Category of time in Christian metaphysics: Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor

St. Tikhon's Orthodox University, Russia Temporality plays a key role in the formation of human self-awareness and, thereby, in the existence of man as such. At the same time, the category of time eludes understanding and is difficult to describe, always inevitably leaving something most essential behind the scenes of strict analysis. Greek antiquity was well aware of the impossibility of the task of determining time and understanding its nature. And yet, not a single major thinker gave up trying to penetrate the mystery of time and unravel its riddle. This need, from the very first steps of temporal reflection, starting at least with Heraclitus and the Eleatics, is characterized by extraordinary persistence, which is easily explained. After all, the fluidity of time means the instability and impermanence of our existence, which a person cannot help but resist, since he has an innate desire to perpetuate his existence, to extend it in time, therefore the phenomenon of time requires a person to overcome it. Awakened human thought strives to gain a foothold in being, to grasp being, and for this it is necessary to subjugate time. However, these persistent attempts are in most cases unsuccessful and therefore almost fruitless. Again and again, thought comes up against the statement of the fluidity and impermanence of everything with which our experience of time is connected. “Everything flows and moves, and nothing remains” - Πάντα ῥεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, 1 - Heraclitus began with this, and this statement continues to be a kind of sentence for antiquity. Time is a relative or correlative category, and therefore it does not exist in itself, but is present only in correlation. This is a paradox that cannot be resolved by philosophical means. Physical time exists beyond any doubt; everyday time also does not require any special proof for its recognition. But time as an object of thought, as a universal category, eludes comprehension. Augustine was able to express this perfectly: “... the past no longer exists, the future does not yet exist, and the present is devoid of extension.” 2 Even more clearly, although less well known, is the statement of Basil the Great: “... the past has passed, the future has not yet arrived, but the present eludes the senses before it is known.” 3 Time can only be grasped through something else, be it its experience, its measurement, its description, or through categories comparable to it. So, time is comprehended through correlation, and not through indication; predicatively, not ostensively. Thus, the subject of correlation with it is of decisive importance for the awareness of time. For antiquity, such a meaningful and stable correlation for time is the concept of eternity. In the constant variability of time, discovered by ancient thought, the ancients tried to find their paradoxical stability, contained in the very fact of instability. And this is where the persistent correlation of time with eternity comes from. In the Platonic system, eternity is an absolute model for time, which serves only as its distant and dim reflection, or its moving image - εἰκὼ κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος (Timaeus 37d). Numerous followers of Plato belonging to his school will remain faithful to this. The concept of time is thus introduced as a category correlative with its inaccessible model - eternity. Eternity remains an irrespective and absolute category. For antiquity this is a solid truth. In the philosophical thought of the 19th and 20th centuries, the subject of correlation with time is the concept of the future, into which development and progress are undoubtedly directed. In this case, the central meaning of time is expressed in the concept of process as the same unstoppable flow. But the bet is now on the movement itself. 4 There is a third possibility of relating time - with the moment of the present. P. P. Gaidenko builds a series of thinkers from the beginning of the New Age of very different origins who adhere to this solution to the problem: Fr. Baader, Edith Stein, Hans Sedlmeier, Paul Tillich and, finally, Meister Eckhart (we note in parentheses that similar aspirations in antiquity are demonstrated by the Stoics and Epicureans, as P. Hadot wrote very convincingly about, revealing the content of the ancient cult of nature, more precisely, the practice of “physics” among the Stoics and Epicureans 5 ). So, if antiquity, or rather the Platonic tradition, correlates the relative concept of time with eternity, if modernity, having lost the height of understanding of the subject, correlates time with the future, if, finally, individual thinkers call for correlating time with the present as a representation and realization of eternity, then Christian thought in the person of Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor correlates time with God, with His inherent attributes of infinity and infinity. The present material is devoted to clarifying this last type of correlation. Let's try to reveal this fundamental revision of the problem of time in three aspects: 1) a change in the temporal paradigm, 2) the filling of the basic terminology, 3) the goal-setting of time and, thereby, its role in human life. 1. Time according to Gregory of Nyssa In classical antiquity, the prevailing metaphor for time is the geometry of a circle, a closed cycle, the dynamics of circulation. This is evidenced by ancient mythology; This is the basis for the great achievements of ancient science, which consisted primarily in the observation of constant and stable alternations in nature. Hence the unusually high authority of astrology and its influence on private and public life. But from here follows a pessimistic understanding of time, which other researchers, from this perspective, rightly characterize as “the law of degeneration, not development.” 6 This is a cosmological concept. It is based on the structure of the observable physical world, and here antiquity was particularly successful. The spiritual world is completely subject to his laws. Thus, fate is measured by astrological, biological and even gastronomic factors (fortune telling by the entrails of animals). In such a worldview, a certain hierarchy of existence is built. Its lower floors are subordinate to the higher ones and are regulated by them, being only their reflection. 7 It is quite clear that such a picture of the world and the fate of man wholly involved in it contain explosive potential, which sooner or later should have led to a rebellion against fate, against the suppression of freedom, against predestination. Numerous textual and archaeological documents from classical and late antiquity indicate that a “tectonic shift” in the understanding of time occurred in the 3rd–4th centuries. 8 Through numerous transformations, experiments or breakthroughs in scientific thought, the predominance of cyclical time gives way to the so-called linear time, which should more accurately be called directional. This change decisively changes the understanding of the world and its ultimate destinies. The sense of closedness and isolation of the universe, familiar to antiquity, reflected in the most diverse versions of philosophical and mythological determinism, is replaced by an unprecedented awareness of the openness of time, the openness of human existence, with all the inspiring and at the same time frightening experience of freedom. And this is connected with the Christian understanding of our problem. The early Christians tried to rethink time in a different, open and, as it turned out later, prevailing way. In their reasoning, they proceeded from the dogmas about the creation of the world and the incarnation of God. Time belongs not only to man and the world. God creates it and He appears in it. Each of His interventions in the course of time becomes a unique and irreducible moment of the universal movement of history (καιρός, time-event); these moments guarantee the irrevocable dignity of time and its irreversibility. And if in the case of Origen, researchers and historians have quite compelling reasons to speak of his teaching as a “heresy about time,” 9 i.e., following the traditions of ancient cyclical temporality, then it is most likely just a tribute to the frontal rapprochement of theological, i.e., church discourse with philosophical or, more broadly, scientific discourse, which was undertaken in the second and third centuries. On the issue of time, Origen adapts to the ideas existing in antiquity (in our case, the concept of temporal cyclism), while pursuing his own special apologetic and missionary goals. That is why we do not yet see in him an independent and mature Christian view of the problem. He remains in the grip of the ancient concepts of cyclism, eternal return, etc. Changing the view on the problem of time is the work of another generation of Christian theologians, who learned many of the lessons of Origen, in particular, the Great Cappadocians. It should be noted that their appeal to the problem of time was mainly due to the theological dispute in which all representatives of this tradition took part, namely, the dispute with Eunomius, who put forward the thesis about the subordination of the Son to time. In fact, with the advent of Christianity, we are not talking about a mechanical replacement of one picture of the world with another - from cyclical to linear. This understanding suffers from some simplification. The issue of time is resolved in a more subtle and nuanced manner. Christian thinkers preserved the positive potential and undoubted scientific merits of ancient cyclism (achievements in the natural sciences - measuring instruments: sundials, water dials, sanddials, discoveries in the field of astronomy), while radically opening the horizon of knowledge beyond the boundaries of cosmology, penetrating into the realm of the spirit - the sphere of life of the human soul. It was they who truly gave time that very human dimension that has since reigned supreme. The remark of Jean Danielou, 10 who said that linear time is historical time, and cyclic time is biological, is fair. Man is a borderline being (μεθόριος) between the worlds - the sensory and the intelligible, and therefore both dimensions are important for him, although in neither case are they of exclusive importance. We find a remarkably precise formulation in the elder brother of one of the main heroes of the Christian rethinking of time - Basil the Great, who talks about the combination of figures of time - the circle and the line. He writes: “Time moves forward in constant rotations.” 11 Cyclic movement is included in a certain broader linear direction; time develops forward in rotations. Thus, biological and historical, or, what is the same in the present case, anthropological time are organically combined with each other and are in a relationship of value subordination. Now it is appropriate to make some terminological observations directly in connection with Gregory of Nyssa. The traditional canon of concepts - eternity (ἀιών/ἀΐδιον) - time (χρόνος) - the moment now (καιρός) - was given by Plato and the philosophical traditions that developed after him. Christian thinkers continued to work within this system. However, as in many other cases, they significantly changed the content of the terms used. And depending on this, they developed their understanding of time, reflecting their experience of overcoming it, or, as we will see later, its transformation. As noted above, for antiquity time is only a vague reflection of eternity. The status of eternity is unshakable and unconditional. It relates to the world of ideas and the One. Eternity is a category that exhausts being as such. For Christian thinkers, both eternity and time are located on the same categorical plane - in the space of the created world. The only question is the quantitative difference, the difference is only in scale. Eternity, like time, is subject to correlative definition. The classic definition belongs to Gregory the Theologian: “What time is for us, for eternal beings is eternity, coextensive with their existence.” 12 Eternity itself, thereby, becomes dependent on eternal beings, is subordinate to them and does not have the status of absoluteness that it had in antiquity. The definition of eternity, which is proposed by Gregory of Nyssa, is as follows: “Eternity, being a certain concept of duration, by itself designates the entire creation that arises in it.” 13 It therefore contains the entire creation because it is a category of long duration, enclosing within its limits the entire duration of the existence of the created world. This definition reveals the spatial scheme of volume as the container of all creation. However, turning to spatial metaphors in no way means a spatial understanding of temporality. 14 It only once again demonstrates the elusiveness of time even in its verbal description. Gregory adapts the concept of eternity to the intelligible world. According to Gregory of Nyssa, eternity serves as the outer boundary and limit of human thought and knowledge; beyond these limits reigns the incomprehensible to us. 15 This is the world of the intelligible, or intelligible. The boundary between the sensory and intelligible worlds, although transparent and constantly overcome, is never eliminated. In any case, eternity (ages) are conceived as temporality, and therefore are located somewhere below and beyond the pre-eternal birth of the Son, 16 since ages (eternity) are His creation. With this understanding, of course, there can be no talk of any deification of eternity, as happened in antiquity. God is beyond time and beyond eternity. Its remote description is accessible only to apophatic means - predominantly. ἄπειρος. 17 Thus, eternity, with all its undeniable advantages compared to time, is also a relative category, created and subordinate to the general plan for creation and the Creator himself. As Gregory of Nyssa says, “Christ is the father of the future age (eternity), for in him the life of endless ages is established.” 18 And the duration of eternity, which includes the limits of the created world, is limited by the fact of its own creation and secondary nature in relation to the Creator. Thus, the Platonic relationship image (time) - sample (eternity) is built on another, higher level of reflection: just as time is a simplified analogue of eternity, so eternity is the image of the Future Age. 19 At the same time, the concepts of eternity and time mutually explain each other. If time is the concept of duration, then eternity is the concept of great duration. To define time, Gregory most often uses the word διάστημα (duration, length in time, interval, duration, time period, etc.). In this technique, he joins a broad tradition dating back to Aristotle. Time is the extension (διάστημα) of everything that exists in this world. “Time is coextensive with everything that undergoes becoming.” 20 Another definition is this: “Therefore, time is understood by us as a measure, because time serves as a measure for each individual measure (measured). Whatever happens, without a doubt, happens in time, and with the continuation of everything that happens, the extension/extension of time continues together, small extension with small, and greater with greater.” 21 In other words, time manifests itself as a kind of network that embraces and envelops all emerging things, all events, everything that happens. Outside of time, nothing happens that happens. Each unit of existence corresponds to a period of time determined by its duration. All of them, as we have already seen, enter into a time of great duration - eternity, understood in their own way. There are two restrictions here: 1) time relates only to those things that undergo formation, emergence and disappearance, in other words, are in motion (the most important predicate for the concept being studied); 2) the duration of time (διάστημα) strictly corresponds to the duration of the existence of these initial and final things. It should be said that in defining time through the concept of extension (τὸ διάστημα), Gregory, as in many other things, follows brother Vasily, who, in turn, relies on the already established philosophical tradition. Thus, in his early treatise “Against Eunomius,” Basil gives a definition very close and clearly supporting Gregory: “Time is a duration coextensive with the creation of the world; time measures any (any) movement, be it the movement of stars, the movement of animals, or anything that does not move, why do we say that one is faster, another is slower, what moves in a shorter period of time (διάστημα) of time is faster, and what moves in a longer period is slower.” 22 So, we have in our hands three keys to the Cappadocian understanding of the nature of time by Basil and Gregory. These concepts are: extension (διάστημα) - a generic feature of time, measure (μέτρον) - the main function of time, measurement, and movement (κίνησις) - a generic feature of the object of time - the world of becoming. However, neither one nor the other, nor the third is an invention of Christian theologians. Behind the above definitions one can discern the figure of Aristotle and the subsequent tradition, represented by many names. What is new in this case is the application of this familiar scheme in relation to human existence, the human dimension of time. Let us reduce the main meanings to three main postulates: 1) time has a beginning from the emergence of that which undergoes becoming (beginning), 2) time is the duration of the movement of moving things, that is, everything that undergoes formation, that is, the entire created world; time accompanies the fate of things (continued), 3) time extends its meaning only to those things, beings and objects that have a beginning and an end (end). And, finally, the third link of our review of basic terminology is associated with the word καιρός, or, with clarification, εὐκαιρία (timeliness, opportuneness, moment, instant now, the indivisible point of coincidence of the fullness of time and being, the very thing that P. P. Gaidenko calls “the ontological eternity of the present” 23). For Gregory of Nyssa, this timeliness is filled with a very specific content. Commenting on Eccl 3:6 – there is a time to seek, and a time to lose; time to save, and time to throw away, he writes: “What do I need to look for in order to get decent time?... - something, finding which is the constant search process itself. For it is nothing else to seek this, and nothing else to find it; but the benefit of acquisition is the quest itself. Would you like to find out the timing? When is the time to seek the Lord? Let me answer briefly: my whole life. For it is timely to care about this one thing along with every other care. It is good not to seek the Lord on certain days or at a specific time; On the contrary, the seeker should never stop doing this at all - this is true opportuneness.” 24 A constant search, a constant process, an eternal movement, perpetuum mobile, in the direction of what is sought, according to Gregory, should become the content of our life, its perfect concentration. This idea, as we will now see, is central to the whole theology of Gregory's time. Let us only note that he completely changes the understanding of the uniqueness and uniqueness of the moment, which is proclaimed, in particular, by Goethe’s Faust. Gregory unfolds the time of human life over the entire extremely compressed extent of καιρός, collects it all at a single point and fills it with eternal content. And the meaning lies in the constant search. Moreover, the search is not aimless and not indifferent; its purpose is to find the Lord, and its content is the Lord himself. And as the further development of Gregory’s interpretation of the book of Ecclesiastes shows, this is not only a process, but also a result: “... as ... the timing of the search is not determined by any time, but all life is a single time for this good search; So we affirm that the storage time is measured by the entire life...” 25 We can talk about the direction of such an experience of time, about its conscious and volitional orientation towards the search, acquisition and preservation not of impersonal eternity, but of filled eternity, in which the Lord, the Ruler of time and eternity, resides. This is a unique practice of time, as one of the spiritual exercises developed by Gregory of Nyssa. Actually, it consists in an endless correlation with what is sought and the complete preservation of what is found. And this practice serves the main purpose of time, which we now move on to discuss, namely, the issue of goal-setting time and its role in human life. The doctrine of salvation, as a feature of any religious consciousness, subordinates every individual experience of knowledge to the destiny of man, no matter how it is understood in one or another religious tradition. After all, religious consciousness does not tolerate an indifferent existence; everything that is accessible to experience has some higher purpose. Salvation in antiquity and Christianity have their own purpose. And time is not indifferent here, being one of the key soteriological categories. This is true for the ancient reading of this category, which formed the idea of ​​the cyclical closedness of time. The Gnostics tried to solve the riddle of time in their own way, proposing their soteriological concept - the escape and elimination of time. Christian thinkers also respond to the religious request by turning to the problem of time. In our case we are talking about the direction of time, about its vector orientation. The reality of human existence lies in constant change (κίνησις, τροπή), in constant movement, be it movement in space or change in time. 26 This is how the essence of the matter was understood in antiquity, and this is how Christians continue to think. But this fundamental characteristic of being in antiquity was assessed in principle negatively. This is the root of ancient tragedy, the irreversibility of fate, fate (Greek tragedy); this is also the essence of classical Greek philosophy (Plato, Aristotle). Christian thinkers have tried to rethink and redirect the movement from the path to disintegration to the path to gathering, constant search and striving for perfection. Not only to rethink movement as a given of human existence, but to elevate it into the principle of the doctrine of salvation - this is the contribution of Christian metaphysicians. Gregory of Nyssa was able to express this intuition with particular force. His words in his letter-treatise De perfectione sound unusually optimistic: “... man’s changeability is not directed towards evil alone... but changeability also produces the most beautiful thing - growth in goodness, when changeability for the better constantly brings the well-changed person closer to the Divine.” 27 And this approach to God has no end or limit, because God is infinite and limitless. “What seems terrifying, namely the variability of our nature, turns out to be a kind of wing for soaring to the highest... so that even some kind of punishment for us would be the impossibility of changing for the better. Thus, let him not be upset who sees in our nature a tendency to transformation, but let him, constantly changing for the better, and transforming from glory to glory, change in such a way that through daily multiplication he becomes better, always improves and never reaches the limit of improvement. After all, this is precisely what perfection consists of, namely, never stopping in growing for the better and not limiting perfection to any limit.” 28 Such lines and similar ones in the texts of Gregory of Nyssa prompt some researchers to the most enthusiastic assessments. Thus, Andreas Spira calls Gregory of Nyssa “one of the fathers of progressive dynamism (dynamisme progressiste), so characteristic of our Western civilization.” 29 The very movement that ancient thought is trying to stop, round off, the very movement that has lost its goal, which has captured modernity, in the light of the theology of Gregory of Nyssa takes on a Christian meaning. This movement can become an eternal aspiration towards God, as endless as God himself. And just as God is not embraced even by eternity, so the aspiration to Him overcomes all ages. This is the peculiarity of the Christian metaphysics of time, open to the divine world. She is nourished by the apostolic preaching (Phil 3:14 - forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forward to those things which are ahead, ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεκτεινόμενος) and the mystical experience of the Christian Church; it is concentrated in the liturgical life of the Christian community in the combination of liturgical cycles - annual, daily, Easter and in the eschatological opening of the circle in the Liturgy of the Eighth Day. One of the pioneers of the theology of Gregory of Nyssa in the 20th century was Jean Danielou. He managed to find the key to Gregory's entire theology, as well as his teaching about time, in the form of the concept of epectasis, or ectasis (ἐπέκτασις). 30 This is how Danielou reveals it: “... a dual state, containing both possession and procession, which Gregory tries to describe through this unusual word epectasis, found only in him. By its very structure, this word expresses duality. On the one hand, possession, the prefix ἐπι-, indicates genuine possession of something, the presence of God in the soul. On the other hand, the prefix ἐκ-, exit from oneself, to the irreducible infinity of God, always attracting the soul to itself in ecstatic love. This removes the opposition between θεωρία and ἀγάπη. In intelligibility, God abides in the soul, but in love the soul rushes outward to Him... Both are indistinguishable aspects of a single reality.” 31 The concept of epectasis is surprisingly similar to the vital impulse (élan vitale) of Henri Bergson, with one, however, distinctive feature. Bergson's impulse presupposes a certain sharp transition, a leap from one state (cf. place) to another. Whereas epectasis, traditionally translated as prostration or extension, implies the filling of the distance between being, from which rapid movement is made, and reaching, which never ends completely. In epectasis there is both stability and mobility. These are motion at rest and motion at rest. Gregory writes about this, referring to the image of Moses in the book “The Life of Moses, or On Perfection and Virtue”: God addresses Moses: “... since you constantly have a desire to stretch into the foreground, you do not have satiety in the continuation of your course, you do not know any satisfaction with good, but your desire is always to strive for more, then I have such a place that it is never possible for someone passing through it to stop its course. But this flow in another sense is standing. For God says: I will set you on a rock (Exodus 33:21). - Gregory is surprised along with his reader, “The most wonderful thing is why standing and moving are one and the same thing.” He who ascends is, of course, not standing; and whoever stands does not ascend. And here standing itself becomes an ascent...” And what kind of place is this, what kind of stone is this that has such exceptional properties? – Gregory’s answer is: “The stone is Christ.” 32 Gregory reveals the mechanism of this motionless mobility and stable instability in his most recent and significant text - Commentary on the Song of Songs: “... the end of what is acquired serves as the beginning for those who ascend to the acquisition of the highest. And the ascendant never stops, borrowing from one beginning another beginning, and the beginning of a greater one never ends in itself; because the desire of the ascendant does not stop at what is known, but the soul, as a result of another even greater desire, ascending in order to a new higher one, always moves from the highest to the highest to infinity.” 33 Gregory of Nyssa's approach to the problem of time is distinguished by its deep thoughtfulness and fidelity to Christian teaching: it represents a complete synthesis of the best of what ancient thought offered and which was partly reflected in the later European tradition... Just as time embraces all created reality (διάστημα), and in a certain sense contains it, being its measure (μέτρον), so through epectasis man able to embrace the entire time of one’s life, direct it, gather it together, and fill it with the highest meaning of existence; and, what is very important, he himself is captured. Thus, material, physical time is refracted, transformed and opened into spiritual time, passing into eternity and even leaving eternity behind. Gregory of Nyssa managed to straighten the ancient cyclical (cosmological) time and enrich it with soteriological meaning and the associated counter “Christological” aspect of time, turning the unstoppable movement towards decay into a constant ascent to the Infinite. 2. Time according to Maximus the Confessor The legacy of Maximus the Confessor is also worthy of attention in connection with consideration of the problem of time. In the European intellectual tradition, he is known as an outstanding thinker no less than Gregory of Nyssa, although an era of two hundred and fifty years lies between the compilation of the main texts of the two authors. In our case, a brief overview of the teachings of Maximus may be useful in showing how similar experiences were shaped differently by adherents of the same teaching in the same language, belonging to the same Eastern Mediterranean intellectual and spiritual culture. Maxim’s understanding of the problem will help us clarify something in Gregory of Nyssa’s presentation of the topic. As a supporting and, apparently, exhaustive summary of Maxime’s statements on the proposed topic, I will use the text of the famous French specialist on this author, J.-C. Larcher, who gave a presentation on “The Idea of ​​Time in the Works of St. Maximus the Confessor” at the MDA in the fall of 2012. 34 In thinking about time as the reality of the created world, Maxim and Gregory are in complete agreement. The concept of eternity, with which we began to reveal the problem in Gregory of Nyssa, is considered by Maxim from the same angle. Namely, as a category, firstly, temporal, secondly, relative and, thirdly, subordinate. It is appropriate to speak of eternity in connection with intelligible entities; however, it is not timeless, but has a beginning: “... every nature of beings is divided into the intelligible and the sensible, and the intelligible is called and is eternal, as it received the beginning of being in eternity, and the sensible is temporal, created in time.” 35 He writes directly about the relative nature of eternity: “Age, time and place belong to the relative, for without them nothing exists that is thought together with them; God does not belong to the relative, for He does not contain at all anything that could be thought at the same time as Him.” 36 God abides in his “time,” if the use of this word itself is at all appropriate for a given case. “There is nothing new for Him, but the future is like the present. Times and ages are not indications for God, but for us who exist in God.” 37 Temporality, therefore, also has a cognitive significance, as a means of knowing divine instructions. Maxim understands time as such in connection with the concept of movement and speaks about this even more clearly than Gregory: “Everything created is and moves, and is under the definitions of nature and time: nature - because of [its] existence, and time - because of movement.” 38 Finally, moving on to the question of the purpose of time and its role in religious life, it should be noted that Maxim develops his thought independently of Gregory and here lies the main difference in the systems of the two thinkers. If we saw in Gregory that time is redirected from decay to ascension, movement instead of a negative value receives a positive value, then Maxim is inclined to talk about overcoming time, about that highest state of the human being, which is called deification. Time stops here. He conveys this state with the words “rest”, “Saturday” and even “standing, stopping” (στάσις). As we have already read: “Age, time and place belong to the relative, for without them nothing exists that is thought together with them; God does not belong to the relative, for He does not contain at all anything that could be thought at the same time as Him. Therefore, if worthy [people] are heirs of God Himself, then [everyone] awarded such grace will be above all ages, times and places.” 39 Maxim also calls this state the word “eternity,” along with what was said about relative eternity above. For this case, the following statements are typical: “Eternity is time when it stops in its movement,” “eternity is time devoid of movement.” 40 Speaking about the purpose of time, which must someday stop, Maxim proceeds from the realities of the eschatological order. He talks about time from that world. He describes it as follows: “The end of the natural movement of the created is rest (στάσις), which, after the passage of what has been passed, makes infinity, in which, since there is no distance in it, all movement of those naturally moving stops, no longer having where, how and where to move, because God, as its Author, has [also] the end that limits and the most limiting of all movement is infinity.” 41 On this point our thinkers differ. I think this should be assessed not from the point of view of their partial disagreement, but due to the fact that they consider the same issue from different perspectives. Gregory of Nyssa from the point of view of man's mystical path to God, Maxim - from the point of view of the eschatological completeness of the entire plan of creation. But the most important content of this state of a saved soul is abiding in Christ. And at this point both thinkers are in perfect agreement. In Gregory, this central intuition is conveyed by the image of the stone given to Moses, which is always moving, while remaining unshakable. And the stone is Christ. And for Maxim, as J.-C. summarizes. Larcher “Christ...is the beginning, middle and end of the story of every person.” The Christological dogma of both thinkers thus collects time in its various refractions: as a philosophical category, as a practice, as a purpose and as a goal. The final predicate of time for both is Christ. And in this respect, Christian metaphysicians bring something fundamentally new to the understanding of time as a factor of human existence. Without eliminating time as such, recognizing the inescapable variability of the world, they fundamentally rethink this very fact. In the philosophical thought of Christianity there is a radical revaluation, a revision of the direction of the total change that rules the world. This change can be either for death or for life. 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Shokhin, ed. Philosophy of religion: an almanac (2012–2013). Publishing House of Eastern Literature of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013 (Moscow), 471–483. Mikhailov, P. B. (2014) “The secret of history in Origen: conflict of interpretations”, Bulletin of PSTGU II: History. History of the Russian Orthodox Church. Vol. 1 (56), 16–30. Florovsky G. V. (1998) “Contradictions of Origenism”, Dogma and History. Moscow. Khorkov, M. L. (2000) “The Doctrine of Gregory of Nyssa about Time,” Historical and Philosophical Yearbook 1998, 65–75. Basilius Magnus (1857–1866) “Adversus Eunomium,” Patrologia graeca, vols. 29. Paris. Belayche N. (1984) “Aiôn: vers une sublimation du temps,” Le temps chrétien de la fin de l’Antiquité au Moyen Âge III–XIII siècle. Colloques internationaux du CNRS N 604, 9–12 mars 1981 (Paris), 11–30. Daniélou, J. (1942) Le signe du Church, ou De la presence de Dieu. Paris. Daniélou, J. (1970) L'être et le temps chez Grégoire de Nysse. Leiden. Daniélou, J. (1944) Platonisme et théologie mystique. Essai sur la doctrine spirituelle de saint Grégoire de Nysse. Paris. Diels H., Kranz W., hrsgs. (1951–19526) Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Berlin. Gregorius Nazianzenus (1857–1866) “Orationes,” Patrologia graeca, vol. 36. Paris. Gregorius Nyssenus (1958–2008) “In Canticum canticorum”; “In Ecclesiasten,” “De perfection Christiana ad Olympium monachum,” Gregorii NysseniOpera, vols. 1–10. Leiden. Gregorius Nyssenus (1857–1866) “Contra Eunomium,” “De opificio hominis,” Patrologia graeca, vol. 45. Gregorius Nyssenus (1968) “De vita Mosis,” Sources chrétiennes, Vol. 3 ter. Paris. Hadot, P. (2004) Le voile d'Isis. Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de Nature. Paris. Maximus Confessor (1857–1866) “Ambigua ad Johannem”; “Capita theologica et oeconomica,” Patrologia graeca, vols. 90–91. Paris. Maximus Confessor (1982) “Quaestiones et dubia,” Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, vol. 10. Turnhout. Mühlenberg, E. (1966) Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa. Gregors Kritik am Gottesbegriff der klassischen Metaphysik. Göttingen. Puech, H.-C. (1978a) “Temps, histoire et mythe dans le Christianisme des premiers siècles,” En quête de la Gnose. T. I. La Gnose et le temps, et autres essais. Paris: 1–24. Puech, H.-C. (1978b) “La Gnose et le temps,” En quête de la Gnose. T. I. La Gnose et le temps, et autres essais. Paris: 215–270. Spira, A. (1984) “Le temps d'un homme selon Aristote et Grégoire de Nysse: Stabilité et instabilité dans la pensée grecque,” ​​Le temps chrétien de la fin de l'Antiquité au Moyen Âge III–XIII siècle. Colloques internationaux du CNRS N 604, 9–12 mars 1981 (Paris), 283–296. Zonaras (1808) Lexicon, vols. 1–2. Leipzig. Diels – Kranz 1951–1952, frag. 12; Lebedev 1989, 209. Hadot 2004; Ado 2005. See about this: Mikhailov 2013, 475: “The ideal of stoic equanimity and self-sufficiency directly comes from physics as a spiritual exercise, since every moment of being-in-the-cosmos is considered as a small element of the whole. Here is the root of the Epicurean teaching about the only reality of the present: the past no longer exists, the future does not yet exist, there is only the present, from which everything that it contains should be extracted. P. Hadot believed that it was precisely with this that the heritage of the ancient Stoics and Epicureans could enrich the spiritual life of modern man.” See in particular Belayche 1984, 11–12. This is what G.V. Florovsky liked to say (1998, 302). However, the categorical nature of this opinion may encounter significant counterarguments, see in particular my article: Mikhailov 2014, 16–30. Αἰὼν γὰρ, οὔτε χρόνος, οὔτε χρόνου τι μέρος• οὐδὲ γὰρ μετρητόν• ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἡμῖν ὁ χρόνος, ἡλίου φορᾷ μετρούμενος, τοῦτο τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, αἰὼν, τὸ συμπαρεκτεινόμενον τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷόν τι χρονικὸν κίνημα, καὶ διάστημα – Gregorius Nazianzenus 1857–1866, 36, 320; Gregory the Theologian 1994, 1, 525: “...eternity is neither time nor a part of time; because it is immeasurable. But what is time for us, measured by the course of the sun, is for the eternal, eternity, something extended with eternal beings, and, as it were, some temporary movement and distance.” The dictionary definition of Zonaras is interesting (Zonaras 1808, 1): Αἰών. ὁ χρόνος ἢ τὸ συμπαρεκτεινόμενον τοῖς οὐρανοῖς (“The age of time or the extent of the [smart] heavens”). If for Gregory “extension” is measured by the actual existence of beings, then for Zonara, thought, becoming Platonized, develops towards certain “objective essences” of the cosmic order, a kind of “world clock”. …ὁ δὲ αἰὼν διαστηματικόν τι νόημα ὢν πᾶσαν δι' ἑαυτοῦ σημαίνει τὴν κτίσιν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γενομένην – Gregorius Nyssenus 1958–2008, “Hom. in Eccl.”, VIII, 5, 440; Gregory of Nyssa 1861, 2, 4, 357: “An age, as the concept of something extended, means the entire creation of God that took place in it.” As M. L. Khorkov (2000, 72) suggests seeing this, considering Gregory’s interpretation of eternity in the form of a kind of “spatial movement.” This reading does not find confirmation in Gregory’s texts. In his work, on the contrary, we find a completely clear distinction between two types of movement - spatial and temporal, see below. 26. See Gregorius Nyssenus 1857–1866, 45, 365. See Basilius Magnus 1857–1866, 29, 608: Μονογενοῦς νοοῦνται - “...the ages are all thought of somewhere below and beyond the birth of the Only Begotten.” Gregorius Nyssenus 1857–1866, 45, 585. For more on this see Daniélou 1942, 38–39, note. 17, 55. …παντὶ τῷ γινομένῳ συμπαρατείνεται χρόνος – Gregorius Nyssenus 1958–2008, “In Eccl.”, 6, 5, 374; Gregory of Nyssa 1861b, 38, 2, 4, 295. …χρόνος οὖν ἀντὶ τοῦ μέτρου ἡμῖν νενόηται, διότι παντὸς τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον μετρου ὁ χρόνος μέτρον ἐστίν. τὰ γὰρ γινόμενα ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται πάντως, καὶ τῇ παρατάσει ἑκάστου τῶν γινομένων καὶ τὸ διάστημα τοῦ χρόνου ?? πλεῖον – Gregorius Nyssenus 1958–2008, “In Eccl.” VI 5, 376; Gregory of Nyssa 1861b, 38, 2, 4, 297. Χρόνος δέ ἐστι τὸ συμπαρεκτεινόμενον τῇ συστάσει τοῦ κόσμου διάστημα• ᾧ πᾶσα παραμετρεῖται κίνησις, εἴτε ἀστέρων, εἴτε ζώων, ἢ βραδύτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου• ταχύτερον μὲν τὸ ἐν ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ ???? χρόνῳ κινούμενον – Basilius Magnus 1857–1866, 29, 560. Ζητήσατε τὸν κύριον καὶ ἐν τῷ εὑρίσκειν αὐτὸν ἐπικαλέσασθε καὶ Εὐφρανθήτω καρδία ζητούντων τὸν κύριον. ἔγνων τοίνυν διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅπερ ζητῆσαι χρή, οὗἡ εὕρεσίς ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀεὶ ζητεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο τί ἐστι τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ ἄλλο τὸ εὑρίσκειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ζητῆσαι κέρδος αὐτὸ τὸ ζητῆσαί ἐστι. βούλει καὶ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν μαθεῖν, τίς ὁ καιρὸς τοῦ ζητεῖν τὸν κύριον; συντόμως λέγω· ὁ βίος ὅλος. ἐπὶ τούτου γὰρ μόνου εἷς καιρὸς τῆς σπουδῆς ἐστιν ἡ ζωὴ πᾶσα. οὐ γὰρ ἀποτεταγμένῳ τινὶ καιρῷ καὶ χρόνῳ ἀφωρισμένῳ τὸ ζητεῖν τὸν κύριον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μηδὲ ὅλως διαλείπειν In Eccl. VII, 5, 400–401; Gregory of Nyssa 1861b, 38, 2, 4, 319–320. …πάντα τὸν βίον ἕνα καιρὸν εἶναι τῆς ἀγαθῆς ἐκείνης ζητήσεως, οὕτως καὶ τὸν τῆς φυλακῆς καιρὸν πάσῃ τῇ ζωῇ μετρεῖσθαι ἀποφαινόμεθα – Gregorius Nyssenus 1958–2008, “In Eccl.” VII, 5, 405; Gregory of Nyssa 1861b, 38, 2, 4, 324. Κίνησις can have both the first and second meaning. See Gregorius Nyssenus 1857–1866, 44, 129, De opific. hom.”: Τῆς γὰρ κινήσεως οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν τοπικὴν μετάστασιν “By movement we mean not only a change of place, but it is also seen in variability and change” (Gregory of Nyssa 1995, 11). οὐδὲ γὰρ μόνον πρὸς τὸ κακὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῇ τροπῇ χρῆται· ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἀμήχανον ἦν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀγαθῷ γενέσθαι, εἰ πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον μόνον τὴν ῥοπὴν εἶχεν ἐκ φύσεως· νυνὶ δὲ τὸ κάλλιστον τῆς τροπῆς ἔργον ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐστιν αὔξησις ? μεταποιούσης τὸν καλῶς ἀλλοιούμενον – Gregorius Nyssenus 1958–2008, “De perf.” VIII, 1, 213–214; Gregory of Nyssa 1865, 7, 261–262. …οὐκοῦν τὸ φοβερὸν εἶναι δοκοῦν (λέγω δὲ τὸ τρεπτὴν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν) οἷόν τι πτερὸν πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω πτῆσιν ὁ λόγος ὑπέδειξεν, ὡς ζημίαν εἶναι ἡμῖν τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ἀλλοίωσιν δέξασθαι. μὴ τοίνυν λυπείσθω ὁ βλέπων ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸ πρὸς τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον διὰ παντὸς ἀλλοιούμενος καὶ ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν μεταμορφούμενος οὕτω τρεπέσθω, διὰ τῆς καθ' ἡμέραν αὐξήσεως πάντοτε κρείττων γινόμενος καὶ ἀεὶ τελειούμενος καὶ μηδέποτε πρὸς τὸ πέρας φθάνων τῆς τελειότητος. αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς τελειότης τὸ μηδέποτε στῆναι πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον αὐξανόμενον μηδέ τινι πέρατι περιορίσαι τὴν τελειότητα – Gregorius Nyssenus 1958–2008, “De perf.” VIII, 1, 213–214; Gregory of Nyssa 1865, 7, 261–262. See Daniélou 1944, 309–326. …ἐπειδή σοι πρὸς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν ἡ ἐπιθυμία συντέταται καί σοι τοῦ δρόμου κόρος οὐδείς, οὐδέ τινα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅρον ἐπίστασαι, ' ἐμοὶ τόπος, ὥστε τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ διαθέοντα μηδέποτε δυνηθῆναι λῆξαι τοῦ δρόμου. ῾Ο δὲ δρόμος ἑτέρῳ λόγῳ στάσις ἐστί· στήσω γάρ σε, φησίν, ἐπὶ τῆς πέτρας. Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πάντων παραδοξότατον πῶς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ καὶ κίνησις. ῾Ο γὰρ ἀνιὼν πάντως οὐχ ἵσταται καὶ ὁ ἑστὼς οὐκ ἀνέρχεται. Ενταῦθα δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἑστάναι τὸ ἀναβῆναι γίνεται… ἡ πέτρα δέ ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός – Gregorius Nyssenus 1968, “De vita Mosis”, 2, 242–243; Gregory of Nyssa 1861a, 37, part 1, pp. 349–350. …ἀλλὰ τὸ πέρας τοῦ εὑρεθέντος ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὑψηλοτέρων εὕρεσιν τοῖς ἀναβαίνουσι γίνεται καὶ οὔτε ὁ ἀνιών ποτε ἵσταται ἀρχὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς μεταλαμβάνων οὔτε τελεῖται περὶ ἑαυτὴν ἡ τῶν ἀεὶ μειζόνων ἀρχή· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐγνωσμένων ἡ τοῦ ἀνιόντος ἐπιθυμία μένει, ἀλλὰ διὰ μείζονος πάλιν ἑτέρας ἐπιθυμίας πρὸς ἑτέραν ὑπερκειμένην κατὰ τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἀνιοῦσα πάντοτε διὰ τῶν ἀνωτέρων ὁδεύει πρὸς τὸ ἀόριστον – Gregorius Nyssenus 1958–2008, “In Cant. cant.”, VIII, 6, 247; Gregory of Nyssa 1862, 39, 3, 213. See online publication on the Bogoslov.ru website: http://www.bogoslov.ru/text/-3152047.html (access date 08/24/2014). Maximus Confessor 1857–1866, “Ambig. ad Iohan.”, 10, 91. 1153A; Maxim Confessor 2006, 158–159. Maximus Confessor 1857–1866 “Capita theological et oeconomica”, 90, 1108C; Maxim Maximus Confessor 1982, 121, 10, 89; Maxim Confessor 2008, 169. Maximus Confessor 1857–1866, “Ambig. ad Iohan.”, 67, 91, 1397C; Maxim Confessor 2006, 364–365. Maximus Confessor 1857–1866 “Capita theological et oeconomica”, 90, 1108C; Maxim Confessor 1993, I, 226. Maximus Confessor 1857–1866, “Ambig. ad Iohan.”, 65, 91, 1164C; Maxim Confessor 2006, 143. Maximus Confessor 1857–1866, “Ambig. ad Iohan.”, 15, 91, 1217С; Maxim Confessor 2006, 195.