (οὔτε αἴσθησις), nor representation (οὔτε φαντασία), nor judgment (οὔτε δόξα), nor name (οὔτε ὄνομα), nor word (οὔτε λόγος), nor touch (οὔτε ἐπαφὴ), nor knowledge (οὔτε ἐπιστήμη), how can we write an essay “On Divine Names”, when the super-essential Deity turns out to be unnameable (ἀκλήτου) and abiding above names (ὑπερωνύμου)?” 18. From this it follows nothing more than that a person cannot, in principle, know God either with the senses, or with the mind, or with any of his other natural abilities: “After all, if all knowledge is connected with the existing and has a limit in the existing, then what is beyond the essence is also beyond the limits of all knowledge” 19. Commenting on the above fragment, John of Scythopolis draws attention to the fact that by “touch” (ἐπαφή) is meant “smart comprehension” (ἡ νοερὰ κατάληψις). The mind in the process of cognition has the opportunity to “touch” (ἅπτεσθαι) and “feel” (αἰσθάνεσθαι) the mental object of cognition, that is, “intelligible and immaterial,” “like touching the sensible” (ἁφῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν) 20 . As a consequence, following the thought of the author of the Areopagite corpus, John of Scythopolis concludes that since God does not have the same nature as human thought, therefore He cannot be comprehended with the help of thought: “We cannot even mentally touch God” (ἐπὶ δὲ θεοῦ οὐδὲ νοερῶς ἐφαπτόμεθα) 21 . In the XIV century. The question of the possibility of thinking about God is raised by St. Gregory Palamas, who develops the most important opposition for patristic Byzantine theology between created (κτιστός) and uncreated (ἄκτιστος) existence 22. Following the author of the Areopagite Corpus and St. Maxim also denies the possibility of thinking about God, and knowing Him by any abilities of human nature, since the created (κτιστός), that is, man, by definition, cannot know the uncreated (ἄκτιστος), that is, God, His uncreated energies and essence: “This light is beginningless and infinite, then it is neither sensory nor intelligible in the proper sense of the word, but spiritual and Divine, in the highest degree removed from all created things; and what is not sensual (μήτε αἰσθητόν) and not intelligible (μήτε νοητόν), is not subject to either sensation (οὐδ’ αἰσθήσει) as sensation, or mental power (οὐδὲ νοερᾷ δυνάμει) by itself" 23 . As St. emphasizes. Gregory, he “fell into extreme madness” who “recklessly decided to see the supernatural (τὰ ὑπὲρ φύσιν) with natural knowledge (φυσικῇ γνώσει) and with the help of natural reason (φυσικῇ διανοίᾳ) and carnal philosophy to explore and explain the depths of God, known only to the Spirit, and spiritual gifts, known only to those who are spiritual and have the mind of Christ” 24. Despite the fact that experimental knowledge of God as a union with Him is possible, this knowledge exceeds all natural human abilities: “But this contemplator, realizing that he does not see with his senses as such, thinks that he sees with his mind; but, examining and carefully examining, he discovers that the mind is also inactive in relation to the light; and this we call “understanding above understanding,” saying by this that the owner of the mind and feelings sees, but sees above both” 25 . Neither with the powers of his soul (mind, feeling, will), nor even with his bodily senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch) can a person cognize the uncreated Divine light. Following the thought of Aristotle, St. Gregory claims that all thinking (διάνοια) is inextricably linked with imagination, that is, representation (φαντασία) 26. And since God is completely alien to the world, both sensual and intelligible, then He cannot be thought or imagined. Indeed, any thinking can only be in relation to something created. In relation to the uncreated God, thinking is impossible, therefore a person cannot think with his created thinking of the uncreated God or grasp him with his mind. The human mind, as one of the natural energies of his rational soul 27, cannot embrace God and think of Him, but contemplating the uncreated God (His Divine energy) in deification, he seems to go blind 28. This is due to the fact that during the experimental knowledge of God, a person’s natural energies are inactive, because it is not through them that a person experiences God 29 . From what has been said it follows that all human thinking about God, in the strict sense of the word, is not thinking about the uncreated God, but thinking regarding the created concept of God. It is necessary to distinguish between thinking regarding the concept of God and knowledge of God Himself. The first is created and accessible to knowledge by the created forces of human nature, and the second is uncreated and is realized only by the action of God Himself. Thus, the problem of the objectivity of human ideas about God can be formulated in the form of the following questions 30: 1) If no created thinking about God Himself and His uncreated Divine energies is possible, then on what basis can we assert that our knowledge of God, presented in the texts of Holy Scripture and Tradition, is objective? In other words, to what extent do created concepts about God objectively reflect the uncreated God Himself? 2) On what basis can one assert that certain reasonings of the holy fathers about God or about the revelation He communicates, presented in their works, are true? Are not the reasonings of the holy fathers in the field of theology simply their “private theological opinion”, the fruit of their intellectual activity, conditioned only by their education? 3) What is the nature of Divine revelation if God cannot be seen, heard, or in any way sensually or mentally comprehended? We find detailed and theologically and philosophically reasoned answers to the questions posed in two texts by St. Maximus of the Confessor: Ambigua ad Ioannem 19 and Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59, in which he, respectively, considers the method of transmitting Divine revelation through prophetic visions, as well as the conditions under which such reasoning about God is possible, that is, discursive theology, which would lead the theologian to conclusions that are true and objective, and not probabilistic and subjective. 2. Formation of ideas about God To the question of how God communicates to man knowledge of Himself and His will through prophetic visions and revelations, Rev. Maxim devotes the entire Ambigua 19. In this Ambigua St. Maxim comments on a passage from the 28th Word of St. Gregory the Theologian, in which the saint asks the question of how the prophet. Isaiah “saw the Lord of Hosts sitting on the throne of glory, surrounded, glorified and covered by six-winged seraphim” (Isaiah 6:1–7), and the prophet. Ezekiel - “the cherubim, and above them is the throne, and above the throne is the firmament, and in the firmament of Him who appeared” (Ezekiel 1:22–27) 31. Discussing this topic, Rev. Maxim, following St. Gregory the Theologian considers three types of prophetic visions, that is, Divine revelations: “daytime vision” (ἡ ἡμερινή φαντασία), “unfalse night vision” (νυκτὸς ἀψευδὴς ὄψις), “the seal of the sovereign” (τύπωσις τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ) 32. “Daily performance” is “seeing and hearing words and objects heard and revealed to the saint not personally (ἀπροσώπως), but spiritually, as through feeling (δι’ αἰσθήσεως)” 33. The “presentation” about which St. Maxim, is not the ability to fantasize, imagine or invent, but an ability that, firstly, forms images (representations) of sensory objects and, secondly, stores them in itself. Before directly moving on to the consideration of prophetic ideas, following the logic of Ambigua 19, it is first necessary to briefly describe the teaching of St. Maxim on “representation” (φαντασία) and the related anthropological and epistemological views of St. Maxima. In order to understand more clearly and more fully the process of forming a holistic idea of ​​the subject, St. Maxim proposes to distinguish the following four concepts: “the ability to represent” (τὸ φανταστικόν), “the subject of representation” (τὸ φανταστόν), “representation” (ἡ φαντασία) as the actualization of the “ability to represent” and the result of “representation” - “presented itself” (τὸ φάντασμα), that is, a certain mental image 34. “What is presented” is “the limit of action and suffering” (πέρας ὑπάρχον ἐνεργείας καὶ πάθους), since in the act of “representation” the “ability of representation” “acts” (ἐνέργει), and the “object of representation” “undergoes” (πάσχει) on itself this action of the “ability of representation”: “The action of the ability of representation (φανταστικοῦ) and the undergoing of the subject of representation (φανταστοῦ) are extremes connected around [presented] through representation (τῆς φαντασίας) as a relationship between them” 35 . Formed through the act of representation (φαντασία), mental representations-images (φαντάσματα) are stored in the representation itself as in the organ of memory, therefore “every idea (πᾶσα φαντασία) is either about past [events] or about present ones, but in no way about those that have not yet occurred” 36. St. Maxim identifies the concept of “idea” (φαντασία) with the concept of “passive mind” (ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς) 37: “For having received from God a soul that has mind, word and feeling, [they also received] this [feeling], which senses in addition to the mental feeling, as well as the word, in addition to the internal, and pronounced, and the mind (νοῦν), in addition to the mental (πρὸς τῷ νοητῷ), and passive (τὸν παθητικὸν) (which [mind] in an animal is called representation (φαντασίαν): this [mind animals] recognize other animals, and each other, and us, and the places through which they passed; in relation to it, as the wise say in such [things], the feeling is created, which is for them an instrument (ὄργανον), perceiving what appears to them), [the saints] considered that in justice their energy should be presented not to themselves, but to God who gave [them], through Whom and from Whom. everything" 38 . For the first time such an identification of “idea” (φαντασία) with the “passive mind” (ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς) is found in Proclus 39. Commenting on the above fragment, I. D. Kolbutova notes the fact that here “Saint Maximus, apparently, connected the lower phantasia of the late Neoplatonic commentators, identified with nous pathētikos, with the ability of Plotinus’ imagination, associated with the higher part of the soul, which “shows the content of the mental act as if in a mirror (οἷον ἐν κατόπτρῳ), thanks to which its perception (ἀντίληψις), preservation and memory of it takes place in the soul." 40. Approval of Rev. The maxim, according to which the ability to imagine (that is, the “passive mind”) is also inherent in animals, directly indicates that “idea” (φαντασία) is the ability of the unreasonable (animal) soul 41, which is characteristic of both animals and humans 42. In addition to the above fragment, in the “Chapters on Love” St. Maxim directly says that the “ability of representation” (τὸ φανταστικόν/ἡ φανταστικὴ), and therefore the “representation” itself (including as an organ of memory), belongs to animals and is not a property (power) of the rational immortal soul: “Of the powers of the soul, some are nutritious and vegetable, others relate to the ability of imagination (ἡ φανταστικὴ) and desire, others - to the ability of understanding (λογιστικὴ) and thinking (νοητική). Plants participate only in the first, irrational animals also participate in the second, and people participate in all three. The first two forces are perishable, and the third is incorruptible and immortal” 43. It is important to note that Rev. Maxim does not identify the irrational (animal) soul with the body in itself: the irrational soul is not in the body as its part 44, although its existence directly depends on it. However, from what has been said it does not at all follow that the rational soul is devoid of memory: in some places of his writings, St. Maxim makes it clear that the rational soul (or, in other words, “mind”) also has memory (μνήμη) 45. According to Carlos Steele, Rev. Maximus, by completely identifying the “passive mind” and “idea,” diverges from the Neoplatonic tradition: such commentators of Aristotle as Syrian, Proclus, John Philoponus, who identified the “passive mind” with “idea” when interpreting Aristoteles. De anima 3.10.433a 9–12, they believe, in contrast to St. Maxim that “passive mind” can only be called the “idea” of a rational being, that is, a person, and not the “idea” of irrational animals (see: [Steel, 2012, 242]). However, Aristotle himself, like St. Maxim, believes that “idea” is characteristic of animals: “Sensation (αἴσθησις) is always present, but representation (φαντασία) is not. If they were one and the same in action, then perhaps imagination would be inherent in all animals. But apparently, it is not inherent in everyone, for example: it is not inherent in the ant, the bee, the worm” 46, “and some animals, although they have an idea (φαντασία), they do not have reason (λόγος)” 47. One cannot ignore the fact that St. Maxim allows terminological diversity and uses the term “φαντασία” not only as indicating the act of “representation,” but also denotes the image itself presented in this “representation” 48. In this sense, “τὸ φάντασμα” is no different from “ἡ φαντασία”. For example, Rev. Maxim writes: “What things we were once partial to, we retain passionate ideas about (ἐμπαθεῖς φαντασίας), therefore, the one who overcomes passionate ideas certainly despises the objects of these passionate ideas. For fighting with memories is just as difficult as fighting with things, just as it is easier to sin in thought than in deed” 49 . So, representation (φαντασία) is not the rational thinking of the rational soul, but the irrational process of the formation of ideas in the irrational soul of a person, occurring in the act of sensory cognition 50. In addition, the idea is at the same time an organ of memory in which all ideas (φαντάσματα) about ever known objects are stored. These representations-images (φαντάσματα) constitute the very internal content of the representation (φαντασία). As a consequence, the “thinking mind” (ὁ νοητὸς νοῦς) can think only those representations-images (φαντάσματα) that are contained in the “passive mind” (ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς), that is, in the representation (φαντασία). As stated above, representation-images (φαντάσματα), formed in the act of representation by the subject of representation, are the result of “suffering” the object of representation. Unlike representation based on sensory experience, in prophetic vision God becomes actively “acting,” and the prophet and the representation (φαντασία) of his soul become “enduring.” This is due to the fact that God, as an uncreated Being in principle, cannot be an object of representation, thinking or sensory knowledge, that is, cannot be an object of suffering 51. In the act of prophetic vision, as in the act of deification, 52 there is a change in activity between the knower and the known: only the “knowable” God acts, and the “knowing” prophet only undergoes this action of God. Prophetic vision is not the result of the action of the “idea” (φαντασία) of the prophet himself, but the result of the influence of God on his “idea” (φαντασία). As a result, with a prophetic vision, the revelation of something fundamentally new and previously unknown is possible. As a result of this Divine influence, which in itself is neither sensory nor mental, the prophet “truly hears and sees,” that is, the prophet receives in revelation a certain idea (φάντασμα), although God Himself does not appear to him in the form of sensory symbols or sounds: “For in relation to Divine [things] it should not be asserted that for the purpose of capturing the imagination (διατύπωσιν τῆς φαντασίας) imaginary (φανταστόν) must certainly be present [real]; but, even if the face is not present and sensually perceived voices are not heard in the air, the imagination acts in a miraculous and supernatural way, so that the one introduced to the Divine mysteries truly hears and sees” 53 . In the “daytime presentation” (ἡ ἡμερινή φαντασία), God is not the object of the prophet’s vision or thought, and He does not create any sensory symbols or phenomena (light, images, words, sounds, etc.) to convey His revelation 54 . But God Himself actively influences the representation (φαντασία) of the prophet and through this representation “forms” (διατυποῖ) in the representation itself certain images, words, sounds 55 . At the same time, it is important that the representation itself in the act of receiving revelation is not active, but passive, for it undergoes (πάσχει) the influence of God (see: [Benevich, 2020, 590]). According to the thought of St. Maxim, when “impressing the representation” (διατύπωσις τῆς φαντασίας) of the soul of the prophet, God does not create “out of nothing” in the representation itself any new representations-images (φαντάσματα). But God “forms” (διατυποῖ) in the “representation” (φαντασία) of the prophet an “image” (διατύπωσις) of Himself or some revelation from those very representations-images (φαντάσματα) that are already in this "representation" are contained. This is precisely what explains the anthropomorphic nature of both the prophetic visions themselves and the language of their description. The same idea is expressed by John of Scythopolis in the scholium “201, 2 B” on the treatise “On the Divine Names”, where he distinguishes three types of representation, of which the second type is “a representation composed of retained remnants of such, which does not have any support in real images, which is called fantasy proper” 56. Here John of Scythopolis also recognizes that our ability to imagine and “fantasize” is directly limited by those “image-representations” that are contained in the “representation” as an organ of memory. Thus, it is impossible to imagine or fantasize anything that does not consist of parts of “idea-images” obtained as a result of sensory perception. Since all representations-images (φαντάσματα), which exist in the representation (φαντασία) of a person as in the organ of memory, are in one way or another connected with sensually perceived reality, then, as the author of the Areopagite Corpus notes, theologians describe God using only images borrowed from the created world: “They call the transcendent and every name of Goodness by the names of one, then another reason and power, giving Her sometimes human, sometimes fiery, sometimes amber forms and appearance, praising Her “eyes” (Ps 90:8; 11:42), “ears” (James 5:4), “hair” (Dan 7:9), “face” (Ps 33:17), “hands” (Job 10:8), “back”, “wings” (Ps 90:4), “shoulders” (Ps 91:4), “back” (Deut 33:23) and “legs” (De 24:10). They supply Her with crowns (Rev 14:14), thrones (Eze 1:26), cups, bowls (Ps 74:9; Proverbs 9:2-3) and other things full of mysterious meaning” 57. As a consequence, describing God or prophetic visions in human language outside the categories, concepts, and images of the created world is impossible. Due to the fact that during the “daytime presentation” God acts only on the presentation (φαντασία), the organs of sensory perception are inactive, therefore St. Maximus likens this type of Divine revelation to a human dream: “For if we, imagining [something] at night in a dream, both see [it] and hear, while often there is no one speaking or visible, then it is much more true that the saints experience this in vigil, since God by wonderful grace works (ἐνεργοῦντος) in them when they are awake, what we usually endure (πάσχειν) in sleep according to the law of nature" 58 . Arguing that there is no necessary connection between the act of representation (φαντασία) and sensory perception, St. Maximus follows the thought of Aristotle 59 . As with the “daytime vision”, with the “non-false night vision” (νυκτὸς ἀψευδὴς ὄψις), that is, dream vision, absolute activity is on the side of God, Who “imagines” in the “soul” of the saints special dreams, through which He communicates His will, as was the case, for example, in the case of the prophet. Daniel (see Dan 2:19) and Joseph, son of Jacob (see Gen 41:38) 60. St. Maximus does not specify in Ambigua 19 what he means by the “soul” in which God impresses prophetic dreams: a rational or irrational (animal) soul. Most likely, we are talking about an unreasonable soul, which is characterized by “idea” (φαντασία). This statement is confirmed by many fragments from the “Chapters on Love” 61, as well as by the fact that a dream is not thinking (νόησις), but a consistent replacement of some “ideas-images” (φαντάσματα) by others. In particular, St. pointed out the fact that dreams are characteristic of an unreasonable soul. Gregory of Nyssa: “But we say that only the rational and ordered activity (energy) of the understanding should be attributed to the mind, and all absurd ghosts dreamed up in dreams, in our opinion, are created by the dumb form of the soul (τῷ ἀλογωτέρῳ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδει) as some pathetic semblance of the energy of the mind... But it seems to me that in a dream the more honorable powers of the soul ψυχῆς) are calmed - I’m talking about the energies of the mind (νοῦν) and feelings - and only the nutritional (θρεπτικὸν) part of it remains active. It is in it that images (εἴδους) are imprinted (ἐνετυπώθη) by the remembering [ability] of this type of soul (τοῦ μνημονευτικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς), similarities (εἴδωλα) of something that happens in reality, and echoes (ἀπηχήματα) produced by feeling and understanding” 62. In addition to night vision, as noted by St. Maxim, there is another “certain vision (ὀπτασίαν) of Divine things (θείων πραγμάτων), accessible to the bodily eyes (σαρκὸς ὀφθαλμοῖς) of the saints due to extreme dispassion due to great purity" 63. About this vision (ὀπτασία), which occurs in reality, and not in a dream, St. Maxim writes in Ambigua 10/17, dedicated to “the contemplation of the Transfiguration of the Lord” 64. Christ, having been transfigured before the apostles on Mount Tabor, with His Divine grace purified their “mental power” (νοερὰ δύναμις) and “sense organs of soul and body” (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος αἰσθητήρια), as a result of which the apostles became able to “assimilate (ἐκπαιδεύονται) the spiritual meanings (λόγους) of the sacraments revealed to them” 65. When seeing (ὀπτασία) the Tabor light with bodily eyes, absolute activity is also on the side of God, and not man, since the Tabor light “exceeds any action of the eyes” (πᾶσαν ὀφθαλμῶν νικῶσαν ἐνέργειαν) 66 . By the light of Tabor itself, the apostles “were guided” (χειραγωγούμενοι) to “the concept (ἔννοιαν) that Christ is “beautiful in beauty above the sons of men”” 67. If about “imprinting the imagination” (διατύπωσις τῆς φαντασίας) St. Maxim writes in detail and in detail, then speaking about the “sealing of the sovereign” (τύπωσις τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ), he limits himself to a short sentence: “With the “sealing” (τύπωσιν) of the “sovereign” he [St. Gregory the Theologian], apparently, as I believe, calls the imprints (τύπους) of future [events], which appear to the saints only uniformly (μονοτρόπως), as if in a picture, according to the simple and unextended touch (προσβολήν) of the intelligent [beginning]" 68 . Of course, under “sovereign” (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) St. Maximus, following the Stoic tradition, understands “mind” (νοῦς), which he also calls “the sovereign of the soul” (ἡγεμονικόν τῆς ψυχῆς) 69. In order to understand how God “imprints” the mind of the prophet, it is necessary to first establish that the Rev. Maxim understands by “mind”. Describing the structure of the rational soul in Ambigua 15, Rev. Maxim writes: “The soul, being an intelligent (νοερά) and rational (λογική) entity, thinks (νοεῖ) and reasons (λογίζεται), [so] its ability (δύναμιν) is mind (νοῦν), movement (κίνησιν) is thinking (νόησιν), and realized reality (ἐνέργειαν) is thought (νόημα). For [thought] is the limit of thinking (νοήσεως) both for the thinker (νοοῦντος) and for the thought (νοουμένου), for it is the determinant of the mutual relationship of extremes” 70 . So, “mind” is the “ability” (δύναμις) of the rational soul to “think”, “thinking” (νόησις) is the “movement” (κίνησις) of the mind, and “thought” (νόημα) is the “result” (ἐνέργεια) "thinking". At the same time, a rational soul cannot help but think, since thinking, that is, the mind in motion, is its “natural movement” (φυσικὴ κίνησις) 71 . The thinking of the rational soul “stops” (παύεται) only when it thinks and goes through “all thoughts about all conceivable [things] (νοουμένων), sensory (αἰσθητῶν) and intelligible (νοητῶν)” and “becoming above the mind (ὑπὲρ νοῦν), reason (λόγον) and knowledge (γνῶσιν), unknown, inexpressible and by simple application (κατὰ ἁπλῆν προσβολήν) will unite with God, not thinking (οὐ νοοῦσα) at all and not reasoning (οὔτε λογιζομένη) about God” 72. The thinking of the rational soul through the mind provides “knowledge (γνῶσις), called indivisible (ἀμερής), non-quantitative (ἄποσος) and united (ἑνιαία)” 73. This is partly due to the fact that the rational soul thinks not with “ideas” (φαντάσματα), but with simple “thoughts” (νοήματα), or otherwise concepts 74 about things that are “within” (ἔσωθεν) of the mind: “Things are outside the mind, but thoughts (νοήματα) about them are formed (συνίστανται) within him” 75. Thought about the subject, according to St. Maxima, “is imprinted” (τυποῦται) on the knowing mind 76. Cognizing, the mind does not “reason” (λογίζεται 77 /διακρίνει 78) with inferences, as is characteristic of reason, but “grasps” (λαμβάνει 79 /ἀντιλαμβάνει 80) intelligible reality. Although the thinking of the mind is “non-fractional” (ἀμερής) and “simple” (ἁπλότητος) 81, it is always performed “in relation to some kind of relation” (κατά τινα σχέσιν), that is, “in relation” to the sensory ( αἰσθητός) and the intelligible (νοητός) world 82: thinking thinks only with those thoughts (concepts) that are obtained as a result of knowledge of the sensory or intelligible world. Thinking occurs “from existing” (ἐκ τῶν ὄντων) 83, it is limited by existing and therefore is not “irrelevant” (ἄσχετος) 84, as the “super-existent” (ὑπερούσιος) 85 is independent. God, but always “relatively” to existence 86. From what has been said, it follows that human thinking can think only with thoughts-concepts (νοήματα), formed as a result of knowledge of the sensory and intelligible world. That is why, as was said above, the uncreated God, as supersensible and superintelligible, does not leave “absolutely any imprint (τύπος) in thinking that tries to think [Him]” 87 . When “capturing the sovereign” (τύπωσις τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ) as well as when “capturing the imagination” (διατύπωσις τῆς φαντασίας), activity passes from the cognizing person to the cognizable God: it is not the rational soul that thinks of God, but God Himself, influencing the thinking of the rational soul (that is, the mind), leaves in it an “imprint” (τύπος) of future events or His Divine revelation. As with the “imprinting of the imagination,” God, “impressing” the mind, does not create new concepts (νοήματα) in the mind of the rational soul, but, using the thinking of the rational soul, in the thinking itself, which thinks in concepts only about sensory and intelligible things, forms from these concepts, “as if in a picture,” an “imprint” of His Divine revelation. St. Maxim clarifies that God reveals the “imprint” of His will in the human mind “uniformly” (μονοτρόπως), since, unlike “reason” (λόγος), the mind does not “reason” (λογίζεται), that is, its thinking is not extended and is not associated with successively unfolding conclusions 88, but he intuitively “grasps” (λαμβάνει/ἀντιλαμβάνει) the perceived reality 89. So, in “Chapters on Love” St. Maxim writes that during prayer as contemplation, the mind, “moving near the logoi that are around God,” “comprehends (λαμβάνει) pure and obvious reflections (ἐμφάσεις) of Him” 90. For a clearer understanding of what has been said, we can again cite an example from Aristotle’s treatise “On the Soul”: when a ring leaves an imprint on wax, it does not create its imprint in the wax “out of nothing,” but forms it from the already existing wax matter. Likewise, God “forms” in the saint’s thinking the concept of Himself from the concepts already present in his thinking (mind). In other words, God gives a certain form to the concepts of the mind, forming from them concepts about Himself. The same analogy is made by St. Gregory Palamas in a dispute with Barlaam of Calabria about the methods of Divine revelation 91. St. Gregory Palamas likens the mind (thinking) of the prophet to matter, and God to the one who gives this matter form, forming (τυπόω) in the prophet’s thinking His Divine revelation: “The dominant [in the soul] of the prophets is being formed (τὸ τυποῦν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῶν προφητῶν). So it is the Holy Spirit who sits in the mind of the prophets and, like matter (ὡς ὕλῃ), uses the dominant one and in it He Himself foretells the future to them, and through them to us” 92 . A similar description of the “imprinting” of Divine revelation in the mind of a saint is found in what is attributed to St. Basil the Great “Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Isaiah”: “The prophet first named the vision, and then added a verbal explanation, wanting to show that he did not receive it through hearing, but proclaimed the meaning of the word, imprinted (ἐντυπωθεῖσαν) in the mind. For we need a word to express our thoughts, and God, touching (ἁπτόμενος) in those worthy of the most sovereign (ἡγεμονικοῦ) of their [souls], impresses (ἐντυποῖ) in them the vision of His own intention” 93 . So, with all the above mentioned prp. Maximum types of Divine revelation, the organs of human sensory perception do not perceive any external symbols or images created by God. 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As a result of the study Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59 it was revealed that St. Maximus defines discursive theology, that is, the study of the meanings (λόγοι) of Divine revelation concerning the “salvation of the soul,” as theanthropic theology. Active “research” (ἐκζήτησις) and “searching” (ἐξερεύνησις) of the meanings of Divine revelation should ultimately lead the theologian to allowing God Himself to “think” with his “mind” (νοῦς) and “reason” with his “reason” (λόγος). According to the thought of St. Maxim, with genuine discursive theology performed “in the Spirit” (ἐν πνεύματι), that is, with the assistance of God, God Himself “moves” (κινεῖ) the “thinking and rational powers of the soul” of the theologian. Since in this case God Himself becomes the subject of thinking and reasoning of the rational soul of man, then such thinking and reasoning about God and the salvation of the soul becomes objective and true. Comparative analysis of the views of St. Maxim on the nature of discursive theology and prophetic visions showed their internal semantic unity. The article concludes with a definition of theological method based on an analysis of Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59. For citation: Elimanov V. E. The problem of the objectivity of human ideas about God in the theology of St. Maximus the Confessor using the example of Ambigua 19 and Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59 (Part 2) // Christian reading. 2024. No. 1. P. ??–??. The article was received by the editor on September 16, 2023 The problem of the objectivity of human conceptions of God in the theology of St. Maximus the Confessor by the example of Ambigua 19 and Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59 (Part 2) Abstract: The second part of the article is devoted to the analysis of Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59, in which st. Maxim the Confessor answers the question of how and under what conditions human reasoning about God can objectively express His being and the revelation communicated by Him. In the analysis special attention was paid to the anthropological views of the st. Maxim. As a result of the study of Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59 has revealed that st. Maximus defines discursive theology, i.e. the study of the meanings (λόγοι) of Divine revelation concerning the “salvation of the soul”, as God-human theology. Active “research” (ἐκζήτησις) and “inquiry” (ἐξερεύνησις) the meanings of Divine revelation should ultimately lead the theologian to the fact that he gave God “think” by his “mind” (νοῦς) and “discourse” by his “reason” (λόγος). The active “research” (ἐκζήτησις) and “inquiry” (ἐξερεύνησις) of the meanings of Divine revelation must ultimately lead the theologian to leave it to God Himself “to think” with his “mind” (νοῦς) and “to reason” with his “reason” (λόγος). According to the thought of the st. Maxim, in genuine discursive theology performed “in the Spirit” (ἐν πνεύματι), i.e. with the assistance of God, God Himself “moves” (κινεῖ) the “thinking and rational forces of the soul” of the theologian. Since in this case God Himself becomes the Subject of thinking and reasoning of the rational soul of man, such thinking and reasoning about God and the salvation of the soul becomes objective and true. Comparative analysis of the views of st. Maxim on the nature of discursive theology and prophetic visions has shown their inner semantic unity. The article concludes with a definition of the theological method based on an analysis of Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59. MA in Theology, Assistant Lecturer at the Theology Department at the Moscow Theological Academy. For citation: Elimanov V. E. The problem of the objectivity of human conceptions of God in the theology of St. Maximus the Confessor by the example of Ambigua 19 and Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59 (Part 2). Khristianskoye Chteniye, 2024, no. 1, pp. ??–??. 2.2. Discursive theology The holy fathers did not receive all knowledge about God in the form of prophetic visions. Most of the patristic works are the fruit of their theological reflections. If during prophetic visions, as was established in the first part of the article, God Himself forms ideas about Himself and His will in the “idea” (φαντασία) or “mind” (νοῦς) of the saint, and therefore the question of the objectivity and truth of these ideas is not subject to doubt, then with discursive theology, when the mind of the holy father itself actively reflects on Divine revelation, the truth and the objectivity of his theological reflections may be questioned. Therefore, the question of why one can consider that patristic teaching objectively reflects the existence of God Himself and His uncreated plans (logoi) for the world and man arises more acutely in relation to discursive theology. We find the solution to this problem in the first part of Quaest. ad Thalas. 59, in which Rev. Maxim answers the question of how and under what conditions human reasoning about God can objectively express His existence and the revelation He communicates. Venerable himself Maxim formulates the problem addressed in Quaest. ad Thalas. 59, as follows: how were the prophets, “taught by the Holy Spirit and writing down what was revealed to them, able to investigate (ἐξεζήτουν) and search for (ἐξηρεύνων)?” 94 At the beginning of Quaest. ad Thalas. 59 prp. Maximus notes that when the grace of the Holy Spirit cleanses the “mental and rational power (νοεράν τε καὶ λογικὴν δύναμιν)” of the soul from the veil of sin and passions, then it becomes able to “seek and seek [the Divine], and then search and seek (καὶ οὕτως ἐξεζήτησαν καὶ ἐξηρεύνησαν)" 95. Both the search (τὸ ζητεῖν / τὸ ἐρευνᾶν) and the search (τὸ ἐκζητεῖν / τὸ ἐξερευνᾶν) of the Divine are carried out in synergy (assistance) of Divine action and the action of the mental ability of man: “It cannot be said that grace by itself, without [the participation of] natural abilities (κατὰ φύσιν δυνάμεων), capable of receiving knowledge, carries out (ἐνήργει) in the saints the knowledge of the sacraments, for in such a case we represent holy prophets as not understanding that they were given the power of enlightening knowledge from the All-Holy Spirit... But it also cannot be said that without the grace of the All-Holy Spirit, but only by exploring [the Divine] with the help of their natural ability (κατὰ φύσιν δυνάμει) they acquired the true knowledge of things, since then it would be discovered that for the saints the visitation of the Spirit is unnecessary, not assisting them in anything in revealing the truth.” 96. As noted in the first part of this article, prophetic vision presupposes the passivity of the prophet, who perceives in his “mind” or “idea” a certain Divine “imprint,” and the activity of God, who forms this “imprint.” On the contrary, discursive theology is characterized by a certain activity of a cognizing person, namely, the person himself must, using his mental and rational ability, “seek” and “investigate” Divine revelation. As Rev. writes. Maxim, after the saints received a certain revelation from God, they tried to “find” (ἐζήτουν) “the meanings of what was revealed to them” (τῶν ἀποκαλυφθέντων τοὺς λόγους) 97 . In order to more clearly present the nature of the synergy of God and man in discursive theology, the purpose of which is the search for the meanings (λόγοι) of Divine revelations, St. Maxim introduces certain terminology, which, somewhat simplified, can be represented as follows: “search” (ζήτησις) and “research” (ἐκζήτησις) is the “movement” (κίνησις) of the “mind” (νοῦς) “through the aspiration to the knowable,” which is determined “knowledge” (κατ’ ἐπιστήμην); and “searching” (ἐρεύνησις) and “searching” (ἐξερεύνησις) is the movement of “reason” (λόγος) 98, which is characterized by “reasoning” (διάκρισις) “through the thought of what correlates with something knowable" 99. So, “the mind by nature is to seek, and the mind is to seek” 100. Next, Rev. Maximus concludes that the saints, “investigating and seeking (ἐκζητήσαντές τε καὶ ἐξερευνήσαντες) pertaining to the salvation of the soul,” according to “investigation” (ἐκζήτησις), carried out by the “mind”, “possessed a hot and ardent desire, directing the mind to God through knowledge (μετ’ ἐπιστήμης) and knowledge (γνώσεως)”; and in accordance with the “research” (ἐξερεύνησις), carried out by “reason,” - “reasonable and wise reasoning (διάκρισιν) regarding Divine [subjects] inherent in their mind” 101. In the above reflections, Rev. Maximus we are dealing with an “additional” definition of the concept “mind” (νοῦς) in the theology of this holy father. The fact is that St. Maxim defines “mind” not only as the “ability” (δύναμις) of a rational soul for intuitive (cataleptic) thinking, which was discussed in detail in paragraph 2.1 of the first part of the article (see: [Elimanov, 2023, 26]), but also as a “subject” of free will (ἐξουσία), which determines movement reasonable soul. One can cite many fragments that one way or another indicate this fact, such as: “Our mind is in the middle of two certain [forces], each of which produces what is characteristic of it. [I mean] virtue and vice, that is, angel and demon. But the mind has the power of choice (ἐξουσίαν) and the power to follow or resist what it wishes” 102. This fragment is especially important because here St. Maxim speaks of “mind” as the subject of free will, since it is the mind that “has the power of choice.” On the other hand, in Opusculum there are 26 prp. Maximus the Confessor, referring to Clement of Alexandria, actually identifies the concepts of “natural will” (θέλησις), “autocracy” (αὐτεξουσιότης) and “mind” (νοῦς): “Will (θέλησις) is natural autocratic movement of an autocratic mind (αὐτοκράτορος νοῦ), or a mind moved towards something spontaneously (αὐθαιρέτως). Autocracy (αὐτεξουσιότης) is the mind moving according to nature, or the intelligent autocratic movement of the soul” 103. Thus, the mind, rushing towards what it wants, is the natural will (autopower) of the soul 104. Since the mind is not any entity separate from the rational soul, we can say it another way: the concepts of “natural will,” “autocracy,” and “mind” describe the autocratic movement of the rational soul towards what it wants. In general, it seems quite justified to conclude that St. Maximus, who in Opusculum 26 attributes subjectivity to the mind, that is, to the power of the rational soul, and not to the rational soul itself as such, uses a stylistic device common to patristic literature (synecdoche), in which the name is transferred from the whole to the part: in this case, subjectivity is transferred from the rational soul to its power - the mind. In accordance with the definition of “mind” as free will (θέλησις / αὐτεξουσιότης) or as the subject of free will, St. Maximus instructs that everyone who wants to “imitate” (μιμέομαι) the saints in their reasoning about God must: 1) “investigate” (ἐκζητεῖν) Divine revelation relating to the salvation of the soul, that is, have his own mind (νοῦς), or natural will (θέλησις), directed towards God in the active fulfillment of the Divine commandments; 2) “seek” (ἐξερευνᾶν), that is, seek (μετέρχεσθαι) with reason (λόγος) interpretation (διάκρισις) of “the works of God” through “prudence and wisdom” 105. However, despite the fact that saints with their minds (natural will) rush to God (i.e., “seek and explore”), and with their minds strive to comprehend the “meanings” of Divine revelations (i.e., “seek and seek”), without the special influence of God on the mind and intelligence of their souls, no objective knowledge of Divine revelations or their correct interpretation is possible: “Therefore, saints, seeking and seeking or exploring and seeking, they had the grace of the Spirit, moving (κινοῦσαν) their thinking (νοερὰν) and rational (λογικὴν) power of the soul so that this seeking and research would serve for the salvation of souls. Without the Spirit, contemplation of the spiritual is impossible, because it is not inherent [in itself] for the human mind to cognize (ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι) the Divine and intelligible without God’s Light” 106 . Here Rev. Maximus directly says that in genuine, true reasoning about God, the grace of the Spirit “moves” (κινεῖ) the “thinking and rational power of the soul” of the saint. Just as sensory things can be seen only in the light of the sun, so things “exceeding sense” (τῶν ὑπὲρ αἴσθησιν) can be seen by the mind only in the Light of Divine grace 107. In other words, with discursive theology carried out “in the Spirit”, God Himself controls, guides the thinking (mind) and reason of the saint, “thinks” with his thinking and “reasons” with his mind, which is the main guarantee of the truth and objectivity of the saint’s judgments on certain theological issues relating to the “salvation of the soul” (ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σωτηρία). The last remark is very important, since the Venerable himself. Maxim throughout the entire Quaest. ad Thalas. 59 emphasizes that God “moves” the saint’s thinking and protects him from mistakes only in those matters that directly relate to the “salvation of the soul” 108. At the same time, it is important to understand that God does not influence the thinking of a saint against his will, but precisely according to his desire, or, to use the terminology of St. Maxim, according to the “search” (ζήτησις) of his mind (i.e., according to the movement of his natural will) and the “investigation” (ἐκζήτησις) of his mind, moves and guides his thinking and rational power of the soul: “The grace of the Holy Spirit does not produce (ἐνεργεῖ) neither wisdom in the saints, except for the mind that perceives this wisdom, nor knowledge, apart from the power of reason that is capable of containing it” 109. God, according to St. Maxim, using the thinking of the saint according to the desire of his free will (mind), Himself carries out movement in his thinking (mind), “seeking” and “exploring” the meanings of Divine revelation: “After all, the Holy Spirit seeks (ἐρευνᾷ) and explores (ζητεῖ) in us the knowledge of beings, but He seeks what is sought not for His own sake Himself, because He is God and [is] beyond all knowledge, but for the sake of us, who need this knowledge" 110. The same thought of St. Maxim repeats in Amb. 1, which is devoted to the interpretation of the words of St. Gregory the Theologian: “Therefore, Unity, “from the beginning” moved (κινηθεῖσα) into two, stopped at the Trinity” 111. The saint makes it clear that here the “movement” (κίνησις) of the Divine cannot be understood as the “self-unfolding”, “self-formation” of the Holy Trinity 112: “If, having heard [the word] “movement” (κίνησιν), you were surprised how [can] “move” (κινεῖται) super-infinite Deity, then [keep in mind that] this state is not His, but ours” 113. Thus, it is not the Divinity that moves from Unity into Duality to Trinity, but God moves (κινεῖ) the mind of a deified person, first enlightening him to understand the doctrine of the unity of God, and then revealing to him the doctrine of His Trinity 114. St. Maximus makes it clear that discursive theology, carried out with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, is possible only for a person who has a certain degree of deification 115. As St. Diadochos of Photica, whose creations are, according to J.-C. Larche, an important source of the teachings of St. Maximus the Confessor (see: [Larchet, 1996, 12]), the human mind can be moved by God only when the one talking about God has a certain “middle” (μεσότης) in spiritual success 116. This “average” state of spiritual success is a state in which a person, on the one hand, is “enlightened by the Spirit,” that is, abides in God, and on the other hand, is not in an ecstatic state, when his thinking, like other energies of the rational soul, is in a state of rest, inaction 117. Thus, one should not assume that the state in which the Holy Spirit guides the thinking of the rational soul is a state characteristic only of selected saints and is possible only at the highest degrees of deification. On the contrary, it is characteristic of all those who are prosperous and successful in spiritual life, and not of those who are in an ecstatic state. According to the thought of St. Maxim, without grace guiding the theologian’s thinking, one cannot begin to think about God at all. But any meditation on God must be done in prayer and with the assistance of the Holy Spirit. This is the position of St. Maxim repeats this many times in his writings, and often in relation to himself 118. So, for example, starting work on the treatise “Mystagogy” and mentally turning to its addressee, that is, to Theoharistos, St. Maxim prayerfully appeals to God to “control” (ἡγέεται) his thinking and words 119. Starting to write Ambigv, he writes about himself: “But how can I call Jesus Lord without having yet received the Spirit of holiness? 120 If [only] - through the intercession of the saints and the help of your prayers - the great God and our Savior Christ grants me [the ability] to think piously and speak in an appropriate manner, I will give a short answer about each chapter, as best I can. Oh St. Dionysius the Areopagite and St. St. Gregory the Theologian Maxim writes that Christ “became for them the soul of [their] soul and reveals Himself to everyone in all [their] deeds, words and thoughts, so that therefore we are convinced that the cited [sayings of St. Dionysius and St. Gregory] – not these [men], but Christ, Who replaced (ὑπαλλάξαντος) them with Himself by grace (κατά χάριν)” 122 . Discursive theology, including understood as the study of Holy Scripture and patristic texts, must be carried out “in the Spirit” (ἐν πνεύματι), that is, with the assistance of Divine grace, and not by the power of human reason alone 123. Only such reasoning about God, which presupposes the “movement” (κίνησις) of human thinking by God, can be true and objective, since in the strict sense of the word, the subject of such “movement” of thinking is God, and not man, who tends to make mistakes. The experiential experience of God, in which God Himself guides the thinking of the human soul, is the only true criterion for testing the truth or falsity of certain judgments about God and salvation. On this occasion, Rev. Maximus the Confessor writes that the theological mind (νοῦς θεολογικός) “should blindly see (ἀνομμάτως ὁρᾶν) the very true God the Word, naked from all [veils] of thought and knowledge, clearly recognizing how how negative judgments regarding God, expressed due to His superiority, correspond to reality, and how much they reveal the positive affirmation of the Divine [Being] through complete detachment from existing [things]" 124. In the given fragment, Rev. Maximus asserts that only that theological mind that “blindly sees the true God the Word Himself” “clearly cognizes” the “correspondence” of “negative judgments regarding God” with God Himself. Only through experimental knowledge of the uncreated God can a person be convinced that his created idea of ​​God extremely accurately reflects the uncreated God Himself. 2.3. The relationship between discursive theology and prophetic visions In Quaest. ad Thalas. 59 the idea is clear and distinct that there is no fundamental difference between prophetic visions and discursive theology carried out “in the Spirit.” Discursive theology is impossible without a special influence on the mind of the theologizing person. The task of the theologian is not to present his own “theological opinion” on any theological problem or any doctrinal position, but to acquire knowledge from God, which is possible only through the special influence of God on his mind and understanding. According to the thought of St. Maxim, the ultimate goal of the reasoning theologian is to let God act in himself and control the thinking and rational power of his soul, which is the essence of Divine revelation (prophetic visions), as was shown in the first part of this article. In other words, genuine discursive theology, carried out with the assistance of God, is such activity of human thinking, which is ultimately aimed at stopping all of its activity and transferring this activity to God, so that it is no longer man himself who thinks, but God who thinks through his thinking. Thus, in discursive theology, the active “searching” (ἐρεύνησις) and “searching” (ἐξερεύνησις) of the theologian must ultimately turn into a passive “enduring” (τὸ παθεῖν) 125 of the actions of God, Which forms, by influencing the mind and intelligence of the theologian, a true and objective understanding of any theological truths. As soon as God Himself becomes the Subject that forms a person’s understanding of theological truths, then such formulated created knowledge about God is true and objective. The difference between discursive theology and prophetic vision is that prophetic vision does not involve “searching” (ἐρεύνησις) and “searching” (ἐξερεύνησις) carried out by “reason” (λόγος). But at the same time, discursive theology, if it claims to be true and objective, is impossible without Divine revelation as the special influence of God on the mind (νοῦς) and reason (λόγος) of man. Any theological reasoning, if it is carried out with the assistance of God, becomes in its essence a Divine revelation. Thus, theological reasoning, not being a Divine revelation in itself, becomes one as a result of the Divine influence on the rational soul of man. From the above it follows that discursive theology, carried out with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, is in many ways similar to the “sealing of the sovereign” (τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τύπωσις), as one of the types of prophetic visions. In both the “imprinting of the sovereign” and in discursive theology, God acts on the thinking faculties of the rational soul and forms in the soul, through its thinking, an “imprint” (τύπος) of Himself or the revelation He imparts 126 . The foregoing allows us to assert that the theological reasoning of the holy fathers, which is carried out in them by the action of God, is absolutely accurate and that the holy fathers, at the level of human created knowledge, objectively broadcast the uncreated knowledge of God about Himself. The teaching of St. The maxim about the absolute activity of God and the “enduring” of the cognitive powers of the human soul in Divine revelation and discursive theology is obviously closely related to his doctrine of deification 127 . As the Venerable teaches. Maximus the Confessor, deification is not the “result” (ἀποτέλεσμα) of the action of any natural human ability, but the “result” of the action of Divine energy alone 128. In deification, a person becomes “outside of what both naturally exists with him and is [as such] conceived due to the grace of the Spirit, which has triumphed over him and showed that he has only God acting [in him] so that there is one, even only one in all [relations] action of God and those worthy of God, or rather, only God (μᾶλλον δὲ μόνου Θεοῦ) as [coming] in a manner befitting the Good [in a manner] wholly into interpenetration with the worthy as wholes" 129 . Since the knowledge of God is not carried out by the natural energies of man, therefore, both human nature and its natural energies only “suffer” (πάσχουσι) the action of God 130. Both in experimental knowledge of God and in discursive theology, man, according to St. Maximus, must allow God to act in oneself, and only thanks to this action of God in man does it become possible to experience both the knowledge of God and true and objective discursive theology. This is exactly how the objective uncreated knowledge of God, that is, life in God, inevitably gives rise to an objective idea of ​​Him in the thinking of the rational soul of man. In Amb. 19 and Quaest. ad Thalas. 59 prp. Maxim touches on the problem of the objectivity of human ideas about God, which logically follows from the patristic teaching about the uncreatedness of God. Since human nature has the abilities of sensory-rational cognition, it is capable of cognizing the world, both sensory and intelligible. However, God, as St. Maxim, is not something sensory (material) or intelligible (immaterial): God, in His essence and in His energies, is uncreated and, therefore, completely alien to the world He created - both sensory and intelligible. Since God is uncreated, He cannot be perceived by any sense organ, nor can He be thought, imagined or imagined in any way. In addition, with sensory-rational cognition, the object of cognition “undergoes” the action of the subject. God, being uncreated, by definition cannot “suffer” anyone’s action on Himself, that is, cannot experience influence on Himself from the outside. God, as superior to the sensory-rational knowledge of man, cannot be known in the same way as an object of the sensory or intelligible world. For the reason that God cannot be known as an object undergoing an act of cognition on the part of His creation, He becomes, in the act of prophetic vision (Divine revelation), an active Subject, communicating knowledge about Himself and His will. In Amb. 19 prp. Maximus the Confessor distinguishes three types of prophetic visions: “daytime vision” (φαντασία), “unfalse night vision” (ὄψις), “imprinting (τύπωσις) of the sovereign.” In all types of Divine revelations there is no place for the active perception of any sensory, created symbols, sounds or words that would be intermediaries between God and the saint and would impart to him knowledge about God and His will. But there is a direct impact of Divine energy, that is, God Himself, on the cognitive powers of the human soul 131, in which, under this Divine influence, a corresponding idea of ​​God or any other images, words, sounds corresponding to the content and meaning of Divine revelation is formed. St. Maxim speaks either of the Divine influence on the “idea” (φαντασία) of the unreasonable soul of a person in sleep or in the waking state, or of the Divine influence on his “sovereign” (ἡγεμονικόν), that is, on the mind (νοῦς), or, in other words, on the mental power (νοερὰ δύναμις) rational soul. Thus, the entire mental-spiritual-physical composition of a person participates in receiving Divine revelation. This circumstance is in direct accordance with the teaching of St. Maxim about deification: if not only the rational soul of a person, but also his body participates in deification, then it is not surprising that when communicating His revelation, God also uses the unreasonable soul of a person, closely connected with his body. Forming an “imprint” (διατύπωσις) of Himself in the “representation” (φαντασία) of a person or imprinting His Divine revelation in him, God does not create in him “out of nothing” any new “images-representations” (φαντάσματα). But God forms the “imprint” of His Divine revelation in the “representation” precisely from those “representation-images” that it already contains. Since all, without exception, “representation-images” that exist in the “idea” of a person are received by him as a result of sensory knowledge and are ideas specifically about the sensory world, then for this reason all Divine revelations and their descriptions presented in the texts of Holy Scripture and Tradition have an anthropomorphic character 132. What was said about the “representation” (φαντασία) of St. Maxim also refers to another type of prophetic visions - to the “imprinting of the sovereign” (τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τύπωσις), in which God already influences the rational soul, namely the “mind” (νοῦς), leaving in it a certain “imprint” (τύπος) Divine revelation, “as if in a picture” (ὡς ἐν εἰκόνι). Since the mind, as an ability (δύναμις) of the rational soul, always thinks only in created (intelligible) concepts (νοήματα), then God from the very created concepts of thinking (νόησιν) of the mind forms (ἐντυποῖ) in the human mind His created image (idea of Himself) or any divine revelation. The idea of ​​God obtained as a result of “imprinting the sovereign” can be likened to a created mental icon of God, which He Himself writes in the mind of a saint, using his thinking as an instrument. In this example, the thinking of the mind can be compared simultaneously with a canvas, paints and a brush: God uses the thinking of the mind and the concepts of this thinking, like paints and a brush, and on the thinking itself, as on a canvas, He writes the image of Himself. God Himself and His created image in the rational soul of a saint, that is, the idea of ​​God, are correlated in such a way as an object and the image of this object in a mirror: this image of God is at the same time extremely accurate, objective, since it was formed by God Himself, and extremely inaccurate, biased, since, by definition, no created concepts can in any way fully reflect the uncreated 133. In the act of Divine revelation, the saint of his own free will opens himself to Divine action. It is this “openness” of a holy person towards God that makes him able to accept Divine revelation. In the formation of ideas about God, “idea” (φαντασία) and “mind” (νοῦς) participate passively, since they are “imprinted,” that is, formed, by God according to the will and with the awareness of the person himself. As a consequence, ideas about God are not the fruit of the imagination or mental activity of the prophets or holy fathers, but the result of the action of God alone 134. In Quaest. ad Thalas. 59 prp. Maximus touches on the problem of how an objective discursive theology is possible, which presupposes the active activity of the “thinking and rational power of the soul” (νοεράν τε καὶ λογικὴν δύναμιν) of man. According to Rev. Maxim, when exploring Divine revelations, the theologian must, firstly, have his “mind” (λόγος) aimed at “searching” (ἐρεύνησις) and “researching” (ἐξερεύνησις) the meanings (λόγοι) of the Divine revelations that relate to the “salvation of the soul” (ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σωτηρία), and secondly, to keep your “mind” (νοῦς), or, in other words, “free will” (θέλησις / αὐτεξουσιότης), directed towards God in “seeking” (ζήτησις) and “searching” (ἐξερεύνησις) of Him through “knowledge” (μετ’ ἐπιστήμης) and “knowledge” (γνώσεως). However, the ultimate goal of a theologian speaking about God is to let God guide his thinking and direct him to a correct understanding of the meaning of Divine revelations. This state in which God “moves” (κινεῖ) the thinking and rational power of the human soul is possible only when the person himself lives “in the Spirit” (ἐν πνεύματι), that is, he will have a certain measure of deification, which is determined by the extent to which he allows God to act in himself. When reasoning about God and the salvation of the soul, accomplished “in the Spirit,” God Himself, and not man, becomes the subject of thinking and reasoning of the rational soul of man. It is God who “thinks” with man’s thinking and “reasons” with his mind, and that is why such thinking and reasoning about God and the salvation of the soul is objective and true. The objectivity and truth of the theological reasoning of a particular theologian speaking about God and the salvation of the soul does not directly depend on the degree of his education (although it cannot hinder him), but depends on his personal closeness to God and the degree of his deification. At the same time, it is important to understand that there is no certain “measure” of objectivity and truth of theological reasoning, which would be determined by the measure of deification, the measure of the theologian’s holiness. This is due to the fact that theological reasoning can be 1) either true, since it is performed “in God,” Who “moves” the thinking of the reasoning theologian; 2) or probabilistic (and often false), since they are committed “without God,” by the power of the human mind alone. However, the very presence of a certain degree of deification is a necessary condition for theology performed “in the Spirit,” because it is participation in God that makes the theologian capable of infallibly thinking about Him. And that is why, in particular, no discursive theology is possible outside of being in the Church as the Body of Christ, because theology presupposes a certain measure of deification. To summarize the Quaest analysis. ad Thalas. 59, we can conclude that, according to the thought of St. Maxim, the theological method is an experience of studying the Holy Scriptures and Tradition, which is accompanied by prayer and in which the Divine grace of the Holy Spirit guides (“moves” - κινεῖ) the human mind to a correct understanding of their theological meanings. We emphasize that the theological method, according to St. Maxim, is applicable specifically in relation to theological meanings, i.e. doctrinal truths, which include the doctrine of God and salvation. Thus, in the theology of St. Maxim, both true experiential knowledge of God (theosis), and true Divine revelation, and objective discursive theology are the “result” (ἀποτέλεσμα) of the action of Divine energy alone. Outside of God, that is, outside of Divine action, neither salvation (deification), nor true revelation, nor objective reasoning about God is possible, therefore, according to St. Maxim, all efforts and aspirations of a person should be aimed at allowing God to fully act and live in himself, as the apostle said about himself. Paul: “It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me” (Gal 2:20). 1. Diadochus, ep. Photices (1943) – Diadochus, ep. Photices. Capita centum de perfectione spirituali // Cent Chapitres sur la Perfection Spirituelle / Ed. par E. Des Places. P.: Cerf, 1943. (SC; 5). 2. Maximus Confessor (1980) – Maximus Confessor. Quaestiones ad Thalassium // Quaestiones ad Thalassium una cum latine interpretatione Ioannis Scotti Euriugenae / Ed. Laga C., Steel C. Turnhout: Brepols, 1980. Pars 1: Quaestiones I–LV (CCSG; 7). 3. Maximus Confessor (1990) – Maximus Confessor. Quaestiones ad Thalassium // Quaestiones ad Thalassium una cum latine interpretatione Ioannis Scotti Euriugenae / Ed. Laga C., Steel C. Turnhout: Brepols, 1990. Pars 2: Quaestiones LVI–LXV (CCSG; 22). 4. Maximus Confessor (1991) – Maximus Confessor. Expositio orationis dominicae // Maximi Confessoris opuscula exegetica duo / Ed. P. van Deun. Turnhout: Brepols, 1991. (CCSG; 23). P. 25–73. 5. Maximus Confessor (2012) – Maximus Confessor. Mystagogia // Maximi Confessoris Mystagogia, una cum latina interpretatione Anastasii Bibliothecarii / Ed. C. Boudignon. Turnhout: Brepols, 2011. (CCSG; 69) 6. Maximus Confessor (2014) – Maximus Confessor. Ambigua // On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua / Ed. and transl. by Constas N. Cambridge (Mass.); London: Harvard University Press, 2014. Vol. 1. 7. PG. T. 91 – Maximus Confessor. Opusculum 26 // PG. 91. Col. 276–280. 8. PG. T. 36 – Gregorius Nazianzenus. Oratio 29, theologica 3 (orationes theologicae) // PG. 36. Col. 73–104. 9 . PG. T. 90 – Maximus Confessor. Capita de caritate // PG. 90. Col. 960–1073. 10. PG. T. 91 – Maximus Confessor. Ad Marinum presbyterum (Opusculum 1) // PG. 91. Col. 9–37. 11. PG. T. 91 – Maximus Confessor. Ambigua ad Ioannem // PG. 91. Col. 1061–1417. 12. Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita (2016) – Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De divinis nominibus // Denys l’Aréopagite (Ps.-): Les Noms divins (I–IV). Tome I / Texte grec B. R. Suchla (PTS 33); introd., trad. et notes de Y. De Andia. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2016. (SC. 578). 13. Maxim the Confessor (1993) - Maxim the Confessor, St. Works of St. Maximus the Confessor / Transl., vs. article and comment. A. I. Sidorova. Moscow: Martis, 1993–. (Patristic heritage). T. 1. 14. Maxim the Confessor (2004) – Maxim the Confessor, St. Maximus the Confessor Selected works of St. Maximus the Confessor / [Trans., intro. Art., comment. and appl. Sidorov A.I.]. M.: Palomnik, 2004. 15. Maxim the Confessor (2014) – Maxim the Confessor, St. Theological and polemical works (Opuscula Theologica et Polemica) / Trans. from ancient Greek D. A. Chernoglazov and A. M. Shufrin; scientific ed., preface and comment. G.I. Benevich. Holy Mount Athos; St. Petersburg: Publishing house RKhGA, 2014. 16. Maxim the Confessor (2019) – Maxim the Confessor, St. Questions and answers to Thalassia / Trans. from Greek, preface and comment. A. I. Sidorova. M.: Sibirskaya Blagozvonitsa; Nizhny Novgorod Theological Seminary, 2019. 17. Maxim the Confessor (2020) – Maxim the Confessor, St. Difficulties to Thomas (Ambigua ad Thomam), Difficulties to John (Ambigua ad Iohannem) / Trans. from ancient Greek D. A. Chernoglazova, A. M. Shufrina; scientific ed., prev. G.I. Benevich. M.: Eksmo, 2020. 18. De Andia (1992) – De Andia Y. “παθὼν τὰ θεῖα” // Platonism in Late Antiquity / Ed. by S. Gersh, C. Kannengiesser. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992, pp. 239–258. 19. Larchet (1994) – Larchet J.-C. Introduction // Maxime le Confesseur. Ambigua / Trad. par E. Ponsoye, intr. par J.-C. Larchet avec comment. de D. Staniloae. Paris: Suresnes, 1994. P. 9–84. 20. Larchet (1996) – Larchet J.-C. La divinisation de l'homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur. Paris: Cerf, 1996. 21. Larchet J.-C. The Mode of Deification // The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor / Ed. by P. Allen, B. Neil. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 341–359. 22. Russell (2006) – Russell N. The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 23. Benevich (2020) – Benevich G.I. Preface // Venerable Maximus the Confessor. Difficulties to Thomas (Ambigua ad Thomam), Difficulties to John (Ambigua ad Iohannem) / Trans. from ancient Greek D. A. Chernoglazov and A. M. Shufrin; scientific ed., prev. G.I. Benevich. M.: Eksmo, 2020. pp. 19–192. 24. Elimanov (2023) – Elimanov V. E. The problem of the objectivity of human ideas about God in the theology of St. Maximus the Confessor using the example of Ambigua 19 and Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59 (Part 1) // Christian reading. 2023. No. 3. pp. 12–31. We are talking primarily about liberal theology. On liberal theology, see Langford, 2014. At the present stage of development of Christian theology, these ideas are shared by representatives of radical theology, see: [Caputo, 2020]. “Concerning any feeling, it is generally necessary to recognize that it is something that is capable of perceiving the forms of what is sensed without matter, just as wax receives the imprint of a ring without iron or gold. The wax accepts a gold or copper imprint, but not because it (the imprint) is gold or copper. In the same way, the sensation produced by each sense organ undergoes something from an object having a color, or being tasted, or producing a sound, but not in so far as each such object is called this or that, but in so far as it has such and such a quality, that is, in form. That which contains such a capacity is the original sense organ αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ᾗ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ᾗ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ᾗ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. (De anima ΙI, 12, 1 (424a 17–26), Aristoteles, 1837, 213–214. Russian translation: Aristotle, 1976, 421). For more information about the general feeling, see: [Gregoric, 2007, 129–201]. (De anima III, 3, 2–13 (427b–428b), Aristoteles, 1837, 222–224). More precisely, one could say that φαντασία is a state of general feeling, which involves the “storage” of ideas about objects. “Imagination is that through which we have, as they say, an image, and the image is not in a figurative sense "(De anima III, 3, 9 Aristoteles, 1837, 223. Rus. transl.: Aristotle, 1976, 430). “ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν· τὰ γὰρ "(De anima III, 8, 5-6 (432a 8), Aristoteles, 1837, 233. Russian translation: Month, 2005, 396). (De anima III, 7, 7–8 (431b 5), Aristoteles, 1837, 232. Russian translation: Month, 2005, 396). "ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν· τὰ "(De anima IΙI, 8, 4-5, Aristoteles, 1837, 233. Russian translation: Aristotle, 1976, 440). Wed. also: “Imagination is something different from both sensation and reflection; it does not arise without sensation, and without imagination no judgment is possible; and that imagination is neither thinking nor making judgments - this is clear οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις ὅτι δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις, φανερόν)" (De anima IΙI, 3, 5–6, Aristoteles, 1837, 222. Russian translation: Aristotle, 1976, 430). Compare: “Since, as it seems, there is not a single thing that exists separately from sensually perceived quantities, then the intelligible is given in sensually perceived forms, including the so-called abstract, as well as everything connected with the properties and states of sensually perceived things (ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα ? ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν De anima III, 8, 4 (432a 5), Aristoteles, 1837, 233. Russian translation: Aristotle, 1976, 440). "οὕτω κἀκεῖ Θεὸς πᾶσαν νοὸς δύναμιν ὑπερβαίνει καὶ ἐνέργειαν, οὐδ’ ὅλως ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι τῷ νοεῖν πειρωμένῳ τὸν οἱονοῦν τύπον ἀφείς" (Ambigua 10/30, 64; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 254. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2020, 492). (Ambigua 10/30, 64; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 254–256). (Ambigua 15, 8; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 372). Compare: (Disputatio cum Pyrrho 188; PG. T. 91. Col 341A). (Ambigua 15, 9; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 372). (Ambigua 15, 3; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 364. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2020, 551). (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 77:77–79. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2019, 357–358). (De divinis nominibus 1, 5; Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita, 1990, 115:19–116:6. Russian translation: Dionysius Areopagite, 2002, 227–229). "Εἰ γὰρ αἱ γνώσεις πᾶσαι τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὄντα τὸ πέρας ἔχουσιν, ἡ πάσης οὐσίας ἐπέκεινα καὶ πάσης γνώσεώς ἐστιν ἐξῃρημένη" (De divinis nominibus 1, 4; Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita, 1990, 115:16–18. Russian translation: Dionysius Areopagite, 2002, 227). [Scholia in Corpus Dionysiacum Areopagiticum; Maximus Confessor, P.G. 4. Col. 201C]. It is noteworthy that here John of Scythopolis conveys the term ἐπαφή as a mental touch, and ἁφή as a sensual touch. As reported by B.R. Zuchla, this scholia (201, 3 C) is present in the Syriac manuscript of scholia on the Areopagite Corpus (London, BM 626 Add. 12152), and therefore should, with a high degree of probability, be attributed specifically to John of Scythopolis (see: [Suchla, 1980, 48, 53]). Currently, the Italian researcher Alberto Nigra, based on the study of some manuscripts of the Latin translation of the scholia on the Areopagite Corpus, made by Anastasius the Librarian, attributed St. Maximus the Confessor contains more than 300 of the nearly 1,700 scholia given in the Migne patrolology. List of scholia, the authorship of which was attributed to St. Alberto Nigra. Maxim, see his article: [Nigra, 2021, 247–256]. (Scholia in Corpus Dionysiacum Areopagiticum; Maximus Confessor, PG. 4. Col. 201C. Russian translation: Dionysius Areopagite, 2002, 229). On the concept of distinguishing created and uncreated beings in Byzantine theology, see: [Zozulyak, 2022, 39–41]. (Pro hesychastis 3, 2, 14; Gregorius Palamas, 1962, 668:11–15. Russian translation: Gregory Palamas, 2021, 227). (Pro hesychastis 1, 3, 12; Gregorius Palamas, 1962, 422:23–27. Russian translation: Gregory Palamas, 2021, 57–58). “Ἀλλ’ ὁ θεατὴς ἐκεῖνος, νοῶν ὡς οὐ τῇ αἰσθήσει ᾗ αἰσθήσει θεώμενός ἐστι, νῷ οἴεται ὁρᾶν· ἐξετάζων δὲ καὶ ἀνασκοπούμενος, οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνον εὑρίσκει περὶ τὸ φῶς ἐκεῖνο ἐνεργοῦντα· καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὃ “νόησιν ὑπὲρ νόησίν” φαμεν, τοῦτο διὰ τούτων λέγοντες ὡς ὁ ἔχων νοῦν καὶ αἴσθησιν ὁρᾷ, ὑπὲρ ταῦτα δὲ ἀμφότερα" (Pro hesychastis 3, 1, 36; Gregorius Palamas, 1962, 648:22–27. Russian translation: Gregory Palamas, 2021, 256). Compare: (Pro hesychastis 3, 1, 44; Gregorius Palamas, 1962, 455–456). Compare: “The soul is tripartite and is contemplated in three forces: mental, irritable and desirable (Τριμεροῦς δὲ οὔσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἐν τρισὶ "(Orationes)" (Orationes) asceticae 3, 27; Gregorius Palamas, 1992, 208:6–8). (Pro hesychastis 3, 2, 1; Gregorius Palamas, 1962, 656:15–22. Compare: Liber de libertate mentis 22–23; Ps.-Macarius, PG. 34. Col. 956D–957B). (Triades pro hesychastis 2, 3, 37; Gregorius Palamas, 1962, 570:17–29. See for more details: Chouliaras, 2020, 175–178). Beyond the scope of this study remains the most important for the theology of the Areopagite Corpus, St. Maximus the Confessor and St. Gregory Palamas problem of vision of God (θεοπτία): how can one see the uncreated God with created eyes (or mind)? It is planned to devote several separate studies to this topic. (De theologia (orat. 28) 19; Grégoire de Nazianze, 1978, 138:14–140:24). However, St. himself Gregory finds it difficult to give an exact answer to this question: “And I cannot say whether this was a daytime phenomenon, contemplated only by the saints, or a non-lying vision at night, or a representation of the sovereign within us, by which the future is embraced as well as the present, or another inexplicable type of prophecy - this is known only to the God of the prophets and participants in similar inspirations” (De theologia (orat. 28) 19; Grégoire de Nazianze, 1978, 140:24–29. Russian translation: Gregory the Theologian, 1994, 402). (Ambigua 19, 1; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 402). (Ambigua 19, 3; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 402). “By limits I mean the ability to represent (τὸ φανταστικόν) and the subject of representation (τὸ φανταστόν), from which, through the medium of representation (φαντασίας), which is the relation of extreme limits, the presented appears (φάντασμα)" (Ambigua 19, 3; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 404. Russian translation with amendment: Maximus Confessor, 2020, 589). "ἐνεργείας μὲν τοῦ φανταστικοῦ, πάθους δὲ τοῦ φανταστοῦ, τῶν διὰ μέσης τῆς φαντασίας, σχέσεως αὐτῶν ὑπαρχούσης περὶ αὐτό, ἀλλήλοις συναπτομένων ἄκρων" (Ambigua 19, 3; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 404. Russian translation with modification: Maxim Confessor, 2020, 585). (Ambigua 19, 3; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 404). As K. Steele notes, the identification of the "passive mind" with "representation" is often made in Neoplatonism in the interpretation of Aristoteles. De anima 3.10.433a 9–12 (see: [Steel, 2012, 242]). Thus, the Neoplatonist John Philoponus, commenting on De anima 3.10.433a 9–12, writes that “representation” forms representations-images within itself, and therefore Aristotle calls representation the passive mind: “mind” - since it has an object of knowledge (representation-images) within itself and comprehends it by direct perception, as is characteristic of the mind, and not through evidence; and “passive” because it is formed, constituted by those representations-images that it has in itself (see: On Aristotle’s on the Soul 1.1–2; Johannes Philoponus, 2005, 20:6.1–6.14). A similar identification is observed in Sirian and Proclus, see: [Steel, 2012, 242].) "Ψυχὴν γὰρ εἰληφότες παρὰ Θεοῦ νοῦν καὶ λόγον καὶ αἴσθησιν ἔχουσαν πρὸς τῇ νοητῇ καὶ ταύτην τὴν αἰσθητήν, ὥσπερ καὶ λόγον πρὸς τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ τὸν κατὰ προφορὰν καὶ νοῦν πρὸς τῷ νοητῷ τὸν παθητικὸν (ὃν καὶ “φαντασίαν” καλοῦσι τοῦ ζώου, καθ’ ὃν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα καὶ ἄλληλα καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς τόπους οὓς διώδευσαν ἐπιγινώσκουσι, περὶ ἣν συνίστασθαι τὴν αἴσθησίν φασιν οἱ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὄργανον αὐτῆς οὖσαν ἀντιληπτικὸν τῶν αὐτῇ φαντασθέντων), δεῖν ᾠήθησαν τούτων τὰς ἐνεργείας, εἰκότως οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τῷ δεδωκότι Θεῷ, δι’ ὃν καὶ ἐξ οὗ πάντα προσενέγκαι" (Ambigua 10/3, 11; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 166. Russian translation with amendment: Maximus Confessor, 2020, 352). See: [Blumenthal, 1977, 254–255]. For more details on how the term φαντασία was understood by Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle, see the same article by Blumenthal. [Kolbutova, 2018, 113]. Compare: (Enneades IV, 3, 30; Plotinus, 1959, 59:9–60:1). We are here so as not to go into the intricacies of the anthropology of St. Maxim, we use the usual Aristotelian classification of three types of soul (vegetative, animal and rational souls). More about the anthropology of St. For Maxim, see: (Ambigua 10/44; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 324–328; Ambigua 10/3; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 162–170; and also: Ambigua 42; Maximus Confessor, 2014b, 122–186). Wed. with a fragment from “De natura hominis” by Nemesius of Emesa: “The faculty of representation (φανταστικóν) is the power of the unreasonable part of the soul (ἐστι δύναμις τῆς ἀλόγου ψυχῆς), acting through the external sense organs. What is imagined (φανταστóν) is that which is subject to the activity of the imagination (φαντασία), just as what is perceived by the senses is subject to the senses. And imagination (φαντασία) is a state of the unreasonable soul, resulting from something imagined. Finally, phantasm (φάντασμα) is a vain state that arises in the unreasonable parts of the soul, regardless of any imagined thing. The Stoics also recognize these four types: φαντασίαν, φανταστóν, φανταστικóν, φάντασμα. At the same time, they define φαντασίαν as a state [movement] of the soul, which reveals both itself and the object of representation that caused it (τὸ φανταστóν)... Φανταστóν is that which generates φαντασίαν and is subject to sensual perception, such as, for example, whiteness and everything that can move the soul” (De natura hominis 6; Nemesius Emesenus, 1987, 55:9–20. Russian translation: Nemesius Emesenus, 1996, 85–86). "Τῶν ψυχικῶν δυνάμεων ἡ μέν ἐστι θρεπτικὴ καὶ αὐξητική· ἡ δὲ φανταστικὴ καὶ ὁρμητική· ἡ δὲ λογιστικὴ καὶ νοητική. Καὶ τῆς μὲν πρώτης μόνης μετέχουσι τὰ φυτά· τῆς δὲ δευτέρας πρὸς ταύτῃ τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα. τῆς δὲ τρίτης πρὸς ταῖς δυσὶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. Καὶ αἱ μὲν δύο δυνάμεις φθαρταί· ἡ δὲ τρίτη ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἀθάνατος ἀποδείκνυται" (Capita de caritate 3, 32; Maximus Confessor, PG. 90. Col. 1028A. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 1993, 125). Compare: “Of the things given to us by God for use, some are in the soul, others in the body, and others around the body. For example, those that are in the soul are its powers (οἷον ἐν μὲν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῆς); those in the body are the sense organs and other members (ἐν δὲ τῷ σώματι, τὰ αἰσθητήρια καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μέλη); and those around the body are food, property, and so on (περὶ δὲ τὸ σῶμα, βρώματα, χρήματα, κτήματα καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς)” (Capita de caritate 2, 75; Maximus Confessor, 90. Col. 1008C. Russian: Maximus Confessor, 1993, 117). See, for example: (Quaestiones ad Thalassium 48; Maximus Confessor, 1980, 339:144–154; 343:232–240). “εἶτα αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ πάρεστι, φαντασία δ’ οὔ. εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν· δοκεῖ δ’ οὔ, οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ, σκώληκι δ’ οὔ" (De anima III, 3, 10; Aristoteles, 1837, 223. Russian translation: Aristotle, 1976, 431). “τῶν δὲ θηρίων ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει, λόγος δ’ οὔ” (De anima III, 3, 13; Aristoteles, 1837, 224. Russian translation: Aristotle, 1976, 431). "Ambigua" 19 and "Capita de caritate" belong to the early works of St. Maxim, therefore we do not consider the possible evolution of his views in terms of the terminological series: τὸ φανταστικόν, τὸ φανταστόν, ἡ φαντασία, τὸ φάντασμα. “Πρὸς ἅπερ πράγματά ποτε πεπόνθαμεν, τούτων καὶ τὰς φαντασίας ἐμπαθεῖς περιφέρομεν. Ὁ οὖν τὰς ἐμπαθεῖς νικῶν φαντασίας, καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ὧν αἱ φαντασίαι πάντως καταφρονεῖ· ἐπειδὴ τοῦ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα ?? " (Capita de caritate 1, 63; Maximus Confessor, PG. 90. Col. 973B. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 1993, 102). Representations-images (φαντασίαι), according to the thought of St. Maxims are generated in the unreasonable soul of a person through the feelings (αἰσθήσεις) of his body, and therefore are called “representations of the body” (τῆς φαντασίας τοῦ σώματος): “As the body has things as its world, so the mind has thoughts as its world. And just as the body commits adultery with the body of a woman, so the mind commits adultery with the thought of a woman, through the representation of its body (διὰ τῆς φαντασίας τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος). For in thought (κατὰ διάνοιαν) he sees the image of his body copulating with the image of a woman” (Capita de caritate 3, 53; Maximus Confessor, PG. 90. Col. 1032D). The body, through the senses, generates not only “ideas”, but “aspirations” (ὁρμαί): “When the body is prompted by the senses to [fulfill] its desires and [gain] pleasures, the vicious mind follows it and agrees with its [i.e. e. bodies] ideas and aspirations (τούτου φαντασίαις καὶ ὁρμαῖς)" (Capita de caritate 2, 56; Maximus Confessor, PG. 90. Col. 1001D. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 1993, 127). The same thought is clearly traced by John of Scythopolis in scholium 201, 2, A-B on the treatise “On the Divine Names”: “Thinking is, after all, action and creativity, and ideas are suffering and an imprint produced by some feeling or as if by some feeling. After all, feeling grasps existing things in a single image, and the mind comprehends, that is, grasps, existing things in a different way, not in the same way as feeling” ποίησις, ἡ δὲ φαντασία πάθος καὶ τύπωσις ἀναγγελτική αἰσθητοῦ τινος, ἤ ὡς αισθητοῦ τινος. τῶν ὄντων κατὰ ἀθρόαν μόρφωσιν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐφάπτεται τουτέστιν ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν ὄντων ἐτέρῳ τρόπῳ, καὶ οὐχ οἷον ἡ αἴσθησις) (Scholia in Corpus Dionysiacum Areopagiticum; Maximus Confessor, PG. 4. Col. 201A–B. Russian translation: Dionysius the Areopagite, 2002, 229). The author of scholium 201, 2, 1–25 A–B is also John of Scythopolis (see: [Suchla, 1980, 48]). “After all, it is only God’s [destiny] to be completion, and [completion] perfect and impassive, - since [only He] is motionless, and complete, and not subject to undergoing (dispassionate), but the one brought into being [destiny], on the contrary, is to be moved to a beginningless completion and non-quantitative, perfect completion to calm down the action, and to endure [qualitylessness], but not to be or become essentially qualityless (it is clear that everything brought into being, that is, created, is not independent) καὶ τὸ ἀπαθές, ὡς ἀκινήτου καὶ πλήρους καὶ ἀπαθοῦς, τῶν γενητῶν δὲ τὸ πρὸς τέλος ἄναρχον κινηθῆναι καὶ ἀπόσῳ τελείῳ ? κατ’ οὐσίαν τὸ ἄποιον· πᾶν γὰρ γενητὸν καὶ κτιστὸν οὐκ ἄσχετον δηλονότι)" (Ambigua 7, 9; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 84–86. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2020, 257). St. Gregory Palamas comes to the conclusion that in God it is possible to distinguish only four categories of existence, excluding, in particular, the category of suffering (πάσχειν): essence (οὐσία), action (τὸ ποιεῖν), intra-trinity relations (τὸ πρός), Hypostases (ὑπόστασις). For more details, see: [Elimanov, 2021, 142–144]. Compare: (Ambigua 7, 10; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 86). (Ambigua 19, 3; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 404. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2020, 584). Subsequently, Barlaam of Calabria will argue that all prophetic phenomena, as well as the Divine light that the apostles saw on Mount Tabor or that the hesychast monks see, have a created origin. In particular, this is precisely what can explain the fact why, during the Transfiguration, under the influence of uncreated Divine light, the Savior’s created clothes acquired a “very white” color (after all, color as such, whatever it may be, is a characteristic of the created world): “And His clothes became shining (ἐγένετο στίλβοντα), very white ( λευκὰ λίαν), such that a whitener on earth cannot whiten so much” (Mark 9:3). "δευτέραν δὲ τὴν ἐκ τῶν μενόντων ἐγκαταλειμμάτων ἀνατυπωτικὴν ἀπὸ τούτων ἀνατυπωτικήν, μὴ ἔχουσαν ἐρηρεισμένας ἐπί τι τὰς εἰκόνας, ἥν καὶ ἰδίως φανταστικὴν καλοῦσι" (Scholia in Corpus Dionysiacum Areopagiticum; Maximus Confessor, PG. 4. Col. 201B. Russian translation: Dionysius the Areopagite, 2002, 229). (De divinis nominibus 1, 8; Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita, 1990, 120:9–121:3. Russian translation: Dionysius Areopagita, 2002, 239). (Ambigua 19, 3; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 406. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2020, 585). Wed. with one fragment from the “Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Isaiah,” which is attributed to St. Basil the Great: “The prophets were formerly called seers (cf. 1 Samuel 9:9), for they saw the future as the present. But ideas that occur in dreams (ἐκ τῶν κατ’ ὄναρ φαντασμάτων) can serve us to facilitate the easiest understanding of prophetic excitement (κίνημα). As in dreams, due to the fact that the sovereign of our soul imprints images in itself ἡμῶν τυπουμένου), we are spectators of cities and countries distinguished by their greatness and beauty, or supernatural animals, and often we retain in our memory some words that struck our ears, while in composing in us so many extraordinary visions (θεαμάτων) and hearings, in reality we We do not see or hear with our bodily senses, so the mind of divine and blessed men, imprinting images in itself, sometimes in the waking state, and sometimes in a dream, is filled with Divine words and visions (θεαμάτων), while the images of visible objects do not reach it through the eyes and it does not receive with the ears the vibrations of the air produced by sounding instruments. For the throne, high and exalted, and He who sat on it, whom Isaiah saw, were not something external that could be seen (see Isaiah 6:1). Also not humanoid was the one from the loins to the top similar to an electrum and the fiery one from the loins to the bottom, described in Ezekiel (cf. Ezekiel 8:2). But the mind of the prophets contemplated these objects with a higher power, while the Spirit in fortune telling showed them the nature of God” (Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam 3; Basilius Caesariensis, PG. 30. Col. 124B–C. Russian translation with amendment: Basil the Great, 1815, 7–8). Most researchers believe that the “Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Isaiah” does not belong to St. Vasily (see, in part: [Rudberg, 1953, 51]). Compare: “That representation (φαντασία) is not sensation is clear from the following: sensation is either a possibility or reality, for example: sight and vision; representation also arises in the absence of both, for example in dreams” (“ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἤτοι δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὅρασις, φαίνεται δέ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος τούτων, οἷον τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις" (De anima III, 3, 3; Aristoteles, 1837, 223). (Ambigua 19, 4; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 406). St. Gregory of Nyssa, discussing the prophetic vision in a dream, also especially emphasizes the activity of God and the passivity of the prophet receiving the revelation: “For let no one understand that this happened by the power of those sleeping [i.e. e. the prophets Daniel and Joseph], otherwise, by consistent reasoning, he will definitely decide that the manifestations of God that occur in reality do not occur as a revelation, but by themselves, following nature. Because, although all people are controlled by their own mind, few are worthy of a clear conversation with God, and natural sleepy dreaming occurs equally and equally for everyone, but only some, and not all, are involved in some Divine phenomenon in a dream. And for all others, if there is any foreknowledge in a dream, it is only in the manner mentioned above” (De hominis opificio 13; Gregorius Nyssenus, PG. 44. Col. 172AB). For a selection of texts and their analysis, see: [Anagnostou-Laoutides, 2018, 72–75]. (De hominis opificio 13; Gregorius Nyssenus, PG. 44. Col. 168B–D. Russian translation: Gregory of Nyssenus, 2000, 54–55). “ὀπτασίαν τινὰ θείων πραγμάτων διὰ τὴν ἐκ πολλῆς καθαρότητος "(Ambigua 19, 4; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 406. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2020, 585). (Ambigua 10/17; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 190–194). (Ambigua 10/17; Maximus Confessor, 2014a,190). (Ambigua 10/17, 29; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 190). (Ambigua bid. 10/17, 29; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 192). In this article, it does not seem appropriate to examine in detail the doctrine of the vision of the Light of Tabor in the theology of St. Maxim, therefore, we will limit ourselves to the above comments. ““Τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τύπωσιν” οἶμαι κατ’ ἔμφασιν αὐτὸν λέγειν τοὺς μονοτρόπως, ὡς ἐν εἰκόνι, κατὰ τὴν ἁπλῆν καὶ ἀδιάστατον τοῦ νοεροῦ προσβολὴν τοῖς ἁγίοις προσφαινομένους τῶν μελλόντων τύπους" (Ambigua 19, 4; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 406. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2020, 585). See for example: (Ambigua 10/2a, 7; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 160). "Ἡ ψυχή, οὐσία νοερά τε καὶ λογικὴ ὑπάρχουσα, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ λογίζεται, δύναμιν ἔχουσα τὸν νοῦν, κίνησιν δὲ τὴν νόησιν, ἐνέργειαν δὲ τὸ νόημα. Πέρας γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς τε τοῦ νοοῦντος καὶ τοῦ νοουμένου νοήσεώς ἐστιν, ὡς περιοριστικὸν τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἄκρων ὑπάρχον σχέσεως" (Ambigua 15, 8; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 370. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2020, 550–551). (Ambigua 15, 8; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 372). (Ambigua 15, 8; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 372. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2020, 551). (Ambigua 15, 2; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 362). St. Maxim very often uses the word νόημα in the meaning of “concept” or “meaning”. The concepts of specific things discussed here should not be confused with “general concepts” (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι), which are formed not by the “mind” (νοῦς), but by “reason” (λόγος) (see: (Ambigua 17, 11; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 394)). At the same time, Rev. Maximus, at least in some passages, uses ἔννοια in the sense of νόημα (Ambigua 15, 3; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 364; Ambigua 5, 3; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 34; Ambigua 6, 2; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 68). Ἔννοια, like νόημα, is comprehended by the mind: “If someone, filled with zeal, wants to comprehend with the mind the more sublime meaning [of these words], then by the right hand he should understand the meanings of incorporeal [things], and by shuytse - the meanings of bodily [things]” (Εἰ δέ τις καὶ πρὸς ὑψηλοτέραν ἔννοιαν ἀνατεῖναι φιλοτίμως βούλεται τὸν νοῦν, δεξιὰν νοήσει πάντως τοὺς τῶν ἀσωμάτων λόγους, ἀριστερὰν δὲ τοὺς τῶν σωμάτων) (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LXIV; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 213:426–428. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2019, 443). "Τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἔξωθέν εἰσι τοῦ νοῦ, τὰ δὲ τούτων νοήματα ἔσωθεν συνίστανται" (Capita de caritate 2.73; Maximus Confessor, PG. 90. Col. 1008A). “Any thought capable of being imprinted on the mind (πᾶν νόημα, νῷ τυπωθῆναι δυνάμενον) is nothing more than elementary learning, announcing what is beyond it” (Ambigua 21, 4; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 424. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2020, 598). (Ambigua 15, 8; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 370). (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 65:312–328). See, for example: (Capita de caritate 2, 74; Maximus Confessor, PG. 90. Col. 1008B; Quaestiones ad Thalassium XXXII; Maximus Confessor, 1980, 225:24; Quaestiones ad Thalassium LI; Maximus Confessor, 1980, 399:74). See, for example: (Capita theologica et oeconomica 1, 31; Maximus Confessor, PG. T. 90. Col. 1096). The mind “grasps” the logoi in existence: (Ambigua 22, 2; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 448). See: (Ambigua 15, 8; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 372). Compare: “For God is not something thinkable or predicable, so that the soul could have any thought about Him in any relation (κατά τινα σχέσιν); but [she can perceive Him] by simple unity, for it is without relation (ὡς ἄσχετον) and above thinking" (Οὐ γάρ ἐστί τι τῶν νοουμένων ὁ Θεὸς ἢ λεγομένων, ἵνα κατά τινα σχέσιν ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν αὐτοῦ δύνηται νόησιν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἁπλῆν ὡς ἄσχετον καὶ ὑπὲρ νόησιν ἕνωσιν) (Ambigua 15, 9; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 372. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2020, 551). See also: (Ambigua 10/26, 58; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 242; Ibid. 10/41, 98; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 306; Ibid. 9, 2; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 148). See: (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 77:77–83). (Ambigua 10/26, 58; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 242). (Ambigua 1, 3; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 8). Therefore, in particular, thinking is always plural or dual, since it presupposes subject-object relations: “All thinking reflects multiplicity or at least duality. For it is an indirect connection of certain extremes connected with each other, that is, it is a connection between the thinker and the thinkable" πάντως ἔμφασιν ἔχει. ἀλλήλοις συνάπτουσα, τό τε νοοῦν καί τό νοούμενον) (Capita theologica et oeconomica 1, 82; Maximus Confessor, PG. 90. Col. 1116B. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2004, 308). "οὕτω κἀκεῖ Θεὸς πᾶσαν νοὸς δύναμιν ὑπερβαίνει καὶ ἐνέργειαν, οὐδ’ ὅλως ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι τῷ νοεῖν πειρωμένῳ τὸν οἱονοῦν τύπον ἀφείς” (Ambigua 10/30, 64; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 254). Compare: (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 65:329–67:334). (Capita de caritate 2, 6; Maximus Confessor, PG. 90. Col. 985B). See: (Pro hesychastis 2, 3, 58–63; Gregorius Palamas, 1962, 591–596). See: “καὶ τυποῦται τοῦτο μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπ’ αἰσθήσεως κινημάτων, ἐκεῖ δὲ τί ἐστι τὸ τυποῦν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῶν προφητῶν εἰ θέλεις μαθεῖν, τοῦ μεγάλου Βασιλείου ἄκουσον· ἑώρων γάρ φησιν οἱ προφῆται “τυπούμενοι τῷ Πνεύματι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν” Πνεῦμά ἐστι τὸ ἅγιον τὸ ἐφιζάνον τῷ νῷ τῶν προφητῶν καὶ ὡς ὕλῃ χρώμενον τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ τὰ μέλλοντα Rus. trans.: Gregory Palama, 2021, 209). "Ὅρασιν δὲ προτάξας, λόγων ἀπαγγελίαν ἐπήγαγεν, ἵνα δείξῃ ὅτι οὐ δι’ ἀκοῆς ἐδέξατο, ἀλλὰ τῷ νῷ ἐντυπωθεῖσαν τοῦ λόγου τὴν διάνοιαν ἐξαγγέλλει. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν φωνῆς μὲν χρεία πρὸς τὸ σημᾶναι ἡμῶν τὰ ὁ δὲ Θεὸς, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῶν ἀξίων ἁπτόμενος, "" (Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam 9; Basilius Caesariensis, PG. 30. Col. 132C. Russian translation: Vasily the Great, 1815, 101). (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 45:1–11. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2019, 337). (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 45:17–28. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2019, 338). Οὐ γὰρ θέμις εἰπεῖν ὡς μόνη καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ἡ χάρις ἐνήργει τοῖς ἁγίοις τὰς γνώσεις τῶν μυστηρίων χωρὶς τῶν τῆς γνώσεως δεκτικῶν κατὰ φύσιν δυνάμεων, ἐπεὶ μὴ συνιέντας εἰσάγομεν τοὺς ἁγίους προφήτας τῶν δοθέντων αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ παναγίου πνεύματος φωτισμῶν τὴν δύναμιν – καὶ πῶς ἀληθὴς ὁ φάσκων ἔσται λόγος ὅτι ὁ σοφὸς νοήσει τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου στόματος; – οὔτε μὴν δίχα τῆς τοῦ παναγίου πνεύματος χάριτος μόνῃ τῇ κατὰ φύσιν δυνάμει ζητήσαντες τὴν ἀληθῆ τῶν ὄντων ἀπειλήφασιν γνῶσιν, ἐπεὶ περιττὴ δειχθήσεται τοῖς ἁγίοις ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐπιφοίτησις, κατὰ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς συνεργοῦσα πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας φανέρωσιν ἐπιφοίτησις, κατὰ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς συνεργοῦσα πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας φανέρωσιν – καὶ πῶς ἀληθὴς ὁ φάσκων ἔσται λόγος ὅτι πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον ἄνωθέν ἐστι (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 45:28–47:40. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2019, 338). “This is demonstrated with absolute clarity by all the saints, who seek after the revelation of the Divine [secrets] and the meanings revealed to them” (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 49:64–66. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2019, 340). (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 65:307–311). (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 65:312–328. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2019, 352). “Ζητεῖ γὰρ φυσικῶς ὁ νοῦς, ἐρευνᾷ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ὁ λόγος” (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 65:311–312. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2019, 352). (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 65:329–67:334. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2019, 353). "Ὁ νοῦς ἡμῶν μέσος ἐστὶ δύο τινῶν, ἑκάστου τὰ ἴδια ἐνεργοῦντος· τοῦ μέν, ἀρετήν· τοῦ δέ, κακίαν· τουτέστιν ἀγγέλου καὶ δαίμονος. Ἐξουσίαν δὲ ἔχει ὁ νοῦς καὶ δύναμιν ᾧ θέλει εἴτε ἕπεσθαι εἴτε ἀντισθῆναι" (Maximus Confessor. PG. 90. Col. 1015B. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 1993, 133). ἤ νοῦς περί τι αὐθαιρέτως κινούμενος. ?? ψυχῆς κίνησις αὐτοκρατής (Maximus Confessor. PG. 91. Col. 277C. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2014, 475). Referring to a fragment from St. Irenaeus of Lyons, St. Maxim also defines natural will (θέλησις) as the autocratic force (αὐτεξούσιος δύναμις) of the soul: “The will of the intelligent soul is the logos belonging to us; [it] exists as the autocratic force of the soul. Will is a striving mind and a rational desire that inclines towards what is desired" ὡς αὐτεξούσιος αὐτῆς ὑπάρχουσα δύναμις Θέλησις ἐστι νοῦς. (Maximus) Confessor. PG. 91. Col. 276C. Russian.: Maxim Confessor, 2014, 473). (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 67:334–337). "Εἴτε οὖν ἐζήτουν ἢ ἐξεζήτουν, εἴτε ἠρεύνων ἢ ἐξηρεύνων οἱ ἅγιοι, τὴν χάριν εἶχον τοῦ πνεύματος κινοῦσαν αὐτῶν τὴν νοερὰν καὶ λογικὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ζήτησιν καὶ ἔρευναν τῆς τῶν ψυχῶν σωτηρίας, καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ πνεύματος οὐδὲν παντελῶς ἐθεώρουν πνευματικόν, ὅτι μηδὲ πέφυκεν ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς "Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 51:110–116. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2019, 342). “After all, just as without sunlight the eye cannot perceive sensual things, so without spiritual Light the human mind is not able to acquire spiritual contemplation. One light naturally illuminates the sense so that it perceives bodies, and another Light enlightens the contemplating mind so that it comprehends [things] beyond sense" (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 51:114–53:121. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2019, 342). St. Maximus also gives another comparison: just as Christ could not have been incarnated and accomplished the House of Salvation without human flesh itself, so God could not have communicated to man the knowledge of Himself “without the power inherent in [human] nature, seeking and exploring this knowledge” (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 51: 104–109. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2019, 342). Yes, Rev. Maxim writes: “Therefore, seeking in the Spirit the salvation of souls and exploring the meanings and methods of this salvation, the Holy Spirit leads them to an understanding [of the mysteries], not allowing their ability, which is inherent in comprehending the Divine, to remain in immobility and inaction” (Οὐκοῦν τοὺς ἐκζητοῦντας ἐν πνεύματι τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἐξερευνῶντας τοὺς ταύτης πνευματικοὺς τῆς σωτηρίας λόγους τε ?? ἐῶν ἀκίνητον ἐν αὐτοῖς μένειν καὶ ἀνενέργητον τὴν δι’ ἧς ἐκζητεῖν τὰ θεῖα πεφύκασι δύναμιν) (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 57:178–183. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2019, 345); “Those who imitate them [i.e. saints] also investigate through knowledge and knowledge what pertains to the salvation of the soul, and seeking [this salvation] through prudence and wisdom, they seek [spiritual] discernment in the affairs of God" καὶ ἐπιστήμης τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν ἐκζητοῦσι σωτηρίαν, καὶ μετὰ ϕοφίας θείοις ἔργοις διάκρισιν) (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 67:334–337. Rus. trans.: Maxim Confessor, 2019, 353). See also: (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 51:113; 53:122; 65:329–330). "ἡ χάρις τοῦ παναγίου πνεύματος ἐνεργεῖ σοφίαν ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις χωρὶς τοῦ ταύτην δεχομένου νοός, οὔτε γνῶσιν χωρὶς τῆς δεκτικῆς τοῦ λόγου δυνάμεως" (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 47:55–57. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2019, 339). (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 51:99–104. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2019, 341). (Gregorius Nazianzenus. PG. 36. Col. 75B). Compare: “After all... the Divinity is motionless (ἀκίνητον), and every [thing] from [which was] non-existent has received existence and is mobile (κίνητον)” (Ambigua 7, 3; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 76. Russian translation: Maximus the Confessor, 2020, 254). (Ambigua 1, 10; Maximus Confessor, 2014, 4. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2020, 195). “...for we are first enlightened in the logos of His being (τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον), and only then in what is the tropos of His existence (τὸν τοῦ πῶς αὐτὴν ὑφεστάναι τρόπον), for, in any case, being (τὸ εἶναι) is thought before as-being (πῶς εἶναι). So, the “movement” of the Divine, arising through the explanation of His being and how He exists (τοῦ πῶς αὐτὴν ὑφεστάναι), is knowledge for those who are ready to perceive it” (Ambigua 1, 10; Maximus Confessor, 2014a, 4. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2020, 195). This is exactly how J.-C. understands this place. Larchet: “Gregory’s statement that “from the beginning the Monad [in this context, the Father] moved towards the Two [Father and Son] and stopped in the Trinity [Father, Son and Spirit],” cannot be attributed to God considered in Himself, and is understood exclusively in relation to a person trying to find and know Him” [Larchet, 1994, 17]. However, as noted by A.M. Shufrin, interpreting this passage, only a deified person can cognize the dogma of the Trinity of God, but since only one energy of God acts in relation to the knowledge of God in the saints, then “we can speak of this movement of the mind as the “movement of God”” (see: [Benevich, 2020, 34]). We will also talk about this circumstance in more detail in paragraph 2.3. of this article. Compare: (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 51:110–53:121). "Τὴν οὖν μεσότητα δεῖ ἐπιτηροῦντα τῆς ἐνεργείας εἰς λόγους θεηγόρους ἔρχεσθαι" (Capita centum de perfectione spirituali 8; Diadochus, ep. Photices, 1943, 88:5–6). See: (Capita centum de perfectione spirituali 8; Diadochus, ep. Photices, 1953, 86–88). Compare, for example: (Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Introdvctio; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 19:53–21:64. Also: “Beginning to discuss it, I pray to the Lord, the Teacher of this Prayer, to open my mind to comprehend the secrets hidden in it and to give me the appropriate word to explain them” (Expositio orationis dominicae; Maximus Confessor, 1991, 29:57–30:61. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2004, 252). Compare: “May God, the only Mind of that which thinks and that which is comprehended by thought, guide our words and thoughts; [single] Word of that which expresses, and of that which is spoken about" μόνος νοῦς τῶν νοούντων καὶ νοουμένων, καὶ λόγος τῶν λεγόντων καὶ λεγομένων) (Mystagogia; Maximus Confessor, 2011, 9:102–105. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 1993, 156). “Ἀλλά πῶς εἴπω Κύριον Ἰησοῦν, μήπω Πνεῦμα λαβών ἁγιότητος;” (Ambigua; Maximus Confessor, PG. 91. Col. 1033A. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2020, 194). "Καί τῇ μεσιτείᾳ τῶν ἁγίων καί βοηθείᾳ τῶν ὑμετέρων εὐχῶν, Χριστοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καί Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν χορηγοῦντος τό νοεῖν εὐσεβῶς καί λέγειν δεόντως, περί ἑκάστου κεφαλαίου τήν "Ambigua; Maximus Confessor, PG. 91. Col. 1033C. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2020, 194). "ψυχήν αὐτοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς γεγενημένον καί διά πάντων ἔργων τε καί λόγων καί νοημάτων πᾶσιν ἐμφανιζόμενον ὡς ἐντεῦθεν ἐκείνων μέν οὐκ εἶναι πεπεῖσθαι τά προτεθέντα, Χριστοῦ δέ κατά χάριν αὐτοῖς ἑαυτόν ὑπαλλάξαντος” (Ambigua; Maximus Confessor, PG. 91. Col. 1033A). Compare: “Therefore, I affirm that whoever wants to go to God in an impeccable and direct way necessarily needs both - knowledge of Scripture in the Spirit (τῆς τε γραφικῆς ἐν πνεύματι γνώσεως) and natural contemplation who are according to the Spirit (τῆς τῶν ὄντων κατὰ πνεῦμα)" (Ambigua 10/17, 30; Maximus Confessor, 2014, 192–194. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2020, 360). See also: (Quaestiones ad Thalassium LIX; Maximus Confessor, 1990, 57:178–183). "δέον πάσης αὐτὸν γυμνὸν ἐννοίας καὶ γνώσεως ἀνομμάτως ὁρᾶν τὸν ἀληθῆ θεὸν λόγον, γινώσκοντα σαφῶς ὡς ἐπὶ θεοῦ μᾶλλον αἱ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν στερήσεις ἀληθεύουσι, ποσῶς μηνύουσαι τὴν θείαν "Quaestiones ad Thalassium XXV; Maximus Confessor, 1980, 165:113–117. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2019, 108). It is this term of St. Maxim uses it to describe the state in which a person is when he is influenced by God. See, for example: (Ambigua 10/19, 35; Maximus Confessor, 2014, 202–204). St. Maximus borrows this term from the doctrine of the knowledge of God, presented in the Areopagite Corpus, in which deification is described, among other things, as “the enduring of [things] Divine” (παθὼν τὰ θεῖα). Compare: (De divinis nominibus 2, 9; Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, 2016, 396:17). Other about the term “παθὼν τὰ θεῖα” see: [De Andia, 1992, 239–258]. As noted above, in discursive theology, in contrast to prophetic vision, God moves not only the mind, but the mind of man, i.e. and the “thinking” (νοερά) and “reasonable” (λογική) power of his soul. Read more about the teachings of St. For the maxim on deification, see: [Larchet, 1996; Russell, 2006, 262–295]. (Ad Marinum presbyterum (Opusculum 1); Maximus Confessor, PG. 91. Col. 33A–33B). “τῇ ἐκστάσει τῶν φυσικῶς ἐπ’ αὐτῆς καὶ ὄντων καὶ νοουμένων, διὰ τὴν ἐκνικήσασαν αὐτὴν χάριν τοῦ Πνεύματος καὶ μόνον ἔχουσαν ἐνεργοῦντα τὸν Θεὸν δείξασαν, ὥστε εἶναι μίαν καὶ μόνην διὰ πάντων ἐνέργειαν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀξίων Θεοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ μόνου Θεοῦ, ὡς ὅλον ὅλοις τοῖς ἀξίοις ἀγαθοπρεπῶς περιχωρήσαντος" (Ambigua 7, 12; Maximus Confessor, 2014, 90. Russian translation: Maxim Confessor, 2020, 258). (Quaestiones ad Thalassium XXII; Maximus Confessor, 1980, 141:87–92). J.-C. Larchet writes about the “deactivation” of natural energy in saints in a state of perfect deification: [Larchet, 1996, 572]. See also: [Larchet, 2015, 341–359]. St. Maxim speaks of the Divine influence either on the “idea” (φαντασία) of a person’s unreasonable soul, or on his “mind,” that is, on the mental power (νοερὰ δύναμις) of the rational soul. Here we can give the following example: just as a ring leaves an imprint of its shape on wax, so God, acting on the “representation” of a saint, forms His Divine revelation from the “images-representations” contained in it. In other words, God gives a certain form to those “image-representations” that are already contained in the “representation”. Compare: “For It is never described in [anything] alone and, due to [Its] natural infinity, cannot be contained within the limits of [one] thought (διανοίας)” (Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Introductio; Maximus Confessor, 1980, 23: 105–107. Russian translation: Maximus Confessor, 2019, 20). Therefore, it cannot be argued that the holy fathers themselves formed the image of God, translating created concepts of love, beauty, mercy, etc. using the method of analogy. into superlatives and applying them to God. For God Himself, using created thinking and the concepts of this thinking, creates His image in the minds of the saints or communicates His will to them.