Criticism of fatalism in the treatise “Against Fate” by St. Gregory of Nyssa in the context of his doctrine of free will

Priest Sergiy Vladimirovich Denisyuk, Master of Theology, graduate student of the Department of Theology of the Moscow Theological Academy (Sergiev Posad) Annotation. The basis of St. Gregory of Nyssa’s anti-fatalistic polemic is the biblical dogma of the creation of us in the image and likeness of God. This means that a person has reason and free will, thanks to which he must fight sin and grow in virtue. In the treatise “Against Fate” by St. Gregory of Nyssa widely uses ancient philosophical arguments against fatalism and astrology, presenting them from Christian positions: the argument of common fate (catastrophes and social disasters); argument of different destinies; νόμιμα βαρβαρικά (“customs of the barbarians”). The Christian argument is to explain the demonic nature of astrological predictions and point out the sequence of the Sixth Day: the stars created on the fourth day cannot influence the earth that preceded them in the course of creation. An important result of the dialogical form of the treatise is the refutation of fatalist arguments, in particular about the influence of zodiac signs on newborns and climatological astrology. Priest Sergey V. Denysyuk, post-graduate student of the Theology Department of the Moscow Theological Academy (Sergiev Posad) Annotation. The basis of the anti-fatalistic polemics of St. Gregory of Nyssa is the biblical dogma about us being created in the image and likeness of God. this means that a person has a mind and free will through which he must fight against sin and grow in virtue. In the treatise "Against Fate" St. Gregory of Nyssa widely uses ancient philosophical arguments against fatalism and astrology, expounding them from Christian positions: the argument of common destiny (catastrophes and social disasters); the argument of different fates; νόμιμα βαρβαρικά (“the customs of the barbarians”). the Christian argumentation consists of explaining the demonic nature of astrological predictions and pointing to the sequence of Six days of Creation: the stars created on the fourth day cannot affect the land that preceded it during the creation. the important result of the dialogical form of the treatise is the refutation of the fatalists’ arguments, in particular to the influence of zodiac signs on newborns and climatological astrology. Nowadays, belief in fate is a widespread misconception even among Christians. A special case of fatalism is astrology, which the Orthodox Church has opposed since ancient times 1 . However, most ancient Christian writers provide only a few small discussions and brief statements about these issues. In this regard, the works of St. Gregory of Nyssa, who compiled a detailed study of fatalism and astrology in the treatise “Against Fate” (Κατὰ εἱμαρμένης, Contra fatum) 2. According to some researchers, this is the best polemical treatise on this topic 3. Without exaggeration, we can say that this book occupies an exceptional position in the debate with astrology and fatalism. However, although this work was translated into Russian in the middle of the 19th century, it has not yet become the subject of scientific research 4 . The prerequisite for criticism of fatalism for St. Gregory advocates the doctrine of free will. By and large, without the approval of this doctrine, any serious polemic with fatalism is impossible in our days. Free will in the writings of St. Gregory of Nyssa 5 All the greatness of man is St. Gregory believed in its creation in the image and likeness of God 6, seeing in this “the fundamental difference between Christian anthropology and pagan anthropology” 7. Since an image is called an image in the proper sense, if it is “like a prototype” (de opif. hom. 16), and God is alien to all materiality, then it is precisely the spiritual component of his nature that man reflects God in himself (de mort.). Consequently, man, albeit with the difference that lies between the image and the prototype 8, possesses “all the divine blessings” and “distinctive features of the Divine” (or. catech. 5). And this means that the Divine likeness in its fullness includes “not only the natural likeness of the human spirit with God, but all supernatural life” 9. This similarity of the human spirit with God is expressed in such inherent properties as spirituality, wisdom, incorporeality, eternity, invisibility, etc. (or. catech. 5). Moreover, “all of them can be reduced to two basic properties and abilities: rationality, or reason (νοῦς, λόγος), and autocracy, or free will (αὐτεξούσιον)” 10. Thus, free will, which the saint called “the best and most precious of goods” (or. catech. 5), is an integral property of the image of God in man: “...The image is similar to the Prototype in that it is filled with all good. Consequently, we have in us the idea of ​​everything beautiful, every virtue and wisdom, everything that is imaginable about the best. One of everything necessary is to be free, not to submit to any natural dominion, but to have autocratic, discretionary determination, because virtue is something beyond one’s control and voluntary, but something forced and involuntary cannot be virtue” (de opif. hom. 16). “So what kind of justice? We remember, without a doubt, what was said, as it should be, at the beginning of the word, namely, that man is made in the likeness of God’s nature, preserving in himself this likeness to the Divine both in other good qualities and in freedom of will...” (or. catech. 21). Naturally, free will is a necessary condition for growth in virtue (de opif. hom. 4). After the Fall, man’s inclination to good was not completely destroyed and sin did not take possession of him so much that he became an unfree being 11 . This, in turn, allows a person to move in different directions: either towards virtue or towards vice (de mort.). And the tragic history of the world is the result of the misuse of free will by rational beings, and the current approach to God is possible only through one’s own free efforts (In cant. 6) 12. So, St. Gregory never tires of insisting on complete and absolute freedom of will, which appears to him as freedom of choice. It is the free choice of the human will that makes people godlike. The human mind, if cleansed, then, like a mirror, can reflect the beauty of its Prototype and become like God (de hom. opif. 12). This Divine beauty is “seen in the inexpressible bliss of virtue,” the distinguishing feature of which is love (de opif. hom. 5). Therefore, for the saint, the rejection of determinism is based primarily on the idea that freedom is inherent in man due to the ontological connection with Divine freedom 13. This human freedom is fully realized by eliminating vices and strengthening the connection with God. For if a person’s life were determined by fate, he would not be responsible for evil, as well as for good. In fact, the very concepts of good and evil are completely neutralized. Thus, freedom for St. Gregory is an expression of man's ontological kinship with God, which persists even after the Fall. This, in turn, makes people capable of communicating with God in order to realize their purpose in the world He created and, if possible, change for the better. Treatise “Against Fate”: content overview The work describes a dispute that took place between the holy father and a certain pagan philosopher ca. 382 in Constantinople. the pagan pointed to the unconditional predestination of everything in the world and argued that human fate depends on the location of the stars at the moment of a person’s birth. At the same time, he believed in fate so much that in response to the call to convert to Christianity, he asserted that if he was destined to be a Christian, then he would become one, even if he himself did not want it (p. 14–15) 14 . St. Gregory refutes his opponent, countering him with an impressive sequence of arguments 15. The treatise is preceded by an introduction and consists of two main parts 16. The first is an apology for astrological fatalism by a pagan philosopher. The second contains a refutation of this doctrine by St. Gregory. The first part contains two main theses of the pagan philosopher. He argues that all reality is determined by rigidly determined, inexorable laws that imprison the universe in an indispensable chain of cause and effect, as a result of which no freedom is possible. Not only external nature, but also a person’s ability to choose and his will are completely determined by fate. In other words, fate controls every aspect of life: without fate, “nothing can happen to us” (p. 15). The basis of fate, which governs the course of events, is astral determinism: celestial bodies, by virtue of their movements and properties, necessarily determine human life. The philosopher bases his astrological fatalism on the Stoic doctrine of “universal sympathy” (p. 23). The logical consequence of this is predictions. According to the philosopher, the accuracy of predictions demonstrates the reality of fate. Conversely, events can only actually be predicted if they have been predetermined. In the second part of St. Gregory offers an extensive refutation of the philosopher’s theses, which can be summarized in several points 17. It is absurd to assert that material and inanimate celestial bodies can predetermine the mental and spiritual activities of a person: thoughts, desires, virtues, etc. (pp. 26–27). If the movements of the stars are indeed the cause of human existence, then “nature would have to continually give birth, without even for a moment interrupting the birth of the human race” (p. 28). But this doesn't happen. Consequently, the birth of a person does not depend on planetary movements, for “stars are always moving, but people are not always born” 18 (p. 29). Moreover, it is incorrect to say that the movement of stars causes birth because births occur at intervals, and “in the origin of those temporary particles that current time produces by the ever-moving stream of stars, no interval can be grasped either by feeling or thought” (p. 38). If the fate of a person is determined at one particular moment of his birth, then many rulers and tyrants must be born every day, because there are many minute particles of time corresponding to the zodiac circle, which must necessarily determine the fate of tyrants and leaders every day (pp. 29-30). In other words, there are many more parts of time in one day than there are basic ways of life for people. Conversely, the completely different fates of people born at the same time refutes the existence of fate. For one can become a king, and another a slave (pp. 34–35). If each of the astral lobes is endowed with irresistible force, equal power must be attributed to them, which must therefore produce equal effects. “Equivalence of forces will equally make everyone kings, long-lasting, strong, prosperous, happy...” But life experience shows the opposite: people are born slaves, sick, poor, etc. indicates the weakness of fate, which revealed a lack of health, wealth, and positions. Consequently, fate is not omnipotent (pp. 30–32). Because of this diversity of destinies and types of life of people, it is necessary to recognize the existence of two opposing destinies, one strong, the other weak and helpless. And since most people are “ill-fated throughout life,” powerless fate prevails. Thus, the omnipotence of fate and its power is just a flimsy idea (pp. 32–34). If “fate has neither soul nor will and does not see its own independence in it,” that is, it is “blind” and inevitable in its mechanical and automatically acting character, then how can it control “free living beings”? It is even crazier to identify fate with God, for “how can one be God who does not pay attention to virtue and justice” (pp. 35–36)? If by fate we mean time (consisting of small parts), and time is nothing more than a dimension extended by the movement of the created bodies of this world, then why is only the movement of celestial bodies an attribute of fate? Why is it not determined by the movement of other bodies: rivers, ships, people (pp. 36–37; cf.: 38–39)? To the philosopher’s objection about the specific influences of the zodiac signs on newborns, 19 St. Gregory contrasts two arguments. Firstly, this is outright “idle talk”. Indeed, in this way the character and morals of people born under a certain zodiac constellation will be determined by the character of the corresponding land animals (pp. 39–40). The second argument against this objection is presented as a dilemma. If the evil influences of the celestial bodies are voluntary, then they are unhappy. If their harmful impulses are involuntary and compulsory, then above fate we must imagine some higher fate. Thus, our mind, “extending into infinity, will not stop anywhere, inventing fate for fate, share for share, necessity for necessity” (pp. 40–41). Interrupting the reasoning of St. Gregory, the philosopher says that events demonstrate the accuracy of horoscopes. With the knowledge of the celestial bodies, astrologers can predict the constitution of the body and life expectancy. The Nyssa saint objects that doctors can also predict illness or death, and fate is not inevitable, since it can be eliminated by resorting to the art of medicine (pp. 42–44). Fate by definition excludes any idea of ​​contingency or chance. A fatal event cannot be “possible” or “accidental” (pp. 44–45). Once again, the philosopher repeats his fundamental teaching: the movements of celestial bodies detail and unshakably record the fate of a person at the moment of birth. To this St. Gregory widely develops the argument of the common fate of Carneades 20. He gives numerous examples of catastrophes from biblical (the flood, the burning of Sodom, the drowning of Pharaoh’s army in the Red Sea, etc.) and universal (wars, earthquakes, falls of cities, shipwrecks, floods, fires, etc.) history, when people died together, although they were born at different times. After this, he asks a crucial question that remains unanswered: did all these people really have the same alignment of stars at the moment of birth (pp. 45–48)? The philosopher claims that the ship, the city, and every people have their own destiny. In response to St. Gregory gives numerous examples to show the absurdity of such a view. From a practical point of view, it is impossible to determine the horoscope of a ship, city or nation, since all this was built and developed over a period of time. So, what moment in the building of a ship, or the construction of a city, or the formation of a nation, will be decisive in the horoscope (pp. 48–51)? With these reasonings St. Gregory, in fact, refutes the doctrine of world astrology 21. The saint speaks of earthquakes that destroy not only inhabited cities and countries, but also uninhabited lands. The cause of such disasters is purely physical, it is not a consequence of fate. For “what is the necessity of fate, when both inhabited and uninhabited places equally suffer such disasters” (p. 52). The bishop concludes by again summarizing the classic argument (pp. 51–53). St. Gregory following St. Basil the Great 22 draws attention to the fact that the earth, according to the biblical narrative (Gen. 1:1–19), was created before the stars. In this regard, it cannot be argued that the stars can have power over what appeared before them (p. 52–53). St. Gregory gives another argument from Carneades, “the customs of the barbarians” 23 . Thus, he refers to the practice of incest among the Persians. If everything happens out of necessity, then this terrible crime should also occur in different places, but only the Persians dare to do this. Consequently, “everyone’s will is made by fate and fate, arbitrarily choosing what he pleases” (p. 54). Astrologers found the answer to the previous argument in climatological astrology, which states that each part of the earth is influenced by different celestial bodies. To this St. Gregory of Nyssa responds with a counterargument about the dispersion of the Jews. The Jewish people are so scattered throughout all parts of the earth that almost all nations have Jewish settlements. However, none of them, no matter in what part of the earth they were born, was given a comfortable life, but all who are born suffer the same state of being persecuted in dispersion (pp. 54–55). “The philosopher admits that he has no answer to this objection: “... This has not yet been investigated by us,” he said, “for what reason, among many peoples, what is decreed by laws avoids the inevitability imposed by the stars” (p. 55–56). However, he insists on the accuracy of astrological predictions, which he believes is only possible if fate is truly inevitable. In response to this, St. Gregory resorts to a non-philosophical and strictly theological argument: the influence of the devil is visible in the correctness of the predictions. Hatred for the human race makes him deceive people, abusing their passionate desire to know the future. It was he and the demons who invented astrology and all forms of mantics. Therefore, the real reason for astrological predictions is not fate; it must be sought in the cunning and treachery of demons (pp. 56–59). Again, if the accuracy of some predictions proves the power of fate, then it must be recognized that “all kinds of predictions have the power of fate.” In this case, different forms of mantika will have different fates (p. 59). But the Bishop of Nyssa insists on a theological explanation. It is the power of demons, “ready for deception” and “many other inventions,” that is cunning in predictions. It is they who invented and support all forms of fortune telling: by the entrails of animals, by the flight of birds, by the stars, etc. (pp. 61–62). Finally, St. Gregory emphasizes the real ambiguity and blatant falsity of many predictions. He gives the example of a false horoscope that caused the revolt and then the defeat and execution of the usurper Procopius (365–366) (pp. 59–61). To summarize, St. Gregory claims: either all astrological predictions are false, or there are still some of them that, when verified by facts, prove their truth. The reason for these and other “accurate” predictions is demons. They use the theory of fate to deceive people and turn them away from God: “For demons try most of all to turn a person away from turning his gaze to God, and from here preparing for himself a share of good things. Therefore, to convince those who are easily deceived that what concerns everyday affairs does not consist in God’s will, but depends on such and such a conjunction of stars and on the power flowing from here, and this is the goal of the harmful demonic nature. So, if it is pleasant for demons to turn a person away from God (delusion in this really turns away), then it clearly turns out that there is some kind of demonic effort involved in this, deceiving those who think that all the power is in the stars, and do not look at the almighty sovereignty of God” (p. 63). Treatise “Against Fate”: analysis of the treatise’s problems As far as St. Gregory's dependence on writings against the fate of pagan and Christian authors is still the subject of discussion among researchers. However, first of all it is necessary to note Origen (Philocalia. 23), St. Basil the Great (hexaemeron. VI.5–7), as well as anti-astrological arguments revealed by Philo of Alexandria in his work “On Providence” (de Providentia I.77–78). It is the latter work that is usually considered one of the probable sources of the Bishop of Nyssa when writing “Against Fate” 24. It is obvious that the purpose with which St. Gregory resumes a widely traditional theme, which is that a fatalistic worldview primarily affects the vision of man as a free being. Naturally, St. Gregory could not agree with such a prospect, which effectively annulled not only any freedom, but also any individual responsibility. It is this doctrine that unites Against Fate with many other dogmatic and moral works of the saint. As can be concluded from the above review, the content of this short treatise is almost entirely philosophical. Of the theological Christian arguments, it speaks only of the cunning and treachery of demons; the story of the creation of the world is recalled and an edifying conclusion is drawn. The rest of the anti-astrological and anti-fatalistic evidence was taken by the saint from Greek philosophy 25. Obviously, all this is explained by the desire of St. Gregory to defeat the pagans with their own weapons. Thus, the treatise definitely contains several anti-astrological arguments of Carneades: the argument of common fate (catastrophes and social disasters); argument of different destinies; νόμιμα βαρβαρικά; the inability to accurately determine the horoscope, be it the horoscope of a city, ship, nation, etc. Less obvious, but still evident, is the argument that it is impossible to accurately determine a person’s horoscope. Following the Stoics, St. Gregory uses exclusively the term εἱμαρμένη, thus excluding any connection between fate and the Divine will. Εἱμαρμένη appears to be an impersonal and therefore indifferent and truly universal force, like συμπάθεια, which, according to the Stoics, binds all the elements of the universe and which, at least in part, justifies deterministic fatalism on this basis. In other words, fate appears as the beginning of a cause-and-effect series that cannot be traced from the very beginning, i.e. fate turns out to be equivalent to the first cause 26. The only theological argument in the treatise is the demonic nature of the origin of astrological predictions. The philosopher insisted that proof of the inevitability of what was destined by fate is the ability to predict the future, which often turns out to be correct. This kind of logical reasoning was used in the question of “theological fatalism”: if God knows what will happen in the future, does that mean He predetermines everything? 27 St. Gregory clearly shows the Christian view of the “truth” of astrological predictions. The reason that they sometimes come true lies in the activities of demons. The argument attributing the truth of some astrological predictions to the influence of demons was also used by many other church authors who wrote against astrology and fatalism. Yes, St. John Chrysostom writes that the devil controls and controls the affairs of those people who turn to fortunetellers, since in this case a person deprives himself of God’s help, neglects it and places himself outside the Providence of God. At the same time, the devil has no power over those who despise these predictions 28. A similar idea is found in St. John Climacus: “Whoever believes in the demon, for those he is often a prophet; and whoever despises him always turns out to be a liar” 29. The idea of ​​God by the pagan philosopher is either rejected or identified with the power of fate itself. Of course, this is another reason that forced St. Gregory to polemicize against fatalism. All elements of fatalism (stars, συμπάθεια, εἱμαρμένη, etc.) are impersonal entities and phenomena that are absolutely opposite to the Good Christian Personal God, to whom it is impious to attribute the negativity inherent in individual and collective history. Therefore, one cannot but agree that the goal of St. Gregory in this polemic - “to separate two concepts, God and fate” 30. God is simple and unchangeable, while fate, on the contrary, is diverse and changeable, which the pagan philosopher himself admits. The will of God is absolutely and immutably good, while fate cannot be spoken of in terms of good and evil, but acts only as a cause-and-effect chain of events. The saint clearly shows that fate, in the view of the pagan philosopher, exhibits a certain ontological dependence on something higher. That is why it cannot be the root cause of everything that exists. Thus, God and fate are of different natures. Divine nature is an entity transcendental to the universe, while fate is “sympathy” that unites all beings in a relationship of unstable interdependence. So, the theological heritage of St. Gregory of Nyssa is of great value for revealing the patristic attitude towards fatalism. The treatise “Against Fate” retains its polemical significance to this day. Pastors of the Church and lay believers must well understand and apply his arguments about the demonic origin of horoscopes, their non-universality and fallibility, their ignorance of catastrophes, as well as the possibility of outside interference (for example, doctors) in the development of human life. The supreme ruler of the world and all free living beings is not an impersonal and soulless fate, but a living Personal God. In turn, the basis for salvation on our part is not trust in fate, but in free human will. Works of St. Gregory of Nyssa: 1. Against fate // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Against fate. M.: Siberian Blagozvonnitsa, 2014. (Contra fatum (CPG 3152) // PG 45, 145–173). 2. Dialogue on the soul and resurrection // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 4. M., 1862 (dialogus de anima et resurrectione (CPG 3149) // PG 46, 11–160). 3. A word to those who mourn about those who have passed away from this present life into the eternal // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 7. M., 1868 (de mortuis non esse dolendum (CPG 3168) // PG 46, 497–537). 4. Great catechetical speech // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 4. M., 1862 (oratio catechetica magna (CPG 3150) // PG 45, 11–105). 5. On the structure of man // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 1. M., 1861 (de opificio hominis (CPG 3154) // PG 44, 124–256). 6. Explanation of the Song of Solomon // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 3. M., 1862 (In Canticum canticorum homiliae (CPG 3158) // PG 44, 756–1120). 7. On the Beatitudes // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 2. M., 1861 (orationes de beatitudinibus (CPG 3161) // PG 44, 1193–1301). 8. About the life of Moses the Lawgiver // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 1. M., 1861. P. 223–379 (de vita Moysis (CPG 3159) // PG 44, 297–430). Research literature 9. Benevich G.I. A Brief History of "Providence" from Plato to Maximus the Confessor. St. Petersburg, 2013. 10. Basil the Great, St. Conversations on the Six Days // Him. Creations. T. I. M., 2012. 11. Verghese P., priest. The relationship between God, man and the world in the works of St. Gregory of Nyssa // Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. 1971. No. 6; 7. 12. Denisyuk S. Classical argumentation in the anti-astrological polemics of the Cappadocian fathers // Moscow Theological Academy. Materials of the Department of Theology. 2014–2015. Sergiev Posad, 2016. 13. Denisyuk S., priest Holy Fathers about astrology. M., 2017. 14. John Chrysostom, St. Conversations on the Gospel of Matthew // Him. Creations. T. VII. Book I. St. Petersburg, 1901. 15. John Climacus, St. Ladder. M., 2007. 16. Maniliy M. Astronomy. M., 1993. 17. Nesmelov V.I., prof. The dogmatic system of Saint Gregory of Nyssa. Kazan, 1887. 18. Saplin A.Yu. Astrological encyclopedic dictionary. M., 1994. 19. Skvortsov I.M., prot. Christian use of philosophy, or the Philosophy of St. Gregory of Nyssa // Proceedings of the Kyiv Theological Academy. 1863. III. 10. 20. Fokin A.R. Gregory, St., Bishop. Nyssa // Orthodox Encyclopedia. T. XII. M., 2006. 21. Amand d., Fatalisme et liberté dans l’antiquité grecque. Amsterdam. 1973. 22. Gaith J. La conception de la liberté chez Grégoire de Nysse. Paris, Vrin, 1953. 23. Lozza G. Il Contra Fatum di Gregorio Nisseno // G. Zanetto, S. Martinelli tempesta, M. ornaghi (edd.). "Nova vestigia antiquitatis". Milano. 2008. 24. Meredith A. Gregory of Nyssa. London, 1999. 25. Motta B. Il “Contra fatum” di Gregorio di Nissa nel dibattito tardo-antico sul fatalismo e sul determinismo. Pisa, roma. 2008. See about this: Denisyuk S., priest. Holy Fathers about astrology. M., 2017. Problems of fatalism of St. Gregory touched on this in other works. For example, in the Great Catechetical Speech he uses a moral argument (or. catech. 31). See: Gaith J. La conception de la liberté chez Grégoire de Nysse. Paris, Vrin, 1953. P. 1953; Motta B. Il “Contra fatum” di Gregorio di Nissa nel dibattito tardo-antico sul fatalismo e sul determinismo. Pisa, roma. 2008. Similarly, in Western science, only recently have researchers turned to a detailed analysis of this treatise. See: Lozza. G. Il Contra Fatum di Gregorio Nisseno // G. Zanetto, S. Martinelli tempesta, M. ornaghi (edd.). "Nova vestigia antiquitatis". Milano. 2008. P. 184. This section analyzes mainly the following works of St. Gregory of Nyssa: Against fate // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Against fate. M.: Siberian Blagozvonnitsa, 2014. (Contra fatum (CPG 3152) // PG 45, 145–173). Dialogue on the soul and resurrection // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 4. M., 1862. P. 201–326 (dialogus de anima et resurrectione (CPG 3149) // PG 46, 11–160). A word to those who mourn about those who have passed away from this present life into the eternal // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 7. M., 1868. pp. 485–536 (de mortuis non esse dolendum (CPG 3168) // PG 46, 497–537). Great catechetical speech // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 4. M., 1862. P. 1–110 (oratio catechetica magna (CPG 3150) // PG 45, 11–105). On the structure of man // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 1. M., 1861. P. 76–222 (de opificio hominis (CPG 3154) // PG 44, 124–256). Explanation of the Song of Solomon // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 3. M., 1862 (In Canticum canticorum homiliae (CPG 3158) // PG 44, 756–1120). On the Beatitudes // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 2. M., 1861. P. 359–478 (orationes de beatitudinibus (CPG 3161) // PG 44, 1193–1301). About the life of Moses the Lawgiver // Gregory of Nyssa, St. Creations. Part 1. M., 1861. P. 223–379 (de vita Moysis (CPG 3159) // PG 44, 297–430). The greatness of man, according to church teaching, says St. Gregory, “consists not in similarity to the created world, but in being in the image of the nature of the Creator” (de opif. hom. 16). Nesmelov V.I., prof. The dogmatic system of Saint Gregory of Nyssa. Kazan, 1887. P. 380. About the differences in the understanding of St. Gregory of the image and likeness of God, as well as about the damage to the image of God as a result of the Fall, see: Skvortsov I.M., prot. Christian use of philosophy, or the Philosophy of St. Gregory of Nyssa // Proceedings of the Kyiv Theological Academy. 1863. III. No. 10. pp. 152–156. Daniélou J. Platonisme et théologie mystique: Essai sur la doctrine spirituelle de St. Grégoire de Nysse. P., 1944. P. 52. Cited. by: Fokin A.R. Gregory, St., Bishop. Nyssa // Orthodox Encyclopedia. T. XII. M., 2006. P. 507. Fokin A.R. Gregory, St., Bishop. Nyssa // Orthodox Encyclopedia. T. XII. M., 2006. P. 507. Man retained “free will, something non-slave and autocratic,” since “if rational and thinking nature were to lose autocracy, it would at the same time lose the gift of rationality” and would no longer be a man (or. catech. 30). See also: Fokin A.R. Gregory, St., Bishop. Nyssa // Orthodox Encyclopedia. T. XII. M., 2006. P. 510. Of course, human will alone is not enough and the gracious help of God is required in the matter of salvation. We will not dwell in detail on the question of the relationship between human will and the grace of God. About this see: Nesmelov V.I., prof. The dogmatic system of Saint Gregory of Nyssa. Kazan, 1887. pp. 566–573. The teaching of St. Gregory of Nyssa on Divine freedom is discussed in the article: Verghese P., priest. The relationship between God, man and the world in the works of St. Gregory of Nyssa // Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. 1971. No. 6. P. 65–68; No. 7. pp. 78–79. Here and further, when quoting the treatise “Against Fate”, the page number according to the following edition is given in parentheses: Gregory of Nyssa, St. Against fate. M.: Siberian Blagozvonnitsa, 2014. G.I. Benevich notes that St. Gregory of Nyssa is one of the few Christian polemicists who gives the floor to his opponent, who even manages to say something in support of his teaching, although the saint does not allow him to fully expound the system of his teaching. In principle, such methods of polemics are also characteristic of pagan philosophers. The latter, in polemics with Christians, as a rule, did not bother themselves too much to understand the details of their teaching. See: Benevich G.I. A brief history of “Providence” from Plato to Maximus the Confessor. SPb., 2013. P. 129. On the division of the treatise, see also: Meredith A. Gregory of Nyssa. London, 1999. P. 63. D. Amand identifies 23 main motives in the reasoning of St. Gregory, presenting them sequentially throughout the treatise (Amand d., Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque. Amsterdam. 1973. p. 423–431). However, some of them are repeated or complement each other. It seems to us that it would be more logical to combine them in meaning, thus avoiding copying the classification of the above-mentioned researcher. It is clear that St. Gregory is based on contemporary cosmology, based on the teachings of Claudius Ptolemy (87–165). As you know, some astrologers endow people born under specific zodiac signs with characteristics and life callings that, in their opinion, are characteristic of this sign. For example, according to Marcus Manilius, those born under the sign of Aries will be associated with wool processing and the creation of woolen products, under the sign of Leo they will be brave, under the sign of Virgo they will be childless, etc., etc. See: Manilius M. Astronomy. M., 1993. P. 102. Carneades of Cyrene (214/13 - 129/28 BC) - Greek Platonist philosopher, founder of the so-called. New or Third Academy. He developed a series of arguments against astrology and fatalism, which later became general philosophical and were called “classical” or “traditional.” About Carneades and his arguments, see: Denisyuk S. Classical argumentation in the anti-astrological polemics of the Cappadocian fathers // Moscow Theological Academy. Materials of the Department of Theology. 2014–2015. Sergiev Posad, 2016. pp. 315–320. Carneades' common fate argument proves the inconsistency of fatalism by the fact that the same fates happen in the lives of people who have different horoscopes. World astrology (astrologia mundane) or mundial astrology (Latin astrologia mundi “astrology of the world (universe)”) is a section of astrology that, in contrast to individual astrology, explores the fate of countries, peoples, cities and rulers, and deals with predictions of wars, epidemics, natural disasters and disasters. The observed phenomena belonged to one or another region of the earth in accordance with geographic control. See: Saplin A. Yu. Astrological encyclopedic dictionary. M., 1994. P. 274. Basil the Great, St. Conversations on the Sixth Day. 6.2 // His own. Creations. T. I. M., 2012. P. 385. The argument νόμιμα βαρβαρικά (“customs of the barbarians”) states: since the characteristics, customs and customs of entire peoples and nations have much in common, they do not depend on the individual horoscope of each person. See: Denisyuk S. Classical argumentation in the anti-astrological polemics of the Cappadocian fathers // Moscow Theological Academy. Materials of the Department of Theology. 2014–2015. Sergiev Posad, 2016. P. 319 On this see: Motta B. Il “Contra fatum” di Gregorio di Nissa nel dibattito tardo-antico sul fatalismo e sul determinismo. Pisa, roma. 2008. P. 24–27. Amand d., Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque. Amsterdam. 1973. p. 431. This is not surprising, because among the three great Cappadocians, and indeed all the fathers of this period, St. Gregory of Nyssa can be considered the most interesting from a philosophical point of view. Lozza G. Il Contra Fatum di Gregorio Nisseno // G. Zanetto, S. Martinelli tempesta, M. ornaghi (edd.). "Nova vestigia antiquitatis". Milano. 2008. P. 188. The traditional answer to this question was developed by Origen and later approved by church theology. Its brief essence is this: God, by his nature, knows in advance how man will use his freedom in the future. See about this: Denisyuk S., priest. Holy Fathers about astrology. M., 2017. pp. 113–114. John Chrysostom, St. Conversations on the Gospel of Matthew. 75.4 // His own. Creations. T. VII. Book I. St. Petersburg, 1901. P. 758. John Climacus, St. Ladder. M., 2007. pp. 49–50. Motta B. Il “Contra fatum” di Gregorio di Nissa nel dibattito tardo-antico sul fatalismo e sul determinismo. Pisa, roma. 2008. P. 88.