Богословско-полемические сочинения

Opusc. 1 761 Marin, most reverend presbyter [9A] Having set yourself the goal of “entering” the many times sung “commonwealth with God” [Wis.7:14] 762, you, God-honored father, prudently 763 make your run towards him. By reason 764 you determine the nature of things for the emergence of virtue 765 [1] 766 ; with your mind you limit the movement of every age and time (with these [two] 767 a more burning longing (πόθος) for God is introduced) 768 for the formation of 769 unerring 770 knowledge 771, 772. Coextensive with infinity 773 you make your movement in languor, and by the incomprehensibility of the object of languor you produce in yourself an incomprehensible attraction, the completion of which is God Himself, who becomes for the worthy the fulfillment of their languor, as the personified enjoyment of goods 774 . Its experience alone is spoken of as “comprehension” - it is clear that it is something that happens on the other side of thinking, that is, unity 775, since it does not fall under any type of mental action. Because of this, your life has become the personification of 776 [2] meaning 777 , [12A] and meaning has become the nature of life 778 . They give the outline of a new man, truly corresponding to Christ 779, bearing, successfully imitating Him, his Creator, God, image and likeness, by which we must now understand truth and goodness 780. The first is the completion of contemplation, the second - activity; The first is the opponent of lies, the second is of deceit. Therefore, through the pursuit of virtue, the comprehension of divine dogmas has come to you, supported by the abundance of knowledge and the power of proof. Having recognized in accordance with it the inaccuracy in the concepts of the will proposed by some, you rejected them, declaring that [12B] will (θέλημα) 781, desire (βούλησις), estimate (βουλή), deliberate choice (προαίρεσις), intention (γνώμη), free will (ἐξουσία), opinion (δόξα), understanding (φρόνησις), and that they differ only in names 782; and that God and the saints will have one will 783 ; and therefore asserting and insisting that Christ has one intentionally choosing will (θέλημα προαιρετικόν) 784 . Because of the poverty of spirit brought up in you, you were not content with yourself to confirm your just decision, but you nobly honored me, brought up in ignorance 785, to make my contribution to the judgment of things already known to you. Which is what I did, albeit recklessly, subdued by the reward of obedience. I will write briefly about each of these concepts in their interrelation, as if in the form of definitions, without deriving my own words - for how could I, poor in them? - [12C] but having collected those on which others have labored in relation to those things 786 in order to know us that in both these things those things differ from each other, that is, both in name and in essence. About natural will, or volition They say that natural will (θέλημα), or volition (θέλησις) 787 is the ability to strive 788 for what corresponds to nature 789 and to maintain all the characteristics inherent in nature 790. For the essence, naturally embraced by the will, strives to be, live and move according to feeling and mind, drawn [12D] to the fullness of being corresponding to its nature 791 . After all, nature is so structured that it is capable of having itself and everything that naturally composes it as an object of volition 792 . Her aspiration depends on the meaning 793 of her being, in accordance with which she exists and arose. Therefore, others 794, [13A] defining this will as natural, say that it is a meaningful desire 795 and vital 796, and deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) is a desire that considers what is in our power (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν 797) 798. So, volition is not a deliberate choice. In fact, if volition is simply some meaningful and vital desire, then deliberate choice is a combination of desire (ὄρεξις 799), estimate (βουλή) and decision (κρίσις). After all, when we strive, we first estimate; Having estimated, we decide; Having decided, we choose, preferring to the worst what the decision recognized as the best. And the first 800 depends only on what is determined by nature; and the second 801 - only from what is in our power, that is, can happen through our mediation. So, deliberate choice is not volition. [13B] But deliberate choice is not volition (βούλησις) 803 . After all, wanting is a desire that fantasizes both about what is in our power and about what is not in our power; that is, formed only by thought (διανοίᾳ) 804. The fantasizing desire is the action only of the ability of thinking without the participation of calculation (λόγου), estimating what is in our power; that is, this or that natural will 805. And deliberate choice is a desire to consider what is in our power (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) to do 806. It would be enough, of course, to have these definitions alone, showing in general terms the difference between those things, to stop the disputes of those who are overly fond of learned conversations and - how to put it mildly... - indisputably contradicting those who are perfectly knowledgeable. [13C] But since the inquisitive seem to come from a desire to approach what they are looking for from a greater number of sides, let’s say it differently. Those who understand those things say: not everything with which “choose” is combined is certainly combined with “want” 807. We affirm that we want to be healthy, rich, immortal; However, we don’t say that we choose to be healthy, rich, immortal, since desire extends to both the possible and the impossible, and deliberate choice applies only to the possible, and to what can happen through our mediation 808 . They, again, want a specific goal, but choose what serves it 809. So they say that what they want is a goal (for example, health), and what serves this goal is pretended (for example, a healthy area). [16A] Wanting is related to deliberate choice, they say, in the same way as what is wanted is to what one imagines - if in fact we choose only what we think can happen through our mediation 810. So, it is shown that deliberate choice is not about wanting; on the other hand, it will be shown that this is not pretending (or pretending). About estimation, or pretending [16B] Estimation (βουλή), or pretending (βούλευσις) 811, is, they say, a desire that takes the form of searching 812 for something that is in our power (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) to do. But what was decided on the basis of estimates was chosen deliberately. From here, of course, it is clear that imagining refers to what is still being sought, and deliberate choice refers to what has already been decided 813 . And it is clear not only from the definition, but also from the etymology. After all, something deliberately chosen is something preferred to something else 814. But no one decides anything before deciding, and no one prefers to choose without deciding. So, deliberate choice is not an estimate (i.e., pretending). About deliberate choice 815 They argue that deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) is an endeavor that considers [16C] what it is in our power (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) to do 816 . After all, an intentional choice is something composite and with many admixtures - a composite of aspiration, estimate, decision. For, considered in itself, deliberate choice is not one of them: neither just an aspiration in itself, nor an estimate, nor a decision, but a mixture of them, just as our human being is composed of soul and body. Since what was previously decided on the basis of an estimate, to which a deliberate choice relates, then becomes such a choice, or more precisely, a chosen one, when it adds aspiration to itself. It necessarily turns out that deliberate choice refers after the decision to what was estimated before the decision. After all, we choose those things that we think about 817. [16D] What are we thinking about (περὶ τίνων βουλευόμεθα) 818 We estimate what is in our power (τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) and can happen through our mediation, and it is unclear how it will end. It is said “in our power” because we are only estimating what can be done (after all, this is precisely what is in our power) 819. And not about wisdom that does not require justification 820. And not about God, and not about what happens necessarily and always in the same way, such as, for example, the cycle of time; and not about the fact that, although it does not always take place, it always takes place in a similar way, such as, for example, the rising and setting of the sun; and not about what happens by nature, [17A] but not always in this way, but for the most part, as, for example, gray hair at sixty and down on the chin at twenty; and not about what happens by nature, but is not determined by this or that time, such as, for example, rainfall, drought, hail. For this reason it is said: “in our power.” And “it can happen through our mediation” is said because we are not talking about everything that is humanly possible, not about every matter. But not even about everything that is in our power and can happen through our mediation, but we must add: “and it is unclear how it will end.” After all, when the matter is clear and recognized as such, we no longer pretend, even if it is in our power and occurs through our mediation. It is shown that the estimate does not concern the goal, but what serves the goal. After all, we are not thinking about getting rich, but about how and through what we will get rich. [17B] In short, we estimate only what can be done with equal reason; and “with equal reason” means that we can do both this and its opposite. If only one of the two opposites could, it would be considered indisputable, and the opposite impossible. After all, no one speculates about things that are recognized and clear, or impossible, or unacceptable. As, for example, when bread and a stone are offered, no one estimates what kind of food will come out of each, since the first is recognized as such, but the second is clearly impossible. We deliberately choose, of course, the same - namely, equally acceptable - things that we are thinking about. But deliberate choice is not some kind of intention (γνώμη) 821 (even if the majority who are not accustomed to think so would think), but is produced by intention - if in fact it is asserted that intention is an inherent [us] 822 desire for that which is in our power, from which intentional choice proceeds; or disposition (διάθεσις) 823, which occurs in the presence of those things that are in our power, about which an estimate is made (with the excitement of desire) 824. After all, a desire disposed towards something decided on the basis of an estimate has already become an intention, followed by - or, more precisely, from which - a deliberate choice follows. So, intention is to deliberate choice, as skill (ἕξις) 825 is to activity (ἐνέργεια) 826 . But deliberate choice is not free will (ἐξουσία) 828 either. After all, deliberate choice is, as I have often said, an endeavor that considers what it is in our power to do; and free will is the power given to us to do what depends on us 829, [17D] or the unhindered opportunity to use what is in our power 830, or the non-slavish desire for what is in our power. It means that free will and deliberate choice are not the same thing, if we really choose freely, but we exercise freedom 831 not by deliberate choice 832, and he 833 only chooses from - and she uses - what is in our power, and what depends on what is in our power, namely, choice, decision, estimate. After all, we estimate, [19A] decide, choose, are prompted and use what is in our power freely 834. But deliberate choice is not any opinion (δόξα). After all, opinion, of course, is twofold - reasonable and unreasonable 835, but the choice is changeable. Thus it is stated that an unreasonable opinion (ἄλογον δόξαν) is a simple and unreasonable knowledge, as if someone gives someone else’s opinion without knowing its basis - for example, saying that the soul is immortal and without offering a convincing reason for its immortality. [19B] And rational opinion (λογικὴν δόξαν), according to them, is knowledge formed after the completion of reflection, as if someone, having thought of something, gives a reason for it, as is customary in science. After all, this is reflection that goes all the way and acts step by step, starting from the premise and right up to the conclusion. As if someone sets out to prove that the soul is immortal, and says: “Since the soul is self-moving, and the self-moving is ever-moving, and the ever-moving is immortal, then the soul is immortal.” Or again: “Since the soul is not composed of parts, and what is not composed is indecomposable, and what is indecomposable is immortal, then the soul is immortal.” After all, it is natural for thinking to run like a mouse 836 along some path leading to the knowledge of things; and it takes the path from premises through inferences to conclusions 837, and thus creates a reasonable opinion. [19C] And one more thing: opinion is not only about what is in our power, but also about what is not in our power; and deliberate choice is only from what is in our power. And we call opinion true and false, and we do not call deliberate choice true and false, but good and bad 838 . And the opinion is about the general, and the deliberate choice is about the individual; for deliberate choice concerns what can be done, and that is singular. It has become clearer, I think, that opinion is not a deliberate choice. After all, if opinion is knowledge formed at the end of reflection, and deliberate choice is an aspiration that estimates what is in our power to do, then choice is not identical to opinion. [19D] About understanding, or understanding But deliberate choice is not also understanding (φρόνημα) (or understanding (φρόνησις)) - if it is in fact asserted that understanding is the striving of contemplation towards rational and cognitive objects 839; [21A] or the state 840 of resistance to unreason (ἀνοίας) and arrogance (ὑπερνοίας) 841 and deliberate choice, as his definition admirably conveys, is an endeavor that considers what it is in our power to do. And understanding occurs in this way, as they say: the first movement of the mind (νοῦ κίνησιν) is called “thinking” (νόησιν), and thinking about something is called “thought” (ἔννοιαν); the latter, if it lingers and leaves an impression in the soul consistent with the conceivable (νοούμενον), is called “deliberation” (ἐνθύμησις); and deliberation, if, even after testing itself, remains the same, is called “understanding” (φρόνησις). Understanding, having expanded, produces reasoning (διαλογισμός), called by those who understand such things “inner meaning [logos]” 842; characterizing it, they say that this is a movement of the soul, reaching in its ability of reasoning (διαλογιστικῷ) the greatest completeness that is possible without voicing; from which, they claim, comes the word [logos], expressed in language 843. [21B] They also assert that understanding (φρόνημα) is the knowledge of what it has comprehended from understanding that appears in the faculty of understanding; they say: “understanding” (φρόνησιν), “comprehensible by understanding” (φρονητόν), “ability of understanding” (φρονητικόν), “understanding” (φρόνημα). And “understanding” is a relation, and “comprehensible by the understanding” is the intelligible, “the faculty of understanding” is the understanding, and “understanding” is the knowledge of what it has comprehended that has arisen from the understanding of the faculty of understanding 844 . Therefore, if this is the case with this, but not so with deliberate choice, then choice is not understanding. [21C] So, it is clear, I think, that the proposed concepts are not identical to each other, contrary to those who think so. If, more than aspirations, they say that they are all the same identical to each other, because aspiration, or, more accurately, the ability of nature to strive, is applied to all with equal success as a genus, then let them say that all species are identical to each other - both terrestrial, and feathered, and aquatic - because the generic concept of “animal” is applied to all with equal success as a more general generic concept of “animal”, and they will disappear the constitution of the universe, since it will not be the establishment of various things, but only the announcement of bare names. About what the saints will not have after the resurrection in all respects one in all and common with God will (θέλημα), even if, [21D] like some they say everyone will have the same subject 846 Therefore, deliberate choice, adding to itself what happens in the presence of those things that are in our power, motivation (ὁρμή) 847 and use of them (χρῆσις), turns out to be the limit of our meaningful movement, consistent with the desire. After all, the rational (λογικόν) by nature, possessing as a natural ability a meaningful (λογικήν) desire (which is called the will (θέλησιν) of the thinking soul), strives, thinks (λογίζεται) 848 and, having thought, wants. After all, it is stated about will (βούλησιν) that it is not just natural, but some kind of definite, that is, related to some object, will; [24A] and it seeks willingly, and seekingly foresees (σκέπτεται) 849, and with foresight it estimates, and with estimate decides, and decisively chooses, and with choice is prompted, and being prompted uses, and using it rests from the movement directed towards that object 850. After all, no one uses it without first having an incentive; and no one is prompted without deliberate choice; and no one chooses without deciding; and no one decides without thinking; and no one imagines without having foreseen; and no one provides without searching; and no one seeks without wanting; and no one wants without thinking; and no one thinks without striving; and no one strives meaningfully without being intelligent (that is, endowed with thought) 851 by nature 852. So, being by nature a rational animal, man is capable of striving, [24B] thinking, wanting, searching, planning, deliberate choice, motivation, use. If a person, among other things, is an animal by nature, deliberately choosing, and this choice is from what is in our power, and can happen through our mediation, and it is unclear how it will end; and in our power is both the logos 853 of the virtues (since it is the realized law of action of faculties that are in agreement with nature), and the tropos 854 corresponding to the abuse of the same faculties (raising, on the contrary, passions contrary to nature) - if so, then it means that everyone who is by nature capable of deliberate choice is susceptible to opposing possibilities and is capable of decision 855 . And if one is capable of making a decision when there are opposing possibilities, then one is also capable of deliberate choice. And if he is capable of deliberate choice, since movement in both directions is in his power, then he is not unshakable by nature [3]. Therefore (since they relate to things that are ambiguous (ἀμφιβόλων) 856 since they are in our power, and estimation, and decision, and deliberate choice), [24C] when there is no ambiguity and the truth, which does not require justification, has already become obvious to everyone 857, there is no deliberate choice that comes into motion because of intermediate (that is, in our power) things, because that there is no solution that brings certainty to the dilemma when, of two opposites, we define the better as that which is more preferable (that is, worthy of choice) than the worse 858. If, according to the law of nature now in force, there is no deliberate choice in this case, 859 since there is no longer any ambiguity in what exists, then only the desire of the mind will act (for those who by nature are capable of such a desire), inexpressibly achieving the only thing that is available to initiates, the pleasure of what is the object of desire by nature (the desire moved towards this pleasure through the listed moments). “Saturation” (κόρος) 860 with this pleasure is an increase to infinity of the very desire of the enjoyers (so that everyone partakes as much beyond natural measure as he is exhausted by desire (ἐπόθησε)) 861 and direct mixing with what is desired by nature. [24D] If, to the extent that someone is overcome by desire, [25A] he so partakes of what is desired, then in relation to the logos 862 of nature everyone’s will will turn out to be the same, but in relation to the tropos 863 of movement – ​​different 864 . If, in relation to the method that characterizes movement, the will is not the same for all people, then in no case will the will of God and those being saved be the same in everything, as it seemed to some, even if the object of will of God and the saints is the same - the salvation of those being saved, which is initially the divine goal 865. It is, after all, the final goal, conceived before all ages, in relation to which there will be a coincidence in the will of those being saved with each other and the God who saves them, [25B] so that He will completely enter into everyone in general and into everyone individually, filling everything with a measure of grace and in all those united with Him in proportion to the faith of each, as if in members, gaining fullness 866. After all, if the will of God is salvific by nature, and the will of man is saved by nature, the one who saves by nature and the one who is saved by nature can never be one and the same, although both have the same goal - the salvation of everything proposed by God and chosen by the saints. [25C] But if the Divine and human will are the same in number, according to those who say this, then, since God established all ages by will, 867 the creator will also be the face of the saints, acting by the same will, be it natural (φυσικῷ), be it intended (γνωμικῷ), or simply that by which they are usually identified with God, which is absurd and, I think, it’s just a matter of current thought 868. After all, until they are all creators, or only apostles, or only prophets 869, and they, again, are not all, or only Peter, or only Moses, not one, but many with God and the Father and abodes for saints 870. And if the will, which is good by nature 871, were identical (in natural quality and quantity) with the human will moved towards it (by imitation) - which, of course, is unimaginable (for how can what is by nature participatory be identical by nature with what partakes?), - [25D] it is impossible for one in all respects (κατὰ πάντα τρόπον) was the intention (γνώμην) of God and the face of the saints, even if, as I said, both have one object of will - the salvation of everything - in relation to which there is a unity of wills 872. But not knowing, it seems, what an absurd meaning they get from what they say, they thoughtlessly allow their thinking to wander into what it should not. After all, there is no will that is in any way thought or said without reference, that is, does not fall under the category of relation; it is inherent, and not one of those things that are in themselves, since it is obvious that it is observable in another. If the will belongs to what is observable in another, then it is in every way incidental, and if incidental, then it characterizes either the essence [4] or the hypostasis [28A] (after all, there is nothing between them, neither average, which would be observed in itself, nor not involved in both, nor from both combined). And if it characterizes the essence, then they will argue that God and the saints have one nature; so that because the will is one, all will undergo a fusion into one essence. For with equal reason what is affirmed about many as being common to them is an indication of the essence to which they belong. And if it characterizes hypostasis, then God and all the saints will have one hypostasis, so that they will all be fused into identity with each other. After all, in a special way, what is inherent in someone by hypostasis, being observed without distinction in others, confuses everyone with each other and makes the logos of the as-being of each name unrecognizable 873. [28B] That in no sense can it be said that Christ has one will, whether it be considered natural or intentionally-choosing (as some may have liked) Therefore, if indeed their arguments in these points turned out to be weak, then in the transition to our Lord and God and Savior of all - Christ, and assuming the so-called “His will” 874 is in any sense united, these arguments cannot in any way turn out to be strong 875. After all, if they say that this “will of Christ” is natural, they will immediately find themselves sick with the Manichaean idea, as those who honor the non-existent and non-emergent one nature of Christ 876, which is manifested by the will corresponding to it; and at the same time, they will be convicted of competing with Aryan madness and Apollinarian confusion of essences, as having alienated Christ in essence from His immaculate Mother and from God the Father 877. [28C] After all, natural will characterizes the essence, and there is nothing to object to this. And if it characterizes nature, then it is clear that those who say this declare Christ to be nature. And if Christ is nature, then by nature He is not God, nor even really man, unless He is in fact Christ by nature the Father, or Christ by nature His Mother. And if Christ is by nature God, just as He is by nature Christ, then whoever says so is a polytheist, since he honors both God and the nature of the Father (who is not Christ by nature), and another nature - Christ (who is Christ by nature). And the result of weaving such fables will be their condemnation for polytheism. [28D] If they say that this is a choosing will (προαιρετικόν) (it is also called intending (γνωμικόν)) 878 , then let us assume that it will follow nature in every possible way - in all circumstances keeping the way of using the practical possibilities available to Christ in accordance with the logos of nature 879 . So 880 they will not even have Christ dispassionate, but capable of restraining passions and, as a result of success, good (whatever this good may consist of by nature). This is, after all, a choice corresponding to nature from the practical possibilities available to the chooser, preferring the best to the worst. [29A] Or she 881 will go against nature and show that the way of using the opportunities available to him has begun to have a corrupting effect on the logos 882 of nature. This is, after all, a choice contrary to nature from the practical possibilities available to the chooser, preferring the worst to the best. After all, just as the decision corresponding to the assessment of the practical possibilities available to the chooser is either right or wrong - a decision, as if the voice of which is the deliberate choice 883 - so either a logos corresponding to nature, due to usefulness, is assigned to it, or, on the contrary, a tropos, contrary to nature, due to uselessness, becomes a messenger, the first - corresponding, the second - contrary to the nature of the intentional choice. [29B] And if the deliberate choice of Christ corresponds to nature, then we not only find them guilty again on the same points, boldly and thoughtlessly making the nature of Christ different - between the Divinity and the creature 884, but we also ridicule them as insanely making Christ susceptible by nature to opposites according to the deliberate choice, like a simple man, in accordance with Nestorius 885. If His choice (according to them) is contrary to nature, I will pass over this blasphemy in silence, so as not to somehow accidentally defile the language with refutations against them. By asserting that Christ has a choosing (προαιρετικόν) will, they definitely hinted that the hypostasis of Christ is capable of moving in accordance with nature and against nature. This is, as I said, a deliberate choice. And if the choice of Christ characterizes His hypostasis 886, then they separated Him - in accordance with this “His will” - as differing in appearance and intention from the Father and the Spirit. [29C] After all, what is observed in the Son as a feature of the hypostasis cannot in any way be common in hypostasis to the Father and the Spirit 887 . Therefore, those of the holy fathers [5] who mentioned the deliberate choice of humanity corresponding to Christ 888 meant essentially the natural ability of striving (in other words, natural volition), or our own deliberate choice inherent in the incarnate God by assimilation (κατ’ οἰκείωσιν) 889 . [29D] What was mainly in mind, your servant and disciple in the questions and answers presented to my most holy master and teacher Thalassius about difficult passages in the Holy Scriptures called a deliberate choice 890 - knowing that if indeed the Creator of men became man for us, then it is clear that he has straightened out for us the steadfastness of 891 deliberate choice (ἀτρεψίαν τῆς προαιρέσεως) 892 , as a master 893 of steadfastness, essentially [32A] accepting in the test itself as having power those passions that we have as punishment, the same as dishonor, philanthropically taking upon ourselves by assimilation 894 . The assimilation of the latter He made for the human race the basis for dispassion in making a deliberate choice, and the test of the first 895 He granted as a sure guarantee of the subsequent incorruption of the flesh. After all, the human part of God did not move according to a deliberate choice, like us - composed of an estimate and a decision regarding the distinction of opposites; so that it cannot be considered, according to deliberate choice, to be fluctuating by nature. But, having received being in connection with God the Word, she found a state that knows no hesitation, or rather, a stable movement in accordance with her natural striving (that is, simply, will), or, more precisely, a motionless state (στάσιν ἀκίνητον) in God the Word Himself, completely deified in accordance with her unmixed nature in Him. implementation. Forming it naturally and setting it in motion [6] - [32B] as his own and natural for His soul, He actually (and not in dreams) fulfilled the great sacrament of the Economy for our sake, without diminishing what was received in anything natural, except for sin, the logos of which is absolutely not inherent in any of the existing things 896. So, since the difference in terms has become clear to us (thanks to the description that sets its own boundaries for each of them), let us not be embarrassed when we hear how, due to the confusion of the things understood by them, someone used these terms 897 indifferently (if indeed the truth for us is in things, and not in names), [32C] and we will not consider the non-identical to be identical, but, piously believing this, we confess Christ to be truly perfect God and a truly perfect person, the same really in his own and true sense (that is, not considered such by name alone). Let us, therefore, proclaim that He has two natures, the hypostasis of which He is (if He is truly not incorporeal), and let us say frankly: two natural wills, according to the [holy] fathers (if He is truly not soulless 898 and not insane), and let us not venture into a new word, to which paternal authority does not allow us to resort to (after all, to say that the will of Christ - natural, or choosing - is one, is not only scary for those who have taken piety seriously because of the proven absurdity of this, [33A] but also because it is not known of any of the holy teachers that he ever said this) 899 ; let us do this, since we know for certain that deliberate choice distinguishes those who are capable of moving in both directions (that is, in good and bad), and this is about the true essence and source of goods, Christ, even thinking - let alone speaking - is the height of all wickedness. That's all there is to it. As for the expression “single energy 900”, found in the seventh chapter of “Difficult Places of the Great Gregory” 901, its meaning is transparent. After all, that God and the saints have one energy that deifies all the saints, I asserted when describing the expected state of the saints in the future (the state of now expected bliss) 902, [33B] meaning: God’s in essence (that is, initially), but it became the energy of the saints by grace. He added: “or rather, only God’s,” since this is the result of only Divine action [7] - the deification of the saints by grace, since the ability for it is not inherent in us by nature. And what we do not have the ability to do, we do not do, since activity is a natural ability in its full implementation. So, activity depends on ability, and ability depends on essence. After all, activity arises from ability, and ability - from essence and in essence. There are, as they say, three interconnected moments: capable (δυνάμενον), ability (δύναμις); and by virtue of ability, possible (δυνατόν). [33C] And they say that essence is something capable; and that, according to which we have the movement of power, is ability; and what we have by nature according to our ability is, by virtue of it, possible 903. If we succeed by nature, then we have it in accordance with our natural ability. But deification is not one of those things that by nature receives existence from us according to ability, since it is not from something that is in our power; for that which exceeds nature has no logos 904 in nature. This means that deification is an activity that is not a sign of our ability (we do not have the ability for it by nature), but only of the Divine ability 905, since it is not a reward for the saints for righteous deeds [8], but a proof of the generosity of the Creator, who made the lovers (ἐραστάς) of the beautiful 906 according to position 907 the same as He Himself is, as will be shown, initially, by nature (according to the logoi 908, which He Himself knows - so that it would be possible for Him to be completely known and remain completely incomprehensible) 909. [33D] So, I did not deny to those who would experience this natural energy (imagining it to be at rest from the works that it is natural for it to do, and experiencing only the enjoyment of goods); [36A] but pointed to the super-essential power as the only one capable of producing deification, and by grace 910 becoming the property of the deified 911 . And let no one suspect that the energy of Christ is proclaimed as one by these words. After all, we do not proclaim Christ as a deified man, but as God completely made man; who made manifest through the naturally active intelligently animated flesh the infinite power of His - in an infinite degree infinitely exceeding infinity - inexpressible Divinity 912; one and the same [36B] - wholly God and truly man; absolutely each of them by nature is the same and to the fullest extent; that is, everything that is not characteristic of each of the natures, having no flaw, except for sin - which has no logos 913 914. After all, whatever natures He was a hypostasis, those naturally He took into Himself and the essential logoi 915. If he accepted into himself the essential logos of those of whom he was a hypostasis, then, of course, he also had animated natural energy in the flesh, whose essential 916 logos is inherent in nature. If, as man, he had natural energy, whose logos was originally an integral part of nature, then it is clear that as God he also had natural energy, whose logos was originally the logos of the manifestation of the superexistent Divinity. After all, existing as a perfect God, and He as a perfect man, He acted naturally, without being divided accordingly by each of the parts of which He was a hypostasis. [36C] And if he acted naturally, without being divided accordingly by each of the parts, as a hypostasis of which He existed, then it is clear that, together with the natures, of which He was a hypostasis, He also had the essential energies included in their composition, of which He was a combination - acting for Himself naturally, and those with which He acted, certifying the truth of those, being of which, in which and - most importantly - by which He actually existed 917. So, from the two natures (Divinity and humanity) Christ, the Only Begotten Word, the Son and Lord of glory; by these natures He is recognized and, as we believe, truly belonging to them, He exists, having two natural - that is, each of the genera from which He was, characterizing and included in their composition - movements. [36D] Or, more correctly, having energies, the partial executions of which were actions 918, alternately produced by Him and completed by Him, without dividing into those from which He was originally, and without any merging of them 919. After all, it does not allow division or merging, is not subject to change in any way, and everything that exists ensures its being and as-being stability and composition 920. [37A] Let this be said briefly for the sake of your command, holy father, so that you have it in case what was said above your hopes turns out to be something useful, telling you how to fight off the chatter of the talkative, who accepted the disorder of the moment as a [guarantee] of impunity 921. And do not treat your poor servant with contempt, but be enriched by the Divine Spirit, rewarding your compliance with your strong prayers; and may you not cease to entrust your servant to Christ, the great God and Creator of all, worshiped by all creation forever with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Amen. 1. By reason, the nature of things for the emergence of virtue is determined in the meaning of emergence, which is a complete, corresponding to virtue, negation of nature. By the mind, the movement of every age and time for the formation of an unmistakable unity 922 is limited in the meaning of ascent, which is the transcendence of that in which nature (I’m talking about the place and time in which things exist hypostatically). And restoration by grace regarding the One from Whom, through Whom and into Whom (as the limit of all) all things occurs in the meaning of Ascension, which is the passive experience of the ascended, and the action of the ascendant. 2. The face, it is also a hypostasis; nature is the essence. After all, essence is that which is “in the image,” [37C] that is, logos; and that which is “in the likeness,” that is, life, is hypostasis; taken together they form virtue. They say that virtue is a hypostasis of wisdom, and wisdom is the essence of virtue. Therefore, the behavior of contemplatives is an unmistakable manifestation of wisdom; and the meaning of contemplation of agents constitutes the basis of virtue. The truest distinguishing feature of both is a steady concentration on what truly exists 923. 3. About the fact that man by nature is not unshakable and why. 4. That will is a characteristic of either essence or hypostasis, and not something in between, neither common to them, nor composed of both, nor not involved in both. [37D] 5. That deliberate choice in Christ means volition, or the natural ability of striving. 6. Behold the mystery of the Economy. 7. To the words “Through Him we live, and we move, and we exist” [Acts 17:28] or simply - about essence, ability 924 and action. 8. About deification. You too, Neil, would have heeded this and understood what the teachers of truth mean. Opusc. 2 His [message] to the same Marin From an essay on energies and wills. Chapter 50 925 That Sevier insidiously asserts that hypostasis is the same as nature, so that through [the expression] “one nature” he could affirm the merger, but [at the same time] avoid exposure by saying that by nature he meant hypostasis; and vice versa, so that he could introduce division (διαιρεσιν), professing unity from the hypostases, and [at the same time] supposedly hide [from accusations] by saying that he used [the word] “hypostases” instead of “nature”; and also so that, accused of asserting the disappearance of natures [after unification] through [the expression] “mere difference (διαφορασ)” 926, he could resort to the concept of simple difference in natural quality in his defense; [40B] and also that, just as Nestorius, speaking of simple unity, in fact introduced division, so Sevier, speaking of the simple difference of natures, in fact affirms fusion. But, pressed by these words and unable to withstand the test of truth, Sevier again, as usual, resorts to the help of lies - he says that in the economy, hypostasis is the same as nature, and difference in relation to natural quality (ἐν ποιότητι) is the same as [difference] real (τῇ πραγματικῇ) and by nature, since every quality is natural and is considered something real (πρᾶγμα) 927. [40C] [Sevirus says this with the following] purpose: if he is caught and clearly exposed - obviously, because of [the expression] "single complex nature" - that he professes, according to Mani, an appearance 928, according to Apollinaris, a fusion 929 and, according to Eutyches, that after the union [there was] a contraction (συναίρεσιν) of those united in one entity 930 ; then he, like a chameleon changing color, will be able to replace the word and say that, [saying] “nature,” he meant hypostasis. If he says that unity arose from hypostases or persons, and [thereby] it will be proven that he, following Ebion 931, Paul of Samosata 932 and Nestorius, thinks about division and affirms energy by grace 933, like the prophet of the Word, then even then the lie will serve as his ready defender and he will declare that he said “hypostases” instead of “nature” 934 . [41A] If, due to the expression “simple difference” 935, he is rightly accused of preaching the disappearance of connected things [after the union], then he will resort to the fact that this difference is supposedly “by natural quality” 936 in his justification; he will say that the difference in Christ after the union is [a difference] of natural qualities, and not of natures or essences 937; [thus], with the help of a concept that abolishes fusion, that is, “difference,” this insidious wise man further aggravates the fusion, presenting it as if one opposite is not the abolition of another ([as it should be] according to the law of nature), but a confirmation 938, which is contrary to the establishment and law of nature. Regarding difference, in order to mislead his listeners, he takes the same position as Nestorius is known to have taken regarding unity 939. [41B] After all, just as [Nestorius], speaking of unity by just one simple name 940, introduced division according to energy 941 - so Sevier, professing a simple difference after unity, by invention believes the existence of different [parts 942], but in terms of energy at the same time affirms their fusion 943. If Nestorius had not thought of unity as simple [name 944], then he would have said that from the unity of natures a single complex hypostasis of Christ was created. Likewise, Sevier, if he had not proclaimed a simple difference, would not have refused to recognize in Christ after the unity the undivided and indivisible quantity 945, for he knew that along with every difference quantity is invariably introduced, and with every quantity there is associated a number expressing it 946. [41C] For it is impossible for difference to exist without quantity, or for quantity to be recognized without a number expressing it. And again: [Nestorius], presuming only the number of natures in Christ, and not recognizing the unity of the hypostasis according to the composition of natures, as a cover for the perfect division of natures, put forward the simple name “unity” - so [Sevirus], instead of [unity] according to the hypostasis, professing unity only by nature, and not recognizing the quantity in relation to natures, as a cover for the fusion of natures, puts forward a simple difference in natural quality 947 . And one more thing: Nestorius, professing the unity of natures in relation to only one gnomic quality, denies one hypostasis, not agreeing to admit that an actual true convergence in essence has occurred. [41D] After all, power (αὐθεντία) 948, dignity, this kind of will (θέλησις) - that in terms of which, as Nestorius said, there is unity - these are obviously movements of intention (γνώμης), and not of nature. [44A] [Sevier], saying that after unification [there is] a simple difference in natural quality alone, obviously presupposes the destruction of the united [things], for he denies that between the united [things there is] a difference in essence, [consisting] in their natural otherness. Briefly speaking about both of them, Nestorius invented the unity of gnomic qualities [in order to introduce] in reality a division by nature, and Sevier, on the contrary, invented a difference in natural qualities [in order to introduce] in fact a merger 949. Truly an evil couple of lawless men, furiously striving from opposite sides to villainously tear apart the truth of Orthodox dogmas! For one, introducing the unity of gnomic qualities, affirms the division of natures, based on his teaching, in no way united; the other, saying that the difference after unification is only [a difference] of natural qualities, [44B] in the same way introduces a change (συγκεχυμένην ἀλλοίωσιν) due to the fusion, based on his teaching, not in any way united - while both do not understand what they are saying. After all, if they decided not to contradict themselves, then Nestorius, who claimed that the unification of gnomic qualities had occurred, should not have divided natures - the unity of which even initially he did not profess at all - but in relation to those [things 950 ] between which, according to him, unification took place, he should have recognized the difference after the unification; Sevier, who introduces the difference of natural qualities, should not merge natures after unity, the unity of which we will not allow him to affirm until he recognizes their difference after unity. After all, the difference between the united [things] is seen after the unity, no matter how Nestorius rages [against this]; [as well as the unity of [things] that differ after unity is seen, [44C] no matter how Sevier takes up arms against this, composing a lengthy speech in defense of his false teaching 951. If, as Nestorius believes, there was a unification of only gnomic wills, then let him affirm their difference after the unification, giving up talking about the actual separation [of natures], [according to his teaching] in no way united 952. Along with the difference in gnomic wills, he also introduced a difference regarding intention (τὴν τῆς γνώμης παραλλαγήν), in which [the difference] is inherent in the manifestation of difference not in nature, but in hypostasis - a difference that presupposes, in connection with the difference in gnomic wills, a weakening and strengthening of goodness. [44D] [Thus], he presented man, from his point of view gradually idolized 953, as a sinner, for he does not, according to every tropos and not in every sense, have the same gnomic will as God 954. For the difference of gnomic wills, as I have already said, presupposes a difference regarding intention; [45A] and the difference regarding intention entails a decrease in goodness. While this [diminishing goodness] is still at least somewhat inherent [in the human nature of Christ], it does not become completely sinless in intention. So, Nestorius, not accepting unity (ἕν) hypostasis from the convergence of natures, [thereby] abolished the unity (ἕνωσιν) of gnomic wills, not knowing how to answer [the question]: what unity in general is revealed from the unity of gnomic wills? 955 After all, he cannot claim that this identity of goodness - the difference in gnomic wills after unity clearly indicates otherness, depending on its 956 strengthening and weakening. For if there has been a convergence [between some things], then in any case it is necessary to recognize the difference between them. [45B] And in vain he invented the concept of “identity of will” (ταὐτοβουλίας), although it is suitable for proving the separation of persons. After all, the identity of the will is the unity of wills, in which the difference [of things] united by [the identity of wills] is preserved; even if at the same time an unfused division of willing persons is seen 957. His own. From the same essay. Chapter 51. That the fathers, speaking of two wills in Christ, meant natural laws, and not intentions. [45C] However, let no one reject the judgment that denies the duality of gnomic wills 959, having discovered that almost all the fathers speak of two wills; let Sevier not follow - based on this judgment, let him not lead the meaning of pious [teaching] to [the thought of] one will, so that [thus] one evil does not come to be replaced by another - I mean fusion to replace division 960. For the Divine Fathers recognized in Christ the number of natural wills, and not gnomic ones, correctly calling the essential and natural laws and logoi of the united [natures] wills. After all, they, by the movements of the mind, recognizing [in Christ] not at all the gnomic desire of a certain person, but the natural desire of mentally animated flesh, endowed with the natural ability of attraction (ἐφέσεως) to things, naturally moved and imprinted by the Word 961 for the sake of fulfilling the economy, they wisely called [this desire] will. [45D] Without such [will], human nature cannot exist - after all, natural will is the ability to strive for what is in accordance with nature, and to maintain all the characteristics inherent in nature 962. [48A] In connection with this ability, someone endowed by nature with will (τῷ φύσει θελητικῷ) always has a [natural] disposition to will (πεφυκέναι θέλειν). The disposition to will and volition are not the same thing, just as the disposition to speak and speaking are not the same thing. After all, something endowed with speech (λαλητικόν) is always capable of [speaking], but does not always speak; since the first [relates] to essence and is contained in the logos of nature, and the second [relates] to deliberation (βουλῆς) 963 and is imprinted in the intention 964 of the speaker. Thus, the disposition to speak, which always exists, [relates] to nature, and the way someone speaks is to hypostasis. In the same way with volition and the disposition to will. If the disposition to will and volition are not the same thing (for the first, as I have already said, refers to the essence, and the second to the deliberation of the will), then, consequently, the incarnate Word, being a man, has a disposition to will, moved and imprinted by His Divine will. [48B] For, as the great Gregory says, “His will, as completely deified, is not contrary (ὑπεναντίον) to God” 965. If it was deified, then it was deified, obviously due to fusion (συμφυΐᾳ) with the deifying; and the deifying and the deified are, of course, two [things], and not one and the same in nature. If the deifying and the deified from [the number of things] correlated (τῶν πρός τι) - and it is inherent in [things] correlated, undoubtedly, that they are assumed collectively and are thought together, one with the other - then, therefore, the Savior, as a person born by nature, along with the rest of the passions, voluntarily imprints Himself in a carnal way (σαρκικῶς) and compression in the face of death (τὴν πρὸς τὸν θάνατον συστολήν) 966 ; thereby He reveals the economy free from any illusory nature and delivers nature from the suffering to which it is condemned for sins 967. And again: having put death to death in the flesh 968, He shows aspiration (ὁρμήν), in order thereby, on the one hand, to demonstrate that what He was born by nature as a man is preserved in Him, and on the other, [48C] in order, being God, to show that the ineffable and great plan of the Father 969 is fulfilled in the flesh. After all, not in order to suffer, but to save, He first became a man 970. Therefore He says: “Father... if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me! [Matthew 26:39] However, not My will, but Thine be done” [Luke 22:42], showing, together with compression [in the face of death], that the aspiration of the human will is imprinted and occurs in fusion with the [will] of the Divine, according to the interweaving of the natural logos with the tropos of economy, if indeed the Incarnation is proof of [the perception of human] nature and economy (I am also talking about the natural logos [of each of the] united [natures], and about the tropos of unity according to hypostasis, while the logos confirms and the tropos renews (καινοτομοῦντος) natures 971, but without change and fusion), - [48D] but not at all needing that the same thing, according to the same thing, first abolished and then implemented - that would be absurd. So, as a man, the Savior had a natural will, imprinted by His natural [Divine] will, and not rebelling against it. For nothing natural ever rebels against God unless it is gnomic. In this case, there is also a division according to persons, if it is by nature 972 [49A] since one should turn the reproach to the Creator if He created something contrary to Himself by nature 973. How did the incarnate Word become truly human if He is deprived of that which, first of all, distinguishes the rational (λογικήν) nature? For what is not inherent in the movement of aspiration according to attraction is probably devoid of any life-creating ability. [49B] That which does not by nature have a life-creating ability obviously does not have any soul, without which flesh could never have arisen. Thus, it turns out that the Word, having assumed the simple form of flesh, only depicted the economy, and did not fulfill it [truly], being hypostasically embodied in the nature of flesh, mentally and verbally animated - for, according to Sevier, [the Word] does not have a natural will like a man 974. After all, if It, like a man, was truly devoid of natural will, then it did not become a truly perfect man; and if It did not become a truly perfect man, then it did not become a man at all. For how is it possible for an imperfect nature to exist that does not even have a logos? 975 The goal of Sevirus and those around him is to expel [from Christ the human] nature, perceived through an ineffable unity, pointing out some of its supposedly natural incompleteness, [49C] and [thereby] establishing the nasty [doctrine] of Mani about appearance, Apollinaris - about merging, and Eutyches - about the descent into one essence 976. I remember when I lived on the island of Cyprus 977, some false bishops from supporters of Sevier entered into an argument with me, and I heard from them [the following]: “therefore, following the Tomos of Leo, we do not profess two energies, that they are accompanied by [two] wills, and together with [two wills], a duality of persons is necessarily assumed; We also do not [profess] one [energy], which cannot be considered simple. But, according to Severus, we affirm that one will and all Divine and human energy comes from the One and the same incarnate God the Word” 978. [52A] Convicting them, one can cite the following prophetic saying: “Oh, oh, flee from the north... Flee to Zion, you who dwell in the daughters of Babylon” (cf. Zech. 2:6–7, according to LXX). For “north” is truly the teaching of Sevier, a dark place and devoid of the presence of Divine light 979; “daughter of Babylon” is a discordant teaching of false dogmas, viciously generated [by Sevier] from the most vicious state inherent in it; “live” in it are those who have turned away from the light of knowledge and do not want, having turned [to the truth], to “be saved in Zion,” that is, in the Church. After all, if we consider the teaching of Sevier, it turns out that it contradicts both theology and economics 980. If, according to him, energies are naturally accompanied by wills, and wills are naturally accompanied by persons, as effects are [accompanied] by causes, then - [52B] not to mention what [his] proof is - and each person, according to Sevier, is obviously accompanied by a will, and together with [each will], undoubtedly, it will be necessary to assume the energy corresponding to it. After all, the concept of “[things] correlated,” implying an indissoluble relationship, leads to the conclusion of complete reversibility [of the connection] between correlated [things] 981 . Thus, since [the word] “will”, said simply, [without specifications], is polysemantic, [then the following is obtained: if the wills, mutually presupposed together with persons, are natural [wills], then the blessed Unity, according to Severus, will also become the Trinity of natures 982. If these [wills] are gnomic, [52C] then it turns out that the [Trinity] rebels against Itself, for the wills in It, as in the Trinity of persons, do not coincide 983. Or, if the super-essential Trinity has one will, then the Divinity will generally turn out to be one-faced and three-named 984. And one more thing: if, according to Sevier’s position, energy is necessarily accompanied by will, and together with will a person is presupposed, then, of necessity, when energy is abolished, both the will accompanying it and the person presupposed with it are abolished. If the will is abolished with energy, and the face with will, then Christ, according to Sevier, will be deprived of hypostasis; [52D] for along with energy, because the will is abolished with it, the person presupposed along with the will is abolished 985. And one more thing: if, according to [Sevir], energies are necessarily accompanied by wills, and along with wills persons are presupposed, and Sevier says that all Divine and human energy comes from the One and the same incarnate God the Word - [53A] then, according to his teaching, [it turns out] that all will - that is, the Divine and human will - is certainly produced from the One and the same incarnate Word, for it accompanies energies along with persons, which are also assumed to be in the same quantity; and no argument will contradict this 986! Thus, with the abolition of natural energies, Christ will appear, according to Severus, to be devoid of essence; and with the exclusion of one [of the energies], He will also be deprived of reflection (ἄβουλος) 987 and hypostasis. If all Divine and human energy is produced from God the Word, then He will have many thoughts and faces; or, more strictly speaking, countless thoughts and faces. For he who said “all energy” indicates the incalculability of the quantity 988. [53B] Thus, if we [start] from the reverse [formulation] of Sevirov’s position 989, then his theological teaching is crushed, for he introduces Arian polytheism, and Sabellian atheism, and the nature of the Divinity, in Hellenic rebellion against itself 990; if we proceed from the direct [formulation] 991, then, obviously, his teaching about the economy turns out to be false, for he confesses the One and the same Christ, [on the one hand], devoid of essence, reflection and hypostasis, and on the other, having countless reflections and faces. What could be more wicked? [53C] Do you see where the canon of Sevier is leading the believers? For such is every teaching that does not stand on the unshakable foundation of truth. If you, my dear, are talking about the one will of Christ, then what and what do you call it? If you claim that this is the natural will of Christ, then [thereby] you make Him alien by nature to both the Father and the Mother - after all, [in this case] He is not one with any of them in essence, for none of them is by nature Christ. And how, by saying this, will he avoid the danger of [falling] into polytheism? If [this will] is gnomic, then it will be a distinctive feature of His hypostasis alone, for the gnomic [will] is what determines the [specific] person. And it will be clearly proven that [the Son], according to your [teaching], has a different will than the Father and the Spirit, and contradicts Them. If [the will is inherent] only in His Divinity, then the Divinity will be subject to passions, for [it turns out that] It, contrary to nature, is attracted to food and drink. And if [the will is inherent] only in His humanity, then [it turns out that] it is not active by nature (δραστήριον). [53D] For how [can it be active] if it is human? And it will be clearly proven that the manifestation of miracles was a deception 992. If the will is by nature common to both, then how can [things] whose natures are different have a will that is common by nature? [56A] If the will is complex, since it [is inherent in] the whole, then - not to mention the fact that this is an unprecedented fabulous invention, for what kind of composition can the will have? – you again alienate [Christ] from the Father, for you make the complex will a distinctive feature of only one complex hypostasis. Thus, having begun [to Sevirov’s teaching], the word “uproots every plant” that “the Father did not plant” [Matthew 15:13], for it is not His nature to cultivate someone else’s field. However, it seems that Sevier abolished the natural will of humanity in Christ, because he did not know that the most important and first feature of any rational nature is, of course, the movement of aspiration. [56B] Having seen it, the fathers clearly confessed in Christ the difference of natural, and not gnomic wills 993. For they would never affirm in Christ the difference of gnomic wills, so as not to proclaim that He has two intentions, two thoughts, contradicts Himself, so to speak, due to discord of thoughts, and therefore has two faces. After all, they know that because of this difference alone - the difference in gnomic wills - the invasion of sin and our separation from God occurred in [human] life. Evil is based on nothing other than the difference between our gnomic will and the Divine will. In accordance (ἀντικειμένη) with this difference, of course, quantity and the number expressing it are assumed, which indicates the aversion of our gnomic will from God 994. [56C] So, Nestorius and Sevirus have the same goal - to think wickedly, but the methods are different. After all, one [of them] 995, because of [fear of] merging, avoids unity according to hypostasis and turns the essential difference into a division according to persons; the other 996, due to [fear of] separation, does not speak of essential difference and turns unity by hypostasis into natural fusion. One should confess in Christ neither fusion nor division, but the unity of those who differ in essence and the difference of those united by hypostasis, so that both the logos of essences and the tropos of unity may be proclaimed piously. These two, having rejected themselves [from piety] (the first by asserting the unity of only gnomic qualities, [56D] and the second by the difference of natural qualities only after unity), lost the true concept of things, the first by boldly attributing division to the sacrament [of Christ], the second by fusion. His own. George, the most holy presbyter and abbot, who asked by letter about the Sacrament of Christ God-honored Father! Having inspired your mind with Divine desire, elevated your mind with zeal and detached it from matter and that which accompanies it, [57A] you are not satiated with the reading of the Holy Scriptures and are able, like no one else, to think about it tirelessly with due attention. After all, that which is above feeling does not know satiety, 998 and that which is above reason does not know any limitation; for the first is by nature higher than any flow and outflow 999 , the second is higher than any form 1000 and image. The first, as far as [we] are allowed, makes possible the manifestation of the hidden, and the second gives an acceptable idea of ​​​​the limitless (ἀορίστου) 1001, which is sufficient for the perception of the mind, and the concept of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, right up to this and because of this, the humane condescension of the One who is above men is accomplished through the appearance (δι᾽ἐκφάνσεως) - [condescension], which by grace idolizes those who ascend by intention (γνώμῃ) 1002 and, [57B] through the exhaustion of the Word 1003, perceive Him completeness, carefully fulfilling the commandments 1004. By fulfilling the commandments you were raised to the perfect degree of prudence and courage, and therefore you chastely oppress the obvious, and righteously enrich the secret 1005 in order to first show the death of Jesus 1006, destroying all sin, and in the second to show life, super-peacefully demonstrating all virtue. Having thus achieved sacred work and contemplation, you have been awarded the sacred limit - salvation. In order to give it to others and make it obvious - in imitation of God - you wished to address an honest message to me, unworthy, although I am insignificant and unknown; [convert] firstly, in order to make me wise and understanding with your word, [57C] and also to sanctify me through your inherent grace, transmitted to everyone everywhere (after all, this is something unlimited, for its cause is the causeless Word); secondly, [you turned to me] in order to skillfully lead me to the knowledge of the New Sacrament, according to which God the Word, who became incarnate for our sake and became completely human, took on human form; By the same thing that [you asked in the letter] a question, you did not want to learn the fundamental, for you have comprehended all the blessings, but to initiate into more perfect sacraments someone who is not also initiated into the lesser ones 1007. So, marveling at your pious disposition, [57D] I, as far as it is in my power, proceed to explain and say the following: the humanity of the Savior is not by nature something other than our [humanity], [60A] but, [on the contrary], identical [to ours] in essence, without any differences (ἀπαράλλακτον); if, of course, it was received from our [nature], through ineffable perception from the virgin, immaculate blood of the Most Pure Virgin and Mother of God. Having united with them like a seed 1008, the Word became flesh, without ceasing to be essentially God, and became a perfect man - just like us, only without sin. Because of him, we constantly rebel against God and fight with Him, based on [our] will (θέλησιν), which for us fluctuates between two decisions. He, [on the contrary], being by nature free from all sin - He was not a simple man, but God incarnate - [so], He did not have any contradiction [in Himself] and kept our nature immaculate and in all respects completely unsullied. That is why He says: [60B] “Now the prince of this world comes, and finds nothing in Me” (cf. John 14:30) 1009 - that is, that with which we distort nature and therefore show opposition in [our] will (ἐναντίωσιν). Because of this [confrontation] about Christ, it is said that He is “disobedient” in relation to what concerns us 1010 until He frees us from this confrontation by the power of His incarnation. Confirming the truth of [the incarnation], He became all for our sake and voluntarily did everything for us, without in any way counterfeiting either our essence or any of its immutable natural properties; if with all these [properties] He deified her too, like baked iron 1011, and showed everything deified, for he completed complete and perfect interpenetration with her (περιχωρήσας) 1012 through unity and became one with her, unmerged, in the same hypostasis 1013. [60C] Thus, His humanity differs from ours not because of the logos of nature, but because of the extraordinary image of 1014 birth - it is identical to ours in essence, but not identical because of the seedless conception, for [His nature] is not [the nature] of a simple [man], but in truth of Himself who became man for our sake. In the same way, His [human] will, in the proper sense, is identical in nature with ours, but is imprinted divinely, [being] superior to ours. After all, it is clear that seminal and permanent conception do not separate nature, but the division occurs around the same nature 1015; the same is true with [the concepts of] birth and unbirth. [60D] For if it happened that the Word, as a man, would differ from us in nature due to seedless conception, then he would undoubtedly differ in essence from the Father due to begottenness, for being begotten and unbegotten are not the same thing. Then we would be different from the ancient Adam and Eve, created without a seed; for Adam is the creation of the Creator, and Eve is part of the creation. [61A] In fact, the Son is identical with the Father in Divinity, for He is God and consubstantial with Him; just as we are related in humanity and consubstantial with both Adam and Eve, and God Himself incarnate for us. For just as the essence of God is not [the category of] ungeneracy and birthlessness (who could say this?), so the nature of humanity is in no way [the category of] seediness and seedlessness. Thus, the great theologian Gregory in no way indicates that the humanity of the Savior is by nature something different from ours, although some believe so, based on his following words: “...then we would answer that these words were uttered on behalf of a person, not what we mean in the Savior (His will, as completely deified, is not contrary to God), [61B] but similar to us, because the human will does not always follow, but very often contradicts and opposes the will of God" 1016. [The Savior's humanity], in the proper sense, both appears and is said to belong to Him, not because it is different or of a different nature and essence than ours, but because it was born through Him and in Him, in one and the same hypostasis, and was not produced separately, by itself or through itself, as with us. Therefore, the Word became his own seed, which produced an extraordinary image of birth, and the Savior’s humanity received as its inheritance both being by nature and originating by Divinity, so that in this way both ours would be confirmed, and that which is above us would be verified. [61C] After all, it is fitting that we [in our teaching, on the one hand], in all respects preserve the nature perceived by the Word Himself incarnate and for our sake, completely made man by God, with its natural [properties] - without which it is not nature at all, but just an empty ghost - and [on the other hand], preserve unity; We preserve [nature] by [affirming] natural difference; we recognize [unity] by [affirming] hypostatic identity. Thus we will at once wisely and piously declare the logos of the economy to be in all respects both unconfounded and at the same time inseparable. If you proclaim Him Orthodoxy, then He, according to the promise, will glorify you and grant you the enjoyment of His [goods], in the present age - in hope, and in the future - in fact. [61D] Pray, holy father, that I may also partake of them; through your mediation, lead me to the One who calls and saves, and who, as a reward for the compassion of the only-begotten towards each other, grants that they will be awarded glory with Him and from Him. To him be glory and power with the Most Holy Father and His life-giving Spirit, forever and ever. Amen. [64A] Those who claim that one should speak of one energy Christ by predominance" (κατ᾽ἐπικράτειαν), since supposedly His Divine [energy], being more active, prevails over the human, must answer like this. Firstly, you also profess two energies: one [of them] is predominant (I mean Divine), and the other is possessed (that is, human), which is inherent in things related (τῶν πρός τι). A thing that is correlated certainly presupposes something opposed to it. Secondly, if you talk about [one] energy by predominance, since human [energy], being possessed, is abolished, then [thereby] you assume a decrease for [energies]. After all, the predominant itself undoubtedly belongs to the number of those who undergo, for it itself is possessed by the possessed. [64B] After all, even if to a lesser extent, it is still undeniably possessed - just as gold predominates over silver or, say, copper, with which it is mixed, but at the same time it is “possessed,” although to a lesser extent, obviously depending on the amount of mixed [metal] 1018. Those who assert that just as the instrument and the mover have one energy, so the Divinity and humanity have one energy. If you mean a natural instrument (φυσικὸν τὸ ὄργανον) 1019, then in your opinion it turns out that either the Word coexists with the flesh in time (σύγχρονος) 1020, [64C] or the flesh is coeternal To the word. After all, if something uses a natural tool, then this [tool] always coexists with it in time, like, for example, a body with a soul 1021. And then we will have to either call the Divine nature creation, or the body uncreated. If you mean a man-made tool (τεχνικόν) 1022, then you assume [His humanity] as [something] inanimate, separate and isolated, which does not always move, but only when the worker wishes to pick it up and work with it. Consequently, you will find yourself either like-minded by the insane Nestorius, who separates and separates the two natures of God Christ, who have come together into one hypostasis and one person, or followers of the wicked Apollinaris, who considers the body of Christ to be inanimate and unreasonable. [64D] Those who say that Christ has one complex energy Complex energy necessarily belongs to complex nature. And every complex nature is characterized by simultaneous and involuntary birth - after all, it is created; it is contained in its place in the universe and consists of many indivisibles (ἀτόμων) 1023. [65A] So, if you are talking about one complex energy in Christ, then you will have to admit that He has one complex nature, which is determined through [complex energy]; [and therefore, to recognize] that the parts [of this nature] arose simultaneously, that their convergence was involuntary and forced, that this nature is created and contained in its own space and place; [and therefore, recognize] the multitude of Christs to whom such [nature] can be attributed 1024. About the words: “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me!” [Matthew 26:39] If you understand the words “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me!”, showing compression (συστολῆς) 1026 [in the face of death], [65B] as spoken by a man, “not as we understand in the Savior (His will (θέλειν), as completely deified, is not contrary to God), but like us, because the human will (θελήματος) does not always follow, but very often contradicts and opposes the will of God” 1027, as the divine Gregory says, what, in your opinion, means the continuation of the prayer: “But not as I will, but Thy will be done” (cf. Matt. 26:39; Luke 22:42)? Compression (συστολῆς) or courage? Complete convergence (συννεύσεως) or divergence (διαστάσεως)? The fact that [these words show] neither contradiction (ἀντιπτώσεως) nor timidity (δειλίας) 1028, but rather perfect fusion (συμφυΐας) and convergence - no reasonable person will dispute this 1029. If they mean perfect fusion and convergence, then from whom do you think it comes? [65C] From a man “like us,” or “from such as we understand in the Savior”? If from something similar to us, then the teacher’s statement about Him - “because the human will does not always follow, but very often contradicts and opposes the will of God” - turns out to be erroneous; for if something follows something, it does not contradict, and if it contradicts, then it does not follow. One, as contrary to the other, abolishes and cancels it. [68A] If you understand the words “But not as I will, but Thy will be done” as spoken by a man not “like us,” but “as we understand the Savior,” then [thus] you confess the complete convergence of His human will (θέλημα) with the Divine and Fatherly will and you confess that the dual by nature [Christ] has two wills (θελήσεις) 1030 and energies that exist by nature, and that in neither one nor the other respect 1031 He has any opposition, but at the same time there is a natural difference in all [things], of which, in which and which He was by nature 1032. If, pressed by these considerations, you are forced to admit that the words “Not as I will” do not come either from a person “like us” or from “such as we understand in the Savior,” [68B] but point to the beginningless Divinity of the Only Begotten 1033, by way of negation (ἀρνητικῶς) - excluding that He desires something separately, contrary to Father, then, of necessity, you attribute to the beginningless Deity itself also what is desired (τὸ θεληθέν) 1034 [1], that is, the rejection of the cup, if you say that negation means the abolition of the fact that [the Only Begotten] desires something separately, and not the renunciation of what is desired, for it is impossible to attribute negation to both of them, that is, to what The Only Begotten desires something separately, contrary to the Father, and to the [most] desired thing. Since, of course, the desire (θέλησις) [of the Savior reflects] the general will (θελήματος) of the Father and the Son, it [turns out that] it 1035 abolishes what God wants, that is, [the desire] for salvation, for this is by nature desirable for Him. If it is impossible to attribute the negation to both the one and the other, then the following is obvious: if you, in order to establish the general will, attribute [the negation] to the fact that [the Only Begotten] desires something separately, [68C] then you [thereby] will not abolish what is desired, that is, the rejection of the cup, and will attribute it to the general and beginningless Divinity, to which you, by means of negation, have elevated the desire (τὸ θέλειν). Since it is impious to even think about this, then, obviously, denial - that is, the words “not as I want” - completely eliminating the confrontation, marks the fusion of the Savior’s human will with His Divine and Fatherly will, for the Word was fully realized in all nature (οὐσιώσει) and [His] fulfillment (οὐσιωθέντος) adored her all. Therefore, having become like us for our sake, the Savior said to God and the Father, as befits a man (ἀνθρωποπρεπῶς): “Not My will, but Thine, be done”; after all, He, being by nature God, and as a man has a desire 1036, which consists in fulfilling the Father’s will. [68D] That is why, according to both [natures], of which, in which and by which His hypostasis was 1037, He is recognized as being by nature able both to will and to carry out our salvation, namely, [as God] He was pleased [that this salvation should be accomplished,] together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and [as a man] He for the sake of this [salvation] was obedient to the Father even to death, even the death of the cross [Phil. 2:8 ], and through the flesh He Himself performed the great sacrament of economy in relation to us. 1. That those who claim that the words “not as I will” point, by way of denial, to the beginningless Divinity of the Only Begotten, [69A] denoting that He does not desire anything separately, contrary to the Father, are forced to elevate what is desired, that is, the rejection of the cup, to the beginningless Divinity itself. And that, since it is impossible to attribute the negation to both the one and the other - both to the fact that the Only Begotten desires something separately, contrary to the Father, and to the desired - they raise it only to the fact that He desires something separately, but not to the desired, which is the rejection of the cup, or our salvation. What could be more ridiculous? After all, it turns out that God wants Him to bypass that which is naturally desirable for Him. After all, the words “Let the cup pass from Me” belong to the same thing as “Not as I will.” His own. [69B] Dogmatic Tomos sent to Deacon Marinus in Cyprus O all-holy servant of God, all-wise secret master and master of His mysteries! I marveled at the beauty of your great piety no less than I admired the courage of your greatest zeal. After all, through the sacred interweaving of both qualities, you have acquired perfection in all virtues. Thanks to the first 1039 you have become completely and in everything and entirely God, through the fulfillment of His Divine commandments, but [at the same time] from the extreme excess of poverty you want to be entirely 1040 among those like me, who, due to their spiritual disposition towards material things, have become mired in the filth of impure passions. At the same time, according to the word 1041, you thereby create for yourself a reliable [basis] for salvation; [68C] after all, there is no stronger [support] for the creation and preservation of virtues than voluntary poverty; for it is the unshakable foundation of the Divine structures in the soul, and also becomes the source of salvation for all others who care about the good; for, rather by clear example than by instructive exhortation, it leads to the greatness of virtue through exalting humiliation, [leading] those who wisely direct both mind and life towards you. Thanks to the second, that is, zeal, you fully possess the “burning” of the Spirit (ζέσιν τοῦ Πνεῦματος) 1042 and the flame in the earth of the heart 1043, which “came to bring down” [Luke 12:49] into it the good-loving and humane Logos by nature, destroying every bad quality and movement of ours; and [with this flame] you, on the one hand, incinerate those who, through deception or foolishness, are attracted to substance or stupidity: they commit bad deeds and utter false speeches, and you expose their depravity and recklessness, [72A] revealing the blessed lamp that burns unquenchably in you according to Divine knowledge and virtue; and on the other hand, [with the same flame] you warm those bound by the cold from the ensuing darkness and cold 1044, [you warm] with the radiant radiance of Divine words, completely dispersing and dispelling the darkness and turning extreme fear into extreme courage and strength; with it you enlighten from the eternal mountains 1045 - I mean, from the immaterial, surpassing all knowledge and power [achieved] by all senses, that is, from the [holy] fatherly sayings and dogmas - [you illuminate] those who strive for light and who, having tried wisdom, have already clearly and well, in their hopes, reflected in themselves that which by nature is desired; you lead them to the same [wisdom] in practice and piously lead them to complete transformation (μεταποίησιν). [72B] For nothing so reflects the work of your Divine priesthood as unquenchable zeal mingled with the fear of God and the [born] word sown in us, which at the same time unites and kindles - [the word] which, wisely guiding us, impels us to do what [the Word] prescribes by nature the First for the sake of our ascent to Him and perfect restoration (ἀποκατάστασιν) through pious deeds and true dogmas, as well as for the sake of flight and aversion from what makes us deviate from this sacred ascent (ἀναβάσεως) 1046. [72C] And what else greatly hinders him and seems to block him - I’m talking about the ascent to the Word - if not the terrible betrayal of the Word on the part of those who stood in the way of the Divine and Fatherly dogmas following the royal path; who do not know any deviation from the two roads, unfortunately leading into the abyss of confusion and into the gorges of separation 1047 [73A] and in no way desire to know, [as they could know] by the grace of the All-Holy Spirit, wisely leading and guiding those who hasten through prayer through pure and Orthodox faith to the perfect face to face [1 Cor. 13:12] knowledge of the great God and Savior of all, Christ [Titus 2:13] and introduction into His sacrament 1048. After all, this betrayal is a distortion of His pious teaching and about Him, [distortion], which, perceiving the confession and teaching of the heterodox 1049, betrays Him, [leading] to the abolition of His most holy human 1050 flesh, but rather to the destruction of the entire economy; and in comparison with the first [betrayal] committed when the Word was with us in the flesh, this betrayal is so much more severe, how much more perfect has become the knowledge of His Divinity among all, and how much clearer is the true [teaching] of His humanity, [73B] which has reached the limits of the universe [Rom. 10:18], loudly proclaimed by the holy fathers 1051. After all, everyone everywhere has firmly confessed and Orthodoxy believes, according to their - I’m talking about the God-judging fathers - exposition that one of the holy and consubstantial Trinity, the Only Begotten Son, being by nature perfect God, became at will (κατὰ θέλησιν) a perfect 1052 man, truly receiving the flesh of one essence with us from the Mother of God and the Ever-Virgin, [flesh] verbally and mentally animated, and, truly indissolubly uniting it with Himself according to hypostasis, is one with it, as before; however, He is not uncomplicated in hypostasis: although He is simple in nature - for He remained God and consubstantial with the Father, [73C] - but at the same time double, for He became flesh. The duality of nature [is inherent in Him so that] He would be essentially akin to [both] extremes (τοῖς ἄκροις) 1053 and preserve the natural distinction of His parts; unity of face - so that He has perfect identity in parts and, being one and only, has difference from extremes in relation to face (προσωπικὴν... διαφοράν); the completeness of essential and natural indistinguishability (ἀπαραλλαξίας) in relation to them (I mean extremes) - so that He would be perfect in both: The same one is both God and man. Those who wickedly teach about the decline of [properties] inherent in His nature, [thus] claim that He is imperfect and has experienced a loss of natural [properties]. After all, if He does not fully preserve - with the exception of sin alone, according to the holy fathers - the peculiarity (ἰδιότητα) of each of the natures, from which and in which the Word is truly incarnate even after unity, [73D] then God, in any case, is incomplete if he is an imperfect God, and man is incomplete if he is a man who has experienced a decrease in natural [properties]. So, under the pretext of unity, which does not harm anything, but only connects things into one hypostasis, one should not abolish their existence by denying natural will and essential energy. After all, then [one of two things will happen]. [76A] Or, [in the first case], we will melt and pour the same amount of natural energies into one will and one energy, as if into a whole of parts - something fabulous - and this whole will turn out to be completely alien and devoid of community with both the Father and us; since neither He has a complex will or energy by nature, nor do we. After all, there can be no addition of [things] that are in the subject, since without the subject essence their existence in themselves is in no way discernible; for in addition to this vileness, which is completely worthy of ridicule, they confess (προσομολογούντων) that, due to natural kinship with both, [the single energy] through division is dismembered and dissected [into two parts] - upper and lower [1]. [76B] Or, [in the second case], we will preserve both the natural will and the energy inherent in [it] unharmed for the Divine nature of the incarnate Word, and take them away from His human essence and abolish them; and thus we will destroy the supernatural unity - for there will be nothing that can be connected into one hypostasis, since [it turns out that] verbally and mentally animated flesh, in other words [speaking], our essence and nature, is and is not preserved in the Word in its entirety. For where and what kind of nature can there be if it has experienced the loss of natural [properties]? [76C] So, if the Lord lacked these natural characteristics or any of them, He would not have been either flesh or man at all. After all, either let them prove that even without these characteristics He is a man by nature, or a man in general; or, since this is completely impossible, it is clear that the incarnate Word, deprived of these natural [features] or any of them, did not become a man - for how and in what way [is this possible] if nature does not have any lack of such [features]? [And then] what the Word, in [their] opinion, obviously became is something else, completely alien to our nature and unknown: either it is something originally united in essence (συνουσιωμένον) with the Word and descended with Him from above 1054 - and what then was the descent to us, for we did not at all agree with In a word, if the holy flesh, united [with Him] by hypostasis, was not received from us? – [76D] either entirely a vision and just an image, deceiving [our] senses, and by no means the essence of the flesh, and therefore not the firstfruits (ἀπαρχή) of our race, uniting by grace the whole dough (cf. Rom. 11:16) and freeing 1055 from all divisions (διαιρετικῶν) 1056, the cause of which was the apostasy of the old Adam, because of which [our] nature was condemned to death. So why do they deny us perfect salvation and confession? That they extend supposedly indestructible conclusions against us, asserting that [two] energies entail [two] wills, and [two wills] entail a confrontation, which, in their opinion, presupposes [two] opposite wills? [77A] However, without refuting each of their arguments, [I will ask right away]: Where and how do they derive such wisdom? I would only like to ask and find out: did they themselves, who did this and created (ἐνεργήσαντες) a new Exposition (ἔκθεσιν) [of faith] 1057, do it unwittingly, and who then used force [on them]? And then, if after the action, when it had already happened, they acquired a will that did not exist before, then where and from whom did this [will] come? And who forced one to have the will to what has already been done, so that it would be done contrary to desire (παρὰ θέλησιν), and what was done would be preferred (στερχθῇ) contrary to the will (παρὰ βούλησιν)? How then is the incarnate Word, if It did not by nature desire (ἤθελε), like man, and did not do (ἐνήργει) what [is] inherent in [It] by nature - [how could It] voluntarily, at will, perceive hunger, thirst, pain, hardship, sleep and everything else? [77B] For not only the Word willed and did this by nature, but He, together with the Father and the Spirit, has a super-essential and super-infinite nature; even if, as the great Gregory, the Divine Teacher of the Nissians, says, “being God, He, having power (ἐξουσιαστικῶς) 1058, when He wanted, gave nature time to do what was inherent in it” 1059. For if [the Savior] desired this only as God, but not as a man, then [the following results]: either the Divine is by nature a body; or [the Word], having changed its essence, became flesh through the loss of His Divinity; either His flesh was not verbally animated at all 1060, and [the Savior] was completely inanimate and wordless in the flesh; or, if she was nevertheless endowed with a rational soul, then she was also endowed with natural will. After all, everything that is verbal by nature 1061 is certainly endowed with nature and will. And if [the Savior] had a natural will, like a man, then, of course, He essentially desired what He Himself, as God, having created nature, naturally put into it for its creation. [77C] For He did not come to destroy nature, which He Himself, as God and the Word, created; He came in order to completely deify nature, which He voluntarily, by the good will of the Father and with the assistance of the Spirit, united with Himself in one hypostasis, with all [the properties] inherent in it by nature, but without sin. So, being by nature God, [the Savior] desired that which by nature is Divine and Fatherly. After all, He had one will (συνθελητής) with His Parent; [80A] and being by nature human, He desired that which is human by nature - thus keeping the economy pure from any illusory nature - but [at the same time] does not at all contradict the will of the Father. After all, none of the natural properties, as well as nature itself in general, in any way contradicts the primary source of [this] nature. Neither does intention (γνώμη) contradict it, nor does everything that relates to intention—only when it agrees with the logos of nature 1062. For if anyone says that any of the natural properties contradicts God, then the blame will fall not on nature, but on God - [the fault is that] He supposedly naturally put enmity into existing [things], [which led] to the rebellion and struggle of [things] against God and among themselves. That nothing natural is opposed to God is clear from the fact that things were created by Him by birth (γέννησιν) 1063, [80B] and regarding their essential composition they do not deserve any criticism from us; on the contrary, they bring accusations upon themselves, obviously because of their perversion. After all, by perversion we become, according to the evil serpent, gnomically involved in all evil, and by birth we are, by nature, God’s precious creation. Therefore, according to the holy fathers, we do not allow in the One and the Same God the Word incarnate any decrease in either natural wills or energies, as well as the natures themselves; We Orthodox believe that One and the same is simultaneously in all respects perfect God and [perfect] man, since He perfectly has, desires and does both Divine and human; since He, of course, has in equal measure both Divine and human essence, and will, and energy. [We believe so], [80C] so that it does not [turn out that, by introducing] a lack of natural characteristics in relation to each of the two [natures], we foolishly confess the decrease, or rather, the complete destruction 1064 of each of the two natures, of which and in which He exists. That [the Savior] had a will by nature human, as well as by essence Divine, is clearly shown by the Word Himself, through the dispensational avoidance (παραιτήσεως) 1065 revealed by Him from death for us, because of which [Jesus] said: “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me!” [Matthew 26:39], - in order to show the weakness of His flesh, as well as the fact that to those who saw [Him] He was represented by the flesh not as a false vision deceiving the senses, but was truly a man - this is evidenced by the natural will, [80D] which is due to the deviation [manifested] by economy 1066. The same thing that [the Savior’s human will] was completely deified, converging with the Divine will, moved and imprinted from it and according to it, [this] is clear from the fact that He made the final decision based only on the Father’s will; According to this [decision], He, as a man, said: “But not My will, but Your will be done.” And in this [the Savior] gives us a model and example so that we renounce our will for the sake of the perfect fulfillment of the Divine [will], even if we see that because of this we are in danger of death. For if He said to the Father, “Not My will, but Thine be done,” not as one who became human by nature, [81A] possesses a natural, that is, human will, subordinates it through economy and brings it to unity with the Fatherly will, then it is clear that He said these [words] as God by nature, and thereby showed that He had a will, not identical and not equal to the will of the Father, but another, different in nature, subduing which He asked that only the [will] of the Father be done. If He had a different natural will than the [will] of the Father, then it is clear that He also had an essence that was different [from the Father’s]. After all, according to the wisest Cyril, “One essence has one will,” 1067 and if the natural will is different, then, of course, in any case the nature is different. [81B] So, [it turns out] one of two things. Or, [in the first case], He had a natural will as a man and for our sake, according to the economy, voluntarily (θέλων), evaded death 1068, and then rushed against it [that is, death] through a perfect convergence with the will of the Father; or, [in another case], not having a natural will as a man, He, as God by nature, endured the suffering of the flesh in His own essence, which by nature experienced compression in the face of death and essentially possessed a natural will different from that of the Father, which [the Savior] asked in prayer so that it would not “come to pass.” And what kind of God is this if He by nature fears carnal death and therefore asks that the cup “pass from him,” and if He has a different natural will than the [will] of the Father? [81C] In order for us to expel this absurdity from our souls, we must adhere to the pious confession of the Fathers. Thus, Athanasius the Great, in his Homily on the Incarnation and the Trinity 1069, says: “When [the Savior] says, “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from [Me]; however, let it not be My will, but Yours... The spirit is willing (πρόθυμον); but the flesh is weak” [Matthew 26:39,41], then we believe that He points here to two wills: the first [of them] is human, which is the [will] of the flesh, the second is Divine. The human [will], due to the weakness of the flesh, avoids suffering, but the Divine will is vigorous (πρόθυμον) 1070 » 1071. In the same sense, obviously, the great theologian Gregory teaches in the Second Word about the Son - he says [the following]: “His will, as completely deified, is not contrary to God” 1072. So, according to this Divine teacher, the Savior’s will (θέλειν) was human; it was not in any respect contrary to God, [81D] for it was by no means gnomic, but, in the proper sense, natural, always imprinted by His essential Divinity and moved towards the fulfillment of the economy; [His will was] completely and completely deified by the descent and fusion with [the will] of the Fatherly - in fact, by unity, and not by nature, it truly became and is called Divine; for by the fact that it is deified, it by no means ceases to be something that belongs to [human] nature 1073. By saying “wholly deified,” the teacher designated the unity of His human will with the Divine and Fatherly will and thereby [84A] completely expelled from the sacrament of Christ all opposition and those who wish the opposite. Having said “His [the Savior’s] will,” [Gregory] pointed to the innate movement of His human will and to [its] essential and natural difference from His Fatherly and Divine [will], and thereby completely refuted the merger along with [considering it] imaginary. After all, knowing that confusion and division, equivalent to it in wickedness, are opposed to the meaning of 1074 economy, this divine father and the holy teachers of the Catholic Church like him, in opposition to each of these two [concepts], loudly professed difference and unity. [They taught] that difference is real (πραγματικῶς) and resides perfectly in the natural logos [2], [84B] and unity is strong and hypostatic (ὑποστατικῶς) preserved in the tropos of economy; so that [we, based on this], are convinced of the [truth] of those things which, together with all their inherent natural [properties], essentially abide in the One and Only Christ God in indissoluble unity. After all, just as they all confessed one and another [nature], that is, Divine and human, and a double nature (διπλῆν φύσιν) 1075 in One and the Same, so they clearly proclaimed to everyone one and the other will, Divine and human, and two wills; as well as one and the other energy, Divine and human, and double energy (διπλῆν ἐνέργειαν) 1076, that is, two [energies]. After all, this is how they clearly expressed the numerical value of entities. For He, [on the one hand], appears [to us] as a man - being, at the same time, by nature God - when economically he desires that “the cup should pass from Him,” [84C] and right up to this [desire] he imprints [in Himself] what is inherent in us, as the wise Cyril instructed us, in order to expel from human nature any compression in the [face of] death and in order to temper 1077 us and raise courageously to fight against her, that is, death. [On the other hand], He appears as God - being, at the same time, essentially human - when, in a fatherly way, He desires to fulfill the economy and create the salvation of us all. He also appears [to us] as a man - being by nature God - when he acts like a human and voluntarily accepts the experience of suffering for our sake; [on the other hand], He is also shown as God - being, at the same time, human by nature - when He acts Divinely and naturally creates Divine signs. From these [manifestations] it became known that One and the Same is both God and man: [84D] how many essences were there from which and in which He existed, so many wills and energies He naturally possessed, in order [thereby] to confirm the perfect existence of those [things] that He truly was. If someone, in order to refute this teaching by contradiction (ἀντιφατικῶς), brings up for discussion [the expression] “God-manly (θεανδρική) energy” 1078 of the Manifestation of God Dionysius and [the expression] “related (συγγενῆ) 1079 and through both the revealed energy” 1080 of the wisest Cyril, then let him know that here too he will not gain power against a pious confession. For [the word] “God-masculine,” properly used by the teacher, obviously periphrastically denotes the dual energy of the dual in nature. [85A] Indeed, by combining parts of the word, he clearly proclaimed [two energies]: Divine and masculine, that is, human; and not just [one], which is why he didn’t designate it with a number [he didn’t call it one]; even if he taught about it singly (μοναδικῶς), denoting [thus] the unity of natural energies 1081. This [unity] does not harm their natural difference, just as the [difference] of essences does not harm their indissoluble unity. For if, according to those who assert this, [the Savior] had one energy and at the same time the [energy] “God-masculine,” then [one of two things turns out]. If the incarnate Word possessed it as one natural energy, then how could one energy by nature be divided into two? And how can one energy simultaneously both bring together (συστήσει) and differentiate (ἀφορίσει) different entities? [How can she] ensure that both have an essential indistinguishability in relation to the homogeneous and, conversely, an essential difference in relation to the foreign? 1082 [85B] I’m not even talking about the fact that in this way [the Savior] is deprived of his natural kinship both with the Father and with us, for neither [the Father] nor we possess innate and essential “God-masculine” energy. If, however, [the second possibility – the single God-masculine energy] was hypostatic, then (besides the fact that this is a new teaching: who ever said that there is a hypostatic energy? [3]) such a teaching also represents [the Savior] alien to the Father, since, unlike the Father, he has not natural, but hypostatic energy. After all, the Word obviously differs from Him 1083 in hypostatic characteristics. [85C] Also, the [expression] of St. Cyril “one energy, related and manifested through both” was introduced by the teacher not for the sake of abolishing the essential difference of natural energies, from which and in which the One and Only Christ God exists, but for the sake of confirming the complete 1084 unity of these energies 1085 . It seems that, [using] other words, he imitates the epiphany Dionysius 1086. To clarify that [the Savior] is neither simply God, nor simply man, nor a separate God acting incorporeally, nor a separate person acting according to [his] intention, but God incarnate and for our sake completely incarnate, acting at the same time both divinely and humanly, [to clarify this, Cyril] said 1087 that by raising the dead and healing every disease and weakness, [85D] The Savior, obviously, acted not only with words and Godly commands, but hastened to attract for these [actions], like some kind of helper (συνεργάτιν), His holy flesh, on the one hand, doing all this as God, by His omnipotent command, and on the other hand, life-giving with the touch of holy flesh, united with Him by hypostasis, in order to thereby show that she too can give life through His essential [human] energy, which includes actual touch, voice and everything else like that. Further, having explained [thus] that the natural energies of Christ God, consisting of both [natures], are completely preserved ([the energy of] Divinity is in the omnipotent command, [88A] and the [energy] of humanity is in touch), [so, having explained this, the teacher] shows that these [energies] are completely united by fusion (συμφυΐᾳ) and interpenetration (περιχωρήσει) one into another; so that, due to the unity of the Word Himself and His most holy flesh, one energy was revealed to us - [energy] not natural and not hypostatic (the teacher did not say anything like that), but akin to [both] parts, through which - as was said, by an omnipotent command and the touch of a hand - it was revealed 1088. So, from the sacred teaching of the wise [Cyril] the following is clear: [on the one hand], he asserts that the difference between natural energies - as well as the very natures to which they belong - persists even after unity, and [on the other hand], he affirms the unity itself. [88B] He asserts the distinction when he says “omnipotent command” and “touch”; unity - when he says “one” and “related” 1089. With these words, the teacher superbly refutes any acquisition or division of the 1090 sacrament of Christ. Those who do not understand this this way, but believe that the “related” energy is one energy of the Word and the flesh, profess the “descent into one essence” (συνουσίωσιν) of Eutyches and Apollinaris. Thus, we should preserve both the Logos unharmed and the tropos of the Economy undistorted, so that the harmful couple - I mean division and fusion - would not find [some] secret way against the truth. Similarly to this [saying], in [the same] pious sense, other expressions of the Holy Fathers should be interpreted, indicating singularity (μοναδικάς) 1091, if any [are] discovered. [88C] We should in no way perceive them as contradicting the [expressions] of the saints indicating duality (δυϊκάς), we should be aware that the latter 1092 defend difference against fusion, and the former defend unity against division. We must joyfully welcome both [expressions] with our souls and lips and confess them Orthodoxy 1093. Through expressions that only seem contradictory in verbal form (κατὰ προφοράν), we must wisely put to flight those who in the meaning (κατὰ διάνοιαν) [of their teachings] contradict themselves, and each other, and the truth, and courageously expel them from our fence, that is, from God's Catholic and Apostolic Church; To those who, like robbers, are plotting to move the boundaries of their fathers, we should in no case give passage to the Orthodox faith, [88D] repelling them with any of the pious weapons and dogmas, which are inherent in bringing them defeat and destruction. However, we should also be aware of [the following]: regarding natures and natural energies, we, in addition to expressions indicating duality, find in the holy fathers those that indicate singularity: “one nature of God the Word, incarnate,” “God-masculine energy,” “related and revealed through both”; Regarding natural wills, as far as I know, it is generally impossible to find a single expression indicating singularity, but only those that denote duality with adverbs or numerals 1094. [89A] How and on what basis can we be allowed to even raise the question whether we should speak of one or two wills in Christ God, while the legislation and teaching of the fathers prescribes to confess and honor in Him two natural wills, as well as two natures and their two natural energies, even to the point of recognizing their difference? Now that I have expounded this at length to your God-honored holiness, I ask you, if it was spoken unworthily or poorly thought out, to grant me forgiveness and correction, out of goodwill and in imitation of the Father's mercy, [89B] and lead me to Christ God, glorified with the Father and the Holy Spirit forever and ever. Amen. 1. It is absurd, he says, to divide one will, for natural kinship forces us to do this, and to devote one half to one nature, and the second half to another, and thus alienate Christ both from God and from us, who do not have a complex will. 2. That the fathers professed difference and unity, opposing fusion and its equivalent division. 3. Neil: There is a hypostatic [energy], but it is our [energy], which is unreasonable. [89C] Because of her, God became man in order to save man, delivering from her all those who, from fear of death, were doomed to slavery for life; or those who, fearing suffering, thought about pleasure; and pleasure is the mother of suffering, the culprit of corruption, the matchmaker and procurer 1095 of death. Copy of a letter written in Saints by Maximus to the Most Holy Bishop Mr. Nikander, about the two energies in Christ O God-honored and most blessed father! Whereas you yourself, according to your name [Νίκανδρος], courageously (μετὰ τῆς ἀνδρείας) gain victory (νίκην) over all enemies [89D] explicitly or implicitly opposing God's Catholic and Apostolic Church; whereas you, in hope, have already received from God a crown [given] for Him, eternally blooming with the gifts and actions of the 1097 Spirit and unfading, and as if with your hands you have already received the most blessed rapture that is naturally desired, due to the perfect convergence with him, and therefore, obviously, you, like no one else, enjoy the Lord Himself - [92A] [while all this is so], how in general and in what way you agree to attribute this [victory] - at least in simple speech, not to mention your honest and blessed writings - to [a person] powerless and timid, who to this day has not been “taught” to move the active forces of the mind or the thoughts of the soul, like the “fingers” of some “hand”, to God’s “battle”, to the holy “war” of Him and for Him (see. Ps.143:1), and thus valiantly put to flight those who rebel with their speeches and teachings against the Lord Almighty and expel them from the good land, which is the Lord our God Himself and the Orthodox faith, truly the solid foundation and composition (σύστασις) of Orthodox dogmas, the eternal source and nature of the virtues? [92B] But you, in imitation of Christ, did this, so that, clearly showing His humiliation (κένωσιν) before me, by intention (γνωμικῶς) from Him, in an inclination towards evil, as if in some side distant from Him, living and “shameful passions” [Rom. 1:26], like pigs (cf. Luke 15:13-16), feeding with his deeds; and by the greatness of condescension proving the power of the Divine virtues inherent in you - [so, in order, having done all this], to awaken in me the desire for this 1098 and strengthen a certain sacred and blissful zeal, forcing me, if possible, to throw off the burden of laziness and negligence that burdens me, among other things. Therefore, having admired you because of your wise care and providence for me, a beggar, [92C] I extended and with tears prayed to the Lord our God to grant me (although I am very sinful) and all [people], so that you, the good and kind shepherd and father, would remain with us for many more years and in the Divine virtues; so that you - especially now, when the true outcome of affairs has confirmed the prophecy of Truth in nature and in essence, and “tribulation such as has not been since the creation of the world, neither will be” (cf. Matt. 24:21), [as a punishment] for sins, has embraced everyone and everywhere 1099 - instill in us strength and strength with the omnipotent staff of faith-filled (θεοπειθῶν) prayers; He wonderfully led and enlightened us with the flute of God-wise teaching; [92D] through doing “made us rest” “in green pastures” of the ever-living habit of virtues; through knowledge he “led” us “to the still waters” [Ps. 22:2] from the ever-flowing sacred springs of dogmas; reliably “saved” us “to a strong place” (cf. Ps. 70:3) and to a “high fold” (cf. Eze.34:14), [that is] to the Catholic Church and to the Lord, according to [His] will, having betrothed it to Himself with His life-giving blood; and we would thus be spared from the attacks of enemies. These [enemies], taking advantage of the opportune time of general unrest and disorder, are plotting to disrupt the sacrament of the saving economy of Christ God for all, great and ineffable, for it naturally embraces all ages and times, and those who are in the ages and in time. [93A] [They believe that] the holy flesh, mentally and verbally animated, received from us by the Savior by the grace of the Father and with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, united with Him in one hypostasis, after union has no [properties] inherent in it by nature (except for sin alone, for it is not [inherent] in nature), but rather that the Incarnate Word Himself, for our sake, became man, [as if] does not perfectly preserve, as we do, [the properties] that essentially distinguish our nature, but either transformed them into [the properties] of His Divine nature and thereby showed the incompleteness of His Divinity, if for perfection in essence a certain addition is required (παρενθήκης), or made it so that they ceased to exist altogether 1100, as not quite good, [93B] and [thereby] destroyed the creation that He Himself created - after all, it turns out that He did not create it according to any logos and wisdom, and therefore did not unite it with Himself in [one] hypostasis. For how is it [possible] that what has arisen according to Logos and Wisdom would not be preserved in Logos and Wisdom Himself with indissoluble unity? Or, if it persists even after the union, then how and for what reason do they not confess it, so that, through this confession, it would be confirmed that God by nature became truly man? Or, perhaps, He initially did not perceive, along with nature, what was inherent in this nature, but, having accepted soulless and unreasonable flesh, which is by no means from us or is not consubstantial with us, He united [it] with Himself 1101, or He did not perceive at all, but sent down from above the flesh that was originally united with Him in essence (συνουσιωμένην)? 1102 [Then it turns out that] He only depicted the economy [accomplished] for our sake and in relation to us, approaching us in human form, [93C] but without joining human nature, in order to save the entire race from the ancient Fall and free it from the condemnation [associated with it]. This and much more is invented by those who do not confess, according to the holy fathers, that natural properties (only without sin) and the natures themselves are perfectly preserved in Christ God even after unity. [96A] After all, we do not consider the Divine uncreated nature to be devoid of existence (ἀνύπαρκτον), will (ἀθέλητον) and energy (ἀνενέργητον), nor do we recognize the human created essence, like ours, to be devoid of existence, will and energy. And if we know that not one of them is deprived of natural existence, will and energy, and if of them (that is, from the Divine nature and human nature), in them and in their hypostasis, the one and only Christ truly is, then if the same One is both by nature truly God, and by nature truly man, how is it possible that He does not have by nature truly both Divine will and energy, and human will and energy? After all, in none of these [the Savior] was by nature incomplete, [96B] through which [things] 1103 He confirmed words with deeds and, on the contrary, supported deeds with words, and [thus] it became known that He both has, and desires, and does both Divine and human, and that of which, in what, and what He was 1104 was made certain. After all, if the natural will or essential energy [inherent in] the Divine or human essence is abolished, He who is of these [essences] has them, and preserves [them] in one hypostasis, then how will He be a man or God 1105? And how can it be proved that He is in essence either one or the other, unless He fully preserves the characteristics of each nature, excepting only sin? For that which has lost its natural properties ceases to be an essence 1106 - it has no existence, because there is no natural movement. [96C] As the great holy Epiphany Dionysius says, “For that which does not have any movement does not exist, and does not represent anything, and has no place at all” 1107. Therefore, if we confess the [two] natures of Christ God, I mean the Divine and, as with us, the human, then for the sake of exact confirmation of their existence and the truth of our confession about them, we should honor the natural wills equal to them, and confess the same number of essential energies; [we] should not reduce or even deny any of these [properties] under the pretext of Divine unity by hypostasis, realizing that unity by hypostasis does not harm any of the natural [properties], as well as the natures themselves. Although [unity], in its [essence], brings these [natures] together, into one hypostasis, it in no way deprives them of existence in the dual number according to [their] natural logos 1108. [96D] The same applies to natural features: [unity] completely unites them through mutual fusion and, according to the Venerable Leo, Pope of Rome, does not allow any of them to be in any respect contemplated separately from the other or outside the relationship of one with the other, but at the same time it does not at all erase their essential and natural difference, but, [on the contrary], completely preserves it 1109. [97A] After all, by preserving [difference], [unity] is itself preserved and, by preserving, it is itself preserved. For, obviously, the unity of things exists as long as their natural difference remains; when the latter is abolished, then, of course, [the unity] is also abolished, completely destroyed due to the merger. So, since it (I speak of unity) does not damage either things or their differences, but only in accordance with its name makes 1110 (ἑνοποιούσης) [the things united] one, then [things] different in nature, being united, are certainly preserved without diminution and in perfection, without undergoing any perversion or fusion either in the essences themselves or in wills, nor in energies, nor in any other natural [property]. How then do others use [unity] as a cover for their own - I don’t know how to put it mildly - good thoughts (καλοφροσύνης) 1111 [97B] and claim that in our, that is, human [essence], the incarnate Word was by nature devoid of will and energy? After all, then the essence received from us turns out to be truly soulless and unreasonable (ἀλόγου); for that which is devoid of energy is obviously motionless and soulless, and that which does not have any rational will is, of course, unreasonable and senseless. And if the incarnate Word by humanity existed by nature without these [things] 1112, then how can we [be able] to believe that He became man? Would it not rather turn out that It underwent a transformation in relation to the Divine nature and, because of it, involuntarily underwent carnal passions? [It was] in these [two] ways that Arius and Apollinaris encroached upon Him, abolishing His natural [properties]: [97C] one taught that [the Savior] was devoid of soul, the other that he was devoid of reason (which [follows] from the fact that He was devoid of energy and will), and [thus] they blasphemously considered Him, according to Himself, a creation and a creature. After all, both said that the Only Begotten was subject to suffering (παθητόν) according to the nature of the Divinity, and not according to the nature of the flesh 1113; although Apollinaris, who abundantly [nourished] wicked [thoughts], also announced the complete transformation (μεταβολήν) of His Divinity into flesh, through deprivation [of properties] and transformation 1114. So, if we are pious, we should reject such a confession and adhere to the teaching of the holy fathers - according to them, confess in One and the same two natural wills and [two] essential energies. [100A] After all, if we say that He has one will and one energy, then we [thereby] obviously admit that He is either not a man by nature, but only God, or only a man by nature, but not God, or neither a man nor God. For if we say that this will is natural, then it will certainly be either Divine or human. If it is Divine, then [it turns out] that the Word, according to it, naturally desires the Divine, revealing Himself not to be a man, but only God by nature, having one will (συνθελητήν) with His Parent - after all, what is by nature human is not inherent in being distinguished by [anything] by the nature of the Divine, and what is in essence Divine is not inherent in being recognizable through [something] in essence human. The corresponding conclusion will be drawn even if we say that this is a will by human nature. [100B] If this [will is not natural, but] hypostatic, then it will be a distinctive feature (χαρακτηριστικόν) only of His hypostasis 1115; and by this [will] He will not be associated either with the Father or with us, since by hypostasis He is separated and delimited from extremes (χωρίζεται). The same can be said about energies. But, based on this, we in no way deny the [expressions] of the holy fathers about them (I mean energies), indicating singularity (μοναδικάς) 1116: the expression of the already mentioned holy Epiphany Dionysius “God-masculine energy” and the expression of the wise Cyril “one energy, related and manifested through both” 1117. They were spoken by the fathers in a pious sense - [100C] due to the unity and complete mutual fusion of natural energies; whereas [expressions] indicating duality - due to their essential and natural difference 1118. After all, [the word] “God-masculine” covers both Divine energy and masculine energy 1119. Having come up with an appropriate expression, which, in verbal form, as I have already said, would bring together both energies, and using it unitarily (μοναδικῶς) 1120, the teacher periphrastically designated the double energy of the Dual in nature. Since above Dionysius wrote “He did not make the Divine as God” 1121 (for He was not only God: He made the Divine by nature, since He was God by nature, but through the flesh united with Him by hypostasis); and “[He did] human things not as a man” (for He was not a simple man: [100D] He did human things by nature, since He was a man by nature, but by God’s power, and not driven to action, as we are, by necessity and natural compulsion) - therefore [the teacher] wove together His Divine and masculine natural energies, for neither of them exists [in Christ] separately from the other, but both, being fused, they are known one in the other and one through the other, due to indissoluble unity; and, having collected both [energies] with the help of an expression indicating singularity, announced them periphrastically. Having said that the Savior made both the Divine and the human - even if not as God and not as a man, for, as I have already said, He was not only God and not a simple man - but truly did, [the teacher sought] to confirm the essential difference of natural energies; [101A] having collected them [together] and in a concise form denoting them with the appropriate expression “God-masculine energy,” [he wanted] to indicate their indissoluble unity. Also, the expression of the wise Cyril “one energy, related and manifested through both” is consistent with the greatest plan 1122 of this great father. After all, through this expression he also points to the unity and fusion of natural energies 1123. For, wishing to show that, thanks to union with God the Word, the flesh became God, and its essential energy became Divine, acting above man, but at the same time not ceasing to be what it was by nature 1124; [101B] just as the Word Himself, having assumed [flesh] for our sake, voluntarily became a man, acting as a man - [so, wanting to show this], this most praiseworthy man says that He healed and gave life not only by an omnipotent command (for He was not only God), but hastened, first of all, precisely for this purpose, to attract, as if some kind of helper, His holy flesh, and gave life and healed through it, [that is] by her touch and voice, in order to show that she can give life, since He united with her and she truly is not any other flesh, but [the flesh] of Himself by nature, the life-giving one. That is why [the Word] “reveals through both” “one related” energy of both His and hers (I mean the holy flesh): [101C] “one” - that is, by unity, “related” - that is, parts; so that she is one and the same both in the omnipotent command and in the touch of holy flesh, for the Word, being God, evidently manifested her through both. By the fact that It gave life through the flesh, It showed that the flesh also became completely life-giving, just as fire, which burns through iron, by unity with it makes iron burning, so that burning is inherent by nature not only in fire, but also in iron, due to the unity 1125; in the same way, the Divine energy in miracles is by nature not only His energy, but also [the energy of] holy flesh, due to [His] hypostatic union with it 1126. After all, according to the teacher, [the Word] attracted her in Divine [affairs] as an assistant, just as the soul [attracts] the body to carry out its affairs. Thus, this [expression] “one energy, related and manifested through both,” testifying to the unity of natural energies, as well as the expression “God-masculine energy,” [104A] in itself means their otherness and duality - after all, it indicates both parts, from which and in which the One Unique Incarnate Word was cognizable, and refers to both, for [energy] is revealed through both, [that is] omnipotent command and touch of holy flesh. One should not be surprised at all by the [word] “related” - the holy fathers used it in relation to [things] both of the same essence and of different essence. For example, the great theologian Gregory spoke about the soul this way in his Funeral Homily to his brother Caesar: “a little later, she cast off [herself] the kindred flesh with which she practiced wisdom here together” 1127. The Teacher called the flesh kindred to the soul because of [their] unity, and not by nature. [104B] Instructing about the Only Begotten Son in the Word on the holy lights, he says: “and witnessed by the kindred Spirit” 1128 - and here he [already] means kinship by nature, and not by unity. And the wise Cyril himself, indiscriminately, uses the word “related” in relation to those separated both in essence and in hypostasis. Thus, interpreting the Gospel of John, he speaks of the healing of Divine baptism: “It consists in some kindred relation (συγγενῶς πως ἐχούσης) to both mentioned [things] 1129; for with the Spirit it sanctifies the spirit of man, and with water it [sanctifies] the body.” What kind of relationship in essence or hypostasis can the Holy Spirit and water have with our spirit and body? [104C] Even if by grace, through sacred regeneration, it is communicated to us and to those parts of which we are composed. But even the singular number, as is clear to everyone, is used by the holy fathers 1130 in relation to [things] both of the same essence and of different essences [1]. [In some cases] what is obviously meant is the [state of] unity 1131, for example, [in the expressions]: “One of both, and both through one” 1132; “one hypostasis and one nature of God the Word incarnate” 1133; “even if both are one, but not by nature, but by convergence” 1134. [104D] [In others], on the contrary, [it is said] about [things] of the same essence, as, for example, [in the expressions]: “There was, and there was, and there was, but there was One; Light, and Light, and Light, but one Light” 1135; “One God, and one highest nature” 1136, says Gregory the Theologian. So, the expressions of the saints [fathers], pointing to singularity or kinship, spoken because of unity, should not be taken at all as a refutation of [their] expressions pointing to duality and heterogeneity, and said [by the fathers] because of difference; just as these latter [expressions should not be taken] as a [refutation] of the former. [105A] After all, whoever perceives them in this way, and does not welcome both equally, and does not properly reconcile some of them with unity, and others with natural difference, he, as befits, inevitably falls into [heresy] - either divisions, or confusion - or rather, strictly speaking, he plunges himself into it and is rejected from the true communion and confession of the holy fathers. For even though the flesh became one with the Word in hypostasis and through unity enriched His energy, it by no means ceased to be created by nature and in no way lost the blameless (ἀδιαβλήτων) natural passions 1137. And if this is truly as it is, then [the Savior] had both a nature different from the [nature of] the Word, and, obviously, a [corresponding] natural energy. [105B] The Incarnate Word had it as a man (for it belonged to him by nature [this energy], since [the Savior] was, like us, endowed with flesh and blood), and, therefore, It had two natural energies, as well as [two] natures: the Divine Fatherly and, like us, human, through which it was confirmed that One and the same is both God and man. After all, to whom His natural energies belonged, the natures also belonged. As God, He revealed Himself to be healing and life-giving through the voice and touch of holy flesh. And the fact that He was essentially a man became known, and when He [acted] with the same touch and hand - he girded himself with a towel and washed the feet of the disciples (John 13:4-5), broke the bread and distributed it to them (Matthew 14:19), dipped a piece of bread into a dish (Mark 14:20; John 13:26), and when he [acted] with his voice - he showed His inherent sorrow, [saying]: “My soul is sorrowful unto death” [Matthew 26:38; Mark 14:34 ], [105C] “My soul was troubled” [ John 12:27 ], “Could you not then watch with Me for one hour?” [Matthew 26:40], and the like. He did not reject the inherent nature of each of the natures of which He consisted and in which He consisted, but confirmed [the existence of] natures with natural energies. So that [through the mouth of] the wise Cyril it could be proven to [us] that the flesh and the Word had by nature more than one energy, as well as more than one nature, although the flesh became related to Him, deified through unity, let us listen to what [the teacher] says, interpreting the Gospel of Matthew 1138, in the second book of the confession: [105D] “Therefore He says that He works in the Spirit of God. Indeed, truly, it is not the natural energy of the flesh and not the power of humanity that weakens Satan and shames Beelzebub. Let someone make a speech and teach you, if he wants, what prevents those who want to extend power against unclean spirits. See if this 1139 works according to the nature of the flesh? After all, we are all in the flesh, and we all have the same logos of humanity. It seems that the overcoming of spirits is not the proper 1140 (ἰδικῶς) work of the flesh or humanity, [108A] for not everyone overcomes, but rather the achievement of action (ἐνεργείας) through the Spirit” 1141 . So, [precisely] because He is conceived as flesh and man, the Father truly says that power against demons is the work of the Spirit, and not of the flesh or humanity. For it is generally accepted that the body of the Lord is holy and has all kinds of power against all kinds of ailments; but it was and is holy, not because it is thought of as mere flesh, existing only in its own (ἰδίοις) 1142 definitions 1143 , but because it is the church of God the Word dwelling in this [flesh], sanctifying His flesh through His Spirit 1144 . Thus, as this Divine man says, “it is truly not the natural energy of the flesh and not the power of humanity that weakens Satan” - [108B] it is not the nature of the flesh that does this, for otherwise all people who are in the flesh, every 1145 according to the logos of humanity, wishing to do [this], would have power against the spirits. Instructing [us], the teacher clearly explained, appearing as the interpreter of his own words: [the flesh of Christ] is holy and life-giving and has power against all sorts of ailments, not because it is flesh, existing only in its own definitions, but because [God the Word] “dwells in it,” which means “united [with it] in one hypostasis.” Thus, it is fitting for us, following the instructions of the holy [fathers], to preserve unharmed the logos of differences, which after unity preserves both the natures themselves and the [properties] inherent in them in essence, and, of course, the tropos of economy, [108C] preserving uniformly (ἑνοειδῶς) the complete fusion of the united [parts], and it is also fitting to expel from our [thoughts] any division and merging. If, however, we do not perceive and understand piously the expressions of the saints indicating singularity - that is, "God-male [energy]" and "one kindred [energy]" - according to the logos of unity, but suppose that this [single energy] is either natural or hypostatic, then we, of necessity, confess that Christ is one nature, in no way participating in any [of the natures] of which He consists, for none is by nature Christ. After all, nature cannot in any way be associated with another nature by nature 1146 - on the contrary, not being involved [in any of them], [108D] it is essentially different from any nature. We will come to this conclusion if we recognize energy as natural; if we [consider it] hypostatic, then [it turns out that] we alienate Him from the Father and the Spirit in terms of energy. For [then] the Son will not be associated with the Father and the Spirit [109A] according to any of the distinctive features of His hypostasis. So, let us not think about confessing one energy, natural or hypostatic, from the Word Himself, incarnate and completely made human. For none of the holy fathers from His Divine descent to us until the present [time] prescribed to confess natural or hypostatic energy from Him. [No one] [ordered to confess] literally and “one” [energy], as far as I know, except the divine Cyril. Just as we wholeheartedly accept [his expression] - although he alone used it - as [said] because of unity, should we not joyfully accept the expressions of almost all the holy fathers, and in particular Cyril, pointing to duality, [109B] as [said] because of natural difference? [We should understand them this way] so that, while welcoming and approving one and only Cyril’s expression [belonging], we would not lead to the overthrow and abolition of the sayings of both him and other saints; as if none of them, but only Cyril, was entrusted with the exact pious meaning of the sermon, and this [meaning is contained] not in his other sayings, indicating the difference, but only in the expression “one related energy.” Besides, how do some say that Christ God simply has one energy? For it is necessary that it belong either to His parts, or to Him in general as a whole. But if it [belongs to] parts, then it will be divided, cut in two, and undergoing [109C] this, it will be completely dissolved and, at the same time, will dissolve those [things] that are connected through it. If [it belongs to] the whole, then [it turns out that] it is capable of perceiving (ἔσται δεκτική) opposite properties, being both mortal and immortal, and created and uncreated, and limited and unlimited. And if this is so, then Christ, by possession and deprivation 1147, had His own energy as existing and not existing, 1148 by means of which (for by it He acted properly) He was able to perceive opposites in one and the same relation, and not in relation to one and the other [Divinity and humanity]. What could be more wicked? The same can be said about will. How, according to the wise Cyril, did the Word attract His flesh as a helper if it did not have natural energy? [109D] After all, what has neither natural energy nor movement is, of course, dead and soulless. And how did It perceive [something] dead for assistance (συνέργειαν)? After all, the inactive (ἀνενέργητον) 1149 is idle due to complete immobility. How did It show that this [flesh] is capable of life-giving - as Cyril himself taught, again - through its natural movements, for example, touch, voice, walking, if these [movements] were not in essence or in it? After all, if these were its [movements] in essence, then the flesh undoubtedly had natural energy; for the movement of arms and legs, and the utterance of speech - all this belongs to its essential energy. If these [movements] are not hers by nature, [112A] it means that the Savior did not show that she is capable of giving life. This is a little of the many things I, taught by you and godly saints like you, dared to write in this modest letter, at your most sacred command. [Thus] I dared to encroach on something that is beyond [my] strength, for I am small and simple - I have neither a sharp mind for understanding, nor a nimble tongue for explanation, nor a good disposition for expounding the most beautiful, but rather the all-good God, who covers the multitude of my sins, through your mediation, overshadows me with [His] grace 1150. I pray with tears, as if I were before you, throwing myself at your feet, [112B] for the Holy Spirit has made you bishops and saviors of souls, - [I pray] that where I have written inaccurately, you will not hesitate to make good-willed corrections, so that in this way you will show yourself to be God's mediators rather than imitators - by the fact that [exuding] God's enlightenment and mercy to everyone, you not only yourself through skill you have earned, but you also provide [others] with their dignity. I ask you to grant this [gift] to my poor and poor infirmity, so that I may be protected from the visible and invisible flame that consumes everything because of my sins, and may rest forever, preserved in the dew of His all-holy Orthodox faith and sacred virtue. Amen. 1. So your bewilderment has been resolved: having said “God, who came into being with the perception of [the flesh], one and one of two opposites,” the great [father] understood “one” as meaning unity according to hypostasis, and not [one] nature. To the holy fathers, abbots and monastics, and to all Orthodox Christians living on this Christ-loving island of Sicilians, humble and sinful Maxim, an unworthy slave. [112D] “Great peace have those who love Your law, and there is no stumbling block for them” [Ps. 119:165], - the Godfather David said to God, [113A] thereby declaring and proclaiming to all those striving for salvation, so that, preserving in the highest degree Divine love for the most desired, thanks to it they would zealously strive 1152 for the good of the world, if possible, both for yourself and for everyone. Because of this, I, your servant, willingly took care to set out in writing what I had previously stated orally, so that you, most holy [fathers], could convince and certify and, [making] an apology, destroy any suspicion regarding our humility that arose in you through the fault of others 1153. [113B] “For I cannot bear,” says Gregory the Theologian, “that some of those who carefully observe all my actions, whether they are correct or not, are tempted by me... The best thing is not to put a stumbling block or temptation for others, without sinning and without even giving suspicion, as long as this is possible and as much as the strength of the mind allows; because we know what inevitable and grave punishment the “Unfalse One” [Titus 1:2] has determined for those who have seduced even one of the little ones” 1154. So, I declare to you, most holy [fathers], that I have never in any way thought of supporting opposing and contradictory dogmas, as those who slander [me] claim. [113C] For I have neither confessed nor written that, according to them, one and the same Christ has at the same time one and two Gods - that is, three! – will (θελήσεις) and energy. After all, one thing is refuted by another - such a teaching has no basis based on natural reasoning (ἐκ φυσικῶν λογισμῶν), [116A] and is also not attested by the true, that is, the holy fathers. After all, if there is one, then how are two [possible]? And if there are two, then how is one [possible]? And what is she like? And what is it called? And with whom, judging by it, is the incarnate Word one in energy (ὁμοεργής) 1155 or in essence? If they say that [It is one in energy] with the Father, then they will thereby introduce a double Divine energy - if they profess a third energy invented by them, which does not exclude His two natural energies, I mean Divine and human. After all, if [she] does not exclude them, then it is obvious that [our opponents] worship two Divine (θεϊκάς) energies in [the One] and the Same - natural and hypostatic. If there are two of them, then they are, of course, different; consequently, [our opponents] assume polytheism, [116B] since they recognize the Divine energy in the Father and in the Son to be different in nature, and not identical. However, they teach not only polytheism, but even atheism - after all, they arrange it as if the Son does not have any Divine energy, since they confuse nature and hypostasis, together with the characteristics of each [of them], and recognize the same thing as Sabellius, confirming that the Son is united to the Father in both (I mean nature and hypostasis) - which is alien to [the teachings of] the Catholic Church. Not to mention the fact that the Father [they make] by nature subject to passions and incarnate, or incarnate, because of His unity in energy with the Son, [manifested] equally in miracles and in sufferings - if, according to them, in nothing else than in miracles and sufferings, the Son acts according to that third energy, as already said, invented by them, [116C] according to which, in addition to the natural Divine [energy], The Only Begotten Word, they assert, is communed with the Father. If, pressed by these [arguments], they believe that according to this third energy the Son is associated not with the beginningless Father, but with the all-pure Mother, then they thereby attribute to Him two created or human energies - again, natural and hypostatic. [Thus] they obviously make [the Son] alien to the Father according to each of them, and, together with Arius, come to dissection (διατομῇ), due to the perfect - in both energies, as they say - rejection of the Only Begotten from the Father. At the same time, they declare us by nature not only to be subject to suffering, but also to be miracle workers, - [117A] if they say that by this third energy of theirs (or, as they like to call [it], [the energy of] the “whole,” that is, the hypostasis), Christ retains kinship with us. By this [energy], as they probably admit, He not only voluntarily accepted the experience of suffering, but also demonstrated the power of miracles - which is impossible. After all, one and the same energy, or will, or nature in general cannot be both Divine and human at the same time; both uncreated and created; both beginningless and having a beginning; both complex and uncomplicated; so that by the same [energy] the Son retains natural kinship and indistinguishability in relation to both, that is, to the Father and to the Mother; or that by means of the same [energy] He would do both, I mean both divine in nature and human. [117B] Even those who invented goat deer would never have thought of such a thing! If it is impossible for one and the same energy, or will, or nature to be both Divine and human in nature, or for the Son to be attached to both, that is, to the Father and to the Mother, by the same [energy], or [through the same one] to do both, that is, both Divine and human; but rather, on the contrary, in a fitting manner (προσφυῶς), as was said, with Divine energy [He made] Divine, and human human, but not separately, but in mutual community and fusion [of these energies] - which means that their third energy, [the existence of] which is not at all confirmed by any Divine utterance of any of the fathers, is devoid of a name, because it is devoid of existence 1156. [117C] But what do we give to the whole, they say, if we do not give it, as a single whole, due to unity, a single energy? If they say this, then they themselves do not know what they are saying. For, believing that the whole is something other than its parts, of which and in which it is composed, they assert - in the form of a statement, and not of proof - that something other than what exists by nature in the parts must be attributed to the whole as to the whole - I mean a single energy. So, let them first show that the whole has another [separate] existence, in addition to the [existence of] its parts, and only then let them give it, as a whole, another energy, in addition to the essential energies existing in the parts. [117D] If they do not [attribute] to the whole an existence that is different in nature, then, of course, they should not assign to it an energy that is different in nature, in addition to the [energies] of the parts. After all, Christ, being by nature both one and the other - the same by nature, both God and man - has by nature characteristics (τὰ... ἴδια) of each nature, that is: Divine will and energy and human will and energy, and not one single [energy] excluding two natural energies, or another [energy] besides two natural ones - that is, three energies and wills. Thus, by nature we attribute both essences, as well as both essential wills and energies, to the One and Only Christ. [120A] Even if, seeing the difference in His parts, we assign to His Divinity the Divine, and to His humanity, accordingly, the human - however, due to unity, we, on the contrary, transfer the characteristics of each of the [two] natures through mutual exchange (κατὰ ἀντίδοσιν) to the other [of them]. That is why we say that God, [taking up arms] against sin, [became] subject to suffering and [became] flesh, which, according to Gregory the Theologian, “was received and became as the anointed [it] and, I dare say, equal to God (ὁμόθεον)” 1157; that [the Savior] “made the Divine, not as God,” for through the flesh, mentally animated and united with Him by hypostasis, and not only the Divinity, as before, “and the human [made] not as a man,” 1158, [that is,] by infinitely powerful power, and not obeying necessity. [120B] After all, the suffering [of the Savior] was not a punishment, as with us, but a humiliation (κένωσις) 1159 for our sake of the incarnate Word. So, to one and the same Christ as a whole, we completely attribute, [as inherent] by nature, all the properties of the natures of which He consists, except for sin alone. Therefore we confess that the same One by nature is both subject to suffering and impassive, and uncreated and created, and limited and unlimited, and earthly and heavenly, and visible and intelligible, and contained and incontainable. If, pressed by these [arguments], they say that the result (ἀποτέλεσμα) of His two natural energies - that is, the sign of God revealed by the Savior God to other [people], such as the Resurrection, or the Ascension, or purification, or any other of such miracles - is one and the same energy, then their speech is unfounded here, [120C] for we know not one, but countless numbers of God’s signs of the Savior, about which the most theological John speaks: “If we were to write about these in detail, then, I think, the world itself could not contain the books that would be written” [John 21:25] 1160. And one more thing: not with any other of the existing ones - is it worth talking about God the Word Himself incarnate for us, Who is above all existing things? - we do not cognize essential existence (οὐσιώδη... ὕπαρξιν) based on external manifestations, but [we cognize it] based on the natural characteristics by which it is determined in itself, in other words, based on natural wills and energies. [120D] For otherwise they would define the carpenter as a being who creates from wood, but is by no means rational or mortal, recognizing the nature of the carpenter by a chair or a bed, and not by the essential characteristics that constitute it; [121A] and even to think such a thing is ignorance! Therefore we recognize that one and the same by nature is truly both God and man, proceeding not from anything else, but from the innate characteristics that define Him at the same time as God and as man, that is, as I have already said, based on the Divine will and energy and His human will and energy, through which He seals what He was and became. After all, as God He voluntarily performed miracles above us, and as a man He suffered for our sake; and in Him not to recognize anything other than those [natures] of which, in which and which He is 1161 - something counterfeit and intermediate, or something third, resulting [from two], like what happens to mules) 1162, as the idle talkers-heretics imagine, deviating from the pious preaching of the holy fathers; [121B] but on the contrary: He is truly in the proper sense those [natures] from which and in which He truly in the proper sense is. Being by nature from Divinity and humanity, and in Divinity and humanity, Christ is by nature God and man - and nothing else [besides them]. How then does the wise Cyril confess, they say, that for the sayings about Christ he thinks of a certain middle position, when he writes to Akaki the following: “Some of the sayings are undoubtedly befitting of God, others, on the contrary, are just as decent for man, and still others occupy a certain middle position”? 1163 But how will this help them for their teaching? [121C] After all, with these [words] the teacher does not convey at all that [the Savior] is something else, an average, [arising] due to the transformation or loss of extremes, I mean Christ's Divinity and humanity, or His Divine and human will and energy, in other words, an intermediate result, not attached to either of the [two] natures of which He consists, or that He is some kind of complex energy (according to their opinion) or possesses it, - on the contrary, [the teacher means] that He is in the proper sense those of whom He is; but these [parts] are not named separately, but together, each of them in the same [name], for Christ is one and only. [Cyril] himself testifies to this when, justifying himself on behalf of the eastern bishops, he writes to Acacius the following: “The Antiochian brothers in no way divide what is united into parts - they insist only that the sayings about Christ are divided: [121D] some befit His Divinity, others, on the contrary, His humanity, for the same is both God and man; at the same time, they say, there are other sayings that are in some way general (κοινοποιηθείσας) 1164 and seem to be addressed to both (I’m talking about Divinity and humanity). This is what I mean: some of the sayings are undoubtedly befitting of God 1165, others, on the contrary, are just as befitting of man 1166, and still others occupy a kind of middle position, showing that the Son of God is both God and man” 1167. So, the teacher showed us: the words occupying a middle position do not mean at all (as some believe) that Christ is something other than those [natures] of which, in which and which he is, but that one and the same is by nature both God and man. [124A] And in proof of this, the teacher cites [the words of] the inspired Scripture, saying this: "When [the Lord] says to Philip: 'How long have I been with you, and you have not known Me, Philip? Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father in Me? He who has seen Me has seen the Father' (cf. John 4:9-10) or 'I and the Father are one' [John 10:30], then we We affirm that the speech is extremely godly. When He denounces the Jewish people, saying: “If you were the children of Abraham, you would have done the works of Abraham. But now you seek to kill Me, the Man who told you the truth... Abraham did not do this” [John 8:39–40], then we say that this was said in a manner befitting a man. However, [we emphasize] that both divine and human [sayings refer] to one [and the same] Son. [124B] We confidently classify as average such sayings as, for example, when blessed Paul writes: “Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever” [ Heb. 13:8 ]; and also “one God the Father, from whom are all things, and we from Him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by Him” (cf. 1 Cor.8:6); and also “theirs are the fathers, and from them is Christ according to the flesh, who is God over all, blessed forever, Amen” [Rom.9:5]. Well, look: calling [Him] Jesus Christ, [the apostle] says that “He is the same yesterday, today, and forever,” and that “through Him all things happen”; and He who is “according to the flesh” of the Jews, calls Him “God over all, blessed forever, Amen.” So, in these cases, do not separate the sayings about the Lord, [124C] for they simultaneously mean both divine and human, but rather relate them to the Son as one, that is, to God the Word incarnate" 1168 . So, with the help of these words of the Spirit, the teacher proved to us that even the middle sayings do not mean anything else, in any respect [inherent] in Christ, but only what is fitting for God and what is human together. That is why he instructs that they should be related to Him inseparably, for the same is by nature both God and man - and, as I have already said, nothing else [besides them]. But [Kirill] himself, they say, confesses one energy from Christ. After all, interpreting the holy Evangelist John, he says the following: “When He raised the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue, saying [124D] “Maid, arise!” [Luke 8:54], then, as it is said [in Scripture], He “took her by the hand” [Luke 8:54]. [Thus], He gave life, like God, by an omnipotent command, but at the same time by the touch of His own flesh, revealing through both one related energy" 1169. However, this saying completely openly expresses the teacher’s thought: [Cyril] does not believe (as others might assume) that both essences, of which there is one and only Christ, have the same energy, for, as it turns out, he says to Ermius: “Those [things] that have received the same nature will act in a similar way; [125A] and for all those whose logos [way] of existence (τοῦ πῶς εἶναι λόγος) 1170 differs, the logos of energy is also probably not the same; for it is generally accepted that [things] having the same energy have the same essence" 1171. So, [if the interpretation of our opponents is correct], we will, of necessity, have to admit one of two things: either that the teacher contradicts himself, or that he sees in Christ one nature, as well as one energy; but not that he professes distinct natures, which converge in relation to the indistinguishability of energy - after all, he says: “it is generally accepted that [things] having the same energy have the same essence” 1172. If both [assumptions] are absurd - that [the teacher] is in disagreement with himself, and that he does not profess the different natures of which [Christ] is - then the following is clear: [125B] with the words “through both he reveals one related energy” [Cyril] does not at all convey that both essences or Christ consisting of them have one energy, but shows that the superessential Word, being by nature both God and incarnate, produces His by nature life-giving and Divine energy both incorporeally and through the body 1173. After all, by the word “related” he designated nothing other than the same life-giving energy, manifested in miracles through both, [that is,] the omnipotent command and the touch of His holy flesh; just as fire, burning both immaterially and through matter, exhibits the same burning power. So, the teacher does not say this for the sake of denying the human energy of the Savior - for, having spoken about the touch of the flesh, he undoubtedly designated human [energy], [125C] if the [ability] of touch (ἡ ἁπτικὴ [δύναμις]) 1174 is an obvious proof of human energy - and does not add to the two natural [energies] itself is different, [third], but indicates energy that is life-giving in nature, manifested, as already said, through both, [that is,] command and touch, and emanating from one and the same God the Word. If, oppressed by these pious sayings of the fathers, they cite the letter of Heraclian to Achillius, in which, according to their assumption, he speaks of one nature of Christ as a whole, in addition to two [natures], and of one movement, then let them interpret it themselves. After all, the letter says the following: “In itself, the whole nature of the Lord is one, and movement is one, but in relation (or: “relatively” - κατὰ ἀναφοράν) two; [125D] by assimilation (κατ᾽οἰκείωσιν), the movement of the parts is one, and the nature is one, and themselves are two. When I say 'movement' I mean energy and suffering" 1175. So, those who use this to support their dogmas must explain in words what it is - the one nature and movement of the Lord [as] the whole, and what it is called, and which of the chosen fathers testify to it; what are the “two in relation”; what is “one nature, as well as the movement of the parts by assimilation” and what are the “two in themselves”; in other words, [what are] these three fours of His natures and movements; and who argued that the same movement means both, that is, both energy and suffering 1176; [128A] and if, in their opinion, it means both, then how [is it possible that] the Son is not separated from the Father in all His movement, for He is naturally subject to suffering in everything, if the movement of God and the Savior does not signify both, that is, both energy and suffering, according to any [natural] tropos - after all, the Divine is dispassionate, irrespective and simple, but rather surpasses all simplicity in simplicity. And one more thing: why, together with the three combinations of movements, do not they imply twelve energies and sufferings, if movement, in their opinion, means both? And which of the saints [fathers] confessed Christ’s nature “in relation to” or “according to assimilation” 1177? [128B] Let them first show this based on the judgments of the fathers, and only then will the assumption [set forth] in their dogmas be confirmed. If they are unable to do this, then let them renounce this [heresy] and, together with us, adhere exclusively to those pious judgments [that come] from the God-bearing Fathers of the Catholic Church and from the Five Holy Ecumenical Councils 1178: let them confess that the same and only Lord and God, Jesus Christ, is both God by nature, perfect in all respects, and man by nature, perfect in all respects, except for sin alone. And let them, while denying the natural perfection of both parts in all respects, do not at the same time deny His Divine or human will and energy - let them, [on the contrary], admit [128C] that the supersubstantial Word did not in any way diminish, change, or destroy either what It was without beginning and without cause, or what It became later and for a reason, that is, our salvation, but, on the contrary, intact and perfection (except for sin alone), in Itself and through Itself, according to everything and in everything, it has preserved [both natures], which it is in the proper sense, as I have already said, by natural existence. Therefore, one and the same, our only Lord God, for each of His natures, of which and in which He consists, has by nature will and energy (θελητικὸς... καὶ ἐνεργητικός), [directed] to our salvation 1179; if, being by nature God, possessing autocracy, and the Creator of the autocracy of all [people], He did not become a man devoid of intelligence and not involved in our natural life - [the life] of those who received existence from Him through creation, but became a truly intelligent man and possessing by nature will and energy, [128D] being at the same time the only one and by nature God, Who completely accepted me with my [properties], so that grant me complete salvation, and completely abolished the condemnation for sin, for “what is not received is not healed; and what is united with God is saved” 1180, [129A] as the one named according to theology says. However, since with these pious teachings of the holy fathers we crush the unreasonable resistance of “those who are unequally yoked” [2 Cor. 6:14], they attack us from the other side - in order to carry out an invasion on us, or, rather, to catch the most simple-minded, they bring our own messages, namely, as they say, what we wrote to the presbyter Marinus 1181 and a letter to Pyrrhus 1182; and therefore it follows, certifying your holiness about everything, to say briefly about this: yes, we wrote to Presbyter Marin various [epistles] about various chapters of Scripture, [129B] but in no way, [neither in a letter to Marin] nor to anyone else, did we speak about these contradictory and opposing dogmas - I mean about one and two, that is, about the three energies or wills they imagined in one and the same Christ, which we, according to them, affirmed equally with them in this [letter]. “For if I build again what I have destroyed, I make myself a transgressor” [Gal.2:18], says the vessel of election. Therefore, the letter announcing this, that is, a forged [letter] allegedly written by us to Marin, but [in fact] undoubtedly alien and not ours at all, we ourselves reject, and we ask that it be equally rejected by all who piously confess the Lord 1183; [129C] in order [thus] to deprive the opponents of all support, for they seek “excuse for sinful deeds” [ Ps. 140:4 ] and use slander against us as a cover for their objections. Since they are unable to resist the protection of their own words, which perish when confronted with the truth, they penetrate the most simple-minded with cunning, under the guise of supposedly our letter. [As for] Pyrrhus, he first addressed us a lengthy essay, in which, having showered us with who knows what honors, he reasoned - in the form of an investigation, and not a [final] decree - about one and two energies of the same thing, [132A] and also called on us to [express] judgment and opinion about both teachings. We, as befits, in the preface of our letter to him, honored him in return, fulfilling the apostolic instruction: “warn one another in respect” [Rom. 12:10], says the divine Apostle; just as the Divine word commands to “love and bless” [Matthew 5:44] those who adhere to a different creed or express it to us in writing. At the same time, I took care not to harden this husband, but, on the contrary, to soften him with laudatory speeches, so that he would agree to recognize the pious dogmas that I set forth according to the teachings of the holy fathers 1184. Therefore, in my letter to him, I wrote that this is how I understand what he has stated, [132B] urging, as I have already said, and calling him to accept the pious doctrine, which will bring him the greatest salvation, if, having loved it, he confesses it with us, as we have written; that is, [professes] in one and the same Christ two natural energies, as well as [two] natures, united inseparably and inseparably - Divine and human, uncreated and created; but by no means the same [nature], no matter what it is called. For it is not [holy] paternalistic, but [on the contrary], heretical that the doctrine of one and the same nature, will or energy is taught by one and the same Lord our God. This was the purpose of 1185 our praise to him, that is, to Pyrrhus - [132C] [with her help I] sought to gradually lead him away from the opposite teaching and return him to the right word of faith. If someone, mistaken about our goal, is still burdened by this praise, not perceiving that this is precisely the meaning of our economy, then let him, as befits, omit and reject this praise - for now it is not sweet for us, but rather painful, due to the complete apostasy of this man 1186 - but together with us he will establish strength (δύναμιν) Orthodox dogmas. This is the word, holy fathers, with which I assure you, making an apology for myself. Be courageous and steadfast in spirit! Do not deviate either to the right or to the left under the influence of hostile men and dogmas, but firmly follow the royal path, guided by Himself who said [132D] “I am the way, and the truth, and the life” [John 14:6], “with one mind and one mind” (cf. Phil. 2:2); “And the God of peace will be with you all” (cf. Phil. 4:9), always piously proclaimed and reverently revered by you, who, after the end of your blessed life and confession here, there gives Himself to you as a most blessed inheritance and rest, and to whom, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, be glory, honor, power, worship, now and ever, and to the ages of ages. Amen. Saint Maximus. Copy of the letter to Mr. Marin, Presbyter of Cyprus [133B] O God-honored Father! Guided by the divine law in God's way, you despised the human law, through humiliation 1188 exalting [my] humility and through poverty exalting my complete inexperience in thought and word, or, more precisely, rashness - I am not ashamed to properly speak about my [qualities] and about the vices of my powerlessness, and the more willingly I reveal them, the more [zealously] Out of philanthropy, you tried to hide them. For who has ever accepted the word of a dumb person so much or the thought of a crazy mind so approved, if not to say “exalted”, as you are mine [word and thoughts]? You not only honored me to the highest degree, out of love passing over my ignorance in silence (which would already serve as the greatest praise for an ignoramus), but also glorified me excessively, by grace applying the reverence with which you are accustomed to adorn your mind in the most beautiful way. [133C] From these traits the logos and tropos 1189 of true nobility are composed, or - which will be more accurate and true - kinship with God. [Such a word] does not extol (this is not inherent in it), but rather inspires modesty; for, as usual, it unshakably strengthens in humility - by exaggerating the inherent [goods], it further reveals their lack and reveals nakedness 1190; by indicating what is above dignity, it makes one feel more keenly that which is according to dignity, whenever it, having reached the depths of the soul, allows one to undisguisedly contemplate the many vices that appear [there]. Having experienced this to the highest degree, I, enlightened by your prayers, touched the Divine laws, [133D] which the logos of the transcendent economy providentially preserves and exposes for those like me who need guidance 1191. A little lower. In the conciliar letter of the current most holy pope 1192 [the inhabitants of] Queen of Cities 1193 condemned not so many chapters as you wrote, [136A] but only two: one of them is about theology, in which, as they point out, [the pope] says that “the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son” (ἐκπορεύεσθαι κἀκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ); the other is about the Divine Incarnation, in which he writes that “as a man, the Lord is deprived of forefathers’ sin.” [The Latins responded to this as follows]: regarding the first chapter, they cited the sayings of the Latin 1194 fathers, which were in agreement [with the words of the pope], as well as the [saying] of Cyril of Alexandria from the sacred interpretation he wrote on the holy Evangelist John 1195. Based on these [quotations], they have proven that they do not consider the Son to be the cause of the Spirit (after all, they recognize that the Son and the Spirit have one cause - the Father, the Son by generation, and the Spirit by procession), [136B] but believe that [the Spirit] proceeds through Him (δι᾽ αὐτοῦ προϊέναι) 1196 [that is, the Son], thus indicating the unity (συναφές) and immutability (ἀπαράλλακτον) of the essence 1197. As for the second chapter, they have nothing to justify themselves at all. For what is controversial in this saying, even if those who are looking for a pretext [for discord] see something out of stubbornness? But they still gave a convincing answer, saying that “[the Savior] has neither the sin in his mind, because of which Adam seems to have first suffered, nor the doing and carrying out of evil 1198 resulting from this [sin] through the body.” This is how [the Latins were justified] in what they were undeservedly accused of; [the Constantinople], on the contrary, have not yet been justified in any way for what they were [accused] of absolutely rightly; for they did not cross out what they attributed to 1200. [136C] In order to avoid being caught by those who are easily carried away, I, at your command, asked the Latins 1201 to translate their [texts], but since the custom prevailed among them to conduct business and correspondence in this way, 1202 I do not know whether they will agree. In addition, in a foreign language and dialect they cannot express their thoughts as accurately as in their own, in which they were brought up; just as we [prefer to express] our thoughts in our [language]. However, let them take care of this too, for they have already experienced the slander of their opponents in practice 1203. [ Pass? ] I read the work of Theodore of Faran on essence and nature, hypostasis and person, as well as other chapters. As an introduction, it may not be useful, [136D] but in the doctrine of person and hypostasis, he seems to follow not the canons [explaining] these issues, but his own opinion, which presupposes hypostatic energy. It is he who [our] opponents put forward as the mentor and defender of their own creed, for they compiled almost the entire Ekphesis from his sayings. Indeed, in these [questions] Theodore also made his teaching dark and unclear, giving the face - precisely as a face - energy, which is a distinctive feature of nature, and by no means the tropos of the implementation (ἐκβάσεως 1204) of this [energy], [that is] how and what quality [is done] 1205. [137A] Based on this [realization], the difference between those who do things 1206 according to nature and contrary to nature is known. After all, each of us acts as what he is in the first place - that is, as a person, and not as someone [an individual], and the tropos of energy reveals, [on the contrary], as someone, for example, Peter or Paul, imprinted by this [tropos] according to intention, whether in decrease or increase, one way or another 1207. Therefore, in the tropos the difference of persons in action is recognized, and in the logos the indistinguishability of natural energy is recognized. After all, [it is] not as if one is endowed with energy or logos (ἐνεργὴς ἢ λογικός) to a greater extent, and the other to a lesser extent, but we all equally have both logos and its natural energy. Whether more or less, one way or another, [for example] fair or unfair, [depends] on the fact that one follows what is [inherent] by nature to a greater extent, and the other does not follow it. [137B] Those who in any respect have deviated 1208 [from this teaching] must be carefully guarded, for they, so to speak, forcibly shift the limits of things and change the rules as they please, as if by command, in order to justify their own [opinions] 1209 by perversion. As for Code 1210 that was sent [to me] (I mean the chapters on the soul and the rest), I did not [have time] to read it carefully, but I still declare my opinion about it. The haste of the messenger who was leaving [to you] did not allow him to study [the code] (after all, he arrived to our insignificance in Carthage 1211 many days after he reached Byzacia), [137C] and also the inherent weakness of my eyes, so to speak, prevented me; but since I wanted to fulfill your order regarding this [code] as soon as possible, I am sending [the answer]. Taking care of rewriting the book containing the interpretation of the Evangelist John, which your holiness considered necessary, seemed appropriate to me, wholly your [slave]; [the book must be rewritten] so that those who maliciously try to explain everything as they please do not have a reason to attack its author. His own. From a message written in Rome [All] the limits of the ecumene and [all people], throughout the whole earth sincerely and Orthodoxy professing the Lord, gaze intently, [137D] as if at the sun of eternal light 1213, at the most holy Church of the Romans 1214, at her faith and confession, perceiving the radiance of the paternal and holy dogmas exuding from her, according to how sincerely and all-piously the six divinely inspired saints decreed and the revered Councils of 1215, and loudly proclaiming the Creed. Indeed, since the descent of the incarnate Word of God [140A] to us, the local 1216 Church has become and to this day is the support and foundation 1217 for all Christian Churches throughout the earth; for, according to that promise of the Savior, “the gates of hell will not prevail” 1218; she keeps the “keys” (cf. Matt. 16:18–19) of the Orthodox faith in Him and confession; it reveals to those who come piously the only piety that is true by nature; it closes and blocks all heretical lips, “speaking lies on high” (cf. Ps. 73:8). After all, the very fact that the Creator of all things and the Lord our Lord Jesus Christ, and His disciples and apostles, and all the holy fathers, teachers and martyrs, who with their deeds and words, labor and sweat, suffering and blood and, [140B] finally, martyrdom, sacrificed themselves for the good of the conciliar, all of us who believe in Him, the apostolic Church - [what they all] founded and built, [the heretics] strive - Oh, the generosity and long-suffering of God! – destroy in two words, without labor and hardship; to abolish the great, all-bright, all-glorified sacrament of the Orthodox faith of Christians. From the letter of the same Saint Maximus, written to the glorious Peter, where he mentions Pyrrhus, Saint Sophronius, Bishop of Jerusalem, and Pope Honorius, and then a little later continues: [573B] In your glorious message you deigned to inform your unworthy servant about Abbot Pyrrhus 1220. And a little further: And indeed, for this sake, I would hasten in your God-protected and most glorious footsteps, in order to refute it and everyone who indiscriminately follows this new heresy - so that everyone who follows you loves piety knows the extreme abundance of their ignorance and wickedness. But I am afraid that they will think that I am acting against the sacred right, doing this against the will of the most sacred throne of the apostolic men, who well manage the entirety of the universal Church and govern it correctly, in accordance with the Divine law. For it is precisely this Divine law that constitutes [573C] what is heavenly and earthly, and one should not deviate from it in anything, but it should be that those who, following you, decided to live holy, should do divine deeds, following God, for they have God as the patron of their deeds and their unyielding protection. For, most glorious sir, the new faith and Ekphesis, as I previously made clear, are even worse than the ancient heretics. For his predecessor wickedly carried in her womb for many years, which he spent in the bishopric 1221, as evidence of his wickedness (for God can often suffer for a long time for the sake of the subsequent exposure of wickedness, not so that by allowing wickedness to increase, but in order to punish him, in its fullness, more justly), and this man gave birth to him even more wickedly [Ekphesis] 1222. And their followers propagate it in contempt [573D] of the Divine. And further: But here is an even more vile custom of theirs, as if a generic sign of all perverted heretics - that they attribute guilt to the innocent in their own wickedness. For here and there they whisper that Sophronius, [574B] who wisely preached and proclaimed the dogmas of the universal Church, fell into error 1223. And a little further: For the divine Sophronius, of which you yourselves are witnesses, most praiseworthy, was in the region of the Africans with me and with all the wandering monks, when they invented these perversions of faith against everyone 1224. And a little further: And everyone had a common home by Divine consent and unanimity, and the Churches were strengthened in the unity of the grace of God, which founded them under the sun, in a peaceful and calm faith 1225. But those who were jealous of their agreement and the confession of Christ God, invented a new Ecphesis against the true faith of Christians, like some kind of black cloud, like a rumbling and menacing storm or an invasion of barbarians, and none other prompted them than the devil himself, the friend of every rebellion, [574C] he also incites the human race to discord. Then decrees were issued in his 1226 favor and wicked writings; then the acts requiring its observance; then [there were] robber councils and gatherings of bishops who came not of their own free will, but were dragged by force, not in a hurry to be called, but fleeing from the barbarians; then, here and there, decrees and threats began to spread against the pious, for they also made the one who then ruled, with insidious gifts 1227, their slave. And further: They convinced this man to spread Ekphesis in their own name 1228. And a little lower: He, having published their work, became his enemy, and his defender, or, rather, both the patron of his distribution, and the accuser; [574D] and, discovering that he was not acting on his own initiative, but was forced by them, created the most impious Ekphesis, attributing it to himself in writing and referring to John 1229, the most holy pope of ancient [575A] Rome, of blessed memory. And a little lower: And so they exposed themselves that it was 1230 clearly made by those who took advantage of their influence 1231, but in no way by him. For in the future this did not bother him at all; he turned his attention to other things. And in all this they, unfortunate ones, do not understand the significance of the apostolic throne, and, what is more than laughter, or, better to say, most of all crying worthy, as a sign of their audacity, they were not afraid to weave intrigues against the apostolic throne itself, and, as if having received some kind of decree from it, in their actions, intertwined for the sake of the wicked Ecphesis, they took the great Honorius as their allies, making this man the greatest height in the matter piety by proving one’s false opinion to others. So, who, O most glorious one, [575B] and which Sophronius convinced these deceivers to do this so severely and for such a long time? What Church has not addressed them with prayer? What pious and Orthodox leader did not beg them to deviate from their heresy, praying and conjuring? For Saint Arcadius 1232 breathed his last and gave up his spirit to God, but until the last hour he did not stop praying to them. And a little further: What about the divine Honorius? What after him is Elder Severin 1233? And what about the one who came after him, Saint John? But didn’t the most blessed pope, who is now on the throne, 1234 use everything possible for prayer? Did not the entire East and the entire West offer up tears, sobs, prayers, and curses to God in prayers, and to them in messages? God accepted the faith [575C] of these truly blessed men and preserved their rewards for it throughout the centuries. The same 1235, having despised the long-suffering of God, which meekly prompted them to convert, and not touched by the prayer of these most worthy men, who they had been working for such a long time, did not tolerate the Divine faith being preferred to their faith. And below: So, the divine and great Sophronius, then coming to Alexandria, almost immediately after the first reading (for Cyrus also gave him these nine chapters of wickedness for review) 1236, lifting up his voice in great lamentation, poured out streams of tears, fervently asking him, begging and imploring him, falling at his feet, so that he would not utter any of this from the pulpit against the universal Church of God, for the dogmas of the impious [575D] Apollinaris 1237 are clearly present here. And below: So these people, O most venerable man, tormented the Divine cause with godless mockery and even some kind of dishonest acting, and the Holy Sophronius, who sobbed so lamentably - as if mourning, like a certain second Jeremiah, the death of the Catholic Church and mourning such a great fall of Divine dogmas, was in no way consoled. And a little lower: So, if the Roman See is aware that Pyrrhus is not only impious, but thinks incorrectly and believes incorrectly, it is quite clear that anyone who anathematizes those [576A] who condemn Pyrrhus, anathematizes the Roman See, that is, the universal Church. It will be unnecessary to say that such a person also anathematizes himself if he is still in communion with the Roman See and with the universal Church of God. Therefore, I beg you, my blessed lord, to warn everyone, so that they do not call Pyrrhus “most holy” or “most blessed,” and the sacred rules do not allow him to be called in this way, for he fell from all holiness, since he voluntarily apostatized from the universal Church, and should not be called with any honorable title one who has long been condemned and rejected from the apostolic see of the city of Rome because of his acceptance alien opinion, until he is accepted back, turning to her 1238 or, rather, to the Lord our God through pious confession and Orthodox faith, [576B] by which he will regain his holiness and holy title. So, if he does not want to be and be called a heretic, let him not justify himself first to one, then to another, for this is unnecessary and unreasonable, because just as when one was offended by him, everyone was offended, so if he is justified before one, he will be justified before all. Let him first of all hasten to justify himself before the Roman throne; when he is justified before him, everyone will call him pious and orthodox. For he is wasting words in vain who thinks that he can persuade and outwit such as I, and does not plead and fall before the most blessed Pope of the most holy Church of Rome, that is, the holy Apostolic See, which from the very incarnate God the Word, as well as from all the sacred Councils, according to the holy canons and definitions, received and has authority (imperium), authority (auctoritas) and power (potestas) in to all and by means of everything [that concerns] all without exception (universarum) of the holy Churches of God, no matter how many there are on earth, [576C] knit and decide [Matthew 16:19] 1239, just as in heaven the Word itself, which rules over the heavenly powers, knits and decides 1240. If he thinks that he needs to be reconciled with others, and does not beg the most blessed Pope of Rome, he acts like someone who, accused of murder or some other crime, rushes to prove his innocence not to the one who is designated by law as a judge, but only futilely and pointlessly bothers to prove his purity to other people, private individuals who do not have the power to remove the charge from him. Therefore, my blessed lord, first of all give instructions about what is well defined by you [576D] in accordance with the will of God - so that this man [Pyrrhus] will not have the opportunity to say anything to anyone about dogmas. But find out exactly, by carefully examining his thoughts, whether he wants to agree to accept the truth. If he strives to do this and, obeying reason, hastens to this, encourage him to make an appropriate appeal to the Most Blessed Pope; for only in this way, according to his divine commandment, 1241 will he and those around him be bridled to the glory of God and to your greater praise. Saint Maximus. About the two natures of Christ [145A] 1. Arius professes three hypostases, but denies the Unity and does not call the Holy Trinity consubstantial. Sabellius professes the Unity, but denies the Trinity, for he says that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are One and the Same. And the Church of God professes both the Unity and the Trinity. Macedonius adheres to the same doctrine as Arius - he believes that the Holy Spirit is a creation; The Church preaches that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son, and claims that He is God 1243. Likewise, in relation to the One (τοῦ ἑνός) from the Holy Trinity 1244: Nestorius speaks of natural difference, but does not profess unity, for he does not say that [unity] occurred according to hypostasis; [145B] Eutyches professes natural unity, but denies difference in essence and introduces the fusion of natures. The Church professes both unity in hypostasis - due to inseparability, and difference in essence - due to non-fusion. 2. How can complete unity have both identity and difference (ἑτερότητα)? – Identity in essence and difference in persons, or vice versa. Thus, in the Holy Trinity, identity is in essence, and difference is in persons, for we confess one essence and three hypostases. In man, [on the contrary], identity is in face, and difference is in essence, for man is one, but his soul is of one essence, and his flesh is of another. [145C] In the same way with the Lord Christ: identity is by face, and difference is by essence, for the person, or hypostasis, is one, but the Divinity is of one essence, and humanity is another. [148A] Just as it is impossible to profess the unity of the Holy Trinity and not proclaim the difference, so it is absolutely necessary to preach both unity and difference in the One of the Holy Trinity. 3. Just as in the Holy Trinity, unity and difference are not indicated by these very words, but we confess difference when we talk about three hypostases, and unity when we recognize one essence, so in the One of the Holy Trinity: we confess difference when we recognize two natures, and unity when we preach one complex hypostasis. 148B] 4. Just like Arius, we anathematize not because he preaches the difference of hypostasis in the Holy Trinity, but because he does not speak about natural unity; so we anathematize Nestorius not because he recognizes natural difference in Christ, but because he does not speak of unity according to hypostasis. 5. Just as we anathematize Sabellius not because he preaches the natural unity of the Holy Trinity, but because he does not speak about the difference according to hypostasis, so we anathematize Eutyches not because he speaks 1245 about the unity of Christ according to hypostasis, but because he does not recognize natural difference. [148C] 6. The difference in hypostasis in the Holy Trinity and the natural difference in the One of the Holy Trinity should not be spoken of as [comprehensible] by the senses - they should be understood with the eyes of the mind. How does it [come out] that in the Holy Trinity you proclaim three hypostases because of the difference in hypostasis, but in the One of the Holy Trinity you do not proclaim two natures in one hypostasis because of the natural difference? 7. Just as, because of the consubstantiality of the Holy Trinity, you speak of one essence, and because of the diversity of hypostases (ἑτερουπόστατον) - of three hypostases, so, because of the diversity of essence of the Word and the flesh, speak of two essences, but because the essences do not have separate hypostases (μὴ ἰδιοϋπόστατον), talk about one hypostasis. [148D] 8. Just as in relation to the Holy Trinity we speak of one essence, without supposing the merging of the hypostases, and of three hypostases, without supposing the abolition of one essence, so in relation to the One of the Holy Trinity [149A] we speak of one hypostasis, without supposing the merging of His two natures, and of two natures, without presupposing the separation of one hypostasis. 9 . Anyone who, due to the difference of natures, does not recognize Christ’s unity according to hypostasis is a Nestorian; the one who, in unity by hypostasis, does not recognize natural differences is a Eutychian; and the one who confesses in the One of the Holy Trinity both unity according to hypostasis and natural difference - he adheres to the royal and immaculate faith. 10. So, whoever recognizes both difference and unity in Christ, neither denies the difference nor destroys the unity. After all, the divine Cyril anathematizes those who, due to difference, deny unity by hypostasis; and the Ecumenical Council anathematizes those who, due to unity in hypostasis, deny the natural distinction of the One of the Holy Trinity. Maximus the Confessor. Various definitions [149B] “Nature” and “essence” are one and the same thing 1247, for both are something common (κοινόν) and universal (καθόλου). Both are expressed (κατηγορούμενα) about many things 1248 different in number and are never, in any respect, contained in one person 1249. Ἐνυπόστατον 1250 [something] common in relation to the essence, or eidos, really existing in the individual [things] related to it (ἐν τοῖς ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀτόμοις), and not contemplated by the simple by invention 1251. [149C] In addition, ἐνυπόστατον is also that which is composed and coexists with something else, different in essence, constituting one person with it and producing one hypostasis, and is in no way cognizable by itself 1252. “Consubstantial” (ὁμοούσιον) - having the same essence with something else, but different from it in hypostasis, as is the case with man and other species. So, if something is identical to another in essence, then it is not identical to it in hypostasis; and if something is one and united with something else in essence, then it is not one and united with it in hypostasis; and if something is characterized by difference from something else in hypostasis, [149D] then it is characterized by unity with it in essence. So, essential unity (οὐσιώδης ἕνωσις) 1253 is a [unity] that brings many hypostases, different in number, into one and the same essence. And essential difference (οὐσιώδης διαφορά) is the concept according to which the essence (in other words, nature) remains not subject to diminution, transformation, mixing, or merging, even when it converges into one hypostasis with something else, different in eidos; and in general does not in any way extend beyond the limits of its own nature. [152A] “Hypostasis” (ὑπόστασις) and “face” (πρόσωπον) are one and the same; for both are something particular and special 1254. Both, by [their] nature, consist in themselves, and do not speak about many [things]. “That which is in essence” (ἐνούσιον) 1255 is something that not only has a set of characteristics contemplated in it, by which it is recognized as [different] from another, but also actually has a common essence [with other things] 1256. “One-hypostasis” (ὁμοϋπόστατον) is something that is combined with something else in one and the same hypostasis, but differs from it in essence; this is the case with soul and body and with other [things], which, having a different nature 1257, are united according to hypostasis. So, if something combined with another way of union is identical with it in hypostasis, that is, it has become one hypostasis with it, then it is different from it in essence; [152B] and if something is one and united with another by hypostasis, then it is not one and not homogeneous with it in essence; and if something combined with another is characterized by difference from it in essence, then unity with it by hypostasis is inherent in it 1258. So, hypostatic unity is that [unity] that brings different entities (in other words, natures) together and binds them into one person, into one and the same hypostasis. And hypostatic difference is a logos according to which otherness (ἑτερότης), according to the totality of features contemplated in the general essence, separating one from the other by number, creates a multitude of individual [things]. [152C] Relative unity (σχετικὴ ἕνωσις) is a unity that brings different intentions (γνώμας) into one will (θέλημα). Relative difference (σχετικὴ διαφορά) is a [spiritual] movement that cuts the general will by the otherness of intention 1259. Relative unity is a friendly disposition, or like-minded thinking and unanimity of wills. Relative difference is the otherness of intention, or the dissimilarity of wills, or the division of disposition (διαθέσεως). Merged unity (συγχυτικὴ ἕνωσις) is the addition of hypostases into something whole 1260, occurring through convergence; [composition], in which the existence of its parts in [their natural] form 1261 and image (σχήματι) after unification is not at all preserved, [152D] but, [on the contrary], is destroyed, mixed and indistinguishable (ἄγνωστον); [composition], in which there is in no way any difference between the [hypostases] that have converged in it, which would designate the essential peculiarity of [each of] them. Separation (διαίρεσις) is the final dissection that places the existence of each thing separately, isolates and leads to the fact that it is contemplated in itself, both in essence and in hypostasis. The peculiarity (ἴδιον) of a hypostasis is that it is visible in itself and differs (διαστέλλεσθαι) from homogeneous [hypostases] in number. The peculiarity of what is in hypostasis (ἐνυποστάτου) 1262 is either that [153A] it is cognized in an indissoluble unity with something else, different in essence, or that it is natural, in the sense of [actual] existence (καθ᾽ὕπαρξιν) abides in individual [things] 1263 . The peculiarity of essence is that by nature it speaks about many and manifests itself in many. The peculiarity of the being in essence 1264 is that it exists in reality and bears the distinctive features of all personal characteristics. Ability (δύναμις) – materialized (ἔνϋλος) 1265 energy; energy – immaterial (ἄυλος) 1266 ability 1267 . And one more thing: energy is the result (ἀποτέλεσμα) of natural ability 1268. Natural will (θέλημα φυσικόν) is the essential attraction [of something] to that which [is] by nature its constituents (συστατικῶν) 1269. Gnomic will (θέλημα γνωμικόν) – spontaneous (αὐθαίρετος) aspiration (ὁρμή) and movement (κίνησις) of the faculty of judgment (τοῦ λογισμοῦ) to one or to the other (ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα) 1270 . [153B] Difference (διαφορά) is the concept according to which the otherness of the designated [things] in relation to each other is inherently preserved; in addition, this concept indicates how that which exists exists (τοῦ πῶς εἶναι) 1271. Identity (ταὐτότης) – immutability, according to which the logos of the signified has perfect singularity, not cognizable in any way 1272 differences 1273. Saint Maximus. A spiritual and dogmatic tomos, proving that the Ekphesis of Basileus Heraclius, perceived as an innovation at the instigation of Sergius, primate of Constantinople, does not agree with the divine 1275 Scripture and the Fathers, but is consistent with the godless heretics, [156A] imagining in the sacrament of Christ our God both fusion and division. [The epistle] was written from Rome to the most holy Bishop Stephen of Dor, a subject of the holy and apostolic see of the holy city of Christ our God 1276. Having likened real life to the night, its movement to a millstone, and its rest to a bed, the Lord judged that of those who are in both (that is, in the millstone and in the bed), one is taken and the other is left (cf. Matt. 24:41; Luke 17:34). The one taken is probably the one from the first [i.e. e. from the millstone] detached through contemplation, and from the second - through doing; who, according to his spiritual disposition, does not remain either within the dimensions in which the movement of visible things is seen, or in the bliss of the passions in which he rests 1277. [156B] The one who voluntarily lingers in this because of spiritual lust and love 1278 is left behind. O God-blessed and most beautiful [fathers]! Having learned first in deed, and now in words, that I remain your slave, how condescendingly you wished in your message to humiliate yourself before the poor and wretched; you, by the grace of God, so lifted up and exalted from the earth that you have lifted up your life to the Word, and your mind to the Lord, above earthly [things] and above earthly [things]; you, who in the image join the prototype and are united with It, or, to put it closer to the truth, want to show proof of height in the voluntary humiliation of your sublime beauty, so that by the excess [of self-abasement] you can bring us to the measure of the super-infinite God of the Word, [156C] Who, by kenosis 1279 in relation to us, incomprehensibly revealed the height of His glory, so that to make us as much more exalted 1280 as He created Himself for us in the flesh more humble 1281, becoming human by nature without transformation or merging - extremely philanthropic! - having accepted all our [properties] without damage, so as not to make either His grace or our salvation defective - [it would have been defective] if He had not bestowed the whole nature 1282, since He had not received the whole, and would have diminished one as much as He had not accepted the other; for “what is not received is not healed,” says the great Gregory 1283. For just as the super-essential God the Word became incarnate for our sake, [156D] from the Holy Spirit and Mary, the Ever-Virgin and Mother of God, through the perception of the flesh, which has an intellectual and verbal soul, - [how He], having become and becoming by nature a new man, would have renewed the old, if He had not received it entirely and intact, without sin alone, from which it [comes] dilapidation; because of which nature is condemned to death, devouring us as much as we have tasted it, having fatally tasted the tree of apostasy? How would He, having humiliated himself, resurrect the fallen one, if He had not united him completely and intact, from the very conception, with Himself according to hypostasis, without only the fall, because of which there was contrition, and because of which the punishment? [157A] Thus, having received the intellectual and verbal soul together with the body appropriate to it, that is, [having accepted] a perfect person - without any flaw - and uniting [him] with Himself by hypostasis, God Himself, Who above nature, having received, had also its [nature's] natural autocratic will (αὐτεξούσιον θέλησιν). If, having departed from the commandment against our will (but we did not retreat against our will!), we would need healing [of our nature], which would be provided by the incarnate God Himself, as one who is similar in the perception of the like, then He would still, having accepted, have nature itself, and its rational and vital energy, with the help of which (oh, if only this had not happened!) having conceived and committed a sin, we would need its salvation, [which consisted that God] through perception would cleanse our nature from all filth and would completely deify it through incarnation. [157B] After all, if the Logos, being God, created it essentially having this, that is, will and energy, [will] showing autocratic, and [energy] active, then it is clear that He united nature with Himself by hypostasis, [only if] He perceived it exactly as it originally created, that is, endowed by nature with will and energy; lest it [turn out that] He perceived only nature subject to suffering, but not its innate abilities (δυνάμεις), and did not perceive nature, but depicted economy. After all, it is impossible for our nature or [the nature of] other beings to exist in any way or be called [such], devoid of their innate abilities, which are inherent in everyone to be essentially different. Consequently, our nature [in the Savior] is not devoid of either will (for [otherwise] it would not be human) 1284 or energy (for it is not soulless). [157C] If [the Savior] by our [nature] were deprived of will and energy, as some of the ancient and modern heretics imagine, then He Who is above us would not have become entirely like us, without certifying ours with our [properties] - those which He Himself, having created man, initially made him natural distinctive features, creating him autocratic and endowed with energy. At the same time, the fact that [the Savior] assumed the ability to do both is indisputably confirmed by the collection of the holy Gospels, when it shows [God] the Word as a man who wills and acts for us (ἐνεργοῦντα). So, it reads: “About the fourth watch of the night he came to them, walking on the sea, and wanted to pass them by” [Mark 6:48]. [157D] Or: “And going from there to the borders of Tire and Sidon and entering a house, he did not want anyone to know; but he could not hide himself” (cf. Mark 7:24). And again: “Coming out from there, they passed through Galilee; and He did not want anyone to know” [Mark 9:30]; and “The next day Jesus wanted to go to Galilee” (cf. John 1:43). And again: “After this Jesus walked through Galilee, for He did not want to walk through Judea, because the Jews sought to kill Him” (cf. John 7:1); and “Where do you want us to prepare Easter for you?” (cf. Matthew 26:17); [160A] and “they gave Him vinegar mixed with gall to drink; and having tasted it, he did not want to drink” (cf. Matt. 27:34; Luke 23:36; John 19:30) 1285. These [expressions]—I mean: “wanted to pass them,” “wanted to go out,” “didn’t want to walk,” “wanted to eat Easter,” and “didn’t want to drink vinegar”—confirm that He had human will and energy, like ours. The fact that He “wanted” and “did not want” to pass, or to eat, or to walk, or to drink is obviously volition (θέλησις), judging by which it became known that He was by nature endowed with will; thanks to the fact that He tasted, ate, went out, set off and walked from place to place - thanks, that is, to energy 1286, it became clear that He was endowed with energy; [endowed with will and energy] according to the fact that He subsequently became for us by nature a man, and not because He Himself was from the beginning by nature God. Indeed, due to the fact that the Logos was God and by nature the Son of God, it was not inherent in Him to bodily want anything, or to eat, [160B] or to be limited in space, [performing] movements from place to place, for He exists everywhere and above all in boundless infinity. Likewise, [Scripture] indicates that [the Savior] superessentially had the Divine and Fatherly will and energy. Thus, it clearly teaches: “For as the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so the Son also gives life to whomever He will” [John 5:21]. Thus, here too: the fact that He wants to revive the dead testifies to His Divine will, and the revival itself testifies to His, in the proper sense, omnipotent energy. And in general, whatever else depends on a nature that surpasses existing things, this [Divine] nature [in Christ] points to. [160C] With such [sayings] the Word Itself, through His disciples, shows that It, by both of Its natures, of which and in which it consists, is endowed with will and energy [addressed] to our salvation. Their successors, [who lived] after them, the manifesters of the Epiphany of the Word in the flesh, the fathers of the Catholic Church appointed by God, preaching equally both the Divine and human nature of the same thing - and not only [nature], but also will and energy - loudly say the following. Named after immortality (ἀθανασίας) 1287 in the Word on the Incarnation and the Trinity says: “When He says, “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me.” However, not My will, but Thine be done" (cf. Matt. 26:39; Luke 22:42) and [160D] "spirit vigorous, but the flesh is weak” [Matthew 26:41], then here two wills are revealed: the human, due to the weakness of the flesh, avoids suffering, and the Divine is vigorous 1288 » 1289. Gregory, named for theology, says in the Second Word about the Son: [161A] “Seventhly, consider the saying that the Son “came down from heaven, not to do His will, but of Him who sent” [John 6:18]. If this were not said about the One who Descended 1290, then we would answer that these words were spoken about man 1291, not what we mean in the Savior (His will, as completely deified, is not contrary to God), but about something similar to us, because human will does not always follow, but very often contradicts and opposes the will of God” 1292. The Nissian mentor of the same name, or rather the teacher of the Universe, says the following in the Word on Easter: “A leper comes, with his body already enfeebled and weakened. How does the Lord work to heal him? The soul wants, the body touches - and with the help of both, the illness goes away. [161B] “And immediately,” says the evangelist, “the leprosy left him” [Matthew 8:3]” 1293. And he also says in the same Word: “And again: the many thousands who accompanied Him in the desert, when they were hungry, [the Savior] did not want to let go, but broke the bread with his hands. Do you see how the Divine appears to the people through both, accompanying both the active body and the aspiration of the will abiding in the soul? 1294. In the second Word he composed against the wicked Eunomius [he also says]: “How did the Lord, reconciling the world to Himself, distribute the grace He created between soul and body, desiring through the soul, and touching through the body?” 1295. And he also says in his work against Apollinaris: [161C] “Since the Divine will is one, and the human will is another, then, as in the person of man, He pronounces what is due to the weakness of nature, for He made our sufferings His own; but [then] He adds a second saying, desiring that for the sake of the salvation of the world, in spite of humanity, a high and God-decent decision would be established. After all, having said “not my [will],” He designated human [will] with these words; By adding “Yours,” He pointed to the unity (συναφές) of His Divinity with the Father, in which there is no difference of will due to the community of nature” 1296. And the divine John, who adorned the throne of the Queen [of cities] 1297, in the Word under the title “On those who did not come into the assembly, and the proof that the Son is consubstantial with the Father,” beginning with the words: [164A] “Again horse riding, and again our assembly became smaller” 1298, says this: “Do you see what [the prophets] predicted about His infancy? Ask the heretic: is God really timid, evasive, hesitant and grieving? If he says “yes,” then step back from him and consider him on an equal footing with the devil, or, better yet, lower than [the devil] himself; for even he will not dare to say this. If he answers that all this is unworthy of God, then say: therefore, God does not pray; for without this [i.e. that is, otherwise], if the words [of the prayer] belong to God, everything else would be absurd. After all, these words express not only that He surrenders to sorrow, but also two wills that are opposed to each other, one the Son’s, and the other the Father’s; for to say: “Nevertheless, not as I will, but as You will” [Matthew 26:39], means to express exactly this. And the heretics never allowed this to happen; [164B] but while we have always maintained that “I and the Father are one” [John 10:30] [said] of power, they say that this is said of volition (θελήσεως), asserting that the Father and the Son have one desire (βούλησιν). But if the Father and the Son have one desire, then how does He say here: “Nevertheless, not as I want, but as You want”? So, if these [words] referred to His Divinity, then there would be some contradiction and many incongruous things would arise from here; and if they relate to the flesh, then they are spoken thoroughly and impeccably. The reluctance of death on the part of the flesh does not serve to condemn it, for this is inherent in [it] by nature; after all, Christ revealed in Himself completely everything characteristic of human nature, except sin, so as to stop the mouths of heretics. [164C] So, when He says: “My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me” and “Nevertheless not as I will, but as You will,” He expresses by this nothing less than the fact that He was truly clothed with flesh, which fears death, because it is characteristic of it to fear death, shy away from it and indulge in grief. He sometimes leaves His flesh alone and deprived of His [Divine] energy, in order, by showing its weakness, to inspire confidence in its [human] nature, and sometimes He covers it, so that you know that He was not an ordinary man. This might have been thought then if He had constantly shown human actions; just as, if He constantly performed the things characteristic of the Divine, they would not believe [the doctrine of] economy. Therefore, He diversifies and mixes both words and deeds, so as not to give rise to illness and madness either for Paul of Samosata, or Marcion and Manichaeus (Μανιχαίου); [164D] that’s why [here] He predicts the future, like God, and avoids suffering, like a man” 1299. Let us also listen to what the mentor of the Alexandrians, Cyril, clearly teaches in the twenty-fourth chapter of the Treasury: “When it seems that He is timid before death, saying, “My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me,” then understand here that the flesh, timid before death, worn by God the Word, was taught by Him not to experience such timidity anymore. [165A] After all, He said to the Father: “However, not as I want, but as You want.” For as the Word and God He was not afraid of death, but sought to complete the economy, since such is the will of the Father. It is also inherent in Him not to want to die, for the flesh evades death by nature” 1301. This same [Cyril] says, interpreting the great Evangelist John: “Christ Himself spoke about this 1302, indicating [the following]: to die for the sake of everyone was desirable for Him, since it was pleasing (βεβουλῆσθαι) to the Divine nature, and not desirable, because of the suffering on the cross” 1303. This is what [Cyril] says regarding the flesh evading death. And the revered Severian, Bishop Gabal, [interpreting] the words “Father... let this cup pass from Me” and [165B] “Father! deliver Me from this hour” [John 12:27], says: “The Lord stops the lips of heretics in advance in order to show that He has clothed himself in this long-suffering body, which fears death, trembles before a violent death, grieves and is indignant at the thought of the end of life. He says: “My soul is now troubled” [John 12:27] and “My soul is grieved unto death” [Matthew 26:38]” – not “My Divinity,” for the Divine is dispassionate, imperturbable and fearless. The Lord says, “The Spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak” [Matthew 26:41] and thus reveals two wills - one of them is Divine, and the other is human” 1304. However, I believe that the teaching of the God-bearing [fathers] about the duality of wills, both about one and the other [will] - [165C] both Divine and human, and that death for the Savior was both desired and not desired, has already been sufficiently presented; desired - in relation to what He was from the beginning, and not desired - in relation to what He subsequently became 1305. Now we should begin to teach about the difference and duality of energies, and also confirming this in [due] order with the testimonies of the God-speaking fathers. Already the great confessor and teacher Ambrose, Archbishop of Milan, in the Second Word to Gratian says the following: “He is equal [to the Father] in the image of God, but lesser in the perception of the flesh and in human suffering. How can one and the same nature be both lesser and equal? How, if she is the smaller one, does she do in a similar way what the Father does? How does the same energy [come] from different entities? 1306 [168A] Can a lesser nature act like a greater one? Can there be one energy where the essence is different? 1307 Also, the Monk Cyril, hierarch of Jerusalem, [speaks about this] in his interpretation of the Gospel saying, where the Lord created wine from water - [the interpretation] begins like this: “Oh, a miracle has happened, and what a miracle! He created a miracle! One and the same showed double energy, enduring as a man, and acting as God - for He was not one and the other, even if He [acted] in one way and another” 1308. So the omnipotent and all-holy Leo, the primate of the great Church of Rome, [writes] in the dogmatic tomos to the saints Flavian against the evil-named Nestorius and Eutyches: “In each of the two images - in community with the second - He acts as is characteristic of [this image]: [168B] The Word does what is inherent in the Word, and the body does what is inherent in the body; The word [exudes] the radiance of miracles, but the body is subjected to humiliation" 1309. John, who has a mouth of gold (χρυσοῦν), or rather, of Christ (Χριστοῦ), in the Word to the widow who put two mites into the treasury, which begins with the words “The name of the fast is simple” 1310, [says this]: In other [cases] the energies of related natures are different - the energy of humanity one, and the power of the Divine another. This is what I mean: below He works, and above He watches over the 1311 first principles; below suffers hunger, and from above sends rain; below it is timid, but above it makes thunder; below he appears before the court, and above he contemplates Himself. As for mercy, [here] the double energy comes together: [168C] He who rewards the merciful from above, from the [throne] of the Cherubim, also tests the philanthropic, sitting opposite the treasury 1312 » 1313. The same [John] says in the Word against the Apostle Thomas against the Arians: “Hearing this, I cleansed my soul from unbelief; removed mental doubt; perceived confidence; touched the body, rejoicing and trembling; I extended my soulful gaze along with my fingers and felt two energies” 1314. In addition, the wisest Cyril, primate of Alexandria, [says] in the thirty-second chapter of the Treasury: “We will not admit that God and creation have the same natural energy; so that created things are not raised to the Divine essence, and the exclusivity of the Divine nature is not brought down to the place appropriate for the born. [169A] Which [things] have the same energy and strength, without differences (ἀπαραλλάκτως), in such things the unity of the species is necessarily preserved" 1315. This is what the fathers of piety clearly [profess], whom we in [our] brief review, cramped by the confines of the letter, chose from many, or [more correctly], from countless and from all, in the words of Scripture, “clouds of witnesses” [Heb. 12:1], in order [with the help of their sayings] to clearly show their completely true knowledge of the Savior Christ. Proceeding from this [knowledge], the fathers, moved by the Spirit, commanded the holy Churches to honor both the two natures of one and the same, and the same and equal natures of will and energy, and one and the other - both Divine and human will and energy, indicating the essential difference of those [parts] of which, in which and which there is one and the same [Savior] 1316; [169B] which [difference] equally refutes [the doctrines] of appearance and of fusion, and with them in full measure also of division, for it truly and clearly shows that with one and the same God the Word those parts of which He consists [are] in an indissoluble unity. After all, if with complete unity in hypostasis there is no unified (ἀσυγχύτως) idea of ​​the essential difference of both the united [natures] themselves and the [properties] inherent in them, then there will be no clear idea of ​​the logos of [their] unity 1317 . Those who are from a destiny that is contrary and hostile to us believe the opposite 1318. Thus, the wicked Apollinaris, in his work called “Proof of the Divine Incarnation in the Likeness of Man,” [says]: [169C] “They do not remember that this will is called [His] own - [belonging] not to earthly man, as they believe, but to God who came down from heaven” 1319. The same madman, in an essay entitled [beginning with the words] “The very appearance of God in the flesh” 1320, [writes]: “For there is one Christ, moved by the only Divine will - due to the fact that we recognize in Him one energy, which comes from His one nature in various miracles and transformations. After all, He is and is considered God incarnate.” And a little lower: “The words: “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me!” However, not My will, but Yours be done” reflect not one will and another will, which would not coincide with each other, but one and the same, which is fulfilled according to Divinity, and evades death according to economy - [169D] after all, the one who said this was a flesh-bearing (σαρκοφόρος) God, no difference in will (ἐν τῷ θέλειν) who did not have” 1321. And the disciple and successor of his wickedness, the heretic Polemon, [already] hostile (πολέμιος) to the true word, according to his name, maliciously says the following to the holy fathers: [172A] “For Christ was God the Word, united with perfect flesh; 1322 and becoming a man, He did not mix with Himself a mind subject to transformation (τρεπτόν), drawn by the natural will to opposites, but rather He Himself became a mind and, [thus], created everything according to the Divine will, not subject to transformation, not one [will] Divine, but the other, according to Gregory of Cappadocia, “deified,” for. it is subject to transformation. After all, what can be deified, of course, can also be brought down to earth (γεωθῆναι), like the first Adam" 1323. And in the sixth letter he wrote to Timothy, his assistant and treacherous accomplice in wickedness, he [says this]: “He who speaks of two wills of Christ - according to those who affirmed this both before and now - either introduces instead of one two Christs, separated from each other not only by nature, but even by reason of hostility; or teaches that the same one is in conflict with Himself. After all, where there is duality, there, of course, is division” 1324. [172B] Also, Themistius, an adherent of the heresy of Sevirus and the leader of the evil [teachings] of the Agnoites 1325, in the forty-fifth chapter of the Second Word [written by him] against the tomos sent to Basilissa Theodora 1326 on behalf of Theodosius 1327, the “heresiarch” of those whom he called “heretics,” says [the following] ungodly: “For despite the fact that Saint Athanasius said that Christ revealed two wills (θελήματα), we still will not attribute to Him two wills (θελήσεις), and at the same time - according to your conclusions - opposing one another; but we piously recognize that one will, as [belonging] to Emmanuel alone, is moved sometimes in a human way, sometimes in a godly manner” 1328. This same disgusting heretic [172C] in the fifty-second chapter in the Third Word of the treatise, in which he follows his ally in wickedness, [speaks thus]: “I speak of one knowledge and one energy in Immanuel, as well as of [one] will. Understand [this] this way: he who is not subject to transformation (for God) and remains above all suffering, [he], moved by the will 1329, as befits a person, avoids suffering, and as befits God, again finds boldness in suffering; [and] both – through the flesh” 1330. That's what they maliciously say. The opponents of both these [heretics] and the truth (I’m talking about those who preach division), forced to the identical, the same as those, evil teaching about one will and one energy - those who also professed relative (ἐν σχέσει) gnomic unity - [172D] burst out with such speeches. Thus, the malicious and absurd Theodore, who ruined the [Church] of Mopsuestia, says in the Second Word of his false interpretations of miracles: [173A] “Having said to the leper, “I will, be cleansed” [Matthew 8:3], the Savior showed that [He has] one will, one energy, produced according to the same power (ἐξουσίαν); I’m not talking about nature, but about good will, by which a man was united with God the Word, who, according to foreknowledge, was subsequently born from the seed of David and already in his mother’s womb had an internal intimacy with Him (ἐνδιάθετον... οἰκείωσιν)” 1331. And the vicious Nestorius, the follower and successor of his madness, in [the treatise] he called “Clear Initiation”, in the Second Word of this treatise, insidiously writes: “We preserve natures without fusion, for they are united not in essence, but in intention (γνώμῃ); That’s why we see that these [natures] have one will, one energy and one power (δεσποτεία), which are manifested in equality of dignity. [173B] For, having accepted the man whom He predestined, God the Word was chosen by him according to the logos of autocracy, because of the foreknown disposition” 1332. This same madman writes in the Fourth Word of the same [treatise]: “[It is] not as if God the Word is one, and the man in whom He finds himself is another. The face of both was the same, both in dignity and in honor - a face revered by every creation; in no place and at no time not separated by the difference (ἑτερότητι) of decision (βουλῆς) and will" 1333. False Deacon Paul the Persian 1334, who also belonged to the most vile heresy of Nestorius, in his essay On Judgment, fighting with God, writes the following: “Since there was no unity in the essence of God the Word and the man whom He assumed, there was not one nature; and if there was not one nature, then Christ is not one hypostasis, having one face. [173C] Consequently, this unity is [unity] by good will, cemented by the identity of decision and intention, so that the unfused difference of natures is shown, and the sacrament of good will is revealed by the unit of decision” 1335. As you see, O most beautiful ones, by examining the writings, and before them the dogmas, in our time they have established a harmonious and consonant unity in all respects, united 1336 for our sins against the immaculate faith: [Ekphesis] 1337 confirms, like madmen, that Christ has one will and one energy 1338. [173D] Ekphesis confesses one will, saying: “Therefore, following the holy fathers in everything, and also in this, we confess one will from our Lord Jesus Christ”; and one energy - saying: “But from it, that is, from [the dogma of] the conservation of two energies, it follows that [we would] honor two wills.” After all, if [Ekphesis] determines that wills follow from energy, then the following is absolutely necessary: ​​since it affirms the secondary (τοῦ ἑπομένου) 1339, that is, one will, then [thereby] the original is also affirmed (τὸ ἡγούμενον), that is, one energy. This is probably why [Ekphesis] ruled that will follows from energy, because he cunningly sought to introduce one energy together with one will. [176A] Therefore, the fathers whom he follows in this and in everything, he recognized not as truly fathers, but as those who are by no means [are] saints. After all, no one will claim that one will [professed], [for example], the Monk Athanasius, who, as we have already shown, openly proclaimed: “He reveals here two wills: one is human, the other is Divine” 1340. Nor [will they say this] about Gregory the Theologian, who said about the human will of the Savior: “His will, as completely deified, is not contrary to God” 1341. The same is true of the Nissian mentor of the same name, who said: “the soul wants, the body touches”; “both the acting body and the aspiration of the will abiding in the soul”; “wishing through the soul, and touching through the body”; “The divine will is one, and the human will is another” and [176B] “having said “not my [will],” He designated the human [will] with these words; By adding “Yours,” He indicated the unity (συναφές) of His Divinity with the Father” 1342. The same is true of John Chrysostom, who taught: “After all, these words express not only that He indulges in sorrow, but also two wills... So, if these [words] related to His Divinity, then there would be some contradiction... and if they refer to the flesh, then they are spoken thoroughly... The reluctance of death on the part of the flesh does not serve to condemn it, for this is inherent in [it] by nature; after all, Christ revealed in Himself completely everything characteristic of human nature, except sin” 1343. Nor [will they say this] about Cyril of Alexandria, who clearly instructs: “such was the will of the Father - to complete the economy. [176C] It is also inherent in Him not to want to die, for the flesh evades death by nature” and “to die for the sake of everyone was both desirable for Him, since it was pleasing (βεβουλῆσθαι) to the Divine nature, and not desirable, since the flesh evades death by nature” 1344. The same is true of Severian, the leader of Gabal, who testifies: “thus, He reveals two wills - one of them is Divine, and the other is human” 1345. The same is true about one energy 1346 - [they will not claim that it was recognized by] the confessor Ambrose, who wisely preached: “How does one and the same energy [come] from different essences? Can there be one energy where the essence is different? 1347 The same is true of Cyril of Jerusalem, who instructs: “One and the same showed double energy, enduring as a man, and acting as God” 1348. The same is true of the divine Leo, who intelligently proclaims: [176D] “Each of the two images - in community with the second - acts in the way that is characteristic of [him]” 1349. Also about Chrysostom, [who taught]: “In other [cases] the energies of related natures are different - [the energies of] humanity and Divinity... As for mercy, then [here] the double energy converges [together]; and “I felt two energies” 1350. And in the same way about Cyril, the most sacred teacher of Alexandria, [who wrote]: “After all, we will not admit that God and creation have the same natural energy” 1351. [177A] [Ekphesis] does not recognize these [fathers] as saints or as chosen secret leaders of the Church, but, [on the contrary], declares that their generally accepted confession of two wills and energies is impious and alien to Christian doctrine. He confirms this with the following words: “Just as the expression “two energies” seduces many, for it was not spoken by any of the holy and elected [fathers] of the Church, but, in addition, from this [expression] it follows that [we would] honor two wills, opposite one another, and thus would bring in two wills that are opposite; which is ungodly and alien to Christian doctrine" 1352. This is how - clearly and, as they say, with an open face, he asserts that to honor the two wills and their equivalent energies (from which, in their opinion, the wills of 1353 follow) is not characteristic of the saints and not the chosen secret leaders of the Church, but rather of the wicked, [177B] for this is ungodly and alien, as they say, to the Christian doctrine; for this [teaching] introduces two wills and the opposite in those who preach it - that is, among the fathers moved by the Spirit, [preaching] two wills and energies equal to them. [Ekphesis] did not deign to follow these [fathers], nor to call them saints, nor to generally honor this with them and according to them in confirmation of the sacrament of the flesh of Christ God. But what are those [fathers] of whom [Ekphesis] speaks, to whom, as he claims, belongs the expression “one energy,” and to whom he follows in this, as well as in everything, in order to confess the one will of Christ God? As has been shown, these people are known - they are the champions of fusion and the leaders of division. [177C] As, for example - for it would not be superfluous, for the sake of persuasiveness, to list them briefly again - the wicked Apollinaris, who fights against God with such speeches: “For there is one Christ, moved by the only Divine will - due to the fact that we recognize in Him one energy” and “there is no difference in will (ἐν τῷ θέλειν) having" 1354; or the enemy (πολέμιος) of truth Polemon, [who asserted]: “[Christ] created everything according to the Divine will, which is not subject to transformation. Not one [will] is Divine, but the other, according to Gregory of Cappadocia, “deified”” and “who speaks of two wills of Christ - according to those who affirmed this in 1355 both before and now - or introduces instead of one certain two Christs... or teaches that one and the same is opposed to Himself” 1356; or the lawless (ἀθέμιτος) Themistius, [who wrote]: “we recognize that one will, as [belonging] to Emmanuel alone, is moved either humanly or godly” and “I am talking about one knowledge and one energy in Emmanuel, as well as about [one] will” 1357; [177D] or Theodore, struck by God (θεόπληξ), [wrote]: “[The Savior] showed that [He] has one will, one energy, produced according to the same power (ἐξουσίαν)” 1358; or Nestorius, completely struck [by madness], [said]: “That is why we see that these [natures] have one will, one energy and one power (δεσποτεία)” 1359; or Paul, according to the way of thinking of the Persian 1360, [claimed]: “this unity is [unity] by good will, sealed by the identity of decision and intention, [so that] ... and the sacrament of good will was revealed by the unit of 1361 decision” 1362. Such and such atheists and villains [Ekphesis] calls holy fathers! He recognizes such and such as the chosen secret leaders of the Church, following them in this and in everything [else]. Together with them, he confesses the same will and energy from Christ God, like them, confusing and dissecting the logos of the economy. [180A] If [Ekphesis] thinks like his opponents, then how can he suppose that he thinks differently, although [in fact] he replaces judgments with the opposite 1363 and chooses what does not exist, preferring it to what exists? After all, if we judge by truth, and not by injustice, then it is clear to everyone: he who agrees and is of one mind with any [people] is not the one who says what they do not say, but the one who honors the same thing that they profess, since disagreement is inherent in being a distinctive feature of dissent, and agreement - of unanimity. However, [Ekphesis] himself testifies, proclaiming that even the wicked Nestorius did not dare to recognize two wills, but professed the “identity of will” (ταὐτοβουλίαν) 1364, that is, one will in the two persons he imagined; so, if, according to [Ekphesis], Nestorius preaches not two, but one will, and this is Apollinaris and all the wicked [following] them [both], and also all of them - one energy, as [our] speech has shown; [180B] then by what he preaches, he undoubtedly shows that we, according to the holy fathers, who speak of two [wills and energies] are, of course, dissenters, and he himself, speaking of one [will and energy], is unanimous with Nestorius, Apollinaris and their followers; [he shows] that, as I have already shown, he rejects the divine [fathers], and calls the wicked [heretics] his fathers! For what reason did [Ekphesis] introduce this against pious confession? If it is because we do not have [true] faith, then the logos 1365 is false, for all those who professed the true word were Christians before them; [180C] if we have it, then we should avoid [their] tropos 1366, for, being false, it introduces unnecessary things 1367; In this way they obscure their insidious plan and, not being able to put forward in defense of their [dogmas] a single saying of any Council, or a father, or a scripture, they assert this by counterfeiting pious dogmas - [dogmas] which were handed down to us by those who were originally self-seers and servants of the Word, and then, one after another, their disciples and successors, the inspired teachers of truth, in other words, the five saints Ecumenical Councils of the Most Blessed God-Bearing Fathers. If they conveyed this to 1368, then where is the proof? In other words, where can they [find] confirmation of such dogmas? Moreover, since we honor and profess the holy Councils, it is clear that the fabrication of something introduced is a forgery. [180D] If such [a teaching] is not from the holy Councils, then how great is their invention, covering 1369 the inglorious in the name of the most glorious! The mention of illustrious fathers and councils is like a bait for the simple-minded to deviate from the truth, [181A] [a bait] invented from ancient times and from time immemorial by dissenters, on the one hand, for the sake, as I have already said, of concealing their own [wickedness], and on the other, for the sake of the insidious deception of those who are [easily] carried away. Therefore, for the sake of the complete eradication of such [teachings] - I mean those who invent insidious fabrications against the faith - the conciliar decision of the Chalcedon Assembly of the Blessed Fathers most beautifully decrees the following: “The Holy and Ecumenical Council has decided: no one is allowed to express, write down, compose, plot, or teach another doctrine of the faith; if any [people] dare either to formulate another creed, or to promulgate it, or to teach it, or to convey another symbol of faith to those who wish to turn to the knowledge of the truth, either from Hellenism or Judaism, or from any heresy - [181B] then, if they are bishops or clergy, let the bishops be alienated from the bishopric, and the clergy alienated from the clergy; if they are monks or laymen, then let them be anathema" 1370. Who of those who at least somehow knew God and participated in the radiant glory of Him, from Whom, through Whom and to Whom is the salvation of those who piously profess Him, would wish to reject the Orthodox doctrine, handed down to us from ancient times and from time immemorial by venerable scholars [men] and fathers, and to prefer the newly introduced innovation, against which - as well as against any other innovation invented by dissenters contrary to the pious way of thinking - [181C] the holy fathers who gathered in Chalcedon passed (as [our] speech showed) the generally accepted conciliar decree on damnation? Would only one who neglected his own life prefer alienation [from it] to the glory of God! Therefore, O Master 1371, being convinced in practice and realizing that this is, quite obviously, the threshold and harbinger of the destruction of all piety, the denial of the true knowledge of the Only Begotten, the “last deception” [Matthew 27:64] and the last beast (see. Rev. 17), according to the prediction of the holy men, who understood this from divine inspiration and the most blessed illumination, for the sake of protecting us, who have reached the end of the ages - [therefore] each of us should with all our might protect our hearts from this introduced innovation, [181D] so that we would not be caught together [with others], behaving carelessly and carefree, and not rebelling decisively and courageously against any wickedness, in the words of Scripture, “destroying arguments and every high thing that exalts itself against the knowledge of God” [2 Cor. 10:4–5]. Thus, the Savior Himself of all, our Lord and God, lovingly defending us, says: “Then if anyone says to you, Behold, here is Christ, or there, do not believe it” [Matthew 24:23]. [With these words] He drives away from His sacrament various counterfeit creeds and speculations of the lost 1372, protects His followers from all sorts of alien teachings, [184A] with which people, inclined to discord and disputes, are accustomed to confuse the sincerity of His confession 1373. [He says this] so that our pious and God-loving mind, caught by any of them, does not fall away from the truth, carried away by the plausibility of the fiction, but not convinced by the evidence from the [holy] patristic sayings. “Watch and pray so that you do not fall into temptation” [Matthew 26:41], the Word again instructs us for the same reason. [Speaking] about “watching,” He wants to instill in us sobriety in such matters, [speaking] about “prayer” - to support us by grace. By “temptation” He here means that which [comes] from error, and not that which comes from coercion; into which we are led from within, and not from without, deviating from the straight and royal path. For you are walking straight along this path, led along it by God, then lead wisely those like me, your [servant], “who lame on both knees” [1 Kings 18:21], [184B] leading them to the light that neither sets nor gives shadow - [the light of] the most divine confession of the Word and [pleasing to Him] deeds; [lead], looking at the posthumous reward, for the Divine law commands that the “strong,” like you, “bear the burdens” of the “weak” and “thus fulfill the law” (cf. Rom.15:1; Gal.6:2]. A heavy burden - above any other misfortunes - is indifference in the use of such words, which happens to the most unreasonable, due to times and persons, or seduction, or threats from those who flatter, confuse or... 1374 So, do not refuse to compassionately extend your hand to the one who has come running to you, [184C] and with a word intelligently purifying him, and through prayer humanely strengthening, introducing and bringing him to God the Word, whom you Orthodoxy worship and believe in, to the eternal Almighty, both now and in His terrible appearance; to whom with the Father and the Holy Spirit be honor, power, glory, worship forever and ever. Amen. Great Maximus the Confessor. About the two wills of the one Christ our God [184D] Different images and types have been skillfully invented by different [people], both for the sake of safety and for the sake of decoration; and with their help they strive to gain external glory, but foolishly neglect the innermost. But for you, sanctified father, who has already prepared your mind for a timeless life, one simple virtue, which is above all appearance and image, is enough for beauty and reliability; which so much beautifies in you both the hidden and the obvious to everyone, [185A] to the extent that you preferred the unchangeable lust that knows no satiety [1376] to the transitory and worldly lust; or rather, which shows [you] (as it should be) as close to God and similar to Him, as much as it showed [you] completely alienated from matter and everything material and not similar to it 1377. That is why those who do evil are unable to catch you. After all, experiencing anything on their part is not inherent in someone who, by intention (γνώμῃ), experienced good - even if it is entirely in their 1378 power - and perceived the fullness of lust (πóθου), the perfect victory of the Desired in him, rest from movement - ever-moving peace (ἀεικίνητον στάσιν), in which death, which anciently took possession of nature 1379, is destroyed, and [nature] does not yield to it due to apostasy 1380. After all, he is no longer subject to hesitation, for the grace of the Spirit has taken possession of him 1381. [185B] Supported by her through prayers, intelligently following her paths, you show through your activity 1382 how many royal and divine [paths are open] for those who want to follow the straight path of piety, and you show others what their deviations are in one direction or another; You show what sorrows threaten some, and what sacred rewards are promised to others, in order to motivate them through fear and desire to divine perfection. Having admired your deeds, I, as befits, praise your mind; but rather, having been amazed by your zeal in both [cases], I praise God, who gives strength and wisdom, and I pray that you would use the same methods in relation to the weak in mind, and would do this tirelessly (for virtue knows no fatigue - it has the power to accomplish all kinds of good), [185C] until you instill [in them] “the mind of Christ” [1 Cor. 2:16] and you cannot teach to “search into the depths of the Spirit” (cf. 1 Cor. 2:10), which describes all the manifest wisdom and power of beings, and reveals that spoken in the sacrament - to those who, like you, have surrendered to Him and have considered nothing more valuable than union with Him. But since you are illuminated by the very first and last virtue of all, as a leader and a seal [for everyone else] - I mean humility - then you wanted to ask your slave and student: [185D] is the definition of natural will correct or incorrect, which was given by the pious monk, who said that it is “the ability to strive for what is in accordance with nature, and to maintain all the characteristics inherent in nature” 1383 . I consider it correct [not only this, but] also that [natural will] is one thing, and gnomic will another. [In my opinion], this does not contradict the teaching of the divine fathers; even if some believe that this is not so, arguing that the fathers define the will (θέλημα) as willing (θέλησιν) and desired (θεληθέν) or the object of the will (θελητόν) 1384. [188A] I would gladly ask them: who gives this definition, which of the fathers? If this is so, then what is this other than a mutual (διάλληλος) indication, which does not explain the logos of each [concept as it is] in itself, but through one affirms and reveals the same [logos] in the other? After all, this is precisely what it means – to define volition as will and vice versa, will as volition. What is defined inversely with its own definition. That they call will volition is, of course, obvious, but they do not consider this to be the definition of will. For who then could point [to anything]? After all, according to those who assert this [it would turn out] that βούλησις is the definition of βούλημα 1385, κίνησις is the definition of κίνημα 1386, and humanity (ἀνθρωπότης) is the definition of man. Whether they designate the signified in one way or another, [188B] they in no way harm its existence, whether that signified is a movement or an essence. And if this is so, then the existence of all general (καθολικῶν) and private (μερικῶν) [concepts] will undoubtedly fall apart, for in all cases we use different designations. I say this only if they call the will volition, but by no means the desired and the object of the will. For how is it possible that desire (ἔφεσις) is the same as the object of desire (ἐφετόν)? After all, if this is so, then to what will [the desire] move, if it, in fact, is what it is moving towards, and by nature is nothing else but this? After all, [in fact, desire] is a kind of relationship between extremes - it connects them with the help of itself, and does not correspond to them in existence. Witness to this is the divine and great Gregory, who does not consider what is desired and what is born to be identical to desire and birth, [188C] but through them, as natural relations, elevates them to the one who gives birth and the one who wills. After all, if he did not agree to correlate the desired and born with desire and birth, although it [desire] is by nature something in between (as he says, “because [the desired] does not always follow desire” 1387), then how could he bring them together and declare them to be one and the same? In addition, if they say that the will is what is desired - and what is desired and the object of the will, by nature, is us, for we are God's creation - then this means that the will of God by nature is nothing other than us; like us, she is born and dies; and before we appeared, He was generally devoid of any will. [188D] The same conclusion can be drawn about us: [it turns out that] we do not have our own and natural [will], but only around us something desired outside is imagined - existing or non-existent, good or evil. Moreover, what is desired is one of the external things (τι τῶν ἐκτός); for it is called an object of the will and desired not because of itself, but because of the will moved towards it. For whenever one who has a natural will does not desire anything that exists, he has no object of will and nothing desired. What are the arguments of those who assert that the will is an object of the will, and who claim that the holy fathers say so? [189A] But let it be called what they want - our dispute is not about the difference in names, but about the difference in pious concepts. Let them answer this logical question: is the Divine will by nature something other than the human will, and the human will something other than the Divine, despite the fact that they are called and called by a thousand names? Let them teach [us] this and strengthen our minds, troubled by the unknown. And then we will not especially complain about how they compose names (αὐτῶν ταῖς ὀνοματοθεσίαις), but perhaps we will add something of our own. If this is in essence not one [will] and another [will], then it is clear that this is by nature one and the same [will]. And if this is so, then, of necessity, nature is one and indistinguishable; for where there is no natural difference of wills, there is no [difference] at all in essence and nature. [189B] If by nature it is one [will] and another [will], then [these wills] are certainly different; and if they are different, then why should not their number also be recognized as number? After all, its negation leads to the abolition of both [the difference] itself and the different [things] as non-existent. For how and for what reason is it possible that they exist but are not countable? Or: how is it [possible] that wills exist by nature, but are not counted by the same nature, unless, of course, this also abolishes the counting of the natures themselves? What is good in relation to wills, which are innate and constituent for things, must also exist in relation to the things themselves; and let them either abolish number for things, if, in their opinion, it causes harm, or, if it does not harm in any way, let them recognize [number] for wills, in order to indicate the innate difference existing in them, due to which we use [the concept of] number in relation to essences; [189C] or let them show how, by rejecting number, they do not lead to the complete abolition of the natural human will of the Savior or to [its] fusion [with the Divine will] 1388. How can the incarnate Word [be] a perfect man without natural will? The fact that [flesh] was deified by union with God (just as [was deified] the very nature of verbally and mentally animate flesh) does not deprive it of real existence (ὀντότητος) 1389 in essence - just as iron is not deprived of its real existence due to complete and complete mixing (συνανάκρασις) and union with fire: when it becomes fire by reason of union, it experiences what is inherent in fire, [189D] but at the same time - by its own nature - it has weight and [the ability to] cut, for its own nature has not suffered damage, and [iron] has not at all lost its natural energy 1390. Despite the fact that [iron] exists with fire in the same hypostasis, it inseparably (ἀδιαστάτως) acts according to its own nature - I mean [the ability] to cut and, again, what [is inherent in it] by unity, that is, burning. After all, this feature [becomes] inherent in iron, as well as in fire - [the ability] to cut, due to their complete interpenetration (περιχώρησιν) and interchange (ἀντίδοσιν); and nothing prevents us [192A] from naming or counting it, that is, iron, nature, although it is contemplated together with fire, and [its] natural energy, although it is contemplated together with hotness and is in no way separable from it (μηδεμίαν... ἔχει διάστασιν), but uniformly with it and in it it appears and is known. So what is the rational basis for not calculating what is naturally inherent in nature, that is, the will, and thus attributing something imperfect, like ours, to the superperfect and preperfect God incarnate Word, despite the fact that He - by the good will of the Father and with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, for the sake of our salvation - joined to Himself through inseparable (ἀδιάστατον) unity all, in equal measure, the characteristics of [human] nature, as well as, to a perfect extent, nature itself, only without sin, since [sin] is not inherent in nature, but in intention, [for it is] the perversion and fall of the soul, driven contrary to reason and law? [192B] That the said monk understood [everything] properly becomes clear to me mainly from the fact that he distinguishes between the natural and the gnomic will. [Natural will], according to his correct definition, is the ability to strive for what is in accordance with nature. After all, everyone, whatever it is, of existing and, especially, rational [creatures] strives for what is in accordance with [its] nature, and has in essence, having received from God the ability to do this in order to maintain (σύστασιν) itself. After all, if it does not have a desire for what is in accordance with nature, then - since it does not exist - how and from where, if it has neither existence nor movement [, will it exist]? After all, only a non-existent and devoid of essence can be powerless, and it has absolutely no power in relation to existing things, or movement. And [gnomic will] is a spontaneous impulse (αὐθαίρετος ὁρμή), inclined towards one of two [possibilities]. [192C] It is decisive not for nature, but, truly, for person and hypostasis 1391. The man-worshiper Nestorius, who confessed division (διῃρημένος), recognizing this, wickedly proclaimed unity of intentions in order to establish one hypostasis through the other, so that, according to his teaching, the simple man would be preserved, who, through a certain intention and spontaneous impulse towards God the Word, as [Nestorius] says, accomplished [with Him] unity; based on this [unity, Nestorius] he affirms the identity of wills (ταὐτοβουλίαν), or, more accurately, the plurality of wills (πολυβουλίαν) 1392. With each movement of the gnomic will, [this hypostasis], according to Nestorius, gradually moves from imperfect to perfect, rushing and breaking forward - but by no means [unites with Him] from the most ineffable conception, when the Divinity of the Word is perfect, with all His [peculiarities], [192D] united into one and the same hypostasis with our whole nature and all its [peculiarities]. So, in order to clearly indicate the perfection of nature in the incarnate God and to refute the opposite [opinion], the mentioned monk affirmed the natural will of the Savior, [193A] and denied the gnomic will 1393; [thus] he left no room either for [the doctrine of] separation, because [one will supposedly] rebels in Him [against another], or for [the doctrine of] appearance, because He [allegedly] does not have a human will. If someone begins to assert that the two wills of [the Savior] cannot be understood otherwise than as opposed (κατ᾽ἐναντίωσιν) to one another, then one of two things: if [they are opposed] because they are different in essence, then I will agree with this; and if because they contradict (ἀντικείμενα) [one another], then this statement is false. If something is different [from another], then it does not necessarily contradict [it]. After all, the contradictory is inherent in the intention moved unreasonably (παραλόγως) 1394, and the different is inherent in nature, preserved by the logos; the first rebels against nature, the second constitutes it. That is, essential difference serves to compose things that exist in nature, and opposition (ἐναντίωσις) serves to dissolve them. After all, nature does not possess what is against nature, and there is no logos for the rebel. [193B] And one more thing: if two wills are in any case opposite and contradictory, then why does this not always and in any case happen among rational [beings] divided by nature and hypostasis? It happens that according to these [wills] of ours - even if they are gnomic! – we converge with God, and with the angels, and with each other; but for this reason we are not yet deprived of either the intention or the inherent will 1395. After all, if we [lost] them, then, obviously, we would [lose] convergence (συννεύσεως) with others; while we have this, we also have other gnomic [features]. [193C] So, if this is the case and no opposition is observed, but at the same time the gnomic wills are preserved - both in the sense of existence and in the sense of calculation, [being] in a friendly disposition towards the relationship - [so, if this is so], then how with one and the same incarnate God the Word, who became completely human for our sake, a confrontation (ἐναντίωσις) is possible between natural wills inherent in Him in essence? For what reason do they call these [wills] contrary (ἐναντία) - because of the number, or because of the existence itself? If for the reason of the latter, then let them take away nature from the flesh, since [it turns out that] it contradicts the Word by reason of [its] existence. After all, the subject, as everyone well knows, has a much greater power of opposition than what is in the subject 1396. If, however, because of the number alone, then let them deprive it of its nature, and not count any of them; and also for the same reason [193D] let them abandon the number in relation to the three hypostases of the one beginningless Deity, so that It does not rebel against Itself 1397. But it is absurd to assign such power to something that is not anything, neither essence, nor quality, nor anything else of existing [things]. It is even more absurd to doubt the very existence of natural will and thus lead to its denial; [196A] and this despite the fact that it is an innate ability, the very first of all natural features and movements [existing] in nature. Indeed, because of this ability alone, we naturally strive to be, live, move, think, speak, feel, eat food, sleep and rest, not experience pain, not die, and generally possess everything that makes up nature, and be deprived of what harms it. The pious monk, it seems to me, acted appropriately when he added: “[the ability] to maintain all the characteristics inherent in nature.” [196B] After all, the essential and innate will [existing] in us - or rather we ourselves, through it and according to it - supports [them] all, strives to support and not lose any of them. And, I believe, anyone who cares at all about what is [truly] existing, and not about what appears to be, will undoubtedly agree that the incarnate God, being a man, had a natural human will; and that by this [will] He naturally desired each of those listed, so that we would be convinced of the [existence] of His mentally and rationally animate flesh - [after all] if He became a perfect man, He was not deprived of any of our [peculiarities], except sin alone, but possessed all, without exception, like us, the natural components of our essence, as well as [the components of] the essence of the beginningless and Divine; through these components He showed that He is truly both man and God at the same time, [196C] and that after unification He perfectly retains a natural kinship both with us and with the Father. After all, the assertion that He revealed Himself to have two wills only during the time of saving suffering, when He actually imprinted in Himself what is inherent in us and, as a man, evaded death, is, as it seems to me, an [empty] statement, in no way substantiated 1399. Why only at this time, and not before, and for what reason? If He had [two wills] then, then He had them from the beginning, from the time He became a man, and did not arrange it this way later, by chance. If He did not have [two wills] initially, then He did not [have them] during suffering, [196D] but created only the appearance of evasion [from death], and with it everything else by which we were saved, namely: tears, prayer, sorrow, sorrow, crucifixion, death and burial. After all, if you abolish only one of our natural [features] preserved by Him, then there will be no others left. For how [is it possible] that this one is not there, but the rest are? And what is the reason for 1400? And what a contradiction there is in the fact that He prayed and voluntarily showed natural (that is, according to the flesh) weakness through compression; that He did not resist at all, but said “if possible” and “not as I want, but as You want,” and combined with compression a strong and decisive movement against death. Indeed, through natural struggle (ἀγωνίας) in relation to a small [period of time] 1401 He actually imprinted in Himself what is inherent in us, [197A] in order to free us from this [struggle], and confirm [the truth of] the nature of our own flesh, and reveal the economy to everyone pure from false images (φαντασίας); in addition, He simultaneously showed the strongest impulse against death, and the complete fusion 1402 and unity of His human will with His own and Fatherly - [showed by] deciding (ἐπικρῖναι) in this way and saying: “not My will, but Thine be done.” With the help of the second He refuted the division, and with the help of the first He refuted the merger. If they say this because He openly expresses His will (τοῦ θέλειν) at no other time, but only during suffering, then let them say the same about His innate understanding (νοήσεως) and [thereby] declare Him unreasonable - after all, He does not openly say “I have understood”! [197B] [Let them say the same] about the sense of smell, and about the rest of our natural [features], which, according to what was written, He did not mention; or even about the soul itself, let it be said that it did not exist before, that is, from the time He became man, but [appeared] only when He mentioned it - as it is said [in Scripture], He did this shortly before suffering 1403. Or let them say that it was created on purpose then for this occasion, since He did not mention it repeatedly and not from the very beginning. Or, if they do not affirm this, let them, according to the great Athanasius, confess “at the same time the flesh and the animate and rational flesh of God the Word” 1404; let them also recognize that the natural will of the Savior as a man existed not only during suffering, although He only mentioned it then, but essentially belonged (συνουσιωμένον) to Him by nature as a man similar to us; [197C] and let them henceforth stop bringing up such topics and drawing such conclusions at inappropriate times. After all, our time is a time of bloodshed 1405, and not of dogmas, 1406, of loud lamentations in order to appease God, and not of sophisticated verbal disputes in order to anger Him even more. It also surprises me [what they say] about energy: they teach that Christ has one, as they say, based on the contemplation of an individual [thing] and correlation with it 1407. I will no longer talk about the fact that each of the natural [features] correlates primarily not with the individual [thing], [197D] but with its nature and essence. Who could act (ἐνεργεῖν) without the forces inherent in nature? Or how would he act or have [any] power (δύνασθαι) without having a nature? That's what I want to ask. Did they proclaim this [unified energy] for the sake of the abolition of natural energies, or in some other way? For if for the sake of abolition, then what kind of energy will it even be, while those [natural] ones are rejected? After all, just as if there are no natures, then, undoubtedly, that which is [composed of] them, that is, a complex hypostasis, disappears, so if there are no natural energies, then there will be no other at all. And I say this not because [as if] other energy is composed of natural ones; for there is no addition [of things] that are in the subject; since [such addition] does not at all reveal their existence in themselves, but something empty 1408. [200A] After all, if, as they say, there are no energies that are, in fact, natural, then how can something that does not exist exist at all? For who affirms the hypostatic energy? Where did this teaching come from, and from whom did they receive it in order to present it to [us]? If it happens that they nevertheless affirm this [hypostatic energy], confessing that [the single energy] correlates precisely with a complex hypostasis that perceives opposite and contradictory [features] - for it is both mortal and immortal, and visible and invisible, and limited and not limited, and without beginning and has a beginning - then, one can assume, the energy will be the same. And how could it be otherwise, if not so, in terms of possession and deprivation 1409? She, being such, will experience one thing, and the other, not being such, will lead to existence as something additional (παρυποστήσει). How can one who has such energy experience the same, not in relation to one and the other, but in relation to the same thing, for the same [will happen] with energy? [200B] After all, it is absolutely necessary that the actor should remain in accordance with his energy, and it with him. How can one [be] God who is God by possession and not by nature? How can one be a person who is such, in fact, by deprivation, and not by essence? What kind of nature is this, devoid of energy, or without natural energy? Since it is in no way devoid of existence, it is not devoid of natural force. And if she did not have [natural strength], then she would be deprived of existence. After all, devoid of strength, as completely weak, is only a non-existent. For any of the existing [things] has a constituent difference (συστατικὴν διαφοράν), [that is] an innate movement, which is perceived together with the genus and creates a definition for the subject; thanks to this [definition], in fact, it becomes known that [a thing] exists and what it is, possessing indistinguishability in relation to homogeneous ones and difference in relation to foreign ones 1410. [200C] If this is so, then how is it possible for the Word made man to become a perfect man or a man in general, if in the flesh he is devoid of natural strength? After all, there cannot be a person without natural energy, just as there can be no other nature without its own essential [energy]. For the absence of such [energy] leads either to the fact that nature ceases to be nature, or to the fact that all natures are identical with each other, and instead of them all there is one, for due to the absence of a component they mix and merge with each other. [Thus], if they do not believe that the Word is devoid of energy by humanity, then obviously they say that It has [by the Incarnation] innate human energy. How could it be otherwise? After all, it is impossible to act without natural energy, just as [it is impossible] to exist without essence and nature. But if the agent has a double nature, it is absolutely necessary that he should have more than just one innate energy; [200D] whereas the existing one (ὑφεστῶτα), of course, has [not] 1411 one nature, even when it has a complex hypostasis. After all, if the first is in relation, then, undoubtedly, the second is also in the same relation - in both cases, as we see, this [relation] is the same. Energy is raised to the active, and nature – to the existing. So, if, due to the unity and singularity of the person, they affirm one energy in the agent, then it is necessary that for the same reason they recognize the single nature of the existing one, so as not to be caught in the fact that they profess a relative unity, speaking about it in relation to energies, and not natures 1412. After all, it is possible that they unite them not into a hypostasis, but only into essence and nature (that which concerns natural energies) - [201A] into nothing other than the energies that are united into it 1413. After all, just as the natural difference [of energies], in their opinion, creates two active ones, so the innate divergence in essence would undoubtedly lead to the conclusion of two independently existing ones. Either let them mix essences into one nature, or let them not attribute division to energies, as well as to essences that exist naturally and are countable. What does not happen to energies cannot happen to natures. Natural difference is evident from their number, and division is excluded by reason of complete unity. After all, without essential energy, it is impossible to know either the Divine or the human nature even what it is, not to mention how it differs from the other; for the definition of a thing is, in fact, the logos of the essential force 1414. [201B] If it is abolished, then, inevitably, the subject is also abolished. Therefore we confess that these [two energies] are naturally preserved in the incarnate Word (the first is autocratically shown in touching the flesh of the Divine, and the second in human experience), in order to confess together with them the natures to which these essential energies belong. [201C] Who may not be aware that in one and the same essence and nature it is impossible to discern differences in existence or natural energy? After all, no [nature] is different from itself - that would be absurd. In an individual [thing] and in a person [such a difference is seen] is indisputable and inevitable if this [person] is complex. For we contemplate the various natures of which it is composed, and the natural movements by which it is known to act by nature, confirming [thereby] its own existence; one and the other, of which it is composed, it shows with the help of the natural energy of one and the other. That is why we discover: the accusations of the one who contemplates it, that is, an individual [thing], but at the same time voluntarily loses sight of nature, denying natural energies - [his accusations] in this [dispute] do not so much oppress us as assist us. [201D] For if an individual [thing] is not always reducible to one natural energy, as well as to one nature (for who could assert or prove [the opposite]?), then it is clear that it has as many essential movements as it has natures or essences - no one can object to this. I won’t even talk about the fact that the complex face of Christ is not, in fact, considered an individual [thing]. After all, it has nothing to do with division, which would be reduced from the most general genus through [intermediate] genera, subordinate to one another, to the most particular species, and would describe its own progression 1415. [204A] Therefore, according to the wisest Cyril, the name “Christ” has no definitional value, for it is not a species spoken of in relation to many [things] different in number, and it does not indicate the essence of anything 1416; for [Christ] is not an individual [thing], raised to a species or genus or limited by them in essence, but a complex hypostasis, which brings the natural division of extremes into perfect identity [according to hypostasis] and brings it together through the unity of its parts. If from the words of those [Orthodox] who - based on the fact that the Lord in the flesh was not devoid of energy - confess that He had innate and human energy, [so, if from their words our opponents] conclude that He [the Lord in the flesh?] was also not selfless (ἀνυπόστατον) 1417, then this means that they are incorrect use the concept of “hypostasis” 1418. After all, the fact that nature is not hypostatic (ἀνυπόστατον) 1419 does not make it hypostasis 1420; [204B] just as the fact that a body is not devoid of form (ἀσχημάτιστον) does not make every body a form (σχῆμα); and the fact that what is begotten is not unbegotten, and what is seen is not invisible, does not make them birth and vision [1] 1421 . And in general, if something is said negatively, that it is not what it is not, then what is said positively about what is contemplated around it does not make it a relation. And one more thing: if this were so (although in fact it is not so), then this would in no way apply to natural energies, which are not rejected by the holy fathers along with the hypostases and do not divide the One into two, as the hypostases would do 1423. For who could show that, if the essential difference is obvious, it would not be correct to recognize natural energies in the same thing? And for what, and how, and what logos determines this, or [which] of the chosen fathers, so that it does not turn out that they [simply] declare it, [and do not prove it]? [204C] If it is not correct to profess natural energies, then neither are the natures themselves. Or how [is this possible]: these are this way, and these are different? If both are correct, then why do they rebel against the truth and deduce hypostasis from the fact that nature is not without hypostasis (ἀνυπόστατον)? After all, if they knew that the fathers equally distinguish [in Christ] both hypostases and energies, then it would not be unreasonable on their part to reject them. But since we know that the fathers preach energy, both Divine and human, as well as natures, but no one, in any way and in any respect, professes the Divine or human hypostasis, except only the separator and man-worshipper Nestorius; then why, if the teaching of the saints [fathers] is not despicable for them, do they thus philosophize against it, [204D] for the sake of the abolition of natural energies? Who else was capable of drawing such conclusions in a similar way, except Sevier, a wise man and a madman, who, due to the obviousness of the truth, quickly refutes his own teaching and does not prevail over the pious, although he plots shameless tricks in his senseless wisdom? [205A] After all, if the fact that nature is not non-hypostatic (ἀνυπόστατον) [2] makes it a hypostasis, then it undoubtedly follows from this: the fact that hypostasis is not non-essential (ἀνούσιον) 1424 shows that it is an essence. As for those who say this, do they not introduce division into the logos of theology through natures equivalent to hypostases, if not essenceless (ἀνούσιοι) hypostases, in their opinion, are always essences 1425? Do they not introduce fusion into the economy 1426 through the singularity of nature due to the unity of the hypostasis? After all, if they do not contradict themselves, then they will admit this to their own detriment 1427. For those who profess natural energies, even such conclusions are of benefit to them, for they acquire the truth for themselves in every way, according to the tradition of the saints [fathers], according to which the fact that nature is not hypostatic (ἀνυπόστατον) makes it not a hypostasis, but hypostatic (ἐνυπόστατον), so that it does not was perceived only by imagination as an accessory [property], [205B] and would be contemplated as a species [existing] in reality 1428. Also, the fact that hypostasis is not essenceless (ἀνούσιον) shows not that it is an essence, but that it is essential (ἐνούσιον), so that we recognize it not as a simple peculiarity, but, in fact, together with what this peculiarity [is] in 1429. Just as in that case, the hypostatic (ἐνυπόστατον) means ἐνύπαρκτον 1430, and ἐνύπαρκτον is involved in the essential and natural existence (ὑπάρξεως); so in this case ἐνεργόν or ἐνεργητικόν 1431 means, in fact, ἐνδύναμον 1432; and ἐνδύναμον – having essential and natural force. Therefore, to confess that Christ’s natures are not hypostatic (ἀνυποστάτους) and not inactive (ἀνενεργήτους) means not to deduce [new] hypostases or active ones, but to Orthodoxy confess in these [natures] the essential and natural existence and energies; [205C] for the sake of confirmation and certification of the truth of the incarnate God the Word, from them and in them (I mean the natures) existing and acting according to them in indissoluble unity. For what reason do they, with the words “all Divine and human energy” 1433 refer to one and the same countless energies - [208A] for [the word] "every" presupposes that we think not one, not two or three, but an innumerable multitude [of energies] - do not see any division in this; but - it is unknown how and why - do they derive this [division] (together with the [two] active ones) from the [teachings] of those who, according to the Divine Fathers, profess two natural [energies]? If many and different in nature [energies] do not divide and dissect the same thing into many active ones, then how can two [do] this? Who is more likely to complain that [the enemy's] accusations are unfounded? If they did not relate to one and the same those [energies] that have grown together in complete interpenetration, which are preserved in Him, [being] in indissoluble unity, [208B] and are set in motion by Him according to one and the other, but uniformly (ἑνοειδῶς) 1434, and with the help of which He divinely demonstrated the power of miracles, being God, and he accepted the experience of suffering voluntarily for our sake, being human by nature - [so, if they did not relate them to the same thing], then their accusations would not be so incongruous. In fact, since they say otherwise - [say] that they [belong to] the same [Christ], and trace them back to the same thing, then from where and how do they derive the [two] actors? And if this is justified, then why do they not first deduce many [acting] in their own [teaching], since we are talking about many energies? For if two [energies] mean two [actors], then, of necessity, many mean many. If the latter is not true, then why is the first true? Neither I nor, it seems to me, anyone else who prefers the true to the imaginary can understand this. [208C] And again: how do they, by way of objection (ἀντιφατικῶς), produce one instead of many [energies]? And which one exactly, and how do they profess it? After all, it is impossible for one and the same person to have both many [energies] and one. If there is a lot, then not one, but if there is one, then how many? Either one will drive out many, or many will drive out one, according to their teaching, according to which they put forward one [energy], rejecting the two natural ones. If it happens that they assert that one consists of many, then, as has already been said, [things] that are in the subject cannot by nature experience addition. [It is also impossible] for one of many to be cut into many. Let them first of all, through one energy, abolish many, so as not to bring many acting to their own detriment. [208D] Or 1435 let them abolish one by means of many, so that it does not [turn out that] they proclaim the descent into one essence (συνουσίωσιν), and even then, if they have strength left, let them argue with those who profess two [energies]. After all, it is absolutely impossible for them to attack others if they themselves refute themselves with their own arguments, and no one else is needed for this at all. That whose foundation is being is firmly based on it, without suffering any damage on any side. [209A] For only that which is supported by truth is truly powerful and strong, and not that which can be refuted by something else - not to mention “by itself.” It is fitting for us, the pious, of course, to renounce this [heresy] and, confessing the actual existence of each of the natures preserved in the one incarnate God the Word, unconditionally confess both the innate energy, as well as the will; through pious and true teaching about Him and about what is inherent in Him by nature (relative to Divinity and humanity) to support the Orthodox teaching of the holy fathers, [209B] who ordered the holy catholic Churches to think and speak about this in this way; not to deny anything of what He was originally and what He subsequently became for our sake, as well as none of all the characteristics that by nature determine both. After all, [the fathers] taught that He is perfect in both respects and in both natures, that He preserves without prejudice the natural characteristics of each [nature] from which He exists, and that He is in all respects similar to us and has voluntarily experienced the same, with the exception of sin alone. So, listening to their blessed voices, we do not deny from Him any of our natural [features], nor from the Fatherly and Divine, [209C] but we confess that one and the same had two different natures, natural energies and essential wills. After all, neither ours nor the Father’s nature is devoid of either essence, or innate will, or energy. If this is so, then it is obvious: [being] from these, that is, from Divinity and humanity, existing in one and the same hypostasis, being both truly God and man, [on the one hand,] is one with us in essence and energy and has the same innate will in humanity, and [on the other hand] is one with the Father in essence and energy and has the same will in Divinity; is related to both the higher, in all related [features], and the lower, in all related [features], with the exception of sin alone. [209D] And he who does not confess [Him] thus agrees not with God’s chosen fathers who proclaim this, but it is known with whom and with what [people] 1436. So let it be so that all of us, through the mediation of your godly prayers, in the church of God - in the catholic and apostolic Church, unceasingly preserved regarding soul and body, would honor this pure and Orthodox confession of the great God and our Savior in the presence of Him and every creature, [212A] instead of everything and first of all, would offer Him this [confession] at the hour of His most glorious appearance, be would be awarded equal [reward] from Him, would partake of the eternal and blessed gifts promised to those who openly confess Him before people, and, through [our] prayers, would actually enjoy what they have now tasted by faith, through the prayers and intercession of our glorious and most holy Most Pure Lady Theotokos and Ever-Virgin Mary and all the saints. Amen. [212B] 1. The invisible is the negation of the visible. What is affirmed is not affirmed in relation to vision, but in relation to the visible, which is the relation of the invisible, in other words, that to which the invisible has a relation. The relation of vision is not invisible, but blindness, in relation to which [vision] is affirmed 1437. 2. Those who say that there is no nature without hypostasis (ἀνυπόστατον) should object that there is no hypostasis without essence (ἀνούσιον). It should also be added: just as the fact that hypostasis is considered not to be without essence (ἀνούσιον), does not show that it is an essence - for the opposite would lead to division and merging both in the sacrament of theology and in the sacrament of economy - so also the fact that nature is considered not to be without hypostasis (ἀνυπόστατον), not suggests that she is a hypostasis. His own. About the terms [meaning] differentiation (διαστολῶν) [212C] Any differentiation of existing [things] is [distinction] either by opposition (κατ᾽ἐναντίωσιν), or by contradiction (κατὰ τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι) 1439, in other words, or by division (διαιρεῖσθαι), or by exception (ἀναιρεῖσθαι) 1440. For example, the sensible and the intelligible [are distinguished by] opposition, for they are of different essences, but one does not contradict the other. After all, these are not mutually exclusive [concepts], and therefore it is appropriate for them to be distinguished by opposition, in other words, by separation. Life and death are also differentiated, but not by opposition, but by contradiction, 1441, in other words, by exception; for the affirmation of one is the negation of the other, the existence of one is not the existence of the other. If it is initially given that something contradicts something, then, consequently, it is, of course, opposed to it; if it is initially given that something is opposed to something, then, consequently, it in no way contradicts it. [212D] To put it more clearly, essences, due to their inherent differences (διαφοράς), are appropriate for differentiation (διαστολήν), as, for example, the soul and the body, as well as all [things] different in essence. Those that are about essence, that is, qualities, are distinguished by contradiction, such as, for example, life and death or something similar. After all, these concepts are obviously mutually exclusive 1442. [213A] Opposition of minds as division; Consider contradiction as an exception. The first of them is in essences, the second is characteristic of [qualities] that are near the essence. With these latter, both surprisingly converge - both exclusion and separation. [Separation] is capable of dividing, but not excluding 1443. Terms [meaning] unity (ἑνώσεων) Unity in essence (κατ᾽οὐσίαν) is found in hypostases, that is, in individual [things] (ἀτόμων) 1445. Unity by hypostasis (καθ᾽ὑπόστασιν) – in essences, that is, in soul and body 1446. [213B] Unity in relation (κατὰ σχέσιν) – in intentions (γνωμῶν), [bringing them] into one will. Unity by arrangement (κατὰ παράθεσιν) – at the boards. Unity by articulation (κατὰ ἁρμονίαν) – in stones. Unity by fusion (κατὰ κρᾶσιν) – in liquid [substances]: in wine with water, and other similar ones. Unity by mixing (κατὰ φύρσιν) 1447 – in dry and liquid [substances]: in flour with water. Unity by fusion (κατὰ σύγχυσιν) – in melting [substances]: in wax with resin and the like 1448. Unity by pouring (κατὰ σωρείαν) – in dry [substances]: in cereals with barley, and the like. Unity by acquisition (κατὰ συναλοιφήν) - in things that are rejected and restored again: for example, in a torch, which comes from the fire and is again reunited with it 1449. Unity in essence – among those who have different hypostases 1450. Unity by hypostasis – among those who have different essences 1451. First aporia of Deacon Theodore, Byzantine rhetorician and synodicary of Archbishop Paul of Constantinople [216B] If the fathers attributed ignorance to Christ according to the same logos 1453 as the will, then the following is necessary: those who say that they perceive in Christ the will not by assimilation (κατ᾽ οἰκείωσιν) 1454 let them admit that He Himself does not know - but what kind of God is He, if He doesn't know the future? - and they will admit that He is a simple man, according to the already condemned heresy of the Agnoites 1455. If, ashamed of such absurdity, they speak of ignorance by assimilation, as well as of abandonment (ἐγκατάλειψιν) and disobedience (ἀνυποταξίαν), then let them, according to the same tropos 1456, speak of will. After all, the fathers put ignorance on a par with the will, preserving the same logos for it, [216C] as Athanasius says in his work against the Arians 1457, and Gregory the Theologian in the First Word on the Son 1458, and others [the fathers] in other works 1459. If every word and saying not spoken by the fathers is undoubtedly an innovation, [217A] then one of two things is necessary: ​​either to show that speaking about “natural wills” in Christ is [in accordance with] the saying of the fathers; or, if they cannot show this, then let them admit that, under the name of the fathers, they are introducing their own new teaching; or, if this is not the case, that they reinterpret the [fatherly] sayings for their own purposes and, [thus], [also] engage in the creation of [new] names. If the second is reprehensible, then, undoubtedly, so is the first. Monk Maxim to Presbyter Marin. Resolution the presuppositions of the aporia of the deacon and the rhetorician Theodore. Resolution of the first [aporia]. [217B] O most holy and revered father! 1460 The rhetorician's questions do not reveal the prudence of the aporia, but rather reveal its unreasonableness 1461, [derived] both from the lie itself and from discord in order to pervert the dogma of the Divine Incarnation of the Only Begotten. After all, the fathers did not attribute to Christ, as he claims, ignorance according to the same logos as will. Who could prove this? 1462 Although [our opponents], of course, as is typical for them, not only invent something that in no way exists, but also boldly put it forward in their own defense. Or, [in the first case], ignorance and will will have one and the same logos, bringing together what is truly in no way compatible, since the first means the negation of what exists, and the second - the affirmation of what exists; which is obviously impossible, for the same logos is by no means both possession and deprivation for both. For since the divine and great Gregory also mentions it (I am talking about ignorance) as proposed by the Arians, he thereby already shows that ignorance is not the same [according to logos] as will. Indeed, in the place where he discusses this, he does not mention will at all in open words. So, he says: “List me also the words that signify ignorance: “My Father and your Father” [John 20:17], “more than” [John 14:28], “created” [Mark 13:19], “sanctified” [John 10:36],” and so on 1464. If, [in the second case], they try to bring together ignorance and will only because he compared them, then, of course, “My Father”, and “your Father”, and “more” (everything that is said by the father), and “to create”, and “to sanctify” will be the same [according to the logos] as ignorance, for in the same row [with him], since he put these [concepts] on a par with ignorance. If the latter is a clouding of the mind, [220A] then the first is even more so – a clouding of those who think like this, not to mention expressing and writing it down. And one more thing: if ignorance and will have the same logos, then either those who desire by nature certainly do not know, or those who do not know by nature certainly desire 1465. Then it will turn out that God, who by nature desires, is subject to the disease of ignorance, and all inanimate [creatures], by nature ignorant, are moved by natural will. If this is so, then Christ Himself, being from the Divinity and humanity, who, as they say, has ignorance and will by assimilation, will certainly have ignorance by nature in relation to the Divine will. I'm not even talking about the fact that [the formulation] “by assimilation” is erroneous 1466; but even so it becomes clear [220B] that [in fact] they defend what they are fighting - they themselves confirm two wills, one by nature, the other by assimilation; that is, obviously, two, with equal ignorances 1467. And this is already absurd - to confess double ignorance in Christ, who does not even have one, but, on the contrary, completely destroys all [ignorance], for He is God's wisdom and power (see 1 Cor. 1:24). And what kind of assimilation are they talking about 1468? Is it about the essential (οὐσιώδη), according to which each [being] by nature assimilates what is natural to it? Or is it relative (σχετικήν), according to which we love (στέργομεν) and assimilate [what is inherent] by nature to another, despite the fact that we ourselves do not endure or realize any of this (ἐνεργοῦντες)? 1469 If the first, then they [thus] declare the incarnate God to be rather a simple man, for they teach that He is by nature ignorant. [220C] And if the second, then they [declare Him] not to be a man at all, but only an incorporeal God, for [then it turns out that He] in a simple respect (ἐν ψιλῇ σχέσει) assimilates the [features] of the flesh, and does not naturally assimilate the natural [features] of man, being and remaining God 1470. Indeed, in the [row] in which the teacher included ignorance, he obviously lists all the natural [features] of the incarnate God; such as, for example, the fact that He slept, was hungry, thirsted, worked, grieved, took upon Himself the crucifixion [torment] and death; and at the same time, both the resurrection and the ascension are what He saved [us], having voluntarily accepted it by nature and endured it for our sake 1471. So, if they teach that these [features] were in Christ by simple relative (ἐν ψιλῇ σχέσει) assimilation, and do not confess that these are natural [features] of the incarnate God as man, [220D] then what kind of [wickedness] will they then leave to Apollinaris and Mani 1472? After all, they surpassed Sevier in wickedness, or rather, in [blasphemous] sayings (ὑπεραυδήσαντες), for he did not so rebel against the truth, [221A] but still used the expression “natural features” (φυσικῶν ἰδιωμάτων), although he rejected the nature of the flesh, compressing different natures into one. This is what awaits those who confuse the unmixable, reject and distort the [holy] paternal meaning [of dogmas], which clearly places everything in the proper order. Therefore, the most blessed and God-bearing teacher in the Second Word about the Son explains [the question of] ignorance, defining as if according to a canon or model, whereas at first they brought it up for discussion without interpretation, catching the listener. [So, Gregory says]: “Let it be clear to everyone that as God He knows, but as a man He says that He does not know; if anyone separates what is manifest from what is intelligible" 1473. So, [Gregory] believes that ignorance [should] be understood only in the differentiation (διαστολῇ) of essences by imagination 1474, [221B] and natural wills, as well as every other natural [feature], with the exception of sin alone, should be cognized in the unity of natures according to the hypostasis of the Incarnate Word Himself, so that [existence] is fully confirmed. those of which, in which, and which He is 1475. So, if we consider ignorance in the distinction by imagination, then it is truly not His 1476, for it is not ours by nature, as a [natural] component; even if it is said that, due to ancient apostasy, [all] this is ours - ignorance, abandonment, disobedience, and disobedience 1477. What is in these [features] the logos of our nature or the [logos] that constitutes [our] essence? That is why we do not attribute these [features] to Christ, for they are not [inherent] at all in Christ; just as we do not attribute to Him, as I have already said, any other of those [features] that are recognized in the distinction by imagination. And this is very fair, [221C] for if we do not recognize the incarnate Word in differentiation and do not imagine Him by mere imagination, but believe that He exists in the complete unity of natures by hypostasis, then it is clear: none of the [peculiarities] perceived in division (ἐν διαιρέσει) by imagination is by no means [inherent] to Him. As truly inherent in Him, we confess only that which is natural [features] (as well as nature itself) and remains undamaged by sin - that which is actually preserved in the unity of the person and one, according to [the person], hypostasis, and thus is confessed by the pious. [221D] So, if the will is not natural, and does not constitute our essence, then let them prove it. And if it is natural (for man by nature is endowed with will) 1478, then [one of two things turns out]: either it exists and is cognized together with other [features] of the incarnate Word, which became essentially human and endowed with will according to both natures of which it consists; or other natural [features] together with it (that is, with natural will) will be cognized in division by simple imagination (κατ᾽ἐπίνοιαν ψιλῶς), and not truly and in reality; and then, according to their [opinion], the entire contemplation of the economy and initiation into it, or rather, in fact, the Incarnation itself, will be understood by them according to division and visible image (φαντασίαν) 1479, [224A] and according to unity, neither any natural [feature], nor even nature itself, will be recognized in Christ. After all, what does not have a natural [feature] will not have nature; just as where there truly is nature, there will invariably be its [peculiarities], without sin alone 1480. Therefore, they have no reason [to object] to the truth. After all, all imagination is eliminated in every possible way, so that [they can] joyfully welcome [the truth] and sincerely confess it with us; do not rely on the arguments of your weak, as if from a cobweb, mind, but believe in Him Orthodoxy - that of which Christ is, in such Christ is; in whom Christ is, such is Christ. Christ is both God and man, [224B] He is both in the Divinity and in humanity, He is united from the Divinity and from humanity 1481. The same Saint Maximus resolves the second absurdity As for showing what the fathers say about natural wills, we will show this when [our opponents] are able to listen, or, more precisely, they wish, for they have blocked the auditory ability of the soul for everything divine and [holy] paternal. If they wish to cleanse it of discord, as if from some kind of illness, and carefully, or rather impartially, fix the eyes of the mind on the shining and sacred lamp of the teaching handed down by the fathers, then they, of course, will understand: [224C] what [the fathers] mention about “natural wills” [is evident from the fact that] they all together speak and teach in direct words about “natural desire”, “an innate desire”, about “the flesh, endowed by nature with an unwillingness to die, for [death] is the condemnation of nature” 1482. And “how is it possible,” says [the teacher of Nyssa], “a common will in both [natures]? Where would the difference in [human] nature be found with a single will? After all, it is absolutely necessary that nature be accompanied by desire (βούλησιν)” 1483. And “so that nature does not want to die, but holds on to real life” 1484. And “just as hunger and thirst are not a crime, so is the desire to preserve real life” 1485. And “that the desire for the present is inherent in nature” 1486. And the fact that the flesh that He took on for our sake, along with all the features inherent in its nature, “[endowed] with evasion from death” 1487. [224D] This is the teaching of Saints Athanasius, Basil, Gregory, John, Theophilus, Cyril and other chosen fathers. What, beyond this, could be any more convincing proof that they speak of “natural wills”? What kind of objection is possible and from whose side is it possible, while in these sayings there is neither ambiguity nor any obscurity? Consequently, we do not introduce new words, as opponents claim, but we profess paternal sayings; nor do we engage in the creation of names, reinterpreting [these sayings] for our own purposes - for this is a daring matter and the invention of a crazy heretical mind - [225A] but as they were comprehended and expressed by the saints themselves, so we piously [for discussion] put them forward. Where and what reason will they find to think differently, but to believe differently and contrary to this - if they generally want to be pious and not deviate from their father’s teaching? After all, if they assume [wills] hypostatic, that is, belonging to a person, [rejecting] 1488 natural ones, then, of course, they will at the same time introduce the difference of persons, or that which is contrary to nature, and [thus it turns out that] they preach the disappearance of essences, plunging into oblivion (ἀνυπαρξίαν) nature, or rather, themselves 1489. After all, any of the [wills] belonging to a person, or those that are contrary to nature - if we assume that such things can be spoken of at all - does not exist [at all], for it is not at all cognizable after the abolition of wills by essence 1490. [225B] The wills of Christ - [called] Divine and human, or deifying and deified, or created and uncreated, or [in any other way] as they wish - [so, the wills of Christ] we are instructed to piously call natural, desiring to designate the natural difference of those of which He is composed. After all, if, according to the Fathers, “it is absolutely necessary that nature should be accompanied by desire,” and, therefore, it is impossible to assume a “common will in both” essences and “the difference of [human] nature with a single will is not revealed” 1491, then it is clear that one should, of course, talk about two natural wills, so that, according to the Fathers, the difference of essences in Christ would be known “unfused and indivisible” 1492. How will they respond to this? What kind of creation of names will they imagine, reinterpreting the fatherly [sayings] for their own purposes? [225C] What wills, according to their desire, should the pious choose, if natural wills are abolished? Are [wills] really belonging to a person? Who then will bear the dissection of the faces of 1493? Or [will] contrary to nature? But who will endure the abyss of evil and non-existence into which they will soon plunge themselves? However, we can be grateful to them for the fact that, having abandoned the struggle against the [dual] number of wills, they turned to the doctrine of their nature (φυσιολογίαν). Perhaps we will allow them to do this: let them call [the wills] as they please, omitting their number - until, having better learned what an absurdity comes from an inappropriate name and what an unpleasant end it will lead to for them, they themselves agree to confess, according to the fathers, natural wills 1494. [225D] Who would not marvel at their rotation! How they, making various circles and loops, contrive to destroy the great mystery of the Divine economy for our sake! Then they put forward the will against natural energies [and thus] honor one energy instead of two, introducing it, as they say, together with [one] will; then [they put forward] ignorance against two wills, so that the will, together with ignorance, is abolished and is considered one of the external [properties]; then through “assimilation” [they introduce] a complete negation of all natural [features] and, [228A] as I have already said, the complete destruction of the sacrament, so that all these [peculiarities] with Him are understood by them in a simple relation, and are not cognized as natural [features] of the incarnate God as a man, [inherent] to Him in unity. One should, [meanwhile], not deviate from the truth, but, on the contrary, completely agree with it and defend it, so as to fully sincerely believe and firmly confess the [two] natures of one and the same Christ our God and the inherent [peculiarities] of [His] natures, to whom be glory with the Father and the Holy Spirit forever and ever. Amen. Dogmatic Tomos to Presbyter Marinus 1496 [228B] Whose mind (λόγος) is adorned with virtues, his mind is illuminated by the graces of knowledge, leading the mind out of all oblivion in the same way as the virtues distance the mind from seduction (ἀπάτης) 1497 , and leading to initiation into the Unseen to the extent that 1498 they encourage one to imitate Him as revealed for our sake 1499. Having indicated this in the Holy Spirit to those, God-honored Father, competing with someone in the harmony of holy morals and even more holy deeds, you yourself have greater glory than they have, as far as the effort you can make, making the limit of the distance 1500 its length (ἐπέκτασιν) 1501, and the words - ever-moving ascent to the Word. And you do this in order to be able to surpass both nature and images (τύπους) to pass through everything, and in purity to converse with the purest, according to the humiliation of oneself in everything and before everyone, and according to such a perfect transition, [228C] which leads to an endless happy flow 1502, by grace bypassing and surpassing everything limited and preparing for that, in order to firmly enter into the Holy of Holies, - where for our sake the Forerunner entered in that which corresponds to us, Jesus who is higher than us (see Heb. 6:20), - preparing the one [229A] who actively “from glory to glory” [2 Cor. 3:18] through virtue ascends to Him, and from knowledge to knowledge passes with the knowledge of heaven (see Heb. 4:14), and covered in mystery with the most vocal silence according to the abandonment of all mental activity unknown (ἀγνώστως) 1503 meets the “Father of spirits” [Heb.12:9] 1504. Through grace and blessed zeal for the sacred rites, supernaturally elevated by Him, you raise up those like me, cast down to the ground, sympathetically extending your hand to them through the letter and the meaning [logos] - through the speculation hidden in the letter, convincing through zeal to inwardly move away from those who lead away from God and irresistibly with all your heart [strive 1505] to Him alone - and with Him uniting - love. In accordance with it, as uncomplicated and formless, you encourage us to discard all duality (including the cover of the very form of connection 1506 consciousness 1507 and appearance), [229B] and practice a truly blessed and manifesting virtue. Strengthened by your most sacred prayers, I may be able to achieve it, leaving behind “sin that easily clings” [ Heb. 12:1 ]. And since, again awakening my thinking for work, and intending to cleanse the premises of my soul from all ignorance, you commanded me to carefully examine the word of the most divine and great mentor of the holy [229C] Church of the citizens of Theopolis 1508 bearing the name of the Resurrection 1508 (or what is the same - the Universal Church) 1510 against the “Mediator” (Διαιτητοῦ) (but rather, strictly speaking, the Separator (Διαιρετοῦ) 1511 - to explore how completely he separates both from God and from us, through the extreme transformation and confusion of God 1512 who became man for us, and the consubstantial generation of the Father, our Lord Jesus Christ, and in what sense he says that He has one energy, while teaching that the energies are natural. It is him [Anastasia] that I propose as a wise interpreter, teaching the meaning of this (since it belongs to him) expression and defining it exclusively as an indissoluble unity of energies inherent in nature, that is, the result they produce (ἀποτέλεσμα) - I’m talking about deed (ἔργον) 1513, that is, action (πρᾶξιν), as pointing at these energies and detecting them; [229D] if some [case 1514] has been attached to a name that corresponds to “energy”, since, being in the proper sense, of course, something particular (μερικόν), it is also universal (καθολικόν). After all, since [a thing] is produced by an essential energy corresponding to a natural feature, it belongs to the category of the particular - just as this energy that produces it belongs, on the contrary, to the category of the universal 1515. Indeed, for the particular (ἰδικά) it is natural to associate with the names of generic (γενικῶν) concepts, [232A] and for the universal - to be reflected in the existence of the particular, although not to associate with its name, so as not to be able to become in some sense special and be classified as a particular 1516. Indeed, as I said, having named the result - or, rather, the action (πρᾶξιν) - of these two energies inherent in nature (as both absorbing into itself according to their combination), based on their corresponding name, this teacher spoke of one energy, so that nothing Divine or human would be performed separately, but would be produced by the same [actor], together fused (συμφυῶς) and united (ἡνωμένως), according to unique interpenetration (περιχώρησιν) 1517 - although, of course, he did not say thereby that He has one essential energy in the sense of natural peculiarity (ἰδιότητα); just as well as the fact that, by virtue of the very singularity of one person (προσώπου), He has one essence and nature, not participating in any of those of which it is composed 1518. [232B] After all, even in the combination of natures, their difference (διαφορά) 1519 in essence is preserved, entirely along with itself rightfully preserving the difference 1520 of the properties essentially inherent in these natures. And, announcing this in the very word on which he labored against the “Mediator,” he, having first very skillfully distinguished between the natural characteristic, suitable (ἐπιτηδείως) for energy, and the energy itself, coming out of this fitness into deed 1521, that is, into action, puts it this way: “Therefore, Christ has one energy” (and gives the reason: so that nothing Divine or human should be fulfilled separately 1522), “we also affirm.” [232C] And having thus indicated the basis (λόγον) of the connection, he also gives the basis of the essential difference 1523, saying: “And not that this particularity itself is one - let it not be! After all, the peculiarity of Divinity and humanity is not the same” (a peculiarity suitable, according to him, for the outflow of energy - of course, natural). Below he returns to this: “And besides, generally speaking, it is absolutely necessary for energies, even from any natures, if they come together, to be one, that is, in the sense of community given by connection and practical completion itself (συμπεράσματος); and it must be called a feature of one nature without merging (for which, on the other hand, it is perhaps impossible to imagine a place of merging).” This father explained his thought more clearly than ever through his characteristic expressions, saying that Christ’s energy alone is not essential, [232D] so that fusion and confusion could not be introduced into His parts; and not hypostatic at all, so that disunion and separation with the poles could not occur in Him - I’m talking about the beginningless Father and His immaculate Mother 1524. After all, He clearly differs from them in hypostasis and hypostatic characteristics. However, what does he say? - “One - in the sense of community given by the connection and the practical completion itself.” Which is what he defined above as “deed and deed,” without leaving any loophole for those who want to mix or those who want to separate; but having driven away the former by notifying what is, primarily and by nature, a peculiarity of the humanity corresponding to Him, and what is the super-essential Divinity; and reversing the second by not splitting or dividing any of the same energies. For the name "energy," commonly used to designate the movement 1525 - both simple, [233A] and observable in relation - or its very result, does not introduce confusion into these things, so long as the understanding of what is meant by them is definitely different. According to him, we inseparably preserve the differences of the 1526 natures that came into the essential confluence of natures, and indissolubly recognize the features that distinguish one from the other 1527 for the sake of union and each from the whole, which for the sake of existence is composed of them - so that we do not mix according to it, nor according to their characteristics, of course, we do not separate them, but we maintain the difference as far as the definitions of essences are concerned, and their connection is strong we are drawn in by the principles of existence [logoi] of the same hypostasis 1528. So, and for these reasons, this - and another, whatever the chosen one, that is, the divine - father thinks (as I already, it seems, wrote) that Christ has both one energy and two 1529; [233B] the first is by paying attention to the combination of energies corresponding to nature (as, of course, the natures), and the second is to their essential difference. And with this, it means that this is the case. And regarding his 1530 interpretation of the saying of the theologian and great preacher of the Church Gregory, asserting that: “this word was spoken on behalf of a person not such as we understand in the Savior (His desire 1531 (θέλειν), as completely deified (θεωθὲν ὅλον), not contrary to God)" 1532, I believe that it 1533 was due to a completely pious intention, in defense - and based on - of which, he 1534 was forced by Philoponus to work seriously 1535; but which slightly lacks precision of expression, because of which people, greedy for everything and down-to-earth, even more manage to make their attacks - or, rather, attacks - and do not care about anything more than about researching and looking for vice in statements that are completely and in all respects reliable and [233C] leave no loophole for undermining their meaning; people who have not grasped from any side the meaning of a simple expression, which, moreover, stems from a pure and unfeigned intention: to recognize and affirm the essential and natural desire of the animate flesh previously received from us (that is, the human principle that corresponds to the Savior), as follows from the words of this God-possessed father [Anastasia]: “for His desire is wise and prudent (περιεσκεμμένον)" 1536, from which the essential difference 1537 of this flesh is revealed with His Divine nature and Fatherly principle 1538, which in no way allows, together with the sacrament that corresponds to Christ, their fusion to occur. [233D] The fact that, as if on the basis of some manuscripts, [this phrase] θεωθὲν ὅλον is read with a sharp emphasis on the penultimate syllable, ([will] is all from God), and not on the last, (all deified) 1539 - so that opponents do not have to introduce a single will - creates a pretext for the accusation against us that we supposedly mean a relative and hypostatic unity 1540 , by grace and by dignity 1541 - pointing out that the saints also are primarily from God [236A] moved and put into action, because of their entire inclination and disposition towards God and the Divine. After all, placing the stress in θεωθεν on the last syllable does not lead to the conclusion that to will as a person - in the sense in which the Savior is - is identical with [the action of] His essential [Divine] and natural will (for who can prove this?), and 1542 inspires the idea of ​​the most perfect union and fusion 1543. After all, the word “deified”, since it belongs to the category of something said in relation to something - well, just like “burnt”, “illuminated” and anything of that kind - certainly brings with it the relation of connection with this “something” (namely, deifying, burning, illuminating), so that the relationship of difference and perfect union is not violated in either direction. After all, not being in discord is not enough for union; for everything that is natural, that is, impeccable (ἀδιάβλητον) 1544, [236B] is not contrary to God, but is not necessarily united with Him. And the deified, although it is certainly united in all respects, does not lose its essential difference 1545, since even in the sense of connection it exists unmerged. But, let’s say, someone says: “Even if we admit that nothing natural is in discord with God, how did he say about the natural will that corresponds to us (if this father inadvertently mentioned it in 1546), that it “does not always follow” God, but “for the most part resists and opposes”? After all, either it is not natural, since it opposes, or it does not oppose, since it is natural. [236C] Otherwise, all that remains is to admit that in its natural quality it opposes the will of the human will, corresponding to the Savior, if the latter is really in no way at odds with God, but the former is in discord” 1547. To this we say that, indeed, that by virtue of which it is natural 1548 is not in discord, but that by virtue of which its movement emanating from us is unnatural 1549 is clear that it is in discord and for the most part resists, which is accompanied by sin. After all, the will, contrary to the principle [logos] and the law of nature, exists through [tropos - τρόπῳ] movement corresponding to the incorrect use of 1550 ability (δυνάμεως) 1551, and not due to the principle [logos] corresponding to its nature, since if it is formed and moves naturally, then it remains, if not in unity, then still in agreement (συμβαῖνον) 1552, and not in discord with God. In nature there is no basis [logos] either for the supernatural or for the unnatural and rebellious. [236D] That is why this teacher did not declare that he never, that is, in no case, follows (our will is following God), but softened it, saying: “since [should] not always” and “[should not] for the most part,” which additionally implies: “[should] sometimes, that is, in rare cases” - due to the difficulty of elevating most people to virtue. After all, the will of the human will, as it was with the Savior, although it was natural, was not simply human, as it is with us; just as precisely as this human will itself - since it surpasses us, being completely deified by union (with which, in fact, its sinlessness is connected). And ours is obviously simply human, and cannot in any way be called sinless, because of the deviation that occurs here and there, which does not change the nature, but distorts the movement or, more precisely, perhaps changes its image [tropos]. And this is clear from the fact that much of what we do is unreasonable, and at the same time there is no transformation of the essence inherent in us from birth from reasonable to unreasonable. [237A] So, no other human will corresponds to the Savior than that which corresponds to us, and no other volition - at least as regards the definition [logos] of nature, although in other respects it surpasses us 1553; after all, He hypostasized divinely, and that was formed, through the most perfect unity with the Divine. As for the fact that, as most befits nature, we adapt, in turn, each of the qualities that have become the subject of censure in us 1554, such as confrontation or opposition, and everything that comes across from this list (and to which the distinguishing natures mentally, without separating, approach as a second nature (τῇ ἑξῆς φύσει)), to take into account, then it is by no means humanity corresponding to Christ is destined to be among them. After all, if these qualities do not look natural, but are contrary to nature and reason even in us, then how can they be tied to Him, even through thought, or, better yet, speculation? Unless by assimilation, through sympathy, “as to the Head of the whole body” 1555; [237B] in the same way as to a doctor - the sufferings and passions 1556 of the patient, until God, who became human for us, frees us from them - not otherwise than completely spending for us and expelling us from us by the power of the possession of the body 1557 corresponding to Him. After all, they talk about suffering and passions, respectively, in two senses: in one they are punishment 1558, and in the other dishonor 1559; and in the first they manifest, and in the second they completely distort the character of our nature. So, He, as a man for our sake, of His own will, perceived the essence, at the same time becoming the guarantee of our nature and canceling the sentence passed on us; and this, in turn, as a lover of mankind, he acquired for himself economically, recognizable as one of us and by our rebellious disposition [tropos] 1560, so that, having completely destroyed it for us, like fire wax or the sun of the evaporation of the earth, He could give us His properties and make us impassive already here, and incorruptible according to promise. [237C] It is necessary, therefore, first of all to approve the zeal and work of the one who strives for such subjects for the sake of piety, but to encourage more careful care for the words of the fathers, because of the detractors of the beautiful, out of excessive bewilderment, they do not concede even that which, with all their desire, is impossible for them to grasp 1561. As for the Pope of the Romans Honorius 1562, I think that in the letter written to Sergius, he used the expression “one will” 1563, he did not refuse, but rather agreed to recognize in Christ the duality of wills inherent in natures, that is, he composed it as it should; He did not say this on the basis of denying the human and natural will of the Savior, but to the fact that the will of the flesh and passionate thoughts were by no means a prerequisite for His virgin birth and incorruptible birth 1564. After all, only the Divine, that is, the Fatherly, will did this - through the Son, personally performing His own incarnation, and with the accompaniment (συνδρομῇ) of the Holy Spirit 1565. And that Honorius really holds this opinion is clear from here. After all, having already said that as a result of the inexpressible [240A] union of human and Divine natures, it is said that “God suffered,” and that “humanity came down from Heaven along with the Divinity,” and that this reveals the properties naturally inherent in each of the two natures of one Christ and the Son, an interchange (ἐπαλλαγήν) corresponding to their most perfect exchange [of properties] (ἀντίδοσιν), he concludes: “Why and one will we confess our Lord Jesus Christ.” How can he say this? - “Since from the side of the Divine our nature is obviously received, it is not a sin” 1566 - he almost literally echoes the great Athanasius, writing against the wicked Apollinaris: “Born of a woman, having restored to Himself the nature [form] from the first creation of man, having as proof flesh without carnal wills and human thoughts, in the form of newness; [240B] after all, there is only one will of the Divine, since all nature is Divine” 1567. Indeed, since because of us and through us there was an exit (πρόοδος) 1568 of the Divinity in the birth of the Word according to the flesh, which became higher than possible for us, it was not preceded by the will or thought of the excited passion of the flesh that determined it, as is observed with us due to pleasure (which has taken possession of the deception of our race), but only the will of the Divinity through the Son, Who, as I said, He Himself creates His corporeality - with the favor of the Father and with the assistance of the Most Holy Spirit - renewing in Himself and through Himself the image [tropos] of birth brought into our nature and creating without seed His conception from the Holy Theotokos and Ever-Virgin Mary. It was precisely this ineffable principle [logos] of His birth that the theologian said: “He has only one will - [240C] Divinity,” and this one says: “The will of our Lord Jesus Christ is one, since from the side of the Divine our nature is obviously received, and not sin” - “without carnal wills and human thoughts,” as the divine Athanasius says, but, of course, not that as a man to Him, - at the same time, in order to be God by nature, - not to have a human natural will, just as certainly, of course, as the Father’s Divine will. He further hints at the same thing, asserting: “He was conceived without sin by the Holy Spirit and the holy, immaculate and ever-virgin Mother of God Mary, and without defilement He came from Her in the flesh.” He cites the Divine Scripture [240D] as mentioning the flesh both in a praiseworthy and in a reproachful sense; [241A] not as being different in nature and essence from ours (let it not be!) inspiring to think of the flesh of the Lord - about which he knew definitely that it was received from our essence, or, more precisely, from the one-natural womb of the Ever-Virgin and Mother of God - but as different from ours in regard to sinfulness, as in no way having, unlike us, in its members a law derived from crime and opposing the law of the spirit 1569. “The Savior did not accept,” he says, “the flesh that was corrupted by sin and opposed to the law of His mind.” For whoever, as a prerequisite, was not preceded by the law of birth from seed corresponding to sin, does not have it at all in his members, but there is a law of divine righteousness, manifested to be a model for us, [241B] and completely nullifying the law introduced into our nature by crime 1570 . After all, the Sinless One says: “He came to seek and save what was lost” [Luke 19:10], that is, the nature of the human race that had fallen into sin. “For there arose not another law in His members [Rom. 7:23], that is, a dissimilar will (διάφορον), that is, opposed (ἐναντίον)” 1571 to the Father 1572. He who said this clearly indicates here not that He did not have a human natural will, but that as a man He did not acquire either, according to the body (through its members), any unnatural energy, nor, moreover, according to the soul, the opposite, that is, contrary to the logos, movement of the will (exactly like us), “since He was born and outside the law of human nature.” And further he shows even more clearly that the meaning of what he said was to exclude from the Savior only passionate, but not natural will. [241C] And that in fact He, on the one hand, in His natural human will converged (συνέβαινε) 1573 with the Fatherly, Divine, without having any dissimilarity (διαφοράν) with it, due to opposition to it 1574, but by His own example teaching us to voluntarily subordinate His, and on the other hand, he represented the Father’s for us, so that we, carefully imitating, could, putting aside our own, through all possible diligence, fulfill the Divine. He says 1575 about it this way: “Even if it is written: “For I came to do not My own will, but that of the Father who sent me,” 1576, and: “Not what I want, but everything that You would want, Father,” 1577, this is not a dissimilar” (that is, opposing, or opposing) “will of manifestation, but perceived according to the economy of man.” dispensations,” compassionately assimilating ours to Himself. [241D] “For our sake, after all, the Teacher of piety spoke these words, with which he gave us a lesson, so that we could follow in His footsteps 1578 and so that each of us in every matter would prefer not his own will, but, on the contrary, the will of the Lord.” Therefore, as I said, he does not take away the natural human will from Him, but the passionate, that is, unnatural, and, speaking in general, calls on God incarnate for our sake [244A] to testify 1579 that what corresponds to us is free from all sin. And in short, with the expression “one will,” he, I think, shows that only the Divine will preceded His birth in the flesh, and with the words: “there is no dissimilarity of will” - that it was not contrary or opposing, but entirely converging and united (τὸ συμβαῖνον δι’ ὅλου καὶ ἡνωμένον) 1580 . Therefore, when he says that “our nature is received from the side of the Divine,” he reminds us of a single will, and when he proposes for discussion: “I came to do the will that is not My own,” he says, omitting the number: “These are manifestations of a non-dissimilar” (that is, opposite, or opposite) “will,” from which the presence in the Savior of two wills corresponding to nature is obviously deduced 1581. [244B] After all, if He did not have a contrary will, He had, like a man, a natural one. After all, what is not disgusting to God is natural in all respects, and no one will object to it - after all, in nature (or in that which corresponds to nature) there is absolutely nothing contrary to God. So, it is dangerous for those who hold the opposite opinion to introduce 1582 into his words what he actually did not write, and try to make this man’s letter a cover for his own opinion (as not the best), reinterpreting these things in a different way, contrary to what he meant. After all, he has his own word as a defender in court, reflecting any slanderous attack. And its meaning, being cleared of all suspicion, as I understand it, is exactly this. And I received even more firm confirmation of this from the most reverend presbyter, lord and Abba Anastasius 1584 - a man adorned like no other with divine virtue and understanding - who returned from Rome, which is older than ours, 1585 [244C] and said that he had a long conversation with the most sacred men of the great Church there about the letter sent from them to Sergius, which consisted in questioning why and how the expression “single will” was inserted into it. He found them annoyed by this and making excuses, and besides them, his most holy collaborator, Mr. and Abba John, dictated this letter in Latin on the orders of Honorius, insisting that they did not mention the will in any way, one in all respects, even down to the number, although this has now been added by those [244D] who translated the letter into Greek. And, of course, not the abolition of 1587, [245A] that is, the rejection of the natural will of the Savior, corresponding to the human principle in Him, but the taking away and complete deliverance from the will, condemned and corresponding to us (according to which the war of the same tribe breaks out against each other) 1588, since they wanted to show that the flesh He assumed was pure from all sin - according to the Tradition of the most sacred sayings and fatherly teachings. And due to this kind of their judgments, they 1589 find themselves in some way echoing what was just expressed by my insignificance and, as it were, sealing what was said in defense of Honorius with their seal. Having found out that they were justified in this, I, of course, was very surprised at their thoroughness and was equally amazed at the cunning of those who dare to do anything for the sake of the wicked defense of “one” and are ready, as has long been their custom, through some kind of forgeries [245B] and reinterpretations, to attract those who zealously struggle against them, no matter how incredible, to their side, and to give their thoughts a meaning that is not the following. So, out of necessity, having learned this, I informed you, revered father, so that, protected on all sides, you could repel the enemy’s phalanxes, tirelessly striking with words and winning through the strength of faith, and already here, as the glory of the winner, having the glory of the Only Begotten, and as a diadem, communion and unity with Him by grace. But, my most sacred and precious soul, tell this to the one who presides as hierarch 1590 [245C] in the affairs of our immaculate, that is, Orthodox faith, under whose wings we all, near and far, will find holy peace, having as the only basis of the most sacred dogmas the blessed illumination received from him and through him, by which we are guided and raised in the Spirit to to the unshaded Father's Light; looking to him 1591 as “the leader of our salvation” [ Heb. 2:10 ] (after Him who is by nature and first), godly straightening our paths, hastening towards a life not destroyed by corruption, but consisting of incorruption. Just as here we participate in it through hope through his divinely inspired prayers and divinely wise teachings, so there we wish through his divinely active [theurgic] mediation and leadership to be honored to participate in it through experience due to our [245D] abiding and perfection in the Word Himself and the Lord our God Christ Jesus. His own. On quality (ποιότητος), peculiarity (ἰδιότητος) and difference (διαφορᾶς) to Theodore, deacon in Mazaria [Sicily] I do not think that you, most sacred ones, need the knowledge of any other of all [people], for you, through simple virtue, have already acquired that only thing - [248A] [the ability] to appeal to the rationally wise Holy Spirit, from whom you exude the Divine on others, pouring out inexhaustible gifts of wisdom; by uttering words, you perform such a [generous] outpouring of thoughts that you humanely extend it even to such humble people as me, who are not involved in any word, of course, in order to [introduce] Divine knowledge and education; even if, as I understand it, experiencing condescension, you ask questions so that we, lying somewhere below and oppressed by ignorance, can be led forward and, even more accurately, by extreme [self-] humiliation, raised to the height of your own knowledge; so that, by condescension cleansing my mind from negligence, and by inspiration from foolishness, I may lead [me] to the possession of knowledge and to zealous and active determination - because it is precisely because of these [properties] that salvation is given to those who are saved by grace, [248B] with the support of those like you, who are worthy to save the worthy. I am talking about what you, in order to educate [me], ordered to explain - about quality, peculiarity and difference. Among the pagan [philosophers] (παρὰ τοῖς ἔξω) 1593 the meaning of these [words] is varied; to fully express their differences in this and [to compose] a lengthy speech about them would be too long - and not commensurate with a letter, but with a detailed essay 1594. In the divine fathers, on the contrary, [the meaning of] these [words] is explained consistently and clearly - they do not designate any subject (ὑποκειμένου), that is, essence and nature, but what is contemplated in the essence, as well as in the hypostasis 1595. [248C] An essential quality 1596 is called, for example, that a person is reasonable, and a horse neighs 1597 , while a hypostatic quality is that a certain person has an aquiline nose or a snub nose 1598 , or a certain horse has a piebald or white color. The same is true for all other born entities and hypostases - quality is contemplated in existing [things] according to the general (κοινῶς) or specifically (ἰδικῶς), in other words, collectively (καθολικῶς) 1599 or in particular (μερικῶς), and by it the difference between species and individual [things] is recognized, [249A] which reveals the true [essence] of things. As for the unborn and autocratic nature, in relation to it there is no talk at all about any quality in the proper sense (κυρίως). After all, the Divinity is not from any essence and incidental [properties] (συμβεβηκότων), since otherwise it would be created, as complex and consisting of these [parts]. In a figurative sense (καταχρηστικῶς) and as far as possible, using ours, to depict what is above us, for there is no other way, namely in this way we are able to perceive at least unclear knowledge about those [things] and at least somehow, even imperfectly, explain them in words - [249B] [so, in a figurative sense] natural qualities are the most holy, omnipotent, all-perfect, super-perfect, self-sufficient, autocratic, all-seeing, as well as everything else that is called natural and Divine and, as super-essential, befits only God 1600. The hypostatic qualities [are as follows]: the Father has the unbegotten, the Son has the begotten, and the Holy Spirit has the proceeding; in other words, unbornness, birth and procession. They are also called peculiarities, since they are naturally or hypostatically inherent only in one person and not in anyone else. Of these, 1601 essential and hypostatic differences are made up, for God, as I said, in a figurative sense, 1602, and for all those born - in their own sense and by nature. That is why they say that these [concepts] are identical with each other - [249C] I mean quality, peculiarity and difference - and retain the meaning of 1603 accessory [properties], and not of any subject, in other words, essence. They differ, [as they say], in that quality is [something] more general, and [it is said about it] simply and about everyone, for none of the existing [things], except God, is devoid of either quality (for it is not independent (ἄσχετον)) or eidos; peculiarity is [something] particular, for it is spoken of in relation to quality and not in general (ὁπωσοῦν) and simply, but in a certain way (τοιῶσδε) - about a certain essence, and not any other; difference is [something] constituting (συστατικήν) and determining (ἀφοριστικήν) 1604 essences 1605. That is why they call it that, calling it constituent difference, which, as I have already said, delimits what exists according to essence, and nature, and according to face, and hypostasis, and in any case eradicates any transformation and fusion 1606. [249D] This is, briefly speaking, the judgment and interpretation regarding quality, peculiarity and difference, according to the teaching of the [holy] fathers. It is inconceivable that any of them would exist—or could be conceived—without the underlying essence of which each of them is and is called; [252A] for it is said that quality, peculiarity and difference [are] inherent in the essence, and not in itself 1607 . The one who speaks (λέγων) differently is unreasonable (ἠλόγησε), for he, contrary to reason (λόγον), has departed from the natural meaning (λόγου) 1608. The only one who, in spite of everything, retreated from him is the insane wise man Sevier: he invents and imagines something in no way and in no way [that does not exist] and affirms in Christ the difference of qualities devoid of essence, in order to reveal Him as non-existent, by removing the natures of which and in which He consists, and with them their qualities 1609. After all, they could not exist if natures were excluded, so that in them (that is, in qualities) and even from them Christ could not exist as a hypostasis (ὑφιστᾶν); even if this unfortunate person portrays Him as complex and [thereby] leads to a complete denial of Him. [252B] Complex nature is not God and not the [nature] of God, for otherwise every complex nature would be by nature God. If every complex nature is God by nature, then, according to [Sevirus], the uncomplicated Father is not God. After all, if the complex is God by nature, then the uncomplicated is not God by nature. And if, [in his opinion], the uncomplicated is also God by nature, then this atheist and God-fighter showed himself to be some kind of polytheist, who did not recognize that He who truly existed as God also became flesh, but at the same time in a complex hypostasis 1610 retained [his inherent] natural simplicity and uncomplicatedness according to the Father, being by nature God and from God 1611, although He was born man from men through man and above humans, by perceiving the flesh, which has an intelligent soul. However, this inhuman does not recognize God made human even as a man, for he denies His human nature, along with the Divine. [252C] He does not consider [the Savior], according to the [holy] fathers, to be two-natural (διφυᾶ), in other words, double in nature, but believes Him to be complex and somehow not genuine (νόθον) 1612, rivaling the abomination of Apollinaris. Abolishing in this way the great sacrament of economy for our sake, this wicked man, being a skillful twister, skillfully abuses names - he makes it so that the forgery he actually commits cannot be exposed in any way, and seems to incite the feeling to the perception of wickedness. He allegedly calls [the Savior] both God and man, but at the same time abolishes the true exact meaning of both names - after all, he does not profess nature, to which, obviously, [both] names refer. And he speaks of difference without [in fact] recognizing any difference, for, according to him, no different things are subject to nature. [252D] [He does all this in order] to allow fusion by introducing one complex nature, and by denying natures to affirm non-existence; so that it would seem that with names he covers abolition, and with difference he crushes fusion. This is the truly villainous cunning plan of this villain, hidden in the darkness of ignorance and darkening those caught. It is to them - for they extend speeches in his defense of 1613 - and one should turn and ask them [the following question]: if, as you believe, Sevier, following the Monk Cyril, professes difference, [253A] rejecting acquisition (συναίρεσιν), then how come he, together with [Cyril], does not profess nature, and in [natures] does not recognize, according to him, essential difference 1614, denying only division (διαίρεσιν), but, [on the contrary], contrary to the law and definition [of Cyril], affirms difference in simple qualities alone? After all, the fact that Blessed Cyril professes natures in which he affirms difference is clear from the fact that he considered it worthy to agree with Nestorius, who affirmed division (διῃρημένῳ), only in the confession of natures, but not in all of his views. After all, the teacher says: “What do I have in common with Nestorius? What I say is that the two are two natures, even to the point of recognizing the difference between the flesh and God the Word; for the flesh, in relation to Him, is different in natural quality and heterogeneity (οὐχ ὁμογενές) of essence” 1615. [253B] So, if [Cyril] confesses both natures, and recognizes the difference between them, and piously explains the reason for such a confession, saying: “for the flesh, in relation to the Word, is different in natural quality” (the same as if we say, in essence and energy, as regards the difference with God the Word) - [if all this is so], then how does the insane Sevier not consider it necessary to agree with Cyril, whom he hypocritically honors, and together with him confess two natures up to the recognition of the difference - according to his teaching - not only in natural quality, but also in the heterogeneity of the essence, in order to simultaneously recognize the difference of both natures and natural qualities, in other words, essences and energies 1616; but, on the contrary, denying the heterogeneity of the flesh in relation to the Word - [253C] which is a difference in nature - introduces instead a difference in non-existent qualities, for without a underlying nature every quality is, of course, non-existent? Acting villainously and rebelling against the true teaching of the wise Cyril, and, one might say, all the godly fathers, he reveals himself to be an alien [to the truth], a friend and defender of lies. When speaking about the difference in Christ's qualities, is he talking about the difference after the union or before the union? 1617 If before unity, then he undoubtedly understands not difference, but division, and affirms unity from divided [parts] - that is, those that previously existed hypostatically (προϋφεστότων) by themselves 1618; [253D] he either abolishes this [unity] through the difference of qualities and [their] confession, or shows that they were not originally united at all 1619. And if he says that they were not united, then it is clear that, according to his teaching, the natures that [have these] qualities are not united, even if he pretends to claim [the opposite]. After all, it is in no way possible for [natures] to be united and [qualities] separated, but [it is necessary] for both to experience the same thing - either unity or separation 1620. If, rejecting division, he admits that along with the natures their qualities were united, then - if he does not contradict himself in anything - it is absolutely necessary that he either, on an equal basis with one complex nature, affirm one complex quality, due to unity, and then he will be exposed in the fact that he does not recognize the difference in qualities, but in both - that is, in essences and qualities - he professes fusion; [256A] or he could, having admitted different qualities and not being afraid of separation, recognize two natures, without fear of complete dissection and without presenting it as a pretext for refusing and avoiding confessing them. After all, if the qualities that he supposedly professes have not, in his opinion, experienced dissection due to difference, then how [it turns out] that the natures will be dissected due to their profession and difference? If he does not profess them, but allegedly professes only qualities, then it is clear that he destroys natures and considers Christ a collection of qualities, which, as we know, are the natures of material things (ὑλικῶν), which, however, are based on matter as a subject, and are not seen in simple qualities alone, as [Sevier] depicts Christ 1621. [256B] That is why he calls Him a complex nature, meaning not any other, but precisely that [nature] that He himself composed and composed of simple qualities. What, according to him, [is inherent in] difference, is obviously unity. [The situation is] not that difference is with some, and unity with others, but [both] are with the same ones, and not with different ones. So, the madman [Sevier] says that Christ is made of qualities, and that He is qualities. According to these [qualities], he again shows Him to be divided, for he claims that due to unity He has various qualities, and not one complex one - if such a definition of unity seems to him the best. [256C] If one law predominates among natures, and another among qualities, then to show it to us is a task for his zeal, or rather, unreason; so that we may know how he understands that, according to unity, two natures are one nature, and different qualities are not one quality? 1622 Or: by what logos 1623 does he affirm the difference of qualities, but does not affirm the difference of natures? And why do not qualities remain unfused in the absence of difference, and natures remain unfused even in its absence? And why are not qualities divided in connection with difference, but natures are divided in connection with it? Or: why does he not confess them undivided, together with their qualities? Why does he compose natures, but not qualities, [256D] and how does he imagine that natures are united into one complex nature, if qualities are not combined into one complex quality? Let him who is his wicked admirer and defender explain these perplexities to us, so that, having abolished them, the accusation may also be abolished; or, if he cannot adequately explain them, then he, together with [Sevier], will bring this [accusation] upon himself, and moreover, he will be condemned for the fact that he dared to call someone in agreement with the fathers who contradicts even himself in everything! This is all, O revered ruler, that I have said at your command, for the sake of refuting and exposing both [Sevir] himself and the crowd of his supporters. The task of your godly mind is to educate and instruct those who are imperfect and undeveloped, like me, in greater and more perfect things, to elevate [them] to the most divine knowledge, [257A] in order to bring [them] closer to God through true knowledge of beings, the cause of which is the Word Himself, Who is by nature superior to beings - our Lord Jesus Christ, to Whom do not cease to bring me unworthy through your prayers, O most holy and revered father. Another [one more creation] of the divine Maxim How could anyone show that the holy Council of Chalcedon, contemplating and expounding this both piously and clearly, supposedly rejects the definition of the Nicene [Council]; even if he is [a person] extremely skilled in inventing what is invented with the help of lies against the true [faith] 1625? [257B] If you blaspheme and scold him because, on the one hand, he firmly observes it, and on the other hand, he supposedly introduces a different definition, then what is this different definition that [the Council] introduces? Confession of two natures,” he answers 1626, “and the expression “in two natures.” After all, it is not in the definition of the Nicene [fathers] - it was obviously introduced by the fathers [gathered] in Chalcedon, and before it was not known to anyone and was not pronounced by anyone. It is clear that you cannot prove this either, for by many of the holy fathers who [lived] before the [Council], this expression was recognized and proclaimed as pious. The words of those who announced it testify [to this] - [words] that are more luminous and brighter than a sunbeam; [257C] even if you either do not understand this due to ignorance, or pretend that you do not understand, in order to slander and [raise] an insane accusation against the fathers and dogmas. If there was no [evidence] (although, as I already said, there is a lot of it), then what prevents so many saints - or, rather, the host of all Christians, for this is what the Holy Council of the Orthodox Fathers truly represents - [what prevents them from] autocratically producing this [expression] and establishing it against the covetousness [professed] by Eutyches (συναιρέσεως)? 1627 He further says: For what reason and why do you accuse the holy Council of Chalcedon, despite the fact that it obviously used patristic expressions, and also everywhere, both verbally and in writing, revile and ridicule it for allegedly introducing a new definition of faith? “Judge not according to appearances,” for God said so, “but judge with righteous judgment” [John 7:24]. [257D] Why do you blame the fathers [gathered] at Chalcedon, and why (for the same reason!) do you extol those who lived before? After all, if the Council of Chalcedon can be blamed for a new definition of faith because of expressions [not] contained in the definition of Nicaea, then, consequently, Cyril and the one hundred and fifty [fathers] can be [accused] of the same thing - and for the same reason. If it is impossible to [blame] them, then I cannot understand how one can [blame] the Council. I intend to show that your fury and tenacity are [in defense of] what cannot be proven. Oh, if only in this way, when you are already sufficiently disgraced, you would be ashamed of [your] madness and such great persistence of lies against the truth! [260A] For otherwise Gregory, the defender of theology, will by no means escape your accusation against the Council of Chalcedon, but will rather fall even more under it, according to your law - after all, he formulated in advance (προδιαρθρῶν) what was not clearly expressed enough by the Council of Nicea about the Holy Spirit, “since then,” as he says, “this question is not discussed" 1629; he recognized the Spirit together with the Father and the Son, and wrote to Clidonia that this is how one should both understand and teach. It seems to me that you have experienced something similar to the disease of disordered vision, which is unable to look at the sunlight and perceive it and blames it for weakness, and not itself; in the same way, you are struck by an illness due to the merger and [therefore] you revile those [260B] who worthily expose it as wicked and contrary to the true [teaching] of the preserved natures in Christ, not [considering] them to be universal luminaries and manifesters of the truth. For if we truly speak about the truth, then all the divine fathers who gathered in Nicaea, and in general every council of Orthodox holy men - [all of them] did not at all introduce a different definition of faith by introducing their own words, as you declare, babbling a lot of nonsense and completely maddened; on the contrary, they confidently confirmed the definition that was established by three hundred and eighteen fathers as the first and only, interpreting it, explaining it and as if developing it - because of those [260C] who misunderstood this [definition] and the dogmas [set forth] in it and falsely interpreted it, [adapting] it to their wickedness. Already soon after Eunomius and Macedonius planned to distort the theological meaning contained in this [definition] of 1630, one hundred and fifty fathers did not allow this with their sayings and dogmas. Likewise, when Nestorius tried to divide the logos of the economy, Blessed Cyril did not allow this; in the same way, when Eutyches wished to [introduce] merger (συγχεῖν), this was prevented by the honest fathers [gathered] in Chalcedon. How can you, together with those (I mean the Councils), not perceive this [last] as some kind of good, since [they did] the same good? Or do you, as haters of goodness, vilify those too along with this [Council]? This is exactly what you do in practice, [260D] but in words you show piety, so that by your feigned piety, supposedly exalting those [Councils] in spite of this, [in fact] through this [Council] you insult those, bringing the same accusation against them for the same acts. Who can bear their such great insolence, [directed] against piety and the pious? And so on. The same Maxim. Chapters on essence and nature, hypostasis and face That “essence” means the species itself (εἶδος) 1632 and nature 1633 - what it is in itself 1634; [261A] and [the word] “hypostasis” designates someone 1635 to whom the essence [is inherent] (τόν τινα τῆς οὐσίας). That “essence” and “essential” (ἐνούσιον) 1636 are not the same thing, just as “hypostasis” and “hypostasis” (ἐνυπόστατον) 1637 are not the same thing, even if in both [cases of the concept] one is contemplated in friend, not apart 1638. After all, ἐνούσιον is what is contemplated in nature, and does not exist in itself; and ἐνυπόστατον denotes that which exists in hypostasis, and does not abide by itself in itself; that is, that which came together not from imperfect parts, but from perfect and imperfect 1639, and is contemplated in convergence [not] by fusion (κατὰ σύγχυσιν) 1640. That “hypostasis” defines a person (πρόσωπον) with the help of distinctive features (χαρακτηριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασι) 1641. And ἐνυπόστατον means [something] incidental (συμβεβηκός); it does not exist in itself, [261B] but its being is in another 1642, it is not contemplated in itself and does not exist in itself independently (ὑφεστός), but is always contemplated around the hypostasis as qualities called essential (οὐσιώδεις) and peri-essential (ἐπουσιώδεις) 1643, which are not essence and do not exist in themselves, but in essence, and have no existence apart from it. That, just as none of the qualities, whether essential or circumstantial, is neither an essence nor an independently existing thing, but always acquires distinctive features (χαρακτηριστικόν) around the essence, such as color in the body and knowledge in the soul (after all, it cannot be said that color appears separately from the body, and knowledge is realized (ἐνεργεῖσθαι) 1644 separately from the soul); so both the hypostatic (ἐνυπόστατον) and the essential (ἐνούσιον) cannot be thought separately from essence and hypostasis. [261C] After all, they do not have existence in themselves, but are always contemplated around the hypostasis 1645. That neither the hypostatic (ἐνυπόστατον) should be reduced to hypostasis, nor the essential (ἐνούσιον) should be defined as essence. That what is asserted by some “there is no nature devoid of hypostasis (ἀνυπόστατον)” is said by them correctly, but is misunderstood, as if what is not devoid of hypostasis is reduced to hypostasis, and is not contemplated, rather, in hypostasis 1646. Which, just as he who says, “There is no body without form or color,” speaks correctly, [264A] but comes to the wrong conclusion by saying that form or color is a body, and is not contemplated in the body; Likewise, the one who asserts “there is no nature devoid of hypostasis” argues incorrectly if he reduces what is not devoid of hypostasis to hypostasis 1647. That there can be no nature that is devoid of hypostasis, but nature is not a hypostasis either, and [therefore] something that is not devoid of hypostasis is not considered as a hypostasis; for this statement is irreversible. After all, hypostasis is, in any case, nature, as well as form - in any case, body; for it is impossible to think of hypostasis separately from nature, and form or color – separately from the body. Nature is not in any case a hypostasis 1648. That nature has a general logos of being, [264B] and hypostasis also has a logos of independent being (τοῦ καθ᾿ἑαυτὸ εἶναι). That nature has only the logos of the species, and hypostasis also means a certain separate thing (τοῦ τινός) 1649. His Holiness Clement, Presbyter of Alexandria, from [treatise] “On Providence” 1650 The essence is with God. God is the Divine essence, eternal and beginningless, incorporeal and unlimited (ἀπερίγραφον), the cause of existing [things]. Essence is wholly existing (δι᾿ὅλου ὑφεστός) 1651. Nature is the truth of things 1652, or their existence in essence (ἐνούσιον) 1653. According to others, this is the becoming of [things] becoming something (εἰς τὶ εἶναι). According to others, this is God's providence 1654, [264C] imparting being and as-being to those who become (τὸ πῶς εἶναι). A complex hypostasis 1655 is a certain complex essence (or: existing - οὐσία), which includes each of all the features existing in [its] own individual [thing]. For what is perceived in general in all individual [things] of the same species distinguishes the essence or nature, first of all in the individual things of this [kind], and in general and [something] common in all individual [things] of a complex species 1656. [264D] His Beatitude Eulogius, Pope of Alexandria Seven Chapters on the Two Natures of the Lord and our Savior Jesus Christ 1657 1. If, by unity, our Lord Jesus Christ has one nature, then tell me which one - received or assumed? And what happened to the other one? If they both exist, then how is it [possible] that nature is one, if one complex one was not formed from both? If this is so, then how [is it possible that] Christ is not different in essence from the Father, Who is uncomplicated? 2. If we accept that our Lord Jesus Christ never had two natures, then how can we say that Christ had one [nature] after unity, or even talk about unity? [265A] If we accept that Christ had two natures, then tell me when Christ had two natures, and from what time was he of one? 3. Is God the Word consubstantial with the flesh He assumed or different in essence? If consubstantial, then how did the Trinity not become a quaternity? If the flesh and God the Word are of different essences, then how is it [possible] that Christ does not have two natures? 4. Some speak of "the one nature of God the Word incarnate"; I believe that you say so too. And if this should be understood to mean that God and the flesh have one essence, then how is it possible that the created is identical to the uncreated, and the eternal is identical to time? If it is so that one nature possesses another or is possessed by another, [265B] then who will agree to admit that one and one are not two, but one? 5. If God the Word and the Father have one nature, then how is it [possible] that God the Word, the Father and the flesh have more than one nature? 6. If God the Word and the flesh are not two in any respect, how is it possible that God the Word and the flesh are not one in every respect? And if God the Word and the flesh are one in all respects, then how can the Word not become flesh, and the flesh the Word, coeternal and consubstantial with the Father, like God the Word? If God the Word and the flesh are not one in all respects, how is it [possible] that God the Word and the flesh are not two in any respect? [265C] 7. If it is impossible for God the Word and the flesh to be united to a greater extent than God the Word and the Father, then how [is it possible that] God the Word and the flesh, being united, are not in any respect two? About essence, nature and hypostasis Essence is something that denotes something general and indefinite (ἀπερίγραπτον) 1658, such as “man” 1659. The one who said this designated a general nature - with this word he did not define any individual person recognized by the name [inherent to him] especially (ἰδίως) 1660. Nature is that which is contemplated equally in all that are called [things] of the same kind. [265D] Hypostasis is that which represents and defines something general and indefinite specifically (ἰδίως), in a separate thing; as, for example, “such and such” 1661. Hypostasis is that which, together with the universal, also has something special (ἰδικόν) 1662. Nature, according to pagan [philosophers] (κατὰ τοὺς ἔξω), is the beginning of movement and rest 1663. Nature is one or another existence (ποιὰ ὕπαρξις) of every [thing]. [The word] “nature” (φύσις) comes from “to be born” (πεφυκέναι) 1664. The first essence is everything that independently exists in itself (τὸ καθ᾿ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστός), such as a stone. The second essence is capable of growing (αὐξητική), as a plant grows and withers. The third entity is animate and capable of feeling (αἰσθητική), [268A] like an animal, [for example] a horse. The fourth essence is animate, capable of feeling and intelligent, [namely] man. That is why he was created last, because he is the only one of all who has an immaterial soul and mind - the image of God. Blessed Maxim. About the fact that it is impossible to talk about one will in Christ The name “Christ” does not indicate nature, but a complex hypostasis 1666. That is, the whole Christ is Lord, and God, and the Almighty, who also has in Himself flesh, which He bore for our sake and for the sake of our salvation, inseparably and unfused, [flesh] subject to suffering, not omnipotent, created, visible, limited (περιγραπτήν) 1667, [268B] by nature not omnipotent, but in Christ possessing an omnipotent will 1668. After all, it is not by hypostasis that Christ is both mortal and immortal, or, again, both powerless and omnipotent, both visible and invisible, both created and uncreated; but one is by nature, and the other by hypostasis 1669. Simply put, not because of the opposition of intentions (γνώμης), but because of the peculiarity of nature 1670. As I have already said, Christ is One, having both by nature. After all, [the words] “not as I will, but as You will” [Matthew 26:39] “express nothing other than the fact that He was truly clothed with flesh, which fears death, because it is characteristic of it to fear death, shy away from it and indulge in grief. He sometimes leaves His flesh alone and deprived of His [Divine] energy, in order, by showing its weakness, to inspire confidence in its [human] nature, and sometimes He covers 1671 it, [268C] so that you know that He was not an ordinary man. This might have been thought then if He had constantly shown human actions; just as, if He constantly performed the things characteristic of the Divine, they would not believe [the doctrine of] economy. Therefore, He diversifies and mixes both words and deeds, so as not to give 1672 grounds for illness and madness either to Paul of Samosata, or to Marcion and Manichaeus; therefore [here] He predicts the future as God, and avoids suffering as a man” 1673. If you shy away from recognizing or confessing two wills in the one and only Christ, does the one will that you recognize in Him seem to you to be without beginning, co-beginning and co-eternal with the Father and the Holy Spirit, [268D] or in quality 1674 entirely Divine, simple and uncomplicated (for it belongs to the Divine essence), or some other due to the incarnation? Indicate what it is and tell us what the name of this will is. I will indicate the name of the will before incarnation - that is, the Divine will. After all, just as the Divine nature as a whole is (ὑπάρχει) trinitarian, beginningless, uncreated, incomprehensible, simple and uncomplicated, so is its will. So I indicated [the name of the will] before the incarnation, and everyone will agree with me, for I told the truth; [you will] agree, whether you like it or not. So, tell us, what name does [will] have after incarnation? Study the entire Old and New Testament and tell me what is the name of the one will that is found in Christ? [269A] Study it, don’t delay! Since the Divine will is called Divine, and the human will is called human, will you not assert that Christ has a divinely masculine will? I don’t think so - after all, the Father and the Holy Spirit do not have a divinely masculine will. Or dare you say that this [will] is complex? However, this is also alien to the Divine. Or will you say that it is natural? Then you too will introduce fusion (συγχύσεις) according to Sevier, for it is impossible for two natures or two natural wills to become one nature or one natural will without fusion. Or [would you call it] hypostatic? Then again [it turns out that] you alienate the Son from the Father and, introducing three wills (θελήσεις), you show them to be inconsistent with each other, as well as the hypostases. [269B] If you say that [Christ], as the One, has one will and energy, then willy-nilly you will have to admit that the Father, as the One, has [one] will and energy, and the Holy Spirit, as the One, too - and then it will turn out that [your] teaching will turn into polytheism. If you call [this will] relative (σχετικήν), then you introduce, following Nestorius, a division of persons. If you say that it is contrary to nature, then you destroy the existence of the willer, for, according to the definition of the fathers, that which is contrary to nature is destructive for nature. Also, you [thereby] will tear the unit into pieces, and encourage us to calculate the second and third shares (διμοιρότριτα) of the one, in your opinion, will, so that we can find out how much of it is Divine and how much is human, as well as how much of it is uncreated and how much is created. In general, as you wish to say, [269C] tell us what is the name of the will that you confess to Christ. If the one will of Christ that you are talking about is nameless, then place it together with the nameless psalms of 1675 - let it at least find its place there! After all, we, most learned [father], in no way can confess anything nameless. Or, perhaps, this [simple name] has not yet been revealed to any earthly beings? So, clearly, based on the [holy] fatherly teachings, capture [this] name and tell us what it means. After all, according to the great Epiphany Basil, “what we count is what we confess” 1676. I affirm that the life-giving flesh of God the Word in God the Word himself had all the supernatural [properties] of its [Divine] nature, [and that] the two natures constitute one person and one hypostasis of God the Word. [269D] After all, we honor the One Son, as One of the Holy Trinity, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit - both before the ages, and now, and to all ages, and beyond the eternal ages. Amen. His own. Ten chapters about the two wills of the Lord and God and our Savior Jesus Christ. Addressed to the Orthodox 1. O blessed ones! If the Word and the flesh have both one hypostasis and, according to some, [272A] also one will, then it is necessary that He differ from the Father and from us both in hypostasis and will. And how then, given the difference of wills, will identity with the Father by nature be revealed? 2. In that the Word is one with the flesh, It is distinguished (χωρίζεται) from the Father, and in that He is one with the Father, It is distinguished (διακρίνεται) from the flesh. If, according to some, [It] has one will with the flesh, then, blessed ones, It is also separated from the Father by will. 3. If it is believed that because the Word is united with the Father and the Holy Spirit, therefore It is different from the flesh - and according to the general doctrine of Christians, It is united with the Father and the Spirit by will - [272B] then by the will of the flesh It is different from the Father and the Spirit, as the fathers determined both for themselves and for us, and we, the blessed ones, strive to observe. 4. This one will, O blessed ones, they must call either natural or hypostatic - if the existence (σύστασις) of [all] existing things is contemplated in essence and hypostasis. After all, what else could they say other than this? So, if they call it natural, then, willy-nilly, they recognize the same nature of the Word and the flesh. If it is hypostatic, then in accordance with the three hypostases they will be forced to recognize three wills - if they do not want to contradict themselves. [272C] 5. If the natural will of the Word is the [will] that creates all begotten [things] - and in their opinion, O blessed ones, this [will] is also the will of the flesh - then, obviously, the flesh of the Word will turn out to be the creator of begotten [things]. In this way the common doctrine of Christians, according to which [His flesh] is created, would be abolished; for how can something be created that creates from something that does not exist and is endowed with a peculiarity inherent exclusively in the Divine nature? 6. If, by means of the fact that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit have one will, it was proven by God's chosen fathers that They have one nature - and according to [the heretics], O blessed ones, the Word and the flesh [also] have one will - then in this way the Word and the flesh will also have one nature. If in the flesh and the Word one will does not entail one nature, [272D] then in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit one will also does not entail one nature, and then our faith is vain, the preaching of the fathers is vain (cf. 1 Cor. 15:14)! 7. This single will is either electing (προαιρετικόν) or natural. If it is natural, then, as has already been shown, it will turn out that the flesh and the Word have one nature. [273A] If she is electing, then [it turns out that] Christ is separated from the Father and the Spirit both in hypostasis and in intention. 8. If, according to the great Cyril, those who have the same essence and nature have the same will 1678, then how can those who do not have the same nature have the same will? 9 . If, according to the golden lips of John, not to desire death is inherent in the flesh by nature 1679 - and the Word united it with Himself by hypostasis invariably, with all the characteristics inherent in it by nature - then how, by denying what is inherent in it by nature, do they not deny, along with the natural characteristics, nature itself? [273B] 10. If they say that a person is introduced along with the will, and therefore, “fearing fear where there is no fear” [Ps. 53:6], do not allow the recognition of two wills in Christ, so that they would not, of necessity, introduce two persons along with them, then if they want to show that the logos of their teaching is consistent, [they are left with one of two things]: either, because the Divinity has one will, to recognize one person, for, in their opinion, person necessarily follows from the will; or because [He has] three faces, [recognize] and three wills; and [thus] introduce the contraction of Sabellius or the 1680 division of Arius. Since, O blessed ones, homonymy 1681 often becomes the cause of error when the listener passes on to a meaning other than that intended by the word, then I ask that your mind, [being] in Christ, [273C] for the sake of a clear and unified idea of the things signified, will explain to you first of all: what 1682 is will in general, and in relation to what signifieds (in other words, [speaking] things) this name is used; whether some of the things he calls are complex, and others simple, and what are the complex ones; if they are complex, then [exist] whether their parts are simultaneous or not, and which of them are antecedent and which are subsequent; and what is the revealing and determining logos of each part, so that we can accept “one will” as [something] intelligible (νοούμενον) 1683 . After all, the teaching of the fathers is not about words, but about deeds, and therefore, as one can discover, they sometimes yield in words, but in concepts - in no way. In addition, [one should understand] what is intentional choice (προαίρεσις) and what is intention (γνώμη), [273D] what is gnomic will and what is electing; for these concepts will help to create an idea of ​​\u200b\u200bwills. The one who does not know this, but talks about wills, is blind and short-sighted, not knowing what he says or what he affirms. [276A] From the questions asked to him by the monk Theodore Nature, according to philosophers, is the beginning of movement and rest 1685; according to the fathers, it is a species that is spoken of in relation to many things, different in number 1686, in regard to [concerning them] any kind of “whatever” 1687. Essence, according to philosophers, is a thing that exists in itself (αὐθυπόστατον) 1688, which, in order to exist (πρὸς σύστασιν), does not need anything else; according to the fathers, natural being (ὀντότης), which [is spoken of] in relation to many [things] different in hypostasis. An individual [thing] (ἄτομον), according to philosophers, is a collection of characteristics (ἰδιωμάτων συναγωγή), the totality of which cannot be contemplated in another [thing]; according to the fathers, this is, for example, Peter, Paul or any other of the individual [people], delimited from other people by special personal characteristics (προσωπικοῖς ἰδιώμασι). [276B] Hypostasis, according to philosophers, is an essence with characteristics 1689 ; according to the fathers, this is each individual person, delimited from other people by face 1690. Saint Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons 1691, disciple of the saint John, apostle and evangelist, from the Words to Demetrius, Deacon of Vienna, about faith, which begin with the words: “If you are looking for God, listen to what David says." The will (θέλησις) and energy of God is the creative 1692 and providential cause of every time, place, age and all nature 1693 . The will of the intelligent soul is the logos [existing] in us; [276C] it exists as an autocratic (αὐτεξούσιος) power of the soul. Will is a mind endowed with aspiration (ὀρεκτικός), and an aspiration endowed with a mind (διανοητική) 1695, which inclines towards what is desired 1696. Will (θέλησις) is the natural ability to strive for what is in accordance with nature 1697. Will is a natural desire, befitting the nature of the rational. Will is a natural autocratic movement of an autocratic (αὐτοκράτορος) mind, or a mind moved towards something spontaneously (αὐθαιρέτως). Autocracy (αὐτεξουσιότης) is a mind moved by nature, or a smart, autocratic movement of the soul 1698. [277A] Saint Alexander, Pope of Alexandria, from the Epistle against the Arians, addressed to Eglon, Bishop of Kinopolis Will (θέλησις) is a natural autocratic (αὐτεξούσιος) 1699 ability of everyone endowed with mind (νοεροῦ), for he [the mind] in essence has nothing contrary to [his] will (ἀκούσιον) 1700 – 1701. Saint Eustathius, Patriarch of Antioch, from the Word on the Soul Will (θέλησις) is the natural movement of the Logos [dwelling] in us. Will is a rational (λογική) and vital (ζωτική) desire 1702. Saint Athanasius, Pope of Alexandria from a longer Word on Faith Will (θέλησις) is the autocratic movement of a soul endowed with intelligence. The first characteristic of a soul endowed with intelligence, indicating its essence, is will. [277B] The mind of the Lord is not yet the Lord, but will, or desire (βούλησις), or energy 1703. Saint Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa from the Word against Apollinaris Will (θέλησις) is a certain mind and disposition (διάθεσις) in relation to something. Autocracy is an autocratic movement of the will (θελήματος) 1704. The will of a soul endowed with intelligence is how it autocratically (κατ᾽ἐξουσίαν), through the choosing will (προαιρετικῆς θελήσεως), chooses from what corresponds to its intention (γνώμην). The will of every rational nature is its life by nature. The deprivation of such life is the abolition of the essence of 1705. Saint Diadochos, Bishop of Photiki from the sixth chapter of the Ascetic [chapters] [277C] Autocracy is the will (θέλησις) of the rational soul, freely exercised in relation to what it desires (βούληται) 1706. Saint Anastasius, Patriarch of Antioch Will (θέλημα) is the logos residing in the heart, which can only become manifest through energy 1707. Will is the desire of the soul, which cannot be stopped from within 1708. Saint Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa Will (θέλησις) is a desire associated with a decision (βουλευτική), towards what is in our power (τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) 1709 and [at the same time] can be carried out with our help and has an unclear end 1710. why is a person intelligent? (λογικός) and what is internal (ἐνδιάθετος) logos and spoken (προφορικός) logos [277D] The inner word 1711 is a movement of the soul occurring in the mind itself (λογιστικῷ), without any utterance. Therefore, we often silently pronounce a whole speech to ourselves (λόγον), and talk in our sleep. Because of this [word], of course, we are all reasonable, and not at all because of the word spoken - after all, those who are dumb from birth, and those who have lost [the gift of] speech due to an accident or illness, are no less reasonable [than others]. The spoken word is realized (τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει) with the help of voice and adverbs 1712. from his conclusions about the will: what is natural will and gnomic will Natural will (θέλημα) is a simple, one and the same kind of aspiration (ὁρμή) and impulse (ἔφεσις) towards those [things] that are [for this nature] by nature components 1713. Gnomic will (θέλημα γνωμικόν) is a different movement and desire of one quality or another for what is associated with pleasure 1714. from a letter to Presbyter Marin: what is will (θέλησις) and deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) 1715 It is said that will or volition is natural (θέλημα... ἤγουν θέλησιν). Turn also above, to this letter itself, [280B] [which speaks] of advice, intention, reflection, opinion and power. Various definitions of our holy and God-bearing fathers, about the two energies of the Lord, God and our Savior Jesus Christ Saint Justin the Philosopher, the death of a martyr from the Word to the sophist Euphrasius about Providence and faith, which begins with the words: “The Most Pure Word” 1717 If God's will (θέλησιν), as well as energy (ἐνέργειαν), accompanies nature (for God by nature is always endowed with will and energy), then [it turns out that] none of the [creatures] endowed with wills has the same natural will and energy as He has, for otherwise it would be of the same nature with Him. [280C] By energy and by nature God knows no limitation. The energy of any entity is its inherent quality. Natural and constituent (συστατική) energy is the defining difference in the nature of the designated thing. Without it, it is impossible for any [thing] in any respect to recognize how it exists 1718. Natural energy is the essential and constituent quality of every entity. What is devoid of it is devoid of any essence. Natural energy is an essential force (δύναμις) 1719, which does not allow [nature] to undergo any change in essence, from one [becoming] another. Natural energy is a force that preserves unmixed (ἀμιγῆ) the essential difference (διάκρισιν) of every [thing] in relation to all [others]. Saint Alexander [Pope of Alexandria], to Eglon, Bishop of Kinopol 1720 Natural energy is the innate movement of every entity. Natural energy is the essential and cognitive logos of all nature. Natural energy is the movement of any entity, pointing [to it]. The energy of the rational soul is the movement and thinking (διάνοια) 1721 of the mind. [281A] Energy is an essential movement that determines (χαρακτηριστική) for the nature to which it belongs; with the help of [energy] nature is known as essentially different from others. Energy is real movement (δραστική); what is called real is that which is set in motion by itself 1722. For we affirm that energy is the natural force and motion of every being; without energy, nature does not exist and cannot be known; for the intelligent (νοερῶν) are characterized by understanding (νόησις), the sensual - feeling (αἴσθησις), with the help of which they themselves by nature comprehend external [objects] and are exposed to their influence 1723, flying - flight, floating - swimming, reptiles - reptile, for walkers - walking, for plants - growth; Generally speaking, we believe that natural energy is a significant (σημαντικóν) feature of every nature. The only thing that is devoid of [energy] is non-existence. [281B] After all, a being participates in some essence and therefore, of course, will by nature also participate in the force pointing to this [essence]. True reason 1724 knows that the definitions of entities are their natural energies 1725. The energy of the rational soul is its own thought 1726 and movement of the mind. The energy of a rational soul is its life by nature 1727. The essential energy of God is that He does not exist anywhere, not because He does not exist, but because He exists above place, time and nature, for which He is by nature conceived as the beginning, end and birth - He who preserves and creates only by will (τῷ βούλεσθαι). [281C] After all, without natural energy the nature of not a single [thing] is clear; since the Creator essentially inserted into each nature - as an identifying feature - a movement that distinguishes this [nature] from others 1728. Saint Cyril [of Alexandria] God-appropriate energy and power is [the ability] to be everywhere, ineffably fill the sky, and also fill the earth, permeate everything, but not be permeable by anything. After all, He cannot be embraced or enclosed in any limits - He [is] beyond any limitation; for it is unacceptable for someone who does not have quality, size and body to experience this 1729. [281D] St. Basil [the Great] Since the definition of every essence is its natural energy - as a confirmation that raises the mind to the nature from which it comes - then [therefore] those things that have the same energy have the same essence 1730. His own, from the writings against Eunomius How is it [possible] divergence (or: “otherness” – ἑτερότης) in essence, in which the identity of energy is cognized? After all, if the essences differ (παρηλλαγμένων), then it is necessary that the energies also differ 1731 . How can the Spirit, who has the same energy with the Father and the Son, not be of the same essence with Them? How is there [possible] divergence in essence in the Trinity, in which the identity of energy is revealed? 1732 If there is no difference in essence, there will be no difference in strength. [284A] Whatever [things] have equal strength, they undoubtedly have equal energy; [which means] those who have the same nature have the same energies 1733. Saint Gregory of Nyssa So, the identity of energy in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit clearly indicates the immutability of nature 1734. We can know the nature of the active (ἐνεργοῦντος) by comprehending energies; the community of nature is clearly demonstrated when it is confirmed by the identity of energies 1735. God is the Father, God is the Son, God is the Holy Spirit; however, according to the same sermon, God is one, for in the Divinity no difference is contemplated either in nature or in energy 1736. [284B] So, if energy and strength are one, then how can we assume a divergence in nature among those [things] in which we do not find any difference in strength and energy 1737? It is absolutely necessary to admit that will (προαίρεσιν) is corresponding and proper to nature; and if [things] are dissimilar in nature, then their wills (τὰ θελήματα) are always dissimilar. If both have sufficient strength, then neither [nature] will be unable to fulfill its will (θελήματος) 1738. So, if we see that the energies realized (ἐνεργουμένας) by the Father and the Holy Spirit differ from one another, then we, based on the difference (ἑτερότητος) of energies, assume that the active (ἐνεργοῦσας) natures also differ. [284C] It is impossible for [things] separated from one another by natural logos to be reduced to [one] type of energy - neither fire cools nor ice warms; but, due to the difference in natures, the energies [emanating] from them are also differentiated 1739 - 1740. Kirill [Alexandrian] [Things] that have received the same nature will act in a similar way (ἐνεργήσει... ὁμοίως). For which [things] the logos of being-as-being differs (τοῦ πῶς εἶναι), for such the logos of any energy is not the same 1741 . If [things] have the same energy and have the same natural forces, then it is absolutely necessary that they have the same essence. After all, not one of the existing [things] will be endowed with the same, immutably (ἀπαραλλάκτως) forces and energies with a [thing] foreign and inessential, [284D] for it is generally accepted: which [things] have the same energy, they have the same essence 1742 . No prudent [person] could admit that [things] different in nature and kind (ἑτεροφυῆ καὶ ἑτερογενῆ) have the same energy. Fire could not act in the same way as water; but, since they are clearly differentiated according to the logos of essence and quality, they will also show different energy 1743. For in those [things] the energy and force are the same, without differences, in such things, of necessity, the commonality of species 1744 is preserved. [Things] having the same energy are inherent in having the same essence, and the difference in nature (τὸ ἑτεροφυές) among such [things] is incredible 1745. We will in no way admit that God and creation have the same natural energy, lest we elevate the created to the Divine essence, and reduce the exclusivity of the Divine nature to the tropos befitting those born in 1746. [285A] Things that have the same energy are clothed with the same logos of as-being 1747 . Saint Ambrose, Bishop of Milan from the Second Word to Basileus Gratian For how can the same energy [be] from different entities? After all, the smaller one acts (ἐνεργεῖ) differently from the way the larger one acts. Where the essences are different, there cannot be one [and the same] energy 1748. from inferences against Eunomius The one who acted (ἐνεργήσας) is one thing, the action (ἐνέργεια) is another, and the thing done (ἐνέργημα) is a third. [285B] These [concepts] are far removed from one another 1749. An active person is one who is moved to act in some way. Action is like an active (ἐνεργητική) movement, so to speak, the very impulse of a deliberate choice (ὁρμή... προαιρέσεως), which strives and tends to somehow act, and as soon as the choice is made, subsides and stops, [which] is quickly set in motion and [quickly] passes. What has been done is what is done and exists because of the action 1750. His [St. Maxim] about the characteristics of the two natures of Christ, chapter 58 Confessing our Lord Jesus Christ as perfect God, we consider Him to be a perfect man, having everything that the Father [had] and everything that the first Adam [had], with the exception of sin alone, that is, body and soul, verbal and mental; [we believe] that in accordance with two natures, He also has two natural [properties] of both natures: two natural wills, divine and human, two natural autocracies (αὐτεξούσια), divine and human, wisdom (σοφίαν) and knowledge (γνῶσιν) divine and human. from the treatise on the wills and autocracy of Christ, chapter 59 For if we talk about two natures of Christ, then we are talking about two natural wills and natural energies. Since His natures have one hypostasis, we consider Him one and the same, naturally willing 1752 and acting (θέλοντά τε καὶ ἐνεργοῦντα) according to both natures, from which, in which and which Christ our God is 1753; from what, that is, natures, in what natures and what He is - that is, two natures, two natural wills and two natural energies, I mean, divine and human; and, [as we believe], He desires and acts not separately (διῃρημένως), but collectively (or: united - ἡνωμένως); for “each of the two forms (μορφή) 1754” desires and “acts in concert with the second [form]” 1755. After all, those who have the same essence, have the same energy and will; For those whose essence is different, their will and energy are different; those who have the same energy, those who have the same essence; In those whose will and energy are different, their essence is also different. Therefore, in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, based on the identity of energy and will, we also recognize the identity of nature; and in the divine Economy, based on the difference of energies and wills, we recognize [and the difference of natures] 1756, while recognizing the difference of natures, we co-confess the difference of wills and energies. Just as the number of natures in the One and the Same Christ, conceived and called piously, does not divide the one Christ, but preserves the difference of natures, which is observed in unity, so is the number of wills and energies essentially inherent in His natures. Indeed, according to both natures, He was endowed with will and energy (θελητικὸς... καὶ ἐνεργητικός), [directed] to the salvation of our essence. According to natural strength (δυνάμει), the two wills of the Lord differed from each other. His divine will is beginningless and omnipotent (παντουργός), and therefore powerful and impassive; and His human will arose in time. Translation by A. M. Shufrin, edited by G. I. Benevich. Corrections have been made to this edition compared to the first, published in: Anthology. T. 2, p. 183–196. Larcher dates this work to 645–646. (Larchet 1998, p. 14). For the historical context of this and other theological polemical works, see the introductory article. Here and below are comments by G.I. Benevich, except those indicated as translators' notes. Or: “harmoniously” (εὐτάκτως). Or: “in relation to the emergence of virtues.” Explanation of this place by St. Maxim can serve as his thought, expressed in the Difficulties to John, in explaining exactly how the rational faculty is connected with the virtues: “who has piously comprehended, through contemplation, the structure of beings, and, with the help of logical reasoning, has correctly and correctly determined their meaning (or: “logos” - λόγον), and keeps judgment for himself, or better yet, keeps himself by judgment unyielding, gathered together and has all the virtues, no longer being moved towards anything else after the truth he had learned, and quickly passed everything, completely not paying attention to anything related to the flesh and the world, secretly already having without battle the action contained in the mind (λóγῳ), because he brought to himself all the [existent] strongest dispassionate logoi of the mental power, according to which every virtue and knowledge exists and is realized, and which [i.e. e. logoi] are the forces of the verbal soul, which do not at all need a body for their existence, but do not refuse from time to time to use it for their manifestation for the reasons stated above” (amb. 10/1: PG 91, 1105C-D, trans. Archim. Nektariy (Yashunsky) with minor modifications from: Maxim the Confessor 2006, pp. 90–91). Here and below, the number in square brackets indicates the number of the scholium. Following the publication of Min, we placed the scholia themselves at the end of the corresponding work. About the loving longing of the mind that finds itself in God, St. Maxim writes in many places, see, for example, carit. 1.100 and approx. 61 A. I. Sidorova in: Maxim Confessor 1993. Book I, p. 274. One source for this theme is apparently James 4:5. Or: “in relation to the condition.” Or: “infallible” (ἀπλανοῦς), see next. note. Option according to another manuscript: “unity”. Then a possible translation: “sinless (or: “infallible”) unity” (this is how the scholiast read this place, see scholia 1 at the end of opusc. 1). The option of “error-free guidance” seems more likely, since St. Maxim often correlates reason and intelligence precisely with virtue and knowledge (see, for example, amb. 10/1). Explaining the expression “infallible knowledge” γνῶσις ἀπλανής in Thal. Prol. 7, S. L. Epifanovich writes: “Spiritual knowledge is called ἀπλανής because it is free from sensory delusion, which forces a person to consider an imaginary sensory existence as real” (Maxim the Confessor 1993. Book II, part I, p. 179, note 12), cf. about the “essential existence of infallible knowledge” granted to the ascetic when God becomes man in him, in scholium 8.59 to Thal. 22 (translation by Epifanovich in: Maxim the Confessor 1993. Book II, part I, p. 200, note 14). The expression “infallible knowledge” is often found in St. Cyril of Alexandria. Reason and intelligence, according to St. Maximus, the abilities of the rational power of the human soul, with which he correlates, respectively, virtue and contemplation. Wed. in myst. 5: “Intelligible power includes active and contemplative abilities; the contemplative is called the mind, and the active is the mind... [the mind] exists and is called wisdom when it fully observes its immutable aspirations for God. In the same way, reason is and is called prudence when it, prudently and providentially controlling the vital force through its energies [actions], unites it with the mind and shows this [vital] force similar to the mind, since it bears through virtue the same and similar reflection of God, which, according to the elder, is naturally divided between mind and reason” (PG 91, 672D–673A, trans. A. I. Sidorova, quoted from: Maxim Confessor 1993. Book I, p. “Infinity” - in St. Maxim is one of the main “attributes”, or energies, of God Himself, that is, contemplated around the essence of God. The question of infinity in the Difficulties and other writings of St. Maxim is discussed by Sherwood (see translation in: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 393, note 11); in addition, see the discussion of the issue of the infinity of God in scholia 1**; 26, 29a, 129a A. M. Shufrina to amb. 7 in the same edition. As Larchet notes (Larchet 1994, p. 78), according to St. Maximus, God is attainable not in the infinity of his own nature, but – by grace – only in “the infinity that surrounds the essence” (amb. 15: PG 91, 1220C). Wed. quote from St. Gregory the Theologian: “In Him this one thing is completely comprehensible - His infinity” (or. 38.7: PG, 36, 317C); St. Maxim brings her to carit. 1.100, speaking about the infinity that surrounds God. According to the Areopagite (on whom St. Maximus relies), grace (i.e., deifying energy) is not just God, but also the desire of God, and in a double sense, since God is both the “subject” and the “object” of this desire (see Ps.-Dionys. d. n. 4.17). In the deification of man, God's desire to be desired is realized. That is, life in God is an identity of quenching and thirst (“ever-moving peace”), and not just contemplation, the pleasure of which, even if it is not caused by need (as, for example, when contemplating the logoi of creation), is nevertheless fraught with satiety. – Approx. translation For unity beyond thinking, see Ps.-Dionys. d. n. 11.2. This concept is widespread in Neoplatonism (see, for example, Proclus, who describes the highest state of the soul as the union of the “single soul” with the One, which occurs not in intellectual knowledge, but beyond thinking, when “the soul, combined with silence, closes its eyes in relation to thoughts about the lower and becomes voiceless and silent with inner silence (ἄφθεγκτος γενομένη καὶ σιγήσασα τὴν ἔνδον σιγήν)” (Procl. de provid. 31.12 (ed. Boese)). for example, in Thal. Prol. 11; Thal. epist. 178 (Sidorov and Epifanovich usually translate: “pre-mental unity”, which somewhat weakens the sharpness of the perception of this expression). is the object of thought (see this issue in cap. theol. 2.3–5), and unity occurs through the action of grace, that is, Divine energy. This statement can be understood in the sense that in a person united with God, the logos of human nature is fully fulfilled, that is, a person becomes the way God intended him, personifying the deified man. However, since Rev. Maxim uses the word λόγος here, there remains some possibility that he is talking about the Logos, then it should be translated: “Because of this, your life has become the personification (or: “face”) of the Logos, and the Logos is the nature of life.” Against such an interpretation is the difficulty of understanding how the Logos can be the “nature of life” of a person or his “face” (except perhaps in the sense of Gal. 2:20), however, keeping in mind that in the next sentence of St. Maxim speaks about the imitation of Christ and the conformity of a person to Christ; such an understanding cannot be excluded. For truth and goodness and the ascent to them through virtue and contemplation, see myst. 5. We present this and the following concepts characterizing an act of will in the nominative case. St. Maxim testifies that the Monothelites identified what he himself correlates below with the natural plane (will), with what he correlates with the hypostatic or personal plane (intention, deliberate choice) in created hypostases in the undeified state. Having distinguished these concepts, St. Maxim defends the doctrine of two natural wills in Christ. In the Disputation with Pyrrhus, Pyrrhus referred to the expression of the “most illustrious fathers” that “God and the saints have one will” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 292B). Who does he mean? There is reason to believe that the Venerable himself. Maxim, in whom a similar expression is found in the Epistle to Cubular John On Love: “we can all have – just as surely as one nature – and one intention (γνώμην), and one will (θέλημα) with God and each other” (ep. 2: PG 91, 396C, trans. A. M. Shufrin according to: Maxim the Confessor 2007a, p. 338; cf. ep. 2: PG 91, 401B). In detail the problems of “one will of God and the saints” by St. Maxim examines it below in a separate section of this work (PG 91, 21D–28A), where, obviously, he responds to those who refer to his earlier work, deducing monothelitism from it. See the analysis of this problem in a separate section of this essay (PG 91, 28A–37A). If this is not a tribute to the Byzantine “tradition of self-abasement,” of which one cannot be sure, then we have evidence here that St. Maxim did not receive, as the scion of a noble family in Constantinople, that excellent education that is spoken of in his traditional life. In turn, this can serve as an argument, although not very reliable, in favor of the Palestinian origin of the saint. Maxima. Distinguishing most of the listed prp. The maxim of concepts characterizing a volitional act is carried out by Nemesius of Emesa (Nemes. de natur. hom. 32 (ed. B. Einarson). Nemesius, in turn, in this matter largely follows Aristotle (Arist. ethic. Nic. 3. 4. 1111b ff.; for more details, see below). However, it should immediately be noted that the concepts of natural will (θέλημα), with which the list begins (unlike the others), is not found in either Aristotle or Nemesius. Its appearance in St. Maximus and, in general, the central place of will (θέλημα) and volition (θέλησις) in the disputes around monothelitism is obviously connected with the fact that this particular word is used in the Gospel in relation to Gethsemane prayer (Luke 22:42; John 6:38) (for more details, see Madden 1982; Bathrellos 2004, p. 118). St. Maximus places the greatest emphasis on the distinction between natural will (θέλημα) and volition (θέλησις), on the one hand, and deliberate choice. (προαίρεσις) - on the other. As can be seen from the analysis done by John Madden (see Madden 1982), St. Maximus often uses definitions of προαίρεσις in the philosophical and patristic tradition (for example, in Aristotle, Clement of Alexandria, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Nemesius) for the understanding of θέλησις he introduced (see florilegium in opusc. 26 and notes 935, 937, 945). At the same time, he separates the natural component of the volitional act from the characterizing hypostasis (“personal”) (for the first time this distinction is outlined, probably, in opusc. 14: PG 91, 153A (c. 640), where definitions are given, respectively, of natural and gnomic will). Their distinction is made even more explicitly by St. Maxim in opusc. 16: PG 91, 185 (c. 644) (see the discussion of the motivation for this distinction and its historical context in Chapter 16 of the introductory article to this edition). Speaking about the difference between St. Maxim θέλημα and θέλησις, I. A. Orlov writes: “In the letter to Stefan Dorsky, where (col. 185) this definition [i.e. e. the definition from the Epistle to Marin - G.B.] is given in exactly the same form, Maxim explains that ϑέλημα and ϑέλησις are non-identical concepts. Between them there is the same difference as between βούλημα and βούλησις, between ϰίνημα and ϰίνησις, i.e., according to the meaning of the inflections themselves, ϑέλησις denotes a certain activity of the soul, and ϑέλημα – detection outside or the result of this activity. But in reality we see no traces of such a distinction in him. Like other Church Fathers, Maximus uses both concepts as completely unambiguous, although he gives clear preference to ϑέλημα over ϑέλησις” (Orlov 2010, p. 118). ὀρεκτικήν. For more information on the aspiration ability, see Arist. de anim. III.9.432b.3–4. Wed. also in scholium 7 on Ps.-Dionys. d. n. 8.3.: “the power of aspiration (ὀρεκτικὰς δυνάμεις), the ability to always want (θέλειν) and desire (ἐπιθυμεῖν) the giver is God” (translated by G. M. Prokhorov with modifications from: Dionysius Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor 2002, p. 475). It is interesting that deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) is defined below (following Aristotle and Nemesius) as “an endeavor that considers what is in our power” (PG 91, 13A). There is reason to believe that this definition, like Aristotle’s definition of βούλησις as an aspiration (Arist. de anim. III.10.433a.23–25), and that of St. himself. Maximus (see below, PG 91, 13B) influenced the way he defined the concept of natural will (applying the principle of not only difference, but also similarity, without which difference could not be spoken of). We are talking about three (more precisely, about six, since St. Maximus calls “aspiration” and the estimate βουλή, see below, 16B, and intention, see below, 17C, and even understanding, see below, 21D) different kinds of aspirations, of which only the natural will characterizes nature. At 21C prp. Maxim himself points to “aspiration” as a generic concept in relation to all moments of a volitional act, denying that the presence of a general genus can be the basis for the identity of the species included in it. St. Maximus traced the origin of his definition to a number of early Christian authors, citing, with reference to Clement Stromatevs (Alexandrian), for example, the following definition: “Will is the natural ability of striving for what is in accordance with nature” (opusc. 26: PG 91, 276C) (Θέλησίς ἐστι φυσικὴ δύναμις τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτική). There are, however, serious doubts about the attribution of this definition to Clement, so that, for example, Madden (see Madden 1982 and our notes to opusc. 26) suggests that its authorship belongs to the saint himself. Maximus or his disciples, who introduced this and similar definitions of the will with reference to ancient authors in order to strengthen their position. Whether this is true or not is impossible to establish for sure, but Madden’s arguments about the inauthenticity of the quotes are quite convincing and are recognized by almost all researchers. From the definition of St. Maxim depends on the definition of St. John of Damascus and all his followers (see Joann. Dam. exp. fid. 36.56–57; 58.39–40). In these comments, we will only occasionally point out parallel passages from Doctrina Patrum, Ps.-Cyril’s treatise on the Trinity, Damascus and other works, which in terms of the doctrine of will and energy depend on St. Maxima. In the critical editions of Doctrina Patrum and Damascus, such parallel passages are indicated; there is no point in repeating them. Translation option by A.I. Orlov: “natural will is the power (or ability) of striving for something in accordance with nature, embracing all the properties that essentially belong to nature” (Orlov 2010, p. 117). Probably for the first time this definition is found in St. Maxima in opusc. 16: PG 91, 185D, but it is also prepared by a very similar (in the first part) definition in a possibly earlier opusc. 14: PG 91, 153A. That is, the natural will of a person embraces the entirety of the intellectual-corporeal nature, and not just one mind or one feeling. For Rev. For Maxim, this is important because, interpreting the Gethsemane prayer, he will have to explain both the aversion from death and obedience to God’s will for the Sacrifice of the Cross as different, although linked together in this prayer, moments of the manifestation of the will of human nature in Christ. Thus, the will of nature is not identical to the instinct of self-preservation, but in the conditions of our existence after the Fall, it does not exclude a non-blameable aversion from death. As A.I. Orlov notes: “It is fair to call natural will... a “life aspiration”” (ὄρεξις ζωτιϰή). And since human nature is endowed with reason, it is φύσις λογιϰὴ ϰαὶ νοερά, then the will of rational beings, in contrast to the unconscious instinctive life desire inherent in “sensually animated” nature, is not just a life desire, but a rational or conscious life desire (ὄρεξις λογιϰὴ ϰαὶ ζωτιϰή) or will in the proper sense; since it is characteristic only of rational nature, it constitutes “the most typical and first feature” of this latter. The concept of rationality as an essential property of the soul is thus inseparable from the concept of will and, in a sense, even identical with it” (Orlov 2010, p. 120). That is, nature has its being as the subject of volition. The question is what exactly is the existence of nature. In the peripatetic tradition, the existence of human nature (as well as other natures) is understood as the ongoing existence of the race in each individual (see, for example, the characteristic statement of Alexander of Aphrodisias: “Socrates is born for the existence of a “man,” and the horse of Achilles for the existence of a “horse”” (Sorabji 2004b, p. 80). Accordingly, God in this tradition provides for genera and species, but not about individuals who serve in relation to the genus. It is clear that the Christian perspective is different and the existence of human nature in it is not reduced to the existence of the human race in the sense of the continuation of its earthly existence. According to St. Maximus, the existence of each representative of a given nature consists in movement according to the logos of this nature, which, as far as man is concerned, has the ultimate goal of unity with God, deification. So the “fullness of being” of nature (PG 91, 12D), realized in Christ and realized by grace in every member of the Body of Christ, is its deification, and not just the continuation of the human race, as with the Peripatetics, or a certain “flowering of all mental and physical powers.” The soteriological, “logos” perspective is only outlined in this place of the Epistle to Marinus (see the next passage - PG 91, 12D-13A), since the goal of St. The maxim is to distinguish between natural will and deliberate choice for the purposes of Christological polemics, but this should not mislead us, that is, we should not think that St. By natural will, Maxim means something like the “instinct of self-preservation,” although there is no doubt that aversion from death in the conditions after the Fall is one of the blameless manifestations of the will of human nature, according to St. Maxim (see previous note). It is unclear who these “others” are, most likely St. Maximus introduces this definition of will himself, although in the florilegia in opusc. 26: PG 91, 277A we find practically the same definition of θέλησις attributed to Eustathius of Antioch. Wed. from Damascus: “Θέλησις τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὄρεξις ζωτική τε καὶ λογική· ἡ δὲ ζωτική, πάντως καὶ αἰσθητική" (“So, volition is a vital and meaningful desire, and if it is vital, then, of course, it is also sensible”) (Joan. Dam. de duab. in Christ. volunt. 25.1). Or: “depending on us.” However, etc. Maximus and Nemesius, on whom he obviously relies in this definition, mean what depends only on us. Therefore, A. M. Shufrin, although he used the expression “depending on us” in the translation of the corresponding passage from Nemesius (Anthology. Vol. 1, p. 424), ultimately, translating St. Maxim, resorted to another option: “in our power” (translator’s message). St. Maximus, in his definition of προαίρεσις, quotes Nemesius almost verbatim: Nemes. de natur. hom. 32.75, in turn, Nemesius obviously follows Aristotle (Arist. ethic. eudem . 1226b.17 (Bekker); Idem, ethic. Nic. 1113a.10–11 (Bekker). Let us present for comparison N.V. Braginskaya’s translation of Aristotle’s definition, with which the definition of Nemesius and St. Maximus practically coincides (the differences are due to the divergence not originals - they are minimal - but translations): “conscious choice is, perhaps, a desire for what depends on us, capable of making decisions) (προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν)” (Aristotle 1975–1983. Vol. 4, p. 103). This and the following two terms characterizing an act of will are given in the nominative case. In Russian translations of Aristotle (Aristotle 1975–1983), βούλησις is translated, depending on the context, as both “will” and “desire”. But Aristotle’s βούλησις is not identical in content to “natural will” or “volition” according to St. Maxim (Gauthier 1954, p. 58–64). Almost exact quote from Nemesius (Nemes. de natur. hom. 32.45); Wed Arist. ethica eudem. 1225b.32; Idem, magn. moral 1.17.3.2. For Aristotle, desire is the desire of the rational part of the soul (Arist. de anim. III.432b5–6). It is interesting that, although Rev. Maxim, in his analysis of the act of will, largely follows Nemesius and through him Aristotle; his establishment of the connection between desire and fantasy (in this case it should be understood in the sense of the ideas we have about what is desired) seems to be original. However, the role of “fantasy” in the context of an act of will is already discussed by Aristotle (Arist. de anim. III.432b.16; 433a.27), and after him by his commentators; from the closest in time to St. For Maximus, this theme occurs especially frequently in Simplicius and John Philoponus. But, as Thunberg notes, Aristotle relates “fantasy” exclusively to the desirable part of the soul (ἐπιθυμία) (Thunberg 1965, p. 232), so he has no connection with βούλησις directly with “fantasy”. St. Maximus follows Nemesius in his distinction between volition and deliberate choice. As for the understanding of desire, for Nemesius this moment of the act of will is, of course, colored by the certainty of the goal (before discussing and determining the ways to achieve it). In this, obviously, desire primarily differs from natural will (the concept of which Nemesius lacks). Natural will, as the Venerable understands it. Maxim characterizes nature as such, that is, any representative of a given nature, this is the basis for any specific act of will. (Cf. “our desires, as private manifestations of the will, are extremely changeable, unstable, which depends on many reasons. And the force acting in them is unchangeable: as a “natural force” (δύναμις φυσιϰή) or as an innate ability, will is equally inherent in everyone” (Orlov 2010, p. 119). This or that “will,” in contrast to natural will, is already characteristic of a certain individual at one time or another and is not at all necessary for another or for the same person at another moment. We find such an understanding of volition in Nemesius, who, however, following Aristotle (Arist. ethic. Nic. 1111b.20) is concerned with drawing a distinction between deliberate choice and volition, and not between volition and natural will: “Not to everything to which the concept of deliberate choice is applicable, the concept of volition is also applicable. So, we say that we want to be healthy, but no one would say that he chooses to be healthy. They talk about the desire [lit.: “wanting”] to get rich, but they don’t talk about the deliberate choice to get rich. You can want to be rich, but you cannot choose to be rich. In addition, desire can apply even to the impossible, but deliberate choice can only apply to what is in our power. After all, we say this: I want to be [become] immortal, but we don’t say: I choose to be immortal” (Nemes. de natur. hom. 32.28–38, translated by F. S. Vladimirsky with changes by A. M. Shufrin and ours according to the edition: Anthology. T. 1, p. 423). Nemesius, in turn, closely follows Aristotle (Arist. ethic. Nic. 1111b.20–31). However, it should be remembered that the ultimate goal of Nemesius is not at all the development of an ethical doctrine (like Aristotle), but a polemic with the doctrine of fate. He uses Aristotle to argue that there is something that is in our power, that the scope of our moral responsibility is not determined by fate (cf. the same themes in Ps.-Plutarch's treatise On Fate in: Benevich 2013). St. Maxim, in turn, is preoccupied with another goal - polemics with the Monothelite teaching. In order to achieve the goal. Wed. This is the same definition in 16C and a note to it. Difficult place. – Approx. translation Wed. Nemes. de natur. hom. 32.28–40; Arist. ethical Nic. 1111b. 20–31. That is, it serves to achieve it. An almost verbatim quote from Nemesius (Nemes. de natur. hom. 32.38–40). Another, more literal version of the translation of this passage from Nemesius: “Willing refers only to the goal, while deliberate choice refers to that which [leads] to the goal, according to the same analogy that what is subject to volition has to that which is subject to estimation: after all, the goal is subject to volition, and estimation is what [leads] to the goal” (Nemes. de natur. hom. 32.38–40, trans. F. S. Vladimirsky with changes by A. M. Shufrin and ours according to the edition: Anthology. T. 1, p. 423). F. S. Vladimirsky in his translation of Nemesia for βουλή and βούλευσις uses the translation: “discussion”, “meeting”, in the Russian translation of Aristotle by N. V. Braginskaya βουλή in the appropriate context is translated as “decision”, and the corresponding verbs, for example βουλεύω - “I make a decision” (Arist. ethic. Nic. 1112a. 19 ff., trans. Aristotle 1975–1983. T. 4, pp. 101–102). Or: “exploring aspiration” (ὄρεξιν ζητητικήν). Wed. from Nemesius: “However, a deliberate choice is not an illusion, that is, an estimate. After all, estimating is a study [weighing] as to what the one [who is estimating] should do; and a deliberate choice is something that was previously decided on the basis of an estimate. Thus, it is obvious that guessing concerns what is still being explored, and deliberate choice concerns what has already been decided” (Nemes. de natur. hom. 32.53–58, translated by F. S. Vladimirsky with changes by A. M. Shufrin and ours according to the edition: Anthology. T. 1, p. 423). It may be noted that, unlike Nemesius, St. Maxim defines the estimate as “aspiration” (ὄρεξις), along with natural will, desire and deliberate choice, thus establishing not only the difference between them, but also an essential point of similarity, a certain “common denominator”. St. Maximus, following Nemesius (Nemes. de natur. hom. 32.67), plays on the etymology of the word προαιρετόν (deliberately chosen) (προ-αιρετόν) in the sense of preferring one thing over another. As Shufrin notes in the scholia to Nemesius, “the estimate is included only when it is necessary to choose from several ways to achieve a given goal, which seem, to a first approximation, to be equally effective” (Anthology. Vol. 1, p. 442). Wed. opusc. 1: PG 91, 17B. In the Russian translation of Aristotle it is usually translated as “conscious choice”, in the translation of Nemesius F. S. Vladimirsky it is translated as “choice”, in the translation of Nemesius edited by A. M. Shufrin in the Anthology - as “conscious preference”. This version was chosen by the translator based on the specifics of the thought of St. Maximus (however, in the notes in the translations of parallel passages of Nemesius, for the sake of uniformity and convenience of comparison, we adopted the real version of the translation of this term). Wed. Nemes. de natur. hom. 32.75; Arist. ethical eudem. 1226b.17; Idem, ethical. Nic. 1113a.10–11. This definition of St. Maxima, although close to the definitions of Nemesius and Aristotle, does not repeat them literally. Wed. Nemesius’s description of deliberate choice: “It is something mixed from an estimate, a decision and an aspiration, and precisely - neither an aspiration in itself, nor a decision, not just an estimate, but something composed [complex] of all this. Just as we say about an animal that it consists of soul and body and that, however, the animal is not a body in itself, not only a soul, but both together, in the same way [should be said] about deliberate choice. That it is a kind of estimate, that is, an estimate together with a subsequent decision, although not an estimate in itself, is also obvious from the etymology. For what is deliberately chosen is something which is preferred to something else; but no one decides before he thinks, and no one prefers without deciding [what is more acceptable]. And since we do not strive to implement everything that seems good to us in practice, then only what has already been decided on the basis of an estimate becomes a deliberate choice, that is, chosen when the desire joins. So, a deliberate choice necessarily happens in relation to the same thing as an estimate. And from this it follows that deliberate choice is an aspiration that has [the ability] to estimate regarding what depends on us, or an estimate that has [the ability] to strive for what depends on us. After all, by deliberately choosing, we rush to what has already been decided on the basis of estimates” (Nemes. de natur. hom. 32.58–74, trans. F. S. Vladimirsky with changes by A. M. Shufrin and ours according to: Anthology. T. 1: 424). This chapter summarizes Nemesius (Nemes. de natur. hom. 33, see translation in Anthology. Vol. 1, pp. 424–426), who, in turn, largely follows Aristotle (Arist. ethic. Nic. 3.1111b.32–1112b33). We don't follow Min's punctuation. – Approx. translation Lit.: “self-hypostatic wisdom.” Wed. the text in 24C, which speaks of a truth that does not require a foundation, and further - that regarding it, that is, those who strive only towards it, there is no longer an estimate and a deliberate choice (we are talking about the saints who abid in God). The concept of γνώμη is not developed as such in the context of the doctrine of the volitional act either by Aristotle or by Nemesius. This is one of the most important anthropological concepts of St. Maxim, to which many studies have been devoted (see, for example, Sherwood 1955b, p. 58–63; Thunberg 1965, p. 226–231; Larchet 1996, p. 137–141; Renczes 2003, p. 271–281; Lurie 2006, p. 391–396 and chapters 16, 17 and 21 in the introductory article to this edition). In the comments we will touch on certain aspects of the understanding of St. Maxim γνώμη, based on one or another context where this concept occurs. ἐνδιάθετος; Latin translation: internum (“internal”), and in Larchet (Larchet 1996, p. 138). This or that γνώμη is, according to prp. Maximus, the result of our choice of virtue or vice (see disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 308B). St. Maxim brings the concepts of γνώμη and διάθεσις as close as possible. In the Disputation with Pyrrhus, the stages of the volitional act are described differently than in the present essay (“Desiring, we seek, consider and consult (or: “we estimate”), and judge (or: “decide”), and tune in (or: “we settle” - διατιθέμεθα), and prefer (or: “choose”), and we see and use” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 294C, trans. D. E. Afinogenov according to: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 157; translation options in parentheses are ours, based on the terminology of this translation). in the present description of γνώμη, this is also clear from St. Maximus’ definition of γνώμη as “location” in the commented place PG 91, 17C (cf. Larchet 1996, p. 138). In the Dispute with Pyrrhus, a different definition of γνώμη is given: “intention is nothing more than some kind of volition (θέλησις), relatively adhering to either a real or an imaginary good” ( disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 308C, trans. D. E. Afinogenov, modified by: Maximus the Confessor 2004, p. 175). Or: “state”. One should not, of course, identify skill (ἕξις) and intention (γνώμη). The similarities and differences between these concepts in St. The maxim is analyzed in particular in Renczes 2003, p. 277–279. Larchet understands γνώμη as “a habitual disposition (disposition habituelle) in relation to good or bad” (Larchet 1996, p. 138), or, referring to the Disputation with Pyrrhus, “a way of life in virtue or vice, inherent in us by choice” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 308B, trans. D. E. Afinogenova, modified from: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 175). As is easy to see, in the description of the act of will in opusc. 1, in contrast to the Disputation with Pyrrhus, Rev. Maxim does not give “intention” a moral meaning, but characterizes it “neutral”, as one of the characteristic moments of a volitional act for us. As for the moral side of ἕξις, our responsibility for the skills we have developed (foundations and disposition of the soul) in relation to good and evil, Aristotle already wrote about this (see, for example, Arist. ethic. Nic. 1114a.10f), Nemesius has similar considerations: “Everyone agrees that it is in our power to engage and exercise; and in exercises lies the beginning of habits (or: “skills” - ἕξεων), because habit is a newly acquired nature; if exercise is the beginning [root] of habit (ἕξεως), and exercise is in our power, then, consequently, habit is in our power. And if habits are in our power, then actions corresponding to these habits are in our power, because actions correspond to habits. So, he who has the skill (ἕξιν) of justice will act justly, and he who has the skill of injustice will [act] unjustly; therefore, it depends on us whether to be fair or unjust” (Nemes. de natura hom. 38.54–62, translated by F. S. Vladimirsky with changes by A. M. Shufrin and ours according to: Anthology. T. 1, p. 429). Unlike Nemesius, for whom, in the context of polemics with the “determinism” of the Stoics, the center of consideration is the question of what is in our power (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν), which is closely related to the concept of autocracy (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον) (Nemes. de natur. hom. 38–40), St. Maxim, in his analysis of the act of will, speaks not of autocracy, but of free will (ἐξουσία), although these concepts are closely related. In Greek, this is also obvious from the etymology associated with the history of the concept (for more details, see the next note). In its internal form, the term ἐξουσία goes back to ἔξεστι (to be allowed [to someone]), hence ἐξουσία (the right to act at one’s own discretion - power [in some area]. The legal term ἐξουσία αὐτοπραγίας (“right of self-activity”) had the meaning of powers delegated to someone (“carte blanche”) - for example, the governor of a province - which, if abused, the delegating authority could deprive him of. The same term denoted the rights of freed slaves. Chrysippus was probably the first to introduce it into philosophical use, defining freedom. (ἐλευθερία) - the state of a sage - as ἐξουσία αὐτοπραγίας (Chrys. fragm. moral . 544.5–7, ed. J. von Arnim), and slavery - the state of a bad person - as deprivation of self-activity (Ibid, 355.1–3). From the Stoics, the term ἐξουσία passed on to other schools, acquiring the prefix αὐτο-, which the legal term did not have (its presence would imply the inalienability of the corresponding powers and/or rights; i.e., the absence of an authority that could deprive them of τὸ). αὐτεξούσιον is equated to “being in our power” (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). The very fact of this identification of dependence (being-in-power) with power (ἐξουσία; whatever meaning is given here to the prefix αὐτο-) indicates the awareness that in fact “our” power is only something in ourselves, the power over which, thus, is his (or “our”) power over ourselves, i.e. – freedom (ἐλευθερία), understood as the property of every person, and not just the sage (as with the early Stoics and Epictetus). This understanding of freedom is already found in St. Justin Martyr (Just. Mart. apol. 1.43.3–4; dial. cum. Tryph. 88.5.2). The term τὸ αὐτεξούσιον was traditionally translated into Latin as "liberum arbitrium" or "libertatis arbitrium". This term becomes, starting with bliss. Augustine, a constant theme of treatises, towards the end of the 13th century. yielding to the closely related term “free will” (voluntas libera). – Approx. translation Here ἐφ’ ἡμῖν is translated as “depends on us”, and not “in our power”, in order to avoid tautology. A more literal, but less literary translation: “freedom of the will is lawful dominion (κυριότης ἔννομος) in doing what is in our power, or unhindered dominion (κυριότης) in using what is in our power.” Lat. translation for κυριότης ἔννομος – legitima auctoritas, Ponsois translation: souverainité autonome. In our power, according to St. Maximus, first of all, what concerns virtue and vice (ep. 1: PG 91, 368C–D). Or: “we have power, free will” (ἐξουσιάζομεν). That is, we are initially free, by nature, we do not choose to be free, but in some way are “doomed to freedom,” which includes a deliberate choice, an estimate and a decision. Based on this and bearing in mind the fact of the Fall, which made us receptive to sin, St. Maximus in his other writings raises the question of the need to freely surrender our autocracy to God (without losing it) in order to live according to the will of God (see his interpretation on 1 Cor. 15:26: The last enemy will be destroyed - death. “This [will happen] when we completely surrender to God (τῷ θεῷ παραχωρήσωμεν) autocratic will (or: “free will” (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον θέλημα)" (qu. dub. 22)). “the law of sin” and the power of the devil.In more detail and in the context of the Gethsemane prayer, St. Maxim speaks about this surrender of autocracy to God in amb. 7: “...This, perhaps, is the submission about which the divine apostle says that the Son “submits” to the Father - those who freely accept [His invitation] to obey; after which - or due to which - “the last enemy will be destroyed by death” [1 Cor. 15:26], since if what is in our power, or rather, autocracy (through which, seeking entry to us, [death] asserted the dominance of corruption over us) is freely and completely ceded (ἐκχωρηθέντος) God, although he rules perfectly, [his destiny] is subordination, due to the inaction of the will to anything other than what God wants” (PG 91, 1076A–B, trans. by A. M. Shufrin with changes quoted from the edition: Maxim the Confessor 2007a, p. 251); see also scholia 45 and 46 of A. M. Shufrin to this place amb 7. A little further than the indicated place from the Difficulties to St. John. Maximus speaks of perichoresis (penetration), which on the part of God is the communication of Divine action (energy) to the creature in response to the intentional concession (ἐκχώρησιν γνωμικήν) of autocracy to God on the part of the creature (amb. 7: PG 91, 1076B–C in trans. A.M. Shufrin). It is characteristic that in the Dispute with Pyrrhus St. Maximus, denouncing the Monothelites, says that in their Ekphesis they were moved “not by reason (= logos), but by free will (or arbitrariness - ἐξουσίᾳ)” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 289D). That is, a deliberate choice. Wed., as used by St. Gregory of Nyssa, some of the most important terms used by St. Maxim: “the verbal and intellectual nature, if it ceased to act freely (κατ’ ἐξουσίαν), at the same time destroyed the gift of rationality. For what will one use thinking (διανοίᾳ) if the power (ἐξουσίας) to choose (προαιρεῖσθαι) that which, according to the inclination of its mind (κατὰ γνώμην), lies with another” (Greg. Nyss. oratio catech. 31.8–11). (By “other” here we mean God, since St. Gregory explains why God does not bring one to Himself by force). The train of thought of Rev. Maximus is closer to the presentation of Nemesius, whose thought, however, on this issue also includes the tradition to which St. belongs. Gregory, who correlates autocracy with the mind: “every person who estimates, since the choice (αἱρέσεως) of what should be done depends on him, estimates in order to choose what was previously decided through estimation, and, having chosen, do it. Thus, it is absolutely necessary that the one who has the ability to pretend should also be the master (κύριον) of [his] actions. After all, if he were not the master of [his] actions, then in vain he would have the ability to pretend. And if so, then of necessity the autocratic [beginning] (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον) accompanies the rational, because either man will not be a rational [being], or, being rational, he will be the master of [his] actions; and being the master of [his] actions, everything will be autocratic. It was also shown that what comes from the underlying matter is changeable. Thus, it necessarily follows from both that man is autocratic and changeable: changeable because he is born, autocratic because he is reasonable” (Nemes. de natur. hom. 40.21–32, translated by F. S. Vladimirsky with changes by A. M. Shufrin and ours according to: Anthology. T. 1, p. 432). Within the same tradition, St. Maxim, referring, however, not to St. Gregory, and on Clement of Alexandria, also establishes an unambiguous connection between the rational soul, more precisely the mind, autocracy and natural will: “will is the natural autocratic movement of the autocratic mind, or the mind moved towards something spontaneously (αὐθαιρέτως). Autocracy (αὐτεξούσια) is a mind moved by nature, or an intelligent, autocratic movement of the soul” (PG 91, 276C). According to Lackner's observation (Lackner 1962, S. 44–45), Rev. Maxim here and in the next four sentences follows a passage from a work that has come down to us under the name of the philosopher David (David prolegom. philosoph. 47.1-8), but it should be noted that David does not make a comparison between “opinion” and “deliberate choice”. Borrowing from David (VI century) is an interesting evidence of the acquaintance of St. Maximus with the writings of Aristotle's commentators who belonged to the Alexandrian school (cf. next note). The original is a play on words. – Approx. translation The translator tried to convey it with another play on words (more precisely, their consonances) in Russian. In the original there is an implicit “etymologization” of διάνοια (thought, reflection), which is raised to διανύω (I complete, bring to the end, pave (the path)). Such etymologization in a similar context can be found in Ammonius (Ammon. in Aristot. Analyticor. prior. libr. i comm . 25.3) and John Philoponus (Joann. Philop. in Aristot. libros de anim. comm . 15.2.2). Thus, we have another evidence of the acquaintance of St. Maximus with Aristotle's commentators (cf. previous note). That is, it is literally said that “meditation (διάνοιας) tends to bring a thought to the end (διανύειν) along some path.” Terms of Aristotle's logic (see, for example, Arist. analyt. prior. et poster. 41b.28), widely used by Aristotle's commentators, in particular John Philoponus. Almost verbatim in: Anonym. in Aristot. ethica Nic. In ethica Nicomachea paraphrasis (pseudepigraphum olim a Constantino Palaeocappa confectum et olim sub auctore Heliodoro Prusensi vel Andronico Rhodio vel Olympiodoro. 151.38, ed. G. Heylbut. Heliodori in ethica Nicomachea paraphrasis (CAG 19.2). Berlin: Reimer, 1889. Defining understanding as aspiration, St. Maxim again establishes a “common denominator” between it and other types of “aspiration”, first of all by deliberate choice in order to immediately distinguish between them. Below (21C) he points to “aspiration” as a generic concept in relation to all moments of the volitional act. Or: abstruseness. As follows from the dictionary entry (ὑπέρνοια) of Lamp’s dictionary, St. Maximus in this definition quotes almost verbatim a passage from the interpretation of Proverbs (3, 13 according to LXX) by Procopius of Gaza (PG 87, 1245B). According to Lamp, ὑπέρνοια is intellectual pride (i.e., intellectual pride). St. Maximus, following Procopius, builds here the concept of understanding as a virtue according to the classical principle of the mean between excess and deficiency (cf. Aristotle: “Virtue is a consciously chosen disposition [of the soul], consisting in the possession of the mean in relation to us, and [the mean] determined by such a judgment as a reasonable person will determine it. The mean is between two [types of] depravity, one of which is from excess, the other from lack” (Arist. ethoc. Nic. 2.6.1107a1–5, translated by N.V. Braginskaya with amendments, cited from the edition: Aristotle 1975–1983, p. 87). 143 (letter 221) and pp. 257–258 [letter 411]), and the development of this doctrine. In particular, Rev. John Cassian connects the observance of the “middle,” or “royal way,” with the virtue of prudence (Joan. Cas. conlat. 2.2; 2.16). The doctrine of the inner and spoken word (logos) was developed by the Stoics, whose legacy was included in the writings of apologists and other Christian writers; for St. Maxims could be relevant, for example, the texts of Nemesius (cf. Nemes. de natur. hom. 14: “On the inner word and the spoken”). Wed. This entire sequence of mental activity is almost verbatim in St. John of Damascus (Joann. Dam. exp. fid. 36.41–48). St. Maximus provides a clearly excessive number of proofs of the difference between understanding and deliberate choice. One does not leave with the feeling that for him, reflecting on what understanding is and giving appropriate definitions is interesting in addition to the pragmatic task of Christological polemics. At the same time, he strives not to leave his opponents any opportunity (no matter how understanding is understood) on the basis that Christ had a human mind, and therefore He fully possessed the mental ability, to attribute to Him a deliberate choice. From this place it is clear why St. Maxim defined most of the moments of a volitional act as one or another type of “aspiration.” Probably, on the basis of this generic concept, his opponents identified various moments of the act of will, which allowed them to say that Christ has one will, understood as one or another rational aspiration. St. Maxim accepts this challenge and speaks of this or that moment of a volitional (and even mental) act as an aspiration, but at the same time proves that there is no reason to talk about their identity. Photius (Phot. biblioth. 195.159b5–11) gives the title of this and the next chapter (which he refers to as the 11th). – Approx. translation Or: “impulse.” We present this and the following concept in the nominative case. Or: “sees the meaning” (we are not talking about discursive thought, but about intuition). – Approx. translation Here Rev. Maxim sets out the most complete sequence of a volitional act and its component actions, which combines its moments described in disp. Pyrr. : PG 91, 294C, with those indicated above in this essay. In total, there are twelve such moments, starting from the initial possession of rational nature and its will and ending with the repose of movement towards the object of striving in its use: 1. rational nature possessing the ability of rational striving (φύσις), 2. volition = striving (θέλησις = ὄρεξις), 3. thought (λογισμός), 4. desire (βούλησις), 5. search (ζήτησις), 6. provision (σκέψις), 7. estimate (βουλή), 8. decision (κρίσις), 9. deliberate choice (προαίρεσις), 10. motivation (ὁρμή), 11. use (χρῆσις), 12. repose (ἀνάπαυσις). It can be assumed that Rev. It was no accident that Maxim divided the act of will into twelve parts. The number 12 in the arithmology of St. Maxima plays a special role, characterizing this material world, our everyday perception of it and being in it. In particular, he writes: “the number twelve signifies time and nature, for time is sevenfold, and nature is fivefold” (qu. dub. 41); “nature is fivefold, since it is composed of species and four elements” (qu. dub. 124). About the sevenfold nature of time and the fivefold nature of nature, see more in amb. 67: PG 91, 1396B–1404C. Wed. Thal. 55: “Scripture mysteriously shows that only the one who finds himself above feelings and time (they are denoted by the number twelve, consisting of five – a number indicating feelings, and seven – a number indicating time) and cuts off the connection of the soul with them, comes from their confusion, rushing to the mountain city” (PG 90, 540D, trans. A. I. Sidorov, quoted from: Maxim the Confessor 1993. Book II, p. 165) and exp. Ps. 59: “The valley... is flesh, which, due to disobedience, has become a despicable land of passions. In it, as if in a valley, every pious and God-loving person defeats nature and time through reason and contemplation. And the number twelve signifies this nature and time, since nature is fivefold due to the [five] senses, and time is sevenfold, as is obvious to everyone. And five combined with seven makes the number twelve” (PG 90, 860A–B, trans. A.I. Sidorova cit. according to the edition: Maxim Confessor 1993. Book I, p. 209). These passages are from the ascetic-exegetical works of St. Maxims are of particular interest, since they not only give an interpretation of the number 12, but it is also clear from them that ultimately St. Maxim sees the task of the ascetic in going beyond the boundaries of nature and time, the basic parameters of “this world.” In turn, this formulation of the question can be correlated with his Christological teaching, according to which volition in Christ (who, of course, was not limited to the parameters of normal human existence after the Fall) was not described by the scheme of our volitional act, consisting of 12 “steps”, the same act that, according to St. Maxim, corresponds to our limitation to the world in its created, spatio-temporal and sensory-species reality. Another feature of this description of the moments of a volitional act is that they are connected with each other in a kind of continuous sequence, in which each link seems to grow from the previous one and forms the basis of the subsequent one. The entire volitional act appears in the form of a movement, starting from the initial “rest” or potential state of nature possessing will, then there is a transition to the very act of volition-aspiration, which determines the object of desire, and everything ends with peace in relation to the achieved goal. That the starting point of movement is “nature”, which has a will, is evident from the following sentence, where, speaking of the act of volition in reverse order, St. Maxim comes to nature: “and no one strives meaningfully without being intelligent (that is, endowed with thought) by nature.” Trying to convey both values. – Approx. translation Here, all moments of the volitional act (except for repose from movement) are presented in reverse order. St. Maxim here associates “decision” not simply with the morally neutral choice of two alternative actions, but with the virtuous use of nature, consistent with the logos of nature, or the abuse of its forces. That is, those in which you can think about one way or another of behavior, decide one way or another, choose this or that. Or: “self-hypostatic truth.” Wed. above, the text in 16D, which says that we “estimate only what can be done (after all, this is precisely what is in our power), and not about wisdom that does not require justification (= self-hypostatic).” St. Maximus draws a distinction between our everyday existence, in which we continually make a choice in favor of what seems to us better, rejecting something worse in comparison with it, and that existence of saints (he burns about him below), when such a choice is no longer made, since God (= truth that does not require a foundation), unlike all earthly goods, is not something comparable to others, is not something that is chosen as the best in comparison with the worst. This idea (outside the context of a dispute about an act of will) was first formulated by St. Maximus in his polemic with Origenism in amb. 7 (in Origen, will is preserved in the minds and in God, and therefore they can fall again), and not only with Origenism, but also with some ideas of St. Gregory of Nyssa, who believed that souls would prefer God as a good compared to the evil they tasted in this life. St. Maxim disputes this point of view in the following passage: “If they say that they [minds] can, but do not want because of [their] experience of the opposite, then even in this case they will cherish the beautiful not for its own sake, as beautiful, but out of necessity and for the sake of the opposite, as something desired not by nature, or in its own sense. After all, everything is not beautiful in its own sense that is not in itself good, desirable, attracting any movement to itself” (amb. 7: PG 91, 1069C, trans. A. M. Shufrin according to: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 243). More about this in the study of Polycarp Sherwood's Difficulties to John in: Maximus the Confessor 2007a, p. 573–576. That is, the ability of deliberate choice in the saints is deactivated. This is fundamentally different from the view that Origen and even St. had on this subject. Gregory of Nyssa. For the latter, see the previous note and the 12th scholia of A. M. Shufrin to Difficulty 7 and Sherwood’s considerations in Maximus the Confessor 2007a, p. 474. Such deactivation of the deliberate choice of saints in the state of resurrection becomes, as can be seen from the words of St. Maximus, the “law of nature,” taking the place of the former “law of sin,” according to which people outside the mode of existence renewed in Christ are doomed to waver in their intention and deliberate choice. When the ability to deliberately choose is deactivated, such fluctuations cease. We are thus talking about a new way of existence of nature, in comparison with the sinful way of existence of nature, characteristic of saints. Moreover, as we will see below (24D-25A), with such a uniform way of existence for everyone (with deactivated deliberate choice), each of the saints has his own individual way (tropos) of communion with God, corresponding to his measure of love and the grace he receives (see more in the introductory article, Chapter 21). A new, uniform way of existence for all does not mean the annihilation of individual differences, which took place among the Origenists, in whom all individual differences are abolished in apocatastasis. A concept from the vocabulary of the Origenists, for whom “satiation” explains the reason for the falling away of minds from God and the disintegration of Enada. St. Maximus argues with the Origenistic doctrine of “satiation” in amb. 7. Already when expounding the doctrine of movement in this work, they gave a description of the ever-increasing desire of the saints in God (PG 91, 1073C), but the word “satiation” appears only in amb. 7: PG 91, 1089A, and the doctrine of satiation is explicitly refuted at 1089B–C. God, as the Absolutely Desired One, cannot become any less significant, much less disgusting (as happens with satiety). On the contrary, the infinite God “stretches to infinity” the aspirations of those enjoying Him, therefore there can be no dispersion as a result of satiety with the absolute Good of the minds that supposedly abided in Him from the beginning (1089C). See for more details the chapter on satiety in Sherwood's study (Maximus the Confessor 2007a, pp. 458–478) and scholium 11b; 122a A. M. Shufrina to amb. 7. In the commented place opusc. 1 prp. Maxim gives a positive meaning to κόρος, which is typical for his treatment of any terms related to ethics. τοσοῦτον ὑπερφυῶς μεθέξοντος, ὅσον ἐπόθησε. Here we find the use of the famous formula, which in patristics received the Latin name tantum - quantum (Greek τοσοῦτον - ὅσον, “as much as”) and which goes back to St. Maxim to the words of St. Gregory the Theologian “so that I too may become as God as He is a man” (Greg. Naz., or. 29.19: PG 36, 100A). Although in this place we are not talking at all about comparing deification with the Incarnation, nevertheless this formula of St. Maxim uses it very widely and covers the process of deification both in its Christological, economic dimension, and in relation to the mystagogy of deification, in particular, in relation to the correspondence of the measure of a person’s procession in love (longing) for God to the measure of communion with God. Sherwood points out many examples of the use of this formula: amb. 10: PG 91, 1113B–C; amb. 33: PG 91, 1288A; amb. 60: PG 91, 1385B; Thal. 61: PG 90, 632A; Thal. 64: PG 90, 725C; ep. 2: PG 91, 464A12; ep. 25: PG 91, 613D (Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 427). Among the researchers on this topic, St. Maximus discussed: Thunberg 1995, p. 31–32; Cooper 2001, p. 161–163; Lurie 2006, p. 75–77 (by St. Gregory the Theologian) and p. 361–363 (in St. Maximus); and most fully Larchet 1996, p. 376–382. Larcher, in addition to the places indicated by Sherwood, notes Thal. 64: PG 90, 725C, which says that God loved us more than Himself, “so much so that He deified us by grace, just as He became man by economy”; Larcher also notes the direct or indirect development of this theme in Thal. 61: PG 90, 637D; amb. 3: PG 91, 1040A; amb. 7: PG 91, 1084C–D (this passage is discussed in A. M. Shufrin’s scholium 102a); opusc. 4: PG 91, 57A–B; or. dom. : PG 90, 877A; Thal. 22: PG 90, 317B–320C and in a number of other places in the works of St. Maxima. St. Maximus obviously objects to the argument in favor of monothelitism, which is given in the Disputation with Pyrrhus by Pyrrhus, who referred to the expression of the “most famous fathers” that “God and the saints have one will” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 292B), as an argument in favor of the fact that unity of will does not mean (contrary to the thesis of St. Maximus, expressed in the dispute in context of Christology) identity of natures. Pyrrhus's argument is all the more serious because St. Maximus, in his Epistle to Cubular John On Love, speaks of one will and one intention of the saints with God and with each other: “we can all have - just as surely as one nature - one intention (γνώμην), and one will (θέλημα) with God and each other” (ep. 2: PG 91, 396C, translated by A. M. Shufrin according to: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 338) (cf. ep. 2: PG 91, 401B). These places allow some researchers (in particular, Catholic scientists Sherwood, Garriga, Rioux) to claim that St. Maximus, during the period of polemics with the Monothelites, changed his point of view on this issue, abandoning the doctrine of the one will of the saints and God, as well as the one action of God and the saints, which he expressed in amb. 7: PG 91, 1076C. Contrary to what St. Maxim, there has been a change in teaching, is categorically opposed by Larchet, who interprets his earlier thought in the light of the later one and finds them in agreement with each other (Larchet 1996, p. 558–563). For an overview of existing approaches to this problem, see scholia 53a and 54 of A. M. Shufrin to amb. 7 in: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 337–343. Shufrin insists in these scholia that expressions from the early works of St. Maximus have a completely correct and supported by the Orthodox tradition (represented, for example, by St. Gregory Palamas) meaning, which, as he believes, is included in the opusc. 1 along with another view that directly denies it, according to which the will of the deified is not entirely one with the will of God. Thus, Shufrin, together with Larche (and unlike Catholic scientists), believes that the teaching of St. Maxima, expressed in amb. 7 and ep. 2, is fully consistent with church tradition, but, unlike Larcher, he believes that in opusc. 1 prp. Maximus came into conflict with his own teaching in some respects. In our opinion, this issue requires further study. The fact is that if in ep. 2 the main pathos was to overcome the sinful gnomic division of people with each other and with God (and in this context it was said about the same “gnomes” and “will” of the saints with God and with each other), now, in the context of polemics with the Monothelites, St. Maximus, with no less pathos, insists on the persisting difference between, even deified, people and God, as well as between different saints. It is in the context of these two – equally important in the soteriological sense – spiritual attitudes that one should ultimately evaluate how much the later Maxim “contradicts” or “does not contradict” the earlier one. For more details, see the introductory article, chap. 17 and 21, where we, in particular, note that the very meaning of “gnomes” in the early and later writings of St. Maxima miscellaneous. Unity of purpose certainly follows from the deactivation in the saints of intentional choice, about which St. Maximus says above (24C ff.), for in the absence of hesitation and ambiguity there remains “only the desire of the mind ... inexpressibly reaching the only thing that is available to initiates, the enjoyment of that which is the object of desire by nature,” that is, God. In turn, such deactivation would have been impossible without a voluntary (meaning, without its loss) surrender of autocracy to God, about which concession the St. Maxim also spoke in amb. 7: PG 91, 1076B. As Shufrin rightly notes, speaking about autocracy: “This ability of the created being is St. Maxim calls autocracy, and its implementation - movement itself, or movement “by intention” (κατὰ γνώμην). “The “intentional (γνωμική) yielding” of this ability to God is such a way of its implementation in which the intention (more precisely, autocracy. - G.B.) does not set, but accepts the goals set by the will of God (cf. Matthew 26:39)" (Maximus the Confessor 2007a, p. 336). In this aspect, there is no doubt that in the early and late works of St. Maxim's teaching is the same. Wed. Eph.1:23. The interpretation of this passage of Scripture is found already in the relatively early Questions and Perplexities: “What does it mean that the apostle said: “the fullness of Him who fills all in all” [Eph. 1:23]? – In essence, God is apophatically excluded from [the number of] existing [things], for he is not named, is not thought of, is not involved in anyone (or anything); but by providence, he who participates in many is filled with them. After all, each of the [creatures] that came into being according to their logos, existing in God, is called a member of God, that is, having a place in God. Without a doubt, even if [it] receives wisely and consciously a movement in accordance with this [logos], it will end up in God, filling its place and producing beauty as a useful member in the Body of Christ” (qu. dub. 173, trans. A. M. Shufrin according to: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 351). The development of this theme - the fulfillment of God's plan for creation in the Body of Christ, expressed in the language of the fulfillment of "logoi" in the Logos - can be found in St. Maxima in amb. 7: PG 91, 1077–1080. On the fulfillment of the Body of Christ as the fulfillment of the eternal plan and Council of God, see amb. 7: PG 91, 1088; 1097A–B. Wed. in the Disputation with Pyrrhus: “the saints, having said that God and the saints have one will, did they say this, meaning the essence or creative will of God, or the object of the will? For the will of the willer and the object of the will are not the same thing, as the sight of the seer and the visible, because one is inherent in him essentially, and the other is external. But if they said this with the essential in mind, they will turn out to be not only introducing the saints as co-natural with God and creators along with Him, but also contradicting themselves, since they assert that those who are different in essence cannot have a common will. If [is meant] the object of the will, then, therefore, the fathers called will, as a derivative through a cause, or, as some like to say, in a figurative sense, and no absurdity will follow if we determine that simply wanting is a matter of nature" (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 292C-D, trans. D. E. Afinogenov with amendments from the edition: Maxim the Confessor 2004, pp. 153–155). Further in the same Dispute (294A) St. Maxim makes a distinction between simple desire (or: “mere desire”) and the tropos of desire. We find a similar distinction above and in opusc. 1: PG 91, 25A. John 14:2. Wed. amb. 7: PG 91, 1077B and cap. theol. 2.89. This passage diverges most, formally speaking, from the early description of deification in ep. 2, where prp. Maxim says that in God “we can all have - just as exactly as one nature - and one intention (γνώμην), and one will (θέλημα) with God and each other” (ep. 2: PG 91, 396C (translated by A. M. Shufrin according to: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 338) (cf. ep. 2: PG 91, 401B). In opusc. 1: PG 91, 24D-28A, perhaps with the greatest strength in the legacy of St. Maximus defends the eternal difference between God and the saints, on the one hand, and between the saints themselves, on the other. The emphasis placed here is additional in comparison with those placed by St. Maxim in amb. 7, where, in polemics with Origenism, with its teaching about Enada, he developed the Orthodox teaching about the unity of the saints with God in Christ. Now, in polemics with the Monothelites, St. Maximus had to expand on what was said in the Difficulties of John, emphasizing differences rather than unity. However, in the doctrine of the logoi of St. Maximus included the idea of ​​individual logoi-providences (see already qu. dub. 173) regarding each of the saints, so it cannot be said that the aspect of the distinction of saints as special, not identical to others, members of the Body of Christ was ignored at that time (for more details, see Benevich 2009a). What is new in comparison with the earlier works is, perhaps, that in opusc. 1 prp. Maxim speaks about the difference of saints, describing it not with the help of the doctrine of the fulfillment in them of different individual providential logos (a doctrine dating back to the Areopagitics and, in general, Neoplatonic thought), but with the help of the more traditional language for Orthodox dogmatic theology of the difference between hypostases, essences and natural wills, to which is added the language of “tropos”, adopted by St. Maxim from the Cappadocians. This should be kept in mind when considering the remark of A. M. Shufrin that in polemics with the Monothelites, the Confessor abandoned the doctrine of one will of God and each individual saint, which Shufrin proposes to interpret as the providence-will of God for him being fulfilled in the saint (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, p. 339, note 161). Teachings about the one will of God and the saints so understood in opusc. 1 is really not there, but there is no teaching about individual logoi here either; the very way of describing deification has changed. It would be possible to reconcile these two descriptions (each of which has its basis in the Orthodox Tradition) in a third one, which would take into account both the one and the other task at the same time, that is, the maximum identification of the unity of the saints with God and with each other, with an equally clear distinction between God and creation and between the hypostases of the saints (the approach to such a reconciliation is the end of Chapter 21 in the introductory article to this edition), see also A. Walker's dissertation (Walker 2000). In any case, it should be noted that in opusc. 1: PG 91, 25B, speaking about the final state of deification, that God “will enter wholly into everyone in general and into everyone individually, filling everything with the measure of grace and in everyone united with Him in proportion (ἀναλόγως) to the faith of each, as if in members, gaining fullness,” Rev. Maximus refers to the same place in Scripture [Eph. 1:23], the interpretation of which is also qu. dub. 173, where he applied the doctrine of individual providential logoi. For Rev. According to Maximus the Confessor, will is a characteristic not of hypostasis, but of nature. – Approx. translation Here Rev. Maxim reveals the most important motive of his polemic against the expression “the one will of God and the saints.” If such unity (interpreted not as unity of purpose) were applicable to the saints, then even more so it would be applicable to Christ, in whom human nature is inseparable in one hypostasis of the Logos incarnate from the Divine. Divine nature; Manichaeism is a form of Docetism. – Approx. translation St. In many works, Maximus, polemicizing with the Monothelites, elevates their teaching to the Monophysite teaching about the one complex nature of Christ and further to the teaching of Arius and Apollinaris of Laodicea, who in fact, although in different contexts, say that the Logos occupied the place of the human mind in Christ, from which their doctrine of one will followed. Accordingly, Rev. Maximus traced the heresy of monothelitism to these well-known and condemned heresies (cf. “I, and my fellow servants, and all who subscribed, anathematized those who, according to Arius and Apollinaris, recognize one will and one action, [and] do not confess our Lord and God according to both, from what, in what and what He is by nature rational, and therefore according to both [natures] possessing [Divine and human] will and action of our salvation)” (disp. Byz. 12, trans. M. D. Muretov according to: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 194; cf. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 300D). The doctrine of the complex nature of Christ has traditionally been criticized by the Chalcedonites as introducing the concept of a nature that is not consubstantial with either the Divine or the human. Having examined in the previous paragraph the consequences of the assumption that there is one natural will in Christ (θέλημα), and showing that this leads to conclusions incompatible with the confession of two natures, St. Maximus addresses another possibility, that this will is intentionally choosing or intending. Further in this and the next paragraph, various ways of interpreting the so-understood “one” will are given, none of which can be applied to Christ. St. Maxim draws a distinction between the righteous, who excel in virtue and deliberately follow the logos of nature, and Christ, to whom, unlike them, the concept of success in virtue is not applicable (in Him human nature is deified from the very conception due to the hypostatic unity with the Divine), just as there is not even the possibility of sin in Him, which even righteous people have. Based on this difference, Rev. Maxim rejects the understanding of the “single will” in Christ as “intention”, the scope of which relates to the preference for one or another (including morally) course of action. All the more inapplicable to Christ is the will that chooses, implying a deviation towards the worse, that is, towards the anti-natural (as discussed below). These two possibilities are different. Maxim from the state of de-activation of the saints' deliberate choice in the resurrection (perfect deification) or the absence of it in Christ. There is an obvious typo in PG 91, 27D5, incorrect aspiration in ουτω. – Approx. translation Metaphor of voting. – Approx. translation In this case, Rev. Maxim does not present his point of view on deliberate choice, but reconstructs the possible points of view of his opponents. One possibility is that the “one will” of Christ, understood as a deliberate choice, is in some way consistent with nature. What kind of nature is this if there is only one deliberate choice, and it corresponds to this nature? She should be alone too. That is, it is something between Divinity and humanity. This is obviously the objection of St. Maxima. In more detail, Rev. Maximus sets out his understanding of Nestorius’ teaching about the so-called “person of unity” in other theological and polemical works (in particular, in opusc. 2: PG 91, 41A-45B), where, among other things, the opinion is criticized that Christ has two gnomic wills corresponding to two natures, but consistent with each other in the course of life (Ibid, 44A-D). This opinion implies the success of Christ in humanity during life (Ibid, 44D), which denies the deification in the Hypostasis of the Logos of His human nature from the Incarnation. Elsewhere, St. Maxim characterizes the position of Nestorius as follows: “the vicious Nestorius ... in [the treatise] called “Clear Initiation”, in the Second Word of this treatise he insidiously writes: “We preserve natures without fusion, for they are united not in essence, but in intention (γνώμῃ); therefore we see that these [natures] have one will, one energy and one power (δεσποτεία)'" (opusc. 15: PG 91, 176A, see also note 572, where it is noted that the authenticity of this quotation may be in doubt). In the Dispute with Pyrrhus, St. Maximus drew the attention of Pyrrhus to the fact that those who published Ekphesis (this was Heraclius, who acted under the influence of the Monothelit bishops) referred to Nestorius as their like-minded person: “speaking of one will, they defend his views, declaring that Nestorius teaches about one will in two persons invented by him, as evidenced by the Ekphesis they defend” (disp. Pyrr. PG 91, 313B, trans. D. E. Afinogenov according to: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. In fact, Ekphesis contains the following reference to Nestorius: “For if even the vile Nestorius, dividing the Divine Incarnation of the Lord and introducing two sons, did not dare to talk about two wills (θελήματα), but on the contrary, glorified the identity of the will (ταὐτοβουλίαν) of two persons invented by him, then how is it possible for those who profess the right faith and glorify the One Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the true God, accept in Him two and such opposite wills? So, following in everything and in this the holy fathers, we confess one will (θέλημα) of the Lord Jesus Christ, the true God” (Mansi X. 991). It is interesting that at the Monothelite Council in 662, St. Maxim was accused of Nestorianism. About the teachings of Nestorius, including his teaching about two wills in Christ, see our article: Benevich 2009c, p. 531–543, where, in particular, it is emphasized that Nestorius in a dispute with St. Kirill (who uses “monoenergetic” expressions) explicitly speaks of two wills in Christ, which, it would seem, is much closer to the diopheliteism of St. Maximus (it is no coincidence that the Monothelites accused the latter of “Nestorianism” at the council of 662 and continued to accuse him further), however, we see how such “diothelitism” of Nestorius differs, according to St. Maximus, from his own diopheliteism - first of all, by attributing to the humanity of Christ only a gnomic (allowing for the possibility of sin) unity with the Divine, which corresponds to Nestorius’s refusal to talk about a single hypostasis of the incarnate Logos. We cannot deal here with the question of how much St. Maxim objectively presented the teachings of Nestorius (especially the later one), and to the extent he used the “heresiological construct” necessary for conducting polemics. See also note. 604 about the teaching of Nestorius about one will in Christ. Above Rev. Maxim examined the possibility of applying deliberate choice and intention (γνώμη) to nature, including in the “Nestorian” understanding. Now he considers another possibility, namely, if we consider that Christ had one will in the sense of one deliberate choice, but applied not to the natures (in the coordination of human will with God’s will, as it was understood, according to St. Maximus, for example, Nestorius), but directly to the hypostasis of Christ. Against this St. Maxim puts forward individual objections below. St. Maxim proceeds from the fact that an intentional choice, if it characterizes a hypostasis, becomes its feature (idiom), and the idioms of all hypostases are different, so we can speak, at best, about the agreement of the “intentions” or “choice” of the Persons in the Trinity, which means that the consubstantiality, as it is professed in Orthodoxy, will be destroyed. This is one of the reasons why the controversy with tritheism turned out to be relevant in the era of disputes with monoenergism and monothelitism, and the anathema against tritheites was included in the Council Epistle of St. Sophronius of Jerusalem 634 (see PG 87/3, 3192C). Substantiating the presence of a human mind in Christ (which was denied by Apollinaris, who put the Logos in the place of the mind), St. Gregory of Nyssa wrote that virtue is never involuntary, therefore the virtue manifested by Christ in His earthly life must presuppose freedom, which is impossible without Christ’s human mind. In Apollinaris, according to St. Gregory, it turns out that with the absence of a human mind in Christ, He is also deprived of freedom, which means that the virtue He shows is not such, since it is the result of coercion. Having advanced this argument against Apollinaris, St. Gregory immediately adds: “So, how does the writer attribute ease to something that is deprived of the opportunity to make a choice (τῷ ἀπροαιρέτῳ), in which there is no personal reflection that would guide him to good? For sinlessness that does not depend on a deliberate choice (προαιρέσεως) certainly does not deserve praise” (Greg. Nyss. Antirrh. adv. Apoll., ed. F. Mueller, Gregorii Nysseni opera, vol. 3.1. (Leiden 1958) 198.14–16). From this passage one might get the impression that St. Gregory attributes to the human mind of Christ intentional choice, or freedom, understood as freedom of choice. But such freedom, at least theoretically, opened up the possibility of wrong choice, that is, sin and opposition of the human will to the Divine will, which Apollinaris, and after him the Monothelites, wanted to avoid. Only Rev. managed to get out of this circle. Maximus, who was able to substantiate the possibility of the presence of a rational human nature in Christ, without introducing προαίρεσις. At St. Gregory of Nyssa, on the contrary, the likeness of man to God is described with the help of this concept. As John Rist notes, “In the treatise of St. Gregory of Nyssa De Virginitate we read that man was created in the image and likeness of God. This similarity consisted primarily in his freedom of choice (lit.: “in the autocracy of deliberate choice” - ἐν τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ τῆς προαιρέσεως) and in his ability to choose what he likes (see Greg. Nyss. virg. ΧΙΙ.2, 12 ff., P. 79, ed. M. Aubineau, Grégoire de Nysse. Traité de la virginité [Sources chrétiennes, 119] (Paris, 1966) (see Rist 1985, pp. 113–114.) Gregory could think that God is capable of sin, so that in the case of attributing προαίρεσις to man, in which, according to St. Gregory, is similar to God, we can rather talk not about error, but about a certain lack of clarity of this thought, which is associated with the lack of a clear distinction between autocracy (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον) and deliberate choice (προαίρεσις), because autocracy according to St. Maxima characterizes both the Divine nature and the human nature, but προαίρεσις manifests itself only in an undivinized person. Be that as it may, it is precisely this kind of ambiguity that we encounter even in St. Gregory, St. Maxim makes it clear in the commented passage from opusc. 1. The concept of “assimilation” was developed by Rev. Maxim even before its use in this place, in particular in opusc. 20: PG 91, 237; it is also found in the Disputation with Pyrrhus, where Pyrrhus is the first to touch upon the topic of assimilation, putting forward the thesis that the human natural will was assimilated by Christ “relatively” (304B). St. Maxim objects to this that it was acquired “essentially” (304A–305C), as necessarily inherent in our nature assimilated by Christ; As for “relative assimilation,” St. Petersburg speaks about it. Maximus says that it is “by which we amicably assimilate what relates to each other... without doing or undergoing anything about it ourselves” (304B). The concept of “relative assimilation” allowed St. Maxim is already in opusc. 20: PG 91, 237A–B to show that Christ’s prayer to “carry the Cup” does not indicate the possibility for His human will to come into conflict with God’s (see for more details Chapter 14 of the introductory article to this edition). Other important works that discuss the concept of “relative assimilation” are opusc. 9 (see note 417 and text) and opusc. 19 (see note 694). St. Maxim is referring to a place from Thal. 42, in which he applied προαίρεσις (hereinafter translated as “volition”) to Christ, speaking of the correction in Christ of Adam’s sin and its consequences: “Our Lord and God took upon all this nature entirely, and in the assumed nature He also had a passionate principle, adorned [by Him] by will (κατὰ προαίρεσιν) incorruptibility. Therefore, as a result of the passionate principle, He became sin by [human] nature for our sake, not knowing the deliberately chosen sin (γνωμικὴν ἁμαρτίαν) thanks to the unshakability of will (διὰ τὴν ἀτρεψίαν τῆς προαιρέσεως). With this unwavering will [the Lord] corrected the passionate beginning of nature, making its end (I mean death) the beginning of transformation to incorruption. And just as through one man, who voluntarily (ἑκουσίως) turned away his will (προαίρεσιν) from good, the nature of all people changed from incorruptibility to corruption, so through one man Jesus Christ, who did not turn away [His] will (προαίρεσιν) from good, the restoration of nature from corruption to incorruption took place for all people (Thal. 42.18–34, trans. A. I. Sidorova with changes from: Maxim Confessor 1993. Book II. Part 1, p. 110). About the evolution of the views of St. For the maxim on the possibility of applying free will and gnomic will to Christ, see note. 633 and ch. 17 introductory article. St. Maxim is literally quoting his expression as used in Thal. 42.24 Or: “creator” (δημιουργός). St. Maximus distinguishes here between reproachful and blameless passions (cf. note 377 and text). The latter are a consequence of Adam’s sin and consist in sinless passions caused by the corruption of nature. Their voluntary assimilation is connected, firstly, with the Logos’ perception of our nature, and secondly, with the assumption of the action of this suffering and death, which in Christ also happened not like with us, but voluntarily, that is, in a Divine way. As for reproachful passions, that is, those that are not just a consequence of sin, but are themselves sinful, they have a moral character and are associated with “decay” or fluctuation of our will (or intentional choice). Christ did not have such passions, but in this place and in a number of other St. Maximus says that Christ “as a lover of mankind took to Himself economically the reproachful passions, recognizable as one of us and by our rebellious disposition [tropos], so that, having completely destroyed it for us, like fire - wax or the sun - the vapors of the earth, He could give us His properties and make us impassive already here, and incorruptible by promise" (opusc. 20: PG 91, 237В–С) . We are talking about the “Strife of Gethsemane,” as described in the Gospel, where Christ is “recognized as one of us,” as if He had a “disobedient disposition,” the ability to resist the will of the Father. This is what it consists of, according to St. Maxim, “relative assimilation” of our “dishonor” by Him. This is not about the “natural” action of the instinct of self-preservation for a person after the fall and therefore the “impeccable” action, but about the resistance to God that arises under its influence when He orders one to go to death. In opusc. 20 prp. Maxim says that Christ did not and could not have had such resistance, therefore it is incorrect to read into Christ’s words a reluctance to go to death or even just the possibility of it. We are talking about the assimilation by Christ, i.e. His depiction, out of compassion, of our resistance for the sake of teaching us to submit to God’s will. That is, the suffering and death that befall people for sin. Wed. interpretive translation of this passage and its discussion by V. M. Lurie in: Lurie 2006, p. 400. The latter emphasizes the parallelism of this passage with the famous passage from amb. 7, where, according to Lurie, it is said “about the cessation of all movement after the creature reaches God” (Ibid.), seeing the same idea in the expression of St. Maxima στάσιν ἀκίνητον (Lurie translates it as “motionless standing”; Shufrin translates it somewhat differently (see text), although he agrees with the existence of a parallel with amb. 7). Be that as it may, in the commented place opusc. 1 prp. Maxim, in the context of polemics with the Monothelites, does not simply repeat what was said in amb. 7: PG 91, 1076, and tries to emphasize that with the “motionless state (or standing)” of the “human part” in the Logos, the movement of human nature is preserved in accordance with the logos of this nature, while the Divine Logos controls all these actions and movements. Here the question may indeed arise whether St. Petersburg does not contradict. Maxim himself, when he speaks, on the one hand, about the presence of a natural human will in Christ, and on the other hand, in the same sentence he clarifies that we are talking about a “motionless state”: “she acquired a motionless state, or rather, a stable movement in accordance with her natural desire (that is, simply, will), or, more precisely, a motionless state in God the Word Himself” (opusc. 1: PG 91, 32A; our italics – G. B.). However, the entire context of the controversy of St. Maxim suggests that by the state of immobility he meant the absence of oscillations of the will in Christ and the impossibility of such oscillations, but not the absence of human will as such (see below, 32C). Of course, the “still state” implies that Christ, by humanity, did not want anything other than what God wanted. At the same time, in the earthly life of the Savior, there were two tropos of “relationships” in Christ between human and Divine nature: either the tropos of complete deification, when the movement of human nature took place directly according to the will of the Divine (without abolishing the autocracy of human nature, but with complete devotion to the Divine (amb. 7: PG 91, 1076B–C)), or the tropos of suffering, when the Divine will allowed human nature to Christ must manifest his will, different from God’s, but not contrary to it (as, for example, during the battle of Gethsemane). That is, those who St. Maximus refers to the natural will (for example θέλημα) and those that he refers in this treatise to the contribution of the created hypostasis (for example προαίρεσις). Wu Minh ἄψιλος. I accept the proposal of Lampe (s. v.) to consider falsa lectio instead of ἄψυχος. – Approx. translation It should be clarified that “unitarian formulas” in relation to energy were found in a number of authoritative holy fathers and, until a certain time, St. Maximus, with a certain interpretation, used them himself (see comments to opusc. 7, 8 and 20, which relate to an earlier period of polemics (c. 640–641), but starting from about 643, he abandoned this, and began to interpret the expressions themselves in a different sense, completely rejecting the expression “one energy” in any sense, obviously, both as fraught with misinterpretation, and because of the more rigid opposition to the Monothelites and his consolidation with the strict Diophelites in the West, and under the influence of their criticism of his expressions as ambiguous (see for more details Chapter 13 in the introductory article to this edition. At the same time, it should be noted that already in these writings, the beginning of the polemic with the Monothelites, St. Maxim rejected the doctrine of one will, insisting that it (unlike the unitary formulas in relation to energy) was not found in the fathers). (see, for example, opusc. 7: PG 91, 88D). Here and below, the terms “energy” and “action” are used identically to translate the same Greek word ἐνέργεια. The use of one word or the other is due to purely stylistic reasons. We are talking about the famous place from amb. 7, in which the state of the deified is described as follows (the disputed place is highlighted by us in italics): “... “an image ascended [back] to [its] prototype (τὸ ἀρχέτυπον)” (Greg. Naz. or. 28.17.6), and like the imprint of a seal, [its] prototype perfectly suited [as exactly corresponding to it], [such an image] no longer has anything else to which it – and cannot [to anything else] – be attributed. Or, to speak more clearly and directly: he cannot even want [this], as he who has received the Divine action, or rather, has become God in deification, and even more so receives pleasure from the frenzy, [becoming] outside of what exists with him both naturally and [as such] is thought of due to the grace of the Spirit, which has triumphed over him and shown him to have only God acting [in him] so that there is one, even only one in all [relationships] the action of God and those worthy of God, or rather, of God alone, as [coming] in a manner befitting the Good [in a manner] wholly in interpenetration with the worthy as wholes" (amb. 7: PG 91, 1076C–D, trans. A.M. Shufrin, ed.: Anthology. T. 2, p. 114). The need to address the polemic with monoenergism in the context of the polemic with monothelitism is well explained by A. M. Shufrin: “from the understanding of will as “the (autocratic) movement of thinking nature,” taken by St. Maxim for armament against the Monothelites (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 301В–С), it follows that the will (“θέλημα”) is a mode of action (“energy”), because according to the definition going back to Nemesius, also adopted by St. Maxim (see, for example, amb. 5 [to Thomas]: PG 91, 1048A), action is precisely the movement of nature. With such premises, monothelitism necessarily follows from monoenergism, therefore the negation of the latter poses the necessity of negating the first” (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, p. 339, note 162). The question is whether St. Maxim says in amb. 7 about the state of the saints “in the future” (understood as posthumous existence), is discussed by A. M. Shufrin in scholium 54 to this place (Maximus the Confessor 2007a, pp. 339–343). Shufrin believes that a number of expressions by St. The Maxima contradicts this statement from his later writing. In particular, immediately before this passage, St. Maxim in amb. 7: PG 91, 1076B quotes the words of the ap. Paul: “I live not for anyone, but Christ lives in me” [Gal.2:20], which are clearly spoken in this life, and which St. Maxim, as Shufrin notes, correlates with the state of deification, described by the formula “one, even only one in all [relations] action of God and those worthy of God.” It seems that St. Maxim contradicts himself or changes his position without admitting it. However, already in amb. 7 there are several places (Shufrin does not comment on them in his scholia and does not mention them when analyzing this topic) that indicate that St. Maxim really spoke about the future age (although he does not specify that this is a posthumous existence) (cf. “the future (and not the former and [then] spoiled) communion of grace worthy” (1076A), “what ... will be the state of things in the future” (1077B), in another place: “nothing that is brought into being, being moving, has stopped, since it has not yet met the first and only Cause” (1072C), from which it follows that the state of “rest in God” he relates to the future century). How, however, do the quoted words of the apostle agree with this? Paul, as well as numerous testimonies from St. Maximus (especially the famous speculation about Melchizedek as having achieved perfect deification (see PG 91, 1144 B–C), that deification is possible already in this life? Comparing all these facts, as well as the statement of St. Maximus in another place, where he says that the soul enters into the resurrection of the Son of God together with its deification (see PG 91, 1381D), and such deification occurs among saints already during their lifetime, we can say that, speaking about the single energy of God and those worthy of Him in amb 7, rev. Maxim really had in mind the life of the next century, which, however, for the deified saints begins and continues, uninterrupted by death (for those who betrayed their autocratic will to God, as the same Apostle Paul did, death will be destroyed [1 Cor. 15:26]), already in this life. About this mystical (or mysterious) aspect of his teaching, St. Maxim in the context of his polemics with the Monothelites, and justifying his use in amb. 7 of the “monoenergetic formula”, remained silent (probably for tactical reasons, the reason for which will be discussed below). J.-C. Larcher rightly objects to those Catholic authors who, like J.-M. Garrigues, they claim that St. Maxim believed only in deification after death (Larchet 1996, p. 643), although it is difficult to agree with the opinion of Larchet, based on Doucet, that St. Maxim once especially emphasized the difference between the deification acquired in this life (as, supposedly, “anticipation”) and what will be in its entirety in “the next.” The examples which Larcher gives (Ibid, pp. 644–645) to support this thesis (in particular, he refers to cap. theol. 2.87) may well be understood as referring to a state acquired in this life (as we see from the example of Melchizedek). St. Maxim reproduces a reasoning known in late antiquity, which can be found already in a treatise of the 2nd century. Ps.-Plutarch On Fate, where it is given in the context of polemics with the doctrine of Stoic determinism: “everything that becomes, like becoming itself, is inseparable from ability (or: “power” - δυνάμεως), and ability is inseparable from essence. For example, whether it arises, or arises, not without an ability that relates to a person, the essence (οὐσία) is a person. It is thanks to the ability, which is “average”, that the essence is capable (or: “powerful” - δυνάμενον), and emergence and the emerging are both possible (δυνατά). So, of these three things: ability (δυνάμεως), capable (δυναμένου) and possible (δυνατοῦ), the capable, as a being, precedes as the subject of the possibility, and the ability precedes the possible” (Ps.-Plut. de fato 571A). St. Maximus in his passage does not rely on Ps.-Plutarch, but on Nemesius, which he follows almost literally: “Ability (δύναμις) is called that according to which we can do something. After all, we have the ability for everything we do; Whatever abilities there are, there are no such deeds. Thus, the action depends on the ability, and the ability - on the essence: after all, the action depends on the ability, and the ability - on the essence and in the essence. So, as we said, these three are interconnected: capable (δυνάμενον), ability (δύναμις) and possible (δυνατόν). The essence is the capable; that which gives us the strength to be able is ability; and what is naturally obtained according to ability is possible” (Nemes. de nat. hom. 33. 55–63, Russian translation by A. M. Shufrin with changes from: Anthology. T. 1, p. 426). Wed. version of the translation of this passage and its discussion by A. M. Shufrin in: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 339; Wed Larchet 1996, p. 564–566). Or: “those who love the beautiful.” θέσις; possibly meaning “adoption.” – Approx. translation Wed. scholium 15 to Thal. 54: “he who loves (ἐραστής) the beautiful is voluntarily brought by Providence by the logoi of Wisdom to the grace of deification” (Thal. 54, translated by A. I. Sidorov, modified from: Maxim the Confessor 1993. Book II, part 1, p. 254, note 43). Together with Sakalis, I accept the reading κατὰ instead of καὶ τὰ. – Approx. translation Wed. a description of the state of deification as the undergoing of Divine action and the repose of natural created action in the previously written Questions and Answers to Thalassius: “We act as long as our naturally rational ability, producing virtues, is active and effective, and our irrespective mental power, perceiving all knowledge, passes through the entire world of beings and conceivables, leaving behind all ages. And we undergo when, having perfectly completed [the circulation] with the logoi of beings [that arose] from nothing, we passed in ignorance (ἀγνώστως) to the cause of beings, and rest according to natural forces along with the finite in nature, becoming that which cannot be achieved by any natural force. For nothing created can be deified from its nature; for only Divine grace is inherent in nature to deliver [everyone] according to [him] the grace of deification, enlightening nature with supernatural light and raising it beyond its own limits in an abundance of glory" (Thal. 22.87–98, our translation corresponds to the interpretation of this place by Polycarp Sherwood (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, p. 417) and in a number of points diverges from the translation of A.I. Sidorov (Maxim the Confessor 1993. Book II, part 1, pp. 64–65)). Wed. characterization of the deified and the application of “infinity” to God in Thalassia’s Questions: “They will have an unchangeable immutability, since every medium [or middle in which there is sometimes a danger of erring in knowledge] will be surpassed by those who, without a word or concept, have been brought by grace through silence, inexpressible silence and ignorance to the most infinite and more than infinite peak, an infinite number of times infinite in nature exceeding everything φύσιν ἐπέκεινα πάντων ἀκρότητα δι’ ἀφασίας ἀῤῥήτου τε σιγῆς ?? χάριν)" (Thal. 63.230) (in the translation we follow Sherwood’s understanding and his interpretative translation (Maximus the Confessor 2007a, p. 430). Compare the use of a similar construction in: Thal 56.149; 60.42; 60.621B1 and in the commented place opusc. 1: PG 91, 36A7. As Sherwood notes regarding Thal. 63.231, “this passage surpasses in the use of negation formulas anything that can be found in Ps.-Dionysius. Dionysius speaks, in another context, of infinitely infinite forces (Ps.-Dion. d. n. 8.2, 889D). The double use is often found in Proclus, but, as in Dionysius, in connection with those below God” (Maximus the Confessor 2007a, p. 430, note 89). It is quite likely that Rev. Maximus is unique in his use of such a formula, emphasizing in an apophatic spirit the absolute and incommensurable superiority of God by nature in relation not only to creation and the categories applicable to it, but also to what is contemplated around God (i.e. infinity). The question of infinity (or infinity) in the Difficulties and other writings of St. Maximus is discussed by Sherwood, see Maximus the Confessor 2007a, p. 393, approx. 11; in addition, see the discussion of the issue of the infinity of God in scholia 1**; 26, 29a, 129a A. M. Shufrina to amb. 7. As Larchet notes (Larchet 1996, p. 78), according to St. Maximus, God is attainable not in the infinity of his own nature, but – by grace – only in “the infinity that surrounds the essence” (amb. 15: PG 91, 1220C). Wed. quote from St. Gregory the Theologian: “In Him this one thing is completely comprehensible - His infinity” (or. 38.7: PG 36, 317C); St. Maxim brings her to carit. 1.100, speaking about the infinity that surrounds God. Understanding this argument is difficult, which is reflected in different interpretations of this passage by different researchers. Firstly, the question arises, why St. Maximus above (33A) said that, speaking of “the single energy of God and those worthy of Him,” he wrote about the future state of the saints, if in this place he seems to emphasize the difference between Christ and the saints (“We do not proclaim Christ as a deified man, but as God completely made man” (36A))? On the other hand, if the state of deification is characterized by the repose of natural energy from what it “has by nature to do,” but at the same time, as St. Maxim, he does not deny this natural energy to the saints, even in the life of the next century (the expression “single energy” does not imply the disappearance of the energy of human nature in a state of deification), then shouldn’t this be more true for human nature in Christ? But if so, why then make the distinction between Christ and the saints, which St. Maxim conducts not only opusc. 1 (36), but also in the Disputation with Pyrrhus (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 297B), emphasizing that the holy prophets (for example, Moses and David) moved at the behest of God, that is, the action of God that guided them, unlike what took place in Christ, was not their own. V. M. Lurie proposed an answer to this question: “Such “external control” of humanity by the Divine is carried out only in Moses, David and other deified people... But in Christ, the control of human functions is carried out directly by the hypostasis of the Logos, which takes these functions upon itself. The Logos controls His both natures, according to both natures He acts, and therefore both of these natures are active, although the activity of one of them lies in “passivity,” that is, in passivity” (Lurie 2006, p. 384). From this explanation it seems to follow that in Christ both natures are active (even if the second is active in the sense of “passiveness”), and therefore in relation to Him it is necessary to speak of two actions only because the Logos himself controls his two natures and actions, and God acts in the saints. However, as we see from the words of St. Maxima in opusc. 1: PG 91, 33D, he, interpreting the expression “single energy” in relation to saints in a state of deification, declares that he does not deny natural energy behind them, but speaks only of repose from what is inherent in it by nature. Thus, he argues that in relation to the saints, the expression “single energy” should be understood in the sense of the presence in them of the deifying action of God, accompanied by the saints’ “perception” of this action, which is the “undergoing” of deification (see Larchet 1996, p. 577). But isn’t it even more possible to speak about the same experience of deification in relation to human nature in Christ? A. M. Shufrin expressed the opinion that the problems of interpretation that arise here can be clarified if we keep in mind that “in the Christological polemic, the question of the human activity of Christ was by default posed in relation only to His life in the mortal body, while the “deactivation” of human energy in the hypostases of saints in the context of the same Christological polemic (against the Monothelites) of St. Maxim speaks only in relation to posthumous existence” (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, p. 342). With this Shufrin explains why St. Maxim in opusc. 1 said that the expression "united energy" from amb. 7 refers to the life of the next century. And he immediately adds: “however, in the context of polemics with the Origenists, as we have seen, St. Maxim admits the possibility of “deactivation” of human energy already in a mortal body.” As can be seen from the text of St. Maximus, even more significant than the attribution of deification to the “future age” in opusc. 1, is that even in this state he does not take away from the saints the energy of human nature, which, however, he himself correlates with the “enjoyment of goods” and the experience of deification (33D–36A). And if this is so, if the saints in the state of deification (no matter in “that” or in “this” life) do not deny human energy, then it is clear that in Christ it should be recognized, at least in the same sense. But then again it is unclear why St. Maxim contrasted Christ and the saints. To resolve this whole complex of perplexities, it seems to us that we should keep in mind the thought of St. A maxim that he persistently pursues, emphasizing, on the one hand, the perfect deification of our nature in Christ from the very Incarnation, and on the other, the fact that He demonstrated the reality of His perception of our nature and our suffering, allowing our will and energy to manifest separately from God’s will, as was the case, for example, in Gethsemane, and did this absolutely freely for the purposes of the economy of salvation and testimony to the truth of the Incarnation. This is precisely why Christ in His earthly life differed from the saints, moved by the beck of God (in whom in this state - and by default they are considered by St. Maximus only in this - the human will does not manifest itself separately from God, that is, God always speaks and acts through the prophets, and in the Apostle Paul lives and acts, as he himself says in Gal. 2:20, - Christ). As for the tropos of deification, when the human natural will in Christ did not manifest itself in the manner indicated above in its difference from the Divine, then in this case, it seems to us, there should be no difference in the formulations regarding the “number of energies” in Christ and in the saints. If energy is understood in its own sense (not including enduring and accepting it in this concept), then we must talk about one energy (as St. Maximus speaks about this in relation to the saints in amb. 7, and such an approach, as A.M. Shufrin shows, has become the property of the Orthodox tradition (see Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 342–343)). If we include endurance in this concept, then in both cases we should talk about two energies and wills, which St. Maxim does it in opusc. 1. This is all the more true since in fact the emphasis in the polemics with the Monothelites was on the teaching about Christ in His earthly life, where, in relation to the tropos of free suffering, the human will and energy of Christ were revealed as such, and to deny the presence of a human will different from the Divine meant to deny the economy of salvation, opposing which St. Maxim accomplished his confessional feat. I am correcting οὐσιώδεις to οὐσιώδης. – Approx. translation The most important Christological formula of St. Maxim, which appears in many of his works. Larchet (1991, p. 330, n. 211) points in particular to amb. 5: PG 91, 1052D; 27: PG 91, 1269C; ep. 15: PG 91, 573Α; Thal. prol. 6: PG 90, 68Α, D; Thal. 9: PG 90, 121B; 19: PG 90, 224Α; disp. Pyrr: PG 91, 289B; rel. mot. 7: PG 90, 121B; disp. Biz. 8: PG 90, 144Α. An abbreviated version of this formula can be found in amb. 27: PG 91, 1268D; 1269B; ep. 12: PG 91, 468BC, 500BC; 500D–501A; 13: PG 91, 524D–525A; Thal. prol. 7: PG 90, 80C; Thal. 9: PG 90, 128C; 21: PG 90, 252Α. This formula has been analyzed by Piret (Piret 1983, p. 203–239). As Larcher writes: “The first expression of this formula: “Christ of two natures” is found in St. Cyril of Alexandria; the second: “He is in two natures” was introduced by the council of Chalcedon [and before that it was used in Antiochene theology. - G.B.], and already theologians of the 6th century. they were united. The third formula: “Christ has two natures” was introduced by St. Maxim" (Ibid). In the preface to the Letters of St. Maxim Larshe also expresses this consideration (Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 32), however, already in Leontius of Jerusalem we find the “complete” formula: “you will have to assume that these natures, which are in Christ, which is Christ and in which Christ exists (ἐνούσας Χριστῷ, καὶ οὔσας Χριστὸν, καὶ ἐν αἵς ἐστι Χριστός) several (at least two!)” (Leont. Hier. contr. monoph .: PG 86, 1817B), and this is already very similar to the formulas used by St. Maxim (ἐξ ὧν ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἅπερ ἐστί - of which, in which and which He is), if not in letter, then in essence, although it is the latter who will use such expressions systematically. It should be noted that some Monophysites, in polemics with whom these formulas were developed, accepted the expression “from which”, in a certain interpretation they allowed the expression “in which”, but nevertheless rejected the formula: Christ is two natures (see, for example, John Philoponus 2001, p. 215–216), so it is precisely this, widely used by St. Maxim, was especially “critical” both for disputes with the Monophysites and for polemics with the Monothelites, where the confession “who is Christ” implied that Christ is not something “third” besides His two natures, and therefore, it is impossible to introduce a single will that would belong to this “third” (such a “third” is neither the hypostasis of Christ, which is not ontologically “third” in relation to its two natures, much less a certain “complex nature” introduced by the Monophysites and not recognized by the Chalcedonites). Bathrellos (2004, p. 109) points to another predecessor of St. Maximus - Leontius of Byzantium (PG 86, 1904A). Wed. use of this formula prp. Maxim below in the interpretation of the Battle of Gethsemane in opusc. 6: PG 91, 68A. Allusion to the Chalcedonian oros. Inseparability and non-fusion, as well as the alternation spoken of here, obviously implies the indivisible and non-merging unity of Divine and human actions in Christ, expressed in the fact that He performed the Divine (miracles) in a human way (through the flesh), and endured the human (suffering) in a Divine way (freely). Wed. “After all, He accomplished the Divine carnally, because through the flesh, which is not devoid of natural action, and the human – Divine, because by autocratic desire, and not by external compulsion, He allowed Himself to be tested by human suffering. And he did not do Divine things, for he was not only God, and not carnal - human, for he was not only a man. Therefore, miracles were not without suffering, and suffering was not without miracles, but the first ones - I will say not without impudence! - were not dispassionate, but the latter were obviously wonderful; both miracles and suffering are extraordinary, for both the Divine and the human came from the same incarnate God the Word, in both of which he certified the actual truth of both what he consisted of and what he was” (ep 19, 593A, trans. G.N. Nachinkin according to: Maxim the Confessor 2007b, pp. 19–20, note. 16). Here the inseparability and non-merging of natures and their actions in Christ is confirmed by the fact that He, as God, supports the immutability of the logoi of the natures of all things and the stability of “as-being,” by which, obviously, in this case we should mean the tropos of the existence of natures. Most likely we are talking about a temporary victory of the Monothelites in the empire, although it cannot be ruled out that St. Maxim also means that his teaching was criticized by some diophelites in the West, who reproached him for inconsistency and reproached him for his early writings, which in their opinion diverged from the current ones. The need to defend against such charges is clear from opusc. 9. The scholiast reads “unity,” although a more likely reading is “conduct.” See note. 11. The scholiast here follows St. To Maxim: “They say that the hypostasis of wisdom is virtue, but the essence of virtue is wisdom. Therefore, the tropos of the behavior of contemplatives is a manifestation of unadulterated wisdom, and the logos of contemplation of doers has become the solid foundation of virtue. The surest sign of both (χαρακτὴρ ἀψευδέστατος) is an unshakable striving towards That which is actually being (τὸ κυρίως ὄν)” (ep. 2 ad Thom. prol. 5–10, ed. Janssens., trans. Archim. Nektariy (Yashunsky) according to: Maxim Confessor 2006, p. Larchet (Larchet 1998, p. 14) dates this work, like the previous one, to 645–646. Most likely, it represents an excerpt from a more extensive work, as evidenced by its beginning (40B–C), which clearly continues previous (which has not reached us) discussions. We probably also do not have the end of this work. Most of this treatise is a polemic with Sevier of Antioch and, along with him, with his opposite, Nestorius. With the teachings of Sevier, St. Maxim polemicized repeatedly, touching on the problem of monoenergism and monothelitism and independently of it. The most significant here is the controversy in the Letters (epp. 12; 13; 15), and in opusc. 2, 3, 16, 21, 24. On the theology of Sevier, see, for example, Davydenkov 2007 (and bibliography), on the peculiarities of the polemics with him by St. For Maxim, see Larcher's preface to the Letters (Maxim the Confessor 2007b, pp. 18–34). As V.V. Petrov notes: “The division (διαίρεσις) of natures is a negative analogue of their difference (διαφορά). It is important that in Chalcedonian usage it was customary to say that the unity of natures in Christ exists “without division” (ἀδιαιρέτως). Thus, the ultimate goal of Divine Providence is the destruction of all division. Maxim applies this principle to his anthropology and cosmology. He writes (in a Porphyrian spirit) that "distinction" of things distinguishes and defines them, showing how they are constructed, while "division" cuts them into parts, so that things are separated from each other. Following Leontius of Byzantium, Maximus says that when applied to things, the difference in number does not introduce division. Every number shows some difference, but not division; it introduces neither unity nor division. Just as in Christ two natures and two wills do not introduce division, so there is no division in relation to things” (Petrov 2008, p. 29). According to Sevier, there is a real difference in the natural qualities or characteristics contemplated in the Divine and human essences of Christ, however, professing such a real difference in qualities, Sevier refused to confess the real presence of two natures (for him, nature and essence are different concepts), since he understood nature, which is identical to hypostasis for him, as a specific realization of essence and, accordingly, refused to confess the presence of two natures in Christ, since in his system this would mean two hypostases (Rev. Maxim writes about Sevier that he “used the expression “natural characteristics,” although he rejected the nature of the flesh, compressing different natures into one” (opusc. 19: PG 91, 221A). 633), especially notes 849, 854, 860 and text. See about the teachings of Sevira Davydenkov 2007; That is, the unreality of human nature as such (cf. opusc. 1: PG 91, 28B). Sevier admitted that one can talk about two natures only in imagination (or mentally), but not in reality (i.e., in concrete realization), on the basis of this he could be accused of Manichaeism, considered here as a form of docetism. This refers to the teaching of Apollinaris that the Logos with human nature (devoid of mind, in whose place the Logos took its place) form a single nature. Since Sevier used the expression “the one nature of God the Word incarnate” (which he traced back to Saints Athanasius and Cyril, but actually belonged to Apollinaris), he could be accused (and was actually accused) of Apollinarianism, although he, of course, was not an Apollinarian. Eutyches is the founder and most radical representative of Monophysitism, from whose teachings Sevier and his followers dissociated themselves. We are obviously talking about Ebion (Ebion), to which some authors trace the origin of the Judeo-Christian sect of Ebionites (Ebionites). The Ebionites (according to church tradition) believed that Jesus was just a man, although they recognized Him as the Messiah and a divinely inspired prophet. Not the deification of human nature in the hypostasis of the Logos, but the giving of grace to the man-Jesus, like the prophets. This means that since Sevier confessed that Christ is “of two natures,” then despite the fact that he identified nature with hypostasis, he could be accused of “Nestorianism,” according to which the human part of Christ is not perceived by the Logos as His own, but external to Him, to which Sevier could and actually answered that he does not confess two hypostases in Christ, but, on the contrary, that is precisely why he speaks of a single complex nature = hypostasis of Christ in order to avoid the doctrine of two hypostases. A distinction made only in thought, but not in reality. For Rev. Maximus’s sign of this reality of difference is the confession of Christ “in two natures” and that He is “two natures,” from which followed two energies and two wills. That is, that the qualities of the two natures are really different. On the use of the concept of “natural” or “essential” quality in the philosophy of late antiquity, see note. 836. Here Rev. Maximus uses the word “essence” in the Chalcedonian sense, identical with nature, which does not correspond to the use of Sevier. That is, that the difference in natural qualities does not mean confirming the real difference of natures (as the difference should do), but actually justifies their unification into one complex one. About the controversy of St. Maximus with the teachings of Nestorius (as he understood it) see opusc. 1: PG 91, 29B and notes thereto, especially notes. 125. That is, a unity that is not a real ontological unity, just as it was not real, from the point of view of St. Maxim, the ontological difference of natures in Sevier. Thus, both heresies opposing each other did not profess in all reality, one the unity of Christ, the other the difference of His two natures. This refers to the well-known concept of Nestorius (as the Orthodox understood it), according to which the human “face” in Christ in the course of His life, coordinating its will with the Divinity, formed the one Christ. This concept implies, according to St. Maxim, the original “separation of energies” in Christ, i.e., the unity of the hypostasis of the Son of God turns out to be not real in this case, but, as defined by St. Maxim, only in name (more precisely, we are talking about moral unity). It is characteristic that the Monophysites-Sevirians formulated their doctrine of one action in Christ in polemics with the teaching of Nestorius. As the Monophysite Patriarch of Alexandria Theodosius (536–566/567) wrote, addressing the Empress Theodora: “... Since He [Christ] has one action befitting God, it is necessary that it is not divided or cut, and that you do not take one as imperfect and having, according to humanity, a need to ascend to the better, and the other as completely perfect and not having any defect, so as not to fall into our hands into the harmful and wicked evil teaching of Nestorius” (translated from the editor: Acts 1996. Vol. 4., p. 133). In another Monophysite work, quoted at the Sixth Ecumenical Council, again in polemics with the Nestorians, monoenergism is affirmed in order to ensure the unity of consciousness or intention (γνώμη) in Christ: “Saying that the same wisdom befitting God and one (co) knowledge (γνώμη) belonged to God the Word and the rational soul, which was His all-holy body is animated, we most of all follow the teaching of the holy fathers, as is clearly shown; We will very clearly prove the unfused hypostatic unity and remove the assumption of duality from everywhere. If we do not do this, then we will be followed, as the wisest Sevier said, by two natures, and two actions, and two wisdoms in Christ. And this is the blasphemous teaching of Theodoret [of Cyrus] and the heresy of the Judaizers, which stems from him, and not ours, because we affirm that Christ is one and the same, and we confess that He has one (co)knowledge (γνώμη) and action befitting God” (translated with changes: Ibid., p. 134). As Archimandrite notes. Cyril (Hovorun), Sevier of Antioch is characterized by an emphasis on one action of Christ, while he could talk about two wills (obviously natural) and one (apparently personal) (Hovorun 2008, pp. 26–28). Sevier, and after him other Monophysites, began to use the Areopagitik formula “God-masculine action” to affirm one action in Christ, justifying the unity of action by the unity of the subject (Ibid, p. 31–32). See about Sevier’s monoenergism in detail in: Davydenkov 2007, p. 145–163 and about his “monothelitism” in combination with monoenergism (Ibid., pp. 163–191). St. Maximus, as he himself testifies, drew his information about the teachings of Sevier from meetings with the Monophysites, whose teachings were somewhat different from the teachings of their teacher (opusc. 3: PG 91, 49C); they most definitely profess not only “one divine act,” but also one will of one Christ. A name behind which there is no real unity of natures in one form. The manuscript says “quality” (ποιότητα), but we make a replacement with “quantity” (ποσότητα), which is also suggested in Min’s note to this place. However, it should be noted that there is one context in which the reading “indivisible quality” makes sense. The fact is that Sevier really rejected the teaching proposed by the extreme monophysite Sergius Grammaticus, that in the one Christ the characteristics of two natures are not preserved, and as soon as a new single complex nature is formed, then one should talk about one common characteristic or quality of this nature. Sevier argued against this doctrine, not accepting the doctrine of a single quality and insisting on maintaining the distinction of natural qualities (Torrance 1988, p. 33–34). Nevertheless, the general context of the polemics of St. Maxima and Sevier incline us to consider the reading “quantity” preferable. We thank F. G. Benevich and T. A. Shchukin for discussion of this point. In contrast to the difference only by imagination (corresponding to the difference only in the qualities of natures), the real difference of natures implies their number - two, which does not cut the one Christ and does not separate Him, since these two natures are united in one hypostasis. According to Rev. Maximus, there is a certain “symmetry” between Sevier and Nestorius: Sevier believes that it is enough to talk about the difference in natural qualities in order to confess Divinity and humanity in Christ, but refuses to talk about two natures (cf. opusc. 19: PG 91, 221A), and Nestorius believes that it is enough to talk about simple, that is, only conceivable unity, covering with such “unity” a real division, as Sevier covers the concept of a simple difference in qualities is a real fusion of natures. According to Lamp's dictionary (s. v.), αὐθεντία is one of the fundamental elements in Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius, serving to justify the unity of the Logos with human nature in Christ. St. Maxim criticizes Nestorius and Sevirus from the standpoint of Chalcedonism, that is, the affirmation of the inseparability and non-fusion of natures in Christ. In Nestorius, from the point of view of Maximus, the division of Christ in two occurs due to unity only in gnomic qualities (and not ontological - in one hypostasis), and in Severus the merging of natures into one occurs due to differences only in natural qualities while denying the duality of natures. That is, gnomic qualities. Distinction and unity are complementary aspects of correct confession, excluding, if correctly understood, fusion and division. Unity according to St. Maximu presupposes the difference of the united. According to this logic, if Nestorius speaks of the unity of gnomic wills, only their difference should follow from this, and not at all the division of natures on which he insists. Or: “by success” - κατὰ προκοπήν. About the criticism of St. For the maxim of the doctrine of the gradual deification of human nature in Christ, see Larchet 1996, p. 275–279. The point is that, according to Nestorius, Christ does not have a completely deified human nature from the Incarnation, but a nature deified gradually, in the course of His life. St. Maxim says that such a teaching makes “man” in Christ a potential sinner, if he is not one with God in all respects, but as if at every new moment of life he “grows” in this unity from lesser to greater goodness. Based on such statements, V. M. Lurie claims that “in this context [St. Maxim] attributes gnomic will to the Logos, obviously considering such usage to be completely legitimate” (Lurie 2006, p. 401), however, it seems that here “gnomes” in relation to Christ is applied only conditionally as part of a refutation of Nestorius’s argumentation. We are talking, apparently, about “goodness”. St. Maxim emphasizes that the unity that Nestorius speaks of turns out to be unreal (not ontological), as above he argued that the difference in Sevier is not real difference. Larchet (Larchet 1998, p. 14) dates this work, like the previous one, to 645–646. He believes that it is a continuation of the previous one (Ibid, p. 93). That is, the teaching of the Nestorians, as St. Peter understands it. Maxim. Sevier of Antioch could speak of two wills (obviously natural) and one (apparently personal), but he did not have a detailed elaboration of the relationship between these wills; the energy in Christ, according to Sevier, is one, initiated by His will alone (Hovorun 2008, pp. 26–28). That is, moved by the Logos according to the logos and the law of human nature. About the movement of God and the imprinting of the human nature of the Divine in Christ by St. For a maxim, see Larchet 1996, p. 288–299 and the extensive literature indicated by him. Wed. opusc. 1: PG 91, 12 C and approx. 29 and opus. 26: PG 91, 276C, where this definition is attributed to Clement of Alexandria. Or “reflection” / “plan” - βουλῆς. Shufrin uses “estimate” to translate this term, but in this context such a translation seems inappropriate to us. Greg. Naz. de filio. 2. or . 30.12.6 (ed. J. Barbel). For a broader context and Russian translation, see note. 256, 273 and text thereto; about the significance of this passage in the polemics of St. Maxim, see note. 266. As Louth 1996, p. 216, n. 22 notes, this passage is from St. Gregory was cited during the tenth session of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Riedinger 1990, S. 330). St. Maxim refers to the interpretation of this phrase and the longer quotation in which it is included, also in opusc. 4: PG 91, 61A–B; opusc. 6:65B; opusc. 7:81C; in opusc. 15:161A; disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 316C–D, where the argument is very close to that in this place opusc. 3. The context of this statement by St. Gregory, made during the polemic with the Arians, as Louth notes, is such that his goal is not at all to show the presence of a human deified will in Christ, but to prove that Christ and the Father have one Divine will, which means that Christ, contrary to the Arians, is consubstantial with the Father (Louth 1996, p. 216, n. 23). It is all the more significant that even in this “unfavorable” context for the affirmation of the human will of Christ, St. Gregory says (although he does not dwell on this) that it exists and differs from the will that is seen among us, being deified and unable (unlike ours) to resist the will of God. St. Maximus had every right to refer to this passage, which is far from obvious from Laut’s note. The translation of this expression (τὴν πρὸς τὸν θάνατον συστολήν), found in Damascus (Joann. Dam. exp. fid. 67.13), has a different understanding: “during suffering He voluntarily began to evade death (τῷ τὴν ποιήσασθαι)" (translated under the editorship of D. E. Afinogenov according to: John of Damascus 2002, p. 280), however, in the translation of the Dispute with Pyrrhus D. E. Afinogenov translates the same word (συστολή) differently: "timidity, in accordance with nature, is an attraction to to existence, [manifesting] in depression (συστολήν), and [timidity] contrary to nature is unreasonable depression (συστολή)” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 297D, translated from: Maxim the Confessor 2004, p. 163). In another place in the same translation we read that Christ “was saddened in the face of death” (συστολὴν ποιήσασθαι) (Ibid, 297C, trans. D. E. Afinogenova, Ibid., p. 163; note that the word “saddened” is translated the same expression as in the text of Damascus translated as “began to evade”!). Hieromonk Dionysius (Shlenov) translates the same word συστολή as “crowdedness” and writes about it: “the term: “crowdedness” / “compression, constraint,” constantly used by St. Maxim, when describing the Gethsemane prayer, conveys a state of premonition of impending death, but at the same time does not carry any negative connotation” (Shlenov 2004, p. 350). It seems to us that such a morally neutral understanding of συστολή is more correct than “depression,” the synonyms of which are despondency, depressiveness, discouragement, oppression (all this is inapplicable to Christ), and “evasion” and “sadness” are simply an inaccurate translation in this place (about “evasion” in relation to the Gethsemane prayer, see note 305). Lamp's dictionary points for disp. Pyrr. 297D translation συστολή: “shrinking” (contraction, compression), which Louth follows (Louth 1996, p. 194). Doucet uses the word "contraction" or répulsion (repulsion, disgust) (Doucet 1985, p. 132). It seems to us that, bearing in mind the use of St. The maxim of the pair συστολή-διαστολή in the sense: compression-extension (albeit in a different context - economic and soteriological, where these terms are also unusual (amb. 10: P. G. 91, 1177BC; Louth 1996, p. 138)), it is possible in this case συστολή is translated as “compression”, despite the difficulty of perceiving this word in this context. Until St. Maxim, the term συστολή was used in Stoic philosophy and among church writers who used Stoic terminology in relation to the state of a person experiencing mental grief. In particular, Diogenes Laertius writes that, according to the Stoics, “a wise man is not subject to grief, because grief is an unreasonable compression of the soul τῆς ψυχῆς) (as Apollodorus writes in Ethics)" (Diog. Laert. vit. phil. 7.118.10, trans. M. L. Gasparov according to: Diogenes Laertius 1986, p. 281). It is characteristic that Gasparov translates συστολή literally - “compression”. The Stoic Chrysippus says that grief is a contraction of the soul that does not obey reason (logos): “Λύπην δ’ εἶναι συστολὴν ψυχῆς ἀπειθῇ λόγῳ” (Chrys. frag. moral 394.7). This idea is repeated in Clement of Alexandria's Pedagogue (Clem. Al. paed. 1.13.101.1.5). Origen, in his Exhortation to Martyrdom, writes about the “compression in their souls” that Christian martyrs can experience in the face of death (Orig. exhor. 4.6) (in this case they must resort to Christ). However, the direct influence of this tradition on St. We cannot affirm Maxim; he speaks not of spiritual grief as such (like Chrysippus or Clement), but of compression in the face of death, and in relation to the human nature of Christ, and not just to the soul (this is in contrast to Origen). Here we can also point out the idea of ​​​​ancient medicine, which we find in Oribasius (IV century), according to which “fear generates compression (συστολήν) of the whole body” (Oribas. collect. medic. 54.2.1). Angelis translates συστολή into Italian as angoscia (longing, longing) (Massimo Confessore 2007, p. 143), probably referring to the description of the battle of Gethsemane in Mark 14:33 and Matthew 26:37, where Christ is said to have “began to grieve and yearn (ἤρξατο λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν)”, however, it is characteristic that St. Maxim resorts to a different expression in describing the state of Christ. In addition to the present, the Gethsemane prayer of Christ is interpreted in a number of theological and polemical works of St. Maxima: opusc. 6: PG 91, 65A-D; 7: PG 91, 80C; 15: PG 91, 160C, 165A–B; 16: PG 91, 196D. For more details, see the introductory article to this publication. Probably this refers to the well-known thought of St. Maxim (see, for example, Thal. 42), according to which Christ allowed the manifestation in Himself of impeccable passions, characteristic of the tropos of the existence of our nature after the Fall. For Christ, such blameless passions, for example, “contraction” in the face of death, did not lead to the sin of opposition to God’s will, despondency, cowardice, trembling, and the like. Thus, He revealed that there is no necessary connection between blameless passions and sin; this connection is broken, while nature itself in the Resurrection of Christ is freed from these blameless passions, that is, from their very possibility. All this would be impossible without a real acceptance of our nature along with its will. From this perspective, it becomes clear why St. Maxim so insisted that in Gethsemane the human will of Christ was manifested and He experienced (albeit irreproachably) our passion - compression in the face of death, and it was from within this test that He did not show resistance to God’s will, did not commit a sin, but revealed the human will in unity with the Divine. Grammatically, this is exactly the case, since the aorist is used here, which presents a semantic difficulty, since it turns out that the killing of death does not occur through the Cross and Resurrection, as is usually believed, but even before that. If there is no error in the manuscript, then the meaning of this statement may be that the Son of God, by taking on flesh, abolished the effect of death (i.e., the fear of death), which usually took place in people and inclined them to sin. Next, Rev. Maxim emphasizes that, on the one hand, the logos of human nature was fully confirmed in Christ through the identification of natural desire, and on the other hand, this did not lead to sin and the tropos of the implementation of natural will was completely deified. That is, the goal of the Incarnation is not the Cross as such, but the salvation/deification of our nature. This is a very important idea, since it is a significant argument against the so-called “legal theory” of the atonement, which makes death on the cross as the goal of the Incarnation. This does not, of course, negate the importance of the death on the cross of Christ and the Cross as a means of our salvation, which is confirmed by the passage close to the one being commented by St. Maxim, where the place of suffering is already clearly indicated: “God, first of all, became man not in order to suffer, but in order to save man through suffering” (Thal. 63.435–437; our italics - G.B.). The concept of “renewal” of natures comes from St. Maxim from the words of St. Gregory the Theologian: “Natures are renewed, and God becomes man” (Gr. Naz. or. 39.13: PG 36, 348D), the interpretation of which by St. Maxim dedicated one of his most important difficulties - amb. 41: PG 91, 1304D–1316A. Amb. 41 is one of the most “popular” works of St. Rev. among researchers. Maxima. It has been the subject of many interpretations (most famously in Thunberg 1965). Of the latest works, V. V. Petrov’s book is devoted almost entirely to the analysis of this difficulty (Petrov 2007). Interpreted words from or. 39 St. Grigory Petrov translates somewhat differently: “Natures are newly arranged (Καινοτομοῦνται), and God becomes man” (Ibid., p. 28). Petrov believes that amb. 41 prp. The maxim is an interpretation not only of the indicated passage from the Word for the Epiphany of the Lord (Feast of Lights), but also for the Word for Christmas (or. 38.3–4) of St. Gregory. On the other hand, there is no doubt that St. Maxim continues in amb. 41 topics raised in the interpretation of the words of St. Gregory: “The laws of nature are abolished...”, which are discussed in amb. 31: PG 91, 1273D–1281B. The “difficulty” from which St. Maxim in amb. 41, is the idea of ​​​​the renewal (or new dispensation) of natures (associated, obviously, with the “abolition of their (former?) laws”): in what sense can natures be “renewed” if the logos of nature, according to St. Maxim, is there something that remains unchanged? In the commented place opusc. 3 just gives an example when, on the one hand, the preservation in Christ of the logos of human nature with its natural will is confirmed, and on the other hand, it is shown that this nature in Christ exists in a renewed (or arranged in a new way, in comparison with the old) tropos of unity with the Divine nature in the hypostasis of the Logos incarnate. Apparently there is a gap in the Greek text. – Approx. translation Here, obviously, it is again emphasized that in Christ, contrary to Nestorius, there was no special “human face” with a gnomic will that could come into (at least in possibility) conflict with the Divine Logos. If human natural will could come into conflict with God's, God - the Creator of our nature - would be guilty of evil. Not a completely fair statement regarding Sevier. As noted above, Sevier recognized the presence of the will of human nature in Christ, but at the same time he also spoke about one (probably hypostatic) will, which is the “initiator” for His single “God-manly action” (more details Hovorun 2008, p. 26–28), which could be realized either “God-decent” or “human-decent” (analysis of Sevier’s model in: Doucet 1985, p. 132–134). Probably Rev. Maxim, polemicizing with Sevier, actually argues with the contemporary Monophysites (cf. below his own testimony: opusc. 3: PG 91, 49C) and the Chalcedonite Monothelites (in polemics with whom this work was written), the identity of whose views with the Sevirians of St. Maxim wants to prove it. Nature either exists in its entirety (in the case of humans, as rational-bodily), or does not exist at all. “Perfect” in this context means the presence in the human nature of Christ not only of an animate body, but also of a soul endowed with reason and intelligence. Larchet attributes the stay of St. Maximus in Cyprus by 626–628, that is, before his arrival in Carthage (Larchet 1996, p. 13). The refusal to confess two energies and wills is due to the fact that otherwise there would be two persons. At the same time, if we correctly reconstruct the thought of the Sevirians, it is denied that Christ has only Divine or only human energy, but one and the same Christ accomplishes, according to His one, obviously hypostatic, will, with His “one God-male” energy (which they professed, referring to the Areopagite) either Divine or Human. The question arises: how does this relate to the Monophysites’ confession of one energy in Christ? For a possible answer, see note. 214. Lauth suggests that the binding of St. Maxim Sevira with the north testifies to his knowledge of the Slavic word “north”, which he could learn from the Slavs during his stay in Constantinople, and its consonance with the name “Sevir” (Louth 1996, p. 217, n. 13; cf. p. 215, n. 5 to words from opusc. 7: PG 91, 72A, addressed to to Deacon Marinus in Cyprus: “you warm those bound by the cold from the coming darkness and cold,” according to Laut, also alluding to Sevier). It is unlikely that this hypothesis has sufficient grounds. Not to mention the fact that St. Maximus uses the Greek word for “north” (Βοῤῥᾶς), the association of Sevirus with the north may arise from the common perception of the north as an unfavorable, cold and gloomy place, and the teaching of the heretic for St. Maxim, prone to allegorical interpretations, could well be associated with cold and darkness, for which it is not at all necessary to know about Sevier’s consonance with the “north”. It is clear that the prophet Zechariah, a quotation from which precedes the call of St. Maxim to flee from the heresy of Sevier, the north is associated with Babylon located to the north of Palestine and with the false worship widespread there. “Theology” is the doctrine of God as such (about the consubstantial and indivisible Trinity), and “economy” here is the doctrine of the Incarnation and Christ. Similar arguments in disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 313C–316A. The result is something similar to Arianism, in which consubstantial beings are denied. Something similar to tritheism arises (see note 127), but St. himself. Maximus reduces this to paganism (see 53B). Analogy to Sabellianism. Thus, Rev. Maximus actually reduces the consequences of Sevier's teaching to already condemned triadological heresies, including those rejected by the Monophysites themselves (cf. 53B). Polemicizing with Sevier, St. Maximus targeted the monothelites of his time, this is evident from the fact that he expresses almost the same arguments in the Dispute with Pyrrhus: “- Pyrrhus: It is impossible that along with wills the owners of wills would not be introduced. – Maxim: You declared this absurdity in your message, driven not by reason, but by arbitrariness, having received Heraclius as your ally, because you also agreed with his unlawful and lawless confusion and approved it with a blessing. After all, if we assume that along with wills the owners of wills are also introduced, then the opposite is also true: together with the owners of wills, wills will also be introduced. And it turns out, in your opinion, that the most essential and most good and blessed Deity, because He has one will, also has one hypostasis, according to Sabellius; and due to the fact that He has three Persons, then there are also three wills, and therefore three natures, according to Arius, since, according to paternal definitions and rules, the difference of wills also introduces a difference of natures” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 289C–D, trans. D. E. Afinogenov according to: Maxim the Confessor 2004, p. 151). The argument, apparently, is this: Sevier denies (according to Maxim) natural energies and wills (“abolishes them”), while strictly connecting energy and will with persons. But, abolishing Divine energy and will (after all, it is also abolished, and not just human), he thereby abolishes the person (hypostasis) of the Logos. Wed. a similar, albeit slightly different argument in the Disputation with Pyrrhus: “And again, if, according to them, a person is introduced along with the action, then when it is eliminated, it is also necessarily eliminated. And if this is true, along with the elimination of both two and one action, both two and one person will be eliminated, and Christ, as far as it is in their power, will pass from the existing and super-existent into the non-existent - and what could be more wicked than this? (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 337B, trans. D. E. Afinogenov according to: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 215). The note to this place in the Dispute says that perhaps St. Maxim here alludes to Psiphos and Ekphesis, in which it was forbidden to talk about both two and one energy, then the “elimination” or “abolition” of energies must be understood precisely in the sense of the prohibition to talk about them (Ibid., note 127, p. 291). However, the context of the controversy in opusc. 3 hardly suggests such an interpretation. If “every” will is Divine and human, then, according to St. Maxim, two faces are also introduced, which Sevier wanted to avoid, but did not avoid, if we assume that the will introduces a face. The polemical nature of the arguments of St. Maxim makes it difficult to understand his thoughts. Or: “meetings” / “discussions”, cf. approx. 203. Here “all sorts” is considered as a volitional act or deed, of which there can be an innumerable variety. Wed. in the Dispute with Pyrrhus in relation to the polemic with monoenergism: “Also, if, according to them, a person is introduced along with an action, and they admit that many actions emanated from the same incarnate Word, then they will also allow persons introduced along with the outgoing actions, since they want to be in agreement with themselves, and it turns out that the One and the Same has countless persons and actions” (disp. Pyrr .: PG 91, 337B, trans. D. E. Afinogenova after: Maxim Confessor 215, cf. 126 on p. 290–291). That is, one according to which wills are mutually presupposed together with persons. Wed. argumentation above 52C, approx. 222–224 and their text. Such when natural wills and energies are denied, and only hypostatic will and energy are affirmed. Here Rev. Maximus obviously makes use of a strict division, relating creative activity to the Divinity and passion to the humanity of Christ. Only the Divine will can work miracles and be “active” in the true sense. If we exclude one of the wills, then either the Divinity will turn out to be passive, or the miracles performed by Christ will be imaginary, since He will not have the opportunity to perform them. Here we encounter the distinction between natural will and gnomic will (θέλημα γνωμικόν). Definition of the last prp. Maximus gives in another work: “[gnomic will] is a spontaneous impulse (αὐθαίρετος ὁρμή), inclined towards one of two [possibilities]. It is decisive not for nature, but, truly, for person and hypostasis” (opusc. 16: PG 91, 192B-C). Accordingly, the impossibility of sin for St. The maxim corresponds to the deactivation of the “gnome” by deliberately yielding it to God, which is in amb. 7 and was described as the one will of God and those worthy of Him (amb. 7: PG 91, 1076B and note 105). Larchet dates the work to around 640, disputing Sherwood's less precise dating of between 634 and 640, since in his opinion the work bears clear evidence that it was written after the publication of Ekphesis (638) (Larchet 1998, p. 27). He also expresses the opinion that the letter is addressed to Abba George, who is discussed in ep. 29: PG 91, 624A, apparently addressed to Bishop. John of Cyzicus. Larshe believes that this George may have been the former abbot of the monastery of St. George in Cyzicus, where St. Maxim (Larchet 1998, p. 25). F. Booth, as part of his criticism of the Greek Life, does not agree with the inclusion of George among the Constantinople, believing that his location was Apamea (a city in Syria) or Palestine (Booth 2013, p. 198, n. 300). The work is discussed in Léthel's book (Léthel 1979, pp. 65–73), which has been justly criticized in a number of significant respects (see notes 265, 267 and 268). We highlight some opusc ideas. 4 in ch. 14 introductory article. Chronologically, it is probably the first in a series of interpretations of St. Maximus of the Prayer of Gethsemane in the context of polemics with the Monothelites. The theme of “satiation” refers to the problematic of polemics with Origenism. According to Origen, the original minds fell due to satiety with the Divine. St. Maxim is already in amb. 7 wrote that one cannot be satiated with God (see more details above, note 100). Here the theme again appears latently in a positive way: the addressee is praised for striving for something that is higher than the things with which one can be fed up. Probably Rev. Maxim addresses the reader who knows his early works well. Flow and outflow (or: “flow and flow away”) is the favorite expression of St. Maxim characterizing the state of the material world. See, for example, amb. 15.: PG 91, 1216A-1221B, which says that material things exist according to the logos (= principle) of flow and flow away (τῷ κατὰ ῥοὴν καὶ ἀποῤῥοὴν λόγῳ). St. Maximus uses here an expression often found in the philosophy of late antiquity, in particular in Neoplatonism. Already in Galen (de patr. phil. 10.6) it correlates with the Heraclitean theme of the “stream”, which “cannot be entered twice.” From those close to St. According to the authors’ maxim, this expression is found in texts that have come down under the name of the philosopher David (or attributed to him), who uses it when discussing the possibility of philosophical knowledge: “The argument that those who deny the existence of philosophy give is the following: everything that exists flows and flows away, never reaching peace, and since the change of things precedes the formation of the concept of them, then even before a word can be uttered about them, they change. They give the following example: it is impossible to enter the same river twice. And some, aggravating their doubts, say that due to the fast flow and movement of water, it is impossible to enter the same river even once. Likewise, beings, being in flux and flow, never achieve peace and, therefore, cannot be known, for as soon as we want to know them, they change and are different at different times, so that no one can overtake and know them. So why is philosophy the science of existence, if existence itself, being in motion and change, is unknowable?” (David. prol. phil. 2:3–4 (Busse), trans. S.S. Arevshatyan, quoted from: David Anakht 1975, p. 34 with amendment). Let us give the answer to this objection: “To this we will answer that, firstly, philosophy does not relate to the particular, which is in a state of flow and leakage, but to the general, which does not change and is always the same. Secondly, if we say about philosophy that it relates to the particular, it is not for this reason that it will not be able to comprehend and know what exists, but because the knower, that is, the soul, does not change along with the knowable, that is, with the object of knowledge. However, according to this, God could not know anything about things, since He does not change along with the knowable things, but always remains the same. However, in most cases, the soul knows things before they have undergone change, as Plato also points out, saying that virtuous souls tend not only to follow things, but also very often to anticipate them and know about them in advance” (Ibid, 4 (ed. Busse)), op. from: Ibid., p. 35). And then David again resorts to the expression “logos of flow” - when he writes that natural science is not (according to Plato) a part of philosophy, since everything that exists “is in a state of flow and flow and will never achieve peace,” while theology is not a part of philosophy, since God is unknowable (Ibid, 5, see Ibid., p. 36). The answer from the Venerable himself. Maxim's answer to the question about the possibility of philosophical knowledge was the doctrine of the logoi of the created, which, in contrast to the created itself, are unchangeable and immutable, since they are the wills of God about the creature. On the flow and flow of created things, see also Ammon., in cat. 2.24. The peculiarity of the terminology and thoughts of St. Maxim is that, unlike the Neoplatonic philosophers, he does not talk about the outflow of beings from the Divine, but he applies the idea of ​​flow and flow away either to the “flow” of the changeable created world, or he speaks, interpreting St. Gregory in amb. 7: PG 91, 1081C7–11, about our “flowing down” from above in the sense of moral deviation from well-being in God. In Difficulties to John St. Maxim resorts to the expression under discussion in amb. 45, saying that the state of Adam's body before the Fall was “without currents or outflows” (δίχα ῥοῆς καὶ ἀποῤῥοῆς) (PG 91, 1353A). Thus, we can conclude that, at least in relation to man, according to St. To Maxim, flow and flow away are characteristics not just of the created and bodily, but of the created and bodily after the fall. According to another reading: ἀρίστου - “best”, probably erroneous, since the reference to having no form or image clearly correlates with “limitless”. Important evidence that for St. The maxim “intention” at the stage of asceticism is not at all something negative, but exactly the opposite, it is necessary and associated with the conscious choice of ascetic life. Only in the state of deification is “intention” deactivated. The doctrine of exhaustion (or: “emptiness” - κένωσις) of the Word (cf. this word, which later became a concept, in Phil. 2:7) in relation to Christology is developed in detail by St. Maxim in amb. 2: PG 91, 1036D–1039D and amb. 3: PG 91, 1037D–1040D. In amb. 2 kenosis was associated with the Incarnation, when the Logos, through the Hypostasis, became the seed of His own flesh (PG 91, 1036D); in amb. 3 says that the “exhaustion” of the Logos was manifested in the fact that He assimilated to Himself human nature with its characteristics (idioms) - passion (“suffering”), visibility, accessibility to description, etc., which means that He Himself became subject to suffering in the flesh, we see, we describe. If the Logos were only nature (that is, Divinity), this could not happen, since nature alone, according to St. Maxim, cannot assimilate the characteristics (idioms) of another without ceasing to be himself. Therefore, speaking about the exhaustion of the Logos, St. Maxim draws attention to the fact that Logos is not only the fullness of the Divine nature, but also Hypostasis. If the Divine nature cannot assimilate human characteristics without ceasing to be Divinity, this does not mean that the Hypostasis of the Son of God, having assumed human nature, cannot at the same time be subject to suffering in the flesh, be visible and described. In amb. 3, having described his understanding of the kenosis of the Son of God, Rev. Maxim proceeds to explain the tantum – quantum principle, found at the end of the quotation from St. Gregory the Theologian, which he interprets in this difficulty. The concept of the measure of deification in the measure of the incarnation of the Son of God has, according to the words of St. Maximus, the one who “by grace, through the complete rejection of [human] nature, is destined to be a manifestation of it [i.e. e. grace] strength” (amb. 3: PG 91, 1040C). It is clear that the words about the rejection of (human) nature mean for St. Maxima parallel in the kenosis of the Son of God. In the Incarnation, He hid His Divinity in an act of self-abasement under the cover of the flesh, giving place to human nature in His Hypostasis. Based on this, Rev. Maximus says that participation in the Divine nature, the manifestation of its power in the flesh is possible for man only through the “rejection” (ἀπολήψει) of created nature. It is about this - the deification of the saints to the extent of the exhaustion of the Son of God, who gave a place in His Hypostasis to human nature - that St. writes. Maxim, completing amb. 3 and speaking of the deified as those in whom the power of God will be manifested “to the extent that God by nature, having become incarnate, shared our weakness.” Christ makes “commensurate with His exhaustion (κενώσει) the deification of those who are saved by grace” (Ibid). In the commented place opusc. 4 prp. Maxim resorts to the same teaching in a very condensed form (obviously assuming that his addressee is familiar with this range of ideas); we are talking about the fact that the “condescension” (or incarnation in the Spirit) of God the Word is perceived by the ascetic when he “empties” himself of created characteristics - rushing beyond the limits of the sensory and mental, as mentioned above, through the fulfillment of the commandments, and in response to this receives communion with the fullness of the Divinity of the Word. “Repression” (from πιέζω) and “fatification” (from πιαίνω) are a pair of “exhaustion” and “fullness”. In qu. dub. 30 prp. Maxim speaks of “temperance oppressing our flesh.” About fattening, see, for example: with reference to Gen. 4:4 about the one who “brings from the purity [of the heart] the first movements of the contemplative soul, fattened in virtues” (Thal. 47.13–14, trans. A.I. Sidorov according to: Maxim the Confessor 1993. Book I, p. 119 and the scholium to this place: “who achieves knowledge, fattened in virtues, that is, active, he becomes Abel, having before him God, who has looked upon his gifts” (translated from: Ibid., p. 222, note 1). virtue and knowledge. Wed. “We always carry about in our body the death of the Lord Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be revealed in our body” [2 Cor. 4:10]. Or: “raise to a more perfect occult knowledge the one who has not yet accepted the lesser.” – Approx. translation Speaking about the flesh of Christ in the Difficulties to Thomas, St. Maximus writes that the Word of God, having exhausted itself, became the seed of its own flesh and the hypostasis of the received flesh (amb. 2: PG 91, 1036D). Wed. at St. Gregory the Theologian: “Therefore, as long as I am disobedient and rebellious with my passions and because I renounce God, until then Christ alone is called disobedient for me (ἕως μὲν οὖν ἀνυπότακτος ἐγὼ καὶ στασιώδης, τῇ τε ἀρνήσει τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν, ἀνυπότακτος τὸ κατ’ ἐμὲ καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς λέγεται" (Greg. Naz. de filio . or . 30.5.9, translated by: Gregory Theologian 1994. T. 1, p. 431). It should be noted that, polemicizing with Origenism, St. Maxim uses the image of red-hot iron somewhat differently when he compares the state of deification with “like air, all illuminated by light [entirely permeated with this light], and iron, all entirely red-hot with fire [so that fire is visible]” (amb. 7: PG 91, 1076A, trans. A. M. Shufrin with our explanatory additions according to Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 251; see also Shufrin’s scholia to this place). Polemicizing with monoenergism and monothelitism, St. Maxim began to use this image somewhat differently. For the first time in the context of polemics with monoenergism, St. Maximus used the image of a red-hot sword in a letter to Pyrrhus (at that time, however, it was not yet a polemic, but an exchange of opinions): “After all, what was created from any parts by a combination of natural convergence without merging and preserves the unchanged natures from which it was made, and preserves without diminishing the power of its component parts to accomplish a single thing, be it suffering or a miracle - as depicted, father, your miraculous and corresponding to the mystery of the Divine Incarnation likening a red-hot sword, the cutting of which, as we know, burns, and the burning, as we know, cuts. For fire and iron had a hypostatic convergence, and neither one nor the other, due to the connection with the other, lost their natural ability and, after the connection, contains it inseparably and without separation from the conjugate and coexisting” (ep. 19: PG 91, 593B–C, trans. E. Nachinkina, quoted from: Maxim the Confessor 2007b, p. 207). Subsequently, this image appears in St. Maxim is one of his favorites (see, for example: disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 340A; 341B). On the history of the theme of the penetration of fire and iron in the patristic tradition, see Biryukov 2009. St. Maximus uses the concept of interpenetration both in relation to the grace and human nature of the saints, and in relation to the Divine and human nature in Christ. So, in amb. 7 he speaks of the state of deification, that in it God comes “beautifully into interpenetration with the worthy as whole with whole περιχωρήσαντος)" (PG 91, 1076C). In amb. 41, describing the possible, but not realized by the first Adam, overcoming the opposition between created and uncreated, St. Maxim says that in a state of deification, a person should, by grace, “wholly penetrated into the totality of God (ὅλος ὅλῳ περιχωρήσας ὁλικῶς τῷ Θεῷ),” become “all that God is, except identity in essence" (PG 91, 1308B). Finally, in amb. 42 prp. Maximus says that in Christ, thanks to His deified flesh, we were given deification, from which it is impossible to fall away, since it unites us with the incarnate God Himself, just as the body is united with the soul. This deification “by unity unfusedly permeates the whole (δι᾿ ὅλου περιχωρήσασαν ἀσυγχύτως κατὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν)” (PG 91, 1320B); i.e. the state of interpenetration of Divinity and humanity, which should have been achieved in the first Adam, along with overcoming the division of created and uncreated, was accomplished only in the Second. Wed. in the Difficulties to Thomas (c. 634): “As with a sword heated by fire, its ability to cut became the ability to burn, and [the ability] to burn became [the ability] to cut (for as iron is with fire, so the ability to cut iron was united with the ability to burn fire), and iron became burning from its connection with fire, and fire became cutting from its connection with iron, but neither of them underwent a transformation into another due to the interchange in the union, but each remains in no way deprived of its natural peculiarity, even being [as if] inside the peculiarity of what was combined with it in [this] union - so, although in the mystery of the Divine Incarnation the Divinity and humanity were united in hypostasis without any frenzy [going beyond] the natural [for each of them] energy due to the unity, but did not possess it [no longer] independently and differently after the union in relation to the united and co-hypostatic [nature]" (amb. 5: 1060A-B, trans. Archim. Nektary (Yashunsky) with modifications from: Maxim the Confessor 2006, pp. 36–37). This probably means that the nature of the seed and the seedless is the same, but what is around (or: surrounding), that is, the properties or paths of existence, are different. Gr. Naz. de filio. 2. or . 30.12.6 (ed. J. Barbel), cf. pre-revolutionary translation of this passage (in a broader context): “Seventhly, consider the saying that the Son came down from heaven, not to do His will, but of Him who sent [John 6:18]. If this were not said by the One Who Descended Himself, then we would answer that these words were uttered on behalf of a person, not what we mean in the Savior (His will, as completely deified, is not contrary to God), but similar to us, because the human will does not always follow, but very often contradicts and opposes the will of God” (quoted from: Gregory the Theologian 1994. Vol. 1, p. 436). About this passage of St. Gregory and its use by St. Maxim, see note. 205, 266, 273 and the text to them. Larcher dates this work to 633, that is, he dates it to the beginning of the polemic with monoenergism around the interpretation of the “new Divine masculine action” after the conclusion of the Patr. Cyrus's union with the Monophysites and St.'s speeches against it. Sophronia (Larchet 1998, p. 24). However, it should be noted that Rev. Maxim, like St. Sophronius, adopted Psiphos (633), prohibiting the use of expressions of both one and two energies, which is also evident from the Council Epistle of St. Sophronius, and on the Difficulties to Thomas (634), where the expression “two energies” is not used. Meanwhile in opusc. 5 this expression occurs (see 64A), so either it was written before the publication of Psiphos, or the work of St. The Maxim refers to a later period, when he had already ceased to observe Psiphos, or, finally, to comply with the conditions of Psiphos St. Maxim was not absolute. Pauline Allen suggests that this work by St. Maxim was a reaction to the council convened in Cyprus by Archbishop. Arcadius of Cyprus under pressure from St. Sophronia (Allen 2009, p. 29). This council is known only from the Syrian Monothelite Psogos, directed against St. Maxim (Maxim the Confessor 2004, pp. 325–328). Hypotheses regarding this council and opusc. 5 are discussed by us in the introductory article to this edition (Chapter 7, notes 135–137). A difficult place to understand. Judging by the example given by St. Maxim, putting forward this argument, by “abolition”, which is mentioned above, should not be understood as the de-activation of human energy, which he speaks of in amb. 7 in relation to the state of the deified saints and “the one energy of God and those worthy of Him” (PG 91, 1076D). We are obviously talking about the “abolition” of human energy only to some extent as part of this “single energy” that monoenergists spoke about. To such an idea of ​​her, St. Maxim objects, arguing dialectically that in this case, the Divine energy will be affected by its “mixing” with human energy. I wonder what else is in amb. 7 prp. Maximus wrote that God in relation to human nature among the saints becomes like the soul in its relation to the body (PG 91, 1088C); This understanding of deification allowed St. Maximus, in the Difficulties to John, speaks of the single energy of God and the saints, since human nature only undergoes deification, without having in itself any potential for its realization, but being entirely moved towards it by God. Next, in amb. 5, written, according to Larche, at approximately the same time as the commented opusc. 5, prp. Maximus says that the Logos sets in motion the nature perceived by Him, just as the soul sets in motion the body (PG 91, 1049D). It is all the more significant that in this place opusc. 5 he puts a limit to this analogy, pointing out that the doctrine of one energy cannot be deduced from it. Wed. the distinction between “natural” and “man-made” tools by the philosopher Stephen, the last head of the Alexandrian school (according to some versions, St. Maximus studied with him in Alexandria or Constantinople), in interpretations of Aristotle: Stephan. in Aristot. libr. de interpret. commen. 16.4. The concept of the involuntary or forced nature of the emergence of complex natures, including human ones, plays an important role in the anthropology and Christology of St. Maxima. First of all, he teaches about the simultaneous appearance of soul and body, in accordance with the single logos of human nature, which is proof of the forced (necessary) nature of their union, and, based on such anthropology, shows that the analogy with the union of the Divine and human natures in Christ (meaning the pre-existence of the Logos to perceived humanity) is not suitable: “... It is ungodly to say that Christ is one composite nature, and contrary to the truth. After all, in any composite nature that has its own parts, which, upon appearing into being, are contemporary with itself and with each other, and from non-existence for the sake of replenishing the universal dispensation are brought into being by power... these parts, of course, necessarily contain each other, as is the case in man and in other creatures to whom a composite nature has been inherited. The soul, after all, does not of its own will take possession of the body and falls under its control, and without intention gives it life based solely on what is in it, and by nature becomes an accomplice of suffering and pain thanks to its inherent ability to perceive them” (ep. 12: PG 91, 488D–489A, trans. E. Nachinkina, quoted from: Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 145). In the commented place opusc. 5, the doctrine of the necessary, that is, compulsory, nature of the formation of complex natures is used in polemics not only with the essentially monophysite Christology (which arises among monoenergists), but also with monoenergism itself: complex energy presupposes a complex, compulsorily composed nature (which is no longer true in relation to Christ), but, moreover, such a complex nature presupposes many individuals of this nature, which (if such a nature existed) could be called Christs. Sherwood dates this work to 640–642. and notes that it in any case belongs to the initial stage of the controversy with the Monothelites (Sherwood 1952, p. 44–45). F.-M. Léthel, who translated and analyzed this work in detail, dates it to the middle of 641 (Léthel 1979, p. 86, n. 47 for dating and p. 87–99 for translation and analysis). The dating did not cause any objection from Larchet, in contrast to Letel’s interpretation of this work, with which he largely disagrees (Larchet 1998, p. 44), referring primarily to the opinion of Doucet, who subjected Letel’s book to detailed criticism and put forward his own interpretation of the teachings of St. The Maxim of the Two Wills and the Controversy of Gethsemane (Doucet 1972; 1983; 1985). We will touch on some aspects of Doucet’s criticism below (see notes 267 and 268), but here we note that, to begin with, Doucet rejects Letel’s opinion that St. Maximus significantly changed, compared to earlier writings, his view of Christology in terms of the doctrine of wills in Christ, especially in relation to the doctrine of “obedience” to the human will of God. Contrary to Letel, “early Maxim” was not any kind of “monothelitist”. Doucet, referring to the Ascetic Chapters, amb. 7, Thal. 61 and 63 and other works, convincingly shows that even before the advent of monothelitism, St. Maximus, although less explicitly, taught the subordination of Christ's humanity to God's will as an important aspect of the economy. What was new during the period of Monothelite disputes was not this, but the explicit linking of this subordination (or obedience) with the doctrine of human will within the framework of the confession of St. Maxim of diopheliteism (Doucet 1985, p. 144–146). Thus, Letel's thesis that opusc. 6 was a turning point, a kind of revelation, in which St. Maxim decisively moved to a different teaching than he (and other fathers) had expressed before; it cannot be accepted. Nevertheless, one should admit, together with Doucet, that a certain clarification of views, an increasing clarification of them in St. Maxim really happened, which was associated both with the increase in controversy on the part of his opponents and with the deepening of his thoughts. For our thoughts on the dating of this work, see the introductory article (Chapter 12), an analysis of some of his ideas in Chapter. 14. For the translation and understanding of the term συστολή, see note. 206. In addition to the present, the Gethsemane prayer of Christ is interpreted in a number of theological and polemical works of St. Maxima: opusc. 3: PG 91, 48C; 7: PG 91, 80C; 15: PG 91, 160C, 165AB; 16: PG 91, 196D. Greg. Naz. or. 30.12. F.-M. Letel specifically highlights this passage of St. Gregory and examines it in the context of the controversy surrounding monothelitism (Léthel 1979, pp. 29–35; cf. Piret 1993, pp. 247–263). However, as Doucet (1983, pp. 54–57) shows, the interpretation of St. Gregory Letelem in the spirit of monothelitism (from which it follows that St. Maximus “corrected” St. Gregory in his explanation of the Gethsemane prayer in opus. 6) is erroneous. See about the use of this place by Rev. Maxim also approx. 205, 256, 273 and text thereto. It should be noted that in the Disputation with Pyrrhus (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 316C) an excerpt from this passage by St. Gregory was put into the mouth of Pyrrhus, who refers to him to prove the doctrine of one will, so that there is indeed reason to believe (as Léthel does (Léthel 1979, p. 29 ff.)) that for the leaders of the Monothelites pat. Sergius and Pyrrhus this passage by St. Gregory was one of the most important patristic sources on which they relied, this can be seen from how often St. Maxim turns to him, refuting their opinion and finding in him confirmation of his teaching. According to Larchet (Larchet 1998, p. 44–45), the present place is opusc. 6 can serve as evidence of the understanding (reflected in Psiphos and Ekphesis) by the Monothelites Sergius and Pyrrhus of the Gethsemane prayer, in which they, not wanting to allow a contradiction of wills in Christ and interpreting their difference as a condition for such a contradiction, did not recognize that the words about the passing of the Cup came from a person “as we understand in the Savior,” but believed that they came from a person “like us,” that interpreted in the sense of relative assimilation, without recognizing the presence of a real human will in Christ (about the relative assimilation of human will in Christ according to the Monothelites, see the recognition of Pyrrhus in: disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 304A–B). St. Maxim points out that such an understanding contradicts what was literally said by St. Gregory (see 65B-C), and then moves on to the words of Christ expressing the fusion of the human will with God’s, showing that they come from the same “man as we understand in the Savior” as the words expressing “compression.” In domestic science, analysis of the interpretation of St. The maxim of the Gethsemane prayer belongs to Rev. Dionysius (Shlenov) (Shlenov 2004, pp. 339–378). He places special emphasis on the teachings of St. Maxim in the context of a dispute with the legal theory of atonement and the “moral and ethical” interpretation of prayer among some theologians and pathologists; Wed Doucet 1983; 1985, which criticizes, in particular, Letel's interpretation, which bears the stamp of such a moral interpretation (see also Larchet's criticism of Letel in Larchet 1996, pp. 351–355). It should be noted that, as we emphasize in the introductory article (chapter 14), St. The maxim “moral” aspect of the Gethsemane prayer, associated with Christ’s compassion for us, is also present, but is developed later, in opusc. 20. Behind the distinction between “contradiction” and “timidity” is the distinction between reproachful and blameless passions (St. Maximus speaks about reproachful and blameless timidity, for example, in the Dispute with Pyrrhus (disp. Pyrr. 297C–D)). What is important to us here is the concept of irreproachable timidity, which, as being in accordance with nature and expressed in “contraction” in the face of death, was freely assumed by Christ. However, in the commented place opusc. 6 prp. Maxim insists that the expression of the fusion (union) in Christ of the human will with God’s is already something different from both reproachful resistance caused by cowardice (which could not have happened in Christ) and from blameless timidity. Lethel's understanding of the concepts of “fusion” (συμφυΐα) and “convergence” (σύννευσις) in the context of this very important passage and those close to it (Léthel 1979, p. 92; 214) was sharply criticized by Doucet (Doucet 1985, p. 147–151) and Larchet (Larchet 1996, p. 352–358). Letel translates συμφυΐα as “accord” and believes that this concept expresses the dynamic relationship between the human will of Christ and the Divine will. Moreover, he argues that it is in such “consent” (συμφυΐα) that deification takes place in the hour of the Gethsemane struggle, while giving such deification an “intentionelle,” and not just a physical” character. Doucet, challenging this interpretation, shows, using different contexts of the works of St. Maxim that συμφυΐα means the fusion (entanglement) of natures through their corresponding actions and wills, which takes place in the hypostasis of the Logos from the very Incarnation, like deification (it is this deification that the passage from St. Gregory the Theologian, which Letel misunderstands, speaks of). Doucet's understanding is confirmed, for example, by the use of συμφυΐα in opusc. 3: PG 91, 48B: “If it [the human will in Christ] was deified, then it was deified, obviously, due to the fusion (συμφυΐᾳ) with the deifying; and the deifying and the deified are, of course, two [things], and not one and the same in nature.” Doucet corrects Letel's understanding. In fact, the concept of συμφυΐα in the Christological context of St. Maxima goes back to the famous place of St. Gregory: “Both natures and names are united, passing (περιχωρουσῶν) one into another according to the law of closest fusion (συμφυΐας)” (Greg. Naz. ep. 101.31.4–6, trans. with changes from: Gregory the Theologian 1994. T. 2, p. 7). As for the “descent,” it really refers to the subject of volition, but in it the deification of the human will is not accomplished, but rather its deification is revealed, which takes place initially due to the hypostatic unity of natures in Christ. We find the same understanding in Larchet (Larchet 1996, p. 353), which, among other things, refers to an important place in this treatise, testifying that the words “not as I will” “signify (sic!) the fusion of the human will of the Savior with His Divine and Fatherly will,” and further explains the origin of this “fusion”: “for the Word was completely realized in all nature (οὐσιώσει) and [His] implementation (οὐσιωθέντος) deified her all” (opusc. 6: PG 91, 68C), i.e. we are talking about the Incarnation (and therefore hypostatic unity) as the source of fusion and deification of the human will. Thus, one cannot say that the moral unity of the human will of Christ with the divine is achieved as a result of the Gethsemane struggle, but one should talk about the revelation of the hypostatic unity of natures in Christ and the corresponding convergence of the human will with the divine, which does not deny the fact that in Gethsemane the difference between the human will and God’s was revealed, when Christ freely allowed human nature to manifest itself in its aversion from death. It is from this state of “compression,” having passed through it, that Christ, through humanity, shows obedience to God’s will – one He has with the Father, not wanting anything other than what He wants (i.e., our salvation). In addition to the polemic regarding the interpretation of συμφυΐα, Larche also disputes the use of Letel, which is absent from St. Maxim’s concept of the “filial tropos of love,” with the help of which Letel explains the nature of the relationship of the Son with the Father, arguing that the Son’s obedience to the Father occurs in accordance with this “tropos of Filial love,” transferring the emphasis from the ontological and mystical sphere to the moral-volitional sphere. To what Larcher said, we can add that for St. Maxim is not at all alien to thinking about Gethsemane in terms of love; the question is what kind of love we are talking about. It is enough to recall one place from the Questions and Answers to Thalassius, written before the start of the controversy with Monothelitism: “For on the one hand, He, as Good, first of all (προηγουμένως), by [Divine] will (κατὰ θέλησιν) became [man], being by nature a Savior everything, and then (ἐφεπομένως) He, as a Lover of mankind, out of voluntary meekness (καθ᾽ ἑκούσιον ἀνοχήν), obeying, endured [human things], being by nature the Redeemer of all" (Thal. 63.431–435). Here you can already see what is in the future for St. The maxim will be revealed in the doctrine of two wills in Christ, since the speech in this passage is that, firstly, the Son of God, by God’s good will, became Man, and secondly, obeying God’s will, he accepted suffering (it is clear that “obeying” refers to the human will) out of love for people. It is not entirely clear what significance the use of St. Petersburg has. The maxim of the word is θέλησις, and not the already used one - θέλημα. Below, “desire” is used to translate θέλησις. Translated by opusc. 1 A. M. Shufrin in the context of a detailed analysis of the act of will, θέλησις is translated as “will”. The relationship between will and energy. About this famous formula of St. Maxim, see note. 157 and the text to it. Monothelites could interpret the words of Christ in the interpretation of St. Gregory differently than St. Maxim, namely, belonging to the Son of God as God, the basis for which is given by the context in which they are used: “Seventhly, consider the saying that the Son came down from heaven, not to do His will, but of Him who sent (John 6:38). If this were not said by the One Who Descended Himself, then we would answer that these words were uttered on behalf of a person, not what we mean in the Savior (His will, as completely deified, is not contrary to God), but similar to us, because the human will does not always follow, but very often contradicts and opposes the will of God. For this is how we understand the words: “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass by from Me, not as I will, but may Your will prevail” [Matthew 26:39]; and it is incredible that Christ did not know what is possible and what is not, and that he began to oppose one will to another. But since this is the speech of the One who has received (which means the word: “descended”), and not the one who has been received, we will give the following answer: this is said not because the Son’s own will is really different from the will of the Father, but because there is no such will, and the meaning contained in the words is this: “Let me not do My will; because I have no will separate from Your will, but there is only a common will for Me and To you. Just as We have one Divinity, so we have one will." (Gr. Naz. de filio. 2. or. 30.12. 6–12, trans. quoted from: Gregory the Theologian 1994. T. 1, p. 436; our italics. - G.B.). In fact, St. Gregory, in the context of polemics with the Arians, interprets primarily John 6:38, insisting that this is about the fact that the Son has one - Divine - will with the Father. St. Maxim, however, from the same topos, paying attention to some of its expressions (see notes 205, 256 and 266 and the text to them), draws different conclusions, preserving, however, the doctrine of the unity of the Divine will of the Son with the Father, which was emphasized by St. Grigory. Or: “object of desire” / “willed”. The desire for the Cup to pass. Desire (or: “will”) (θέλησις) is a concretization of natural will. St. Maxim insists that the will of human nature in Christ was never “concretized” in the refusal to accept suffering for the sake of our salvation, for this would already mean the absence of “fusion” and deification - sinful resistance to God’s will. The prayer for the Chalice cannot be interpreted this way. At the same time, the words testifying to “compression” in the face of death could not be uttered by Christ according to the Divinity, just as the words that continue them, which express the determination to accept the will of God for the sake of our salvation, were spoken by Christ “in a humane manner” (see 68C). This serves for St. Maxim is proof of the presence in Christ of a human will, which not only manifests itself in its difference from the Divine (in the face of death), but is also “imprinted” by it and accepts what it desires - our salvation. In this context, it would be necessary to clarify the statement of the priest. Dionysius (Shlenova) regarding the “discovery” of St. Maxim in his interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer: “The Savior, by His humanity, thirsts for our salvation, and in order to save us, freely accepts death” (Shlenov 2004, p. 352). It is important to remember that the desire for our salvation is not some independent and independent will of the Savior’s human will, initiated by it. As can be seen from the Gospels and their analysis by St. Maxim, we are talking about the obedience of the human will of Christ to the will of God, about the following (by virtue of hypostatic unity and deification) by Christ according to humanity of the Divine will, which desires our salvation. As for the “discovery” of St. Maxim, about whom Shlenov speaks, then St. Maximus indeed brings clarification to the widespread patristic tradition of interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer (Larchet 1998, p. 47), the expression of which can be found, for example, in the polemics of St. Gregory of Nyssa with Apollinaris. Within the framework of this polemic, the presence of a human will in Christ was already explicitly affirmed, however, the words “not my will, but yours be done” were understood as in the quotation from St. Gregory the Theologian (or. 30.12), emanating rather from Christ according to the Divinity (which is quite understandable, bearing in mind the previous polemic that was waged in the Church against Arianism): “So, since one thing is the will (βούλημα) of man, and the other is the will of God, then having assimilated our weaknesses, one thing [Christ] speaks as a man - that which is characteristic of the weakness of nature, and the other after that the expression is added as one who wanted, for the salvation of people, to fulfill a high and worthy desire of God, exceeding [the desires] of man. Having said: “not my” [will], He meant by this word the [will] of man; and having added: “Yours,” he pointed to the commonality with the Father of His own Divinity, Who, according to the communion of nature (κοινωνίαν τῆς φύσεως), has no difference in will (θελήματος); for, speaking about the will (θέλημα) of the Father, this meant the will of the Son [according to Divinity]” (Greg. Nyss. antirr. advers. Apoll. 3.1, trans. according to: Gregory of Nyssa 2006. T. 1, p. 217). Later, in opusc. 7, prp. Maxim was able to explain how his interpretation can be reconciled with the interpretation of the fathers who wrote about the Gethsemane prayer before him; in particular, he speaks of the sense in which the human will of Christ can be spoken of as Divine: “[His human will was] completely and completely deified by the descent and fusion with [the will] of the Fatherly - actually by unity, and not by nature, it truly became and is called Divine" (81D). Thus, even the words attributed to opusc. 6 prp. Maximus of Christ according to humanity, but expressing the “convergence” of volitions - an expression of the “Divine” in the sense of volition indicated here, so that there is no insurmountable contradiction between the interpretation of St. Maxim and previous fathers do not exist, however, to prove this, he had to work hard. See also note. 311. Again the key Christological formula of St. is used. Maxima (see notes 257 and 272). Larcher dates this work to ca. 642 (see Larchet 1998, p. 50), but for a number of reasons, which are discussed in more detail in the introductory article to this edition (chap. 12), it seems to us to have been written in 640–641, after opusc. 6, but before opusc. 20. That is, piety. – Approx. translation Or: you seem to be completely abiding. – Approx. translation Apparently, we are talking about the Beatitudes: blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven [Matthew 5:3], since both before and after this place we are talking about poverty. Wed. “Do not quench the Spirit” [1 Thess. 5:19]. The expression “burning of the Spirit” is found in St. Maxima in qu. dub. 152: “Those who, like priests, always offer themselves to God as a “living sacrifice” [Rom. 12:1] and, like Cleopas, keep within themselves the burning of the Holy Spirit - they offer God His own fire. When people carelessly move away from such a state and allow passions to inflame in themselves, then they bring alien fire and are burned in their conscience by the fire of accusations” (translated by D. A. Chernoglazov, quoted from: Maxim the Confessor 2010, pp. 169–170) (cf. St. Gregory of Nazianzen: ἡ ζέσις τοῦ Πνεύματος, for example in: Greg. Naz. in sancta lumina (or. 39): PG 36, 352. 47. Lauth expresses an unlikely, in our opinion, assumption about the connection of this expression in St. Maximus with the words of the priest pronounced during the “rite of warmth”, - adding hot water to wine during the Eucharist (Louth 1996, p. 214, n. 2). The expression “earth of the heart” is often found among St. Maxim in Questions and Perplexities, in particular, he says that we must “expand the land of the heart to accept the Word of God” (qu. dub. 17, translated by D. A. Chernoglazov according to: Maxim Confessor 2010, p. 81), and in another place: “after correcting the work of moral philosophy, the whole land of the heart is filled with divine knowledge” (qu. dub. 80, translated by Maxim Confessor 2010, p. 127), or: “the heart in the Gospel is called earth” (qu. dub. 148, translated by Maxim Confessor 2010, p. 167, cf. Matthew 13:19.). Louth (1996, p. 215, n. 3) refers this expression to the Macarius Corpus, although St. Maxim, as we see, raises it to the Gospel. Louth (Louth 1996, p. 215, n. 5) connects cold with Sevier, supposedly consonant (in the minds of Maxim) with the Slavic “north”; this assumption seems doubtful to us, although the connection of Sevier with the north, cold and darkness in St. Maxima actually occurs (see note 218 and the text to it). In any case, in this place, the coming darkness and cold, of course, should be understood as the spread not of Monophysitism, but of Monothelitism; St. Maxim does not resort to Aesopian language, but rather to figurative language. Abridged quotation from Ps.75:5, according to LXX. Anabasis (ἀνάβασις, ascent) is one of the key concepts of the mystagogy of St. Maxima used in amb. 10 and many of his other works; it is associated with a number of other concepts: diabasis (διάβασις), epanabasis (ἐπανάβασις) and metabasis (μετάβασις) (see, for example: cap. theol. 2.18: “The one who prays should never stop his ascent [anabasis] to God. After all, our ascent must be understood as success in virtues... as an elevation [epanabasis] of spiritual knowledge in contemplation from glory to glory [2 Cor. 3:18] and as a transition [metabasis] from the words of Holy Scripture to the spirit [of Him]" (PG 90, 1133A, trans. A.I. Sidorov with our insertions, quoted from: Maxim Confessor 1993. Book I, p. 237). human nature. From the further text of this work it will be clear what relation this “ascent” has to the problem of polemics with the Monothelites, who do not understand, according to St. Maximus, the sacrament of deification and its application to the problem of wills (cf. 81C-D). Monophysitism and Nestorianism. There is an allusion here to Chalcedonian Oros. Or: “dedication.” We are talking about the mystery of the union of the Divine nature with the human in Christ. We are obviously talking about the Monophysites and the union with them, which St. Maxim calls it betrayal. Or: “from us” – ἐξ ἡμῶν [taken]. – Approx. translation That is, the distortion by the Chalcedonians of the true teaching about Christ and the union with the Monophysites is heavier than the betrayal of the Lord by Judas to death. It is grammatically acceptable: “perfect by desire / volition,” but here the option adopted in the main text is more likely. – Approx. translation Otherwise: “to the edges,” i.e., to Divinity and humanity. A hint at the Origenistic model, or, more likely, at the teaching that was attributed to Apollinaris in the Orthodox tradition. Lauth believes that it was attributed to him without reason, etc. Maxim in this case uncritically follows the same tradition (Louth 1996, p. 215, n. 12). In reality, things are more complicated. Indeed, the Orthodox Fathers claimed that Apollinaris taught that the Logos descended to earth with the flesh that He had from eternity in heaven (see, for example, Greg. Naz. ep. 102), which looks very strange. However, it must be borne in mind that for Apollinaris the main opponents in Christology were Paul of Samosata, Marcellus of Ancyra and Photinus of Sirmium. To them he attributed the doctrine that Christ is a “divine man,” that is, a man who carries the Divinity within himself, and not the Son of God Himself, the Logos, who assumed human nature. In polemics with this teaching, as it appeared to Apollinaris, he first of all developed his Christology, including the doctrine of Christ as a “man from heaven,” seeking with this expression to emphasize the fact that Christ in His earthly life had no other Hypostasis other than the Hypostasis of the eternal Son of God, as well as the fact that His human nature was composed on the basis of the Divine Mind, i.e. e. Logos, which took the place of the mind in the normal composition of human nature. In turn, St. Gregory the Theologian, in the Christological teaching developed in the dispute with Apollinaris, tries to maintain a “balance,” that is, to formulate the doctrine of the relationship of the two natures in Christ in such a way as not to slide into the opposite extreme compared to adoptionism (i.e., into Apollinarianism); He also takes into account the third danger, which was realized later in Nestorianism. In this context, the polemic around the doctrine attributed to Apollinaris that Christ descended to earth with the flesh that was with Him in heaven, despite all the overexposures of the literal understanding of this phrase, is not without deep meaning, since it contains the question of the consubstantiality of Christ in the flesh with us. In fact, if Christ does not have a human mind, but has a Divine mind, which is the Divine Logos, then His human nature is incomplete, and it is simply impossible for us to talk about His consubstantiality. Thus, the concept of the “heavenly man” or “man from heaven” of Apollinaris really comes into conflict with the Orthodox teaching about the consubstantiality of Christ with God according to Divinity and with us according to humanity. In Apollinaris, the flesh of Christ, replenished not with the human mind, but with the Divine Logos, turned out to be something like an “individual” human nature, existing exclusively in Christ, but different from other people. In this sense, it turned out to be “heavenly,” so the Cappadocian polemics with this expression, or more precisely, with the ideas behind it, are completely justified (for more details, see Benevich 2009a, pp. 371–373). This refers to the well-known teaching of St. The maxim is about divisions that are overcome in Christ; the above talks about unification. About the oppositions that Adam should have overcome, but this did not happen, but only became entrenched (from differences became divisions), as well as about the overcoming of these divisions in Christ, see amb 41: PG 91, 1304D–1316A. This is one of the most “popular” among researchers. The Difficulty Maxim, about which many works have been written (most famously: Thunberg 1965). Of the latest studies, V. V. Petrov’s book is devoted almost entirely to the analysis of this difficulty (Petrov 2007). In this difficulty, as is known, St. Maxim speaks of five oppositions overcome in Christ: male-female; heaven-universe; heaven and earth; sensory-intelligible, created-uncreated. This refers to Ekphesis, published by imp. Heraclius, responsible for which Rev. Maxim placed it on the Monothelites, primarily on the Patr. Sergius and other ideologists of monothelitism. Above (opusc. 7: PG 91, 76D) prp. Maximus sets out in his own words the arguments of Ekphesis, which also reproduce the arguments of the epistle of Sergius to Honorius and, possibly, Psiphos (see more details in the preface to this edition, chapters 9 and 10). According to Louth (1996, p. 215, n. 15), this quote in the writings of St. Gregory of Nyssa could not be found, but it is given in the Council Epistle of St. Sophronius of Jerusalem (PG 87, 3173B). Venerable himself Maxim cites similar words from St. Gregory of Nyssa in relation to the temptation of Christ in the desert: “Having remained inaccessible [to suffering] for forty days, he later became hungry: after all, when He wanted, He gave [human] nature to act in its own way.” These words of St. Gregory of Nyssa (Greg. Nyss. orat . de beat. 4: PG 44, 1237A) St. Maxim mentions in disp. Pyrr. : PG 91, 352B. According to Rev. Maxim, Christ, when he wanted this, as God gave to human nature, essentially assimilated by Him, to act in its own way - in accordance with those ways of manifestation that are characteristic of it after the fall, in particular to experience hunger, thirst, pain, and reluctance to violent death. This teaching occupies an important place in the theology of St. Maxima. Thus, during a debate with Pyrrhus, he will say: “Natural properties in the Lord do not precede desire, as in us, but... really experiencing hunger and thirst, He experienced them not in the same way as we do, but in a way superior to us (for voluntarily)” (disp. Pyrr: PG 91, 300A, trans. D. A. Afinogenov according to: Maxim the Confessor 2004, p. 175). According to Rev. Maximus, suffering, which became the way (tropos) of the existence of human nature after the Fall, took place in Christ not as with us (due to natural necessity), but voluntarily, that is, as conditioned by His Divine permission, which did not negate the very fact of the existence of human will in Christ. After St. Maxima repeats this thought. John of Damascus: “Of course, our natural passions were in Christ both in accordance with nature and supernaturally. In accordance with nature, they were aroused in Him when He allowed the flesh to endure what is characteristic of it, and supernaturally because in the Lord what was natural did not precede His will, for in Him nothing is seen as forced, but everything is voluntary. For He hungered by His will, He thirsted by His will, He feared by His will, He died by His will” (Joann. Dam. exp. fid. 3.20, trans. edited by D. E. Afinogenov, cit. according to the edition: John of Damascus 2002, p. 277). Or: “was not endowed with a rational soul.” Or: “reasonable” - λογικόν. The mere presence of γνώμη does not lead to sin if the intention does not contradict the logos of nature. St. Maximus in this place does not yet go into the question of the presence of γνώμη in Christ (he already explicitly says below that the human will of Christ was not gnomic, see 81D), nor does he delve into the fact that in the state of deification of the saints γνώμη is deactivated. Read more about changes in the use of γνώμη by St. For Maxim, see in the introductory article, especially in chapters 16 and 17, where we, in particular, note a recurring error (with reference to the phrase commented here) among many researchers (apparently starting with Sherwood) - the statement that St. Maximus, until 643, recognized γνώμη in Christ. As can be seen from opusc. 7: PG 91, 81D, this is not true. Or: “according to [their] creation.” – Approx. translation ὑπαρξίαν should apparently be corrected to ἀνυπαρξίαν. The author of the Latin translation proceeds from this: abolitionem ac interitum. – Approx. translation Formally speaking, another translation is acceptable here: “house-building prayer [for deliverance] from death.” It is precisely this way that παραίτησις, Louth, translates as “pleading” and not as “evasion”: “he humanly begged to be spared from death (He humanly begged to be spared from death)” (Louth 1996, p. 184–185), a similar translation is found in Ponsois (Maxime Confesseur 1998 , p. 150–151) and in Angelis (Massimo Confessore 2007, p. 88). However, the question of which option to choose for translating and understanding this important passage can, it seems to us, be resolved unambiguously. The word παραίτησις, which St. Maxim characterizes Christ’s attitude towards death, found below in the same work (81C) with reference to the understanding of the Gethsemane prayer of St. Athanasius of Alexandria, where παραίτησις should definitely be interpreted in the sense of “deviation”: “Athanasius the Great in his Homily on the Incarnation and the Trinity says: “When [the Savior] says, “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from [Me]; however, let not My will be done, but Thine... The spirit is cheerful; but the flesh is weak" [Matthew 26:39,41], then we believe that He points here to two wills: the first [of them] is human, which is the [will] of the flesh, the second is Divine. The human [will], due to the weakness of the flesh, avoids (παραιτεῖται) from suffering, and the Divine is vigorous (πρόθυμον)" (cf. opusc. 15: PG 91, 160D) (St. Maximus quotes a work considered to have belonged to St. Athanasius of Alexandria, but now attributed to Marcellus of Ancyra, known as “On the Appearance in the Flesh of God the Word and Against the Arians” (21); in the pre-revolutionary Russian translation the phrase that interests us is translated even more “radically”: “by this he shows two wills: human, characteristic of the flesh, and Divine, characteristic of God; and human, due to the weakness of the flesh, renounces suffering, and His Divine will is ready for it” (Marcell. de incarn. et contr. Arian. 1021.28–34, trans. according to: Athanasius of Alexandria 1994. T. 3, p. 273, our italics. - G. B.)). 186), but for some reason he does not notice his inconsistency, although it is clear that St. Maxim follows the usage of St. Afanasia. It was in the sense of evading death that St. Petersburg understood this expression. John of Damascus, when he wrote: “natural and blameless passions are not in our power... Such as, for example, hunger, thirst, fatigue, labor, tears, avoidance of death (ἡ τοῦ θανάτου παραίτησις), timidity, death throes” (Joann. Dam. exp. fid. 64.10, edited by D. E. Afinogenov, from: John of Damascus 2002, p. In fact, a prayer for deliverance from death cannot in any way be called an irreproachable passion (it can only be a consequence of such), but avoidance of death can be. Louth's version of the translation: “his natural will bears witness in his plea to be spared from death that took place in accordance with the economy” (Louth 1996, p. 185) and a similar version of Pontsois's translation (Maxime Confesseur 1998, p. 151) - although grammatically admissible, but, it seems to us, does not reflect the thoughts of St. Maxima. Cyr. Al. comm. in Joann. 10. In Jn. 14.21: II.493 (ed. P. E. Pusey); as Lauth notes, this quote is given at the tenth meeting of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Riedinger 1990, S. 326). Louth's translation: “he willed to entreat that he be spared from death” (Louth 1996, p. 185) seems incorrect. Laut further understands St. The maxim is generally correct, although this passage that we translated: “and then rushed against it [death],” formally speaking, can be understood differently: and then rushed against it [the will that evades death]. Doucet rightly criticizes this understanding found in Balthasar, and as an argument refers to a passage from this work just below: “in order to expel from human nature all contraction in the face of death and to harden us and raise us courageously to fight against it, that is, death” (opusc. 7: PG 91, 84C) (Ducet 1985, p. 136, n. 75). Thus, Christ’s struggle in relation to Gethsemane should be understood as a struggle against death (cf. opusc. 16: PG 91, 196D, which speaks of a “strong and decisive movement against death,” which is tantamount to striving against death in opusc. 7). St. Maximus quotes a passage from a work attributed to St. Athanasius of Alexandria, known under the title “On the Appearance of God the Word in the Flesh and Against the Arians” (21); see pre-revolutionary Russian translation in: Athanasius of Alexandria 1994. T. 3, p. 273). In modern science, doubts have been expressed regarding the attribution of this work to St. Athanasius (perhaps its author was Marcellus of Ancyra), however, for St. Maximus and the fathers of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, it had the authority of St. Afanasia. This passage was quoted at the tenth meeting of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Riedinger 1990, S. 298). Or: “decisive.” Although the translation “resolute” is more suitable in meaning, we leave the option “cheerful” as the first one, since it repeats the word used in the Gospel quoted above. St. Maxim quoted from St. Athanasius, from which one may get the impression (and not without reason) that the author did not at all want to say that Christ as a Man possesses a “decisive will”, because as such it is said about another will - the Divine. St. Maxim, obviously, understood that such a difficulty was present in his interpretation, therefore, a little lower (81D) he overcomes it, arguing that the human will of Christ can also be called Divine will because of its deification, fusion with the will of God and subordination to it. Thus, the very words of Christ, in which He expresses this fusion, St. Maxim, on the one hand, considers it evidence of the human will (otherwise, as he shows, it would turn out that the Son and the Father have different wills according to the Divinity, and the Trinity would be separated), and on the other hand, these same words testify to the deification and fusion of the human will with God, and therefore they can in this specific sense be considered evidence of God’s will, one in Christ and the Father, according to which He accepts the Cross for the sake of our salvation. Thus Rev. Maxim reconciles his interpretation with the traditional patristic one, clarifying the latter in the context of polemics with the Monothelites, who did not take into account precisely this aspect - the doctrine of deification and the preservation in it of both the deifying and the deified. Greg. Naz. or. 30.12 (see notes 205, 256, 266 and 273 for more on this passage and its context). See about this important place in approx. 276 and 311. The singular number in the expression “double nature” here obviously does not mean that St. Maxim has in mind one complex nature as the Monophysites understand it. Before this he explicitly speaks of two natures. Most likely, he resorts to such an expression in preparation for the interpretation of the Areopagite’s “God-masculine action” and other similar unitary expressions as dual, despite the fact that in this very expression energy is singular. A little further in the same paragraph he talks about “double energy,” immediately revealing this expression in the sense of two energies. However, the very use of unitary expressions - “double nature” and “double energy” - St. Maximus indicates that there is a sense in which he considers them quite acceptable; moreover, during this period (c. 640–642) he insists that these expressions should be preserved, since they express the fusion of human energy with the Divine (opusc. 8: PG 91, 100B–C). Below he will give an interpretation of such unitarian expressions from the holy fathers. More details about the motives and nature of the polemics of St. Maxima in opusc. 7 and 8 see in: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 44–47 and in the introductory article to this edition (Chapter 13). See previous note. Expression from the 4th Epistle, to Gaius Ps.-Dionysius (Ps.-Dionys. ep. 4.1.19, ed. G. Heil & A. M. Ritter). This expression, distorted by the Patriarch of Alexandria Cyrus, formed the basis of the monoenergist union that he concluded in 633, the union of the Chalcedonites with the Monophysites in Alexandria. It is found in the seventh chapter of the Nine Chapters, in which the authors of the union referred to the authority of the Areopagite (however, distorting the original text): “Christ and the Son produced both divine and human things with one divinely masculine action, in the words of St. Dionysius" (quoted from the publication: Acts 1996. T. IV, p. 188). “One” is put instead of “new,” as was the case with the Areopagite. However, even in the Areopagite “action” is in the singular, so the monoenergists had certain grounds. St. Maxim, however, insists that unitary expressions should be interpreted in the sense of the closest unity and fusion of two energies, and not the absence of one of them or a reduction in some “one”. Below, in the interpretation of St. The maxim of this expression by St. Kirill, one can find a justification for such a translation. In particular, he writes: “related to [both] parts” (88A), and in opusc. 8: PG 91, 101C explains in even more detail: ““one” - because of unity [the union of two energies], “related” - that is, parts,” and explains: “so that she is one and the same both in the omnipotent command and in the touch of the holy flesh, for the Word, being God, obviously revealed her through both.” V. M. Lurie translates this expression when he considers the question of “monoenergism” or “dioenergism” of St. Cyril, otherwise – “co-natural”, but such a translation does not, from our point of view, fully reflect the meaning that the saint puts into this word. Maxim. However, we will cite what is essential for the problem of interpretation of St. Maximus St. Kirill Lurie’s reasoning: “The Alexandrian school used the same expressions. St. Cyril of Alexandria formulates (in one of his most widely read works, the Commentary on the Gospel of John (PG 73, 577C–D; in connection with the resurrection of Jairus’ daughter) a statement about one, and not two energies in Christ: Christ “gave life to (Jairus’s daughter) as God, by an omnipotent command, but He also quickened (her) by the touch of (His) holy flesh, showing through both a single and co-natural energy (μίαν τε καὶ συγγενῆ… τὴν ἐνέργειαν).” However, Cyril was not consistent in his “monoenergetic” terminology. Thus, in his official Message to Emperor Theodosius. II about the right faith, he leans towards the dioenergist terminology, although he does not introduce it directly, but in his other exegetical work, The Treasure of the Holy Trinity, turning to the interpretation of the Epistle to the Romans, he opposes the opinion about the possibility of two energies (PG 75, 453 BC): “So, let us not attribute one natural energy to God and creation, so as not to elevate the created to the (status of) divine essence, and so as not to reduce the abundance of the divine nature to the place befitting those born.” With all this, there is no reason to think that Cyril’s views on this issue changed - so that one of these formulations could be considered incorrect (outdated) and discarded. Rather, here we need to see the different semantic content of the term “energy”” (Lurie 2006, pp. 167–168). Larcher notes the difficulty in translating the word συγγενῆ and prefers to translate it not “congenial”, as Ponsois suggests, but “apparenté” (related), emphasizing that such a translation is more consistent with the meaning of this term in the understanding of St. Maxim, especially revealed in opusc. 8: PG 91, 104A–B (Larchet 1998, p. 37, n. 2). Despite this, Angelis translates into Italian: "congeniale" (Massimo Confessore 2007, p. 91). St. Cyril uses this expression in his Commentary on the Gospel of John (Cyr. Al. in Joann. 6, 53:4.2, ed. Pusey, I.530; PG 73, 577C–D), speaking of Christ’s healing of the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue (Luke 8, 49–56) and the son of a widow (see Luke 7:11–15). St. Maxim interprets this expression of St. Kirill in opusc. 7: PG 91, 88A–89D and opusc. 8. As we see, Rev. Maxim considered it necessary to emphasize the unity of natural energies in Christ, which, in his opinion, lies behind the unitarian expressions of the fathers. This is how he interpreted the issue during this period of controversy. In the Disputation with Pyrrhus, written after 645 (most likely also after 655) and belonging to the next period of controversy, he interprets the purpose of using this expression differently (see more below, note 325 and text, as well as in the introductory article, chapter 18). That is, if such one “complex” energy, in which the divine and human would merge into one, existed, then there could no longer be in it that which is homogeneous with the Divinity or with humanity. For Rev. Maxim, such a merging of natural energies in Christ was refuted, for example, by the possibility of human action (prayer for the Cup is an expression of such an action), which, although it was performed in Christ not as with us, but voluntarily, that is, in a manner decent to God, it was still a human action, and not a mixed one. Apparently, from the Father: αὐτό should be corrected to αὐτόν. – Approx. translation Lit.: “extreme”. – Approx. translation This is how he interpreted this issue until about 643. However, in the Dispute with Pyrrhus, St. Maximus interprets the purpose of using this same expression by St. Kirill is different. Let us cite the corresponding passage from the Disputation: “Pyrrhus. – Why did the church luminary Cyril put forward a dogma opposite to the pious understanding that has now emerged as a result of the discussion, speaking about “who showed through both [actions] one related action,” that is, about Christ? – Maxim: – This statement does not at all contradict the two actions; on the contrary, it confirms them. After all, he did not say that the Divinity of Christ and His humanity have one natural action (because otherwise he would not have said in another place that “no one in his right mind would allow one action in the Creator and creation,” but wanting to show that the action of the Divinity is one - both without flesh and with flesh. As if someone, wanting to show that the action of fire is the same with wood and without wood, would say that fire burns both without wood and with firewood. So the Father did not call the action of two natures one, but called one action the Divine and the Father, essentially present in the incarnate Word of God, by which He not only, by an all-creating command, incorporeally performed Divine signs, as He Himself says (once and after the incarnation He is one-actant to His own Parent, who acts incorporeally), but also by the touch of His flesh revealed them bodily. After all, this is the meaning of the words “through both”” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 344B–C, translated by D. E. Afinogenov according to: Maxim the Confessor 2004, pp. 223–225). As can be seen from this passage, Rev. Maxim, at this stage of the debate, already explains the purpose of using St. in a slightly different way. Kirill’s expression “one kindred energy.” This goal, as St. Maxim Pyrrhus, was to emphasize the identity of the Divine energy of the Son of God, acting through the flesh and “incorporeally,” that is, purely Divine (by command). The purpose of using this expression, which he indicated in opusc. 7:85C: “for the sake of confirming the complete unity of these energies” - St. Maximus does not mention it in his Dispute with Pyrrhus. Wed. also approx. 366 and text. St. Maximus defended the opinion that the author Areopagitik lived in the 1st century, i.e. long before St. Kirill, so that the latter could act as his follower. What follows is a free arrangement of an excerpt from the Commentary on the Gospel of John by St. Cyril of Alexandria (see Cyr. Al. in Joann.: 1.530.8–19, ed. Pusey). About the peculiarities of this interpretation of the statement of St. Kirill, see note. 325. To what was said there it should be added that the passage itself of St. Cyril describes the working of miracles, that is, the very case that falls under the first type of Divine action (see St. Maximus for more details about the two types of Divine action) when Christ performed miracles through His rational flesh. Another kind of divine action differs from this type when, for example, during the temptation in the desert or during the Gethsemane prayer, Christ freely demonstrated the action of human nature as such (albeit according to the Divine tropos). However, this case too, St. Maximus considers the unitarian expression of “God-masculine action” to be quite describable (opusc. 8: PG 91, 100C-D). This means, obviously, that both words “one” and “related” are in the singular. In the original word play: συναίρεσίν τε καὶ διαίρεσιν. – Approx. translation “Unitarian”, in which “energy” is used in the singular. Expressions indicating duality. As can be seen from the statement, St. Maxim at this stage of the polemic not only recognized unitarian expressions, but spoke about the need to confess the sacrament of Christ in such a form so as not to lose in it the doctrine of the unity of two natures in one hypostasis of the Son of God. Subsequently, in the most acute phase of the controversy, he will no longer talk about the need to use unitary formulas and interpret those of the fathers, as we saw in the example of the quote from St. Kirill (see note 325), it will be different. Here and in the following theological and polemical work of St. Maximus insists on the need to confess both formulas at a time when Ekphesis actually prohibited the use of both controversial and confusing, according to Ekphesis, expressions. It was at this time that St. Maxim insisted on the need to preserve - in a correct and inseparable interpretation - both the unitarian and dioenergist formulas of confession. In opusc. 8: 101C he even claims that anyone who does not profess both types of formulas will inevitably fall into heresy and fall away from tradition: “who... does not welcome both equally, and does not properly reconcile some of them with unity, and others with natural difference - he, as befits, inevitably falls into [heresy] - either division, or confusion - or rather, strictly speaking, he plunges himself into it and is rejected from the true communion and confession of the holy fathers. Here Rev. Maxim shifts the focus of his polemic to criticism of the monothelitism of Ekphesis, where not one energy was confessed, but one will in Christ. He speaks of some “asymmetry” in the Orthodox tradition in relation to unitary expressions in relation to energies (they occur) and wills (they do not exist, as St. Maximus claims). The word "pleasure" (ἡδονή) is feminine in Greek. – Approx. translation Larchet dates this work to around 640 (Larchet 1998, p. 33). It is not entirely clear that Rev. What Maxim means by “this”. – Approx. translation We are probably talking about the Arab invasion, which St. Maxim interpreted it in other writings, and in this place, as the fulfillment of apocalyptic prophecies and punishment for sins, primarily for apostasy from Orthodoxy (see our article: Benevich 2010 (http://www.bogoslov.ru/text/1371847.html) and Benevich 2011). The reference to Matthew 24:21 is a clear indication of such an apocalyptic context for understanding St. Maxim of ongoing historical events. Let us recall that in 638, approximately two years before the writing of this work, Jerusalem fell, which was forced to surrender to Caliph Umar, Patriarch Sophronius, who led its defense, the mentor and comrade-in-arms of St. Maxima. Lit.: passed into oblivion. This refers to the teaching of Apollinaris, in agreement with which St. Maximus reproached the Monothelites because both they and Apollinaris, as he believed, denied the presence of the will of rational human nature. Apollinaris was also reproached for professing such a doctrine (see note 294). Probably through human and Divine will and energy. – Approx. translation That is, how will He remain a man after the abolition of human energy or will, or God after the abolition of the Divine? Lit.: “protrudes beyond the essence.” – Approx. translation Ps.-Dion. d. n. 8.5, translation by G. M. Prokhorov. St. Maximus quotes Pseudo-Dionysius inaccurately: the original does not speak of “movement”, but of “force”. – Approx. translation This refers to expressions from the Tomos of Pope Leo to Archbishop Flavian of Constantinople. Here, first of all, we should mention the famous formula: “Each of the two natures, in conjunction with the other, acts as is proper to it (agit utraque forma cum alterius communione, quod proprium est): the Word does what is proper to the Word, and the flesh does what is proper to the flesh (verbo scilicet operante quod verbi est et carne exsequente quod carnis est). One of them shines with miracles, the other is subject to suffering (Unum horum coruscat miraculis, aliud succumbit injuriis)” (Leo. ep. 28.4, translated from: Acts 1996. T. IV, p. 121). This formula, with a certain understanding of it, subsequently became a stumbling block for some (primarily Monophysites), but also a source confirming the presence in Christ of two natural actions, and not just two natures, for others. First of all, in this formula the words may seem seductive: “the flesh does what is proper to the flesh.” How to understand them? Is not Christ, the Word incarnate, the sole subject of all actions, both in Divinity and in humanity? How can one talk about the flesh and its action, as if dividing it with the Word, as if the flesh does not belong to the same Word? For many in the East, these words of Pope Leo, as well as the fact that he did not use the formula of St. Cyril, “the one nature of God the Word incarnate”, subsequently became a reason not to accept Chalcedon, where the Tomos of Pope Leo to Flavian was fully approved. St. Maximus, in his doctrine of natural action, i.e., that action is possessed by nature (both Divine and human), and not by hypostasis, gives an Orthodox justification for the use of words by Pope Leo. At the same time, as we see in opusc. 8, prp. Maxim in the Tomos of St. Lev finds evidence of the unity of the two actions. Lateran Council (649), whose decisions will be largely prepared by St. Maxim, will also confirm the basic Christological position of St. Cyril: “If anyone, according to the wicked heretics, destroyers, while in Christ God the essential unity of two wills and two actions is preserved, piously taught by the holy fathers, namely, Divine and human, in his madness introduces contradictions and divisions into the Mystery [of His Incarnation], and if for this reason he does not convey the words of the Gospel or the Apostles about the Savior and does not attribute their one and only Jesus Christ, our Lord and God, according to Blessed Cyril, so that it can be seen that He really is both God and man, may he be condemned” (16th anathematism, quoted from: Christian Doctrine, p. 203). To the above, it should be added that in one of his treatises, Pope Leo, interpreting the free acceptance of the Cross in Gethsemane, writes: “Superiori igitur voluntati voluntas cessit inferior - (So, the lower will yields to the higher will)” (Leo. Leg. 56.2: PL 54, 327B). As A. Grillmayer notes, in the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer of St. Leo diverges from previous tradition, in particular from St. Athanasius, for whom in the Gethsemane prayer the flesh of Christ only shows weakness, and the victory over this weakness is entirely attributed to the Divine (see: PG 26, 1021B–C) (Grillmeier 1965, p. 471). At St. Maximus, we find such an interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer, which embraces both this understanding of Pope Leo (it does not matter that St. Maximus might not have known him), and the Eastern teaching about deification, which is not clear enough in the Tomos to Flavian. For more information about the Tomos of Pope Leo and his Christology, see our article in: Anthology, Vol. 1, p. 606–622. Literally: “makes one.” This means that the very concept of unity implies that one is united with the other, which means that this concept implies the presence of two (in this case, two natures and two wills). Rare word formation; here, obviously, used ironically. Perhaps, Rev. Maxim alludes to the outwardly pious motives of the Monothelites and Monophysites, who are trying to emphasize the significance of the Divinity in Christ. The same rapprochement between Apollinaris and Arius can be found in the polemics against Apollinaris before St. Maxima. Thus, according to the testimony of the essay Against Apollinaris, attributed to St. Athanasius of Alexandria, but probably did not belong to him, “Arius admits that one flesh served to cover the Divinity; and instead of our inner man, that is, the soul, the Word was in the flesh, and thus dares to attribute the concept of suffering and resurrection from hell to the Divine” (Athan. Al. (?) contr. Apoll. 2.3.). Although Apollinaris vigorously denied that Christ suffered according to Divinity, the Orthodox more than once accused him of precisely this. See eg Greg. Naz. ep. 102: “according to the reasoning of Apollinaris, the Only Begotten God Himself, the Judge of all, the Author of life and the Destroyer of death, is mortal, accepted suffering with His own Divinity, and during the three-day mortification of the flesh, the Divinity was also mortified and, thus, resurrected again from death by the Father” (translation and discussion, see Benevich 2009a, p. 373). This probably refers to the teaching of Apollinaris, according to which in Christ the Logos took the place of the human mind, which St. Maxim polemically interprets it as the formation of a common nature of Divinity and humanity, which can in a certain sense be called human, since the Logos took the place of the human mind, “completing” with Himself human nature (more precisely, the body animated by the irrational soul). Everything that is unique to a hypostasis relates to its idiom, by which one hypostasis is different from another. If the will of Christ is hypostatic, then its presence as characterizing hypostasis certainly violates the unity of the will of the Holy Trinity, and therefore the consubstantial Persons. We are talking about the so-called unitary formulas, which are also discussed in opusc. 7 (see notes 315, 321, 333 and the text thereto). See note. 325, 329 and text thereto. Wed. opusc. 7: PG 91, 88A. See the interpretation of the Divine Act in the Difficulties on Thomas 5 (amb. 5: PG 91, 1056B–1060B) and in the introduction to this edition (chapters 8 and 13). Or: “as indicating singularity.” Or: “comes from the greatest mind.” – Approx. translation Wed. opusc. 7: PG, 91, 88A. That is, this expression is St. Maximus interprets it as indicating the deification of both the flesh of Christ and His human energy, which can be called God and Divine, respectively. On the image of fire and iron in Christology and the doctrine of deification by St. Maxim, see note. 251 It is interesting to compare this place with how St. Maxim interprets the expression of St. Cyril later in the Disputation with Pyrrhus. There, a similar example illustrates something else, namely that “the action of the Divine is one - both without flesh and with flesh.” An example is given as follows: “As if someone, wanting to show that the effect of fire is the same both with wood and without wood, would say that fire burns both without wood and with wood” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 344B–C, translated by D. E. Afinogenov according to: Maxim the Confessor 2004, pp. 223–225). The theme of the identity of God’s action, carried out incorporeally and through the body, is also in the opusc. 8 (see above: “she is the same both in the omnipotent command and in the touch of holy flesh” (101 C)), but along with this, St. The maxim also contains a thought about unity: ““one” - that is, by unity” (Ibid). That is, the word “one” in the expression of St. Cyril is explained through the doctrine of the unity of two actions and the deification of human nature in Christ. And in the Disputation with Pyrrhus, the part of the explanation related to unity, which legitimizes the unitary formulas, is no longer present (cf. the interpretation in opusc. 9: PG 91, 125B, which was written ca. 646, around the same time as the debate). More details in the note. 325. Greg. Naz. funebris in laudem Caesarii fratris oratio (or. 7) (ed. F. Boulenger): 21.3.1–2. Greg. Naz. in theophany (or. 38): PG 36, 329.28. To the “sensual body” and the “intelligent soul” that make up a person. See: P. E. Pusey, Sancti patris nostri Cyrilli archiepiscopi Alexandrini in D. Joannis evangelium. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1872 (repr. 1965). Vol. 1, r. 219.14–20. Several words that are not entirely clear for translation are missing. Possible translations: “in each of the inflected genders” or: “in all grammatical genders and cases.” – Approx. translation A state of unity as opposed to unity by nature. Wed. Flavius ​​Justinianus Imperator. contr. monoph. 5.7 (ed. M. Amelotti, R. Albertella and L. Migliardi (post E. Schwartz)). I literally could not find such a phrase. The expression “the one nature of God the Word incarnate,” as is known, originates from Apollinaris, but in a different sense it was used by St. Cyril of Alexandria, and St. Proclus of Constantinople in the Tomos to the Armenians uses a different formula: “I am piously taught and know only one Son, I confess one hypostasis of God the Word incarnate (σαρκωθέντος), the same one who endured suffering and performed miracles” (ACO 1.4.2:190.20). I literally could not find such a quote. Greg. Naz. de spirit. sanct. (or. 31). 3.14. Greg. Naz. de spirit. sanct. (or. 31). 10.6. Wed. the concept of blameless and natural passions in Christ in: Didym. Caec. fragm. in Psalm. Fr. 716a.14; Cyr. Al. fragm. in sancti Pauli ep. ad Rom. 192.4; Idem, fragm. in sancti Pauli ep. i ad Corin. 313.21; Idem, de adorat. et cult. in spirit. et verit.: PG 68, 993.2; ACO 1.1.6.155.22. The following is an excerpt from the interpretation of St. Cyril on Matthew 26:40. Conquering spirits, “shaming Beelzebub.” Another possible translation is: “Does He accomplish this?..”. – Approx. translation The source of the quotation and its exact boundaries could not be established. Presumably this is an excerpt from the Commentary of St. Cyril of Alexandria on the Gospel of Matthew. Perhaps this phrase is also a quotation, since St. Maxim repeats it in a modified form in the next paragraph. – Approx. translation The translation is approximate: probably, instead of καὶ εἷς one should read καθεῖς. – Approx. translation Otherwise: “nature cannot possibly have a common nature with another nature.” – Approx. translation “Possession” (ἕξις) and “deprivation” (στέρησις) are Aristotle’s categories (Arist. cat. 1.10.11b20). The meaning of the objection of Rev. The maxim, apparently, is that if the energy belongs directly to the hypostasis of Christ, and not to the two natures of this hypostasis, then it is impossible to say, for example, that Christ died on the Cross according to humanity, but is immortal as God, but the same thing - death and immortality - would have to be attributed directly to the hypostasis, which would lead to a contradiction, since the death of the hypostasis in this case would mean deprivation (i.e. absence) of immortality, and the hypostasis would cease to be immortal. Another translation option: “And if this is so, then Christ’s own nature was [simultaneously] both existing and not existing, [one and the same] in terms of possession and in deprivation.” – Approx. translation Otherwise: “devoid of energy.” – Approx. translation It is interesting that above Rev. Maxim said in some detail that a person on his own, without the help of the grace of the Holy Spirit, cannot cope with unclean spirits with human strength. Here he, as if in continuation of this thought, on the one hand, in the traditional monastic spirit, writes about the weakness of his strength, but also testifies to the grace that was given to him and helped him in writing this work. Larcher dates this work to 646 or 647; in any case, it was written before the Lateran Council of 649 (Larchet 1998, p. 97). Lit.: “joyfully” – περιχαρῶς. – Approx. translation We are talking about suspicion regarding St. Maxim about his latent monoenergism and monothelitism due to his use, along with dioenergist and diophelite, unitary formulas. Proof of his adherence to strict diopheliteism (this is what was professed in the West) became an important part of the church-political struggle of St. Maximus in preparation for the Lateran Council. To the defense of St. Maximus had to resort after Pyrrhus’s renunciation of the repentance he brought after the dispute with Maximus (see more details in Chapter 19 in the introductory article). Greg. Naz. or. 2: PG 35, 409.2–12. Translation according to the edition: Gregory the Theologian 1994. T. 1, p. 23–24. As can be seen from this place, St. Maxim does not renounce his doctrine of the fusion of two energies and wills, but (implicitly) refuses to call them one, although he previously allowed these expressions. This approach was characteristic of him in the midst of controversy and in the face of criticism from Orthodox Christians in the West, by whom these formulas were misinterpreted. Greg. Naz. or. 45: PG 36, 641.3. Otherwise: “devastation / kenosis.” St. Maxim polemically simplifies the arguments of his opponents. They mean, obviously, that every time something is done by Christ, it is one thing, for example, the Resurrection or Ascension, since the hypostasis that does it is one. Venerable himself Maximus, in a letter to Pyrrhus, wrote about “doing a single thing” (ep. 19: PG 91, 593B), but even in this letter he expressed fear that the “single thing” in the sense of the result of an action would not be reduced to a single action in the sense of the energy through which the thing is accomplished. See about this most important thing for St. Maxim Christological formula approx. 157. Mule (lat. mulus) is the result of crossing a donkey and a mare. Florilegium Cyrillianum 123. 20. See Cyr. Al. in Joan.: PG 73, 577 CD and approx. 319. Otherwise: logos “as being.” Such a quote from St. Kirill could not be found. There is a partial match with: Cyr. Al. in Joan. 1. 220.8 and Cyr. Al. thesaur .: PG 75.137.13., and the second part of the sentence is about the unity of essence and energy in St. Cyril belongs to the Holy Trinity. St. Maximus may have composed a sentence from two different places in St. Kirill to get the meaning he needs. Cyr. Al. thesaur.: PG 75.137.13. Wed. approx. 366, where the present place and similar thought in the Disputation with Pyrrhus is compared with the interpretation of the same statement by St. Kirill in opusc. 8. Otherwise: “the ability of touch.” As Bathrellos (2004, p. 199) notes, this is a quote from Heraklian, ep. Chalcedonian: CPG, iii. 291 (6801) and CPGS, 392 (6801). Given by Rev. Maxim's quotation is the only source for this passage, so it is difficult to judge its context and meaning. Heraklian was a Chalcedonite and bishop of Chalcedon from 537(?) to 553. According to Patr. Photius, Heraclian was a model of Orthodoxy (Phot. biblioth. 85: PG 103, 288A-289A; ed. Henry, II.9–10), although the same Photius notes Heraclian’s special sympathies for Antiochian theology (he revered Diodorus of Tarsus as one of the holy fathers). In saying that one movement is energy and suffering, the author of the above quotation probably meant that in Christ the Divine belonged to action (energy), and human nature in relation to the Divinity is passive, i.e., moved by Him. At least for the monoenergist Pyrrhus, such considerations were an argument in favor of the doctrine of one energy. See his argument in the Disputation with Pyrrhus: "We speak of one action, not to deny human action, but because, in contrast to the Divine action, it is in this sense called suffering." St. Maximus does not deny that human movement can be called transmutation: “After all, everything that is from God and after God undergoes through that which moves, since it is not self-motion or self-power,” but denies that on this basis one can speak of one energy. His main argument is references to the fathers who called human movement “action”, although, according to St. Maxim, action is called “as distinguishing and demonstrating uniformity in all [hypostases] of the same species.” As a movement it was called, as follows from the words of St. Maxim, “enduring” - in contrast to the movement of the Divine, which was called “action” (precisely as a movement). This circumstance, apparently, escapes the attention of Pyrrhus, and he agrees with the argumentation of St. Maxim (PG 91, 349 C-352 B, quotes translated by D. E. Afinogenov from: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 231, 235; see discussion of this passage in Maxim Confessor 2007a, note 136, p. 59). This passage is difficult to understand and may contain polemical exaggerations. It is unclear where the number 12 came from (if we take one movement, energy and suffering of the “whole Christ” and add to this the same three for each of the two natures, then together we get nine, although perhaps St. Maximus hints that the soul and body also have their own movement, energy and suffering). Regarding the question of Rev. Maxim: “Which of the saints [fathers] confessed Christ’s nature “in relation” or “by assimilation”, then, as noted in the commentary to the Russian translation of the Dispute with Pyrrhus, “in St. Cyril of Alexandria and later in Leontius of Byzantium in his writings against Nestorius, this word (“by assimilation” - G.B.) means the perception and assimilation of human flesh by the Logos” (Maximus the Confessor 2004, p. 249, note 38). However, Venerable himself Maxim introduced the distinction between “essential assimilation” (which corresponds to the understanding of “assimilation” in St. Cyril) and “relative assimilation” (see notes 129 and 694), but those with whom he polemicizes in this passage obviously did not distinguish between these concepts. St. Maximus speaks directly or indirectly several times in his writings about five Councils. Thus, in the Disputation with Pyrrhus, he says that the Fifth Council commanded two wills, since it decided to accept all the writings of Athanasius, Basil and Gregory, and they speak of two wills (PG 91, 301A). In opusc. 11 (PG 91, 137C–D) he speaks of “six holy councils,” obviously including the V Ecumenical and Lateran; in opusc. 9: PG 91, 128B on the “five holy ecumenical councils”, finally in opusc. 15: PG 91, 180C–D on the “five holy and ecumenical councils.” However, during the first trial of St. By Maxim, he speaks only about four Ecumenical Councils (for a discussion of related issues, see: Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 90–95 and in the introductory article, chapter 20). Or: “capable by nature of desiring and realizing our salvation.” – Approx. translation Greg. Naz. ep. 101.32.2 (ed. P. Gallay). We are talking about those letters to the deacon, and then to Presbyter Marin, where St. Maxim recognized the Unitarian expressions of the fathers and gave them his own interpretation (see opusc. 7; opusc. 20 and the introductory article to this edition, where these writings are discussed in detail in Chapter 13). We're talking about ep. 19 to Pyrrhus (no later than early 634), written in the context of the adoption of Psiphos in 633. For more on this letter, see Maximus the Confessor 2007a, p. 16–21 and the introductory article to this edition, chap. 6. It is unclear what letter we are talking about. Let us note that Rev. Maxim is not saying that they misunderstood what he wrote, say, in opusc. 20, and that the letter itself in question is forged. Although St. Maximus says that in the letter to Pyrrhus, on the one hand, he showed courtesy and respect for the addressee, and on the other, he wanted to find the fastest way to persuade him to his point of view with his praises addressed to him; one can still doubt that in the letter to Pyrrhus only this caused high praise for Psiphos, developed by Sergius and Pyrrhus and called St. Maximus with the “God-written tablets” bestowed by the “new Mediator”, the “new Moses”. The point is not only in these praises, but also in the fact that Patr. Sophrony, etc. Maximus accepted Psyphos and was in communication with Sergius and Pyrrhus. However, it is also certain that St. Maxim was never a monoenergist, who professed the union of Divine and human energy in Christ into one natural or hypostatic energy (see for more details in: Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 16–21). It is characteristic that further in opusc. 9: PG 91, 132C prp. Maxim admits that his former praise of Pyrrhus and Sergius is now “painful” to him, but he does not renounce his views of that time. Τρόπος – lit.: “direction”, “way”. The point is probably that Pyrrhus finally renounced what he brought after a dispute with St. Maxim of repentance. This happened either under the influence of the defeat of the rebellion of the exarch of Carthage Gregory (in this case - in 647) (Haldon 1997, p. 307), or perhaps for some other reason (in this case, perhaps as early as 646), when Pyrrhus, having visited Ravenna and having secured the patronage of the exarch of Ravenna Plato, publicly renounced the repentance he had brought in Rome and returned to his former monothelitism. Pope Theodore responded by solemnly excommunicating Pyrrhus (Kulakovsky 2004, Vol. III, p. 168). Opusc. 9 was clearly written after these events. This work, especially in the part devoted to the question of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, played and still plays an important role in the controversy between Orthodox and Latins about the Filioque, as well as in past and present attempts to achieve mutual understanding. Many studies have been devoted to it, of which we will refer to only a few. A chapter with an analysis of this work is available for the Russian reader in: Larche 2004, p. 35–102 (unfortunately, the translation of Larchet 1998b by O. Nikolaeva contains many errors). J.-C. Larcher, following Sherwood, dates this work to 645–646. (Larchet 1998b, p. 11; Sherwood 1952, pp. 53–55). For our considerations regarding the time and place of writing this work, see Chapter. 18 of the introductory article (note 586 and text). The question of the authenticity of the message, that is, its ownership by St. Maxim, discussed in particular in Larchet 1998b, and from later works in: Siecienski 2007, p. 189–227. Based on a comparison of the theology of the letter (in it, St. Maximus defends expressions from the conciliar letter of Pope Theodore, in particular, the Latin doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit and from the Son, giving this work his own interpretation), with the Trinitarian theology of St. Maxim, as expressed in his other works, the author puts forward a number of arguments in favor of the authenticity of the letter. The same topic, with consideration of arguments of a philological nature, is discussed in the dissertation of the same author: Siecienski 2005, p. 31–36 – and in the book published on the basis of this dissertation: Siecienski 2010, p. 73–86. These studies also discuss the use of this message by St. Maxim in the controversy between the Orthodox and the Latins around the Filioque. It should be noted that most Orthodox fathers (among whom are St. Gregory of Cyprus, St. Gregory Palamas, St. Neilos Cabasilas) considered opusc. 10 as genuine, moreover, St. Mark of Ephesus believed that the doctrine expressed in it and the interpretation of the procession of the Holy Spirit “and from the Son” is the touchstone of the correctness of the teaching on this matter (Larchet 1998b, p. 14, n. 6; Siecienski 2007, p. 191), while many Latin polemicists believed it to be spurious and refused to accept its interpretation, although we were the first to mention it obliged to the defender of the position of Rome in the disputes of the times of the patriarchs. Photius (c. 867) – to Anastasius the Librarian. At the same time, Anastasius quite adequately described the contents of the letter to St. Maxim: “we have [an excerpt] of a letter written by the same St. Maximus to the priest Marinus regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit, where he expresses the opinion that the Greeks tried in vain to attack us, since we do not say that the Son is the cause or beginning of the Holy Spirit, as they claim. But, not being ignorant of the unity of the essence of the Father and the Son, as He [i.e. e. Spirit] comes from the Father, we confess that He also comes from the Son, understanding processionem, of course, as “mission.” Interpreting piously, he instructs those trained in both languages ​​to be reconciled, teaching both us and the Greeks that in one sense the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but in another he does not, showing the difficulties of transmitting complex expressions of one language into another” (Anastas. ad Ioannem Diaconum: PL 129, 567). Otherwise: “word and character.” – Approx. translation γύμνωσιν – otherwise: “deprivation”, i.e. lack of benefits. – Approx. translation The authenticity of this passage, i.e., its belonging to St. Maxim, there is no doubt - both the spirit, the vocabulary, and the ideas in him are typical for him. Disputes about authenticity relate only to the further text of this work. Among modern researchers, Karayannis should be mentioned, who denies that St. The maxim of the subsequent part of the epistle (see Karayiannis 1993, p. 89), but Larchet examines his arguments in detail and does not agree with them (Larchet 1998b, pp. 14–15; cf. Siecienski 2007, p. 193). Although the name of the Pope St. Maximus does not indicate, most likely, it was Pope Theodore (24.11.642–14.5.649), and not Pope Martin (July 649–16.9.655), since it is clear from the letter that it was written from Carthage (opusc. 10: PG 91, 137B), and St. Maximus left Carthage in 645 or 646, and there is no reason to assume that he returned there in 649. The authenticity of the message is questioned by the fact that nothing is known about the conciliar messages of these popes containing the question of the procession of the Spirit. However, many researchers do not consider the argument “from the absence” of such messages to refute the authenticity of opusc. 10. The context of the appearance of this work by St. Maxima could be like that. At the height of the anti-Monothelitian polemic on the part of Rome against Constantinople, Pope Theodore wrote an anti-Monothelitian letter containing (among other things) the controversial expressions. The Constantinoples took advantage of these unusual expressions in order to prove that Rome, which criticizes them, has itself moved away from Church Tradition, and thus gain additional trump cards in the dispute. In a situation where the authority of Rome, its main support in the fight against heresy, was called into question, St. Maxim could write his message. This development of events seems quite plausible, although, as Larcher notes, until a critical edition of the text is released, its authenticity can only be discussed hypothetically and based on circumstantial evidence (Larchet 2004, p. 39). As Larcher rightly notes elsewhere, this letter can be considered as an argument in favor of the fact that St. Maximus did not profess the dogma of the infallibility of the Roman See; in fact, he does not defend the teaching of Pope Theodore on the basis of such a dogma, but considers it correct that the Roman Church explains its teaching in response to the request of the Church of Constantinople. And the criterion of the correctness of this teaching for St. The maxim is not the infallibility of Rome, but the agreement of the faith of the Roman Church with the teachings of both Western and Eastern holy fathers, as the Venerable himself understands it. Maxim (Larchet 2004, pp. 191–193). Moreover, it is clear from the letter that he considered it permissible to urgently ask the Romans, for the sake of the triumph of truth, to formulate their confession in terms understandable in Constantinople, just as he convinced the Constantinople people of the need to understand the difficulties of translating the confessional formulas of another Church and from another language, without, however, questioning the very right to test the faith of the Roman see. Constantinople. – Approx. translation Lit.: "Roman". – Approx. translation Larcher cites numerous evidence from the Latin fathers (St. Hilary of Pictavia, Ambrose of Milan, Leo the Great, Gregory Dvoeslov) and from St. Cyril of Alexandria, which speak in different contexts and expressions about the procession of the Holy Spirit and from the Son, but all these places, as Larcher shows, are consistent with the interpretation of St. Maxim, and are not a confession of the origin of the Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit or the Hypostasis and essence from the Son. The only exception among the Latin fathers is Blessed. Augustine (Larchet 1998b, pp. 26–52; Larchet 2004, pp. 46–80). According to another reading: “and through.” – Approx. translation One of the indirect confirmations of the authenticity of this message by St. Maximus - parallels in his own writings of the main theological thought opusc. 10 about the procession of the Holy Spirit and from the Son. So, in qu. dub. 1, 34 (ed. Declerck) prp. Maximus interprets a difficulty that partly overlaps with the problematic of the Filioque. We present this text because of its importance for understanding the teachings of St. Maxim: “That which cannot be said: Christ is the Spirit, in the same way as about the Father and the Son, although it is said without distinction: the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ. Just as the mind is the cause of the word, so it is also the cause of the breath, through the medium of the word. Just as we cannot say that the word is a voice, so we cannot say that the Son is the Spirit.” The problem that is resolved in this question and answer is St. Maxim, concerns the asymmetry or inequality of formulas existing in Scripture. In fact, if the Persons of the Trinity are equal in honor and if they say: the Spirit of God, obviously meaning God the Father, and the Spirit of Christ, then why can’t we say: Christ of the Spirit? Answer Rev. The maxim has implications for future controversy surrounding the Filioque problem, and in this context J.-C. comments. Larcher: “The second part of this passage indicates, in accordance with the wording of the question, that St. Maxim did not mean a relationship of origin, but a relationship of “belonging”: the Spirit is “the Spirit of the Son” or “the Spirit of Christ,” expressions that we find in Holy Scripture (cf. 1 Cor. 2:16; 2 Cor. 3:17-18; Rom. 8:9) and which do not mean that the Spirit receives from the Son His personal existence or even His Divine nature, but that the Spirit is Spirit the Son, whom He received from the Father in order to manifest Him, to send Him and to give Him to people. As having proceeded from the Father and as being revealed, sent and taught through the Son, the Spirit can be counted as “caused” through the Son. In this sense, the used St. Maxim's comparison indicates that the Father is the Cause of the Spirit through the mediation of the Son, just as the mind is the cause of breath or voice through the mediation of the word. The very nature of the symbol used clearly indicates that St. Maxim means the manifestation of the Holy Spirit" (Larchet 2004, pp. 91–92). Larche's interpretation is obviously based on the solution to the problem of the relationship between the Son and the Spirit, which was given by the Council of Blachernae in 1285 and in the theology of St. Gregory of Cyprus, as well as among the Orthodox polemicists who followed him against the Latin teaching of the Filioque; in this perspective he reads etc. Maxima. It can be assumed that something like this St. Maxim also means in opusc. 10, if this essay belongs to him. Another parallel place in St. Maxima – Thal. 63.167–170 (ed. Laga/Steel): “Τὸ γὰρ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον, ὥσπερ φύσει κατ’ οὐσίαν › οὐσίαν ἐστίν, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσιωδῶς δι’ Υἱοῦ γεννηθέντος ἀφράστως ἐκπορευόμενον (The Holy Spirit, just as by nature is essentially present in God and the Father, so by nature is essentially [inherent] in the Son, since He proceeds in an inexpressible way essentially from the Father through the begotten Son).” Unity with the analyzed passage from opusc. 10 is obvious (cf. Siecienski 2007, p. 201). Other parallel places indicated by Larcher: cap. XV. 4: PG 90, 1180A (where the Logos is called the “source” of “eternal Life,” that is, the Holy Spirit) and or. dom.: PG 90, 884A–C; ibid. PG 90, 876C–D). Otherwise: “energy”. – Approx. translation The second accusation against Rome from Constantinople related to the expression about the absence of “forefathers’ sin” in Christ according to His humanity. As Larchet suggests, this expression and the idea of ​​it in Latin theology could be associated with the characteristic “Augustinian” complex of ideas about the hereditary transmission of sin (and guilt) of Adam (Larchet 1998, p. 84). In turn, in Constantinople, expressions about the absence of forefathers’ sin in Christ according to humanity could be understood in the sense of affirming the otherness of Christ’s human nature in comparison with ours (for example, in the spirit of the Aphthartodocetes, polemics with which were characteristic of both the Severian Monophysites (or Theodosians) and the Chalcedonites, who entered into a union with them in 633 on the basis of monoenergism). However, as evidenced by Rev. Maxim, the Latins dismissed the suspicions of the Constantinoples, answering that the absence of ancestral sin is understood in a moral sense, that is, as the absence of sin in Christ in thoughts and actions. Here Rev. Maximus moves from an apology for Rome to an attack on the Monothelites in Constantinople, referring to the Ekphesis doctrine of one will in Christ. Lit.: "Romans". – Approx. translation In Latin. – Approx. translation For linguistic problems arising in rendering the relevant terminology in the debates surrounding the “procession” of the Holy Spirit “and from the Son” see Larchet 1998b., p. 52–56 (Larchet 2004, pp. 81–83). The essence of the problem is that the Latins often used for the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father (denoting His personal origin) the same verb - procedere - which they used to denote the manifestation or sending of the Holy Spirit through the Son, while the Greeks used for the first the verb ἐκπορεύεσθαι, and for the second - προϊέναι. From the text of the letter from St. Maximus, it is clear that, for all his apologetics for the Latins, he considers it necessary that they express themselves less ambiguously and bring terminological clarity to this issue. Nevertheless, as Larchet also shows there, among the Greek fathers the distinction between these terms did not always take place, and ultimately, understanding the thoughts of one or another father must stem from the context. Otherwise: “identification”. – Approx. translation Almost nothing is known about the personality of Theodore of Faran (Lurie 2006, p. 293). What exactly is his work does St. Petersburg have in mind? Maxim, also unknown. Some researchers (for example, F. Elert) suggest that this is the Preparation, inscribed with the name of Theodore Raifsky and which has come down to us (translation in: Theodore Raifsky 2003). A. I. Sidorov wrote a work devoted to the problem of identifying the author of the Preparation, in which he defends the Orthodoxy of this work and refutes the authorship of Theodore of Paran; in this context, he also discusses the testimony of St. Maxima in opusc. 10, characterizing it as follows: “We learn that Theodore of Faransky wrote a work devoted to problems of logic and similar in content to the second part of the “Preparation” from the letter of Maximus the Confessor to Marinus of Cyprus (PG 91, 136–137). Here Maxim says that he came across the work of Theodore of Faran, containing an analysis of the concepts of “essence”, “nature”, “hypostasis” and “person”, as well as “subsequent chapters”. According to Maxim, these “chapters serve their purpose well as an introduction.” However, in the section on person and hypostasis, as well as where we are talking about the norms that define these concepts, Theodore, “it seems,” follows himself, affirming the “hypostasis of energy” (ὑποστατικὴν λέγοντι τὴν ἐνέργειαν). And the “enemies” put forward Theodore as a teacher and defender of “their own opinion.” Further, Maximus says that the entire Ekphesis (union symbol of 638) is determined by the provisions expressed by Theodore of Parano, for with his “sayings he darkened and clouded the (Orthodox) teaching, attributing to the person as a person the energy that characterizes nature.” The excerpt from the message of Maximus the Confessor is remarkable in several respects. Firstly, it confirms the above assumption that Theodore of Faran was a “pro-Monophysit”-minded Orthodox bishop, or, in other words, simply a renegade in Orthodoxy (in fact, all Monothelitism was such a renegade). Secondly, the excerpt highlights very clearly the main point of disagreement between the Orthodox and Monothelites on the issue of the “energy” of Christ: the former considered “actions” to be correlated with “essences” (or “natures”), the latter correlated “energy” with the “face” (or “hypostasis”). It was on the thesis of the correlation of “energy” (and “will”) with nature that Maximus the Confessor built his entire anti-Monothelitian polemic. Finally, thirdly, the analyzed message of Maximus the Confessor serves as the strongest argument in favor of the hypothesis that the second part of the “Preparation” belonged to Theodore of Paran” (Sidorov 1991, pp. 135–167 cited from: http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=lib&id=313). Further A.I. Sidorov, analyzing the “Preparations”, proves that their author cannot be considered a monoenergist, as for Theodore of Faran, about whom St. writes. Maxim and who, obviously, lived in Sinai somewhat later than Theodore of Raifa, he, according to Sidorov, was one of the theologians who developed the philosophical apparatus of Christian theology, of which there were many in the 6th–7th centuries. In the Dispute with Pyrrhus, Theodore of Paran is spoken of as one of the most important ideologists and leaders of monoenergism even before the conclusion of the union by Cyrus (PG 91, 332–333). Theodore of Parano was condemned as one of the heresiarchs at the Lateran and VI Ecumenical councils. Or: “being done.” – Approx. translation Wed. in the Disputation in Visia (7): “No one acts as someone by hypostasis, but as something by nature. For example, Peter and Paul act, but not in the Petrine and Pauline way, but humanly, for both of them are people naturally according to the general definition of nature, and not hypostatically according to individual personal qualities. Also, Michael and Gabriel act, but not like Michael and Gabriel, but like angels. And thus in every nature, determined by a many number [of objects], we contemplate a general, and not a single action. So, whoever speaks of hypostatic action imagines the very nature, which is one, to be infinite in actions and in the multitude of indivisible [individuals] suitable for it, distinguished from itself, which if we recognize as true, then together with all nature we will destroy the image of being in it” (translated by M. D. Muretov according to: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 190). For an analysis of this passage, see Lurie 2006, p. 322. In the commented place opusc. 10 prp. Maximus connects the individual tropos of discovering natural energy and γνώμη: “the tropos of energy is discovered by [everyone] as someone, for example, Peter or Paul, imprinted by this [tropos] by intention (κατὰ γνώμην), whether in decreasing or incrementing order, one way or another.” At the same time, he speaks quite definitely about the state of people not in the life of the next century, but in this life, that is, about people who are not deified, who can “by intention” (κατὰ γνώμην) to a greater or lesser extent follow what is inherent in nature, for example, “justly or unjustly” (in other words, they can sin). This means that this passage cannot serve as proof that in the eschaton, due to the fact that individual differences take place there (of course they are there, since the angels are different from each other), γνώμη must also be preserved (cf. considerations on this in note 759 to the introductory article in the context of the dispute with Manoussakis). That is, it is important to emphasize that there is no cause-and-effect relationship between γνώμη and the presence of individual characteristics. The question of the connection between γνώμη and the morally neutral “stylistic” characteristics of a person, St. Maxim does not seem to discuss it either here or anywhere else, and seems to take the very presence of such features for granted. παρεγκλιθέντας. There are other readings in the manuscripts: παρεγκληθέντας, παρεκβληθέντας. We are talking about the teachings of monoenergists and monothelites, who attributed energy and will to the hypostasis. Unlike them, Rev. Maxim distinguishes between the logos of nature and the tropos of using or revealing this energy. The tropos (or method) can be greater or less in accordance with the logos of nature, which is the same for all bearers of a given nature. The concept of tropos in relation to hypostasis was transferred by St. A maxim from triadology to Christology and anthropology (Larchet 1998, pp. 85–86). Lit.: “notebooks” – Approx. translation Evidence that the letter was written in Carthage, which allows it to be dated to c. 645–646 It is impossible to say exactly which code and whose interpretation of the Gospel of John we are talking about (see below). Byzakia, mentioned further in the same sentence, is a city in Cyprus. According to Larcher, the present work is an excerpt from a letter written in Rome shortly after the Lateran Council (649), in which St. Maxim took an active part and was the inspiration of it. Along with the following theological and polemical work, opusc. 11, which contains the understanding of Rev. The maxim of the role of the Roman see is attracted by Catholic scholars (for example, J.-M. Garriges) as evidence of the great Orthodox father in favor of the doctrine of Roman primacy and infallibility. However, as Larchet insists (Larchet 1998, pp. 107–108; Larchet 1998b, pp. 154–157), consideration of this issue cannot be divorced from historical context. Read more about opusc. 11 in the context of the Roman primate problem in Larchet 1998b, p. 154–157 (translated in: Larcher 2004, pp. 195–197). See also chap. 20 of the introductory article to this edition. Larcher finds here a possible parallel with the conciliar message of the patriarchs. Sophronia (PG 87, 3188). Larcher rightly drew attention to the fact that Rev. Maxim speaks not about popes, but about the people, and this is not accidental. At the critical moment, when Pope Vitalian entered into communication with the heretic Patriarch Peter of Constantinople (in 657), St. Maxim, through his student Anastasius and the Greek monks in Cagliari, will turn, hoping that they will influence the pope, for support, to “the God-fearing and reliable, rock-like men of ancient Rome, who ... are always our defenders and ardent fighters for the truth”; However, in this letter Anastasius is not absolutely sure that Rome and even these “men of Rome” will retain the faith, but it is said that “they will receive a reward from the Lord if they preserve the Orthodox faith... and will not accept or approve anything other than it, whether greater or less, nothing except what is established by the holy fathers and councils” (Anast. ep. Cal. 5, trans. Z. A. Barzakh according to: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 205). That is, it cannot be said that St. Maximus professed the dogma of the infallibility of the Roman see and even the Roman Church (= the men of Rome). This refers to the five Ecumenical Councils and the Lateran, which, although not called Ecumenical here, is actually equal to them in importance. In the Russian translation by O. Nikolaeva there is a gross mistake: instead of “foundation” there is “cornerstone” (Larchet 2004, p. 196; 198), while in the New Testament Christ is called the cornerstone [1 Pet. 2:6], etc. Maximus would not have called the Roman See that way. He speaks simply of the foundation (θεμέλιον). Larchet's translation (Larchet 1998b, p. 155) does not contain this error. Larcher drew attention to the fact that Rev. Maxim does not use the future tense form here, as in Matthew 16:18: “they will not prevail” (οὐ κατισχύσουσιν), but in his polemic with Garrigues about this passage he himself is mistaken when he writes that “Maxime utilize prudemment le passé, et non le future comme J.-M. Garrigue dans sa traduction (Maxim wisely uses the past rather than the future, like J.-M. Garrigue in his translation)” (Larchet 1998b, p. 155). In fact, the form he uses is participium praesentis medio-passivi. St. Maxim transforms the quotation from Matthew 16:18 as follows: the future tense is replaced by the present, the active voice is replaced by the passive, the simple sentence is replaced by the participial phrase. Literal translation: “for, according to that promise of the Savior, she is not overcome by the gates of hell (κατισχυομένην).” Attitude of Rev. The maxim to the Roman Church is fully defined by his words that it “became and is still the support and foundation for all Christian Churches throughout the earth.” This is what took place in the past - from the founding of the Church to the present day. But he does not at all say that this will always be the case, therefore there is no basis to elevate his words to the dogma of the infallibility of the Roman Church, as Larchet says (Larchet 1998b, p. 157–158). Per. from Latin by Z. A. Barzakh, scientific edition by G. I. Benevich. This is a letter addressed to the exarch of Africa, illustration Peter (more about him: Maximus the Confessor 2007b, pp. 57–60) and dates from J.-C. Larchet, either late 643 or 644 (Larchet 1998, p. 73) survives in Latin passages translated by Anastasius the Librarian – PG 91, 141A–146A (PL 129, 573B–576D), so there is no certainty about its absolute authenticity (Larchet 1998b, p. 139–140; Larshe 2004, pp. 177–178). The letter is a response to Illustration Peter’s request about how the ex-patriarch of Constantinople Pyrrhus should be called and generally treated. The fact is that in one of his messages to Constantinople, Pope Theodore drew the attention of Patriarch Paul of Constantinople, who took Pyrrhus’ place, to the fact that he and his clergy still called Pyrrhus “most holy”, and demanded that Paul canonically remove Pyrrhus for his heresy (Mansi X. 702–708, in particular 704A and 707C). Since Illustrious Peter was in fact an official and ruler appointed by the authorities of Constantinople, he found himself in a difficult position and was perplexed as to which course he should follow in this matter - the See of Constantinople, which expressed (even after the removal) the greatest respect for Pyrrhus (the title “most holy” actually confirmed that his removal, which occurred as a result of a palace coup, was illegal), or the course of Pope Theodore and Rome. Peter turned to St. Peter with this difficult question. Maxim, whom, judging by a number of testimonies, he considered his Abba and adviser on spiritual issues (see for more details Larchet 1998b, p. 139–140 (there are a lot of errors in the translation of this place (Larchet 2004, p. 177–178); Maximus the Confessor 2007a, pp. 41–42, note 70 and p. 46, notes 88 and 89). It is clear that in this context, Rev. Maxim had an important reason to speak about the significance of the Roman See, which at that time was the only patriarchal see - the guardian of Orthodoxy throughout the world, which we see in this message. We are talking about Pyrrhus, once the abbot of the Chrysopolis monastery, the closest associate of the patriarch. Sergius of Constantinople, later Patriarch (20.XII.638–29.IX.641). After the change of power in Constantinople, Pyrrhus found himself in exile in Africa, but still enjoyed respect among the Monothelite community, in particular among the patriarchs. Paul (1.X.641–27.XII.653). In this environment, Pyrrhus, judging by this letter, was still called “most holy.” We're probably talking about Patr. Sergius of Constantinople (18.IV.610–9.XII.638), whom St. Maxim considered responsible for the publication of the imp. Irakli Ekfesis. St. Maxim, apparently, means that from the monoenergist Union of 633, through the efforts of St. Sophronius was “neutralized” by Psiphos, and before the publication of Ekphesis in 638, some time passed until the heresy of Sergius had yet manifested itself in full force and was not condemned by the church. At this time, the Orthodox did not break church communion with the hidden heretics. Perhaps the reason for such accusations against St. Sophronius of Jerusalem was his recognition of Psiphos, which prohibited the use of the expressions “one” and “two actions”. It is known, however, that St. Sophronius, in his district letter of 634, formally avoiding the expression “two energies,” unambiguously confessed divine and human action in Christ. Attitude of St. Sophrony to Ekphesis, who confirmed the ban on the expressions “one” and “two actions”, but rejected the expression “two wills” and professed one will in Christ - an open question. According to the hypothesis of Jankowiak and Booth, Patr. Sophronius Ekphesis signed, but according to the traditional version, he did not (see more details in the introductory article, Chapter 7). Depending on the solution to this issue, the commented passage can be understood. Probably this refers to the stay of St. Maxima with St. Sophronius in Carthage. It is interesting that Rev. Maximus describes the state of the Church during the period of Psiphos as peaceful and prosperous. Thus, even at the time of writing this letter, he does not consider the adoption of Psiphos by the Orthodox to be a mistake, although he also says that Sergius at that time was already secretly nurturing Ekphesis. Ekphesis. For more on the hypotheses regarding the edition of the Ekphesis and the stages of its establishment in the empire, see the introductory article, especially chapters 10 and 11. In the comments to this edition we use the more traditional version of the edition of the Ekphesis in 638, rather than the new Jankowiak-Booth version, which dates the Ekphesis to 636 and claims that it was signed by all the patriarchs, including Sophronius of Jerusalem. This version, which has not yet received general acceptance, is discussed in the introductory article. Var.: “services”. Most likely we are talking about imp. Irakli (610–11.II.641). Perhaps, Rev. Maximus hints that Sergius “enslaved” Heraclius by providing him with significant financial support on behalf of the Church during the war with the Persians (in fact, it was a loan, which the emperor more than returned after the victory). See: Kulakovsky 2004. T. 3, p. 54–55. We can, of course, only talk about the close relations between them that arose as a result of the services rendered by Sergius to Heraclius, since by the time the Ekphesis was published, Heraclius had long since defeated the Persians and paid off the Church. It is possible, however, that Rev. Maximus is not referring to a specific case of financial assistance, but to the political and ideological support that Sergius provided to Heraclius throughout his reign. Since Heraclius published Ekphesis. This refers to Pope John IV (24.XII.640–12.X.642), who, of course, could not be related to the publication of Ekphesis in 638; however, in Constantinople they could and did refer (see below) to another pope - Honorius (27.X.625–12.X.638), in whose letter of 634 to Patr. Sergius had the expression “one will” (St. Maxim writes about this below). Pope John IV, however, like St. Maxim, rejected the Monothelite interpretation of this expression. See for more details: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 33–41. We are talking about the Archbishop of Cyprus Arcadia. St. Maxim speaks highly of him in an essay sent to the Cypriot presbyter Marinus - opusc. 20: PG 91, 245BC. Pope Severin (28.V.640–2.VIII.640). Pope Theodore (24.XI.642–14.V. 649). Nine chapters of the union pact with the Theodosian Monophysites, concluded by Patr. Cyrus of Alexandria in 633 St. Maxim, following in this, apparently, St. Sophronius, compared monothelitism with Apollinarianism, which (albeit on different grounds) also taught about one will in Christ. We thank S. A. Zavyalov and A. M. Shufrin for their help in translating this difficult but very important passage. As the modern Romanian canonist V. Nicolae Dure writes, “the terms potestas and auctoritas are borrowed from Roman law; in Rome they replaced the old pastoral expressions, in particular cura and sollicitudo. The first two terms denoted the power of the highest person (head), and the second two corresponded to the dignity of the shepherd. Therefore, cura and sollicitudo did not apply to the pope, but at the same time applied to all bishops” (Duray 2006, p. 205). The translation of this passage by O. Nikolaeva in Larcher’s book (Larchet 2004, p. 180), apparently made from French, cannot be considered satisfactory, nor can the Russian translation of this passage in the text of the article: Garrigues 1985, p. 12). Another version of the translation, probably also from French, is given in the text of the article: Larcher 2006, p. 214. The original article is not available to us; we provide the Russian translation of the passage that interests us: “...St. Maximus even believes that the Roman Church is “the very incarnate Word of God, which [probably means the Church. - G.B.], just like all holy councils, according to sacred rules and definitions, has received and possesses everything for the sake of everything more than other churches on earth, has primacy, authority and the power to bind and decide.” The inaccuracy of this translation is obvious, see the Latin text: Nam frustra solummodo loquitur, qui mihi similes suadendos ac subripiendos putat, et non satisfacit et implorat sanctissimae Romanorum Ecclesiae beatissimum papam, id est apostolicam sedem, quae ab ipso incarnato Dei Verbo, sed et omnibus sanctis synodis, secundum sacros canones et terminos, universarum, quae in toto 576C terrarum orbe sunt, sanctarum Dei Ecclesiarum in omnibus et per omnia percepit et habet imperium, auctoritatem et potestatem ligandi atque solvendi. Cum hoc enim ligat et solvit etiam in coelo Verbum, quod coelestibus virtutibus principatur. We cannot, following J.-C. Larche, dwell on the view of the Venerable expressed here. Maximus in place of the Roman See in the Church. Let's just say that the significance of the Roman See for St. Maxim, as can be seen from this passage and a number of places in the opusc. 11 and Letter A (translated in: Maxim the Confessor 2007b, pp. 253–256 and notes thereto), was undoubtedly exceptional. It seems that this is not just about what for St. Maximus The Roman throne was “first among equals,” which is generally accepted for Eastern Orthodox ecclesiology, but in reality it refers to primacy, which consists “in ensuring the unity of the Church in true faith and canonical discipline” (this formula, which, in our opinion, coincides with the position of St. Maximus, is taken from an article by the Greek scholar Vlasiodas Fidas: Fidas 2006, p. 88). Moreover, according to A. M. Shufrin, this place from opusc. 12 should be understood in the sense of analogy: Rome is to the other Churches as the Word is to the heavenly powers. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the high calling of Rome placed on him a great responsibility, and his leadership loses all meaning if Rome ceases to stand in the true faith. St. Maxim, as can be seen from his reaction to the betrayal of Pope Vitalian, who accepted the heretical confession of Patriarch Peter of Constantinople, was far from believing in the infallibility of Rome. Ultimately, as is known, Rev. Maximus called the Catholic Church “the right and saving confession” (Maximus the Confessor 2007a, p. 199). Only if Rome stands in this confession does it occupy a primary place in the Church with the associated powers and rights. An early treatise, written around 626–627, as Larche believes, in Crete, where St. Maximus did not live long and entered into polemics with the Monophysite bishops (Larchet 1998b, p. 19). The treatise is analyzed in detail in Piret 1983, p. 108–153. πῶς we leave without translation. The appearance of this word is probably a copyist's mistake. – Approx. translation In the Greek text μὴ λέγοντα - “does not speak.” The particle μὴ probably resulted from a scribal error. – Approx. translation The work was written around 640 in the context of polemics with Monothelitism (Larchet 1998, p. 33), but bears the imprint of polemics with Monophysites and Nestorians and represents a series of definitions of the main concepts that St. Maxim uses in this controversy. This circumstance should be kept in mind, since in other contexts the Rev. Maxim, not to mention other Orthodox theologians, these concepts can be used somewhat differently or completely differently. An earlier work that gives definitions of basic concepts is opusc. 23 (626–633). The work was written, apparently, in the context of polemics with the Monophysites, if it belongs to St. Maxim. The first part of this work, where definitions of the main concepts are given, almost entirely coincides with a passage from Leontius of Byzantium (Leont. Byz. сontr. Nest. et Eutych.: PG 86, 1277D–1280A). The identification of essence and nature, dating back to the Cappadocian fathers, was a common place in anti-Monophysite polemics (see, for example, in the treatise Against the Monophysites by Emperor Justinian - Justinian. contr. monophys . 169.5) and was due to the fact that Monophysites often identified nature and hypostasis. Otherwise: “is a predicate of many things.” – Approx. translation The words “and never, and in no respect” can be considered as a polemic against the Monophysite doctrine of private natures (about it, see: Lurie 2006, p. 139; 334). D. Battrellos recently entered into controversy with Larcher and other researchers, arguing that St. Maximus, and in the Leontief Corpus the “private” human nature is confessed in Christ (Batrellos 2004, pp. 102–103; on the Leontief Corpus, see ibid, pp. 39–54). Larcher responded in a detailed review of this book in Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique 101/2 (2006), p. 202–205 (cf. Lurie 2006, pp. 349; 525). We leave this word here in Greek, since its translation is already one or another interpretation of it, while there is a heated debate around the understanding of this term and how to correctly translate it, in which Russian and Ukrainian patrolologists have recently joined. One of the translation options – “hypostatic” – is justified in the article: Govorun 2006, p. 655–665. The conclusions of this article are disputed in the article: Glushchenko 2009, p. 4–26. The term ἐνυπόστατον is discussed in many places in the collection dedicated to Leontius of Byzantium and the Leontief Corpus, with which the technical use of the term in Christology is usually associated (see Leontius of Byzantium 2006, pp. 156, 248, 251, 279, 288, 297, 301–309, 371, 376, 381, 387, 438, 474–478, 529–533, 594–613, 632, 635, 646, 654–665). See also the report presented at the XVI International Conference of Patristic Studies (Oxford, August 8–13, 2011) by Hieromonks Cyril and Methodius (Zinkovsky): The term “ἐνυπόστατον” and its theological meaning (see Russian text and discussion of the report on the Bogoslov.ru website: http://www.bogoslov.ru/text/1991254.html). It seems to us that the translation of ἐνυπόστατον as “enhypostatic” (or similarly using the prefix “in”) in relation to the Christological context of St. Maxim can be considered acceptable (bearing in mind his definition of “existing in individuals”), remembering, however, that this term emphasizes the reality of existence (historically the first meaning of the word ἐνυπόστατον - really existing, real) as opposed to only mental existence (we are talking primarily about human nature in Christ). Thus, the general meaning of the first meaning is: “the general that actually exists in individuals.” D. A. Chernoglazov proposed to translate ἐνυπόστατον as “being in hypostasis” (see the use of this translation in 153A), however, it should be remembered that this concept also has a second meaning, see below note. 492 and text. A. R. Fokin gives this translation of this and the following definition of St. Maxim: “The hypostatic is universal in essence, that is, a species that independently and truly exists in individuals, and is not contemplated only mentally. In other words, the hypostatic is also that which is united and composed with something else, different from it in essence, forming one person and one hypostasis, being in no way cognizable in itself” (Leontius of Byzantium 2006, p. 661, note 33). The second definition of ἐνυπόστατον is, of course, intended to describe the “human component” in a Christological context. Human nature is hypostatic in Christ. Two definitions of prp. The maxims are pointed: the first - against the Monophysites, since it emphasizes the reality of the existence of human nature in Christ (and not just by imagination, as, according to the Orthodox, the Monophysites said), the second - against the Nestorians, since it emphasizes that human nature in Christ does not form a separate hypostasis (does not exist on its own), but finds its existence in the hypostasis of the Son of God incarnate, which it forms, being combined with the Divine nature, and is known in this hypostasis, and not somehow separately. At St. Maximum human nature in Christ is not hypostatic (otherwise it would be unreal), but it also does not form a special hypostasis (otherwise it would be independent), but is hypostatic (or exists in hypostasis). Understanding St. The maxim of the term ἐνυπόστατον in opusc. 14 differs significantly from its understanding in the Chalcedonian author of the Leontief corpus De Sectis (second half of the 6th century): “the hypostatic is called hypostatic in two ways: in connection with the fact that it exists, and in connection with the fact that it exists in itself, like Peter and Paul” (PG 86, 1240D) (however, this does not mean that in other contexts St. Maximus does not use this concept in the senses specified in De Sect is). In the context of polemics with the Monophysites and Monothelites ἐνυπόστατον by St. Maxim is not used in the sense of “existent in itself”, this is what hypostasis is for him. The appropriateness of translating ἐνυπόστατον with the word “hypostatic” in these contexts by St. The maxim is also visible from other places in his Theological and Polemical Works (let us take as an example one of the passages translated by V.V. Petrov: “the fact that [nature] is not hypostatic does not make it itself a hypostasis, but only a hypostatic one, so that it should not be perceived only mentally, as incidental, but must be seen as a really [existing] species. And in the same way, the fact that [hypostasis] is not insubstantial does not yet make it an essence, but shows it as realized, so that it is cognized not as simply special, but as truly [existing] together with what this special [is] in” (opusc. 16: PG 91, 205AB, trans. V.V. Petrov according to: Petrov 2008, p. 33)). The concept of essential or natural unity was widely used by St. Cyril of Alexandria (see, for example, Cyr. Al. in Joan. 2.477.6; 3.1.9; 3.3.13). St. Maximus, in the context of polemics with the Monophysites and Monothelites, interprets this concept in such a way as to use it in defending the position of the Chalcedonites (cf. later the same strategy, although a different interpretation in Joan. Dam. exp. fid. 47.66). St. Maximus obviously contrasts the essential unity that takes place in the Holy Trinity with the essential difference in Christ. The identification of hypostasis and person, going back to the Cappadocian fathers, was finally consolidated in the Chalcedonian oros, which St. Maxim. This identification allows us to get rid of the Nestorian logic, according to which the presence of human nature in Christ entailed the existence of a human “face.” The face of Christ among the Chalcedonians is one, as is the hypostasis, which does not negate the presence of individual characteristics of human nature in Christ, which it received in the hypostasis of the Son of God, but excludes it - which is important for St. The maxim in the context of the polemic with the Monothelites is the presence of “intention” (gnomes), which characterizes each “person” of rational nature in an undeified state. Or: “essential.” – Approx. translation τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας – lit.: “common [element] of essence.” – Approx. translation The definition is directed against the Monophysites, in particular against Sevier, who taught, as St. Petersburg understood it. Maxim, that in Christ there were properties of human nature, but it is impossible to talk about the reality in Him of human nature = essence, along with the Divine (opusc. 19: PG 91, 221A). Just like the concept of “hypostatic”, “essential” in St. The maxim is intended to emphasize reality as opposed to what exists only in thought. In the context of the controversy surrounding monoenergism and monothelitism, the doctrine of the reality of human nature, which has its natural energy and will in Christ, became especially relevant. Lit.: “different by the difference of nature.” – Approx. translation Again an argument against the Monophysites. St. Maxim establishes the concept of one-hypostasis by analogy with the concept of one-hypostasis - things of the same essence differ from each other in hypostasis, i.e. the concept of one-hypostasis implies a strict difference of hypostases with the identity of essence, in a similar way, one-hypostasis “things” have one hypostasis, but are strictly different in essence. According to Rev. Maximus, the Nestorian Christological “model” presupposes a relative unity of human nature with the Divine in Christ, and not a hypostatic one. He calls the Nestorians those “who professed relative (ἐν σχέ- σει) gnomic unity” (opusc. 15: PG 91, 172C-D). Elsewhere in the same treatise, St. Maximus characterizes the position of Nestorius, referring to his work as follows: ““they are united not in essence, but in intention (γνώμῃ); therefore we see that these [natures] have one will, one energy and one power (δεσποτεία)” (opusc. 15.: PG 91, 176A). In other words, natures agree with each other in “intentions”, which allows for the possibility of sin. In the Orthodox Christological model, this is impossible, since human nature is deified due to hypostatic unity with the Divine. In the original: εἰς ὅλου τινός, which is unacceptable for the Greek language. Apparently the text is corrupted. – Approx. translation Otherwise: “in eidos.” – Approx. translation Here the two understandings of ἐνυπόστατον are given in reverse order compared to the definitions in 152A. Otherwise: “materialized”. – Approx. translation Otherwise: “immaterial”. – Approx. translation The definition is repeated with minor changes in Ps.-Zonar (Ps.-Zonar. lexic. 723.26). Wed. second sentence with the words of St. Gregory of Nyssa: “πᾶσα γὰρ ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς ἐστιν ἀποτέλεσμα (for all energy is the result of ability)” (Gr. Nyss. de orat. dom.orat.v 260.30). From the comparison it is clear that St. Maxim adds a clarification to the definition: “natural” (ability), which is essential for his polemics with the monoenergist Chalcedonites - each nature has its own energy. Wed. this entire paragraph with a later definition: “Activity is a natural ability in its full implementation. So, activity depends on ability, and ability depends on essence. After all, activity (= energy) arises from ability, and ability - from essence and in essence” (opusc. 1: PG 91, 33A). In this definition, Rev. Maxim resorts to the classic triad: essence-ability-action. As for the first sentence of the commented paragraph from opusc. 14, then its meaning is not clear to us; perhaps the copyist made a mistake here, since this is action (energy), according to St. Maxim, is the realization of ability, and not vice versa, as comes from the phrase: “Ability (δύναμις) is materialized (ἔνυλος) energy.” In correspondence with us, J.-C. Larcher agreed that “one would expect the opposite: energy is a materialized ability, and ability is immaterial (or: immaterialized) energy,” and expressed the opinion that “there is a problem with authenticity in this work and others containing definitions (it is possible that some of the definitions are taken from other authors). Only a critical edition can give a definitive answer." Wed. this is a definition with a later one in opusc. 1: PG 91, 12C. Or: “spontaneous (αὐθαίρετος) impulse (ὁρμή) and movement (κίνησις) of the mind (τοῦ λογισμοῦ) towards one or the other.” Lurie, translating this definition, makes a mistake by translating ἐφ̉ ἑκάτερα as “individual”: “gnomic will is a spontaneous individual desire and movement of the mind” (Lurie 2006, p. 395), which for him is proof of the statement that ““gnomic will”... is a natural will that has received “gnomic” location in the individual” (Ibid.). Despite this error in translation, in general, Lurie’s thesis that the gnomic will characterizes a person or hypostasis (and therefore an individual) is confirmed by the words of St. Maxim: “And [gnomic will] is a spontaneous impulse (αὐθαίρετος ὁρμή), inclined towards one of two [possibilities]. It is decisive not for nature, but, truly, for person and hypostasis” (opusc. 16: PG 91, 192C). The expression αὐθαίρετος ὁρμή is found in Didymus the Blind (Didym. Caec. fragm. in Psalm. Fr. 146.18). At St. Maxim, even before the Theological and Polemical Works, this expression is found in the Questions and Answers of Thalassius in a remarkable context, where we are talking about overcoming, by the Providence of God, the sinful gnomic division of rational creatures: “God, through [His] Providence, likens particular [creatures] to the whole (πρὸς τὰ καθόλου τῶν μερικῶν) until it unites through the movement towards well-being their self-willed desire (τὴν αὐθαίρετον ὁρμήν) with their natural, more general logos (τῷ γενικωτέρῳ λόγῳ) rational essence, and will not make them identically moving and consonant with each other and the whole so that the particulars do not have a gnomic difference in relation to the whole (τὴν γνωμικὴν πρὸς τὰ καθόλου τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους διαφοράν), but so that the same logos is contemplated by everyone, without being shared (διαιρούμενος) by the troposes of those in whom it equally affects (τοῖς τῶν καθ’ ὧν ἴσως κατηγορεῖται τρόποις), and until He truly reveals the grace that deifies everyone” (Thal. 2.12–22, trans. V.V. Petrova according to Petrov 2008, p. 27). Moreover, later, in opusc. 1: PG 91, 24D-25A, prp. Maxim emphasizes that even in the state of deification, with a single mode of existence for all (with deactivated deliberate choice, and therefore “gnomes”), each of the saints still retains his individual way (tropos) of communion with God, corresponding to his measure of love and the grace he receives (more details in Chapter 21 of the introductory article to this edition). Actually, in the above passage from Thal. 2 does not speak of the absence of troposes characterizing each hypostasis, but only that these troposes should not separate the single logos of nature (which can only be the case when “one follows to a greater extent what is [inherent] by nature, and the other does not follow it” (opusc. 10: PG 91, 137B)), i.e., in the presence of a gnomic division between the hypostases. The concept of “gnomic will” is found in the treatise of Ps.-Cyril On the Holy Trinity, which was written after the writings of St. Maxima (Cyr. Al. de trin. [Sp.]: PG 77, 1160.45). In this treatise, like St. Maxim, the gnomic will refers to the created hypostasis and it is argued that Christ did not have a gnomic will, which would be associated with weighing and considering various possibilities, since this would mean the presence of ignorance in Christ (ibid, 1161.4–6). But the same author says that “dwarfs” are also understood in another sense - a simple inclination towards the object of desire (ibid, 1160.57–59). Otherwise, “points to the way of being, to the as-being.” – Approx. translation Definitions of prp. Maxima repeats St. St. almost unchanged. John of Damascus. See Joan. Dam. Fragmenta philosophica (e cod. Oxon. Bodl. Auct. T.1.6).10. The translation of this work was made while working on the project “Palestinian Orthodox philosophical and theological tradition of the 6th-9th centuries,” carried out with the support of the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Foundation. Project No. 11–63–00001a/P. The real “dogmatic tomos” was written by St. Maximus in Rome ca. 646–647 (Larchet 1998, p. 104). Around this time, Rev. Maxim moved to Rome from Carthage and settled in one of the Roman monasteries, in which monks of Greek origin, immigrants from Palestine, probably lived. At the Palestinian monastery of St. Savva had his own monastery-monastery in Rome, and St. Sophronius of Jerusalem had long-standing relations with Rome, established from the time of his stay in Rome with St. John Moschus (Andia 2000, p. 285). According to the traditional version of St. Sophronius, before his death in 638, sent the Palestinian bishop Stephen of Dorsk to Rome, where Orthodoxy is preserved, admonishing him to seek support in the fight against the heresy that had spread in the east of the empire (Mansi X. 896BC). In 647, Pope Theodore, a Greek monk from Palestine by origin, sent bishop. Stephen to Palestine as apostolic vicar to restore the Orthodox hierarchy (Larchet 1998b, p. 154, n. 108 and publisher's note in PG 91, 153). For other versions of Stephen's mission, see the introductory article to this edition, chap. 7 and regarding opusc. 15 in ch. 19. Dogmatic Tomos, written by St. Maxim Bishop Stephen, who at the time of writing was apparently already in Palestine and asked for help from there, was supposed to serve as an aid for the latter in polemics with the Monothelites in Palestine. Opusc. 15 contains a kind of anti-Monothelitian florilegium, which was partially included in the famous work Doctrina Patrum, compiled either by St. Anastasius Sinaite, or Anastasius, a student of St. Maxima. Quotes from this florilegium were used at the Lateran Council and at the Sixth Ecumenical Council, although the present florilegium is not identical to the one that was compiled specifically for the Lateran Council by Greek monks (including, probably, St. Maximus) who lived in Rome and prepared its materials. Lit.: “sacred.” The translation is intended to convey the play on words. – Approx. translation In fact, Bp. Stefan, as was said in approx. 514, was sent from Jerusalem to Rome by Patriarch Sophronius, but the name of the message, which probably does not belong to St. Maxim, and was given by the Roman editor of his works, reflects the position of the bishop. Stephen as vicar apostolic. Characteristic for St. Maxim is an anagogical interpretation of Holy Scripture, in this case the New Testament. He interprets the words of Christ, which literally refer “to the time” of the Coming of God and the Judgment, in relation to the present, in the horizon of the “last times” already taking place and the ongoing visit of God, which delights the one who, through contemplation, is detached from the cycle of the created world, and through action - from repose in the bliss (i.e., pampering pleasure) of the passions. φιλομετέωρον: a rare word not recorded in the TLG. – Approx. translation In ed. Minya ἐπιποθέστερον (very desirable), but this word seems to us to be an error that arose during correspondence, since such a translation violates the logic of the thought of the saint. Maxima. – Approx. translation Another example of using prp. The maxim of the principle tantum is quantum (see note 101). In the original: “I don’t kiss by nature.” – Approx. translation Greg. Naz. ep. 101.32.2. The translation is approximate. The text is probably corrupted. – Approx. translation Beginning with a reference to Mark 7:24, the same examples from Scripture are given in the message of Pope Agathon to Emperor Constans (see transl. Acts 1996. Vol. 4, p. 39). This means St. Athanasius of Alexandria. St. Maximus quotes a passage from a work attributed to St. Athanasius of Alexandria, known under the title “On the Appearance of God the Word in the Flesh and Against the Arians” (21); see pre-revolutionary Russian translation in: Afanasy Alexandrisky 1994, T. 3, p. 273). For the attribution of this work, see note. 309. At St. Gregory the Theologian: “not by the One Who Descended.” St. Maxim replaces the preposition παρά with περί. – Approx. translation At St. Gregory the Theologian: “on behalf of a person” - see previous note. Greg. Naz. De filio (or. 30) 12.1–8, trans. with changes from the edition: Gregory the Theologian 1994. T. 1, p. 436. About the use of this passage by St. Maxim, see note. 256. Greg. Nyss. in Christ. Resurr. or. i. Greg. Nyss. opera, vol. 9.1 (ed. E. Gebhardt) 9.292.14–16. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. 179.15. Greg. Nyss. contr. Apollo. 3.1:181.18–25. Joan. Chrys. de consubstantiali (= Contra Anomoeos, hom. 7): PG 48, 755.48. Joan. Chrys. de consubstantiali (Contra Anomoeos, homilia 7): PG 48, 765.46–766.29, trans. with significant changes according to: John Chrysostom. T. I, Book. 1, p. 376. Worn like clothing. – Approx. translation Cyr. Al. thesaur.: PG 75, 397.8–10. This part of the quote from St. Kirill is noticeably distorted. – Approx. translation Cyr. Al. in Joan. 1.496.1–4. Quote from St. Sevirian of Gavalsky is also contained in Doctrina Patrum: 119.13, a work compiled after the writing of Opusc. St. Maxim, probably using them, since many of the quotations given in Doctrina Patrum coincide with quotations from St. Maxima. In Doctrina Patrum, his publisher Franz Descamps also indicates the source of the quotation - Sever. Gabal. hom. 9, which survives in the Armenian translation of the Venetian edition of 1827. Here Rev. Maxim somewhat simplifies his teaching, in accordance with the patristic quotations that he cites, and the immediate needs of the polemic - to prove the presence of two natural wills in Christ. In his other writings, he expresses a more subtle teaching, according to which the acceptance of the Cross for the sake of our salvation was desired by Christ and according to the deified human will. Disgust from death was freely demonstrated in the Gethsemane prayer. Lit.: “from different (different) essences.” In the Latin original diversae potestatis (note in Min's edition). Ambr. Med. expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam, lib.10: PL 15, 1820.60. The passage is a commentary on Luke 22:42. Wed. Cyrill. Hierοs. homilia aquae in vinum conversae (fragmenta) [Sp.] 93.12; Wed Cyr. Al. in Lucam (in catenis): PG 72, 937.7. Leo. ep. 28.4, Wed. approx. 349. It was not possible to find an essay by Chrysostom that began with such words. συγκροτεῖ: otherwise – “saves”, “collects”. Allusion to Mark 12:42: “And Jesus sat opposite the treasury...” – Approx. translation Doctrina Patrum 91.20–93.12, a quotation also used at the Lateran Council. Joan. Chrys. in sanctum Thomam apostolum [Sp.]: PG 59, 500.10–14, cf. Doctrine Patrum 101.10. Cyr. Al. thesaur.: PG 75, 105.17–19. Translation option: “After all, if with complete unity in hypostasis without merging (ἀσυγχύτως) there is no idea of ​​the essential difference of the united [natures] themselves and their inherent [properties], then there will be no idea of ​​the logos of [their] unity without merging.” – Approx. translation The following are examples representing the confessions of two opposing teachings in relation to the Orthodox confession - Apollinarian-Monophysite and Nestorian. Quoted in: Greg. Nyss. contr. Apollon. „Gregorii Nysseni opera, vol. 3.1“, ed. Mueller, F. v. 3.1.179.14–16. St. Maxim could have taken a quote from this work. The text appears to be corrupted. See Min’s note: “In the essay entitled “The Phenomenon Itself...”: by suggest. Agathonis (we are talking about the work of Pope Agathon - D. Ch.) is different and better: “On the appearance of the incarnation of God the Word,” which was probably the title of the book. What is contained in Maxim’s letter are the first words of the treatise. Perhaps Maxim originally wrote more fully: “in an essay entitled “On the Appearance of the Incarnation of God the Word,” [beginning with the words] “The Appearance itself...”.” Thus, scribes often shorten what the authors wrote, sometimes without any reason.” – Approx. translation Apollinaris, Lietzmann 1905. Fr. 108–109, p. 233. On the theology of Apollinaris in the context of the controversy surrounding monothelitism, see Hovorun 2008, p. 6–9. Lit.: “with the perfection of the flesh.” – Approx. translation Fr. 173–174. Apollinare et altri 1978, p. 527. Wed. Mansi X. 1116b. Fr. 175. Apollinare e altri 1978, p. 528. About Themistia and its position in the context of the problems of monoenergism and monothelitism, see: Hovorun 2008, p. 30–34. This refers to the wife of Emperor Justinian, Theodora. Theodosius of Alexandria is the head of the Monophysite party, with whom the agnoite (and also Monophysite) Alexandrian deacon Themistius was in polemics. The Tomos of Theodosius, addressed to Theodora, dates back to 538, it was written in Constantinople, where Theodosius was in honorable imprisonment under the patronage of Theodora. Here, obviously, a dispute broke out between him and Themistius (for more information about this dispute and the text of the Tomos of Theodosius, see: Van Roey, Allen 1994, p. 3–57). For the use of this fragment from Themistius in the Lateran and Sixth Ecumenical Councils, see Van Roey and Allen 1994, p. 6. From the fragment it follows that Theodosius accused Themistius (based on the latter’s teaching about the ignorance of Christ according to the flesh, derived from polemics with the teachings of Julian of Halicarnassus) of having a doctrine of two knowledge, two actions and wills, but Themistius denies this, arguing that in Christ - as a single hypostasis - there is one knowledge, will and action (Van Roey, Allen 1994, p. 12). Themistius claims that he correctly interprets the teaching of the Areopagite about the Divine and masculine action. κατὰ τὴν θέλησιν – otherwise: “relative to the will.” – Approx. translation For the use of this fragment from Themistius in Doctrina patrum, materials of the Lateran and Sixth Ecumenical Councils, see Van Roey, Allen 1994, p. 6. As Govorun notes, Themistius justified the unity of the action and will of Christ by the unity of His hypostasis; a single action, following Sevier, he called “God-manly” (Hovorun 2008, p. 31). Nestoriana, 224.5–10 (ed. Loofs). Probably Rev. Maxim is the only source of this and the following fragment. Do they belong to Nestorius or are they an exposition of St. The maxim of his teaching is an open question, as is whether Nestorius really said that the natures in Christ are united “by intention (γνώμῃ),” i.e., he used exactly this term. Nestorian philosopher and theologian who lived in the second half of the 6th century. at the court of Khosroes I, author of commentaries on Aristotle. Lit.: “invading.” – Approx. translation Formally, hereinafter the subject is “unity,” i.e., a new unity of heretics, namely the heresy of the Monothelites. However, since further Rev. Maxim quotes or sets out Ekphesis in his own words and polemicizes with him (as stated in the title of opusc. 15), here and further, for the sake of greater clarity of the text, we insert the word Ekphesis. It is interesting, however, that Rev. Maxim does not call him as such, perhaps because he wanted to place responsibility for this heresy not on the imp. Heraclius, who published Ekphesis, and on Patr. Sergius and his companions. Strictly speaking, in the Ekphesis there is no confession of one energy; moreover, disputes about one and two energies are prohibited in it (Ekth. (ed. Allen), p. 214 = Mansi X. 991 and the introductory article to this edition). But St. Maxim still considers Ekphesis to be monoenergetic and proves this below. He analyzes the argumentation of Ekphesis and shows that, on the one hand, one will is introduced by him with reference to supposedly available evidence from the holy fathers; on the other hand, it is said that two energies introduce two wills. But this statement in Ekphesis precedes the thesis of one will with reference to the fathers. Thus, along with the thesis of one will, the doctrine of one energy is also affirmed, although apparently Ekphesis prohibits talking about one energy, as well as about two. Otherwise: “what follows.” – Approx. translation Full quote from approx. 529. Full quote from approx. 532. Full quotes from approx. 535, 536. Full quotes from approx. 538, 539. Full quotes from approx. 541, 543. Full quote from approx. 544. In the original περὶ μιᾶς ὁμολογίας - “about one confession.” The text is probably corrupted. From the context (see 165C) it is clear that instead of ὁμολογίας one should read ἐνεργείας. – Approx. translation Full quote from approx. 547. Full quote from approx. 548. Full quote from approx. 549. Full quote from approx. 551. Full quote from approx. 555. Quoted from Ekphesis, ACO 2.1.160.4–29. Lit.: “in their opinion, initial for them,” i.e. for wills - τὰς... ἡγουμένας. – Approx. translation Full quote from approx. 561. We read φησαμένους ("affirmed") instead of φυσωμένους ("puffed up", "puffed up") - the first option, more suitable in meaning, is found in the full version of the same quotation (172A). – Approx. translation Full quote from approx. 562. Quotes from Themistia are in full in approx. 568, 570. Full quote from approx. 571. Full quote from approx. 572. Perhaps a hint that Paul, as a Nestorian, was close to a certain kind of “dualism” (not Zoroastrian, of course, but the corresponding inability to unite two natures in Christ). There was a widespread tradition (recorded in Monophysite and Islamic sources) that Paul converted to Zoroastrianism at the end of his life, but this is distrusted in modern scholarship (Teixidor 1996, p. 509, n. 1). We read μονάδι instead of μοναδικῆς, as in the fuller version of the quotation (see above). – Approx. translation Full quote from approx. 575. He considers heretics to be saints, and saints to be heretics. – Approx. translation Or: “identity of will.” This refers to the reference in Ekphesis to Nestorius, where it is said that even the wicked Nestorius “did not dare to talk about two wills (θελήματα), but on the contrary, glorified the identity of the will (ταὐτοβουλίαν) of two persons he invented” (Mansi X. 991). It is not our task to analyze the teachings of Nestorius and his associates. Let us refer only to N. N. Seleznev’s most favorable presentation of his teaching for Nestorius: “he teaches about two natures, two knomes of the One and one will of Christ, the Son of God” (Seleznev 2005, p. 56). The same author speaks very positively about the “grand ecumenical project” of Imp. Heraclius, on the reconciliation of the Churches “on the basis of the recognition of one will” in Christ; It was this confession that Heraclius heard from the lips of the Nestorian Catholicos Ishoyav II (Ibid., p. 50). It is all the more interesting that at the Monothelite Council of 662, St. Maximus was accused of Nestorianism, and this accusation was repeated by Macarius of Antioch, who was condemned at the Sixth Ecumenical Council. Probably the Monothelite Chalcedonians, who accused him of Nestorianism, believed that the teaching of St. Maximus introduces two persons with two wills (for which Nestorius was condemned), but the Nestorians, who professed one will, in their opinion, actually (if not formally, then in essence) departed from the confession of two persons (or hypostases) in Christ, and it was already possible to enter into communication with them, as the emperor did. Irakli. In all these reasonings of the Monothelites, the will turns out to be a property of the person, and not of nature, as was the case with St. Maxima. Otherwise: “reason”, “foundation”. – Approx. translation Otherwise: “way”, “way”. – Approx. translation A difficult place to understand. Perhaps, Rev. Maximus means that the reason for the emergence of heresy is not the lack of correct confession among the previous fathers (the heretics argued that the fathers did not write about the two actions, but Maximus, with the help of numerous examples, proved that this was not so), but the incorrect way (tropos) of its interpretation by the current (and former) heretics. To express his thoughts, Rev. Maxim uses a conceptual apparatus that he developed within the framework of triadology, Christology and anthropology (where the “logos of nature” and the “tropos of existence” are distinguished). By “superfluous” (τὸ περιττόν) may be meant the desire to ensure the unity of Christ through the concept of one will and energy. This is unity, from the point of view of St. Maxim, is ensured by the doctrine of the perception of human nature into the hypostasis of the Logos, which exists in it in an inseparable and unmerged unity with the Divine. What the heretics say. – Approx. translation We read ἐπικαλύπτων (“covering” - see also below, in the same phrase: συγκάλυψιν “hiding”) instead of ἐπικάμπτων (“bending”). – Approx. translation St. Maxim, obviously, addresses the bishop. Stefan Dorsky. ἐπιλόξων – the word is not recorded in the LSJ and Lampe dictionaries. – Approx. translation Here Rev. Maxim gives his characteristic spiritual interpretation of the words of Christ, warning against accepting the Antichrist, which in this interpretation is the false confession of Christ, that is, heresy. He who accepts heresy accepts the Antichrist; apocalyptic events are perceived as happening now (cf. note 517). In the original ἀκριβοῦντων - apparently the text is corrupted. – Approx. translation Larchet believes that the treatise was written a little later than 643 (Larchet 1998, p. 58). The addressee of the message is unknown. In the message of St. Maximus discusses the teachings of a certain pious monk (see 185D), but there is reason to believe that he is talking about his own teachings. The text of this work, presented in Patrologia graeca, contains many dark passages, the meaning of which will not be clarified until a critical edition appears. In the notes we draw attention to such places. The main ideas of this work, as well as its dating, are discussed by us in the introductory article in Chapter. 16. On the concept of satiety and the controversy with Origenism in this context, see note. 100. Another example of use by St. The maxim of the formula tantum is quantum (see note 101). Doing evil. – Approx. translation Wed. interpretation of St. Maxim on 1 Corinthians 15:26: The last enemy to be destroyed is death. “This [will happen] when we completely surrender to God (τῷ θεῷ παραχωρήσωμεν) autocratic will (or: “free will” (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον θέλημα)" (qu. dub. 22). Only such a free surrender of our autocracy to God makes us free from the “law of sin” and the power of the devil and death. As is clear from the commented passage opus. The ever-moving rest of the mind in God is a steadily identical movement around the same One and Only under the action of God himself (see Thal. 65: PG 90, 757C–760A and Larchet 1996, p. 667). One of the earliest developments of the doctrine of such movement is found in qu. dub. 129, where prp. Maximus says: “enlightened through knowledge, having opened the mental part of the soul inseparably to God by the equal identity of movement and having found inexpressible joy in the constant enjoyment of divine beauty, how can one accept the opposite [of this joy] of sadness?” (translated by D. A. Chernoglazov according to: Maxim Confessor 2010, p. 157). This passage is clear evidence that in a relatively late work, and not only during the period of writing the Difficulties to John, St. Maxim believed that the exit from the state of wavering intention characterizes the state of holiness not only after death, but also in earthly life (see discussion of this issue in note 142). Wed. Τhal. 6. Otherwise: “by your own deeds.” – Approx. translation Wed. approx. 26 and 27 and their text. The first part of this definition is similar to what was found in the opusc written earlier (c. 640). 14: PG 91, 153A: “Natural will (θέλημα φυσικόν) is the essential attraction (ἔφεσις) of [something] to that which [is] by nature its constituents (συστατικῶν).” Or: “willed.” Opponents of the diophelites sought to identify will and volition with the object of desire (desired, willed), so that, based on the assertion that the object of desire for Christ as a single hypostasis is one, they could conclude that He must also have one will. St. Maxim, on the contrary, insists on the need to distinguish between all concepts. He makes a more detailed distinction later in opusc. 1. Rough translation: “the process of desire – the determination of desire.” – Approx. translation Rough translation: “process of movement – ​​determination of movement.” – Approx. translation Greg. Naz. or. 29:6.25. To understand the context of the thought of St. Maxim, let us quote the entire passage from St. Gregory, which he means (we are talking about the birth of God the Son from God the Father): “But I think that there is another desire and another desire, another begetting and another birth, another speaking and another word, if only we are in a sober mind. The first is the mover, and the last is a kind of movement. Therefore, what is desired is not from desire, because it does not always follow desire, and what is born is not from birth, and what is heard is not from pronunciation, but from the one who desires, who gives birth, who speaks. And what is in God is higher than all this. In Him, the desire to give birth is already, perhaps, birth itself, and not something intermediate, if only we completely give room to desire, and do not say that birth is higher than desire” (Gr. Naz. or. 29.6: PG 36, 81B). St. Maxim analyzes this passage in αmb. 24: PG 91, 1261B–1264B. The problem discussed by Rev. Maxim, is connected with the fact that in the patristic texts it was easy to find expressions in which the will (or volition) referred to the Divinity or humanity of Christ (numerous examples above, in opusc. 15), but there was no mention of “two” wills, i.e. there was no counting of wills. A similar problem arose at one time in polemics with the Monophysites: they easily agreed to talk about the Divinity and humanity of Christ, but rejected the possibility of talking about “two” natures in Christ on the basis, firstly, of the fact that the fathers supposedly did not have such expressions, and secondly, because the number supposedly divides the one Christ. St. Petersburg is now discussing similar problems. Maximus in the context of polemics with the Monothelites, with the only difference that he is polemicizing with the Chalcedonites, who already recognize two natures in Christ, so his main argument is the strict connection between nature and its will. If natures are numbered, then the wills corresponding to them must be numbered. This is the logic of this passage. See about the analogy with a red-hot iron in St. Maxim approx. 251 and 253. On the gnomic will, see note. 510. For some problems associated with the attribution of natural will to nature, and gnomic will to hypostasis, see the article: Benevich 2011, p. 362–366 and more in Chap. 17 of the introductory article to this edition. As Rev. explains. Maxim further, we are talking about the fact that the unity of the “intention” of the man-Christ with the Logos occurs in the Nestorian Christological model each time, as it were, anew, thus the identity of the will (in the sense of intention) is achieved for each occasion again and again. For this reason, he ridicules St. Maxim “identity” as “many wills”. The fact that even Nestorius affirms the ταὐτοβουλία will in Christ is said in Ekphesis, where this is an argument in favor of monothelitism. See also note. 604. About the history of the failure of St. Maxims from application to Christ προαίρεσις and γνώμη see introductory article, ch. 17, where we, in particular, draw attention to the misconception repeated after Sherwood that St. Maximus abandoned the use of γνώμη in Christology only from this point in the opusc. 16. “Unreasonable,” in the internal form of the word, can also be read as “contrary to logos.” When intention chooses goals contrary to the logos of nature, it is moved unreasonably. But intention can also be in accordance with the logos of nature, i.e. its presence does not necessarily lead to a contradiction with life by nature. Moreover, in order to achieve agreement with the logos of nature, it is necessary, as St. Peter repeatedly emphasizes. Maxim, deliberate effort. The idea is repeated again that the presence of a gnomic will does not necessarily entail a contradiction between God and each other. If this is so, and Rev. Maxim insists that this is so, i.e. sin and separation are not necessary due to the very fact that we have a gnomic will, as well as from the fact that we are of a different nature than God’s, then a more general conclusion can be drawn - the very difference of natures does not necessarily entail opposition of their wills. The subject is nature, and “in the subject” is will. When Rev. Maxim speaks of “number,” in particular in relation to the Trinity; one should not think that he applied the usual number to the hypostases of the Trinity. It repeatedly, for example in amb. 1, says that the Trinity is higher than our idea of number, and the hypostases of the Trinity are not formed (that is, they are not counted) in the same way as if we added 1 + 1 + 1 and got 3, for otherwise we would get tritheism: “The Trinity (τριάς) is truly a triad (τριάς)”, not composed “a number decomposing [into units]” (after all, It is not a sum of units to be subject to division)” (quotes in quotation marks from St. Gregory the Theologian) (amb. 1: PG 91, 1036B, trans. A. M. Shufrin). We are talking about a different, mysterious and paradoxical understanding of number, when 3 = 1 and 1 = 3. Likewise, in relation to the two natures in Christ, we can say that in a certain sense 2 = 1 and 1 = 2, although the three hypostases in the Trinity are no less real than the one Divinity, and the two natures in Christ are also real, although they are not separate hypostases, but one. Thus, in the commented place opusc. 16 “number” in relation to the persons of the Trinity and the natures in Christ corresponds to the real difference in one case of Persons, and in the other of natures, but not the “numberability” of God or the natures in the one Christ in the usual sense of numbering applied to the things of the created world. St. Maxim means that it is absurd to give a number, which is neither an essence nor a quality, the power to oppose (in this case the human will to the Divine). The number only indicates a real difference - either natures, or hypostases, or wills. It can be assumed that the teaching that Christ revealed Himself to have two wills only at the moment of the passion (probably meaning Gethsemane and the Cross) corresponds to the idea of ​​the Monothelites that Christ had a human will not in essence, but in “relative assimilation,” which means that He revealed it economically at certain moments, “sealing us in Himself.” This very expression “impressing (or: depicting) us (or: ours) in Himself” goes back to St. Gregory the Theologian, in whom it is most definitely attributed to what later came to be called “relative assimilation”: “It seems to me that the words have the same meaning: God, My God, listen to Me, why have You forsaken Me [Ps. 22:1]? For He Himself was not abandoned either by the Father or by His own Divinity... but (as I already said) in His person He represents us (ἐν ἑαυτῷ δέ, ὅπερ εἶπον, τυποῖ τὸ ἡμέτερον). We were previously abandoned and despised, but now we have been accepted and saved by the sufferings of the Impassive. Likewise, He assimilates (οἰκειούμενος) to Himself both our foolishness and our sinfulness, as can be seen from the continuation of the psalm, because the twenty-first psalm clearly refers to Christ” (Greg. Naz. or . 30: 5.20–27, trans. according to: Gregory the Theologian 1994. Vol. 1, p. 431). So the transfer of the doctrine of relative assimilation by the Monothelites to the Gethsemane prayer had a certain justification for them in the patristic tradition. On the relative assimilation of Monothelites in theology, see below. 694 and ch. 14 introductory article to this edition. St. Maxim also taught that Christ manifested the human will, in its difference from the Divine, through a special economy, in particular in Gethsemane, when He perceived fleshly weakness, but for him such a manifestation occurred on the basis of the presence of a human natural will in Christ. At the same time, Rev. Maxim uses the same formula of St. Gregory “imprinting us in Himself,” putting into it a different content (cf.: “After all, through natural sorrow ... He actually imprinted in Himself what is inherent in us, 197A in order to free us from this [sorrow], and confirm [the truth of] the nature of our own flesh, and reveal the economy to everyone pure from false images.” Thus, Rev. Maximus clearly expands the meaning of the patristic concept of “assimilation”, including in its horizon not only relative assimilation, but also essential (cf. opusc. 19: PG 91, 220B–221C). It is important to note that long before the controversy with the Monothelites, St. Maxim used the same expression when speaking about the state of deification (in this context about the yielding of the human will to the Father in Christ) and referring to the Gethsemane prayer, in which Christ showed us an example of such a yielding: “as He Himself says, imprinting in Himself what is characteristic of us, the Savior [in the petition] to the Father: “Not even as I will, but as You” (amb. 7: PG 91, 1076, trans. A. M. Shufrin according to: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 251 and his scholium [48] on pp. Shufrin in the scholium to this place expressed the opinion that St. Maxim is talking about “relative assimilation,” but Doucet, who also claims that we are talking about assimilation, denies that it is relative (since the latter is the assimilation of reproachful passions) and says that here we are only talking about essential assimilation, that is, the real manifestation in Christ of the human will, inferior to the Divine as an example to us (Doucet 1985, p. 141–142, see the discussion of this problem of interpretation in the introductory article, ch. 14). Otherwise: “logos”. – Approx. translation In the published text: πρὸς μικρόν “in relation to small things.” Perhaps one should read πρὸς σταυρόν – “in relation to the crucifixion”, or πρὸς πικρόν – “in relation to the mournful”. – Approx. translation Despite this consideration of the translator, it seems to us that the option indicated in the Patrology of Min is the most probable, and its meaning is that the struggle was freely allowed by God for a short period of time determined by God Himself. However, a final interpretation of this passage will be possible only after the publication of the critical edition of Opusc. On the concept of “fusion”, see note. 269. This probably refers to the words of Christ: “My soul is grieved unto death” [Matthew 26:23]. Athan. ep. ad imper. Jovianum [Sp.]: PG 28, 532.15. This probably refers to the shedding of blood in asceticism, although perhaps we are also talking about the shedding of blood due to the Arab invasion. In the original homeotelevts: αἱμάτων… δογμάτων. – Approx. translation The logic of monoenergists is understood by St. The maxim is this: Christ has one action, because He is one. That is, just as there is no addition of two natures into one divine-human nature, so there is no addition of the energies of these natures, since such an alleged “complex energy” could not be attributed to any nature, because energy characterizes a certain nature, and where there is no nature, there is no energy, and vice versa. “Possession” (ἕξις) and “deprivation” (στέρησις) are categories of Aristotle (Arist., cat. 1.10.11b20). See possible understanding of similar argumentation by Rev. Maxima in opusc. 8: PG 91, 109B–D and approx. 387. Let us quote Polycarp Sherwood's commentary on this passage and his translation of this passage: “In refuting the monoenergists, it was necessary to show that action must proceed from and manifest its own essence. The subsequent course of the controversy only served to ensure that Maxim developed his argument even more clearly. Thus, we read in the most extensive anti-Monothelitian treatise that has come down to us: “Each of any existing things has a constitutive difference (συστατικὴν διαφοράν) - an inherent movement; it, taken together with the genus, forms the definition of the subject, through which it is truly cognized and what it is, and what it is. Both one-begottenness and difference are invariably preserved in relation to the same or another species. And since this is so, how is it possible for the Word made man, lacking the natural powers of the flesh, to be called a perfect man, and indeed a man in general? (opusc. 16:PG 91, 200B8–C2). It would be a mistake to conclude from the logical flavor of the argument (the shadow of Porphyry's tree is too thick to be missed) that the argument has this order in mind. Maxim looks at the underlying ontological reality. Thus, a little later, he wrote to the Sicilians: “So we recognize one truly by the nature of God and man in no other way than by the inherent characteristics [or properties] that characterize Him both divinely and humanly - I mean Divine and human will and action, and human will and action of the same thing, by which and by which He seals what He was and what He became” (opusc. 9: PG 91, 121A2–8)” (quoted from: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 409). We add “not”, considering that it was missed by the scribe, otherwise the meaning of the sentence is unclear. – Approx. translation To remove suspicion of Nestorianism from them. Most likely, the text in this place is corrupted. We translate literally, but the meaning of this passage is unclear. – Approx. translation Polycarp Sherwood devoted a separate paragraph of his famous study to the topic: essence-power (or: ability)-energy in St. Maxim (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 400–412). One can bring such a parallel to the commented passage from the early work of St. Maxim: “Every essence, introducing with itself its limit and definition (ὅρος), by its nature is the beginning of the force-movement contemplated in it; every natural movement towards action, contemplated after the essence, but before the action, is the middle, as naturally located between the two; and each action, naturally limited by its definition (λόγος), is the end [or goal] of the previously presented essential movement” (cap. theol. 1.3, trans. A. M. Shufrin, taking into account Sherwood’s understanding of this place according to: Maxim the Confessor 2007a, p. 403). On the role of the triad essence-power-action St. For Maximus in the Christological debate, see Maximus the Confessor 2007a, p. 407–410. The meaning, apparently, is that the complex face of Christ does not belong as a whole to any species, and therefore, strictly speaking, is not considered an individual, since any individual must be the final point in the descent along the ladder from the most general genus to the individual. There is no race of “Christs”. Involving Larche (with reference to St. Cyril) to explain this thought to St. The maxim of the doctrine that in Christ there was not an individual, but a common human nature, seems unsuccessful or incomplete (Larchet 1998, p. 66, n. 1). Speech by Rev. The maxim is clearly about something else: the hypostasis of Christ itself is not an individual in the sense of what is particular in relation to the race. This is also evident from the further reference to St. Kirill. Wed. at St. Cyril of Alexandria: “The name “Christ” does not have the meaning of definition and does not mean, like the name “man”, “horse” or “bull”, the essence of something, whatever it may be, but rather indicates an action performed in relation to someone” (Cyr. Al. scholia 219). By "work" here is meant anointing; Christ is the Anointed One (see below). As Leontius of Jerusalem writes, referring to this quote: “If this name is neither a definition nor a designation of the essence, then it is clear that the one, in your opinion, nature of Christ should be called by someone in relation to nature (φυσικῶς), but neither by God (after all, He is a part of this [nature]), nor by man (after all, the situation is the same with him). So, tell me, what is the name of this integrity? “After all, the name “Christ,” says Cyril, “means an anointing that is anointed on someone.” It is also clear that there is no anointing (χρῖσις) without oil endowed with essence (χρίσματος), and that the anointed (χριόμενος) is not someone devoid of essence, and that the oil and the anointed are not one essence. So, of course, since we have two objects and two natural names, we say that there are two natures in Christ” (Leont. Hier. contr. monoph. (apor. 21): PG 86, 1781D–1784A, trans. D. A. Chernoglazov according to: Polemical Works 2011, pp. 39–40). Lit.: “devoid of hypostasis.” – Approx. translation St. Maximus, apparently, is polemicizing here with those of the monoenergists who, from the presence of the energy of human nature in Christ, deduced that this nature represents a special hypostasis, which would lead to Nestorianism. However, the version of the text presented in PG is questionable. It is quite possible that the text is damaged, since some expressions of St. Maxim (if we consider the surviving text correct) seem to us to contradict the logic of his argument. Nevertheless, in the translation we adhered to the text that is presented in PG, leaving for future clarification of this and the following reasoning of St. Maxima according to the critical edition. That is, everything that exists exists in some form. In polemics with the Monophysites, the Chalcedonites in the 6th century. (this is best seen in the Leontief Corpus) insisted that human nature in Christ is not self-hypostatic (is not a separate hypostasis), but also not non-hypostatic (since otherwise it simply would not exist), but hypostatic (Leont. Hier. contra Nestor.: PG 86, 1556A: “We do not want to show you the Lord’s man as non-hypostatic, - Yes, it will not be - but only non-self-hypostatic, that is, inseparable from the Word. For who can doubt that it is not the same thing to say “non-hypostatic” and “self-hypostatic”? From the fact that human nature in Christ is not without hypostasis (and this follows from the presence of human energy), it does not follow that it is hypostasis. The phrase is unclear, but the thought expressed by St. Maxim, in general it is clear: if a certain definition is denied, this does not mean that the opposite of the negated definition is thereby affirmed. That is, energies are not produced by hypostases. From the fact that there are two energies in Christ, it does not follow that there are two hypostases in Him. Lit.: “devoid of essence.” – Approx. translation If from the fact that every hypostasis is not without essence, we conclude that each hypostasis has its own essence, then a division is introduced into the logos of theology about the Holy Trinity, since you will get three essences in God, corresponding to the three hypostases, that is, tritheism. By economy here we mean the doctrine of Christ. If from the fact that the hypostasis is not without essence, it follows that it has an essence, then it turns out that the single hypostasis of Christ has an essence corresponding to it, that is, monophysitism. The meaning of the word ἐνυπόστατον is used here, which emphasizes the reality of existence (in this case, human nature in Christ). Wed. definition of ἐνυπόστατον in opusc. 14: PG 91, 149B and notes to this definition. The definition of ἐνούσιον, which St. The maxim is pointed against the monophysites, but is also applied to the dispute with the monoenergists. Wed. text in approx. 496. Lit.: “being in existence.” – Approx. translation Here and further we leave the Greek words in the main text without translation, since in Russian there is no established terminology for translating the corresponding Greek terms, but in the note we give a translation option. Lit.: “being in action or in action.” – Approx. translation Lit.: “that which remains in force.” – Approx. translation An expression used by monoenergists who attributed “all Divine and human energy” (speaking of the latter in the singular) to Christ alone. “All” here refers to the multitude of things that Christ accomplished. St. Maximus speaks of two natural energies as the means by which all this multitude of things accomplished by Christ was accomplished. “Unified” implies that the mode of action of Christ is not dual, but one, which does not exclude the presence of two energies. In the original: "and". – Approx. translation That is, with heretics - Monophysites and Nestorians. Affirmation and negation are Aristotle’s categories, referring to one of the four types of “opposition” (Arist. cat. 10.13b). Such statements and denials presuppose a certain pair of oppositions, that is, the relation of the affirmed to a certain negated. The scholiast gives an example: visible-invisible; something is either visible or invisible. The opposite of the ability to see is blindness, not non-vision. It is believed that this is an early composition of St. Maximus, which dates from 624–626. (Larchet 1998, p. 19). In this case, it was written long before the start of the controversy around monoenergism and monothelitism, and the need for its writing could have been caused by the controversy with the Monophysites. It should be noted, however, that some of the concepts developed in this and the following work are opusc. 18, which is also considered to have been written before the conclusion of the monoenergist union of 633 - St. Maxim also uses it in polemics against monoenergism. On the other hand, all these concepts were widely discussed in the philosophical schools of commentators on Aristotle throughout the 6th century. (regardless of the needs of Christological polemics), for example, in the commentaries of Aristotle and the logical works of Simplicius, Philoponus, David. So, if it were possible to prove that this is indeed an early work of St. Maxim, this could serve as evidence of his interest in “school philosophy” even at a time when in his ascetic and exegetical writings, written at the same time, this interest was not yet clearly manifested. However, we repeat that the early dating of this work is only a hypothesis of Sherwood and Larcher, in favor of which no indisputable arguments have been put forward. Or: “opposites.” In opusc. 16 prp. Maxim uses some of the concepts found here: “If someone begins to assert that the two wills of [the Savior] cannot be understood otherwise than as opposing (or: by opposition - κατ᾽ἐναντίωσιν) one another, then one of two things: if [they are opposed] because they are different in essence, then I will agree with this; and if because they contradict (or: are opposite - ἀντικείμενα) [one another], then this statement is false. If something is different [from another], then it does not necessarily contradict [it]” (PG 91, 193A). From comparison with opusc. 17 it is clear that both there and here St. Maxim allowed two meanings of opposition - implying either difference (as in the case of two essences or two wills in Christ), or - mutually exclusive contradiction (the possibility of which in Christ he denied). A later work uses slightly different terminology, but the overall idea remains the same. From this example it can be assumed that St. Maxim has in mind (although he does not write about this explicitly) Christological problematics. God is immortal, man is mortal. Immortality and mortality are opposite qualities, but in themselves the Divine and human essences do not exclude each other (they can unite in one hypostasis). Perhaps this is the context of the concepts he is considering here. The meaning is this: if A and B are distinguished by separation (aka “opposition”), then they are not mutually exclusive. – Approx. translation Larchet dates this work to 626–633, that is, before the start of the controversy with the monoenergists (Larchet 1998, p. 20); this seems to us not so obvious, since the work contains a mention of “unity in relation (κατὰ σχέσιν) - in intentions (γνωμῶν), [bringing them] into one will,” a statement characteristic of the works of St. Maxim of the period of polemics with monothelitism. Larcher finds a parallel to this work in the Christological polemics of Leontius of Byzantium: Leont. Byz. epilysis: PG 86, 1925C, but among the types of “unity” that Leontius writes about (many of them are actually found in St. Maximus), there is no unity of intentions that brings them into one will (Leontius speaks of relative unity as one of the types of unity, but not of the union of intentions into one will!). This clarification in the way of describing relative unity seems quite intentional; it is possible that it was caused by polemics with monothelitism (cf. 619 opusc. 15: PG 91, 172C-D). In addition, it can be assumed that a later edition (already during the controversy with the Monothelites) was introduced into the earlier work. We are probably talking about that kind of unity when we say that individuals of the same kind have the same essence. Such unity, apparently, St. Maxim distinguishes it from unity, which is placed penultimate in his list: “Unity in essence is among those who have different hypostases.” In the latter case, we are obviously talking about the Holy Trinity. This kind of unity St. Maxim clearly distinguishes from unity, which occupies the last place in the list (the last place in this case indicates that it is the most important), namely from unity, about which it is said: “Unity in hypostasis is among those who have a different essence.” This is obviously about the unity in hypostasis of the two natures in Christ. St. Maxim clearly distinguishes this type of unity from the type of unity he puts in second place, such as soul and body. In fact, soul and body constitute one nature, but the Divinity and humanity in Christ are not one nature. Otherwise: “by batch.” – Approx. translation Wed. from Leontius of Jerusalem: “if unity occurs in one nature, as if in one hypostasis - as is the case with Syrian resin and soft wax, when they are combined into one composition (σύστασιν) mastic (μαστιχήματος) [it is not entirely clear what exactly we are talking about. - G.B.], then in this case, of course, it is necessary to talk about one nature in relation to [this] connection" (Leont. Hier. contr. monoph.: PG 86, 1816A–B) The image will become clearer if we keep in mind that in the triadological polemics “unity by acquisition” was called that kind of unity of Persons in the Trinity, which Sabellius taught about. It is this that is called unity by acquisition, for example, St. Gregory the Theologian (Greg. Naz. or. 20: PG 35, 1072.4). In this concept, as the Orthodox understood it, the Persons of the Trinity did not have separate hypostases, and the Incarnation was thought of as like separating a light (torch) from the fire and returning it back to the common fire. Lit.: “different hypostases.” We are talking about the unity of hypostases in the Trinity. Lit.: “various essences.” We are talking about the unity of two essences in Christ. Larcher dates this work to ca. 642 or slightly later (Larchet 1998, p. 68). In this essay, Rev. Maxim resolves the aporia put forward against the Diophelites by Deacon Theodore, the closest assistant of Patriarch Paul of Constantinople, who replaced Pyrrhus in the capital see on April 1, 641. According to V. M. Lurie, Deacon Theodore was not an extreme Monothelite and enjoyed a reputation as a serious theologian and philosopher even in Diophelite circles. Lurie attaches great importance to this work by St. Maxim, believing that in the person of Theodore he faced the most serious opponent, and it was in this polemic that St. Maxim had to clarify his position in the dispute and the method of defending Orthodox teaching (Lurie 2006, pp. 326–328). In the introductory article we repeatedly refer to this work by St. Maxim, including clarifying Lurie’s thesis (see especially chapters 16 and 17), noting that even before writing opusc. 19, particularly in opusc. 7, prp. Maxim refused to apply the gnomic will to Christ, so there is no reason to believe that the controversy with Theodore had a decisive influence on him in this matter. We see the role of the polemic with Theodore in a slightly different way. It is in opusc. 19 prp. Maxima was the first to explicitly formulate the difference between relative and essential assimilation, which he applied both to the doctrine of the will in Christ (this was his main goal) and (in passing and more veiledly) to the problem of ignorance. At the same time, the “Agnoite theme” itself, as Lurie rightly noted, played an important role in the polemics around monothelitism, which is especially noticeable in later works (for example, opusc. 1 and disp. Pyrr.). Otherwise: “in the same sense.” – Approx. translation We are talking, of course, about human will. Lurie understood the same phrase (opusc. 19: PG 91, 216B) differently, from our point of view inaccurately: “will (θέλημα) and ignorance (ἄγνοια) in Christ are defined by the same concept (κατ’ αὐτὸν τῷ θελήματι λόγον καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν κατηγόρισαν οἱ Πατέρες ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ)" (Lurie 2006, p. 327). Further, he conveys the following thought from Theodore’s aporia as follows: “the fathers even added ignorance to the will, retaining the same definition (logos) for the will,” and interprets this thought: “Simply put, the fathers, according to Theodore, defined ignorance as a property or state of the will” (Ibid.). In fact, we believe, Theodore argued that the fathers predicated ignorance and will to Christ according to the same principle (logos, foundation) or in the same relation, that is, if there is one, then there is the other, and further he says: if the will is natural, then ignorance is natural; if ignorance is by assimilation, then the will is by assimilation. Wed. Larchet’s understanding of this place: “the fathers consider the will and ignorance of Christ in the same respect,” and further explains Theodore’s argumentation: “to allow will and ignorance to be considered on the same plane and refuse to recognize that Christ had a human will by assimilation means necessarily attributing to Him natural ignorance” (Larchet 1998, p. 68, cf. Bathrellos 2004, p. 83; 132; 160). So there is no reason, as Lurie does, to put into Theodore’s mouth such a weak argument that the fathers “defined ignorance as a property or state of the will” or somehow “defined one thing through the other” (below, St. Maxim polemically ridicules such an opinion as absurd, from which it does not at all follow that Theodore really taught this (see opusc. 19: PG 91, 220A–B)). Lurie writes there: “the fathers... say nothing of the kind... in any of the works known today” (Lurie 2006, p. 327). He gives his reasons why Theodore could resort to such a weak argument, connecting it with the Edict against the Agnoites imp. Justinian, where it is said that the soul of Christ had all the knowledge of the Logos due to the presence in it of the entire will of the Divine (see. ibid.), however, it seems to us that Theodore’s argument is different and can be explained differently than Lurie does, so Theodore’s reference to the fathers, in particular to St. Gregory the Theologian, is made clear (see next note). Connecting Theodore’s argument with the legacy of polemics against the Agnoites, Lurie probably follows the version expressed in: Grillmeier 1989, S. 388–391, but the same Grillmeier (Ibid, S. 392–402) emphasizes that, with the rare exception of Anthem of Trebizond, the Chalcedonites conducted polemics with the Agnoites, not resorting to monothelitism. As Larchet suggests, after the publication of Ekphesis (638), in which it was generally forbidden to talk about two wills in Christ, the Monothelites, pressed by the arguments of the Diophelites who referred to Scripture, especially the Gethsemane prayer, admitted that it was possible to talk about two wills in Christ, but that the human will in Him was only “by assimilation” (Larchet 1998, p. 68), which means that it was revealed by Him only at certain moments, when He spoke not on His own behalf, but on our behalf. That such a version of Monothelitism actually existed in Constantinople can be seen from one place in the Dispute with Pyrrhus, where Pyrrhus says to St. Maxim that the fathers allegedly taught that Christ had a human will “by assimilation,” and a little further he clarifies that by assimilation “relative” (σχετικήν) (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 304A–B). How to understand this expression, and what grounds did the Monothelites have for such a statement? Close in time to the controversy surrounding Monothelitism, a major Chalcedonite theologian was St. Eulogius of Alexandria († c. 608). He set forth the doctrine that some words of Christ and about Christ in the New Testament should be understood truly and in the proper sense, and some relatively ἀναφοράν) (Phot. biblioth. 230.268a.12). At the same time, St. Eulogius says that among the words that must be understood relatively are those that express our rebellion and ignorance (τὸ ἀνυπότακτον ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν), which Christ pronounces “as the Head of the body [of humanity]”, that is, on our behalf, “through unspeakable love for mankind, appropriating (οἰκειούμενον) what is ours as His own” (Ibid, 230.268a.18–22, cf. the origins of this teaching in Gr. Naz. or. 30.5.16–27 (ed. Barbel), see the translation of this passage from St. Gregory in note 639). The Monothelites-Chalcedonians could attribute a similar teaching to the words of Christ in Gethsemane, that is, consider that the entire prayer for the Cup should be interpreted as an example of relative assimilation, when Christ, assimilating, in particular, our disobedience and ignorance of the will of God (= “if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me” [Matthew 26:39]), speaks not on His own, but on our behalf (similar to those pronounced in such a way “relative assimilation” St. Eulogius, following St. Gregory the Theologian, considered the words of Matthew 27:46: “My God, why have you forsaken me?”, see Phot. It was precisely such a doctrine that, apparently, triumphed in Constantinople soon after the adoption of the Ekphesis (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 304A–B). As for St. Maxim, then he, speaking about “relative assimilation,” fundamentally distinguishes it from the essential, which he further talks about in opusc. 19: PG 91, 220B-C. The presence of human nature in Christ also implies the essential assimilation of its will. In Gethsemane, according to St. Maximus, Christ was able to demonstrate the action of human will, different from God’s, because He always had it (as an integral property of nature) (cf. notes 129 and 639). As for the concept of “relative assimilation”, which, according to St. Maximus, following St. Eulogius, there is a compassionate assimilation (Eulogius speaks of unspeakable love for mankind), then he develops it in detail in relation to the Gethsemane prayer in opusc. 20: PG 91, 237A–B. This “assimilation” is of a different kind than the essential one. The Monothelites, apparently, considered the entire prayer: “My Father! If it is possible, let this cup pass from Me” [Matthew 26:39] – in words interpreted in the sense of relative assimilation. The basis for this interpretation of this place by the Monothelites, in particular by Deacon Theodore, could be the words of St. Gregory the Theologian about this verse Matthew 26:39, said in the following context: “this was spoken on behalf of a person, not like we mean in the Savior... but like us (τοῦ καθ’ ἡμᾶς) (explicit understanding in the sense of “relative assimilation.” - G. B.), because the human will does not always follow, but very often contradicts and opposes the will of God. For this is how we understand... the words: “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass by from Me: not even as I will, but may Your will prevail” [Matthew 26:39]; and it is incredible that Christ did not know what is possible and what is not, and that he began to oppose one will to another” (Gr. Naz. or. 30.12.6–12: PG 36, 120B, trans. according to: Gregory the Theologian 1994, p. 436; cf. Bas. Caes. contr. Eun. 4 [Dub]: PG 29, 697.4–28). In the last phrase of this passage (“and it is incredible that Christ did not know what is possible and what is not, and that he began to oppose one will to another”), as it might seem to the Monothelites, ignorance and the presence in Christ of a different will than that of the Father are put on the same level. 256. approx. 697–699). So, Theodore’s aporia was supported, as it seemed to him, by a very significant patristic tradition, etc. Maxim had to solve a difficult problem by giving a different interpretation of the same passages. It seems that A.I. Sidorov underestimates the complexity of the aporia of D. Theodore, as well as the nature of the difficulty that the saint faced. Maxim, when he writes about it: “The artificiality of the aporia, naturally, made it difficult to resolve it, and therefore St. Maxim found himself in a difficult situation” (Sidorov 2006, p. 256). St. It was indeed not easy for Maximus to respond to Theodore’s aporia, but not because it was artificial, but because, apparently, it was rooted in the patristic tradition. On this heresy see Van Roey and Allen 1994, p. 6–12; Lurie 2006, p. 163–166; in the context of the doctrine of wills and actions in Christ – Hovorun 2008, p. 30–34. Otherwise: “in the same way.” – Approx. translation We are talking about a work that was attributed in the tradition to St. Athanasius, but is now considered to have been written by Marcellus of Ancyra. This work speaks of ignorance in the following place: Marcell. de incarn. et contr. Arian. 999. 334–340, but there is no connection between the ignorance of Christ and His human will. For the Gethsemane prayer in the same work, see Marcell. de incarn. et contr. Arian. 1021.25–34 (here speaks of two wills in Christ, but not of ignorance). In the same work, in relation to the words from Matthew 26:46; Phil.2:7; Is.53:4), that is, speaking about “abandonment,” submission to the Father and bearing our sins, there is an expression that will later correspond to the concept of “relative assimilation” (see note 694). Thus, the words about “forsakenness by God” Christ “speaks on our behalf (ἐκ προσώπου ἡμετέρου λέγει)” (Ibid, 988.32). We are talking about an excerpt from Greg. Naz. or. 29.18.1–10, which lists various passages from Scripture that served the Arians to prove the creatureliness of Christ: “those in which ignorance is attributed to the Son [Mark 13:32], obedience [1 Cor.15:28], prayer [Luke 6:12], questioning [John 11:34], prosperity [Luke 2:52], accomplishment [ Hebrews 5:9]. Add, if you want, more humiliating words than these, for example: sleeps [Matthew 8:24], hungers [Matthew 4:7], is weary [John 4:6], weeps [John 11:35], is in agony [Luke 22:44], takes refuge [John 8:59]” (translated from: Gregory the Theologian 1994. Vol. 1, pp. 425–426). As can be seen from this list, struggle (the struggle of Gethsemane) is mentioned on a par with ignorance, but this fact in itself, without applying to it the doctrine of relative assimilation, as it obviously seemed to him, in the spirit of St. Eulogius and the same St. Gregory (or. 30.12), could not serve as an argument for D. Theodore. About the “ignorance” of Christ according to the Gospels of St. Gregory also speaks in Greg. Naz. or. 30.15, but he has no connection with “will” in this place. Here, it is likely that D. Theodore means St. Eulogius of Alexandria, who developed the concept of relative assimilation in more detail in the context of polemics with the Agnoites, to whom he may not have directly referred to as the father closest in time (and not yet so authoritative). It was at St. Eulogy there is an explicit understanding of words relating to “ignorance”, “submission” and “abandonment” (Theodore also lists them) in the sense of relative assimilation, although this concept itself, even if not named, is found already in the authors of the 4th century. (see note 694). From this appeal it is clear that the correspondence of St. Maxim is not leading with D. Theodore, but with his comrade-in-arms, Presbyter Marin, so Lurie is mistaken when he writes: “In 642 or a little later, he (Maxim - G.B.) turns to the close assistant of Patriarch Paul, deacon and rhetorician Theodore of Byzantium, with an answer to two of his questions... The tone of Maxim’s answer is far from confrontational” (Lurie 2006, p. 326). The tone of the answer could not have been confrontational, since Rev. Maxim answered Marin, who apparently forwarded him the aporia of Theodore. As for the attitude towards Theodore’s motives, then the tone of St. Maxima is quite confrontational, i.e., accusatory, because a little further he says that Theodore’s aporia stems from lies, discord and the desire to pervert dogma. However, at the very end, examining the second aporia, St. Maxim denotes a certain limit of leniency in the confession of faith that the Orthodox could show towards their opponents. In this phrase the text is apparently corrupted. We translate literally. – Approx. translation However, Rev. Maxim could have meant that the word “ἀπορία” has two meanings - difficulty in understanding (aporia) and lack, poverty. He could tell that Theodore was trying to put the diophelites in a difficult position, but showed the poverty of his mind. As we have seen, the fathers, whose teaching was summarized by, for example, St. Eulogius of Alexandria, applied to Christ words expressing “ignorance” along with “disobedience” and “abandonment” in the same sense of “relative assimilation,” but none of the fathers understood human will and ignorance in the same sense. The phrase in the original is not entirely clear grammatically, but its general meaning is clear. St. Maxim uses Aristotle’s categories – “possession” (ἕξις) and “deprivation” (στέρησις) (Arist., cat. 1.10.11b20). What he probably means is that the will affirms the being possessing it in existence (and the one who has one or another nature also has the corresponding will), and ignorance is the deprivation of knowledge, which characterizes the inferiority of the rational nature. According to Rev. Maximus, as Bathrellos notes (Bathrellos 2004, p. 129), in a state of deification a person has perfect knowledge (amb. PG 91, 1220A-C). St. Maxim cites an excerpt from Gr. Naz. or. 29.18.1–3, which slightly precedes a passage from the same First Word about the Son, which deals with ignorance (Gr. Naz. or. 29.18.6 ff.). In an excerpt from St. Gregory, indeed, the word “will” does not appear anywhere, but there are a number of words that imply human will and ignorance applied to Christ (“obedient”, “submission”, “questioning”, “prosperity”, etc.). Obviously, D. Theodore had exactly this in mind, i.e., he proceeded from the presence of a general context for the words corresponding to ignorance and meaning that Christ had a human will. Further, he, having received from St. Eulogius (?) doctrine that words denoting ignorance should be understood in a relative sense, insisted that the human will should be understood in the sense of relative assimilation (see note 694). St. Maximus first shows that the context of St. Gregory is different. The common denominator in the passage is not ignorance, it simply lists various expressions that are applied to Christ according to His human nature (see just below). Here and further in this paragraph, Rev. Maxim, interpreting the words of D. Theodore literally (in one of their possible meanings), brings them to the point of absurdity. Most likely, Theodore wanted to say not that ignorance is determined through will or will through ignorance, but that the recognition of human will in Christ entails the recognition of ignorance in Him. But in such polemically exaggerated argumentation, St. Maxim has his own reason - he reveals the reason for the confusion that arose in Theodore, namely, his lack of philosophical elaboration of the problems of the dispute (in fact, he refers only to the fathers). Venerable himself Maxim gives below the philosophical foundations of his position, but Theodore, apparently, did not have them, because otherwise why not give them? This means that it is a mistake to say that Christ had a human will “by assimilation.” If Christ has one will according to the Divine nature, and another according to assimilation, then it turns out two - but it was precisely the expression “two wills” that Ekphesis prohibited. This argument, of course, is not decisive, but is expressed as if by the way. From this moment on, Rev. Maxim moves on to philosophical arguments, which are decisive. Battrellos believes that the distinction between essential and relative assimilation was introduced by the Venerable himself. Maxim (Bathrellos 2004, p. 133, n. 192). Wed. development of the concept of relative acquisition in opusc. 20: PG 91, 237A–B and our discussion of this topic in ch. 14 introductory article. It is appropriate to remember that in a polemic with the agnoite Themistius, the Monophysite Theodosius of Alexandria back in the 6th century. put forward the doctrine of three types of assimilation (appropriatio): 1. Assimilation in which the Logos allows the manifestation of blameless passions (for example: hunger, thirst, pain); 2. Assimilation of our “poverty” (need, indigentia); it corresponds to the natural limitations of our nature. Ignorance of the future (ignorance in this sense) refers precisely to this type of assimilation. According to Theodosius, the soul of Christ, although as such the human soul is characterized by limited knowledge, receives the fullness of knowledge from the union with the Logos, that is, it does not suffer real ignorance, it is only thought of as limited in knowledge, but in the single nature of God the Word it is embodied ignorant and in such a limited sense is not; 3. In addition, there is Christ’s assimilation of our reproachful passions as the Head of the whole body, which is not the enduring of these passions, but there is no direct evidence from Scripture, as Theodosius believes, about the perception of such (reproachful) ignorance by Christ. The problem of Christ’s ignorance is resolved by Theodosius on the basis of the doctrine of the second type of assimilation, while he believes that it is impossible to equate ignorance with other blameless passions (say, hunger and thirst), since recognition of the real suffering of ignorance by Christ would mean a separation in the knowledge and energy of thinking of God the Word and human nature in Him, which would be, as Theodosius believes, Nestorianism. That is why he said that Christ did not know “not in reality, not according to His humanity, but according to assimilation.” By assimilation here we mean the perception of something external, alien (Van Roey, Allen 1994, p. 17–18). Theodosius was a monoenergist and a monothelitist, and within the framework of this teaching, since knowledge is one of the types of energy, the single energy in Christ, encompassing His soul, ensured the complete knowledge of the soul (although by its own nature the soul did not have such knowledge) (Grillmeier 1989, S. 387–388). Below (see note 715) we talk about the difference between this understanding and the possible understanding of St. Maxim, but even now it is clear that the two types of “assimilation” that Maxim speaks of differ from the three recognized by Theodosius. In his early essay Questions and Perplexities of St. Maxim has already addressed the topic of “ignorance” of Christ. There he answered the question “How should we understand the ignorance of the Son [of God] regarding the consummation? (Matthew 24:36; cf. Mark 13:32),” as follows: “There are two [types] of ignorance – reproachful and blameless; and one of them depends on us, and the other does not depend on us. What is reproachful and depends on us concerns virtue and piety. The same thing that is beyond reproach and does not depend on us concerns things that we, although we want to know, do not know, for they happen far away or will happen in the future. So, if [in the case of] the holy prophets, by grace they recognized things that were distant and beyond our control, did not the Son of God know all [things] to an incomparably greater degree, and for this reason [His] humanity, not by nature, but by union with the Logos, [knew them]? For just as iron heated in fire has all the properties of fire - for it burns and burns - although by nature it is not fire, but iron, so the humanity of the Lord, by unity with the Logos, knew everything, and everything that befits the Divinity was revealed in it. According to [the] human nature, united with Him [with the Logos], it is said that He did not know” (qu. dub. 1, 67, translated by D. A. Chernoglazov according to: Maxim the Confessor 2010, p. 209). From this text it is clear that, at least during this period, St. Maxim believed that ignorance (of course, only blameless) “affects” the human nature of Christ, but not about Himself. Larchet (Larchet 1998, p. 69–70) believes that the distinction between reproachful and blameless ignorance helps to understand the thought of St. Maxim and in opusc. 19 (see next note). St. Maxim gives a list of “blameless passions” that were accepted by Christ according to human nature (in the state it had after the Fall), but, it must be emphasized, they were endured by Him voluntarily, according to a special tropos not characteristic of us (according to God’s will). The logic of the argument of St. The maxim is this: to affirm the inevitability of suffering ignorance in Christ (ignorance only by nature) means to deny the deification of our nature in Him; to affirm only relative ignorance means to deny the presence of human nature in Christ (one of the characteristics of which is blameless ignorance, along with other blameless passions). These are the “boundaries” for the doctrine of ignorance that St. Maxim is against the aporia of St. Theodore, who insisted on the existence in Christ of only relative assimilated ignorance (= ἐν ψιλῇ σχέσει, as St. Maxim puts it) in order to make the human will only “relative.” (We do not agree with Shlenov’s interpretation of this passage, who writes: “St. Maxim taught that Christ did not accept ignorance either by relative assimilation... or by essence” (Shlenov 2004, p. 369), for more details see note. 715). But how should ignorance in Christ be understood? His own explicit teaching about this St. Maxim does not offer (after all, this is not the topic of this essay), but a little lower, analyzing the quote from St. Gregory the Theologian, expresses a number of thoughts on this issue, from which one can try to reconstruct his opinion (see opusc. 19: PG 91, 221A–B and note 715). Or: “in what way are they inferior to Apollinaris and Mani?” - a translation that is more suitable in meaning, but less accurate. – Approx. translation Greg. Naz. or. 30.15.12–14. Wed. St. has almost the same thought. Eulogius (with reference to St. Cyril of Alexandria) in the transmission of St. Photia: Phot. biblioth. Cod. 230: PG 103, 1084B For this Christological formula, see note. 157. Jerome. Dionysius (Shlenov) (Shlenov 2004, pp. 369–370) states that St. Maximus, denying that Christ accepted ignorance both by essential and by relative assimilation, follows the holy fathers, especially St. Eulogy, but the situation is more complicated. As we have seen, St. Eulogius just wrote that the words that express our rebellion and ignorance (τὸ ἀνυπότακτον ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν), Christ pronounces “as the Head of the body [of humanity],” that is, on our behalf, “by to unspeakable love for mankind, appropriating (οἰκειούμενον) what is ours as His own” (Phot. biblioth. 230.268a.18–22). Elsewhere he writes: “if anyone wants to say that Christ did not know in a relative sense, since ignorance was not something external to His body or human nature, of which He is the Head, then he will not go beyond the limits of the probable” (Ibid, 284b5–8, trans. A.I. Sidorov after: Sidorov 2006, p. 251). It is these sayings of St. Eulogius, presumably, became the basis for the assertion of D. Theodore that Christ’s ignorance was only due to relative assimilation. If we consider together with Shlenov that St. Maxim denied relatively acquired ignorance, it turns out that at this point he disagrees with St. Eulogius, but does not follow it at all. In fact, we believe that St. Maximus denies not relatively assimilated ignorance (at the moment of prayer for the Cup) as such, but, as can be seen from the text, only (or “merely”) relative assimilation (ἐν ψιλῇ σχέσει) - without Christ’s perception of our nature, one of the blameless passions of which is ignorance. In such an understanding, obviously, it would turn out that Christ only sometimes portrayed Himself as ignorant (like us), but He did not have the human nature that we are characterized by ignorance. Although St. Maxim does not speak clearly about this, but it seems that his teaching about ignorance in Christ presupposes the following: 1. Christ accepted our nature with the consequences of the Fall, including the blameless passion of ignorance, contemplated in His human nature when mentally separating it from the Divine; 2. due to the hypostatic unity and communion of natures, even such blameless ignorance in Christ was not characteristic of Him, that is, it was not His own (see below note 716 and text); 3. nevertheless, economically, Christ, on the basis of consubstantiality with us, could manifest Himself as an ignorant person (as can be seen from Scripture). But what kind of ignorance can we be talking about here, reproachful or blameless, or both? In opusc. 19 prp. Maximus does not write about this directly, but mentions a tradition in which “it is said that due to ancient apostasy, [everything] is ours—ignorance, abandonment, disobedience, and disobedience” (opusc. 19: PG 91, 221B). Within the framework of this tradition, Christ’s words about the Chalice are understood as “relative assimilation” out of love for humanity and compassion for us (as in St. Eulogius), and according to relative assimilation, it is reproachful passions that are assimilated. Larshe notes that Rev. Maximus lists ignorance along with reproachful passions, which Christ could only perceive by relative assimilation (Larchet 1998, p. 70), however, it is not clear his own opinion about whether St. Maximus, that Christ relatively assimilated reproachful ignorance; It seems to us that there is no need to doubt this. In addition, we saw that St. Maximus lists ignorance among the blameless passions characteristic of human nature as received by Christ. It remains an open question whether he believed that Christ ever allowed His human nature to actually experience blameless ignorance in the same way that He allowed it to experience hunger or fear. Neither in qu. dub. 1, 67, nor in opusc. 19 there is no direct answer to these questions. A.I. Sidorov, wondering whether, “according to St. Maxim, “mentally comprehended in Christ, human ignorance to the category of the real,” answered him cautiously in the affirmative: “It seems that in this case for him, the “mental” and the “real” do not at all exclude each other, but rather overlap each other” (Sidorov 2006, p. 258). At the same time, it is also true that, speaking about the absence of a gnomic will in Christ, in the Dispute with Pyrrhus St. Maxim emphasizes that gnomic will (in the sense of choosing) exists only in a state of ignorance, which Christ could not have. Here it must be said that, unlike the Monophysite Theodosius of Alexandria, St. Maxim did not distinguish blameless ignorance (in the sense of simple limited knowledge) from other blameless passions (see note 709). For Theodosius, the concept of ignorance was organically connected with his monophysitism and monoenergism, since knowledge was considered as one of the energies of the one God the Word incarnate. One can only guess how the saint would have resolved this issue. Maxim, based on his dioenergism and taking into account what he had already decided at the time of writing the opusc. 19 (and not in polemic with the “Agnoite argument” of D. Theodore) of the question of the absence of gnomic will in humanity and the Divinity of Christ. “Not His,” in the sense of ignorance belonging to Christ in the fullness of His God-manhood, that is, in the unity of the hypostasis of the incarnate Logos (see justification in qu. dub. I, 67). Exposition of the doctrine of “ignorance” in Christ by St. The maxim in this place is close to some passages in the Word of the Chalcedonian Anthimus of Trebizond (former Patriarch of Constantinople) to Justinian, including a reference to the same words of St. Gregory the Theologian and their interpretation (Van Roey, Allen 1994, p. 65). At the same time, Anthimus was a monoenergist, and his teaching about the absence of ignorance in Christ was justified by the fact that in Christ there is one energy and one knowledge (just like the monophysite Theodosius of Alexandria) (Anthim., Sermo ad Justin. : Mansi XI. 440E-441A, these words of Anthimus with their condemnation are given in the materials of the VI Ecumenical Council). Thus, Rev. Given the presence among the Chalcedonites of a monoenergist tradition of interpreting the doctrine of the ignorance of Christ, Maximus had to give a different, dioenergist and diophelite interpretation (cf. Lurie 2006, p. 237). This was another difficulty that he might encounter, in addition to the one mentioned above (approx. 694), however, it should be noted that there were many Chalcedonian authors of the 6th–7th centuries, for example St. Eulogius of Alexandria or the author of the popular Questions and Answers (Ps.-Caesarius), which solved the problem of Christ's ignorance without resorting to monoenergism or monothelitism (see Grillmeier 1989, S. 382–389). Nevertheless, the same St. Eulogius had not yet developed a dioenergetic doctrine in detail, moreover, he spoke only about the relative assimilation of ignorance (see Sidorov 2006, pp. 251–252), which, obviously, served as the basis for D. Theodore’s arguments. St. Maximus here lists ignorance among the reproachful passions - abandonment, disobedience and disobedience, so that, at first glance, he says that reproachful ignorance is not part of the logos of our nature, which is obvious. But above, he spoke of ignorance by design, meaning unimpeachable ignorance. The question arises: did he consider such ignorance also not to be part of the logos of our nature, just as hunger, thirst, illness, death, etc. are not included in it? These passions are characteristic of the tropos of the existence of our nature after the Fall, but they do not constitute the logos of nature (“the crooked” tropos introduces into nature exactly what is not in the logos, and deification straightens the tropos in accordance with the true logos of nature). But if Adam had full knowledge after creation, he could not have fallen. It turns out that he was created capable of acquiring complete knowledge by grace, but able not to obtain it (which happened, according to St. Maximus, “immediately” after creation). The Logos of nature had to receive its fulfillment in deification, and in such a “fulfilled” logos of nature, of course, there is not only reproachful ignorance, but also non-reproachful ignorance. Will, in contrast to ignorance, is an integral characteristic and property of human nature. The point of the entire previous passage about ignorance is primarily to show its difference from will. St. Maxim completes the answer to the first aporia, based on this fundamental statement - the belonging of the will to nature, which in reality, and not by imagination, was perceived in the hypostasis of the Logos. Otherwise: “by imagination.” – Approx. translation The usual argumentation of St. Maximus in his polemics with Sevier and the Monophysites (cf. note 167). Cyr. Al. thesaur.: PG 75, 397.13. Greg. Nyss. advers. Apollon. „Gregorii Nysseni opera, vol. 3.1“: 3.1.179.24– 27. Bathrellos (2004, p. 145) notes that in opusc. 19, 224 pr. Maxim closely follows the axiom of St. Gregory of Nyssa, which connects βούλησις and φύσις. Joan. Chrys. in Joann. PG 59, 371.54. Joan. Chrys. in Joann. PG 59, 371.57–59. Joan. Chrys. in illud: Pater, si possibile est, transeat: PG 51, 38.19. 7. Wed. Cyr. Al. in Lucam: PG 72, 924.23. The text is damaged, we are restoring the meaning. – Approx. translation The point, apparently, is that if we abandon the doctrine of a single natural will for all representatives of a given nature, then due to the fact that each hypostasis has its own will, it turns out that there is no single entity characterized by one natural will. After all, essence is something unified in all the hypostases of a given nature, and if there is no essence, then the hypostases also turn out to be non-existent. Every volitional act of one or another hypostasis (person), according to St. Maxim, is based on a natural ability - natural will. This means that even if we assume the concept of the will of a hypostasis or person (although St. Maximus does this only conditionally), we must keep in mind that without natural will neither anti-natural (= sinful) nor in general “personal” will is possible. Repeated quotes from St. Gregory of Nyssa (see note 723). Link to Chalcedonian oros. Obviously, what is meant first of all is the argument that if persons introduce wills, then in the Holy Trinity there will be three wills and the unity of God will be abolished. Here Rev. Maxim denotes the limits of leniency to which one can go in polemics with the Monothelites. He does not insist that they must confess that there are two wills in Christ (indeed, such a confession was practically never found among the fathers), moreover, he does not insist that opponents confess that the wills in Christ are natural (in fact, the concept of natural will as a philosophical concept looked new and caused difficulty in understanding (cf. in the Disputation with Pyrrhus, Pyrrhus says that this expression “cuts hearing" (disp Pyrr.: PG 91, 301A)), the only thing that St. Maxim, as can be seen from this place, was the recognition of the Divine and human will in Christ. He believed during this period that with such a confession it is possible to come to an agreement with opponents, since later they will understand that these wills, which they thus recognize, are natural. Maxim (perhaps he expresses it, hoping that the new Patriarch of Constantinople, Paul, who replaced Pyrrhus, will gradually abandon his ideological line) is similar to the one that he and St. Sophronius of Jerusalem manifested after the adoption of Psiphos, when they agreed not to speak of two energies in Christ, but at the same time spoke of divine and human actions (for more details, see Maximus the Confessor 2007a, pp. 13–24). Later, at the height of the persecution of the diophelites, for example during the debate in Viziya (656), St. Maxim takes a much tougher position, insisting on the need to confess two wills and two actions, and not just Divine and human wills and actions, as his interlocutor suggests (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, p. 185). The very confession of “two” wills served for St. Maximus is a kind of confirmation that we are talking about two natural wills, since his opponents believed that “two” introduce the possibility of contradiction in wills, and he argued that the natural (created by God Himself) will cannot, as such, come into conflict with its Creator (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 292B), which means that by professing two wills, we confirm that the wills are natural. Larchet refers to Sherwood's dating (c. 640), but notes that it is impossible to date the work precisely (Larchet 1998, p. 27). As Battrellos notes, Sherwood believed that opusc. 7 was written between 640 and 642, possibly ca. 642, op. 8 – approx. 640, and opusc. 20 – between 640 and 643. However, says Battrellos, opusc. 20 should have been written after opusc. 7, since in the latter Maximus implies that unitary expressions regarding energy belong only to Dionysius and Cyril of Alexandria (see 88B-C), while in the former he recognizes as such also a passage from Anastasius of Antioch; so it seems likely to date the opusc. 20 between 642 and 643. (Bathrellos 2004, p. 198). In addition, it should be noted that if the name of the addressee of the letter was inscribed by the Venerable himself. Maxim, then opusc. 7 was written before opusc. 20, since in the first he addresses the deacon Marinus, and in the second he addresses the presbyter. Angelis ignores these arguments and places this work among the works of 640 (Massimo Confessore 2007, p. 49). Opusc. 20 is one of the most important works of St. Maximus, characterizing his views in polemics with monothelitism at the early stage of the dispute around Ekphesis (638) and explanations of his patriarchs. Pyrrhus. For more details, see the introductory article (chapters 12, 13, 14). The essay is devoted to the interpretation of “one energy” along with “two” in St. Anastasia of Antioch, as well as the expression “one will” of Pope Honorius, which gave the monoenergists and monothelites a reason to defend their teaching. Like opusc. 7 and 8, this work is typical for that period of controversy when St. Maxim considered it acceptable and even necessary to confess two energies along with the use of unitarian expressions. Translation by A. M. Shufrin, edited by G. I. Benevich. Corrections have been made to this edition compared to the first, published in: Anthology. T. 2, p. 173–182. This obviously means deception, seduction that arises from the sensory perception of the world in the form of pleasure and suffering expected from it (cf. Diogn. 10.7; Clem. Al. str. 2.10.138.2). On reason and intelligence in their relation to virtue and knowledge, see note. 5. Here and in the next sentence there is another example of the use of the famous formula tantum - quantum (Greek τοσοῦτον - ὅσον, “as much as”) (see note 101). Wed. Ps.-Dion. ep. 3. – Approx. translation Wed. the second scholia to this letter: ““Hidden” he often says instead of “God” and “intimacy” instead of “divinity”” (translated by G. M. Prokhorov according to: Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor 2002, p. 773). Or: “field”. – Approx. translation ἐπέκτασις is an important concept of Orthodox mystical theology, going back to the words of the apostle. Paul “I do not consider myself to have attained; but only, forgetting what is behind and reaching forward (ἐπεκτεινόμενος)” [Phil.3:13] and widely used by St. Gregory of Nyssa (see Danielou 1962). St. Maxim introduced certain clarifications to the concept of the unceasing ascent to God of St. Gregory with the help of his concept of ever-moving peace in God (see note 620). εὔροια is a Stoic technical term. – Approx. translation Wed. in Sextus Empiricus: “happiness, as the Stoics say, is a happy flow of life βίου)" (Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. Hypot. 3.172.5). However, Rev. Maximus is unlikely to have adopted the term from the Stoics, which is repeatedly found among the Cappadocian fathers. Wed. “We are doers as long as our naturally rational ability, producing virtues, is active and effective, and our irrespective mental power, perceiving all knowledge, passes through the entire world of beings and conceivables, leaving behind all ages. And we are the sufferers, when, having been perfectly completed with the logoi of beings [that arose] from nothing, we passed in ignorance (ἀγνώστως) to the cause of beings and gave our natural powers rest together with the finite in nature, becoming that which cannot be achieved by any natural power” (Thal. 22: PG 90, 320D–321A). Lacuna in the text. – Approx. translation σχήματος: lat. Min's translation obviously comes from the reading: ὀχήματος. – Approx. translation Or: “thinking” (διανοίας). – Approx. translation We are talking about St. Anastasia I of Antioch (years of patriarchate 559–570; 593–599). About the life and theological works of St. Anastasia see: Weiss 1965 (diss.). According to Günther Weiss, Anastasius against Philoponus was written shortly after 553, when Anastasius was still apocrisiary of the Patriarch of Alexandria and Philoponus was still alive (Weiss 1965, pp. 101–103). Composition by St. Anastasia (Contra Iohannis Philoponi,Diaeteten‘ (CPG 6956)) has come down to us only in a few fragments (besides fragments from St. Maximus, two fragments have been preserved in the Teaching of the Fathers: Anast. doctr. part. 191.7–13; 204.13–205.18). Nevertheless, fragments of his other works, devoted to the problems of energies in Christ, have been preserved, the content of which is consistent with what can be concluded from fragments from the treatise against Philoponus, preserved by St. Maxim (for more details, see Sidorov 1989, pp. 24–32). Theopolis - Antioch. Antioch was renamed Theopolis (City of God) during the reign of Emperor Justin and at the beginning of the patriarchate of St. Ephraim of Antioch (527–545) after the devastating earthquake of 526, the restoration work after which was led by Ephraim (not yet the patriarch), sent for this by the emperor. Justin. An important testimony that St. Maximus actually calls the Patriarch of Antioch Ecumenical; What is significant, however, is that this patriarch is Orthodox. Perhaps, Rev. Maxim means that the Universal Church is that City of God (Theopolis), the primate of which is the holy patriarch. We are talking about John Philoponus; It is believed that he received the name “Mediator” from the title of his work Διαιτητής (“Mediator”), in which he discusses the Christological teaching, acting as a reconciliator of Chalcedonites and Monophysites, but from a Monophysite position. St. Maxim further emphasizes that, in fact, Philoponus turned out to be not a mediator, but a separator (in fact, as a result of his church-theological activity, not only did the union of Chalcedonites and Monophysites, for which Philoponus advocated, not occur, but also several splits arose in the Monophysite camp itself, tritheites appeared, the ideological leader of which he became, and then they split into two sects depending on their attitude to the doctrine of the Resurrection) (for more details see Benevich 2010a). St. Maximus probably emphasizes in these expressions the highest degree of unity of the Logos with the perceived flesh in order to sharpen the problem of how, with such unity, the preservation of Divine and human energy is possible. For the Christology of St. Anastasia is generally characterized by an emphasis on the unity of the Divine and human nature in Christ, and most of all on the most perfect degree of deification of human nature in this union, while unconditionally preserving the essential difference of human nature. A.I. Sidorov writes that, according to St. Anastasia, “the human nature of Christ was, as it were, “hidden” or “covered” by the Divine nature... This is similar to how something is in fire and perceives its qualities, and therefore the difference between the participant and the participant becomes almost unknowable. Anastasius gives the following example: if you imagine all the air on earth ignited and a mustard (or millet) grain thrown into such a fire, then it will naturally submit to the ruling power of this fire and will appear the same as it” (Sidorov 1989, pp. 26–27), nevertheless, the logos of the essence of the grain will continue to exist (Anst. ad Serg. Gramm.: doctr. part. 125–126). Or: “action.” – Approx. translation It is interesting that Sevier of Antioch, referring to the Fourth Book Against Eunomius, which was attributed to St. Basil the Great (probably due to Didymus the Blind), began to distinguish between "deeds" and energy; at the same time, he spoke about two different types of “deeds” (or “results”) - corresponding to Christ as God and as Man, but one energy corresponding to one actor (Christ) (Davydenkov 2007, p. 146). See the difference in the relationship between the concepts of “actions” and “deeds” among monoenergists and dioenergists in Hovorun 2008, p. 118–119. Govorun, in particular, notes that monoenergists from the very beginning recognized the existence of two types of “deeds” of Christ - divine and human, but insisted (unlike dioenergists) that Christ has one energy. Or: "action". – Approx. translation Energy is a manifestation of nature, and as such it is universal for all carriers of a given nature, but deed, that is, action, is private and concrete, although its basis is natural energy, which is used in one way or another by one or another hypostasis (i.e., active). Natural energy manifests itself in a particular act, and an act can be said to be an “action,” but action in the sense of natural energy (universal) should be distinguished from such a particular manifestation of it, and natural energy is not a particular act. This fundamental point of Rev. Maxim made it one of the fundamental ones for himself in polemics with monoenergists, who, as one of the arguments, precisely cited the statement that “the result (ἀποτέλεσμα) of His two natural energies - that is, the sign of God revealed by the Savior God to other [people], such as the Resurrection, or the Ascension, or purification, or any other of such miracles - is one and the same energy” (opusc. 9: PG 91, 120B), and especially with the monothelites, who confused natural will with the act of volition and its object (see, for example, opusc. 1) and, taking advantage of this confusion, on the basis of the singularity of the object of volition, they also asserted the singularity of will. Read more about the interpenetration of energies in opusc. 16: PG 91, 189D–192A. It is precisely by the presence of the concept of interpenetration of energies (and not even by the explicit confession of “two” energies, which at various stages of the polemic he allowed not to talk about) the teaching of St. Maxim, apparently, differed from the teachings of the monoenergists, in particular Pyrrhus. On the adequacy of understanding St. Maximus St. Anastasia testifies by comparing the analysis of this passage with the ideas contained in a passage from the work of St. Anastasia Words on energies, preserved in Doctrina patrum. In view of the importance of this text, we present it in its entirety: “However, since the word “energy” has many meanings, and its homonymy often becomes a cause of confusion for many, it should be distinguished in how many meanings “energy” is used. And let us not be mistaken when, having heard this term, we find ourselves drawn, as usual, to a meaning other than the one in question. For “energy” designates the first thought that exists in us, and this is the simple and unrelated energy of the mind, which secretly puts forward its own thoughts of its own, without which it would not be justly called “mind”. “Energy” is also called the clarification and revelation of the conceivable through the utterance of speech (λόγου). It, in turn, is by no means independent and simple, but is contemplated in relation, for this very relation, which the creator has to the becoming, is in some way energy. And the accomplished itself (ἀποτελούμενον) is again [energy]. For example, as can be seen in architecture and shipbuilding. After all, in them they plan in advance what will be built, the architect - the building, the shipbuilder - the ship, and then they bring to light what they have planned, in turn they manufacture and finish it. Doesn’t it seem to you that each of these things is the “energy” of the creator? “Of course,” you say. And one is simply a soul, another is a soul with the help of a body, another is a body with a rational soul, and yet the result of a person’s “energy” is one. I think the same about the “energies” of our Savior that are subject to our study, since the holy fathers often used the example of man in relation to the general, exploring the unity of natures. So, just like one is the energy of the rational soul, and the other is the energy of the body, and their common energy is that of man, consisting of both. Likewise, regarding our Savior, the God of the Word made man, we reflect, observing divine energy as divine, for example, the formation of our own body from a Virgin who did not know any natural pleasure (φυσικὴν ἡδονήν), without connection with her husband, or the transformation of water into wine by the mere aspiration of the will (ὁρμῇ θελήματος), and the like. I call human [energy in Christ] the same life as in humans, by which we move towards the desire for food (or: “the urge to eat” - ὄρεξιν), towards growth. For life is energy, and, moreover, the first energy of living things. If suddenly it is not energy, as others may think, then it is certainly suffering, which is absurd, so after all it is energy. However, having reflected on this, we see that, just as the natures from which energies come were united with each other, and just as from the united natures we contemplate one inseparable and unmixed hypostasis, so from different energies the result (τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα) is one - [the product of] the one Christ” (Anast. doctr. part. 78.16–80.3, trans. F. G. Benevich). From this passage it is clear to what extent St. Maxim, in his understanding of energy, its attribution to nature, and the result to the hypostasis of the actor, follows St. Anastasius, who can rightfully be called a pioneer in the development of Orthodox teaching about energies in Christ. Or: “dissimilarity.” – Approx. translation A. M. Shufrin, in the original translation of this text, translated διαφορά as “dissimilarity” throughout. This not entirely familiar translation (usually in St. Maximus διαφορά has the meaning of “difference” - see, for example, opusc. 14: PG 91, 153B) was obviously justified by one passage from the letter of Pope Honorius, which talks about the dissimilarity of natural wills in Christ, which, according to this letter, did not exist (see opusc. 20: PG 91, 241V). Nevertheless, if in the quotation from the Greek translation of the message of Pope Honorius διάφορος (this is the word used) is identical to ἐναντίος (“opposing”), then in most cases of the use of διαφορά and διάφορος by St. As a maxim, it points to the difference between natures and their wills, but not at all to their opposition. Ultimately, we decided to give both versions of the translation for διαφορά (indicating one of them in the note), but we include in the main text the one that seems to us to better correspond to the thought of St. Maxima in this place. Or: “dissimilarity.” – Approx. translation On the inseparability of divine and human energy in Christ according to St. Anastasia and the connection of this teaching with the Tomos of Pope Leo, see Sidorov 1989, p. 28–29. Or: “dissimilarities.” – Approx. translation Rev.'s favorite argument. Maxima - hypostatic energy, if such a thing existed, would separate the Son from the Father, that is, it would produce a division in the consubstantial Trinity. A.I. Sidorov cites the following definitions of energy from the Philosophical Chapters of St. Anastasia: “she is: 1) the natural force and movement of each essence; 2) creative activity (ποίησις) and the manifestation of any will; 3) the movement of all essential existence; 4) spontaneous (δι̉ αὐτῆς) movement of an entity that reveals the existence only of itself” (Sidorov 1989, p. 30 with reference to Uthemann 1980, pp. 352–353). In these definitions, three points attract attention - a clear correlation of energy with essence, the definition of energy through the movement of essence and - in the second definition - the understanding of energy as a manifestation of will. All these points will be characteristic of St. Maxima. Ponsois interprets it differently: “...without merging the features of natures in their combination.” – Approx. translation It is interesting to compare the analysis of St. Maxim of an excerpt from the Word of St. Anastasia versus Philoponus with ideas from an excerpt from the Word of St. Anastasia in defense of the Tomos of Pope Leo, which was presented at the Sixth Ecumenical Council: “if He (Jesus Christ) did in a Divine way that by which He was to be known as God, and that by which it was necessary to see Him as a true man, He did in a human way, then, obviously, one action completely belongs to the Divine nature, and the other to the human. If these actions are distinguished as one and the other, as they really are, then why accuse anyone of distinguishing them from one another by speaking of both natures [in Jesus Christ]? It is necessary, as Cyril said (in the 23rd chapter of the Treasury - translator's note), to render to God what is due to Him, and to humanity [attribute] what is due. Both [actions] are not the same thing, and therefore, [as is] appropriate, they are not attributed [to the same nature]; but, however, both completely relate to one [and the same Christ], since He was and is one, although He acts differently through His different natures. Just as it is not the same thing that He reproached His Mother when She said: They have no wine [John 2:3] and that He turned water into wine, so humanity is not identical with the Divinity, and the Divinity with humanity, nor is that which comes from [both of] them identical. Both are done by the same God, who is also man, who did not allow natures to be mixed up, as well as the actions that proceed from them. Both are impossible and alien to pious thinking. Just as feeding and growing is not the work of the Divine, so raising the dead is not the work of humanity. So, both belong to Him, who decently united the Divinity with humanity, not through fusion, but through unfused unity. So there are two actions, as well as two natures, and the agent is one, who is both God and man” (Mansi XI. 436E–437B, trans. op. cit. from: Acts 1996. T. IV, p. 129). This passage (if it is completely authentic) is one of the rare patristic quotations from the time before the debate about monoenergism, where the expression “two actions” is used. It is characteristic that the fathers of the Council chose it, and not the place that St. Maxim in opusc. 20. Unitarian expressions in their complementarity to the confession of two energies were, as a rule, not used during the Council period, and their importance and equality were not emphasized (this was already the case with St. Maximus himself after 643). However, this passage also emphasizes the unity of the action in the presence of two energies. Here we see with all clarity that St. During this period, Maxim considered it quite acceptable to confess: “one and two” energies. In other theological and polemical works, the translation of this quote is “willing”. Greg. Naz. or. 30.12. Read more about this passage from St. Gregory and his role in the controversy surrounding monothelitism, see note. 205, 256, 266 and 273. This is an interpretation. – Approx. translation Anastasy. – Approx. translation An attempt to convey in translation Maximus' play on the etymology of the name Philoponus (= hardworking). – Approx. translation St. Maxim probably means that “prudence” as a characteristic of Christ’s desire in the mouth of St. Anastasia is evidence of his confession that desire belongs to human nature. Perhaps, Rev. Maxim means that “prudence” is characteristic of the human will. But in general, due to the quote being taken out of context, its meaning is not entirely clear. That is, as θεόθεν, and not θεωθὲν. – Approx. translation Θεόθεν means “from the gods”, “by the will of the deity”, “from above”. In this context, θεόθεν ὅλον would mean that the will of human nature in Christ would not be deified, as St. Gregory, and behind him St. Maxim, but would come from God. Govorun believes that the Monothelites “could read θεόθεν, which means “from God”... And this would convince them even more strongly that St. Gregory spoke about one will. The Diophelites, obviously, read θεωθέν, in the sense that the will became deified. This was for them evidence of the presence of two wills: one – Divine, and the other – human, deified (θεωθέν).” And further Govorun writes: “If the will, which in Gregory’s phrase is designated as θεωθέν, is the only will of Christ and, moreover, the Divine one, then this leads to absurdity, since the Divine cannot be deified. According to Maximus, this would also mean that the human nature of Christ either cannot be deified or must undergo unacceptable changes: otherwise, if the deification of the human will is opposed to the belief in the existence of two wills, as they claim, then the deification of nature will be opposed to the belief in the existence of two natures” (Hovorun 2008, p. 132). Battrellos writes that St. Maxim paradoxically equates hypostatic unity with relative unity here (Bathrellos 2004, p. 104), but most likely we are talking about hypostatic unity in the Nestorian sense, as can be seen further from the context, and in this sense both “relative” and “hypostatic” are understood. Probably, the Monothelites believed that the teaching of the Diophelites about the deification of the human will in Christ was equivalent to the teaching of the Nestorians (at least, such an argument was put forward). Defense against this accusation from Rev. Maximus seems to be nowhere else in the Theological-Polemical Works, although starting from the opusc. 16 prp. Maxim makes a clear distinction between the Orthodox and Nestorian teachings about the wills in Christ. At the VI Ecumenical Council, the Monothelite Macarius of Antioch called Maximus and his followers Nestorians. According to the image of the connection as the Nestorians thought of it (see notes 125 and 604). “Καί” here should probably be understood in the sense of “a” or “but”, as understood, for example, by Ponsois, but A. M. Shufrin decided to preserve the literal translation, whenever possible conveying the style of the St. who is difficult to understand. Maxima. This entire paragraph is difficult to understand and translate due to the fact that we do not know for certain the context of the dispute from which the saint comes. Maxim in his answer to Marin (it is also possible that the text in Min’s edition came to us with distortions), just as we do not have the text of St. Anastasia, where he analyzes a quote from St. Gregory, about whom St. Maxim said that there were some inaccuracies in expressions. J.-C. Larchet, judging by his cursory analysis of this passage (Larchet 1998, p. 29), understood this passage in the sense that the expression θεόθεν ὅλον confirms the teaching of the Monothelites and others. Maxim challenges him precisely because of this (Govorun gives the same interpretation). More extensive analyzes of this topos by St. Gregory, see texts in approx. 205, 256, 266 and 273. In none of these places, however, is there any mention of the possibility of another reading of this passage from St. Gregory, and his expression about complete deification is used by St. A maxim to prove the presence in Christ of a human natural will (deified, of course). St. Maxim resorts to an important argument, according to which everything natural is impeccable, that is, not sinful, nevertheless, he distinguishes such “natural” from deified. The state of deification is characterized not only by the actual absence of sin, but also by its impossibility, which in Christ took place due to the hypostatic unity and interpenetration (perichoresis) of natures. St. Gregory the Theologian in or. 30.12. The question that is put into the mouth of the opponent, St. Maxim, based on the difference in the word St. Gregory between the natural will, “corresponding to us” and “corresponding to the Savior.” The thesis was put forward above that the natural will is irreproachable, but St. Gregory says that the will that corresponds to us often contradicts God’s, which means, the opponent says, either it is not natural, or it is not true that it can conflict with God. That is, his thesis that the natural does not contradict God, St. Maxim tests his opponents with imaginary questions, obviously preparing his addressee for them. The meaning of this test is clear from what follows - if there is a natural human will in Christ, then St. Gregory says that the will that corresponds to us (and this seems to be the natural human will) can come into conflict with the Divine. But in Christ this cannot be. Hence the conclusion - it means that in Christ there is no natural human will (= natural, corresponding to us, would come into conflict with the human will that is in Him), i.e. it is impossible to speak of two natural wills - human and divine - in Him. This, obviously, is the general thrust of the objections to which the Venerable will respond. Maxim. Nature as such, in its movement in accordance with the logos of nature as God intended it. “Coming from us” already indicates the bearer of the will, who uses it in one way or another. We are talking, as can be seen from what follows, about the tropos of using nature, which it receives in one form or another and which manifests itself in one or another act of volition. It is this tropos that can be, and for the most part is, reproachful for us, and not the logos of nature. Wed. understanding of St. John of Damascus hypostasis as one who acts and uses (natural) energy ὑπόστασις) (Joan. Dam. exp. fid. 59.10–12). It is the method (tropos) of using energy that depends on the hypostasis (= the actor), which in one way or another uses the natural ability. Sin is not in nature created by God, but in how we (as hypostases) use it. It surpasses us in tropos, which in Christ is the tropos of deification due to hypostatic unity with the Divine nature, but is identical in logos. Reproachful passions. From this place St. Maximus gives his understanding of Christ’s relative assimilation of our reproachful passions. This question, as we could see repeatedly (see notes 129, 134, 154, 267, 417, 639 and especially 694 and 715), was significant for the controversy, since the Monothelites from a certain point, certainly from the time of Patriarch Paul, if not earlier (Bathrellos 2004, p. 83), began to argue that all prayer for the Cup and similar passages in The Gospels should be understood in the sense of the relative assimilation of our will in its reproachful opposition to God, but not in the sense of the action of the natural will. St. Maximus, in response to this, develops his understanding of relative assimilation and its place in the Gethsemane prayer, for more details see chap. 14 introductory article. Greg. Naz. or. 30.5.7. This place is from St. Gregory, like the one that followed him (Greg. Naz. or. 30. 5.16–27), served as the source for the development of the concept of relative assimilation. Let's give their Russian translation: “As for me he is called an “oath” [Gal.3:13] He who breaks my oath; and “sin” [2 Cor.5:21] – He who “takes away the sin of the world” [John 1:29]; and Adam from the old is made new; so He makes my disobedience, as the Head of the whole body, His disobedience. Therefore, as long as I am disobedient and rebellious with my passions and because I renounce God, so long will Christ, solely for me, be called disobedient” (trans. Gregory the Theologian 1994. Vol. 1, p. 431). And further: “It seems to me that the words have the same meaning: O God, My God, listen to Me, why have You forsaken Me [Ps. 21:1]? For He Himself was not abandoned either by the Father or by His own Divinity... but (as I already said) in His person He represents us (ἐν ἑαυτῷ δέ, ὅπερ εἶπον, τυποῖ τὸ ἡμέτερον). We were previously abandoned and despised, but now we have been accepted and saved by the sufferings of the Impassive. Likewise, He assimilates (οἰκειούμενος) to Himself both our foolishness and our sinfulness, as can be seen from the continuation of the psalm, because the twenty-first psalm clearly refers to Christ” (Greg. Naz. or. 30.5.20–27, trans. according to: Gregory the Theologian 1994. Vol. 1, p. 431). The original has one word: πάθη. – Approx. translation The expression κατ’ οἰκείωσιν καὶ ἀναφοράν (by assimilation and relatively) is found further in Ps.-Cyril’s treatise On the Holy Trinity, which was written after the writings of St. Maxim, but here it is said that “according to assimilation and relative” the words were uttered by Christ: “My God, my God, what have you forsaken me?” [Matthew 27:46] (Cyr. Al. de trin. [Sp.]: PG 77, 1168.47); He considered them to be spoken “relatively” to St. Eulogius (Phot. biblioth. 230.268a.22), who follows St. Gregory the Theologian (Gr. Naz. or. 30.5.16–27)), since Christ was never abandoned by the Father either in Divinity or in humanity. As the author of the same treatise further says: “Τὸ ἡμέτερον τοίνυν οἰκειούμενος πρόσωπον, καὶ μεθ’ ἡμῶν τάσσων ἑαυτὸν, ταῦτα ἔλεγεν (He said this, taking our face to Himself and placing Himself along with us)” (PG 77, 1169.3–4) (cf. the same position in Damascene in: Joan. Dam. exp. fid. 91.95 ff.). Impeccable passions - feelings of hunger, thirst, illness, mortality, etc. See about the sources of the concept of impeccable passions approx. 377. Reproachful passions are resistance to God and all kinds of sinful passions. Here Rev. Maximus hints at the possibility of applying the concept of relative assimilation to the Gethsemane prayer. Christ in Gethsemane does not show resistance to the Father’s will, but can only seem so to us, who in such circumstances, that is, in the face of death, usually show resistance or, at a minimum, hesitation of the will. Having accepted our nature with that blameless passion that arose in it after the Fall (as a punishment for it), Christ (albeit in a voluntary tropos different from us) allowed Himself to endure blameless passions for humanity. As for resistance, He did not show it, but out of compassion for us, He only “relatively” assimilated (depicted) the image of our resistance (for more details, see Chapter 14 in the introductory article). There is no doubt about the understanding of St. The maxim of the pedagogical meaning of the Gethsemane prayer, in which Christ “by his own example teaches us to voluntarily submit our [will]” and “represents the Father’s for us, so that we, carefully imitating, can, putting aside our own, fulfill the Divine through all possible zeal” (opusc. 20: PG 91, 241C). Relative assimilation has a pedagogical function and is performed out of compassion. St. Maximus probably advises Marin, on the one hand, to encourage those who try to delve into the doctrine of “relative assimilation”, since it is part of Tradition, and on the other hand, he warns against succumbing to the influence of the Monothelites who used this doctrine for their own purposes. In fact, in addition to the relative, there is also an essential assimilation (see opusc. 19), it was in accordance with it that Christ assimilated both our human nature and its natural will. Only in the perspective of these two teachings is it possible to correctly interpret the corresponding passages in the Gospels and in the Fathers. From this place St. Maximus begins an apology for Pope Honorius (625–638), who, in his response to Patriarch Sergius, who sent Psiphos to him (634) and in his own way set out the history of the controversy around monoenergism, wrote his letter containing the expression “one will.” This expression of Pope Honorius probably served as the patr. Sergius and Imp. Heraclius as an argument for publishing the imp. Heraclius Ekphesis (638), where the doctrine of one will is declared the only correct one. St. Maxim in opusc. 20 tries to prove that Honorius uses this expression not at all in the sense in which the Monothelites use it. It is interesting to note that neither prp. Maximus nor his opponents drew attention to the other part of Honorius’ letter, in which he, completely in the spirit of Psiphos, which, as we remember, was accepted by St. Sophronius of Jerusalem, etc. Maximus, speaks of the need to abstain from the confession of both one and two energies: “one should not turn into church dogmas what the councils have not examined, nor have the legal authorities deigned to explain, so that anyone would dare to preach one or two actions in the Lord Jesus Christ” (Acts 1996. Vol. IV, p. 178). The only thing Honorius insisted on in the context of this issue was the affirmation of one acting in the communication of two natures (Ibid.). In the second message of Patr., written somewhat later. Sergius Honorius repeated: “We should not affirm either one or two actions,” to which he adds the formula of Pope Leo: “Both natures ... acted and produced each in communication with the other” (Acts 1996. Vol. IV, p. 195), which in fact was a stumbling block for monoenergism. The reason for the controversy was a phrase from the first letter of Pope Honorius to Patr. Sergius: “From here we confess one will in the Lord Jesus Christ” (Latin retroversion from Greek: unde et unam voluntatatem fatemur Domini nostri Iesu Christi) (Mansi XI. 538 sqq., trans. according to Acts 1996. T. IV, p. 177). In his argument, Rev. Maximus relies on the context in which Pope Honorius's phrase about one will occurs. Below he gives selected quotes from Honorius's message or retells them. For the sake of completeness of perception, let us present the thoughts of St. Maximus has a longer passage containing the controversial phrase about one will, in another translation: “Since, obviously, the Divinity could neither be crucified nor experience human suffering, it is said: “God suffered,” “humanity descended from heaven with the Divinity,” only because of the ineffable union of the Divine and human natures. Hence we confess in the Lord Jesus Christ one will; for it is clear that our nature is accepted by the Divinity, not sinful, not that which is damaged after the fall, but a nature created before the Fall... He was conceived without sin by the Holy Spirit, therefore His birth from the holy immaculate Virgin and Mother of God was without sin, not participating in the custom of nature that sinned" (Mansi XI. 538 sqq., trans. according to Acts 1996. T. IV, p. 177). That is, Honorius spoke about one will in the passage cited in the previous note, meaning the will of God. Not from the side of sin. – Approx. translation From the essay “On the Incarnation, against Apollinaris” attributed to Athanasius the Great (PG 26, 1148C). – Approx. translation Or: “origin.” Neoplatonic term, Christianized in the Areopagitica. Favorite topic of St. A maxim developed by him especially in the Difficulties to John (amb. 41 and 42). Within the framework of this concept, Rev. Maxim, in particular, teaches that God, having created man, did not create death (and corruption) - they are the result of the Fall. Nevertheless, Adam could become corruptible, that is, incorruption was not necessarily inherent in him, therefore the coming into being (emergence), accepted by the Incarnate Logos, did not exclude sinless corruption, which He made possible for Himself by taking our flesh at birth. On the other hand, birth, which became a way of multiplying the human race after the Fall, was seedless and virgin in Christ. The fact that for people born passionately leaves a stamp on their entire existence, plunging them into a cycle of pleasure and suffering and making them prone to sin, this did not happen with Christ; the virgin birth, the perception into the hypostasis of the Logos of our nature, did not allow sin or even the possibility of sin. St. Maxim emphasizes that both emergence and birth required healing. The emergence of Adam led to corruption due to sin, and birth became a punishment for sin and, in turn, became a reason for sin; Christ, by his seedless and virgin birth, excluded all possibility of sin; Thus, having healed the birth and at the same time eliminating sin, He eliminated, ultimately (i.e., after the Resurrection), corruption, which was the punishment for sin. Therefore, the emergence, which in Adam could have entailed corruption (and indeed did entail it because of sin), in the New Adam - Christ - due to sinlessness and because of hypostatic unity with the Divine nature, allowed human nature to be established in deification and incorruption. We put this and the following quotes from Honorius’ letter to Sergius in quotation marks, based on his text preserved in the 12th act of the VI Ecumenical Council (Mansi XI. 537–543). – Approx. translation On the use and translation of the concepts διαφορά and διάφορος in opusc. 20 cm approx. 759. Wed. above, rev. Maximus speaks of natural will: “if it is formed and moves naturally, then it remains, if not in unity, then still in agreement (or: “convergence” - συμβαῖνον), and not in discord with God” (opusc. 20: PG 91, 236C). This kind of “convergence” of St. Maximus distinguishes from total convergence, see Ibid, 244A. In this sequence of manifestations of human will - from difference from the Divine (without contradicting it) through concession to complete convergence - St. Maxim, interpreting the message of Pope Honorius, sees the economic and pedagogical meaning of the Gethsemane prayer (see below). Honorius. Next comes again an excerpt from the message of Pope Honorius Patr. Sergius (cf. Acts 1996. T. IV, p. 177). Following Sakalis, we correct ἐπιμαρτυρετάς to ἐπιμαρτύρεται. – Approx. translation As we see, Rev. Maxim distinguishes the will that is simply “converging” with God, which is the natural will (not contradicting it), from the will that is “entirely converging and united,” which is the human will in Christ due to hypostatic unity and deification. Later Rev. Maxim will develop this topic in the context of the concepts: “fusion” (συμφυΐα) and “convergence” (σύννευσις) (see note 269). At the same time, it is incorrect to assume that the moral unity of the human will of Christ with the divine is achieved as a result of the Gethsemane struggle, but one should talk about the identification of the hypostatic unity of natures in Christ and the corresponding complete convergence of the human will with the Divine, which does not deny the fact that in Gethsemane the difference between the human will and God’s was revealed, when Christ freely allowed human nature and its will to manifest itself in aversion from death. St. Maximus believes that in the words of Christ “I came to do a will that is not My own,” “My” will is meant (i.e., Pope Honorius means) the human natural will in Christ. Following a note in the Ming edition, based on the transmission of this passage by Anastasius the Librarian (Collectanea, PL 129, 572B), instead of πολλὰ βαίνειν we read ἐπιβαλεῖν / ἐπιβάλλειν. – Approx. translation Larshe believes that this is a student of St. Maxima (Larchet 1998, p. 32, n. 3). Based on one place in the Disputation with Pyrrhus, one can identify Abba John with the closest theological adviser (secretary?) of Pope Honorius and Pope John IV (see: “the reliable interpreter of this letter is the one who compiled it on behalf of Honorius, still living and illuminating the whole West ... with the dogmas of piety ... He, in a letter to Saint Constantine, the then emperor, again on behalf of his saints of Pope John..." (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 329A, trans. D. E. Afinogenov according to: Maxim the Confessor 2004, p. 203)). About the history of the writing of the letter of Honorius and about the efforts of Rome and, first of all, Pope John IV (640–642) (who in 641, with the help of his collaborator Abba John, composed an apology for Pope Honoria (Apologia pro Honoria Papa: PL 129, 561B–566D; Mansi X. 682E–686E)) to relieve Honorius of responsibility for monothelitism, see Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 267–272, approx. 95–97. During the dispute with Pyrrhus, the incident of Honorius surfaced again (disp. Pyrr.: PG 1, 329A-B), while St. Maxim referred to the interpretation of the “one will” of Pope John in approximately the same sense as we find in this explanation of Abba John, Honorius’s closest collaborator: by one will we should understand the absence in Christ of opposition to God’s will in the form of two wills “flesh and spirit” fighting in Him. As we have seen, the explanation of St. The maxim is more complex: first he gives an interpretation of “one will”, based on the immediate context where this expression occurs, in the sense of the will of God at the incarnation (and the absence of sinful lust in the birth of Christ), then (245A) he adds that the human will of Christ completely converges and is united with this will, and then, based on another place in Honorius’s letter, he recognizes as a possible understanding of Honorius’ words and the interpretation of Abba John (for more details, see introductory article, chapter 13). Larchet, citing Meyendorff, argues that it is now accepted by commentators that Honorius, although he expressed himself very sloppily, was dogmatically free from heresy (Larchet 1998, p. 33). This point of view was not shared not only by the fathers of the VI Ecumenical Council, who condemned Honorius along with Sergius and Pyrrhus, but also by many researchers, including such famous ones as Hefele and Caspar, who considered it a stretch (Maximus the Confessor 2004, p. 271). We follow the conjecture proposed in Min’s edition: ἀκύρωσιν instead of κυρίωσιν. – Approx. translation It is interesting that Rev. Maximus is describing here what he himself will call “gnomic will,” but this term is not used here. According to a note in Min's edition, the reference is probably to Arcadius, Archbishop of Cyprus. – Approx. translation Saint Arcadius of Cyprus was the primate of the Cyprus Church in 626–642, archbishop of Salamis (then capital of Cyprus). Memory – August 29. This hierarch. – Approx. translation The expression unobscured light (τὸ ἄσκιον φῶς) is found in Clement of Alexandria (Clem. strom. 6.16.138.2.2) in relation to the light of truth. In the church tradition Christ is called the Never-Evening Light, i.e. “unsetting, unfading,” (irmos 5 of the Canon of the Presentation canon). Although Polycarp Sherwood admitted that the work could have been written either in 646 or 633 (relating the dating to the time of the supposed visit of St. Maximus to Sicily), we, following Larchet (Larchet 1998, p. 22), with a high degree of confidence place it at the beginning of the polemic against monoenergism or to a time immediately preceding it. There are no signs of polemics with Monothelitism (without which it is difficult to imagine the work of 646), in this work, but it is reminiscent of works of the 630s devoted to polemics with the Monophysites. There are certain reasons to correlate this essay with the visit of St. There is no Maximus of Sicily. The most we can say is that already at this time (probably in 633-634) he had correspondence with clergy and monks living in Sicily (another work directed to Sicily much later, c. 646, was opusc. 9). Since the correspondence was conducted in Greek, most likely these were clergy and monks of Greek origin. Or: “from outsiders.” – Approx. translation The translation is approximate - the text contains anacoluth and is probably corrupted. – Approx. translation This opposition is justified below by the context of the polemic with Sevier of Antioch, but already in Aristotle one can find the doctrine of what will later be called “essential quality,” which is almost identical to the second essence (Arist. cat. 3b.10–20, cf. commentary to this place: “second essences are the essential qualities of the first essences and, as such, differ from their accessory qualities” (Aristotle 1978. T. 2, p. 602, note 9)), although he, along with this, considers “quality” as a special category, but in this second case we are not talking about essential qualities, but about incidental ones (Categories, Chapter 8). The concept of essential quality is widely used in the philosophy of late antiquity, as among pagan philosophers and commentators on Aristotle (see, for example, Plotin. enn. 6.3.14.30; Porph. in Arist. cat. 4.1:95.22; Ibid: 95.29; 95.35; 96.19; 96.21; Simplic. in Arist. cat. 8.98.22; Ioann. PG 75, 108.15; PG 75, 569.20; Leont Byz. et Eutych: PG 86, 1277D). After St. Maximus, this concept is widely used by Damascus, and in the future the distinction between essence (nature) and essential (natural) quality will become an important point, emphasized by St. Gregory Palamas, for example, in a polemic with Nicephorus Grigora, who identified them (Fakrasis 2009, p. 29; 31 and comments by D. S. Biryukov with a small excursion into the philosophy of St. Maximus and Damascus, Ibid., p. 69; 80). Along with the concept of essential quality, there is the concept of “natural quality”. For example, Clement of Alexandria talks about the different “natural qualities” of a saw and an ax, according to which they can perform one or another action (saw and chop) (Clem. strom. 6.16.148.6.2). At the third Ecumenical Council, following St. Cyril said that the Divinity and humanity in Christ are distinguished by their natural qualities (ACO 1.1.4.26.26). For the difference in qualities that define each species, see, for example, Porph. in Arist. cat. exp. 4.1.82.18 (but here we speak of a man as a reasonable mortal and a dog as an unreasonable barking animal). On the reasonable man and the neighing horse, but without mentioning “quality,” see, for example, Cyr. Al. ep. paschal.: PG 77, 689.50; David in Porphyr. isagog. CAG. 18.2.: 85.30–86.5. An example of a description of the difference between one person and another, which is often found in Galen (see, for example, Galen. de method. med. libri xiv: 10.137.7). St. writes about the difference in special qualities among hypostases in a theological context. Gregory of Nyssa (letter attributed to St. Basil) ep. 38.3: PG. 32, 328C–D (for more information on this issue, see: Biryukov 2009b). Otherwise: “universal”. – Approx. translation St. Maxim, having warned that he is not expressing himself in his own sense, but in our concepts, speaks of the multitude of “natural qualities” in God, probably thereby emphasizing that these natural qualities differ from the Divine essence, one and completely unknowable and unnameable. Of qualities or characteristics. – Approx. translation By analogy with created essences and hypostases, but not in the proper sense, since God is simple, and the Divine hypostases are also simple, so that the characteristics (or qualities) of the hypostases and the hypostases themselves differ only by analogy with such a distinction in the created world. Or "logos". – Approx. translation Wed. in Alexander of Aphrodisias (Alex. in Arist. metaphys . 749.20) and in Porphyry (Porph. isagog . 4.1.10.5). Similar formulas and concepts (although not exactly the same) are found in authors belonging to the school of Alexandrian commentators on Aristotle: Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, Elijah, David, Olympiodorus. Wed, as St. Maximus speaks in the Difficulties to John about the ontological aspect of the Judgment of God, comprehended through the contemplation of “difference” (διαφορά) in creation: “And about the court (I speak) as a distribution that does not educate (or: “punishing” - παιδευτικήν) and as if punishing sinners, but about the preserving and delimiting (or: “defining” - ἀφοριστικήν) existing, according to which every created (being) in (inextricable) connection with the logoi, according to which it appeared, has a legalization that is unchangeable in natural identity (νομιμότητα) indestructible, since the Creator initially passed judgment and established regarding the existence of everyone and what it should be, and how, and what (it) [should be] (ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ δημιουργὸς ?? τε καὶ ὑπεστήσατο)" (amb. 10/19: PG 91, 1133D-1136A). See more details in Benevich 2013, p. 173–185. Here begins the polemic with Sevier, whom St. Maxim accused him of separating the essential quality from the essence, confessing in Christ two different essential qualities, but not two essences and two natures (see just below). The paronomasia characteristic of Byzantine authors, based on the fourfold repetition of the root leg/log, is lost in the translation. – Approx. translation Here Rev. Maxim, without going into the subtleties of Sevier's philosophical and theological system, judges it based on general ideas and philosophical concepts characteristic of the Chalcedonites: an essential quality, like energy, always belongs to some essence that exists in hypostasis. Sevier proceeded from a completely different philosophical system, in which, in particular, it was possible to talk about two different essential (or natural) qualities in Christ in the absence of two natures (despite the fact that “nature” he considered identical with the hypostasis) (see, for example, from the Epistle to the Committee of Ecumenium: “the difference and property in the sense of the natural quality of the natures that formed Emmanuel were preserved, and the flesh did not pass into the nature of the Word and the Word was not transformed into flesh" (quoted from: Davydenkov 2007, p. 209). For more information about Sevier’s teaching on natural quality, see: Davydenkov 2007, pp. 206–218. This researcher notes that Sevier in the First Epistle to Sergius the Grammar uses the expression of St. Cyril “logos of being” (ὁ λόγος τοῦ εἶναι πῶς) is equivalent to “natural quality” (ποιότης φυσική). This can be understood in such a way that Christ for Sevier exists “Divinely” and “humanly” (that is, he recognized such expressions as correct); he spoke (unlike the Monophysite Sergius Grammar) about two natural qualities or two “logoi of as-being” in Christ. In his correspondence with Sergius Grammaticus (who taught about one natural quality, since Christ has one, albeit complex nature), as Davydenkov notes, “he spoke not only about the distinction between Divinity and humanity in Christ at the level of natural quality, but also about the ‘difference in essence’” (Davydenkov 2007, pp. 216–217 and note 109). It is not known whether the Venerable knew. Maxim, perhaps, did not know all these details of Sevier’s teachings (cf. note 854). In any case, since Sevier and other Monophysites were monoenergists (see note 183), this is for St. Maxim was once again confirmation of the incorrectness of their teaching as a whole. The confession of the difference of essences without confessing them themselves, as well as the confession of two natural qualities and two logoi as being without the confession of two natures and essences in Christ, was not recognized by St. Maxim was correct and, obviously, was understood by him as the basis of monoenergism. Lit.: “and in the addition of the hypostasis.” – Approx. translation The simplicity of the Divinity, preserved during the hypostatic union of the Logos with the flesh, ensures in the eyes of St. Maxima is the possibility of preserving the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father and the Spirit. The complex nature, as the Monophysites confessed it in Christ, called into question consubstantiality, since the complex Theanthropic nature cannot be consubstantial either with the Father in Divinity, or with us in humanity. This is the logic of the argument of St. Maxima. It is difficult to say whether we are talking about monoenergist Chalcedonites, who were inclined to union with the Monophysites, or, more likely, about modern prp. Maximus and his addressee, the Monophysites (cf. 256D). Here Rev. Maxim is not entirely fair to Sevier, who “spoke not only about the distinction between Divinity and humanity in Christ at the level of natural quality, but also about the ‘difference in essence’” (Davydenkov 2007, pp. 216–217, note 109). For Rev. For Maximus, the recognition of an essential difference is obviously equivalent to the recognition of two different essences in Christ, and for Sevier, the confession of two different essential qualities is sufficient for this. But Sevier really did not recognize two natures. For more details, see note. 849 and 860. The source of the quote could not be found; it is quite possible that it is not genuine, or we are dealing with a free retelling of the content. St. Maxim establishes a clear correspondence between the presence in Christ of two different natural qualities and the presence of two essences, whose qualities they are, as well as the energies of these essences. Energy is natural to him. Sevier, in turn, spoke of two different types of “deeds” (or “results”) - corresponding to Christ as God and as Man, but one energy corresponding to one actor (Christ) (Davydenkov 2007, p. 146). As Hovorun notes: “Monoenergist-monothelites allowed a significant distance between the natural qualities of Christ and His energies-wills, while their opponents considered energies and wills as natural qualities” (Hovorun 2008, p. 105). From the commented place opusc. 21 this is exactly what is visible. Moreover, although this work does not contain a direct polemic against monoenergism, it actually contains all the prerequisites for a polemic against it. St. Maxim, obviously, has in mind the well-known Monophysite formula: of two natures, but one nature. Polemical argument; Of course, Sevier did not profess such a thing, etc. Maxim knew this. The place is complex, what is meant is not entirely clear. Argumentation of Rev. The maxim coincides with the argumentation of the monophysite Sergius Grammar, with whom Sevier polemicized. Sergius also believed that there is either one nature and one natural quality (there are no two different ones), or two different natural qualities and two natures (Torrance 1988, p. 38). Sevier, however, proceeded from different philosophical premises. The concept of essential quality allowed, as he believed, to profess the difference of essences without separation: Divinity and humanity in Christ retain their essential qualities (irremovable natural difference - otherness (otherness) in relation to each other), but do not exist without each other (which in his terminology is equivalent to the denial of two natures) (Ibid, p. 86–87). Thus, if for prp. Maxim, the essential quality, like energy, was evidence of the presence of essence, was its constituent sign (Christ was from two, in two and two essences = nature), then for Sevier it was understood rather as a form of differentiation within the framework of a single complex nature-hypostasis of the “Divine” and “human”, without talking about the Divinity and humanity of Christ as such. It is possible that the clarification of Rev. Maxim is associated with the famous teaching of St. Gregory of Nyssa from chapter 24. treatise On the Structure of Man, which explains how the “intelligent” (God) could create a sensory creation. The sensual is interpreted by St. Gregory as “composed of any qualities”, and “each type of quality is separated by logos from the subject”; all these qualities, collected together, form “substantial nature” (PG 44, 212D–213A, trans. V.M. Lurie, quoted from: Gregory of Nyssa 1995, pp. 76–77), that is, the material turns out to be an “assembly” of the intelligible, since each such quality is contemplated “separately and unmixed. After all, another is the logos of color, another is the logos of gravity,” etc. (Ibid.). With this understanding, qualities do not endow some matter with qualities, but they themselves - in the assembly - create “material nature”. In contrast to this concept of the material, St. Maxim definitely speaks of matter itself as the subject of all qualities of material things. That is, why the number “two” in relation to natures divides the one Christ, as Sevier believed, but the number “two” in relation to natural qualities does not separate (Davydenkov 2007, p. 217). Or: “on what basis.” According to Larchet, it is currently not possible to date this work (Larchet 1998, p. 18). Combefis's note (it is unclear on what basis) says that this is a composition from the word of Gregory, Patriarch of Constantinople, to the emperor. Such a reference to St. Gregory the Theologian can only be understood in relation to a quotation from him, moreover, from an essay addressed not to Emperor Theodosius, but to Cledonius (see opusc. 22: PG 91, 260A), but not in relation to the entire present work, which is two small passages devoted to the defense of the Council of Chalcedon from the attacks of the Monophysites. Confidence that the essay belongs to St. Maxim, no. Angelis places this work first in his Italian edition of the translations of Opusc., but also notes the doubtfulness of its attribution to St. Maxim. The translation is approximate. The original text appears to be corrupted. Critic of the Council, monophysite. Against a new heresy a confession of faith in new terms may well be advanced. Wed. from Leontius of Jerusalem: “Since because of some who speak of two natures of Christ (that is, the Word and the flesh of the Lord), each of which is special not only in relation to the logos of nature, but also in the sense of the existence of its very hypostasis, and did not teach that the Word Himself was incarnate in one unity according to hypostasis, it was, of course, necessary to say: “the one nature of God the Word incarnate,” so that the duality of natures would be signified by the fact that nature is called “incarnate” in relation [to something] (for “incarnate” is said in relation to [nature] that has embodied); and it is clear that there is no reason for the wicked to separate one hypostasis of these two natures only because the expression “two natures” is accepted, for among foolish people “nature” has many meanings, and is often used instead of “essence” or “hypostasis” (when applied to a person (προσωπικῆς)) - insofar as It is also necessary for us, due to the fact that again some, having fallen into a new and opposite wickedness, teach that the incarnation of the Word through transformation and fusion became one nature, to introduce this new expression (about two natures), which, like the expression “one nature of God the Word incarnate,” preserves the meaning [of the teaching] opposite [to the opinion of] the mentioned heretics, and warns against newly appearing evil teachers (that in which the first was obviously powerless [expression] (about one nature)), and thus [it is necessary] to explain [the doctrine] about the two natures of the one Christ, united in His one hypostasis" (Leont. Hier. contr. monophys.: PG 86, 1808C–1809A). We add the particle “not” for meaning. There is no negation in the Greek text. Sherwood notes that this work consists of three parts, each of which should be given its own number (in a number of manuscripts these parts are separated from each other, as is done in the case of different works). With some degree of probability, according to Sherwood, dating can only be discussed in relation to the first part, starting with ten chapters devoted to the basic concepts of Orthodox theology. Sherwood believes that it was written in 626–633. (Sherwood 1952, p. 30). We are not completely sure that this part belongs to opusc. 23 prp. Maxim, in any case, a comparison of the text says that these ten chapters (after the first sentence) are only a slightly modified quote from Leont. Byz. сontr . Nest. et Eutych.: PG 86, 1277D–1280A (Larchet (Larchet 1998, p. 21) only indicates the influence of the two Leontiev, but not the specific place on which the author of opusc. 23 relies). However, it cannot be ruled out that Rev. Maxim made slightly updated extracts from Leontius, but then the dating of this “extract” could be anything. Further in the same part there is a quotation from Clement of Alexandria’s treatise on Providence (the authenticity of which raises serious doubts) and another passage attributed to the saint himself. Maxim, but not entirely clear in content. The affiliation of the florilegies that make up the second and third parts of this work, St. Maxim is doubted by a number of researchers (Larchet 1998, p. 22), however, the materials published by Epifanovich indicate that they, like the definitions, belong to St. Maxim (Epifanovich 1917, nº XVII). The concepts that are defined here are discussed in more detail later in opusc. 14 (c. 640). These definitions, going back partly to Leontius of Byzantium, partly to the Cappadocian fathers, were largely adopted further (through St. Maximus?) by St. John of Damascus, so the study of the origins of this tradition and the methods of its transmission (impossible until the appearance of critical editions of the entire Leontief corpus and the theological and polemical works of St. Maximus) is of great interest. Otherwise: “eidos”. – Approx. translation Wed. Arist. meteorolog. 379b.26; Alexander. in metaphys. 543.22. Wed. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. 3.10.48.4. That essence exists in itself and does not need another is a commonplace among Neoplatonist commentators on Aristotle (see, for example, Simplic. in physics 9.132.3). For polemics with the Monophysites, this position was important in order to emphasize the unmixed nature of the union of essences in Christ, each of which is preserved as such. Wed. Leont. Byz. сontr . Nest. et Eutych.: PG 86, 1277D. Otherwise: “being in essence.” – Approx. translation Otherwise: “being in hypostasis.” – Approx. translation About these concepts, which St. Maximus uses, following Leontius of Byzantium (see especially Leont. Byz. сontr. Nest. et Eutych.: PG 86, 1277D - this is the passage of Leontius, which is quoted here almost verbatim by St. Maximus, if he is the author of this work) and other neo-Chalcedonites, see more in opusc. 14, especially the text in approx. 490–496 and the notes themselves. This refers to the perfect Divinity and imperfect (since it did not have its own hypostasis, but was perceived in the hypostasis of the Logos) humanity. We add “not” according to the meaning, because it is impossible to imagine that St. Maxim professed the fusion of Divinity and humanity in Christ. The text is probably corrupted. Wed. Joann. Gramm. apology. council. Chalcedon. 209. See discussion of the meaning and different translation options of this passage in: Leonty of Byzantium 2006, p. 475–476. Since the passage belongs to Leontius, we considered it possible not to go deeper into its interpretation and refer to this study, paying attention to the complexity in its understanding and the possibility of errors in translation. In addition, since we are not dealing with critical editions, discrepancies may be explained by errors in the manuscripts. Thus, the corresponding place in Leontius’ text is translated: “the hypostatic indicates that it is not an incidental property that has existence in another and is not contemplated in itself” (Ibid.). That is, in Leontius: “the hypostatic indicates that it is not incidental.” At St. Maxim: “the hypostatic denotes what is incidental, not in itself...”. Or: “inherent” (cf. the translation of a parallel passage in Leontius of Byzantium: Leont. Byz. сontr. Nest. et Eutych.: PG 86, 1277D in: Leontius of Byzantium 2006, p. 474). Otherwise: “implemented.” – Approx. translation Continuation of the presentation of the passage from Leont. Byz. сontr . Nest. et Eutych.: PG 86, 1277D. Wed. Leont. Byz. сontr . Nest. et Eutych.: PG 86, 1277D–1280A. Wed. Leont. Byz. сontr . Nest. et Eutych.: PG 86, 1280A. Although this passage is listed among the fragments of the writings of St. Clement of Alexandria (Clem. Al. Fr. 37, ed. O. Stählin), this passage from opusc. 23 is its only source, and there are serious reasons to doubt its attribution, as well as other passages from the work On Providence, to which St. Petersburg refers. Maximus, to Clement of Alexandria. About this work of St. Clement to St. No one reports Maxim, and it cannot be ruled out that it belongs to the saint himself. Maximus or his disciples (Madden 1982, pp. 69–71), although, as regards this passage (as opposed to those where definitions of the will are given), what relation could it have to the disputes in which St. Maxim, remains unclear. At the same time, it must be admitted that the topic of providence was very important for him (for more details, see Benevich 2013), but in this passage it is practically not developed, but is only mentioned, and not entirely in the spirit of the teachings of St. Maxima (see note 894). At the same time, in the passage there are expressions and terms characteristic of St. Maxima (ἐνούσιον, τὸ πῶς εἶναι, etc.). The question of the attribution of a passage cannot be resolved without studying the corresponding manuscript tradition. Reproduced by Damascene (Joan. Dam. fragm. philos. 11.2). The fact that nature proclaims the truth of things (and not just prophecies and the writings of saints) writes Cosmas Indicoplous προδήλως κηρύττουσα) (Cosm. Indicopl. topogr. christ. 10.41.6), but this idea seems to be somewhat different than in the passage from opusc. 23, as can be seen from the addition “or their existence in essence (ἐνούσιον).” Damascene also reproduces this definition without adding about “being in the essence” (see Joann. Dam. fragm. philos. 11.32). Otherwise: “fulfillment.” Wed. these and the following two definitions with the definitions of nature by St. Anastasia of Antioch as presented by A.I. Sidorov: “As for “nature,” it is the reality or fulfillment (τὸ ἐνούσιον) of things. According to some, “nature is the formation of those who come into being, and according to others, it is the Providence of God regarding [everything] that has become, determining both [their] being and the image of [this] being (τὸ πῶς εἶναι)” (Sidorov 1989a, p. 185). In the original the match is almost complete. The identification of nature and providence (πρόνοια) is characteristic of the Stoics. Among the Neoplatonists, fate (εἱμαρμένη) was identified with nature, which, in contrast to providence emanating from the Mind (in Plotinus) or the Genads of the One (in Proclus), was correlated with the Soul of the World. However, even among the Stoics, providence was practically identified with fate, while among the Neoplatonists, fate was entirely derived from providence and was established by it. For Rev. Maximus characteristically distinguishes the logos of nature, which as its design was correlated with Divine providence, from nature itself, which, unlike providence, was created. We find no evidence of such teaching in this passage. The concept of a complex hypostasis in relation to Christ is developed by John the Grammar (Joann. Gramm. сapit. xvii contra monophysitas. 70); confession of a complex hypostasis becomes mandatory in Orthodox theology after the Edict of the Right Faith of the Emperor. Justinian (Justin. edictum rectae fidei. 144.21). Wed. at St. Maxim: “The name “Christ” does not indicate nature, but a complex hypostasis” (opusc. 24: PG 91, 268A). In general, in this passage the language is somewhat darker than usual in St. Maximus expresses the doctrine of a complex hypostasis (perhaps in relation to Christ, although He is not directly spoken of), in which each part (essence) is consubstantial with the essence contemplated in the hypostases (“individual things”) of the corresponding species, i.e. nature. The ending of this passage is not entirely clear, but it can be assumed that the phrase “and in general and [something] common in all individual [things] of a complex kind” implies a complex created hypostasis, primarily a person consisting of soul and body, the “type” of which can be considered complex. In relation to Christ, of course, one cannot speak of any “complex form.” This work is found not only among the works of St. Maxim, but also in itself (see PG 86, 2937–2940). It is given in expanded form (as consisting not of seven but of thirteen chapters) in Doctrina Patrum (pp. 152-155). See also the translation of this work (all thirteen chapters) by P. K. Dobrotsvetov, edited by D. S. Chepel: Christian reading No. 7–8. 2009, p. 137–140. The present translation of the seven chapters differs from Dobrotsvetov’s translation. Since this work belongs to St. Eulogius, not St. Maxim, we will refrain from commenting on him. Otherwise: “unlimited” – Note. translation Wed. St.'s understanding of essence as “general and indefinite” Gregory of Nyssa in the famous letter 38, which was attributed to St. Basil the Great (Basil. ep. 38.3.9). Wed. Basil. ep. 38.2.5–6 ff in Doctrina Patrum 35.12 and Joan. Dam. сontra Jacobit. 5.6. V.V. Petrov (Petrov 2008, p. 35, note 111) also gives similar parallel passages in St. Maxim and other authors: “261B, 264C; ep. 15: PG 91, 545A, 548D). In 545A Maximus refers to Basil the Great (Bas. ep. 214, 4; 236, 6; 210, 5). Wed. Leont. Byz. contr. nestorianos et eutych. I: PG 86, 1305BC); Idem,advers. argumenta Severi: PG 86,1928BC)". He also examines the concept of hypostasis in St. Maxim in its various aspects – ontological and “existential” (Petrov 2008, pp. 35–46). Wed. Basil. ep. 38.3.9–11. Cp. Joan. Gram. apolog. council Chalcedon. 205 ff. see Doctrina Patrum 198.14. Wed. Arist. phys. 253b.8 and a more exact match of the quotation in: Ps.-Plutar. placita philosopher. 875C.3 and Alexan. metaph. comm. 660.11. Wed. Melet. de nat. hom. 154.13. From this sentence to the end of opusc. 23 text attributed to St. Clement of Alexandria (Clem. Al. Fr. 38. 4–9) (source cited by the publisher, in addition to the corresponding passage in Migne: Denis Nicolas Le Nourry. Bibliotheca maxima veterum patrum et antiquorum scriptorum ecclesiasticorum. Apparatus ad bibl. patrum I Col. 1335 aus Paris. 854 f. 130r). The fragment is attributed to the same mysterious treatise on Providence. According to Sherwood, this work was written c. 640, shortly after the publication of the Ekphesis and is one of the first reactions to it (Sherwood 1952, p. 63); according to A. Cereza-Gastaldo, it dates back to 646–647, that is, written simultaneously with the opusc. 15 (Larchet 1998, p. 40). Apparently, this means because of deification. The hypostasis of Christ is the hypostasis of the Logos, for which the Divine nature is His own, the flesh was taken into it, and already through this flesh we talk about the mortality of Christ, Who is in the proper sense immortal. Thesis of Rev. The maxim is polemically pointed against the Nestorian model, in which Christ is conceived as “composite” of two hypostases. He further continues this polemic when he says that in Christ there was no gnomic confrontation of wills. Of course, the purpose of this entire passage is not a polemic with Nestorius, but with the Monothelites, who believed that two wills implied their opposition. St. Maximus means that the Christological model, in which human nature is perceived in the hypostasis of the Logos, excludes such a confrontation (cf. Bathrellos 2004, p. 105). This phrase begins the discussion about the Battle of Gethsemane, which was apparently discussed above. Apparently, this text is an excerpt from a more extensive treatise. – Approx. translation In the original, “does not cover.” The denial probably appeared as a result of a scribal error - it is not found in the text of St. John Chrysostom, nor in opusc. 15, which also contains this quotation. – Approx. translation ὑπόθεσιν. In opusc. 15:164D – πρόφασιν (“reasons”). That's exactly how it is with Min. This lengthy quote is from Joan. Chrys. Contra Anom., homilia 7: PG 48, 765.46–766.29, trans. with significant changes according to: John Chrysostom. T. I, Book. 1, p. 376 (found in St. Maximus in opusc. 15: PG 91, 164C-D), which gave Cereza-Gastaldo grounds to consider these works written at the same time (see note 905). It seems to us that this argument cannot be considered absolutely convincing (not to mention the slight discrepancy in the two quotes, see note 912). We should probably read ποιότητι (“by quality”) instead of ποσότητι (“by quantity”). – Approx. translation It is not entirely clear what the Rev. means. Maxim, perhaps psalms without an inscribed name. The argument is ironic; its meaning, apparently, is that, having listed all the types of one will that could be applied to Christ (God-manly, hypostatic, natural, relative, anti-natural), and showing that none of these names is suitable, St. Maxim ironically notes that perhaps this will has no name and should be counted among nameless things? The source of the quote could not be found. Larcher, following Sherwood, dates this work to ca. 640 (Larchet 1998, p. 43); It seems to us that a later dating (643 and later) is not excluded, since the work raises the question of the content of the concepts of deliberate choice, intention, gnomic will (which is typical for the works of St. Maximus after 643). However, the definition of gnomic will is already given in opusc. 14: PG 91, 153A, and in opusc. 7: PG 91, 81D speaks of its absence in Christ, so it is quite possible that this work was written c. 640. Since the work is short, more precise dating is difficult. Wed. Cyr. Al. comm. in Joann. 10. In Jn. 14, 21: II.493 (ed. P. E. Pusey). Wed. Joann. Chrys. contra anomoeos, homilia 7: PG 48, 765. Otherwise: “identity of names.” – Approx. translation We read here τί instead of εἰ. Otherwise the phrase would be translated: “is there any will at all” - Approx. translation It is difficult to say what St. Petersburg means. Maxim, it is possible that this “one will” is not something real. However, in the next sentence he speaks of a certain concession in words, so it is possible that, when he mentions “one will,” he admits some sense in which this expression can be used (for example, in the sense of the fusion of two natural wills). It is possible that in this place we are dealing with a corrupted text. Perhaps the situation is even simpler: St. Maxim rhetorically asks in what sense one could conceive of “will alone,” meaning that there is no such sense. Ponsois (Maxime Confesseur 1998, p. 267) and his dependent Angelis (Massimo Confessore 2007, p. 77) translated for reasons unknown to us: “so that we can accept “one will” in the full sense.” Sherwood believes that this work, like the previous one, was written c. 640 and is its continuation (or was one work with it) (Sherwood 1952, p. 45). He considers it useless to guess about the addressee of the letter (Combefis claimed that it was Theodore of Raifsky, but Diekamp did not agree with him). The work consists of a list of brief definitions of basic philosophical and theological concepts relevant to the current dispute with the Monothelites (their understanding of pagan philosophers is contrasted with the patristic understanding), after the list of definitions there is a florilegion. Judging by the fact that the florilegium ends with quotes from St. Maxim and a reference to his letter to Marin (we are talking about opusc. 1), the final edition of this work no longer belongs to St. Maxim, and some of his students and followers, and produced after the opusc was written. 1, or even after the death of St. Maxima. It is difficult to say whether the remaining parts of the florilegium belong to him. Sherwood believes that this work is a direct continuation of the previous one, however, if we exclude quotes from the saint himself. Maxim at the end of the work, it can be noted that it does not define such key concepts for the dispute as deliberate choice and intention, the need to understand which (along with natural will) is spoken of at the end of the opusc. 25. It is possible that this work is a continuation of the previous one, but it was not received in its entirety. We discuss the question of the attribution of quotations from the florilegium separately (see note 931). Wed. Arist. phys. 253b.8 and a more exact match of the quotation in: Ps.-Plutar. placita philosopher. 875C.3 and Alexan. metaph. comm. 660.11. We find the same definition in the Preparatory work of Theodore of Paran (see translation by A.I. Sidorov in: Anastasius Sinait 2003, p. 419), so there is every reason to believe that the monk Theodore, mentioned in the title of this work, should be understood as Theodore of Paran. St. Maximus, as well as the subsequent Orthodox tradition, which included some statements from this Theodore (see, for example, in Doctrina Patrum 41f, ed. Diekamp), seemed to separate two Theodores - the condemned father of monoenergism and monothelitism and Theodore, who was quoted. In modern scholarship, many believe that this is one person (references in Booth 2013, p. 145, n. 22). Venerable himself Maxim, apparently, believed that he had some useful things for beginners in philosophy, but there were also misconceptions (cf. opusc. 10: PG 91, 136C and note 445). Wed. definition: “Nature is that which is contemplated equally in all that are called [things] of the same kind” (opusc. 23: PG 91, 265C). It is noteworthy that in the form in which this definition came to Mina, it is extremely reminiscent of the definition of “species” according to the Isagoge of Porphyry (Porph. isagog. 4.1.4.11), which became generally accepted in the philosophy of late antiquity, including among Christian philosophers: “εἶδός ἐστι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον (species is what is said about many things that differ in number relative to [their] whatness).” This definition can be found not only among pagan philosophers, but, for example, in Doctrina Patrum 258.21, and earlier - in David (David in Porph. isagog. 170.4) and in a Christian treatise of the second half of the 6th century. De sectis: PG 86, 1193A). At St. Maxim we find almost the same expression in the definition of nature. The difference is that he (judging by Min) inserted the word ὁποῖον: φύσις ἐστί… εἶδος τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ἐν τῷ ὁποῖον τί ἐστι, κατηγορούμενον. Otherwise: “on your own.” – Approx. translation Wed. Leont. Hierus. Adver. nestorian. I.11.: PG 86.1445B. Here it is worth mentioning the polemics of St. Eulogius of Alexandria against (arguing with each other) Monophysite patriarchs Peter of Antioch and Damian of Alexandria. In this controversy, St. Eulogius rejected both the identification of hypostasis with hypostatic peculiarity, and the definition of hypostasis as an essence together with peculiarity (exposition of the treatise of St. Eulogius in: Phot. bibliot. 230.278a1–280b36, transl. in: Anthology, T. 1, pp. 89–95). Larchet (Larchet 1998, p. 49, n. 2, 3) gives the following list of parallel passages to the definitions of prp. Maxima: Leont. Byz. contr. nestorian. et eutich. I: PG 86, 1280A, 1305BC; Idem,adver. argum. Sever.: PG 86, 1924A, 1928BC; Leont. Hierus. Adver. nestorian. I.11.: PG 86.1445B. However, the arrangement of a series of definitions on the principle of their opposition among pagan philosophers and the holy fathers is not found in these places of the Leontief corpus. It seems that Rev. Maxim builds these rows deliberately, emphasizing the peculiarity of Christian thought. As you can see, some of the supposedly “pagan” definitions are found in Christian authors, just as, on the contrary, the definitions that he calls patristic are found in pagan philosophers. It can be assumed that Rev. Maxim, by the “patristic” understanding of terms, primarily means one that serves his argument in a dispute with the Monothelites. In addition to the parallel passages listed by Larchet, it is useful to compare this passage with the beginning of the treatise of the second half of the 6th century. De sectis: “Since we have decided to mention heresies, then first of all we should consider four nouns as they are used by the fathers. This is essence, nature, hypostasis and face. You should know that among the fathers the essence and nature are one and the same, as, in turn, the hypostasis and the face. Their essence, that is, nature, is what philosophers call species. Kind is something that is expressed about many objects that differ in number. Hypostasis, that is, face, is what philosophers called an indivisible (individual) essence (ἄτομον οὐσίαν). We correctly added about the individual essence, because the church [authors] did not call individual accidents (τὰ ἄτομα τῶν συμβεβηκότων) either hypostasis or person” (PG 86, 1193A, trans. F. G. Benevich). The author of De sectis conducts a polemic with the Monophysite concept of a private (or individual) essence, within the framework of which the essence with accidents was identified with hypostasis, and on this basis, in order to exclude the existence of a separate hypostasis of human nature in Christ, they came to the concept of a single complex nature in Christ. In the same treatise, polemicizing against the tritheism of Philoponus, the author rejects both the identification of hypostasis with essence, and the very concept of “private essence”, equivalent to hypostasis, considering thinking in these concepts to be insurmountable Aristotelianism (see De sectis: PG 86, 1233A-B). At St. Maximus we see the “trace” of this polemic when he contrasts the “philosophical” concept of hypostasis as an entity with individual characteristics with the patristic understanding - as “an individual person who is distinguished from other people by the face” (we would say contrasts the “individual” with the “personality”, warning against understanding the latter term in the sense of its modern connotations). It is in this distinction that the foundations are laid for the distinction between the human hypostasis-person and simply an “individual thing” of a certain kind. Outside of the application of a special tropos of existence to the concept of hypostasis (which St. Maximus does in a number of other works (see about this, for example, Lurie 2006, pp. 363–366; Petrov 2008, pp. 37–39), a new approach to understanding the human hypostasis is only emerging here, but it is already remarkable, although St. Maximus does not have a direct polemic with the doctrine of the Monophysites about private essence (in relation to human nature in Christ), he fully assimilated the results of this polemic that took place in the 6th century, as can be seen from this series of contrasts between the “pagan” and “Christian” categorical apparatus of his philosophical theology. Beginning with this passage attributed to St. Irenaeus, opusc. 26 is a florilegium whose origin remains a mystery. John Madden examines this issue in detail (Madden 1982) and comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to speak about the authenticity of any of the passages of patristic authors, which define the θέλησις presented in the florilegia, that is, their belonging to those authors of the “past” to whom the florilegia attributes them. Probably all other parts of the florilegion, except for passages from St. Diadoche Photikiysky and etc. Maxim, fabricated. The question arises: who did it, when and for what purpose. If excerpts from St. Maxima (the title of which speaks of him as a saint), concluding the opusc. 26, included simultaneously with others, then the florilegium was most likely not compiled by St. Maxim, and his students and followers. This is also supported by the fact that, as Madden points out, there are other, more extensive florilegia with definitions of θέλησις, allegedly from the holy fathers, which were definitely compiled later and distributed by the followers of St. Maximus during the period of persecution (Madden 1982, p. 71, n. 31). Thus, the “maximites” clearly felt the need for this kind of justification from the patristic tradition of the original teaching of St. Maxima about θέλησις. This confirmation could not be found (since, as Madden claims, the concept of θέλησις before St. Maximus in the theological and philosophical sense that it received from him was not actually used, it was not for nothing that Pyrrhus said that the concept of “natural will hurts the ear” (PG 91, 301A)), therefore the corresponding florilegia were compiled, in which the definition θέλησις surprisingly resembles the definition of St. Maxima. Did Rev. participate? Maxim in the compilation of such florilegies, it is impossible to say for sure. Two definitions from it, which are included in the florilegium opusc, speak against this. 26. The counterargument is that in the Disputation with Pyrrhus one of the definitions of θέλησις is given, allegedly from St. Clement of Alexandria (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 317C), which seems to be proof that St. Maxim, who led this debate, is responsible for this kind of “fabrication.” It should, however, be borne in mind that the Dispute with Pir is not a documentary record of the dispute itself, and perhaps it was not written by St. Maximus, but is a fairly late work (possibly by students of St. Maximus), in which the course of the dispute was fairly freely restored (Noret 1999). In this case, the same disciples of the monk who wrote this text could also have composed florilegia, like the one found in the opusc. 26. In favor of the fact that St. Maximus is not its author; it also says that in none of his original works, including the Epistle to Marinus (opusc. 1), where definitions of will and volition are given, he does not refer to any of the patristic authorities used in the florilegia, although, it would seem, being its compiler, he could well have used such an argument more than once in his epistles. Summarizing what has been said, we are inclined to believe that the florilegium could have been compiled by the disciples and followers of St. Maxim at a relatively late stage of the controversy, possibly even after his death, although the authorship of the monk himself cannot be completely ruled out. Instead of ποιοτική (“qualitative”) we, following the edition of the fragments of Irenaeus of Lyons (W. W. Harvey, Sancti Irenaei episcopi Lugdunensis libri quinque adversus haereses, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1857, pp. 470–511), read ποιητική. – Approx. translation The understanding of the will of God as God's providence and providence as will was characteristic of the main philosophical schools of late antiquity. Thus, in Ps.-Plutarch’s treatise On Fate (2nd century), which belongs to the current of middle Platonism, it is said that providence is “the thinking and will of God, which is a benefactor in relation to everything” (Ps.-Plut. de Fato. 572f.). The understanding of providence as the will of God was also adopted by Christians (for more details, see Benevich 2013 and our report at the conference on St. Maximus in Helsinki (September 2013) (in press)). Or: “belonging to us” (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). Similar expressions are found in Aristotle, but in relation to the concept of προαίρεσις: “διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική (therefore, conscious choice is an aspiring mind [i.e., a mind driven by aspiration], or a meaningful aspiration [i.e., aspiration driven by thought])” (Arist. ethic. Nic. 1139b.4, trans. N.V. Braginskaya from: Aristotle 1983. T. 4, p. 174). From this it is clear that St. Maximus significantly shifted the paradigm of the use of philosophical concepts compared to Aristotle (for more details, see Madden 1982, pp. 78–79; Maximus the Confessor 2004, p. 259, note 62). Formally: Iren. Fr. 5, but, as Madden (1982, p. 72) notes, nowhere in the surviving writings of St. Irenaeus does not appear θέλησις in a meaning close to that used in this passage, and the work to which it is attributed is not mentioned by either Eusebius or Jerome. Therefore, it cannot be considered authentic. Wed. in the Disputation with Pyrrhus: “the philosopher of the philosophers Clement, who in the 6th book of Stromatus determined that desire (θέλησις) is an aspiring mind, and volition (βούλησις) is a reasonable aspiration, or a desire aimed at something; τῷ ὄντι φι λο- σό φῳ τῶν φιλοσόφων Κλήμεντι, ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ τῶν Στρωματέων λόγῳ τὴν μὲν θέλησιν νοῦν εἶναι ὀρεκτικὸν ὁρισαμένῳ, τὴν δὲ βούλησιν εὔ- λο γον ὄρεξιν ἢ τὴν περί τινος θέλησιν" (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 317C–320A, trans. D. E. Afinogenov according to: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 189). As is known, neither in the sixth book of Stromatus, nor anywhere else in Clement there is such a definition of θέλησις (for more details, see Madden 1982, p. 69–72 and Maximus the Confessor 2004, p. 259, note 62). But we find almost the same definition of natural will (θέλημα) as here in the original writings of St. Maxima – opusc. 16: PG 91, 185D (c. 644) (cf. a very similar (in the first part) definition in an even earlier opusc. 14: PG 91, 153A, c. 640) and opusc. 1: PG 91, 12С (646), from which it is most logical to conclude that this passage from “Clement” and the definition of θέλησις in it depends on the corresponding places in St. Maxim, and not vice versa (it is interesting that in opusc. 16 prp. Maxim gives this definition, referring to a certain “pious monk”, probably due to its novelty, he does not indicate the source, but also does not attribute the definition to himself, so as not to be accused of introducing an innovation). It should be noted that in opusc. 26 the concept θέλησις is used, and in opusc. 1 gives the corresponding definition for θέλημα. The definition emphasizes the natural aspect of θέλησις, which is a significant shift from the Aristotelian paradigm (see note 935). Formally: Clem. Al. Fr. 40, but the fragment cannot be considered authentic (see Madden 1982, pp. 69–71). Madden argues that the passage is not authentic (Madden 1982, p. 73). Wed. practically the same definition for will in opusc. 1: PG 91, 13A. Madden argues that the passage is not authentic, although Blessed. Jerome also mentions the work of St. Eustathia under that name. Publishers St. Eustathius also does not accept the passage as authentic (Madden 1982, pp. 72–73). Wed. further from Damascus: “θέλησις τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὄρεξις ζωτική τε καὶ λογική· ἡ δὲ ζωτική, πάντως καὶ αἰσθητική" (“So, volition is a vital and meaningful desire”) (Joan. Dam. de duab. in Christ. volunt. 25.1). Madden argues that the passage is not authentic (Madden 1982, pp. 73–74). Wed. at St. Gregory of Nyssa: “according to autocracy and autocracy, the movement of human will (κατὰ τὸ αὐτοκρατές τε καὶ αὐτεξούσιον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προαιρέσεως ἡ κίνησις)” (Greg. Nyss. opif. hom. 185.5). It is characteristic that where florilegies are in the spirit of St. Maxima emphasizes natural will, St. Gregory speaks of arbitrariness (see next note). As Madden (1982, p. 74) notes, some of the ideas in this passage are found in St. Gregory of Nyssa in the treatise Against Apollinaris, however, there is no definition of θέλησις, but instead there is a definition of προαίρεσις that partially coincides with the definition of θέλησις (PG 45, 1217C = Greg. Nyss. contr. Apoll. 3.1.198.5). In fact, if St. Gregory writes: “ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἰ μὴ νοῦς τίς ἐστι καὶ πρός τι διάθεσις (will is nothing more than a certain mind and disposition towards something),” then in the quotation from the florilegium we have practically the same definition, but applied to the will (θέλησις). Thus, like the previous passages “from the fathers”, in which θέλησις is defined, this one is not genuine. Moreover, it characteristically shifts the emphasis from προαίρεσις to θέλησις, which “intercepts” the definition of the first – “will”. But this can be looked at not as a crude fabrication for the purpose of deception, but as the fact that the “Maximites” believed that St. Gregory of Nyssa and other fathers understood προαίρεσις in the sense in which they now understand θέλησις. The controversy was conducted in conditions far from academic tolerance, so we have no right to expect such statements that would contain a detailed argumentation of the reasons for replacing one term with another in the corresponding definitions of persecuted fathers. One of the few genuine quotations (Diadoch. ascetic. 85.18–19, ed. des Places. Paris 1955 (SC 5 bis)). As Madden notes (Madden 1982, p. 75), from this quote one can judge how before St. Maxima could be used θέλησις: it was not a terminus technicus, but a word of the colloquial language. The defined (i.e., more complex and philosophical concept) here is “autocracy,” the definition of which is also mentioned in the Disputation with Pyrrhus (“So, if thinking beings by nature have autocratic movement, then everything that thinks is also capable of desire by nature. For the blessed Diadochos of Photica defined autocracy as desire (θέλησιν)” (disp. Pyrr .: PG 91, 301C, trans. D. E. Afinogenov according to: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. Judging by one of the definitions of energy that are found in the Philosophical Chapters: “creative activity (ποίησις) and the manifestation of any will” (Sidorov 1989, p. 30), St. Anastasius could well understand will as something that manifests itself through energy. The source of the quotation could not be found (Madden does not say anything about it, probably because he focused his research on the definitions of θέλησις rather than θέλημα). We cannot exclude or confirm the authenticity of the quote. A concept often found in Nemesius (see note 37). Madden (1982, pp. 75–76) notes that the concept of θέλησις does not appear in the extant writings of Nemesius, who, as is known, developed the doctrine of the volitional act in detail in his treatise On the Nature of Man (chapters 27–33), but θέλησις does not play any role in this context. Thus, we are most likely again dealing with an inauthentic composition. Noteworthy is the naming of Nemesius as a saint (in the Difficulties to John, St. Maximus says when he quotes, without naming the name, the definition of the providence of God of Nemesius, which cites the words of “God-bearing fathers” (amb. 10: PG 91, 1189B). The passage is authentic (Nemes. de nat. hom. 14.8–15), but does not contain a definition of θέλησις. The appearance of the doctrine of the inner word (logos), dating back to the Stoics, in this context can probably be connected with what is above, with reference to St. Anastasia of Antioch, will (θέλημα) was defined as “the logos residing in the heart, which can only be made manifest through energy” (opusc. 26: PG 91, 277C). This exact definition is not found in other works of St. Maxim, but there are close ones, for example in: opusc. 1: PG 91, 12C–D. Wed. at St. Maxim: “Gnomic will (θέλημα γνωμικόν) is a spontaneous (αὐθαίρετος) aspiration (ὁρμή) and movement (κίνησις) of the faculty of judgment (τοῦ λογισμοῦ) to one or to the other (ἐφ̉ ἑκάτερα) (opusc. 14: PG 91, 153A). The difference in definitions is noteworthy. It is characteristic that of all the concepts related to the act of will, developed by St. Maxim in opusc. 1, these two were chosen for the title; it was their semantic “separation” that was the main philosophical innovation of St. Maxima (see notes 26, 935, 937, 945). Larcher dates this work broadly between 640 and 646. and notes that many of the quotations included were used at the Lateran Council (Larchet 1998, pp. 75–76). Madden (1982, p. 72) believes that this and the following passage attributed to St. Justin Philosopher, cannot be considered authentic: firstly, St. Justin does not use the term θέλησις in the sense in which it is used here; secondly, the work with that title, as well as the known possible addressee of St. Justina with that name is not mentioned by any second. Or: “to recognize it as being (τοῦ πῶς εἶναι).” – Approx. translation Otherwise: “ability”. – Approx. translation The source of the quote could not be found; probably, like the previous ones, it is not genuine. Or: “understanding”, “thought”. This definition is repeated by Nemesia: Nemes. de nat. hom. 15.44. Similar definitions of energy are found in earlier authors, for example, repeatedly in Galen (see, for example, Galen. de natural. facultat. 2.7.2). Or: “they suffer from them.” – Approx. translation Or: "logos". – Approx. translation The passage starting with the words: “For we affirm” and up to this point is identified as an excerpt from the Words of St. Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa to the grammarian Xenodorus" (Greg. Nyss. Fr. 4. tractatus ad Xenodorum (CPG 3201): 4–13). Govorun notes that this passage was widely used in disputes in the 7th century. both dioenergists and monoenergists (Hovorun 2008, p. 111). He also notes that Aristotle already considered energy and motion together, and after him the Stoics (Ibid, n. 65). Or: “understanding” (διάνοια). This passage belongs to St. Gregory of Nyssa is doubtful. Even if the passage from the word to Xenodorus is genuine, the preceding and following parts probably do not belong to it. Nevertheless, St. Gregory, you can really find similar thoughts. For example, the words: “The energy of the rational soul is its own thought (or: understanding) and movement of the mind” has a parallel in Greg. Nyss. Adver. Apollon. 3.1.177.17. The source of the quote could not be found; it is probably not genuine. The ending of the passage coincides with Basil. contr. Eunom.: PG 29, 676.2, but in general the source of the quotation could not be found, and it is probably not genuine. Wed. at St. Gregory of Nyssa: “it would be fair to conclude from the difference in actions about the difference in the essence that acted during each action (καλῶς εἶχεν ἐκ τοῦ παρηλλαγμένου τῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐργασθείσης ὑφ’ ἑκατέρου τούτων οὐσίας παρηλλαγμένον τεκμαίρεσθαι)" (Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. 1.1.394.9). The sentence coincides with the sentence from the indicated work (Basil. contr. Eunom. PG 29, 721.1–2). The source of the entire quotation could not be found; it is probably not genuine, but is composed of several partly genuine, partly retold passages. Judging by the parallel passage from St. Gregory of Nyssa, it fully corresponds to the teaching of the Cappadocian fathers about the natural nature of energy and the inseparability of essence and its action. Greg. Nyss. ad Eustathium de sancta trinit. 3.1.13.19–20 = Basil. ep. 189.7.29. Greg. Nyss. ad Eustathium de sancta trinit. 3.1.14.11–12 = Basil. ep. 189.8.12–13. Greg. Nyss. ad Ablab. 3.1.55.5–12. Greg. Nyss. de orat. dom. 260.32–262.2. Greg. Nyss. сontr. Eunom. 1.1.505.8–506.3. Greg. Nyss. ad Eustathium de sancta trinit. 3.1.11.2–11= Basil. ep. 189.6.14–20. As we can see, this fragment of the florilegium is a skillfully assembled “collage” of quotations from St. Gregory of Nyssa. In the next one we will see the same skillful work with quotations from St. Cyril of Alexandria. Cyr. Al. in Joann. 1.318.5–8. Cyr. Al. thesaur. : PG 75, 105.14–18. Cyr. Al. thesaur. : PG 75, 241.19–24 (with minor variations). Otherwise: “eidosa”. – Approx. translation Cyr. Al. thesaur. : PG 75, 453.31–33 (with minor variations). Cyr. Al. thesaur. : PG 75, 517.53–55. Cyr. Al. thesaur. : PG 75, 453.27–31. The source of the last sentence could not be found. It was not possible to find exactly such a quotation, but the distinction between these concepts is indeed in the 4th book of Against Eunomius of Ps.-Basilius (perhaps it belongs to Didymus): Bas. contr. Eunom.: PG 29, 689.37. The source for the quotations in this passage could not be found. opusc. 3a–c represent three passages first published by S. L. Epifanovich (Epifanovich 1917, 62–63, no. XVII), which in the manuscript tradition are adjacent to the opusc. 3 (Sherwood 1952, pp. 53–54, no. 83–85; Larchet 1998, pp. 16–17; Winkelmann 2001, p. 116, no. 95). Epifanovich himself expressed the opinion that the author of these passages was St. John of Damascus, and indicated the corresponding places in Damascus (Epifanovich 1917, p. VIII), but Sherwood suggests that Damascus depends on St. Maxima. Winckelmann also includes these passages among the works of St. Maximus, pointing out, however, parallel passages in Damascene: Joann. Dam. exp. fid. 136–138, 160). Due to the controversial authorship of St. Maximus we place these passages after the main body of Theological and Polemical Works. These works are not included in the French translation by Larcher-Ponçois, but in the preface Larcher does not speak of their inauthenticity. If they really belong to St. Maxim, according to Sherwood, they were written at the same time as the opusc. 3, that is, in 345–346. Typical for St. Maxim formula, see note. 157. Here "form" has the meaning of nature and is usually translated as "nature". Quote from the Tomos of Pope Leo to Archbishop Flavian of Constantinople. Added for context. The text in the manuscript is probably corrupted.