Г. И. Беневич. Богословско-полемические сочинения прп. Максима Исповедника и его полемика против моноэнергизма и монофелитства

Offered to the reader in Russian translation are the works of St. Maximus the Confessor is usually called Theological-Polemical Works (Opuscula Theologica et Polemica (hereinafter - Opusc.) (CPG 7697)). In the sequence and composition in which they are presented in this edition, they were published by François Combefis and included in the Patrology of the Abbé Migne (PG 91, 9A–285) 1 . The works in this publication are not arranged in chronological order (in addition, their dating is still a matter of debate), however, the patrolologists have assigned individual works a numbering in accordance with the order of their arrangement in the Patrology of Min. In particular, he opens theological and polemical works devoted to Christological themes, opusc. 1 – Epistle to Prester Marinus (c. 645–646), one of the most theologically and philosophically important works of this corpus, quite late in the time of writing. This edition reproduces the order and numbering of the works that appear in the Ming Patrology, and the introductory article and notes provide considerations about the estimated time and place of their composition. Works included in Opusc. , were written by St. Maximus presumably from 626 to 649. 2, that is, they cover the main period of his writing activity. Some of these works relate to the polemics of St. Maxims with the Monophysites 3, however, most of it was written during the period of his polemics with monoenergism and monothelitism, so that the works containing criticism of the Christology of the Monophysites and Nestorians, in the general context of Opusc. it is legitimate to consider it within the horizon of this controversy. Of the works related to the polemic with monoenergism and monothelitism, this edition does not include: Letter 19, addressed to Abbot Pyrrhus, which was written at the very beginning of the polemic (its translation has already been published), 4 those parts of the Difficulties to Thomas (including the Second Letter to Thomas) that are devoted to this topic (their Russian translation has been published 5, but we will repeatedly mention and discuss this work), Dispute with Pyrrhus, which in Patrology, Minya is highlighted as a separate work (its Russian translation has also already been published) 6 and materials related to the polemics of St. Maxim and his associates during their trials, as well as those written in exile (the Russian translation of these works has also been published) 7. Thus, the publication of the Russian translation of Opusc. , of which only a few works have been translated into Russian so far, together with those previously published, allows the Russian reader to get an idea of ​​​​the course of the polemics of St. Maxim with monoenergism and monothelitism. With the publication of this translation Opusc. Almost all of the main works of St. Maxim will be available in Russian translation, which can be considered an important milestone in the study of the legacy of the great theologian and philosopher in Russia 8. Unfortunately, not all of these translations could be carried out on the basis of critical editions, since critical editions of many of the most important works of St. Maxim does not exist, although work on them has been going on for many years 9. Once critical editions are published, existing translations will probably have to be clarified. This also applies to the translation of theological-polemical works, a number of passages of which, as they are given in the Patrology of Min, caused serious difficulties in understanding, not least because of possible errors and gaps in the manuscript. In view of the importance of these works for understanding the legacy of St. Maxim, we considered it possible to offer the Russian reader the first experience of their annotated translation 10, recognizing its preliminary nature and hoping that after the appearance of the critical edition the work will continue. Publication of the translation of the most important Christological works of St. We preface Maximus, written in a difficult church-historical and political situation, with an introductory article in which we will try to recreate in general terms the context of the writing of these works and review the main milestones of the polemics of St. Maxim with monoenergism and monothelitism until the beginning of his trial and offer an understanding of the main ideas expressed in the Theological-Polemical Works and other related works 11. “In the tradition” of the works published below in chronological order, we will begin not from the very beginning of the polemic against monoenergism in 633, but from one characteristic, although, it would seem, little related to this polemic episode from the later period of the work of St. Maxim - the appearance of a united edition of the famous Difficulties (Ambigua) by St. Maxima, in which the previously written Difficulties to John (c. 628–630) for some reason ended up being placed after the Difficulties to Thomas (c. 634). With this mysterious episode we will begin our analysis of the position and participation of the Venerable. Maxim in polemics against monoenergism and monothelitism. 2. Opusc. 1 and the problem of connecting Difficulties to Thomas and Difficulties to John The question of the legitimacy of the “combination” in one edition of the Difficulties on Thomas and the Difficulties on John and the continuous numbering of individual Difficulties has been discussed more than once; scientific consensus and new arguments on this matter are presented in the article by Janssens 12 - the author of the critical edition of the Difficulties to Thomas and the Second Letter to Thomas 13, who is well versed in the manuscript tradition associated with these works. The question is not purely textual, since if the combination of both series of Difficulties and continuous numbering, starting with the later Difficulties to Thomas, go back to St. Maxim or someone from his entourage and accepted by him, this means that it is precisely this order that expresses the will of the author, and, therefore, could have had for St. Maxim makes some sense. One of the main arguments in favor of the fact that Venerable himself. Maxim combined both series of Difficulties into one book - a phrase from opusc. 1 (dated by Sherwood 645/646): “As for the expression “single energy,” found in the seventh chapter of the Difficult Places of the great Gregory, its meaning is transparent” 14. That is, here we have evidence that the Venerable himself. Maxim speaks of a passage from the second difficulty of the Difficulties to John, where the controversial expression “single energy” 15 is used, looking at the future polemics around monoenergism, calling the difficulty the seventh, and thus he himself establishes a continuous numbering of the Difficulties. Moreover, he begins this numbering with the Difficulties to Thomas written later (the total number of difficult passages interpreted by St. Maximus in this letter to Thomas is five), and only after that, collecting the Difficulties to Thomas and the Difficulties to John into a single work, he continues the numbering so that the second difficulty from the Difficulties to John appears in the combined work as the seventh. Based on this evidence, the overwhelming majority of scholars believe that somewhere in the period between the writing of the Difficulties on Thomas and the Theological-Polemical Work 1 (that is, between 634 and 645/6) St. Maxim or someone from his inner circle published a “united” edition of the Difficulties with continuous numbering, in which the Difficulties to Thomas 16 appeared first. And even if such an edition does not belong to St. Maxim, then use in opusc. 1 of this numbering indicates that he accepted it. At the same time, as Janssens testifies 17, there was a manuscript tradition in which the Difficulties to Thomas appear as a separate work. Moreover, as he notes, as a separate work included in the collection of letters of St. Maxima, Difficulties reached Thomas in the best preserved versions. According to the scientist, we should talk about the parallel existence of both manuscript traditions - one (going back to St. Maximus himself), in which both series of Difficulties are combined, and the other - also, obviously, during his lifetime - in which these are two different, independent works, written at different times and to different addressees. Speaking about the reasons for combining the two series of Difficulties into one book, Janssens suggests that this was done “for the sake of completeness” 18. Such an explanation, although it is not excluded, does not seem sufficient to us, not to mention the fact that “for the sake of completeness” St. Maximus could well have limited himself to adding the Difficulties written to Thomas after the Difficulties addressed to John, which would have been historically more correct; he did the opposite. Adam Cooper 19 recently proposed his hypothesis about the reason for the connection in the reverse chronological order of writing of the Difficulties on Thomas and John. However, the reason he puts forward 20, on the one hand, is formulated in too general and vague a form, and on the other hand, is divorced from the specifics of the Christological polemic and church situation that was relevant for St. Maxima and, from our point of view, served as the main reason for the connection of the two series of Difficulties. An explanation for the combination of Difficulties should be sought in precisely this order, we believe, in the church-historical situation in which it was made. As already mentioned, Rev. Maximus mentions the continuous numbering of the united Difficulties in the same essay sent to Presbyter Marinus in Cyprus at the height of the anti-Monothelitian controversy, in which he, hoping to do this through Marinus, explains to the rigid Diophelites, who apparently suspected him of being an unreliable comrade-in-arms and criticized him 21, the meaning of the expression “single energy” that he once used in the Difficulties to John, which looked to them monoenergetic 22. Perhaps the decision to combine Difficulties was influenced by the fact that the use of St. The maxim of the “monoenergetic” formula was hinted at by Pyrrhus in a debate with him in 645, although, if you believe the text of the Disputation, he did not name him as the author of the doctrine of one energy-will of God and the saints, but simply referred to the “most famous fathers” 23. So Rev. Maxim needed to explain how his previous statements correlated with his current position. We will still discuss the essence of this explanation, but for now we note: it is quite likely that in the church-historical situation in which St. Maximus was criticized by hard-line diophelites and dioenergists for his previous “monoenergist” expressions, as well as for a more than favorable letter to one of the main monothelyte heretics, Pyrrhus (ep. 19, dated 633/4), when the monoenergists themselves recalled this to him, St. Maximus or, with his approval, someone close to him could “attach” to the Difficulties on John, which contain a “monoenergist” expression, the Difficulties on Thomas, in which 24 the “new God-masculine action” 25 from the Areopagitica is unambiguously interpreted in the spirit of dioenergism. Having placed this interpretation ahead of the difficulty from the Difficulties to John (in the combined corpus it turned out to be the seventh), St. Maxim forestalled accusations of monoenergism against himself, as well as misinterpretations of his thoughts. Most likely, the unification of the Difficulties occurred when St. Maxim wanted to testify to his strong Orthodoxy, as it was understood by strict dioenergists, and to absolve himself of accusations (actual or possible) of adherence to monoenergism, inscribing the “monoenergist” formula of the early Difficulties into the dioenergist context of the later ones, prefacing the latter with the first and thereby confirming the understanding of his earlier thought, which he defended in the opusc. 1 26. From this brief description of an episode from the history of the formation of the corpus of texts by St. Maxim can be seen how difficult his position was during the controversy that flared up and how difficult the course of the controversy was, in which St. Maximus had to not only polemicize with the monoenergists and monothelites, but also defend himself in front of his own comrades, the dioenergists and diophelites, who did not understand some of the subtleties of his mystical theology, developed, in particular, in the Difficulties to John and in earlier writings, as well as the reasons why, at the first stage of the monoenergist crisis, he spoke commendably about Psiphos and its authors. Studying the legacy of St. Maxim, the vicissitudes of his life and work, it is necessary to take into account all these factors that influenced the formation of his works in the form in which they have come down to us. Let us now turn to the history of the monoenergist crisis and the beginning of the controversy with monoenergism. 3. Background to the monoenergist union of Cyrus Without going into details of the church-historical events that preceded the conclusion of the union with the Monophysites-Theodosians in Egypt by Patriarch Cyrus of Alexandria in 633, about which patrolologists and Church historians have repeatedly written, I would like to highlight some of them that are essential for understanding the course of the struggle of St. Sophronia, etc. Maxima against monoenergism. An important question that arises in connection with the beginning of the controversy is: why did the mono-energist union concluded by Cyrus in Alexandria provoke such sharp opposition from St. Sophrony, if, as V. M. Lurie claims, “the ‘monothelitian’ and ‘monoenergist’ theological language... in the era of the Fifth Ecumenical Council approached the status of normative in the Chalcedonian environment” 27? The same researcher believes that a feature of the Christological polemics of the 7th century. it was that as a result, the “peripheral” theological tradition of dioenergism, characteristic of “provincial Palestine” (primarily Leontius of Jerusalem), to which he attributes St. Sophrony and Maximus 28 are a rather rare phenomenon in the history of ideas 29 . Was dioenergism really “marginal” among the Chalcedonians at the beginning of the controversy, and was the reaction of St. Is Sophronia’s response to union an unexpected reaction from a representative of the “provincial” Palestinian tradition? It seems that the situation was somewhat more complicated. That among the Chalcedonians, and not only among the Monophysites and Nestorians, some theologians resorted to unitarian formulas 30 is an undoubted fact. It is enough to recall this kind of expression not only in the so-called “book”-message (λίβελλος, libellus) of Patriarch Mina (536–552), addressed to Pope Vigilius 31 (neither supporters nor opponents of monoenergism doubted its authenticity 32 until it was declared a fake at the Sixth Ecumenical Council), but also in St. Anastasia of Antioch (559–570; 593–599) (whose unitary expressions St. Maximus subsequently had to explain in opus. 20). At the same time, to consider that “monoenergism” as a form of expression of the doctrine, with the exception of “provincial Palestine,” in the rest of the empire (at least in its eastern part) in the Chalcedonian environment was more common than “dioenergism,” would be a bit of a stretch 33 . It is enough to recall a number of facts. In the Dispute with Pyrrhus he is mentioned as the Patriarch of Alexandria, St. John the Merciful († 11/11/620 (or 619)) managed to “snatch from the hands” of the addressee a letter sent to Patr. Sergius of Constantinople to the Monophysite Bishop George, nicknamed Arsan, in which Sergius asked the latter to compile a florilegium (that is, a collection of excerpts from authoritative holy fathers revered by both Monophysites and Chalcedonites), confirming the doctrine of one action of Christ, and this letter also spoke about the motives of the request - the plan for creating on the basis of this teaching the unity of the Church (that is, union with Monophysites). The reaction of St. is also reported there. John: “that’s why I decided because of him (that is, because of this letter - G.B.) to depose him” 34, which was prevented by the Persian invasion of Egypt (shortly after that St. John died). It is not entirely clear whose deposition is being referred to here, however, as Archimandrite V.V. Bolotov notes. Cyril (Govorun), George as a Monophysite was outside the ecclesiastical authority of St. John and in the eyes of the latter was already excommunicated, so it is quite possible that it is meant that the captured letter could serve as a reason for him to initiate proceedings for the deposition of the patriarch. Sergius, which, of course, would have been impossible without the convening of the Council 35. This episode, if it really took place 36, can be considered evidence that in the eyes of the Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria, a union with the Monophysites based on monoenergism was absolutely unacceptable. Mention in this context of St. John the Merciful is especially important, since this saint was highly revered by St. Sophronius and etc. Maxim. St. Sophronius, together with his teacher and friend, the brightest representative of Palestinian monasticism, St. John Moschus 37, as is known, at one time they were in Alexandria under the patronage of St. John, being in fact, if you believe the Life of St. John, written by Leontius of Naples, his closest collaborators and advisers on dogmatic issues 38; they, apparently, were the first compilers of the life of this saint, which has not reached us 39. If St. Sophronius and John Moschus were in fact advisors to St. John, then didn’t they themselves decide how to treat the union movements of the authorities carried out on the basis of the idea of ​​​​monoenergism? If this is really so, then one should not be surprised at the reaction of St. Sophronia on the Union of Cyrus. But even if this did not take place, the very active participation of St. Sophronius in polemics against the Monophysites in Alexandria under St. John the Merciful, of course, played a role in his irreconcilable attitude towards the union (we will return to this topic below). Not only such a pillar of Orthodoxy as St. John the Merciful (if the story about him is true), but also the future heresiarch Cyrus, who was the bishop of Phasis (a city in Lazika), when the emperor. Heraclius, while in the Caucasus, proposed to Cyrus the idea of ​​a union with the Monophysites based on monoenergism; as is known, at first he doubted the validity of this project and only after the convictions of Heraclius and Sergius accepted it and became its supporter and guide. The reaction of Cyrus in a letter to Sergius (626) 40 is typical, in which doubts are expressed regarding the legality of the ban on the expression “two actions”. The ban first appeared in the order (κέλευσις) of the emperor in 623 41 to the Archbishop of Cyprus Arcadius in connection with the case of the leader of the Cypriot Monophysites Paul One-Eyed 42 . Having reviewed this document presented to him by Heraclius, Cyrus was not satisfied, but referred to the Tomos of Pope Leo to Archbishop Flavian of Constantinople. In particular, he wrote to Sergius that, having read the order of the emperor, Archbishop. Arkady, “having found that it prohibits talking about two actions in the Lord... after the union... tried to offer the all-honest message of blessed Leo, clearly proclaiming two actions (sic!)" 43. In fact, there is no expression “two actions” in the Tomos of Pope Leo, but it is only said that “each of the two natures, in conjunction with the other, acts in the way that is characteristic of it” 44, but Cyrus, characteristically, understood this precisely as “two actions.” The fact is that Cyrus (and by his reaction one can judge the understanding of this place in the Tomos, which was the most natural) was not so ready to accept the ban on the expression “two energies”, not without reason believing that it contradicted such a most authoritative document among the Chalcedonians as the Tomos of Pope Leo. Knowing the further behavior of Cyrus, it can be assumed that he decided to contradict the emperor not because he was so firm in standing for Orthodoxy, but because, as a church politician and a smart person, he wanted to assess whether the new church union ideology proposed to him by the emperor had a chance of success, whether it was sufficiently justified. In the same letter to Sergius, Cyrus reports that in response to his doubts, the emperor invited him to familiarize himself with the attitude (ἀναφορά) of the patriarchs. Sergius on this matter, which explained that we are talking about a refusal to talk about two actions after the union (that is, Divinity and humanity in Christ), since in all places of St. The Scriptures which speak of the actions of Christ can be “combined into one and only action, both passionate and impassive, belonging to the ineffable dispensation of our Lord Jesus Christ,” 45 with which interpretation Cyrus, as he assures, humbly agreed. However, the fact that he decided to express the course of his doubts in a letter to Sergius and talk about this ups and downs in a conversation with the emperor suggests that he was not completely convinced of the reliability of the ideological course taken at this stage and wanted to receive additional clarification. This is exactly how Sergius understood the purpose of his letter 46, which is why in his reply letter to Cyrus he was not too lazy to give a number of arguments, proving the strength of his position 47. In particular, he wrote that the question of one or two energies was never considered at church councils; among the holy fathers, the expression “one energy” is found in St. Cyril of Alexandria and in the “book” of Patr. Mena (536–552), addressed to Pope Vigilius (537–555). As for the Tomos of Pope Leo, says Sergius, since it was a stumbling block for the Monophysites, the Chalcedonites wrote more than once in its defense, but none of the holy fathers, in particular St. Eulogius of Alexandria, who wrote his apology, did not use the expression “two actions” when interpreting Pope Leo. Finally, Sergius adds to this that he sends Cyrus the corresponding evidence from the fathers and notes that if the doctrine of two energies among the fathers was found somewhere, then, of course, it would have to be accepted, since the teaching of the fathers must be followed not only in spirit, but also in letter, but personally such evidence is unknown to him 48. Cyrus, apparently, was convinced by such argumentation, and from that time on he became a faithful collaborator of Sergius and Heraclius in their union policy, and in 631 he became the Patriarch of Alexandria, despite the fact that Heraclius also appointed him as his governor in Egypt 49 . We, however, were interested in this episode not only as an important moment in the prehistory of the monoenergist union of 633, but also as an illustration of the fact that “monoenergism”, even one of its future pillars, was initially perceived with caution. It is one thing that one of the fathers used unitarian formulas, and quite another is the prohibition to talk about two energies (which was contrary to the spirit of the Tomos of Pope Leo) and the use of monoenergism (that is, the explicit confession of “one action, not two”) in order to establish unity with the Monophysites and Nestorians 50. This was precisely the new thing that was implanted by the ideology of Sergius and Heraclius. There is no doubt that Patr. Sergius was aware that he was undertaking something risky, this can be seen from the great preparatory work that he carried out, collecting testimonies from the fathers, entering into correspondence on this matter with Theodore of Parano 51, the Monophysite bishop Arsan mentioned above and with the same Cyrus of Fasida 52, as well as by the fact that he was ready (as subsequent events showed) to go, encountering serious resistance in the church environment, to certain concessions. Ultimately, Sergius, and especially Heraclius, were not principled monoenergists, for whom this teaching and even such usage of words would have stemmed from a well-thought-out theological and philosophical position 53 . At the same time, a new ideology, designed to unite all Christians of the empire and neighboring countries, was developed by them long before the conclusion of the union in Alexandria, and great importance was attached to it, which is evident from the fact that agreement with the ideas of Sergius and Heraclius on the part of Cyrus became for the latter a pass to receiving the See of Alexandria. 4. Monoenergist union and St.’s reaction to it. Sophronia Apart from the episode of the failed polemic of St., which was not confirmed from independent sources. John the Merciful against the plans of the mono-energist union of Sergius, until the conclusion of the union by Cyrus there was no noticeable opposition in the Church to the union policy. Perhaps the authority of Heraclius, the pious emperor who defeated the Persians, recaptured Jerusalem and returned the Life-Giving Cross, played a role, as well as the fact that before the union in Alexandria, Heraclius’s entry into communion with the Monophysites in Syria 54 and Armenia 55, as well as communion at the liturgy of the Nestorian Catholicos in Aleppo and even the command of the emperor Archbishop. Arkady of Cyprus regarding Paul One-Eyed, forbidding to talk about “two actions”, were perceived as having a political, rather than dogmatic character, and all this came only from the emperor 56, although behind all his church-political initiatives stood, as St. Petersburg would later emphasize. Maximus in the Dispute with Pyrrhus, Patr. Sergius 57. Be that as it may, the union concluded on June 3, 633 Cyrus in Alexandria, was already a clearly ecclesiastical act, 58 containing a confession of one (albeit the so-called “God-masculine”) 59 energy. As is known, this confession caused sharp opposition from St. Sophronius, who by that time had gained great authority, which can be seen at least from the fact that Cyrus considered it necessary to familiarize him with the agreement before promulgation (which once again confirms: Cyrus was not sure that the idea of ​​​​monoenergism would not cause resistance in the Church, and wanted to enlist the support of the influential St. Sophronius, but rather pretend that he was consulting with him and respecting his opinion, hoping to weaken his possible protest). Let us remember that St. Sophronius was an adviser on dogmatic issues to St. John the Merciful in the same Alexandria, which Cyrus could not but know about. The controversy began with the fact that St. Sophronius, finding himself in Alexandria in 633, did not accept the mono-energist union concluded in Egypt and Libya by Cyrus, the pope of Alexandria and the Theodosian Monophysites 60 . What was the reason for such a harsh reaction from St. Sophronia? The answer to this question is not so trivial if we keep in mind that, on the one hand, the Chalcedonian monoenergists presented the union as an agreement concluded according to oikonomia for the sake of saving the brothers and Christian unity, and not as some kind of compromise in faith. That is, the content of the union document was considered not as a statement of dogma in its absolute formulation, but as a certain platform of agreement in faith, sufficient for entering into liturgical communion. On the other hand, “unitarian expressions” in relation to energy were indeed found in one form or another in the Orthodox tradition, for example, among St. Anastasia of Antioch (St. Maximus will have to explain them in opus. 7, 8 and 20). With all this in mind, a strong reaction from St. Sophronia explain. One of these explanations was proposed by the English researcher F. Booth in a book being prepared for publication: “The Crisis of the Empire. Doctrine and Dissent at the End of Late Antiquity." In particular, he draws attention to the fact that even before the monoenergist crisis in the writings of St. John Moschus and St. Sophrony, a hard line is visible in relation to the issue of admission to the church sacraments of heretics and, in general, any confusion with them (below we will see an example of such “mixing” in Cyprus in the use of the Trisagion in the version used by the Monophysites, which was opposed by St. John the Merciful, and then St. Sophronius in the Life of St. John and in a letter to Cyprus to Archbishop Arcadius) 61. Thus, in an environment that, following Boudignon and Booth, can be called the environment of the Palestinian monastic brotherhood, whose informal leaders were St. John Moschus and St. Sophrony, a harsh attitude prevailed towards hiding political-ideological goals and motives under the cover of “oikonomia” 62 and posing a threat to betray the Orthodox faith, in other words, so that the Church with its teachings was placed at the service of the state. This is one of the features of the spiritual attitude in this environment, which influenced the entire further course of the controversy. Let us now return to the reaction of St. Sophronia for union. This is how ten years later St. Petersburg characterizes the beginning of events. Maxim in opusc. 12 (643/4 63): “So, the divine and great Sophronius, then coming to Alexandria, almost immediately after the first reading (for Cyrus also gave him these nine chapters of wickedness for review), 64, lifting up his voice in great lamentation, poured out streams of tears, fervently asking him, begging and imploring him, 65 falling at his feet so that he would not utter any of this from the pulpit against the Catholic Church of God, for here the dogmas of the wicked Apollinaris are clearly present 66 » 67 . St.'s disagreement Sophronius evoked one place in the seventh chapter of the Nine Chapters, in which the authors of the union referred to the authority of the Areopagite (however, distorting the original text): “one and the same Christ and Son produced both the divine and the human by one divinely masculine action, according to the expression of Dionysius like the saints” 68. We have yet to discuss this passage and St.'s understanding of it. Sophronius, St. Maximus, Cyrus and Pyrrhus and other authors, for now let us return to the beginning of the dispute in Alexandria. As Patr. reported those events to Pope Honorius. Sergius of Constantinople: “Sophronius began to object to the chapter on one action and declared that it was necessary to affirm in all respects two actions in Christ our God” 69. As Sergius further wrote, Sophronius did not agree with Cyrus’s arguments that in this case it was necessary to apply oikonomia, which was used by the holy fathers “for the sake of saving many souls... [when] they acted in the spirit of moderation and leniency.” That is, Cyrus believed that since the expression “one action,” as Sergius also wrote, “was also used by some of the holy fathers,” 70 Sophronius might not have raised controversy on this issue in order to attract Monophysites to Orthodoxy. Nevertheless, as Sergius further writes to the pope, Sophronius was not satisfied with Cyrus’s answer, and Cyrus left this dispute to be resolved by Sergius, to whom St. went with a message from Cyrus. Sophrony 71. Arriving in Constantinople, Elder Sophronius, according to Sergius’ message to Pope Honorius, again demanded that the expression “one energy” be abandoned. This is how it is said in the Disputation with Pyrrhus: “Since Sergius made public his own illness 72 in many ways and harmed most of the Church, Blessed Sophronius confronted him with the humility befitting his rank: throwing himself at his feet and, instead of any prayer, bringing to him [as a conviction] the life-giving passions of Christ God, so that he would not renew the heretical statement, which, fortunately, had been extinguished by the previously living holy fathers 73.” 74. Although ten years after the events of 633, St. Maxim, in a letter to the illustration to Peter, wrote: “So these people, O most venerable man, tormented the Divine cause with godless mockery and even some kind of dishonest acting, and the Holy Sophronius, who sobbed so lamentably - as if mourning, like a certain second Jeremiah, the death of the Catholic Church, and mourning such a great fall of Divine dogmas, did not console in any way” 75 - some consolation of St. Sophronius then received it in Constantinople. Partly under his pressure, but more probably out of fear of growing controversy, Sergius wrote to Cyrus, “so that he, after with the help of God has established a union with those who were previously in disunity 76, would no longer allow anyone to preach about one or two actions in Christ our God, but would rather encourage them to confess... that one and the same Only Begotten Son... acts in Divinity and in humanity, that every God-decent and human-decent action occurs inseparably from one and the same incarnate God the Word and is attributed to the same. And to confess this because the expression “one action,” although it is used by some of the holy fathers, sounds strange and outrageous in the ears of some, who assume that it is pronounced in the sense of the destruction of two natures... which is by no means the case, and let it not be, as well as because the expression “two actions” seduces many, as not being used by any of the divine... secret leaders of the Church" 77 . Sergius included his letter to Cyrus in a letter to Pope Honorius, written at the end of 633 or beginning of 634. 78 Faced with resistance from St. Sophronius, Patriarch Sergius of Constantinople took a number of steps designed to preserve what was achieved by his union policy with Cyrus, avoiding the growth of controversy; probably, having enlisted the support of the bishops who were in Constantinople, he issued a patriarchal decree - Psiphos (Ψῆφος) 79 (August 633) 80, prohibiting the use of the expressions “one” or “two energies”; its presentation is given above in an excerpt from Sergius’ letter to Cyrus. The text of Psiphos has not survived, and we can get an idea of ​​it from this letter. If we compare the words from the ill-fated seventh chapter of the Nine Chapters of Cyrus with the reconstructed text of Psiphos, covering the same problem, then it is obvious that the monoenergists have taken a significant step back: Instead of stating that the “divinely decent” and the “humanly decent” are accomplished by “one action,” Psiphos speaks of the “inseparability” of the divinely and humanly decent action. The expression “every godly and humanly decent action” implies (although this is not directly stated) two types of action. The letter of Sergius to Honorius, as, apparently, the Psiphos set out in it, contains several more important passages directly related to the history of the emergence of Monothelitism, the topics of which will be discussed more than once in the theological and polemical works of St. Maxim, but we will refrain from discussing them for now and will turn to them in Chapter 9 in the context of a conversation about the prehistory of Monothelitism. For the time being, the center of the controversy (at least for St. Sophronius and Maximus) was the question of energies, probably because the union of Cyrus was mono-energist. In this regard, Psiphos is especially important for the history of the controversy: a statement of the contents of this document was sent by Abbot Pyrrhus, close to Patriarch Sergius, to the spiritual child and associate of Elder Sophronius, monk Maximus, whose response to this message is, in turn, directly related to the polemic with monoenergism in the Difficulties to Thomas, which were written, most likely, after the answer of St. Maxima Pyrrhus (ep. 19) reached Chrysopolis and Abba Thomas could familiarize himself with him and ask his question regarding one place in the Letter to St. Gaius. Dionysius, the answer to which is the fifth difficulty to Thomas (amb. 5). But let us first turn to the correspondence of St. Thomas, which preceded the Difficulty with Thomas. Maxima with Pyrrhus. As can be seen from Sergius’ letter to Honorius, Psiphos commanded not to use either the mono- or dioenergetic formula, although in his letter to the Pope Sergius definitely speaks of two natures in Christ, and that the same Christ “acts both in Divinity and in humanity.” The exposition of this faith was directed by the archimandrite and abbot of the Chrysopolis monastery 83 Pyrrhus the Venerable. Maxim, which we learn from the preserved response letter from St. Maxima (ep. 19). The appeal of such an influential church figure as Pyrrhus (remember, the future patriarch) to a simple monk suggests that St. By that time, Maxim had already gained fame as perhaps the most authoritative theological “expert” of the empire 84. Probably the reaction of St. Sophronius, who also took the patriarchal throne, seriously alarmed Sergius and his associates, and in this situation, the church leaders of Constantinople turned to Abba Maximus, wanting to enlist the support of a person who could influence the opponents of the course of Sergius and Cyrus, preventing polemics from flaring up; Most of all, Sergius wanted to avoid controversy. Such a person had to be perceived as “one of our own” among like-minded people of Elder Sophrony, and at the same time had to be open enough in the eyes of Sergius and Pyrrhus to enter into dialogue with them. Let us make a brief digression about the personality of Pyrrhus and his perception of St. Maxim. Interesting observations were recently made by Kristjan Boudignon 85 . Referring to the research of Bernard Flusen 86, he noted that Pyrrhus originally belonged to the community of Palestinian monks and at one time played a prominent role in it 87, so if St. Maxim was also of Palestinian origin and belonged to the brotherhood of Palestinian monks, scattered, according to Boudignon, throughout the empire; this correspondence is of particular interest. As Boudignon notes, Pyrrhus played an important role in the church glorification of Anastasius the Persian; the veneration of Anastasius in Palestine, and then in Constantinople and Rome, one of the initiators of which was Pyrrhus, obviously contributed to the latter’s fame. Pyrrhus, very likely, turned to St. Maxim, believing that he would perceive him as “one of his own,” and the answer to him was St. Maxima - more than respectful - indicates that, even if they were not closely acquainted, the warmest and most respectful relations took place between them, in which St. Maximus subsequently had to justify himself to Christians in the West (see opusc. 9), bearing in mind that Pyrrhus became one of the main heresiarchs and a cunning “player” in the church-political field. Let us now return to the theological aspects of Pyrrhus’ letter to St. Maxim. Openness of Rev. The maxim to their ideas could well have been assumed by Sergius and Pyrrhus. The fact is that with the wide fame of St. Maximus and the fame of his works, it is likely that they read his works, in particular the Difficulties to John (c. 628–630) and Questions to Thalassius (630–633), in which St. Maxim spoke of “undergoing deification” and used (in Difficulties) such expressions as “one action of God and those worthy of Him [that is, the saints],” citing at the same time the deification of our nature in Christ as an example of perfect deification and in the same context interpreting the Gethsemane prayer 88. Pyrrhus during a dispute with St. Maximus (in 645), as an argument in favor of the “one will” of Christ, referred to the expression of the “most famous fathers” that “God and the saints have one will” 89, and in favor of monoenergism he expressed a consideration very similar to the teaching of St. Maxim about undergoing deification and, as a consequence of this, “one energy of God and the saints”: “We speak of one action not in order to deny human action, but because, in contrast to the Divine action, in this sense it is called suffering” 90. All this allows us to assume direct or indirect acquaintance of Pyrrhus with the works of St. Maxim, which he, quite naturally, later relied on in an argument with him. Sergius and Pyrrhus probably had reason to believe that they would find understanding with Abba Maximus, and at the same time they were probably aware of Abba Maximus’s closeness to Elder Sophronius. So the choice of St. Maximus as the addressee of the message, with the goal of finding an ally in the camp of opponents potentially dangerous to their politics, was probably carefully thought out - Sergius and Pyrrhus cannot be denied political talent. St. Maximus indeed responded more than favorably to Pyrrhus’s letter, which is especially evident from the beginning of the letter (ep. 19, dating no later than the beginning of 634), for which St. Maxim subsequently had to give explanations to the tough diophelites 91. Let's quote this excerpt: “Your holy, God-pleasing father, having read the letter, I learned that your mind is completely enlightened by the fullness of the Spirit, and I recognized that it surpasses natural intelligence as much as it has achieved Divine and supernatural wisdom. After all, it seemed to me that through the writing I saw before me your God-wise mind, sparkling with only the pure rays of the Spirit, with which it tends to be transformed into something closer to the Divine, who was worthy of adoption by the Father of all, and freeing me as much from ignorance of the Divine teaching as it previously seemed to me that I had knowledge of it. Therefore, amazed at the sharpness of your mind in everything, I only cried out in the same words that a certain woman once cried out to the Lord, shocked by the power of His speeches: “Blessed is the womb that bore You, and the breasts that You sucked!” [Luke 11:27]. I glorify not only the one who gave birth to you, a blessed, honest father, as worthy to become the mother of such a son, but also your thought, which always conceives, and bears, and gives birth to the pious word, for by grace it became a womb that contains the supernatural Word by the affinity of the will with the Word Himself. And according to your persistent disposition, emanating from your heart, as if from your breast, you nurse the Word, feeding it with action and contemplation, and It grows along with pious thoughts and good disposition and - an amazing thing! – by its own growth creates the deification of the nurturing mind. What else could I tell you, honest father, knowing that you became the parent of such words in which, as if from some lofty mountain of knowledge, you revealed the decree of the Divine teaching, as if God-written tablets, found and revealed through a new Mediator, sent to us by the great Moses, the priest of priests and the head of the Divine priesthood of the whole earth? And this decree was communicated by the holy and unitedly worshiped Trinity through the above-mentioned bishop and, for the sake of unanimity, more closely united the Churches that despised the innovation in faith, which was liked by many in the city of Alexandra” 92. And although at the very end of this passage, St. Maxim makes it clear how he feels about the monoenergist union concluded in Alexandria, the rejection of the provisions of which turned out to be a necessary condition for maintaining unity in the Church. It is difficult to attribute the highest praise of Psiphos, which he speaks of as “God-written tablets”, bestowed by the “new Mediator”, the new “great Moses”, and its authors – Sergius and Pyrrhus, only to the account of “economy” courtesy. We cannot, however, assert that St. Maxim at this time was still a cryptomonoenergist and therefore easily agreed with Psiphos. This once-expressed assumption is today rejected by almost all researchers 93 . About the reasons for the high assessment of St. The Maxim of Psiphos can be concluded not only from the explicit refusal to use the expression “one action”, but, for example, from a comparison of a passage from Psiphos and a phrase from the letter of St. Maxima Pirru: Nevertheless, one should not assume that St. Maxim at this stage simply accepted Psyphos. In a letter to Pyrrhus, he first formulated his own interpretation of the “God-male action” (however, without mentioning this expression), the same one that is later, quite explicitly, repeated in the Difficulties to Thomas 5; we will address it below. For now, looking ahead, we note that according to this interpretation, “God-manhood” means the unity of Divine and human actions in Christ, expressed in the fact that He performed the Divine (miracles) humanly (through the flesh), and endured the human (suffering) “Divinely” (freely), which is confirmed by the following quote from ep. 19: “After all, He accomplished the Divine carnally, because through the flesh, which is not devoid of natural action, and the human – Divine, because by autocratic desire, and not by external compulsion, He allowed Himself to be tested by human suffering. And he did not do Divine things, for he was not only God, and not carnal - human, for he was not only a man. Therefore, miracles were not without suffering, and suffering was not without miracles, but the first ones - I will say not without impudence! – were not dispassionate, but the latter were obviously wonderful; both miracles and suffering are extraordinary, for both the Divine and the human came from the same incarnate God the Word, who in both cases verified the actual truth of both what he consisted of and what he was” 96 . This unity is so close that St. Maximus even speaks of the “single work (ἔργον)” of the incarnate God the Word, “whether it be suffering or a miracle” 97. The expression “single action” nevertheless evokes in St. Maximus expresses the doubt, which he expresses, albeit cautiously, but at the same time making it clear to Pyrrhus that this question is fundamental for him: “I still have not been able to understand exactly in what sense and how one should speak and think about a single action. We don’t just utter meaningless words, but express our thoughts in words. For this reason, I have often discovered that the theologizing Fathers conceded in words, but never in thoughts, because the secret of our salvation lies not in syllables, but in what is thought and what is real. They did this by caring for the world, and this by strengthening souls with the truth.”98 Here Rev. Maximus clearly outlines the boundaries of oikonomia: if the expression “single action” has a meaning that he personally considers heretical, then he will not accept it, which is why he asks Pyrrhus to clarify it. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that Psiphos, although with certain reservations, St. Maxim accepts. In accepting Psiphos, St. Maxim (it is important to emphasize, in the interpretation that he gave him) 99 there is nothing surprising, since the leader of the dioenergist party, St. Sophronius, according to the message of Sergius to Honorius, having received the confession of Patriarch Sergius, left Constantinople, satisfied with this confession and without breaking communication with Sergius, which the latter informed Pope Honorius about. The main thing that caused satisfaction and St. Sophronia, etc. Maxima, - Psiphos prohibited the expression “one energy”, which was contained in the union agreement concluded by Cyrus. 7. Patriarchate of St. Sophronia, the question of the “Cyprus Council” – alternative history Before moving on to the analysis of the polemic with monoenergism in the Difficulties of Thomas, we should touch upon two very controversial, but essential for understanding the history of the Christological polemics of the 7th century. question. The first concerns the circumstances under which St. Sophrony became patriarch. According to F. Booth's recently proposed reconstruction of the events that followed St. Sophrony obtained from the patriarchs. Sergius edition of Psiphos, before he ended up in Jerusalem, where he was elected patriarch, St. Sophronius traveled to Rome, where he took the remains of his teacher and friend, St. John Moschus and, according to the latter’s will, went with them to Palestine. Booth writes about this as follows: “According to the biographical prologue appended to Lug Spiritual - the most likely author of which is Sophronius - before his death, Moschus called his beloved disciple to himself and handed over “Lug” to him, bequeathing not to leave his remains in Rome, but to bury them in Sinai, or, if this was prevented by barbarian invasions, in the Lavra of Theodosius near Jerusalem. When Sophronius, together with his twelve fellow disciples, brought the remains of John to the East and reached Ascalon, he, realizing that the “tyrannical uprisings of those called Hagarians” were preventing passage to Sinai, came to Jerusalem “at the beginning of the eighth indiction,” that is, in September 634.” 100. It must be said that until now the dominant opinion in science was that the death of Moschus occurred in 619 and at the same time St. Sophronius delivered his body to Palestine. Booth gives several arguments in favor of re-dating this event 101. Among others, there is a mention of the raids of the Saracens, that is, the Arabs, who at that time began their invasion of the empire, which ended with the capture of Palestine and Egypt (however, there were raids as such before). There is, however, another opinion that St. John Moschus was with St. Sophronius in Constantinople and died there, and not from the first Rome, but from the second, his body was brought to Palestine 102, but this opinion is less justified. Be that as it may, the proximity of St. Sophronius to Moschus, who had great authority among Palestinian monasticism, the arrival in Palestine with the holy remains of Moschus, accompanied by twelve (the number, of course, has a sacred meaning) disciples gave St. Sophronius' even greater authority in the circle of monasticism in Palestine made his election as patriarch, which was then extremely important for the further course of disputes around monoenergism, almost inevitable 103. Even if the transfer of the body of Moschus, in accordance with the traditional version, took place in 619, the memory of this event was undoubtedly preserved, which again made St. Sophronia is an undisputed candidate for patriarch. As later St. Sophronius wrote in his Council Epistle that in Jerusalem he was forced to submit to “great coercion and violence on the part of beloved clergy, pious monks, faithful laity and all the inhabitants of the holy city of Christ” who wished for him to become patriarch 104. After the death of Patriarch Modest, the Patriarchal throne had been vacant for two years. In fact, the ecclesiological situation in Palestine at this time was even more complex. The fact is that even before the election of St. Sophronius in Jerusalem was appointed by Emperor Heraclius (as the diophelites later began to say - contrary to the correct church procedure and under pressure from secular authorities) as locum tenens Sergius of Jaffa, who, according to some versions, after the death of St. Sophronia again served as the patriarch's locum tenens, radically changing the course of St. Sophronius and accepting monothelitism in full agreement with the ideology of Heraclius and Sergius of Constantinople, whose unionist policy he supported initially, which is why he was put forward by Heraclius 105. Even if this version is inaccurate and Sergius of Jaffa was no longer alive (as F. Booth believes) 106, there remained bishops dedicated to them and following his course (we will discuss this in more detail below). It is characteristic that Sergius remained until the arrival of St. Sophronius to Palestine only as a locum tenens, which (despite Heraclius's desire to see him as patriarch) probably reflects the fact that he did not enjoy sufficient authority among Palestinian monasticism and clergy to become patriarch, and that the struggle between various parties in Palestine began even before the outbreak of the monoenergist crisis 107. For the same reason, probably, he was not elected after the death of St. Sophronia (if he was still alive). In Palestine, as we will see, after the death of the patriarch, a split actually formed between the hierarchy going back to Sergius of Jaffa, or those who recognized it, and those who did not recognize it and the Monothelite Ecphesis and was, in accordance with the covenant of St. Sophronia, in communication with Rome 108. But this all relates to the future, but for now the arrival of St. Sophronia to Palestine with the relics of St. John Moschus (if it really happened in 634) and his occupation of the patriarchal throne became the most important church-political event of this period. Sergius of Jaffa, who went into the shadows during this period, or, if he was not alive, his followers, represented in Palestine the party to which he also belonged, who was once an archimandrite there in the monastery of St. Anastasia Pyrrhus is a party ready to follow the ideology of the emperor, or, as in the case of Pyrrhus, to form an ideology that serves the interests of the empire. With the arrival of St. Sophronius and his election to the patriarchy, this party in Palestine was significantly squeezed, although it did not cease to exist, as evidenced by subsequent events in the dispute over monoenergism. The second question that needs to be addressed concerns an event, information about which came from such an unreliable source as the Syrian Psogos (Reproach, written in the Maronite environment and directed against St. Maximus) 109, which tells about the Council of Cyprus. According to Psogos, in it, in addition to the archbishop. Arcadius of Cyprus, representatives of four patriarchates participated - the Pope, the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem 110, and Alexandria was represented by Cyrus with five bishops; There was no Chalcedonian Patriarch of Antioch at that time. Formally, the council was convened to consider the use in the Church of Cyprus of the addition to the Trisagion “crucified for us” (the question was raised by St. Sophronius, who called on Arcadius to convene the council). At the same council, in addition to discussing the addition to the Trisagion (the council’s decision on this matter is not given), the doctrine of “two actions, two wills and two minds” 111 St. was allegedly considered and condemned. Maxim (he was represented at the council by his student Anastasius) 112. Sebastian Brock, who published the Syriac Psogos, suggested that the council initiated by St. Sophronius even before his election to the patriarchate, took place shortly after the election, around 634 113, and that the immediate consequence of the council, at which the question of the actions of Christ was considered, was the adoption of Psiphos approved by the emperor (the adoption of a dogmatic resolution by the emperor based on the results of the Cyprus Council in Psogos is actually said, although, apparently, the author, as Brock believes, confuses Psiphos and Ekphesis into one ) 114 . According to Broca, if the information of Psogos corresponds to something real at all, then we should be talking about Psiphos (and not about Ekphesis (he, along with other researchers, dates it back to 638)), since the story about this event in Psogos says that the bishops of all four thrones (that is, including Jerusalem) signed this decree, and the consent of St. Sophronia with Ekphesis, where the doctrine of one will was expressed, in his opinion, there could not be 115; Psiphos is St. Sophrony, as you know, accepted. The version of events expressed by Brock, which is generally reproduced by Talker 116 and Allen 117, who accept the dating of the Council of Cyprus in 634, raises some questions. If such a council, in which forty-six representatives of all patriarchates except Antioch 118 participated, actually took place before the publication of Psiphos and led to its appearance, then why Patr. Sergius, who described in detail in a letter to Pope Honorius the events preceding the appearance of Psiphos, did not mention this important council that condemned dioenergism, which would clearly be in favor of Sergius's position, especially since, according to Psogos, a representative of the pope participated in this council? Why did Pope Honorius, in his two reply messages, not mention the council, if his representative participated in it? On the other hand, if the council was convened after the publication of Psiphos, which, as we have seen, was accepted not only by St. Sophronius, but also, perhaps more positively, St. Maximus, how could there have been confrontation (and, indeed, disputes in general) around the issue of one or two energies in Christ? Bearing in mind that not a single independent source confirms that a council was convened in Cyprus, at which polemics around monoenergism erupted, that this council is not mentioned not only by opponents of this teaching, but also by its supporters, one can doubt that such a council (which discussed the doctrine of energies and condemned dioenergism, with which St. Sophronius allegedly agreed) actually took place, and precisely because As a result of this, and not as described in Sergius' letter to Honorius, Psiphos was adopted. At the same time, the dispute surrounding the addition to the Trisagion between St. Sophronius and Arcadius of Cyprus, which is mentioned in Psogos, really took place, as evidenced by the letter of St. partially preserved in the Syriac translation. Archbishop Sophronia Arkady. Already S. Brock notes the presence of independent evidence of the dispute between St. Sophronius and Arkady regarding the addition to the Trisagion - letters to St. Sophronius to Arkady, preserved in the Syriac translation 119. He believes that this letter was written by St. Sophronius even before he became patriarch, and perhaps even before the start of the controversy with monoenergism, which is not reflected in him. However, Micheline Albert, who published the letter to St. Sophronia Arkady, put forward a different concept and chronology of events 120. She believes that the letter to Arkady was written after the adoption of Psiphos and after the Council Epistle of St. Sophronius, since he was not happy with Psiphos and the situation of dogmatic uncertainty in the Church. As Albert believes, the letter about adding to the Trisagion and the proposal to Arkady to convene a council on this occasion were only a means for St. Sophronius to convene a representative council (initiating it was Arkady, who was on good terms with all departments) in order to discuss the doctrine of energies and approve dioenergism. This initiative failed because, unlike St. Sophronius, Arkady was a supporter of oikonomia in relation to the Monophysites, which is evident both from the use in his church of the Trisagion with the addition accepted among the Monophysites, and from the fact that he obeyed the command of Heraclius not to talk about the two actions of Christ. As a result, the council assembled in Cyprus did not allow St. Sophronius to prevail over the supporters of oikonomia and monoenergists and introduce dioenergism into the Church. Albert supports his hypothesis with an excerpt from a letter from the next Archbishop of Cyprus, Sergius, to Pope Theodore, from which it is clear that Arcadius refrained from direct confrontation with the monoenergists and monothelites, expecting them to change their views, although he always remained faithful to Orthodox teaching and Rome 121. This hypothesis about the events around the “Cyprus Council,” which Albert dates from 634–636, or at most 637 122, is certainly ingenious, contains a number of useful observations and is not without a right to exist, although it does not take into account, as it seems to us, the fact that, according to Psogos, immediately after the council, based on its results, a document signed by four patriarchs was adopted, forcing St. Maxim, who found himself in isolation, had to shut himself up in a cell for a long time, right up to the Arab conquest 123. Such a document, as Broca rightly notes (if you follow this logic), could only be Psiphos, and not Ekphesis (which St. Sophronius, in Broca’s opinion, did not accept), while Albert’s council meets after Psiphos, that is, her hypothesis does not fit in with a number of information from Psogos, so she failed to create an integral and internally consistent concept of events that links all known sources (in any case case, neither Sidorov, nor Allen, nor Govorun repeat this concept). From Albert’s important observations, however, it should be noted that in the 32nd paragraph of the letter to St. Sophronius says to Arkady that the number in relation to Christ, without dividing Him, indicates only “the number of actions” 124. This mention of the number of actions is undoubtedly noteworthy in the context of the controversy with monoenergism, although in general the letter is not devoted to this controversy, from which Brock concludes that it was written before it began, but Albert does not agree with this, referring, in particular, to the 32nd paragraph. M. Jankowiak and F. Booth went even further than M. Alber in attaching significance to the information of the Syrian Psogos. Thus, in a recently defended dissertation 125 and a paper read at the Oxford Patristic Conference 126 Jankowiak defends the opinion that the Council of Cyprus took place shortly before the publication of the Ekphesis, which was published as a result of its results not in 638, as was previously believed, but in 636. 127 Unlike M. Albert, this version assumes that St. Sophronius, as written in Psogos, accepted, under pressure from the other patriarchs and their representatives, both the decree of the Council of Cyprus and the Ekphesis, believing that the line of Psiphos was thus maintained. This hypothesis, which radically revises the entire course of events that preceded the polemic against the monothelitism of St. Maxima in alliance with Rome deserves detailed study in the future. Its advantage is that, in contrast to the dating of the Ekphesis in 638, the publication of this document is made clearer, since 636 is the height of the Arab invasion of Syria and Palestine, and in 638 many of the Monophysites at whom the union was aimed were already under Islamic rule. Jankowiak put forward a number of other arguments in favor of this hypothesis. In correspondence with us, after several clarifying questions, M. Jankowiak summarized his thoughts as follows, emphasizing that he does not claim to have a final solution to this issue (our explanations in square brackets): “The current scientific consensus is based on several contradictory premises, which makes it vulnerable. All questions related to this topic can be divided into two groups: 1) why the date [accepted for Ekphesis] 638/9 is impossible, and 2) why Ekphesis can be an edict issued only after the Council of Cyprus, which I date to 636. This is only a summary statement of my dissertation 128. [Yankowiak, however, made this statement after our question regarding the letter of St. Maximus Thalassia (beginning 640), in which for the first time in the writings of St. Maxima is mentioned, and critically, by Ekphesis; below we will discuss the features of this letter]. Firstly, when did Maxim find out about Ekphesis? I don't understand this letter to mean that he learned about Ekphesis at this point in time. When he says: “protulerunt eis dogmaticam chartam nunc ab eis expositam,” this is rather vague in terms of chronology. I rather read this text as the beginning of Maximus's opposition to Ekphesis. [Regarding the above two groups of questions, then] 1) The traditional dating of Ekphesis - the end of 638 is based on three arguments: ¾ letter from Maximus to Thalassius (see above) ¾ mention of the 12th indiction (638, September–639, August) in the acts of the Lateran Council (see below) ¾ letter of Cyrus of Alexandria to Sergius of Constantinople, included in the Acts of the Lateran, in which he accepts the Ekphesis. This is actually a very strange text. If you read it carefully, you will see that he is not talking about the publication of Ekphesis, but only about the copy that Heraclius sent to Exarch Isaac. Cyrus explicitly describes the document he received as "a copy of the Ecphesis of the most honorable faith, issued (...) by our most pious and God-protected lord and great emperor for Isaac... exarch of Italy." This means that Ekphesis dates earlier than the fall of 638, when the letter of Cyrus was written. It now remains to explain why the patriarch of the third most important See of Chalcedon was informed of the Ekphesis by means of a copy of the imperial letter sent to a third party. This in itself is impossible and, moreover, contradicts the title of the Ekphesis, which states that the imperial edict was received (that is, officially accepted) by all the patriarchs 129. One possible explanation is that the Ekphesis was published much earlier than the letter of Cyrus was written, and that the Patriarch of Alexandria was only confirming his support for this document. Another way to explain the events is to accept the message in the chronicle of Patriarch Nicephorus about the disgrace into which Cyrus fell in exile. I am inclined to date this break in the patriarchate of Cyrus around 636–639. Indeed, Cyrus's letter looks like a declaration of loyalty from a man who is in a very weak position. But whichever explanation we choose, it seems clear that Cyrus is writing about a document that appeared much earlier than the fall of 638. 2) Ekphesis - the edict of Heraclius, confirming the decisions of the Council of Cyprus. In my opinion, the Syrian story of Maxim's life provides a reliable history of the first part of the controversy. In my dissertation, I find allusions to the planned council in Honorius's second letter to Sergius, dated 635. The terminus ante quem of this council was the Battle of Yarmouk in August 636 - I think that after this date travel from and to Jerusalem was impossible. Thus, the Council of Cyprus was most likely convened in 636. I see no reason to reject the description of this council in the Syrian history of the life of Maximus. ¾ The title of Ekphesis in the Lateran Acts says that he was accepted by all the patriarchs. ¾ I believe that, although this title has been preserved only in Latin, this text can be considered authentic. ¾ “all the patriarchs” who accepted the Ekphesis (Syrian history confirms and clarifies that there were four of them), these are Sergius of Constantinople, Patriarch of Alexandria (most likely it was George, who replaced Cyrus, and not Cyrus himself), Patriarch of Jerusalem and Pope (the See of Antioch was vacant until 639). Only Honorius could be Pope, since Severin refused to sign the Ekphesis. If it was Honorius (and it could not have been another pope), then the date given by Pope Martin is impossible: the 12th indiction began on September 1, 638, 44 days before the death of Honorius, and it is impossible to imagine that in the 7th century. the journey from Constantinople to Rome took less than 70 days. The Patriarch of Jerusalem was Sophronius, which is consistent with Syrian history, which says that the compromise reached in Cyprus was accepted by all parties to the conflict, including Sophronius and Maximus [Regarding St. Maxima, it seems to us that Jankowiak still inaccurately presents the data of the Syrian Psogos, according to which St. Maxim was clearly upset by the results of the Cyprus Council, and he himself was not present at it at all, but this has no direct relation to Jankowiak’s hypothesis, in any case, and according to Psogos St. Maxim did not oppose the resolution of the council immediately after it and did not break off communication with St. Sophronius]. ¾ I do not find it surprising that Sophronius and Maximus initially accepted Ekphesis and that Maximus reacted [negatively] to it only a few years later. The same scenario took place with Psiphos: at first they both accepted him with some doubts, and only openly opposed him after a year or two. The chronology that I propose for Ekphesis suggests the same scenario [here Jankowiak is somewhat inaccurate: according to his version, St. Maximus spoke out against Ekphesis four years after its adoption - too long a period for awareness of the heresy]. ¾ Even if the previous argument is rejected, it is still necessary to explain why no one responded to Honorius's claim about one will. Honorius was at this stage in his communication with Sophronius. ¾ I am sure that Sophrony and Maxim knew his letter to Sergius. ¾ Of course, Maximus and Sophronius wanted their initial acceptance of Ekphesis to be forgotten. And again, the scenario with Psyphos is similar: from opusc. 9 it is known how embarrassed Maxim was by his initial acceptance of Psyphos [Here the author is not entirely fair, St. Maximus nowhere admits his letter to Pyrrhus (ep. 19) and the adoption of Psyphos as a mistake, but only words of praise addressed to future heretics]. I think this gives a clue: Maximus could not condemn the edict confirming the Council of Cyprus, since he accepted it. He could only condemn its later copy; and to do this, present it as an original document. That is why the original Ekphesis was forgotten (together with the Council of Cyprus), and its later copy, sent to Rome and presented to the apocrisiaries of Severinus [about which St. Maximus mentions Thalassia in a letter early in 640], was presented as original. All this, of course, implies that in the course of the controversy with the Monothelites there was a lot of manipulation of the texts. I don't think this can be doubted after Riedinger's work on the Lateran Council, which no one has refuted. I admit that the identification of Ekphesis with the Edict of Heraclius, signed as a result of the Council of Cyprus, is hypothetical, but much less hypothetical, in my opinion, is that the traditional dating of Ekphesis 638/9 does not stand up to criticism. All of these considerations by Jankowiak, it seems to us, deserve attention and should be fully discussed when the final version of the works of him and F. Booth, who largely shared his reconstruction of the course of events, is published. For now, we do not dare to make a final judgment regarding this hypothesis, but we would like to take it into account in the general course of presentation of the Monothelite disputes. This hypothesis was shared, in particular, by F. Booth, who in correspondence with us mainly referred to the fact that all works that do not mention the Council of Cyprus come from Diophelite circles, and therefore cannot be considered a reliable source. According to Booth, the later Orthodox tradition tried to “obscure” the fact of the signing of St. Sophronius Ekphesis (hence his later dating). In any case, these arguments require further research, and if St. Sophronius actually accepted Ekphesis (despite the fact that St. Maximus retained communication with him), then the position of St. Maxim at the very beginning of the polemic against monothelitism was even more difficult than previously imagined. According to Booth, St. Sophronius could have adopted Ekphesis since, compared to Psyphos, there was not much added to it. But this “little thing” St. Maxim just found it (according to Yankowiak, not immediately) very important. Among the objections that this version meets with us is the well-known story about the sent St. Sophronius with a mission to Rome Bishop. Stephen of Dorsk, from whom he took the word to defend the rigor of Orthodox teaching and convince the Romans that heresy in the East must be fought (Mansi X. 896B–C) (this will be discussed below). If St. Sophronius accepted Ekphesis, then such an embassy would be inappropriate. It was usually believed that Stephen was sent before the death of St. Sophronius in 638, But Booth believes that the embassy took place earlier, according to his and Jankowiak’s dating - around 636–637, and after the death of St. Sophronius, according to their hypothesis, Stephen went to Rome again. Even if this is so, the question arises why Stephen, during the life and after the death of his teacher St. Sophronius, who allegedly accepted Ekphesis, insisted, at risk to himself, on the need to fight it, and during the life of St. Sophronius he was sent to Pope Honorius, with whose legates the Patriarch of Jerusalem had just signed the Ekphesis in Cyprus. Booth answers this question in the spirit that St. Sophronius accepted Ekphesis under pressure, wanting a compromise, but continued the fight, especially after the Arab conquest of Palestine, realizing the harmfulness of Ekphesis. But why, if St. Sophronius realized it already in 637, St. Maximus began his polemic with Ecphesis only in 640? Perhaps, Rev. Maxim was separated from St. Sophronia under the conditions of the Arab invasion, or does this version itself not stand up to criticism? All these hypotheses need to be discussed after they are published in final form. Fortunately, the question of the Cyprus Council (whether it was or not, and if it was, how it ended) is not decisive for understanding the theological and polemical works of St. Maxims written against the Monothelites, starting from 640. There are, however, several indisputable facts related to Cyprus and important for the general context of the debate around monoenergism and monothelitism. Firstly, the fact that Emperor Heraclius, in his command of 623 regarding Paul One-Eye, forbade talking about two actions in Christ, and Archbishop. Arkady of Cyprus apparently observed this ban 130. So for the tension between St. Sophronius and Arcadius of Cyprus (who had different understandings of the oikonomia permissible in relation to heretics) had very real prerequisites, this is also known from the story with the addition to the Trisagion. Secondly, it is also known that ultimately St. Maxim will honor Arcadius of Cyprus as one of the pillars of Orthodoxy and call him a saint 131. Arkady's closest collaborator was Marin (deacon, then presbyter), to whom St. Maximus will direct his most important Theological and polemical writings from different periods of polemics, including during the life of Arcadius (d. c. 643) 132 ; Obviously, their real addressee was Arkady. It was in Cyprus, with the blessing of Archbishop. Arcadia based on the life written by St. Sophronius and John Moschus, the life of St. will be compiled. John the Merciful 133, which spoke very highly of the patriarch’s closest advisers – St. John Mosche and Sophronia. The next bishop of Cyprus, Sergius, would write to Pope Theodore in May 643 that Arcadius, even if he kept silent in the disputes due to oikonomia, was on the side of Orthodoxy and Rome and bequeathed him to follow the same path 134. From all this we can conclude that, despite a certain tension that may have occurred between St. Sophronius and Archbishop. Arkady at the early stage of the monoenergist crisis, ultimately the latter was considered, perhaps, by St. Sophronius and certainly St. Maxim as an important strategic ally, capable of at least somehow influencing church policy in Constantinople. About the fact that the archbishop. Until his death, Arkady did not stop begging those who accepted Ekphesis to abandon Monothelitism, St. Maxim testifies in opusc. 12: PL 129, 575B, so the correspondence of St. Maxima and Marin probably played an important role in bringing to Arkady arguments in favor of the Orthodox teaching, which he, in essence, shared. This should be kept in mind when referring to the relevant Theological and Polemical Works. If we return to the question of the beginning of the dispute about monoenergism, then no matter how the issue of the “Cyprus Council” was resolved, we can assume that the opusc dates back to the early period of the controversy, probably even before the adoption of Psyphos. 5 prp. Maxima, dated by Sherwood c. 633 135, where, as this researcher notes, St. Maximus shows himself to be a supporter of the doctrine of two energies and polemicizes with the doctrine of one (which was prohibited by Psiphos, which St. Maximus accepted, which means, most likely, opusc. 5 was written before him). St. Maxim, which is noteworthy, gives arguments of a philosophical-theological and partly dialectical nature (and does not analyze quotations from Scripture and the fathers), similar in type (but, of course, not in content) to the arguments of the theorist of monoenergism Theodore of Faransky in his letter to Sergius 136. It is possible that opusc. 5 has something to do with the controversy surrounding monoenergism in Cyprus, in which at an early stage of the debate (and regardless of the “council”) Anastasia the Venerable could somehow take part through his student. Maximus, as stated in Psogos 137. Let's return to the works of St. Maxim, the dating of which is beyond doubt, and the theological content is of undeniable interest. 8. “God-masculine action” in the Difficulties to Thomas in the context of polemics with monoenergism 138 Despite the extremely favorable review of Rev. Maximus on Psiphos and Pyrrhus’ letter to him, if Sergius and Pyrrhus hoped to find in Abba Maximus “one of their own among strangers” and with his help to influence Elder Sophronius and his supporters in order to remove the union from criticism, then they were mistaken in their calculations. Although Psiphos was recognized by everyone and, it would seem, peace had come, however, the newly elected Patriarch Sophronius of Jerusalem, in his Council Epistle sent to Sergius and Honorius, and his disciple St. Maximus, in the Difficulties to Thomas, written in 634, 139, shortly after the publication of Psiphos, considered it necessary to formulate the doctrine of the Divine and human actions in Christ in such a way as to bar the path of the emerging heresy. Before St. Maxim had a double task: on the one hand, he, like St. Sophronius, was confident in the falsity of the union of Cyrus, or more precisely, the idea expressed in the monoenergist 7th chapter of the Nine Chapters, on the other hand, in the writings of the saint himself. Maxims, written before the start of the controversy about energies, contained views that could be considered monoenergist. Thus, Rev. Maximus needed to again formulate some aspects of the doctrine of the deification of human nature and its will in Christ in such a way that, while preserving previous views, protect them from a mono-energetic interpretation. Speaking about the works of anti-monoenergist polemics of Patriarch Sophrony and St. Maximus in 634, it should first of all be noted that neither St. Sophrony in the Council Epistle, neither St. Maximus in the Difficulties to Thomas does not talk about two actions in Christ. Of course, this can be explained by the observance of Psiphos, that is, the prohibition to use the expression “two energies” in response to the prohibition to use the expression “one energy.” Nevertheless, the fact remains that St. Sophrony and etc. Maxim believed that you can be Orthodox and not literally profess “two energies” - otherwise they would not have accepted Psyphos. However, the ban on confessing the “one” (or “single” 140) energy of Christ on the part of St. Maxima at this stage was an absolute 141. At the same time, Rev. Maxim in the Difficulties to Thomas not only denies the expression “single energy,” but seeks to answer the question to which this expression, which is incorrect from his point of view, explicitly or implicitly answers - the question of how one should think about what Christ did, since the two natures in His hypostasis are inseparably united and He Himself represents the One Hypostasis. The answer to this question is Rev. Maxim gives in one place the 4th difficulty to Thomas: “For by the interchange (ἐπαλλαγῇ) of these [properties, that is, divine and human,] He clearly confirmed [the presence of] the natures of which He Himself was a hypostasis, and their essential actions (οὐσιώδεις ἐνεργείας), or movements (κινήσεις), for whom He Himself was an unfused (ἀσύγχυτος) unity (ἕνωσις), not perceiving divisions according to both natures, the hypostasis of which He was, since He acted... singly (μοναδικῶς), that is, uniformly (ἑνοειδῶς), through each of the [deeds] He performs, inseparably (ἀχωρίστως) with the power of His Divinity, co-revealing (συνεκφαίνων) the action of one’s own flesh” 142. St. It was important for Maximus to point out not only that each of the entities, whose Hypostasis was the Son of God, had its own, not merging into one (this is emphasized by the text taken from the Chalcedonian oros ἀσύγχυτος) essential actions and movements, but also that Christ acted “single”, that is, “uniformly”; this emphasizes the inseparability of the two natures in Christ in their manifestation outside (this is indicated by the ἀχωρίστως taken from the same oros). How exactly does Rev. Maxim understands this “singularity,” he revealed in the fifth difficulty to Thomas (amb. 5). Before moving on to it, let's note the following. None of Abba Thomas’s questions addressed to St. Maximus is not directly related to the controversy surrounding monoenergism and the formula about “God-masculine action” from the Areopagitica. Even in the fifth question regarding one passage from Letter 4 to Gaius, Thomas does not ask a question about “God-manly action” or about actions in Christ in general. Interpreting a difficult passage from Letter 4 to Gaius: “How, you ask, does Jesus, who is above all [creatures], essentially find himself on the same level with all people? Indeed, in this case, He is called a man not even because He is the cause of people, but because He truly is a man in his entire essence” 143, - Rev. Maxim could well have not explained the expression “new Godly action” contained in this letter. Strictly speaking, Foma did not ask him about this. Nevertheless, Rev. Maxim does this, that is, he uses this question of Thomas, and a number of previous ones, in order to reveal his understanding of actions in Christ. It is important to note that Rev. Maximus, already at this time (in 634), quite consciously and not as a “reaction” to the questions asked by Thomas, considered it necessary to polemically sharpen his understanding of the corresponding passage from the Areopagitica, not simply giving it his interpretation (as he did, without even mentioning the “God-masculine action”, interpreting Psiphos in ep. 19), but contrasting his understanding with the monoenergist understanding. Most likely, such an active entry by St. The maxim in the controversy is due to the fact that, in addition to the 7th chapter of the Nine Chapters of the Union, which was formally abolished by Psiphos, the opposing side extended its interpretations and justifications, that is, monoenergist interpretations of the “God-male action” Areopagitik, and it is in this sense that neither St. Maxim, nor St. Sophronius could not be “consoled” by Psiphos, or more precisely, by the situation that arose after its adoption, about which St. Maxim is reminiscent of the illustration of Petru in the opusc. 12 in 643 (we noted this above). Anyway, in amb . 5 prp. Maximus sees the fulcrum of the new heresy in the interpretation by Cyrus and his followers in the 7th chapter of the Unionist Act (Nine Chapters) of the Areopagite expression “God-masculine action” as “one” 144: “If the tropos of unity leaves the logos of difference unharmed, then what the saint [the Areopagite] said is a periphrasis, which, by the appropriate name of the twofold (διττοῦ), according to the nature of Christ, also indicates a double action (τὴν διττὴν ἐνέργειαν) (since from unity the essential logos of the united is in no way diminished by the nature and quality), but not like some, “by denying extremes creating an affirmation” 145 of a certain middle. For in Christ there is nothing average, affirmed by the “denial of extremes”" 146. What are we talking about here, who are these “some” who “by denying extremes create affirmation,” and what generally happened in the polemics of St. Sophronius with Cyrus - we learn about this from the dogmatic “article” of Pyrrhus, justifying his brother Cyrus: “The venerable Sophronius attacked one point, as having distorted by changing one word the testimony of the God-bearing teacher Dionysius... On paper, indeed, instead of the word “new” the word “one” was inserted, but such a word was inserted by the most holy Cyrus not as a forgery - but not it will be, my word of honor! – but as if the word “new” could be understood in no other way than in the sense of “one”. For, he says, having made one statement through the denial of extremes and having only expressed it that another... the divine teacher taught, how can one not confess one action of Christ, also one?” 147 Probably, Pyrrhus refers here to a certain auto-commentary that Cyrus made to the 7th chapter of the Nine Chapters - the same one that rejects St. Maxim. The extremes in question are the actions of “only Divine” and “only human”. In fact, the Areopagite says about Christ (and St. Maximus refers to these words, commenting on them): “... not as God accomplishing the Divine, - for not only in a Divine way, separately from the flesh (for he is not only non-essential), and not as a man - human, for not just in a human way, separately from the Divine (for not only a man), but as God who has become a man, living with us by some new God-masculine energy" 148. That is, the denial of the extremes that Cyrus speaks of is “not like God, doing the Divine... and not like a man, doing the human.” The point is that Christ never accomplished what was divine only as God or what was human only as a man. From this double negation, Cyrus drew a conclusion about one action in the 7th chapter of the Nine Chapters: “Christ and the Son produced both the divine and the humanly decent by one divinely masculine action” 149. St. Maximus recognizes the importance of this double negation in the Areopagite, but does not agree that a single action can be inferred from it: ““Godly-manly” (Θεανδρικήν) [the action is called] and not as simple (ἁπλῆν), nor as something complex (σύνθετον), that is, [in the first case] either as [an action] according to the nature of one naked Divinity, or one existing in itself, humanity, or [, in the second case, as] relating to a complex nature, the middle between the extreme [parts], - but as befitting of “God who became a man,” that is, who became perfectly human” 150. Here, as we see, St. Maxim lists one after another possible interpretations of what “one” can mean: either one Divine energy, or one human, or something complex (like a person, for example, has a complex action, since his nature is complex - mental and physical). But Christ has nothing like this: He does not have a complex nature (contrary to what the Monophysites believed), but two natures, and this means that we cannot talk about one action. Having rejected such interpretations of “one energy”, which follow from two denials and one affirmation of Cyrus, St. Maxim nevertheless admits these denials, but along with them he makes two statements, saying that Christ: “as God was the engine of His own humanity, and as a man, He was that through which His Divinity is revealed, possessing, so to speak, [the ability] to suffer divinely (for this [with Him] is voluntary), because He was not just a man, but in a human way - to work miracles (for [he did this] through the flesh), because He was not naked God" 151. Here Rev. Maxim distinguishes, in essence, two types of Divine action in Christ: 1) the suffering of soul and body, which He endured 152 as God according to Hypostasis, 153 and 2) miracles, which, through the action of His Divine nature, He performed through the flesh. As for the latter, in them the flesh of Christ was the conductor of Divine action, its instrument. Having in mind this kind of action (true, in relation to the saints, but it is clear that this applies even more so to Christ), St. Maxim wrote back in amb. 7, that in this case God in relation to human nature becomes like the soul in its relation to the body 154. This understanding of deification allowed St. Maximus, in the Difficulties to John, speaks of the single energy of God and the saints, since deified human nature only endures, without having in itself any potential for its realization, but being entirely moved towards it by God. But if God becomes in relation to the flesh the likeness of the soul, as St. writes. Maxim, what is the mistake of the Uniate monoenergists? What is “monoenergism”, etc. Was Maxima different from their monoenergism? 155 Rev. Maxim, however, argued that in miracle-working actions human nature (the soul and body of Christ) is not deprived of its natural movement. But the Uniate monoenergists did not say that there was no such natural movement in the flesh of Christ 156. We can say that the teaching of St. The maxim about the single action of the miracle-working flesh of Christ, moved by God, did not diverge from the doctrine of the Uniate monoenergists. Interpretation of St. Maxim, however, excludes the possibility of deducing the unity of even the first kind of Divine action from the unity of the Hypostasis of the Son of God. Therefore, if the “Uniates” put such a meaning into their formula (this is how St. Maximus interpreted their logic, according to the Dispute with Pyrrhus 157), then, despite the similarity with the “Uniates,” Maxim’s interpretation of the Areopagite formula in this aspect was essentially different. Be that as it may, it should be remembered that in addition to the first kind of divine action of St. Maxim also speaks of another type of this action - the suffering that Christ endured “divinely,” that is, “voluntarily, because He was not just a man.” What are we talking about here? What does it mean that Christ endured everything connected with the suffering of the flesh and soul - hunger, thirst, pain, right up to the agony of the cross, “divinely”? St. Maxim explains it this way: “that is, voluntarily.” Subsequently, in a dispute with Pyrrhus, he would clarify what he meant: “Natural properties in the Lord do not precede desire, as in us, but... actually experiencing hunger and thirst, He experienced them not in the same way as we do, but in a way that surpasses us (for it is voluntary)” 158. In the same debate, Rev. Maxim cites the words of St. to illustrate this statement. Gregory of Nyssa about the temptation of Christ in the desert: “Having remained inaccessible [to suffering] for forty days, he later became hungry: after all, when He wanted, He gave [human] nature to act in its own way” 159. So, suffering, which became the way (tropos) of the existence of human nature after the Fall, took place with Christ not as with us (due to natural necessity), but voluntarily, that is, as conditioned by His Divine will. St. Maxim expressed this understanding already in the early qu. dub. 53 (Declerck): “The words [measured] the whole earth by a handful [Isa. 40:12] mean that the Lord squeezed His own flesh ([after all] it was earthly) on all sides so that even natural, that is, blameless, passions did not act, [if] He did not let go 160.” Christ, when He wanted this, as God gave to human nature, essentially assimilated by Him, to act in accordance with those ways of manifestation that are characteristic of it after the fall, in particular to experience hunger, thirst, pain, and reluctance to violent death. This second type of “God-manly action” of Christ is fundamentally different from the one with which He performed miracles. Did the Uniate monoenergists understand the difference between the two types of “God-masculine action”? Unfortunately, their writings relating to the early stage of the controversy have come to us in fragments, moreover, as a rule, in documents that came out of the dioenergist environment, so it is impossible to be sure how they understood this issue. In fact, it may seem that this distinction was lost among them, since by their teaching about one energy (in which two are combined) they seemed to erase the difference between, on the one hand, the single action of two natures, Divine and deified human in miracles, and on the other, the suffering of human nature (as if undeified) in the Divine Hypostasis 161. Such an interpretation can be given, for example, to the passages that have come down to us from one of the first theorists of monoenergism, condemned at the Lateran and VI Ecumenical Councils, Theodore of Parano: “Since He [the Word], for the highest reasons, for the sake of some divine and wise economy, allowed sleep, fatigue, hunger, thirst, when he wanted, then we have every right to attribute excitement to the omnipotent and wise action of the Word and the cessation of these [states]; hence we preach one action of the same Christ” 162. Here, if we understand the word “excitement” in the sense of the impetus that God supposedly gives to these sufferings, “exciting” them, then it turns out that this impetus and the suffering themselves are identified in one action. But is this what Theodore had in mind, or was it simply the Divinity’s allowance for the human nature of Christ to suffer for a short time according to the old tropos? There are other monoenergist statements in Theodore that may give the impression that he believed that every action of Christ was Divine in the same sense. For example, this: “Everything that is told about the Lord Christ, whether about God, or about the soul, or about the body, or about both, I mean, about body and soul together, was done individually and inseparably, beginning and, so to speak, flowing from the wisdom and goodness and power of the Word and passing through the medium of the rational soul and body. Therefore, all this is and is called one action of the whole, as one and the same Savior of ours” 163. However, is it true that Theodore, and even more so the later supporters of monoenergism, did not distinguish (even if without calling it such names) the miracles performed by Christ according to the tropos of miracles and according to the tropos of suffering, when the human sufferings of Christ were not carried out, but were only allowed by His Divinity? In a recently published article, Richard Price expressed the opinion, supported by a number of quotations, however, mainly from the later period of the controversy, that the monoenergists (at least some of them) were aware of this difference, even if they did not express it as precisely as the St. Maxim 164. Be that as it may, it was with St. Maxim and, characteristically, in the polemic with monoenergism, the doctrine of two kinds of “God-male action” was clearly formulated, within the framework of which it is argued that, although Christ endures suffering not like us, but “divinely,” human nature in these sufferings manifests the state in which it remains after the fall, that is, acting (or rather, suffering) in the “old” tropos (expression “divine” means that this tropos was not forced for Christ). The true tropos of the existence of human nature in Him, “renewed” by deification, was such that if He did not deign otherwise, His flesh (and even the clothes that He wore, as can be seen from the Gospel, Luke 8:43) was miraculous and produced the same effect together with the Divinity 165. Thus, in the Difficulties to Thomas, as we have seen, St. Maximus introduced an important clarification in his version of the “monoenergism” of the period of the Difficulties to John - a clarification caused by the polemics with the monoenergism of the “Uniates”: God not only deified our nature in Christ, renewing the tropos of its existence (as they claimed), but also, when He wanted, allowed it to manifest that old tropos that became inherent in it after the fall. This is a clarification made by Rev. Maximus in his previous teaching, and is, in our opinion, the main explanation why he connected the Difficulties to Thomas with the Difficulties to John, prefacing the first to the second, although chronologically, as we have already noted, they were written later 166. He clearly wanted the Difficulties on John (at least the "monoenergist" passage in amb. 7) to be read in the context of the Difficulties on Thomas. Summarizing the conclusions from both Difficulties (to John and to Thomas) regarding the understanding of St. By the maxim of actions in Christ, we can say that in these works he affirms, on the one hand, the unity of the actions of human and Divine natures, and on the other, that the Savior in earthly life endured suffering for humanity only because He Himself as God (together with the Father and the Spirit) wanted this. Therefore, likening the relationship of the Divine nature to the human nature in Christ to the relationship of the soul to the body in man is not sufficient: the soul in man is the only mover of his body and therefore does not have the power to provide the body with the freedom of some of its purely bodily, “inanimate” actions (they simply do not exist without the soul), while Christ allowed the human nature in Him to act in its old, undivine tropos 167 . When Rev. Maxim objects to Cyrus that there is no one kind of God-masculine action, since there is no God-masculine nature (that is, one that would be the natural unity of Divinity and humanity), he does not deny that God-masculine action exists, but, on the contrary, proceeds from the fact that there are two kinds of “God-masculine actions” (and not one), and neither of them is reducible to the other. And although even in the Chalcedonian edition (that is, in the expression “new divine action”) the word “action” is used in the singular, St. Maxim rejected the interpretation of this expression of the Areopagite behind the 7th chapter of the Nine Chapters of Cyrus as actually denying two types of Divine-male action and therefore rejected in the Difficulties to Thomas the very expression “single Divine-male action,” which did not prevent him from asserting that Christ acted “singlely” and “uniformly,” that is, always with the mutual communication of both of His natures, which describes the tropos of the existence of these natures in a single hypostasis. Concluding the analysis of the interpretation of “Godly action” in the Difficulties to Thomas, let us briefly dwell on the difference in the interpretation of this expression among St. Maxim and St. Sophronius of Jerusalem in his Council Epistle. It is easy to notice that St. Sophrony, like St. Maximus in the Difficulties to Thomas, written at about the same time, offers a dioenergist reading of the Areopagite formula, but different from the reading of St. Maximus, speaking not about two, but about three types of actions characteristic of Christ, of which only the last is called “Godly”: “Of [the actions of Christ] some are Godly; others, on the contrary, are humane; [the third] occupy a place between [them], having [in themselves] what is proper to God and what is proper to man in identity. We affirm that it is precisely in this [last] sense that the general Divine and masculine action is spoken of, which is not “one,” but heterogeneous and different, about which the Divinely-speaking Dionysius, divinely captivated by the divine Paul, spoke from the hill of Areev as having [in itself] the divine and humanly decent in identity and, through [its] most elegant and complex name, revealing in perfection every action of each essence, that is, nature" 168. Although in this interpretation of the “God-masculine action” St. Sophronius, some researchers find parallels with the teachings of St. Pope Leo the Great 169, it seems more likely to us that the influence of the scholia of St. John of Scythopolis to the corresponding place in the Areopagitica. In general, oddly enough, although on St. John of Scythopolis in the context of the polemics around monoenergism was also referred to by St. Sophronius 170, and, later, Pope Agathon 171, however, we were unable to find direct references to his scholia to the 4th Epistle to Gaius in them or in other authors (both dioenergists and monoenergists). Both the Doctrina Patrum and the Acts of the Lateran (649) and Constantinople (681) Councils contain a dioenergetic passage of St. John of Scythopolis from his work Against Sevier 172, and the interpretation of the 4th Epistle to Gaius on the disputes of the 7th century. as if it had no effect. However, if we turn to the essence of the interpretation of St. John of Scythopolis of the “new Godly action” of the Areopagite, then upon careful comparison it turns out that the understanding of this expression by St. Sophronius in the Council Epistle of 634. 173 very close to the understanding expressed by St. John of Scythopolis in the scholia to the Epistles of the Areopagite (SchEP 536.1) 174. Both authors say that Christ sometimes acted only as God, sometimes only as a man, and sometimes both as God and as a man, and they call this complex, intertwined of two, or “mixed” (an expression of St. John of Scythopolis) action “God-masculine” 175. It is likely that such a coincidence of understanding among St. Sophronius and St. John is associated with the influence of the latter's scholia on the Patriarch of Jerusalem; fortunately, both theologians can be attributed to the same Palestinian tradition 176. Meanwhile, Rev. Maximus, as we have seen, gives another interpretation, which in our opinion is closer to the understanding of the Areopagitica themselves, of “God-masculine action” in the sense of two kinds of “God-masculine action” in Christ, as we wrote about above 177. Understanding of “Godly masculine action” in the sense of SchEP 536. 1 st. John of Scythopolis and the Council Epistle of St. Sophrony at St. Maximus, as later with St. Pope Martin, not found 178 . Nevertheless, it should be noted that the interpretation of the previous passage from the 4th Epistle to Gaius in the previous scholium of St. John of Scythopolis (SchEP 533.3) is much closer to the interpretation of the “Godly action” that was later formulated by St. Maxim 179. It turns out that both dioenergist interpretations - St. Sophronia, etc. Maxim - go back to St. John of Scythopolis, which can serve as an additional argument in favor of a connection not only with St. Sophronia (which is obvious), but also St. Maximus (independently of St. Sophronius) with the Palestinian Orthodox theological tradition, although it is also possible that St. Maximus himself interpreted this expression in the Areopagitica in a similar way to one of the interpretations of his first scholiast. 9. Prehistory of monothelitism and polemics with it Most likely, Rev. Maximus did not enter into polemics with monothelitism immediately after the publication of Ekphesis, since his first writings against the doctrine of one will in Christ were written around 640. 180 Just as Ekphesis has its own prehistory, so does the polemic with him. Maxima. We will focus on these two topics, since they are directly related to the content and main ideas of theological and polemical works written starting from 640. The first confessions of one will by Christ in the Chalcedonian environment in the 7th century. appeared not from the lips of Pope Honorius, who is sometimes unfairly considered the father of Monothelitism 181, but much earlier - simultaneously with the first statements about one action, when in correspondence related to the case of Paul One-Eyed, and then in the context of conversations of the emperor. Heraclius with Patr. Cyrus Sergius referred to the fact that the famous letter of Mina of Constantinople to Pope Vigilius states that, along with the fact that Christ has “one action,” He has “one will” 182. Sergius reported this to Pope Honorius in a letter of 634. In the context of the same case, Paul One-Eyed in correspondence with Patr. Sergius through the mediation of Bishop. Sergius Macarion, the doctrine of the one will of Christ was confirmed and substantiated by Theodore of Faran, from whose corresponding letter, unfortunately, only fragments have been preserved 183. In the letter of Sergius to Honorius we encounter a well-known, partially repeated later in Ekphesis 184, argument against the confession of two actions in Christ, connecting this confession with the subsequent confession of two wills, which in turn leads to a confrontation (the possibility of such would be enough) of two wills in Christ, which is completely ungodly. Let's take this famous argument: “... just as the expression “two actions” seduces many, as it is not used by any of the divine and illustrious secret leaders of the Church, to follow which, moreover, would mean accepting two wills that are opposed to each other (θελήματα), such as the [will] of God the Word, who wanted to accomplish saving suffering, and the [will of] His humanity, opposing His will, and thus introducing two wills (θέλοντας) opposite to each other - which is wicked. It is impossible for two wills (θελήματα) to be present together in one subject. The saving teaching of the God-bearing fathers clearly suggests that the animate [endowed] with mind flesh of the Lord never made its natural movement on its own and according to its own desire (ὁρμῆς) contrary to the wave (νεύματι) of God the Word hypostatically united with it, but made a movement when, what and how much it wanted (ἐβούλετο) God himself is the Word" 185 . We will not analyze this passage, which quite likely reproduces the argumentation from Psiphos 186, which means it was known to St. Sophronius and etc. Maxim; it has already been discussed several times 187. It is not our task to reconstruct the genesis of the Monothelite ideas expressed in it 188. Let us note only two hypotheses that are of interest for the analysis of the theological and polemical works of St. Maxima. François-Marie Letel connected the ideas of this key passage, partly included, as he believes, in the Ecphesis, with the famous topos from the Second Discourse on the Son of St. Gregory the Theologian 189, which was indeed repeatedly discussed by St. Maxim during the controversy 190, since the Monothelites constantly referred to him, so there is no doubt about his relevance to the dispute with the Monothelites. At the same time, as can be seen from a comparison of the two quotes, the passage from St. Gregory (neither in Psiphos nor in Ekphesis there is a direct reference to him) touches only on part of the ideas expressed by the patriarch. Sergius 191, so in any case it cannot be an exhaustive source for the formation of the teachings of the Monothelites, but rather was used by them (as St. Maximus will prove, wrongfully) to confirm it. A completely different hypothesis regarding the genesis of Monothelitism was recently put forward by V. M. Lurie, who, in line with the general concept of the dependence of Monothelites on the dominant direction of Chalcedonian theology of the 6th century. 192 connected him with the controversy surrounding the Agnoites (a heresy that appeared among the Monophysites in the 6th century and was widely discussed in the empire, including by the Chalcedonites), which, in his opinion, had a decisive influence on both the formation of Monothelitic theology (which is not excluded, although it requires further research), and on the polemics with it by St. Maxima 193. At the same time, proving the latter, Lurie from the works of St. Maxima refers only to opusc. 19 is the only place where the question of the connection between the “ignorance of Christ” and the presence of His human will is explicitly discussed. We will refer to this work later, but here we note that Lurie, rightly drawing attention to this topic, interpreted this work inaccurately, missing that, along with the theme of ignorance, the key themes in it are the themes of relative and essential assimilation, repeatedly discussed by St. Maxim in other works, that is, very important for him, as well as for the entire dispute, and only through the prism of these topics should one address the issue of “ignorance.” As a result, the importance of the “Agnoite” factor in the debate around monothelitism was, it seems to us, exaggerated in Lurie’s study to the detriment of other important issues, but we will dwell on this in more detail below. As is known, in response to the message of Sergius, Pope Honorius wrote his message, containing the words about the one will of Christ 194 that became fatal for Honorius’s reputation, 194 used by the Monothelites to justify the Ekphesis they subsequently published. The official transition to monothelitism, which proclaims one will in Christ, will occur in the ideology of the empire only four years after Sergius’ letter to Honorius and his response 195. In the meantime, both sides observed Psiphos, and the theme of the will of Christ, or more precisely, His human will, was not the focus of attention. Nevertheless, in the same Difficulties to Thomas, clearly directed against the monoenergetic interpretation of Psyphos, one can find the teaching of St. Maxim about the free passions of Christ, which is directly related to the future polemic against monothelitism. In fact, in amb. 4: PG 91, 1041A–1045C ex. Maxim parses a difficult passage from St. Gregory the Theologian, which concerns not only the “passive” aspect of created nature perceived by the Son of God, as in the previous amb. 3, but also that specifically human (but also angelic) aspect of the created, which is defined in terms of “obedience” (or “disobedience”). Since the topic of obedience is directly related to both the question of the free passion of Christ and the Gethsemane prayer, let us dwell on this difficulty in more detail. St. Maxim examines a passage from Homily 30 (Second about the Son) 196 St. Gregory, where the Theologian, answering the Arians, explains in what sense the words of the Apostle about Christ should be understood: “He, being the image of God, did not consider it robbery to be equal with God; but he humbled (lit. “drained” or “emptied” - ἐκένωσεν) Himself, taking the form of a slave, becoming in the likeness of men and becoming in appearance like a man; He humbled himself, becoming obedient even to the point of death, even death on the cross” [ Phil. 2:6–8 ], words that the Arians and Eunomians used to prove the otherness of the Son of God to the Father, since obedience is characteristic only of rational creatures. It is the consideration of the theme of “obedience” in conjunction with the theme of “suffering” (that is, first of all, obedience in accepting suffering) that allows St. Maxim come at the end of amb. 4 to that question of natural actions, which leads him to discuss the “Divine Action” of the Areopagitica first, without direct mention, at the end amb. 4, and then, making this the main topic, in amb. 5. However, this difficulty will now interest us not in terms of polemics with monoenergism (which we discussed above), but in the perspective of future polemics with monothelitism. His interpretation of St. Maxim begins with the words of St. Gregory that Christ “as the Word was neither obedient nor disobedient” 197. To the Theologian's arguments that submission or disobedience to God characterizes a rational creature, and not the Giver of the commandments, St. Maximus adds an argument specific to his philosophy, developed in particular in amb. 1 and amb. 23. A rational creature, unlike God, is characterized by movement. The existence of God “by nature is peace (στάσις)” 198. Consequently, Christ as the Word of God and God is “absolutely free from obedience and disobedience” 199. It is clear what significance this has from the perspective of interpreting the Gethsemane prayer, to which the theme of obedience is directly related. Next, Rev. Maxim interprets the words of St. Gregory, explaining his understanding of the “form of a servant” [Phil.2:7], assumed by the Son of God. Moreover, as one might assume, Abba Thomas asked a question about the meaning of the expression of St. Gregory “takes on an alien image” (μορφοῦται τὸ ἀλλότριον) 200. St. Maxim gives two complementary explanations of this expression. The intended difficulty in understanding this passage could relate, in particular, to why St. Gregory calls the “slave image” “alien,” and in general why is man, created in the image and likeness of God, in whom the Son of God “put on,” called “an alien image.” Answering these and similar questions, Rev. Maxim notes that this expression implies not only human nature as such, but also the “alien” susceptibility to suffering for the sinless Son of God, given to us as punishment for the Fall. Punishment befell the entire nature, therefore, Christ, having accepted this nature, also accepted our (alien not only to Him, but also to us, as we were created by Him) susceptibility to suffering. The next passage, continuing this thought, is St. The maxim is built on a subtle distinction between “exhaustion” (κένωσις) and “indulgence” (συγκατάβασις). “Exhaustion,” as you can understand, St. Maxim here connects 201 with the fact that the Son of God perceived human nature (cf. “he emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, becoming in the likeness of men, and becoming in appearance like a man” [Phil. 2:7]), and “condescension” with the fact that the incarnate Logos became by this nature, like us, “truly a man subject to suffering” 202. The distinction is important because suffering and death are not part of the logos of our nature, and therefore it is necessary to distinguish these properties, given to it as punishment and not defining it in its essence, from the human essence itself with those idioms that it had before the Fall. Nevertheless, Christ perceived, as following St. Gregory emphasizes St. Maxim, “all of me... together with what is peculiar to me,” that is, “whole nature along with blameless passions” 203. Next, Rev. Maxim explains the meaning of the perception of non-blameable passions. In general terms, his theory has been covered more than once by researchers 204; we will only note what is important for understanding his thoughts in this place amb. 4. As a result of Adam's fall and as a punishment for it, human nature became passionate and mortal. In itself, exposure to suffering is not a reprehensible passion, but a person subject to this passion, due to the fact that his will is not confirmed in God (and this is the case with every undivine person), easily falls into reprehensible passions, which bring upon him even greater punishment from God (for personal sins). Thus, the entire “old Adam” finds himself under the “law of sin” [Rom. 7:23], in a vicious circle of blameless and reprehensible passions. The meaning of the Son of God accepting our nature with the blameless passion inherited from the old Adam, according to St. Maxim, consists in, 1) “saving those possessed by sin” (that is, demonstrating complete non-subjection to the “law of sin”, which we spoke about above), but also 2) thereby destroying (or canceling) the punishment for the sin of Adam, which the Son of God, being holy Himself, freely took upon Himself for the sake of our salvation. He abolished this punishment in Himself, that is, the passion and mortality of our nature, making our flesh partaker of His Divine power, that is, deified and, ultimately, incorruptible. Now “to those who by deed try to honor grace,” He imparts “divine power,” “making [in them] the immutability of the soul and the incorruptibility of the body 205 in the identity of intention (γνώμης) in relation to what is naturally good” 206. Having finished with the first explanation of the words of St. Gregory on the acceptance by the Word of God of an “alien image”, St. Maxim moves on to the second, which, as he writes, “he learned from one saint, wise both in word and in life” 207. It is difficult to say who he means, the fact is that it is in this interpretation of St. Maxim comes to that interpretation of the two types of “God-masculine action” (without calling it by this name), which we discussed in detail in the previous chapter, analyzing the Difficulties to Thomas in the context of the polemic with monoenergism. Let us now follow how Rev. Maximus will approach the question of two kinds of “God-masculine action”, giving a second explanation for the adoption of a “foreign image” by the Son of God. If in the first explanation “foreignness” was understood as the exposure to suffering given to man as a punishment for sin, which the Son of God accepted, then in the second the “foreignness” of the accepted “view” is associated with obedience. The Word of God according to Divinity is not simply “free from obedience and disobedience,” as St. Maxim wrote at the beginning amb. 4, His Divine nature is “alien to obedience, as well as submission.” Therefore, putting on an “alien form” is interpreted here not simply as putting on passion (although this aspect, of course, is not canceled), but more deeply, as being fulfilled by the Son of God, who took on passionate flesh, in the very core of this “passion,” obedience and submission “for the sake of us who have transgressed the commandment.” Adam fell through disobedience, therefore, in order to save him, as can be understood by St. Maximus, it was necessary not only not to fall into the sin of resisting God’s will because of the passion of the flesh and thereby destroy the “law of sin” (this is the first explanation), but also to fulfill obedience or, as St. Gregory the Theologian, “to give honor to obedience” 208 (which Adam trampled underfoot) and “to test it in suffering.” We are talking not only about the voluntary acceptance of the Cross by the Son of God, but also about all the suffering that He endured freely (ἑκουσίως), “giving honor to obedience” and “testing it in suffering,” although it is clear that, first of all, we are talking about the free passions of Christ. St. Maxim specifically dwells on the meaning of this expression by St. Gregory. The Son of God condescends to us, accepts our exposure to suffering, but, moreover, freely accepts the suffering itself (which, as the Lord of creation, He might not have experienced): hunger, thirst, struggle in the face of death, crying - everything that is characteristic of the nature of the old Adam (except for sin). By this, according to St. Maxim, He proves an “active disposition” and “condescension” towards us, that is, as can be understood, based on other passages from his writings, He accepts this not out of natural necessity and not as a punishment for sins, like us, but freely, that is, in a divine way. The meaning of Christ’s free acceptance of suffering is victory over the devil and the granting of the fruits of this victory to us: “For He who by nature was a Master became for my sake, by the nature of a slave, a slave, in order to make [me] a master over him who, by deceit, tyrannically began to rule over me, and for this purpose, doing what is due to a slave lordly, that is, pertaining to the flesh - in a divine way... having destroyed corruption with passion and created an undying life through death; and doing what befits the Master slavishly, that is, relating to the deity, carnally, showing ineffable exhaustion, deifying with passionate flesh the entire race, earthed by corruption” 209 . Immediately after this passage, St. Maxim speaks of the confirmation through the interchange of the divine and human presence in Christ of two natures with their essential energies - a passage that we have already examined 210. Finally, amb. 4 prp. Maxim gives his interpretation of the words of St. Gregory that Christ “tests” our obedience “in suffering.” He understands this “test” not only in the sense of Christ undergoing suffering for the sake of our salvation, but also in the sense of “experiential knowledge” by God incarnate, “how much should be exacted from us and how much we should be excused” 211. However, this idea also belongs to St. Gregory, who sees in this “test” by Christ of our suffering a manifestation of God’s love for mankind, since Christ as the Judge, who himself has taken our place, will not, as is clear from the context amb. 4, demand from us and condemn us for what only He could do 212. In general, speaking about the theology of St. Maximus on the eve of the start of polemics with the Monothelites, it is important to emphasize the importance that at that time he attached to the theme of the obedience of Christ, perfected by Him according to humanity (since in His Divinity He is above obedience and disobedience), but in a special, different from ours, Masterly way. And although in the Difficulties to Thomas the doctrine of wills in Christ is not yet discussed, in contrast to the topic of natural actions, the doctrine of the obedience of Christ and its place in the economy is directly related to the future polemic with the Monothelites, whose doctrine, as understood by St. Maxim, in fact, leaves no room for the free passions of Christ (His obedience according to humanity), making the humanity of Christ only a weak-willed instrument of the Divine 213. At the same time, it is also very characteristic that in the Difficulties to Thomas, having devoted so much space to the theme of obedience and free passions of Christ, St. Maximus does not touch anywhere on the question of wills in Christ, but speaks in this context only about natural actions. As Doucet notes, the doctrine of the human natural will of Christ (as opposed to the Divine) was not developed until a certain point by St. Maximus, and therefore he spoke of Christ's obedience to humanity in other terms 214. The fact is that in the controversy with monoenergism, which did not stop even after the publication of Psiphos, neither St. Sophrony, neither St. Maximus in the period from Psiphos to Ekphesis did not write speaking about the energies of the Divinity and humanity of Christ, neither about His two wills 215, nor simply about the Divine and human 216 will of Christ in the same way as they wrote about the Divine and human energies. Subsequently, when the doctrine of the wills characterizing nature will already be St. Maxim developed in detail, he directly (referring to the same place in the Apostle Paul - Phil. 2:8) will connect the theme of obedience, in particular manifested in Gethsemane, with the doctrine of two natural wills: “having become like us for our sake, the Savior spoke to God and the Father, as becomes man (ἀνθρωποπρεπῶς): “Not my will, but yours, be done”; after all, He, being by nature God, and as a man has a desire 217 consisting in fulfilling the Father’s will. That is why, according to both [natures], of which, in which and by which His hypostasis was, He is recognized as being by nature capable of both desiring and realizing our salvation, namely, [as God] He was pleased [that this salvation would be accomplished] together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and [as a man] for the sake of this [salvation] He was obedient to the Father even to death, and the death of the cross [Phil. 2:8], and through the flesh He Himself performed the great sacrament house-building in relation to us" 218. Returning to the period between Psiphos and Ekphesis, it should be noted that St. Sophrony and St. We were unable to find a discussion of the above argument of Patr. in the works of Maximus dating back to this time. Sergius (who, according to most researchers, was included in Psiphos) 219, is against the confession of two energies, that they supposedly introduce two wills into the opposite. The reason for the lack of an answer to this argument, or its discussion at all during this period, is a mystery 220. It is possible that Rev. Maxim and St. Sophrony did not want to enter into direct polemics with Sergius and disturb the shaky peace established in the Church. In fact, although in the Council Epistle of St. Sophronia is a direct criticism of the doctrine of one action of Christ 221, but Psiphos also contained an argument against the confession of one action: “the expression “one action” ... sounds strange and outrageous in the ears of some, who assume that it is pronounced in the sense of the destruction of two natures” 222. Polemics with Psiphos (and this would be a response to the argument against two energies) would truly be a violation of the concluded peace. Was this the reason for the silence of St. Maxim and St. Sophronia, or something else 223 - it’s hard to say. The fact is that the answers to these or similar arguments put forward in the controversy surrounding monoenergism, St. Maximus will give later, in the 640s, when he finally formulates his doctrine of the two natural wills of Christ, which also characterize His two natures, as well as their two energies. Unlike Psiphos, which was published by the patriarch and only later approved by order of the emperor, Ekphesis (Ἔκθεσις), although its authorship belonged to Sergius, was published, according to the traditional version, at the very height of the Muslim Arab invasion of Palestine 224 and Syria by the emperor himself. Heraclius and only later received church confirmation first by Patr. Sergius before his death (December 638), and then by the new patriarch Pyrrhus (December 20, 638 - June 29, 641; January 9 - June 1, 654). Govorun cites the opinion of Pheidas that the Ekphesis was approved by all five patriarchs - Honorius, Pope of Rome, Sergius of Constantinople, Cyrus of Alexandria, Macedonia of Antioch and Sergius of Jerusalem (meaning Sergius, Bishop of Jaffa, who, once appointed by Emperor Heraclius, served as the locum tenens of the Jerusalem Patriarchate and ruled the Jerusalem Patriarchate after death of St. Sophronius in 638) 225. As already noted, Jankowiak and Booth dispute this version, believing that the Ekphesis was signed as early as 636 Pat. Sophronius, and Sergius of Jaffa retired or died even before Elder Sophronius became Patriarch of Jerusalem, so after the death of St. Sophrony should not speak about Sergius of Jaffa, but only about the bishops who represented his ideological line 226. In any case, from the moment of its publication, the Ekphesis, hung in the narthex of Hagia Sophia, became the main ideological document of the empire, containing the official confession obligatory for all Orthodox Christians. The part of the Ekphesis, devoted to the controversial issues of energies, almost verbatim repeated the corresponding passage from the letter of Sergius to Honorius (probably included in Psiphos) 227 and, in addition to the prohibition on the confession of both one and two actions, contained the argument that the presence of two actions in Christ will certainly introduce two wills and two willers, moreover, the opposite, which means a conflict of wills (in the previous chapter we cited this passage, partially repeated in Ekphesis). To this argument another one was added, which deserves special attention, since St. Maximus will discuss it repeatedly in his Theological and Polemical Works: “For if even the vile Nestorius, dividing the Divine Incarnation of the Lord and introducing two sons, did not dare to talk about two wills (θελήματα), but on the contrary, glorified the identity of the will (ταὐτοβουλίαν) of two persons invented by him, then how is it possible for those who profess the right faith and glorify the One Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the true God, to accept in Him two and such opposite wills? So, following in everything and in this the holy fathers, we confess one will (θέλημα) of the Lord Jesus Christ, the true God, such that at no moment did His animate flesh, endowed with mind, perform natural movement separately and by its own impulse (ὁρμῆς) contrary to the wave (νεύματι) connected with it hypostatically of God the Word, but made a movement when, what and how much God the Word himself wanted (ἠβούλετο)” 228. The end of this passage repeats almost verbatim the corresponding passage from the letter of Sergius to Honorius, which in turn was probably included in Psiphos 229. If the latter is true, then the text of Psiphos was, as it were, skillfully “embroidered” 230 and an insertion was made into it regarding Nestorius, whose teaching on this part seemed to be reproached by the dioenergists and diophelites, and then there was a confession of one will, the interpretation of which turned out to be that part of this passage that was already in Psiphos. It turned out that those who accepted Psiphos should, in theory, also accept the doctrine of one will, as long as it is understood in the interpretation that Psiphos, already accepted by all, gives it. In the cunning of Patr. Sergius and those who helped him draw up this document (probably the future Patriarch Pyrrhus was among them) cannot be refused, if we also keep in mind that the phrase about one will was already written by Pope Honorius 231, just as everything else that Sergius’s message contained was accepted and approved by him. Thus, almost all parts of this key passage from the Ekphesis, with the exception of perhaps the argument regarding Nestorius, which seemed compelling, had already been tested in one way or another. It would be appropriate to remember that in the Council Epistle of St. Sophronius definitely states that “at times the same [God incarnate] willed (ἐβεβούλητο) to suffer and to perform and act humanly... and not when natural and carnal movements desired (ἤθελον) to naturally move towards [carrying out] action” 232. Yes and etc. Maxim, of course, did not admit that a human will could exist in Christ, which could at least potentially come into conflict with God’s. Perhaps both saints therefore did not enter into polemics with the corresponding passage from Psiphos, which said that it was impious to confess two opposing wills in Christ or that His flesh could not move contrary to the will of the Divine. Nevertheless, in Ekphesis something more was already affirmed, namely, one will in Christ, which excluded not only two wills capable of conflicting, but also two wills in general 233. In turn, this meant that Christ’s obedience according to humanity to God’s will, about which St. Maxim wrote several times before, it couldn’t be. But it was precisely this obedience, performed for us to correct the sin of Adam, obedience right up to death on the cross (see Phil. 2:8), which constituted for St. Maximus is the core of the economy of our salvation, as we could see by examining the corresponding passages in the Difficulties to Thomas 4 in the previous chapter. So the introduction of St. Maxim's polemic with the Monothelites was dictated not simply by the fact that the formula “one will” repeated the corresponding heretical formulas of Apollinaris, Monophysites and even the Nestorians, but first of all, we believe, by the fact that the confession of one will in Christ, to which Ekphesis forced, excluded the most important aspect of soteriology in the teaching of St. Maxima. If we now return to the argument added in Ekphesis (in comparison with the letter to Honorius and Psiphos) regarding Nestorius, that even he “did not dare to talk about two wills (θελήματα), but on the contrary, glorified the identity of the will (ταὐτοβουλίαν) of two persons invented by him,” then it should be noted that about The diophelites were well aware of the teachings of Nestorius on this matter. Yes, St. Sophronius wrote in his Conciliar Epistle: “We ... do not say, like the empty-headed Nestorius, that the union [of Divinity and humanity in Christ] is relative (σχετικήν) or by equal honor or identity of will (ταὐτοβουλίαν), carrying nonsense about convergence [consent] (σύμβασιν) in the impulse (ῥοπῇ) and identity (ταὐτότητι) of wills (θελημάτων)” 234. Subsequently, as we will see, St. Maximus will make a clear distinction between such a “convergence” or “concord” of wills, which Nestorius professed, and the perfect unity of the human will with the Divine in Christ, 235 insisting that in Him such unity in deification (without the abolition of the human will) took place not because of the moral unity of Jesus the man with the Logos (as in Nestorius), but because of the hypostatic unity of human nature with Divine in the hypostasis of the Logos incarnate. On the other hand, Rev. Maxim will repeatedly use this argument from the Monothelite Ekphesis for polemical purposes in his Theological and Polemical Works, showing that Monothelitism, at least in one of the senses of “one will,” is equivalent to Nestorianism (which was once confirmed in practice by the communion of Emperor Heraclius with the Nestorian Catholicos Ishoyav II) 236. Of course, the Chalcedonite Monothelites themselves did not mean when they referred to Nestorius in Ekphesis that their doctrine of one will was the same as that of Nestorius, but since the Chalcedonites, unlike the Monophysites, preserved the doctrine of two natures, it was quite logical to suspect them of the Nestorian understanding of “one will”. If they do not agree to this, then how will St. Petersburg prove it? Maxim, for them there will remain an alternative to Monophysite monothelitism, when one will corresponds to one complex nature, or even Apollinarianism, when the Logos as God completely controls His flesh, which does not have its own will (but for Apollinaris this corresponded to the absence of a human mind in Christ, replaced by the Logos). Thus, by adding to the Ekphesis an argument about Nestorius, which seemed irresistible, the Monothelites, without realizing it, themselves set the parameters in which the saint would argue with them. Maximus, when in the midst of the controversy he will directly say that the Monothelites have chosen as their “holy fathers”, whom they will follow and to whom they refer in the Ekphesis as those who taught about one will, all the heretics listed above, and the first in this list will not even be Apollinaris, but Nestorius 237. In the same acute phase of the controversy, St. Maximus will say that the Ekphesis is essentially not only monothelitic, but also monoenergist, although it reproduces the formal prohibition against the profession of one energy, taken from Psiphos. In fact, if in Psiphos the prohibitions on the confession of one and two energies balanced each other, then in Ekphesis this balance was disrupted. After all, the argument for the ban on two energies was that they introduce two wills, opposing each other, that is, a strict relationship between energies and wills was established (but that in Christ there are two united wills was not yet denied). Now, in a situation where one will was proclaimed, in accordance with this ratio it turned out that there was one energy in Christ, thus Ekphesis seemed to be violating his own prohibition on professing one energy. All these arguments from Rev. Maxim will speak later 238. Let us now turn to how events unfolded after the adoption of Ekphesis in their chronological sequence. Probably the first reaction known to us by St. Maximus on Ekphesis is his letter to Abbot Thalassius, preserved only in the Latin translation of Anastasius the Librarian, in which St. Maxim talks about the church-political events that took place in Constantinople in connection with the confirmation of the new Pope Severin (28.V.640–2.VIII.640). We will dwell on these events themselves below, but for now we note that the presentation of the essence of the teaching of Ecphesis, the acceptance of which was demanded from the Roman apocrisiaries as a condition for the approval of Severin (which they evaded), looks rather strange, since there is no mention of “one will”. Here is the relevant excerpt from the letter: “They [the authors of Ekphesis - G.B.] set forth the reason for natural actions (facendarum) taking place in Christ God, that is, in His essences, from which He is and in which He is and is thought; and they declare that it ought not to be said that there are one or two [causes of action] in Him. They recognize that it is only necessary to confess that from the One and the same incarnate Word of God flows both that which belongs to God and that which is human, and that both should be related to the One and the Same” 239 . This statement of the essence of the “dogmatic charter” (that is, Ekphesis), which was proposed for signing by Severin and which is reported by St. Maxim, attracts attention. St. Maximus does not say anything about the fact that this document contains a confession of one will in Christ, and yet this, it would seem, was a feature of the heresy of Ekphesis, which the Byzantines tried to force the Apocrisiaries to recognize. Why St. Maxim (if you believe the translation of Anastasius the Librarian) in the presentation of this document places emphasis not on the question of one will, but on the affirmation of one agent as the cause of actions, instead of recognizing as such causes two natures (Divine and human) - it seems unclear. This raises questions all the more if we bear in mind that the expression “from the same incarnate Word of God flows both that which belongs to God and that which is human, and that both are to be attributed to the One and the Same” 240 is not much different from the confession from the reconstruction of Psiphos according to the letter of Sergius to Cyrus from the letter to Honorius: “One and the same Only Begotten Son ... acts in Divinity and in humanity... (and) every godly and humanly decent action occurs inseparably from the One and the same incarnate God the Word and is attributed to the same” 241 or from ep. 19 Pyrrhus, approved by St. Maxim: “both the Divine and the human came from One and the Same God-Word incarnate” 242. It cannot be ruled out that the letter from St. Maxim has not reached us in its entirety, and the lost part contains precisely his first reaction to the doctrine of “one will.” If, nevertheless, the entire statement of Ekphesis was conveyed in the letter, it should be explained somehow. One possible hypothesis is the following. As is known, Psiphos, recognized by the Orthodox, prohibited the expressions “one” or “two actions”. It is possible that Rev. In his presentation of the new heresy, Maxim places emphasis on the question of the cause of actions, since he believes that the assertion that such a cause is the hypostasis of Christ is the main misconception, and not a statement about one will. As we will show below, St. Even after 640 (at least until 643), Maximus found it possible to interpret in an Orthodox manner the expression “one action” found among the holy fathers and considered it quite usable and even necessary, but he always categorically rejected the idea that the cause of actions (and then will) is hypostasis. On the other hand, the expression “one will” in Ekphesis appears in the context of justifying the incorrectness of the expression “two actions,” so it is likely that at first the emphasis in the perception of Ekphesis was indeed not on the doctrine of will, but on the problematic of actions and their causes. This opinion, in particular, was expressed by M. Jankowiak, who in his dissertation recently proposed a hypothesis that radically revised the entire course of events associated with the beginning of the controversy with monothelitism, and, among other things, drew attention to the first reaction of St. Maxima on Ekphesis in a letter to Thalassius 244. According to this hypothesis, the controversy around monothelitism did not begin immediately after the publication of Ekphesis (Jankowiak dates it not to 638, as was done before, but to 636), but later - in 640. He believes that the beginning of the controversy is not associated with the publication of Ekphesis, but with the publication of its explanation and justification of the Patr. Pyrrhus, in which he gave an interpretation of a well-known passage from Homily 30 of Gregory the Theologian 245 (St. Maximus will later polemicize with this interpretation more than once; below we will discuss these interpretations), Pyrrhus also referred in it to “one will” from the letter of Pope Honorius to Sergius, and perhaps to the unitarian expressions of St. Anastasia of Antioch, who are St. Maxim explained later in opusc. 20,246. Lack of immediate negative reaction from St. Sophronius on Ekphesis (Jankowiak, like Booth, believes that he could well have signed it at the Council of Cyprus, as follows from Psogos) is explained by the fact that the theme of “wills” in Christ by St. Sophrony was not interested at all, and the few places in his writings, in particular in the Council Epistle 247, where it is touched upon, do not speak of certainty on the issue of the doctrine of the wills in Christ and an understanding of the meaning of this topic 248. With regard to actions in Christ, Ekphesis, as Jankowiak and Booth believe, does not contain anything new in comparison with Psiphos, and the doctrine of two wills in Christ was not generally accepted at that time (not only St. Sophronius, but also St. Maximus did not express it explicitly, so the latter formed his attitude to this issue gradually). We will not go into a detailed analysis of this hypothesis - this is a matter for future research. Let us note just a few questions that arise in connection with it. Why St. Maximus, in a letter to Thalassius, calls the content of Ekphesis a “new heresy” 249? Why do the apocrisiaries of Severinus tell the Byzantines: “we assure you that we will communicate everything that you have proposed, and will show the charter itself [meaning Ekphesis] to the one who will be ordained pope” 250, if this “heresy” (Ekphesis himself) is already four years old? How did it happen that Rev. Maxim, in his correspondence with Arkady of Cyprus through Marin, did not have to answer the most inconvenient question - why St. Sophronius signed Ekphesis, etc. Maxim remained in communication with him after that, that is, actually accepted him for such a long time? Be that as it may, on one point the considerations expressed by Jankowiak certainly seem worthy of attention. Indeed, the theological polemic of St. Maximus in his first Theological and Polemical Works, written against the Monothelites in 640–641. (starting already with opusc. 4), is aimed, apparently, not directly against Ekphesis, which he does not mention, but against ideas that were expressed in support of Ekphesis a pat. Pyrrhus in his letters of 640–641 that have not reached us; however, this may have a completely understandable explanation: Emperor Heraclius was alive until the beginning of 641, and it was for St. Petersburg to enter into polemics with the imperial decree. Maximus was clearly less comfortable than with his justification by Patriarch Pyrrhus, despite the fact that St. Pyrrhus also Maxim does not mention it in these writings, and conducts polemics not with people and decrees, but with theological teachings, still hoping at this stage to convince the Monothelites, and most importantly, to enlist the support of influential persons in the Church, the same Arcadius of Cyprus, whom a letter containing open attacks against Ekphesis would put in an uncomfortable position. There is one more point that is of great importance for the history of polemics with the Monothelites, concerning the mission of Stephen, bishop. Dorsky. As is known from the materials of the Lateran Council of 649, St. Sophronius sent the Palestinian bishop Stefan Dorsky to Rome as his representative, admonishing him to seek support in the fight against the heresy that had spread in the east of the empire, in Rome, where Orthodoxy was preserved 251. In 649, during the second session of the Lateran Council, Bishop Stephen of Dors submitted a petition to the council in which he described how “cruel waves” were befalling the Orthodox faith in the East, as the heresies of monoenergism and monothelitism were spread one by one by the patriarchs of Constantinople. He recalled how the elderly patriarch of Jerusalem sent him to Rome in order to inform the pope about dangerous dogmatic innovations threatening the faith, taking an oath from him at the site of Christ’s Crucifixion so that he, “traversing as quickly as possible from one end of the earth to the other, would reach the apostolic see, where the foundations (κρηπῖδες) of pious dogmas are, and let the most sacred dogmas know to the people there - not once and not twice, but again and again - everything that was set in motion here for the sake of akrivia (precision - δι’ ἀκριβείας) [in matters of faith]. And so that he does not cease to beg and entreat them until, with apostolic wisdom, they pass judgment for a victorious purpose and pronounce the final canonical refutation of alien dogmas” 252. Here we see the very important concept of acrivia, which St. Sophrony, or rather, Bishop conveying his thoughts. Stefan obviously opposed “oikonomia,” which became the main slogan of the Uniates. According to the hypothesis of Jankowiak 253 and Booth, who shared it, St. Sophronius sent Stephen on a mission to Rome in 636 or a little later, that is, during the life of Honorius. But his first mission was not crowned with success (the latter is evidenced by the words of Stephen at the Lateran Council) 254. Stephen's second trip to Rome occurred at a later period (possibly in 640 or 641), when his appeal met with the support of Rome. There is no doubt that the spiritual testament of St. Sophronius, as well as the mission of Stefan Dorsky, was known to St. Maxim, who after the death of St. Sophronia became the main theologian of that informal brotherhood 255 about which we spoke above. From St. John Moschus and St. Sophronia, the main responsibility for the struggle for Orthodoxy now passed within this community, to which, of course, the bishop also belonged. Stefan Dorsky (he himself was a fearless and stubborn fighter, but, it seems, not a great theologian) 256, to St. Maxim. In Palestine there is opposition to the teachings of St. Sophronia was probably formed during his lifetime, and after his death the Monothelites, many of whom owed their ordination to Sergius of Jaffa, turned out to be more influential than the followers of St. Sophronius, so that Stephen of Dor, who will be sent by Pope Theodore as apostolic vicar from Rome to Palestine in 646, will be defeated in the conversion of Palestine to Orthodoxy 257. We will return to this episode later 258. So, according to most researchers, the new phase of the polemics of St. Maxima with the Uniates Sergius, Pyrrhus and their like-minded people begins around 640. 259 In this and the next two years, St. Maxim wrote several works directed against the unionist ideology of the church-political authorities of the empire, which took the form of anti-diophelitism. Below we will talk about what was characteristic of this phase (ending around 643), and how it differed from subsequent ones. For now, let us briefly describe the circumstances of the inclusion of St. Maxim into the controversy at its new stage. The beginning of anti-diophelitism as a doctrine imposed on the Christians of the empire was marked by the publication by Emperor Heraclius of Ekphesis, prepared by Patr. Sergius and his closest collaborator Pyrrhus 261 in continuation of their union policy towards the Monophysites 262. In this document, not only was it forbidden, as in Psiphos, to speak of two and/or one energy, but it also proclaimed one will in Christ, and the expression “two wills” was actually declared impious, that is, prohibited 263. This meant that the balance established by Psiphos, within which St. Maximus could express unanimity with his future opponent Pyrrhus, as we saw from Maximus’ letter to him (ep. 19). Now that the Ekphesis has been issued, affirming one will in Christ and rejecting two, peace with those who stand in these positions has become impossible. In fact, on the one hand, Ekphesis, like Psiphos, forbade talking not only about “two”, but also about “one” energy, so as not to give reason to think that there is one nature in Christ (Sergius here, apparently, reproduced and seemed to share the argument of St. Sophronius that energy is a characteristic of nature) 264. On the other hand, the prohibition of the expression “two wills,” accompanied by the proclamation of one, implied that the will of Christ is not natural and not the result of the perichorisis of two natural wills, but the will of the Hypostasis 265. This was the substantive core of the heresy of monothelitism, as St. Petersburg understood it. Maxim and with whom in the future he, in alliance with Rome, will fight 266. One can only guess why exactly in 640 (and not immediately after the publication of Ekphesis) St. Maxim began to argue with him so actively. We have already expressed several hypotheses above, but here we will briefly dwell on some important church-political events of this time. In 640, Pope Severin finally received imperial approval, which was preceded by a series of dramatic events. After the death of Pope Honorius (October 12, 638), Severinus was elected in Rome almost immediately, but the authorities in Constantinople tried to impose recognition of Ekphesis on the apocrisiaries of the 267 pope as a condition for his confirmation. The apocrisiaries refused this, citing the fact that they did not have the authority to sign doctrinal documents. After a long delay, diplomatic maneuvers on the part of the Apocrisiaries and violence on the part of Constantinople, 268 Pope Severinus in 640 was approved, and its representatives managed to achieve this without signing the Ekphesis 269, and subsequently, during the four months of the pope's reign, the question of Ekphesis was no longer raised before him, although a formal break between the Roman and Constantinople Sees apparently did not occur 270. At the end of 640, after the death of Pope Severin, a new pope was elected and received the approval of the emperor - John IV (December 24, 640–October 12, 642), who immediately after his election, even before the death of Heraclius, convened a council that proclaimed the doctrine of two wills and condemned those who denied it, in particular Sergius, Cyrus and Pyrrhus 271. The same Pope John wrote the first apology in defense of Pope Honorius, more precisely, his expression “one will”, used in the First Epistle to Sergius. The apology was already sent to the sons of Heraclius - Constantine III and Heraklon. The main idea of ​​Pope John's defense of Honorius is that by the expression “one will” he meant the natural human will of Christ, free from sin, that is, that in this natural human will Christ had no struggle (characteristic of people after the Fall) between spirit and flesh, so that it was internally unified 272. That is, Pope John insisted that “one will” in the letter of Honorius is applied not to the hypostasis of Christ, but to His human will. In this context, by the way, it was explicitly stated that the will belongs to nature and that to speak of one will already in relation to Christ means to confuse natures, which would contradict the Tomos of St. Pope Leo and would proclaim one nature in Christ 273 . St. Maxim, as we will see when turning to opusc. 20, will choose a slightly different line of defense for Pope Honorius. Jankowiak goes so far as to say that there is some controversy between the positions of the Venerable. Maximus and Pope John IV 274. No less interesting is his opinion that on St. Maximus was influenced by the defense of Ekphesis Patr. Pyrrhus, more precisely, Pyrrhus’s response to Pope John’s letter to the emperors, since he would argue with the arguments from this response in the vast majority of his writings written in 640–641. The "Diophelitism" of Rome should not be taken for granted. In fact, Pope Honorius, as we know, accepted the message of Sergius and Psiphos and himself uttered the formula about one will (no matter how it is understood). However, for Rome, where the Tomos of St. Pope Leo remained the main doctrinal document on the issue of Christology, the actual ban on two energies, stemming from Ekphesis (according to the logic of Ekphesis, the doctrine of two energies was rejected on the basis of the doctrine of the inadmissibility of two wills - in Psiphos these were opposite wills, and now - any, after which one will was proclaimed), was absolutely unacceptable, since it contradicted the very foundations Christology of the Roman Church. So, although the doctrine of two wills had not yet been dogmatized in Rome, but was only sometimes expressed by its theologians (one of them was St. Pope Leo himself), 275 now, in opposition to the anti-diophelitism and anti-dioenergism of Constantinople, Rome came to explicit diopheliteism, reinforcing traditional Latin dioenergism. Meanwhile, Emperor Heraclius died in Constantinople, and a struggle for power began between his heirs. When Constantine III came to power for several months, Pope John “addressed Constantine with greetings and a complaint about the anxieties in the church life of the western regions that were caused by the messages of Pyrrhus in justifying monothelitism. Having mentioned that Pyrrhus indicated Pope Honorius's solidarity with Sergius, the pope presented a brief overview of the history of the issue, defended Honorius's Orthodox way of thinking and urgently asked the emperor to order that the text of the Ekphesis (charta) be removed from the walls of the church of St. Sofia" 276. In Rome they expected that the charter with Ekphesis would be lifted, and were in no hurry to break off relations with Constantinople. This, however, did not happen: after the death of Constantine III (May 25, 641) and the short reign of the fifteen-year-old Heraklon with his mother, Heraclius’s second wife, Martina (May–September 641), people came to power in Constantinople who proclaimed his eleven-year-old son from his first marriage Constant as emperor and supported Ekphesis. One of their leaders, both spiritual and political (the emperor was not yet independent), was the new Patriarch Paul (1 Oct. 641–27 Dec. 653), who replaced Pyrrhus (removed for purely political reasons as a close ally of Martina), but ultimately confirmed the continuity of his ideological course 277 . Pyrrhus himself was sent into exile in North Africa (October 641), retaining his authority among the Monothelites - and among the patriarchs. Paul, and even more so with the Patriarch of Alexandria Cyrus, who apparently maintained contact with him, who, according to Jankowiak, died only on March 21, 642. 278 We dwelled on these details, first of all, to note that in Constantinople at that time people were still in power and could come to power, ready to change the ideological course and distance themselves from Ekphesis, and in other parts of the empire, in particular in Palestine, Cyprus and North Africa, serious polemics and church-political struggle unfolded, which also took place against the backdrop of new military successes of the Muslim Arabs 279. It is clear that the active inclusion in the debate of St. Maxim at this time is associated with the described church-political processes 280. Not about all the recipients of the works of St. We know the maxims of this period; in particular, it is of interest, although it is difficult to establish precisely, whether he had supporters in the capital of the empire at that time 281. But we can definitely say that St. Maxim had such supporters in Cyprus, where important works of this period were sent - opusc. 7; 19 and 20, addressed to the deacon, and then to Presbyter Marin, a close collaborator of the archbishop. Arcadia 282, who did not stop communicating either with the church authorities in Constantinople or with St. Maximus, and was, apparently, a kind of mediator between the two parties, himself adhering to a position close to that approved by Psiphos 283. Wrote by Rev. Maxim during this period, perhaps, to the monks who lived not so far from the capital, in particular the presbyter and former abbot of the monastery of St. George in Cyzicus (see opusc. 4) 284. But before turning to these and other works of the first period of the polemic with the Monothelites (its features, and why we separate it from the next, will be discussed further), it is necessary to say at least in general terms about the main milestones and themes of this polemic, how they can be reconstructed based on the Opusc written during this period. 12. Theological and polemical works 640–643. – writing order and main topics The exact dating of most of the theological and polemical works of St. There is no Maxim. Researchers who have studied this problem usually give a wide range of dates for their writing and sometimes differ greatly from each other 285 . To complicate matters, there is no critical edition of the Opusc corpus. All this, in turn, makes it difficult to reconstruct the course of the polemics of St. Maximus with the Monothelites, and hence the understanding of his works. Without claiming to have a final solution to this problem, I would like to express some considerations that would make it possible to clarify, if not the time of writing of certain theological-polemical works, then at least the sequence of their appearance, which corresponds to the main milestones of the polemics of St. Maxima with Monothelites. The general principle that we will use when putting forward our hypothesis about the dating of the works and the sequence of their writing is that during the controversy, the issues that St. Petersburg resolved. Maxim, became more and more complex, so that in later works one can often find repetitions of answers (as we will see, they were sometimes somewhat different) to questions resolved in earlier ones (especially in this regard, such voluminous works as the Dispute with Pyrrhus are characteristic), but the very appearance of new problems in Opusc. happened gradually, so you can try to trace how it happened. Not only the works of the saint themselves will help us in this. Maxim, but also information gleaned from other sources about the theological and church-political context of their writing. The first task that St. Petersburg had to solve in this controversy. Maxim, was connected with the fact that in his own theology, as well as in the previous patristic tradition, there was practically no teaching about the human (along with the Divine) natural will in Christ (or about the will of human nature) - precisely as a dogma, since this topic had not yet been problematized. Without this position, which became the basis of the entire polemic of St. Maximus with the Monothelites, further dispute would be impossible, so the works in which St. Maximus introduces it, opposing the teaching of the Monothelites about one will in Christ, which should obviously be considered the earliest in this polemic. Opusc is definitely such a work. 4: PG 91, 56–61, less likely – opusc. 24: PG 91, 268–269 286, and even less – opusc. 25: PG 91, 269–273 287 . We will not analyze these works 288 here, we will only note that already in opusc. 4 prp. Maximus begins a polemic with the Monothelite interpretation of the famous topos of the Second Word about the Son of St. Gregory the Theologian 289, which became a source for the Monothelites, allegedly confirming the absence of a special human will in Christ. St. Maximus refutes them, using the doctrine of perichorisis and the deification of our nature in Christ, which excludes the confrontation of wills 290, but presupposes the presence of human will in Him. As for the doctrine of human natural will, then, having appeared in St. Maxima in opusc. 4 in 640 in a purely theological context, it will receive a comprehensive philosophical development, together with other concepts characterizing the volitional act, only in opusc. 1 (c. 645/46), but already in opusc. 16: PG 91, 184–212 (c. 643–644) some essential points of the doctrine of natural will will be formulated, which we will dwell on below. Having introduced the concept of human natural will in Christ, St. Maxim could begin to solve the second task - the interpretation of the key passage in the Gospels for the entire polemic with the Monothelites, the Gethsemane prayer, which was already implicitly touched upon in Sergius' letter to Honorius 291. In Ecphesis, the same interpretation, which asserts that there could be no opposing wills in Christ, became an argument in favor of denying Him any two (and not just opposing) wills and affirming one. In opusc. 6 - probably the first lengthy interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer in theological and polemical works - St. Maxim combined his interpretation of the famous topos from the Second Word about the Son of St. Gregory (already touched upon by him in opusc. 4) with the disclosure of the doctrine of two wills in Christ and the nature of their interaction during prayer in Gethsemane 292. In this essay, Rev. Maxim continues one of the important themes of the Difficulties to John 7 and speaks of the complete fusion of the human will in Christ with the Divine will due to the hypostatic unity of the two natures 293; this theme is developed in the context of the doctrine of perichorisis in other Opusc. 294 V opusc. 6 (it can be dated to 640–641, but in any case - after opusc. 4 295) almost all the concepts in which St. Maxim will speak further about the Gethsemane prayer. Developed by him previously, in particular, in the Difficulties to John 7 and the Difficulties to Thomas 4, the doctrine of Christ’s obedience according to humanity to the Divine will, one with Him with the Father and the Spirit, and the corresponding interpretation of Phil. 2:8 is set forth by Rev. Maxim in opusc. 6: PG 91, 68D is already in the language of the doctrine of two wills. Exegesis of the Gethsemane prayer, more detailed than in opusc. 6, together with a lengthy interpretation of the key topos for the polemic from St. Gregory the Theologian is found further in opusc. 7: PG 91, 69–89, directed to Deacon Marinus in Cyprus. Judging by the more detailed development of this topic, as F.-M rightly notes. Flew, opusc. 7 was written after opusc. 6,296. Place opusc. 7 in writing order after opusc. 6, we believe, follows for one more reason - in this work a new topic appears, which was not discussed in previous Theological-polemical works: St. Maxim examines in it those expressions of the holy fathers related to the topic of energies in Christ, which we called above “unitarian”. In opusc. 7 in the context of polemics with the anti-dioenergism of Ekphesis, he gives an interpretation of the “God-masculine energy” of the Areopagite and the expression “one energy, related (συγγενῆ) and manifested through both” by St. Cyril of Alexandria 297, 298. It can be assumed that both of these expressions were referred to by the defenders of Ekphesis. If we remember that once imp. Heraclius, in a special command, prohibited the archbishop. Arkady of Cyprus to use the expression “two energies” and that the dispute around this topic was relevant for Cyprus (as one might guess even from the unreliable information about the “Cyprus Council”), the explanation of St. The maxim on this matter, directed at Cyprus, is by no means accidental. We will dwell on these interpretations in more detail (St. Maximus defends in them not only the doctrine of two natural energies, but also the need for unitary expressions as conveying their unity) in the next chapter, but here we note that the task of interpreting unitary expressions (along with defending two natural wills and natural energies) St. Maxim also decides in what was written, probably at the same time as the opusc. 7, or a little earlier, opusc. 8,299. Both works can be dated to 640–641, but in any case after the opusc. 4 and 6. In the writings of this period, St. Maximus already definitely contrasts the confession of two natural wills in Christ with the incorrect teaching about the “one will” of Christ, understood either as the will of nature, or as the will of the hypostasis - such a will would separate Him from the Father and the Spirit; this argument appears already in opusc. 24,300, if we are correct, following Sherwood, we consider it early in this Opusc series. , dating to 640. The opusc should perhaps be assigned to the same period. 14: PG 91, 149B–153B, containing definitions of various concepts of Christology 301, including definitions of natural and gnomic will (θέλημα φυσικόν and θέλημα γνωμικόν) 302, the distinction of which is clearly related to the anti-Monotheletian polemic, although not yet made explicit. The same distinction in relation to the anti-Monothelitian polemic is found in opusc. 7 303 and will appear in many works written later. So there's definitely something to say about the opusc place. 14 in Opusc case. does not seem possible - it could have been written earlier opusc. 7, and later 304. The next task, which Rev. Maxim had to decide in a polemic with the antidyophelites (remember that they essentially denied the “two energies”) - an interpretation not yet discussed in the opusc. 7 and 8 Unitarian Expressions of St. Anastasia of Antioch, relating to one and two energies of Christ, and the Orthodox interpretation of the phrase about one will in the first letter of the Patr. Sergius of Pope Honorius. These tasks of Rev. Maxim solves in opusc. 20: PG 91, 228–244 – dogmatic tomos, directed to Presbyter Marinus in Cyprus, at the end of which St. Maxim highly appreciates the position taken by the archbishop in the current controversy. Arkady Kiprsky. It can be assumed that the latter, through Marin, responded positively to the previously sent opusc. 7 (addressed to Marinus, who was then a deacon), and together with Marinus they asked a number of questions regarding the arguments apparently put forward in the polemics with the Monothelites (about the phrase of Pope Honorius and about the interpretation of two passages from St. Anastasius of Antioch, including from his explanation of the same key topos of St. Gregory the Theologian, which was discussed in opusc. 4, 6 and 7). To these questions Rev. Maxim answers in opusc. 20. Sherwood dates this work to 640, although he admits that it was written later, no later than May 643 305, but he, like Larcher 306, does not talk about the order of writing the opusc. 20, 7 and 8. It seems to us that we can speak with a high degree of probability about opusc. 20 as the latest of the three works. This opinion has already been expressed by Battrellos 307, who gave the following argument in favor of it: in opusc. 7 prp. Maximus, as the only unitary expressions found in the fathers, parses the expression from the Areopagitica and St. Kirill (PG 91, 88B–C), and in opusc. 20 he already knows about the corresponding expressions in St. Anastasia. The following can be added to Battrellos’s consideration: as can be seen from the Dogmatic Tomos to Presbyter Marinus, about these Unitarian expressions of St. He learned Anastasia from Marin, who was questioning him, behind whom stood the archbishop. Arkady, and Marinus and Arkady themselves, are very likely reproducing the arguments of the Monothelite party, which were current in Constantinople, with which they did not interrupt communication; through them, probably, St. Maxim received the latest news about new theological trends in the capital, in particular, about arguments in favor of the dominant ideology (as we will see in opusc. 19). Battrellos dates the opusc. 20 between 642 and 643, but for us, we repeat, what is important is not the exact dating (perhaps this work was written earlier, in 641) 308, but the sequence of writing theological and polemical works, which allows us to trace the development of the thought of St. Maxim and the course of the controversy around monothelitism 309. We will analyze the contents of opusc in more detail. 20 in the following chapters, here we note that, in addition to those listed, St. Maxim for the first time in Opusc. explicitly touches upon the theme of “relative assimilation” 310, which he further develops in a number of works, of which the most important are opusc. 19, disp. Pyrr. and opusc. 1. Judging by the available information from Monothelite sources and the expressions of the Venerable himself. Maximus, in the Monothelite camp, after criticism of Ekphesis by the Diophelites, a doctrine arose that in Christ, especially at the moment of the Gethsemane prayer, the human will as distinct from God is manifested, but only in the sense of “assimilation”, that He pronounces the prayer for the Cup as if on our behalf, that it is not an expression of His own (which He has by virtue of the perception of our nature) human will. It is difficult to say when such an opinion was first voiced in Constantinople, but before opusc. 20: PG 91, 237A–C prp. Maxim does not discuss it explicitly 311. In turn, among the Monothelites, this point of view was expressed by Patr. Paul of Constantinople, as indirectly evidenced by his own statements 312, and directly one of the aporia that his deacon Theodore put forward and to which St. Maxim will answer in opusc. 19 (c. 642–643). Christ speaks about the relative assimilation of our will in the Dispute with Pyrrhus and Pyrrhus 313, and, as one can understand, Pyrrhus refers to Patriarch Paul, who was at the time of the dispute in Constantinople, and St. Maxim ironically notes that Pyrrhus himself supervised his education. Be that as it may, we can assume that with the enthronement of Paul, that is, from 641 or a little earlier, this teaching was already widespread in Constantinople and took hold there. In opusc. 20, obviously responding to this new teaching compared to the Ekphesis of 638, St. Maximus lays the foundations of his own, different from the Monothelite, doctrine of relative assimilation in relation to the Gethsemane prayer and develops this theme in opusc. 19, making a clear distinction between relative and essential or natural assimilation, which we will discuss below. The presence of a new topic - relative assimilation, which St. Petersburg will carefully understand. Maxim strongly advises his addressee 314, a topic that has not previously been explicitly discussed in Opusc. and probably became new during the course of the controversy itself, once again proving that opusc. 20 was written later than the other two works that discuss unitary expressions. Next after opusc. 20, opusc most likely appeared. 19: PG 91, 216–228, which St. Maximus wrote in response to the aporia of the deacon and the synodicary of the patriarchs. Paul the rhetorician Theodore the Byzantine; their rev. Maxim was sent by the same Cypriot presbyter Marinus 315 (obviously with the knowledge or on the direct instructions of his archbishop) 316 . We will dwell in more detail on this very important work in the history of polemics with monothelitism separately, but here we note that in it, along with the theme of relative assimilation, which appeared in opusc. 20, the related (according to Theodore) theme of “ignorance of Christ” appears. The first aporia of Theodore is based on the thesis that the human will (an example of its manifestation is the prayer for the Chalice) must be assimilated by Christ in the same sense as ignorance, and the latter was manifested by Christ only by relative assimilation, as was clarified by the Church during the polemic with the condemned heresy of the Agnoites. So, in opusc. 19 in addition to the topic of relative assimilation, which was raised in opusc. 20, a new theme appears - the ignorance of Christ according to humanity. This topic will become very important in the course of the controversy, since, for example, in the Dispute with Pyrrhus St. Maximus will reject the presence of γνώμη in Christ, citing the fact that the doubts and hesitations characteristic of γνώμη are associated with ignorance, which could not be in Christ 317. V. M. Lurie believes that the controversy with the Agnoites is one of the most important factors in both the emergence of Monothelite Christology and the response of St. Maxima on it is 318. We have yet to discuss the second part of this statement in more detail, but for now we note that together with the new Opusc. the theme of the ignorance of Christ according to the flesh, which was introduced by Deacon Theodore, St. Maxim in opusc. 19 in response to the same aporia, Theodora continues to develop the doctrine of relative assimilation, introducing, along with the concept of relative assimilation that already existed in the patristic tradition, the concept of essential assimilation, distinguishing them for the first time 319. The emergence of a new concept, as well as the answer to a new question - about the connection between will and ignorance, clearly indicate that opusc. 19 was written after opusc. 20, probably in 642–643. 320. In the same work, Rev. Maximus refutes Theodore, who denied that among the fathers one can generally find a teaching about natural wills in Christ. This statement of Theodore once again demonstrates that the concept of the will of human nature, which the saint did not have in explicit form. Maximus in his Christology before the polemics with the Monothelites began, sounded like an innovation. St. Maximus manages to cite several examples from the holy fathers that refute Theodore’s attack, but these examples in themselves do not yet say that the fathers before St. Maximus developed a doctrine about the human natural will of Christ (Theodore, however, did not ask about the doctrine, but only about the expression), so St. Maxim will have to make a lot of effort to formulate and justify it. It should also be noted here that in opusc. 19 he indicates the limits of leniency that could then be taken in polemics with the Monothelites 321. St. Maxim does not insist that they must confess that there are two wills in Christ (in fact, literally such a confession was practically never found among the fathers), that is, he does not insist that the wills be counted. Moreover, it does not even require that opponents confess that the wills in Christ are natural, since this expression “hurts their ears” 322; the only thing he then demanded from his opponents was recognition of the Divine and human will in Christ. Obviously, while showing oikonomia, he still believed at that time that with such a confession it was possible to come to an agreement with his opponents, since subsequently they would understand that these wills, which they thus recognize, are natural. Such condescension by St. Maxim (perhaps he expressed it, hoping that the new Patriarch of Constantinople Paul, who replaced Pyrrhus, would gradually abandon the ideological line of the latter) 323 is similar to the one that St. Sophronius of Jerusalem showed after the publication of Psiphos, when he agreed not to speak of two actions in Christ, but at the same time spoke of a divine and a human action. However, this time in Constantinople they did not want to accept a confession that suited both sides (after all, St. Maximus essentially demanded the abolition of Ekphesis, which counted the wills and affirmed one), and, starting from 643–644, the controversy entered its acute phase, the distinctive feature of which in the theology of St. The maxim will be the demand for the confession of both two natural wills and two natural energies in Christ (the first theological 324 work of this phase of the polemic will be opusc. 16) and the denial of the correctness in any sense to speak of one energy, which was not in the writings of 640–643. We will talk about the works of the next period separately, but for now let’s turn to the most significant moments of the first period of the polemic with the Monothelites, in which they differ from the works of the next, acute phase of the polemic. 13. On the interpretation of unitary formulas in opusc. 7, 8 and 20 325 As noted above, at the first stage of the polemic with Ekphesis, in which “one will” was an indirect justification for the incorrectness of the confession of two energies, St. Maximus had to not only prove the existence of a human natural will in Christ along with the Divine, but also explain in what sense the unitarian expressions of the fathers should be understood, primarily those in which “one energy” is found or implied. Returning to the Areopagite's "God-male action" (which he interpreted in amb. 5 326, and now in opusc. 7 327 and opusc. 8 328), St. Maximus notes that this expression indicates the unity of the two actions in Christ: “[Christ] wove together His Divine and masculine natural energies, for neither of them exists [in Him] separately from the other, but both, being fused, are known one in the other and one through the other, because of the indissoluble unity” 329. From this passage it is clear that St. Maxim during this period aims to affirm the presence in Christ of not only two energies, but also their unity. This can be seen even more clearly from his discussion in opusc. 7, and especially opusc. 8, expressions of St. Cyril of Alexandria “single related energy.” In opusc. 8 the thought unfolds as follows. The first part (PG 91, 97D–100A) contains the expected denial in the context of polemics with the Monothelites that there is one will/energy in Christ. This is justified by the fact that such will/energy could be either only human, or only Divine, or hypostatic. In any of the three cases, from a theological point of view, the result is absurd; therefore it is obligatory to “confess in One and the Same [Christ] two natural wills and [two] essential energies” (opusc. 8: PG 91, 97C). It would seem that we are encountering standard arguments here, which were later expressed more than once, including by the Venerable himself. Maxim, in polemics with monothelitism/monoenergism. However, right there, literally in the next sentence (100B–C), St. Maxim writes that “we in no way deny [the expressions] of the holy fathers about them (I mean energies), pointing to singularity (μοναδικάς)” - we are talking about the unitary expressions of St. Cyril of Alexandria and the Areopagite, since they express unity in the sense of unity (ἕνωσις) and complete fusion (συμφυΐα) of natural energies with each other. Finally, combining the first statement with the second and interpreting the expression of St. Cyril “μία συγγενὴς ἐνέργεια (single related energy)” 330, prp. Maxim writes: “Whoever... does not equally welcome both [that is, the expressions “one” and “two energies”], and does not properly reconcile some of them with unity (ἑνώσει), and others with natural difference (διαφορᾷ) - he, as befits, inevitably falls into [heresy] - or division, or confusion - or rather, in fact, he plunges himself into it and is rejected from the true communion and confession of the holy fathers” 331. In a slightly later opusc. 20, interpreting the expression “one energy” of St. Patriarch Anastasius of Antioch and other fathers, St. Maxim writes: “This – and another, no matter what, recognized, that is, divine – father thinks... that Christ has both one energy and two; the first - paying attention to the combination of energies corresponding to nature (as, of course, natures), and the second - to their essential difference” 332, 333. At the same time, Rev. Maxim explains the unity of actions in Christ by their perichorisis, that is, the interpenetration of the energies of Divinity and humanity, rejecting the possibility of understanding “one energy” as one of the natural or as the energy of some common “Theanthropic nature.” Thus, interpreting “one energy” in St. Patriarch Anastasia, St. Maximus explains: “This teacher spoke of one energy, so that nothing Divine or human would be fulfilled separately, but would be produced by one and the same [actor] together fused (συμφυῶς) and united (ἡνωμένως), according to a unique interpenetration (περιχώρησιν) - although, of course, he did not thereby say that He has one essential energy in the sense of natural peculiarity (ἰδιότητα); just as well as the fact that by virtue of the very singularity of one person (προσώπου), He has one essence and nature, not participating in any of those of which it is composed” 334. Interpenetration implies the “fusion” and “unity” of two natural actions, so close that St. Patriarch Anastasius (as St. Maxim) calls it “one energy” 335. This energy is not of a hypostasis and not of any one essence (nature), it is formed by the unique interpenetration of two natures and their energies in one hypostasis 336, and it produces a single result (ἀποτέλεσμα), deed (ἔργον), action (πρᾶξις), indicating these energies and their discoverer 337 . Let us now turn to the interpretation of St. The maxim of the expression “one will” in the message of Pope Honorius to Patr. Sergius, whose presence became one of the important arguments of the Monothelite party. Probably, after Pope John, who came out in defense of Pope Honorius (he owns an essay called “Apologia pro Honorio Papa”) 338, St. Maxim in opusc. 20, polemicizing with the anti-dyophelites, also defended Pope Honorius, trying to deprive opponents of the opportunity to refer to him. Orthodoxy of Pope Honorius St. Maxim defended more than once throughout his life. However, the first of the surviving apologies of Pope Honorius (second part of opusc. 20) 339 is not an apology in the proper sense, but an explanation addressed to the Cypriot presbyter Marinus. Having finished the interpretation of the expression “one energy” by St. Anastasia, Rev. Maximus goes on to Honorius: “As for the Pope of the Romans Honorius, I think that by the fact that in the epistle written to Sergius he used the expression “one will,” he did not refuse, but rather agreed to recognize in Christ the duality of wills inherent in natures, that is, he composed it as it should” (opusc. 20, PG 91, 237C). Next, Rev. Maxim gives arguments in favor of his thesis, some of which we will discuss below. Here we note that the main thing in his interpretation of Honorius’s thought was to emphasize two points - firstly, that the conception of Christ in the flesh was not preceded by any sinful and passionate will 340, and secondly, that Honorius placed the main emphasis on the absence in Christ of a sinful will opposing God, since Christ, conceived without sin by the will of God alone, 341 could not have any will contrary to God. In particular, citing the words of Honorius: “After all, the Savior did not accept, he says, the flesh, corrupted by sin and opposing the law of His mind,” St. Maxim writes: “Whoever said this clearly here indicates not that He did not have a human natural will, but precisely that as a man He did not acquire any unnatural energy according to the body (through its members), much less - according to the soul - the opposite, that is, contrary to the logos, movement of the will (exactly like us), “since He was born and outside the law of human nature.” And further he shows even more clearly that the meaning of what he said was to exclude from the Savior only passionate, but not natural will” 342. Developing this idea, Rev. Maxim writes, explaining not only the words of Honorius about one will, which became the subject of controversy 343, but also the general idea of ​​the place from his epistle where this phrase occurs: “The meaning of what he said was to exclude from the Savior only the passionate, but not the natural will. And that in fact He, on the one hand, in His natural human will converged (συνέβαινε) with the Fatherly, Divine, without having any difference due to opposition to it, but by His own example, teaching us to voluntarily subordinate ours, and on the other hand, He represented the Father’s for us, so that we, carefully imitating, could, putting aside our own, through all kinds of zeal, fulfill the Divine one.” 344. Final words of interpretation of St. The maxim of the thoughts of Pope Honorius corresponds to the passage from the latter’s epistle, where an explanation is given of well-known passages in the Gospels (the same ones interpreted by St. Gregory the Theologian in the Second Discourse on the Son) 345: “Although it is written: “I came not to do My will, but the will of the Father who sent Me” (cf. John 6:18) and “not as I will, but as You will, Father” (cf. Matt. 26:39) and so on: but this is not said about the different will, but about the economy of perceived humanity. This was said for our sake, to whom the Teacher of piety gave an example, so that we would follow in His footsteps (cf. 1 Peter 2:21), teaching the disciples so that each of us would not act according to our own will, but would prefer the will of the Lord in everything” 346. So Rev. Maximus, using the expression “converging will,” interprets the words of Pope Honorius in the sense of what he himself will call “relative assimilation” 347. Christ in Gethsemane gives us an example in conformity with the will of God, that is, voluntary submission to it. Having interpreted this passage in the letter of Honorius, St. Maximus warns that the Monothelites have no right to consider this pope as their own: “It is dangerous for those who hold the opposite opinion to introduce into his words what he actually did not write, and try to make this man’s letter a cover for his own opinion (as not the best), reinterpreting these things in a different way, contrary to what he meant. After all, he has his word as a defender in court, reflecting any slanderous attack” 348. In other words, Rev. Maximus argued that the text of Honorius' letter to Sergius eloquently testifies in favor of the interpretation that he offers, and not the Monothelites. St. Maximus also puts forward other arguments in favor of such an understanding of Honorius’s thought, which does not deny the human will and energy in Christ, in particular the testimony of the Roman presbyter Anastasius, who communicated in Rome with Honorius’ secretary John, who participated in the drafting of Honorius’s message and testified to Anastasia precisely such an understanding of it by Honorius himself 349. We will not discuss here how correct St. Maximus interprets Honorius 350 and whether the defense of his message is caused solely by the need to present a united front with Rome and knock the “Argument of Honorius” out of the hands of heretics, or also by confidence in his Orthodoxy (it is impossible to say for sure about this) 351, what is much more important for us is what St. Maxim emphasized in his interpretation at that time. Here, as in the interpretation of the Unitarian expressions of St. Anastasia, Areopagite and St. Kirill, St. Maxim emphasizes the complete convergence and unity of the human will or energy with the Divine will or energy. It is in this sense that he not only admits, as we have seen, the expression “one energy,” but also insists in opusc. 7 and 8 on the fact that this expression should be welcomed and used along with those testifying to the two energies in Christ. In the same context, he justified the expression “one will” of Pope Honorius. The question may arise: how legitimate is it to call this energy “one”? Isn’t such usage a violation of language and common sense? Considering this formulation of the question to be purely grammatical or “linguophilosophical,” Pope Honorius, in the same letter to Patriarch Sergius, rejected it as inappropriate in theology: “And how one should speak or think, whether one or two actions should take place for the sake of the works (τὰ ἔργα) of Divinity and humanity, this does not concern us, we leave this to the grammarians,” and further: “No one will captivate the disciples of fishermen with philosophy and empty flattery, the following their teaching" 352. The Pope considered it sufficient to confess two natures and their “works” in Christ, and left it to philosophers and grammarians to argue about the number of the latter. One of those who undoubtedly deserve the name of philosopher, St. Maximus subsequently had to defend the message of Honorius. However, philosophy was inseparable from St. Maxim from theology, and, interpreting the expression of Pope Honorius “one will,” he nevertheless based a purely theological consideration: “By the expression “one will,” he [Honorius], I think, shows that only the Divine will preceded His birth in the flesh, and with the words: “there is no dissimilarity of will” - that it was not contrary or opposing, but entirely converging and united (τò συμβαῖνον δι’ ὅλου καὶ ἡνωμένον)" 353 . The last clarification about the “entirely converging and united” human will in Christ is especially significant. We have already cited the words of St. Maxim that Christ “in His natural human will converged (συνέβαινε) with the Fatherly, Divine” 354, but there we were talking about the example that Christ sets for us, here St. Maximus adds that His human will was “entirely converging” and, most importantly, “united.” How about St. Does Maxim understand “total similarity” 355 and “unity”? To answer this question, you need to keep in mind that in opusc. 20 he 356 speaks not of two, but of three types of relationships between the human will and the Divine. Thus, he writes about the human will: “If it is formed and moves naturally, then it remains, if not in unity (τò ἡνωμένον), then still in convergence (τò συμβαῖνον) 357, and not in discord with God. After all, in nature there is no basis either for the supernatural, or for the unnatural and rebellious” 358. From this phrase it is clear that St. Maxim distinguishes three ways in which the human will can manifest itself: natural (natural), when it is in agreement with God, unnatural, when it is in discord with Him, and supernatural, when there is a “unity” and “complete convergence” of the human will and the Divine. It is clear that the last method corresponds to the complete deification of human nature, due to which the tropos of its existence is renewed. St. Maxim writes directly about this: “Not being in discord is not enough for unity (ἕνωσιν), for everything that is natural, that is, impeccable, is not contrary to God, but is not necessarily united with Him. And the deified... in all respects is certainly united (ἡνωμένον)” (Ibid. PG 91, 236A–B). How can it be that St. Maximus understands the expression “one will” Honorius 359? If you follow the text opusc. 20 literally, it turns out that by this expression he understands one Divine will, which preceded the Incarnation. So, he writes: “in short, by the expression “one will,” he, I think, shows that only the Divine will preceded His birth in the flesh” 360. This is exactly the words of St. Maxim was understood, for example, by Battrellos and Jankowiak 361 . At the same time, to both researchers (especially Batrellos) such an interpretation seems strained and unsuccessful, not to mention the fact that Pope John IV, as we have already noted, interpreted Honorius’s “one will” as the human will, which is why Jankowiak even says that the interpretation of St. Maxima implicitly polemically starts from the interpretation of Pope John. In fact, the interpretation of St. Maxima is much more subtle than these researchers thought. He really shifts the emphasis in it from human will to God's will. However, if we expand the context of his interpretation of the words of Honorius, then the expression “one will” of the latter, it seems to us, is understood by him as the Divine will (it preceded the Incarnation; here Batrellos is right), with which the human will completely converges and unites (and this Battrellos and Jankowiak did not take into account). In fact, as Rev. writes. Maximus (let us now take the entire sentence), “by the expression “one will” he, I think, shows that only the Divine will preceded His birth in the flesh, and by the words: “there is no dissimilarity of will” - that it was not contrary or opposing, but entirely converging [with this Divine will] and united (τὸ συμβαῖνον δι’ ὅλου καὶ ἡνωμένον) [human will]" 362. The fact that the human will of Christ, neither in spirit nor in the flesh, could enter into sinful conflict with God’s, is directly related to the fact that Christ was conceived without sin and the human nature in Him was initially deified. As for the relationship between the interpretation of St. Maxim with the interpretation of Pope John, here it is worth paying attention to several significant details. In opusc. 20 prp. Maximus, speaking about the position of Rome, refers not to the message of Pope John, but to the words of Pope's secretary Honorius, whose name is also John. Moreover, the interpretation of Honorius in these words of the pope’s secretary (given by St. Maximus from the words of Abba Anastasius, who met with him) differs in one significant point from the interpretation of Pope John, known from his Apology of Pope Honorius. In the latter we are literally talking about the impossibility in the human will of Christ of a contradiction between the will of the flesh and the spirit (or mind) 363, and in St. Maximus, as he interprets Honorius 364 and as he expounds the words of the pope’s secretary - about the absence of sin in human nature and the will of Christ. This can be seen from the following words of St. Maxim: “of course - not abolition, that is, rejection of the natural will of the Savior, corresponding to the human principle in Him, but taking away and complete deliverance from the will, condemned and corresponding to us... [confessed in Rome], because they wanted to show that the flesh He assumed was pure from all sin - according to the Tradition of the most sacred sayings and fatherly teachings" (opusc. 20: PG 91, 245A). St. Maxim insisted precisely on this, admitting, however, as we will see, analyzing his interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer, that the “will of the flesh” in Christ could manifest itself economically in Him and according to the old tropos (in particular, in evading death), while His spirit (or mind), following the Divine will, rushed against the fear of death. Be that as it may, giving Rome’s position its own interpretation 365, Rev. Maximus “inscribed” his interpretation into his own, without hiding a certain difference: “due to this kind of judgment, they [the Romans] find themselves in some way echoing my insignificance just expressed and, as it were, sealing what was said in defense of Honorius with their seal” 366. Summarizing the analysis of unitary expressions interpreted by St. Maxim in opusc. 7, 8 and 20, we can say that by the “one energy” found in the holy fathers, he understands that the energies of two natures in Christ are revealed fused and united by virtue of their interpenetration, and by the “one will” of Pope Honorius - the Divine will, with which His human will “wholly converges and unites” by virtue of its deification. Moreover, such a complete convergence corresponds to the supernatural (that is, irreversible, as opposed to mere consent) unity of the human will and the Divine, which obviously corresponds to the first of two types of “God-male action” of Christ 367. It should be noted that if, relative to the energies of prp. During this period, Maximus recognizes and even considers it necessary to use the expressions: “two” and “one” 368 (and both), then in relation to wills he speaks of two wills in Christ, and by “one will” Pope Honorius prefers to understand one will of God (and not the interweaving of two wills) 369, however, adding here that the human will in Christ is with God completely converges and unites. Thus, in the interpretation of St. Maximum of unitary expressions relating to energy and will, in opusc. 7, 8 and 20 there is some asymmetry, obviously due to the fact that he conducted a polemic with Ekphesis: in response to the prohibition to say “one” or “two” energies of St. Maxim professes “both one and two,” and in response to the statement “one will” he says “not one, but two,” but such that the human and the Divine are in complete convergence and unity. St. Maxim emphasizes this asymmetry, referring to the fathers: “it is also necessary to realize [the following]: regarding natures and natural energies, in addition to expressions indicating duality, we find in the holy fathers those that indicate singularity: “one nature of God the Word, incarnate,” “God-masculine energy,” “related and revealed through both”; Regarding natural wills, as far as I know, it is generally impossible to find a single expression indicating singularity, but only those that use adverbs or numerals to denote duality” 370. Further, he rejects, referring to the absence of the expression “one will” among the fathers, the very possibility of raising the question about it, which would mean a violation of church tradition 371. Nevertheless, later St. Maxim in opusc. 20 gives an example of a unitary expression used by the fathers in relation to the will 372, which is interpreted in the same sense as “one will” in Honorius 373. But the main thing, of course, is the recognition of St. The maxim of Honorius is expressed by the Orthodox in the interpretation that he himself gives to him, taking as a basis, as we have seen, not the human will, as Pope John did, but the Divine will, with which the human is united and completely converges. From this difference from the interpretation of Pope John it is clear that St. Maxim not only stood in solidarity with Rome in his defense of Pope Honorius, but pursued an independent line in this defense, which flowed from his own theological position. According to A.M. Shufrin, expressed in correspondence with us, this interpretation shows the fidelity to the thought of St. Maxim in relation to his own teaching, expressed in amb. 7: PG 91, 1076C 374, where in relation to deification it is said about the one energy of God and the saints, or rather God alone, which St. Maxim had to apply it to wills, especially when speaking about Christ, since he thought of will as a type of energy. In addition to the problem of the unity of natural energies and wills, St. Maxim considers in opusc. 20 another topic related to another - apparently purely human - type of action of Christ. Speaking about the sufferings and passions of Christ, he uses a distinction corresponding to reproachful and blameless passions: “After all, sufferings and passions are spoken of, respectively, in two senses: in one they are punishment, and in the other dishonor; and in the first they manifest, and in the second they completely distort the character of our nature” 375. It is obvious that by “punishment” here we mean the manifestation of human nature in the old tropos of its existence, that is, in passions and suffering, which, as we have seen, St. Maxim also attributed in the Difficulties to Thomas 5 to the type of “God-manly action” (albeit different from the working of miracles) on the basis that Christ did not endure them forcedly, but only when He Himself as God (together with the Father and the Spirit) wanted it. So, doing in opusc. 20 main emphasis on the theme of unity in Christ of human natural energy and will and the Divine, St. Maxim, at the same time, continues to develop the theme of the suffering freely endured by Christ. The question arises, how does the Venerable understand? We maximize the state of the human will in the old tropos of the existence of our nature, allowed by God, in particular, in the face of death, the very threat of which He, as a human being, experienced not as we experience the threat of death, but voluntarily at a certain moment of His earthly life 376. Here we come to the key evangelical episode for the debate around Monothelitism - the Gethsemane prayer, the interpretation of which became for St. Maximus was one of the main arguments in favor of diopheliteism, while for his opponents, paradoxically, the same prayer turned out to be one of the main arguments in favor of their teaching. 14. Interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer and the problem of relative assimilation Gethsemane prayer in the interpretation of St. Many works 377 are devoted to Maxim. At the same time, until now, it seems to us, insufficient attention has been paid to some key issues of his interpretation of this episode of the Gospels, taking into account the change in the context and those tasks that St. Maxim decided on one or another of his interpretations, gradually revealing and clarifying his understanding 378 . In order to assess the severity of the problems associated with the changing context and the various tasks that the Venerable solved. Maxim, turning to the Gethsemane prayer, it is enough to give one example. In amb. 7: PG 91, 1076B, long before the start of the controversy with the Monothelites, St. Maxim, speaking of the fact that in the state of deification, autocracy is completely ceded to God’s will, cites as an example the famous Gospel words “not as I will, but as You will” [Matthew 26:39] and refers to this episode in which, according to him, Christ “impresses in Himself (or “depicts”) what is characteristic of us (ἐν ἑαυτῷ τυπῶν τὸ ἡμέτερον)" 379 . That is, the surrender of human autocracy to God, which is a condition for the state of deification among the saints (this is what is spoken of in this place amb. 7), Christ “imprinted” as an example for us in Gethsemane. At the same time, the interpretation of the expression of St. Maxim "captures what is characteristic of us" among researchers differs. Thus, Doucet argues that it testifies to Christ’s assimilation of ours, but not that assimilation that in the church tradition will be called “relative,” but that in the same tradition will be called “essential,” that is, the manifestation of human will in its difference from God’s and subordination to it 380 . “Relative assimilation,” says Doucet, concerns only the reproachful (meaning opposition). In contrast to this understanding, A. M. Shufrin in the scholium to this place expresses the opinion that St. Maximus, in all likelihood, uses here an expression from the Word of 30 St. Gregory the Theologian 381, which later served as the basis for the theory of the so-called “relative assimilation,” better known from an excerpt from the Exposition of the Orthodox Faith by St. John of Damascus 382. At the same time, Shufrin obviously proceeds from the fact that in the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer (though not in the place where he talks about imprinting and assimilating what is characteristic of us) St. Gregory really speaks about Christ’s depiction of our disobedience, etc. Maxim knew this well (we will discuss the corresponding passages from St. Gregory below) 383. However, posing the question of what kind of “assimilation” St. Petersburg had in mind. Maxim (and this is precisely how Doucet poses the question) is an anachronism, since the very distinction between “relative” and “essential” assimilation will be made by St. Maximus in the very course of the controversy around the Monothelite Ecphesis much later than the writing of the Difficulties to John 384. As we will see, the merit of St. The maxim is that it will show that, along with the relative assimilation, which the Monothelites spoke about and which, following St. Gregory the Theologian, recognized by St. Maxim, in Gethsemane Christ revealed the essential assimilation of the human will, and he distinguishes one assimilation from another. But he will finally formulate this teaching only in opusc. 19, that is, almost fifteen years after amb was written. 7. So in the Difficulties to John, this topic is simply not problematized, just as there is no detailed interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer. The fact is that in the context of polemics with the Monothelites, the topic of “assimilation,” especially in relation to the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer, becomes one of the most important, which is why it is necessary to carefully consider it. In fact, at the height of the controversy surrounding Ekphesis, the deacon of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Paul, Theodore, as can be seen from opusc. 19, argued that the manifestation of the human will in Christ (probably he had in mind primarily the episode in Gethsemane) should be understood “by assimilation” (κατ᾽οἰκείωσιν) 385, implying the type of assimilation that St. Maxim will call it “relative” (monophelites, it seems, did not distinguish between two types of assimilation and by “assimilation” they meant relative) 386 . In general, as we have already mentioned, after criticism of Ekphesis by the Diophelites, the Monothelites began not to completely reject Christ’s human will, but recognized it “by assimilation,” attributing this moment of Christ’s manifestation of our will primarily to the Gethsemane prayer 387 . In doing so, they referred to the famous words of St. Gregory the Theologian, said by him in the context of polemics with neo-Arians, which were interpreted as evidence, firstly, that Christ has one will and this will of God, and secondly, that even if we can talk about two wills in Christ, then the human will, which is discussed in the Gethsemane prayer, was not His own, but belongs to a person like us, whom Christ, by assimilation, “depicts.” So the ignorance of this man, who does not know what is possible for God and what is not, and his disobedience to God’s will, which can be read from the Gethsemane prayer, of course, do not belong to Christ Himself, but to this man “depicted” by Him 388 . So, there is no doubt about the significance of the theme of “assimilation” in the polemics around monothelitism; it is all the more important to study how the teaching of St. Maxim, which served as a response to the corresponding teaching of the Monothelites, which, as we have just seen, had two dimensions - the denial of the natural human will in Christ (and, accordingly, two wills) and the affirmation of the will “by assimilation,” in particular, in Gethsemane. Both dimensions must be taken into account when analyzing the response to the Monothelite teaching of St. Maxima. It should be said right away that the understanding of St. Maxim in amb . 7 words of Christ “not as I want, but as You” [Matthew 26:39] in the sense of “depicting what is characteristic of us,” that is, assimilation (no matter how it is understood) does not at all mean that He lacks human will. Although St. During this period, Maximus did not use the concept of natural human will in application to Christology; when interpreting this passage, he, albeit indirectly (since he speaks mainly about the saints, and about Christ only in this context), argues that in the state of deification, autocracy is not abolished, but is unshakably established in accordance with nature and God’s will (which Christ shows in Gethsemane) 389 . Autocracy in the understanding of St. Maxim, in which he follows Blessed. Diadochus of Photiki, equivalent to will 390. In contrast, Theodore, based on the fact that the holy fathers consider reproachful passions, for example, ignorance, disobedience, abandonment, to have been adopted by Christ only relatively (that is, only “represented” by Him by our disobedience, ignorance, etc.) etc.), argued that according to the same principle (or logos), that is, in the same sense, the will that manifests itself should be understood. He does not speak directly about the Gethsemane prayer, but there is no doubt that it is implied in this context. In a condensed form, Theodore’s argument sounds like this: “if, ashamed of such absurdity [attributing real ignorance to Christ], they talk about ignorance by assimilation, as well as about abandonment (ἐγκατάλειψιν) [on the Cross] and disobedience (ἀνυποταξίαν) [in Gethsemane], then let They speak about will along the same tropos. After all, the fathers put ignorance on a par with will, preserving for it the same logos (or “meaning”)” 391. The argumentation of Deacon Theodore, at first glance, especially if we keep in mind that the Venerable himself. Maxim in amb. 7 actually applied the theory of “assimilation” to the Gethsemane prayer, a very strong one. It is no coincidence that Presbyter Marin, apparently with the blessing of the archbishop. Arkady of Cyprus, forwarded the aporia of Theodore to St. Maxim - the answer to this complex question was urgent for all interested parties. It is interesting that the theme of relative assimilation is implicit in St. Maxim already in his first polemical treatise against the Monothelites - opusc. 4 (c. 640). Here he is, quite in the spirit of the traditional understanding of such difficult passages of Scripture, for example, St. Gregory the Theologian, says in what sense “disobedience” can be applied to Christ (he does not yet refer to the Gethsemane prayer, but there is no doubt that he is talking about it) - it should be understood as disobedience “in relation to what relates to us” 392. St. Maxim refers to St. Gregory the Theologian, closely retelling his famous words: “because of this it is said about Christ that He is “disobedient” in relation to what relates to us 393 until He frees us from this confrontation by the power of incarnation” 394. In essence, we are talking specifically about the relative assimilation of our rebellion, however, the very concept of “assimilation” by St. Maxim does not use it here, and does not say what it consists of and how it should be understood, obviously not expecting to encounter difficulties with his addressees at this point. At the same time (and this is new to the ears of many) he says that Christ had a natural human will 395 and that, unlike ours, His will did not have any opposition, that is, hesitation and struggle between two decisions 396 . So, Rev. Maximus insists on the presence of a natural human will in Christ, since He truly perceived our nature; as well as on the fact that, due to the seedless conception and interpenetration of Divinity and humanity in the single hypostasis of the Son of God, Christ could not commit any sin, which means that it is impossible to talk about any contradiction of the human will in Christ to God’s will or even about its possibility. The next step in opusc. 6 prp. Maxim proceeds directly to the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer, and the title of this work contains the words of Christ about the passing of the Cup: “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me!” [Matthew 26:39]. Obviously, even then they were for the Monothelites (and St. Maximus in this work, the addressee of which is unknown, addresses the Monothelites) the main argument in favor of the fact that the words of the Gethsemane prayer, which expresses the deviation from the Chalice, cannot testify to the presence of human will in Christ, since Christ could not contradict the will of the Father. In any case, his interpretation of this phrase and the entire Gethsemane prayer of St. Maxim begins with a thesis (including a quote taken out of context from St. Gregory the Theologian), which he puts into the mouth of a Monothelite: “If the words “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me!”... you understand as said by man, “not as we understand in the Savior (His will (θέλειν), as completely deified, is not contrary to God), but similar to us, because the human will (θελήματος) does not always follow, but very often contradicts and opposes the will of God" 397, as the divine says Gregory..." 398 . From this passage (most likely reproducing the thesis of the Monothelites) we can conclude that they, referring to the prayer for the Cup, denied that Christ had a human will, obviously considering that this prayer for the passage of the Cross was pronounced on behalf of “a man like us.” As Larcher notes 399, the present place is opusc. 6 can serve as evidence of the understanding of the Monothelites Sergius and Pyrrhus of the Gethsemane prayer, in which they, not wanting to allow a contradiction of wills in Christ and interpreting their difference as a condition for such a contradiction, did not recognize that the words about the carrying of the Cup came from a person “as we understand in the Savior,” but believed that they came from a person “like us,” which they interpreted in the sense of relative assimilation 400. Larchet, however, does not pay attention to the fact that the Venerable himself. Maximus once (amb. 7) actually correlated the Gethsemane prayer with what later came to be called “assimilation,” and in opusc. 4: PG 91, 60B, as we noted, “disobedience” in the application to Christ was correlated with our disobedience (and therefore with “relative assimilation”, not yet called by name). It is interesting that in his first interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer in polemics with the Monothelites, that is, in opusc. 6, prp. Maxim does not discuss the topic of assimilation and the related topic of “disobedience” at all; instead, he transfers all the emphasis to the evidence from the same Gethsemane prayer and the same quote from St. Gregory of the presence of human will in Christ. St. Maximus proves this by saying that prayer for the Cup shows contraction (συστολή) 401 in the face of death (such compression, unlike disobedience, is not a sin - it is not communicated, but implied), and the further words of Christ “not as I will, but Thy will be done” [Matthew 26:39; Luke 22:42] testify that the human will in Christ is in complete fusion (συμφυΐα) and complete convergence (σύννευσις) with the Divine will 402. This is confirmed by the words of St. Gregory in the quotation cited by the Monothelites: “His will (θέλειν), as completely deified, is not contrary to God,” 403 from which it clearly follows that the human will (wholly deified) in Christ by St. Gregory admitted. So in opusc. 6 prp. Maxim solves the problem of proving, on the basis of the words of the Gospels and the testimony of the most authoritative holy father, the presence of a human will in Christ, which manifested itself first in contraction before the threat of death, and then as completely converging with God’s. At the same time, his first interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer bypasses the question of Christ’s “disobedience” and the related theme of relative assimilation, based on the final testimony of the fusion of the human will in Christ with God’s in Matthew 26:39 and Luke 22:42, and regarding the preceding prayer for the passing of the Cup by St. Maxim speaks only of “compression” before the threat of death. So, on the basis of what he calls “compression,” and the subsequent complete convergence of the human will with God’s, St. Maximus affirms the need to confess “[Christ] who is double by nature has two wills (θελήσεις) and energies that exist by nature, and that in neither one nor the other respect 404 He has any opposition, but at the same time there is a natural difference in all [things], of which, in which and which He was by nature” 405. Next 406 prp. Maxim convincingly rejects the possibility of interpreting the Gospel words “not My will, but Thy will be done” as spoken by Christ according to His Divinity (this interpretation was found among some fathers, although it was disputed by others) 407 and appends to the Gethsemane prayer the famous words of St. Paul about obedience [Phil.2:8], which implies the presence of human will in Christ. The next work interpreting the Gethsemane prayer was a dogmatic tomos addressed to Deacon Marinus in Cyprus - opusc. 7. In its first part, Rev. Maximus makes theoretical arguments for the presence of human energy and will in Christ, arguing against the thesis of Ekphesis, that the presence of two energies would mean the presence of two contradictory wills. St. Maximus insists that nature, since it is created by God, cannot in itself possess a will that opposes God. Even “intention (γνώμη) and everything that relates to intention” (we are talking, apparently, about all stages of a volitional act), “when it converges with the logos of nature,” does not conflict with God’s will 408. Only intention and gnomic choice, contrary to the logos of nature, separates us from God and from each other 409. After this theoretical preamble, Rev. Maxim proceeds to the interpretation of the Gospel, where prayer for the passing of the Cup is understood as evidence of Christ’s human nature and its will, which is confirmed “through the economic avoidance (παραιτήσεως) shown by Him from death for us, because of which [Jesus] said: “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me!” [Matthew 26:39], - in order to show the weakness of His flesh, as well as the fact that to those who saw [Him] He was represented by the flesh not as a false vision deceiving the senses, but was truly a man - this is evidenced by the natural will, which is due to the deviation [manifested] according to the economy” 410. As we see, in this interpretation, as in opusc. 6, we are not talking about resistance and not about the relative assimilation associated with it. The main goal of St. The maxim is to prove that Christ has a human natural will, which was economically revealed by Christ in Gethsemane. As in opusc. 6, prp. Maxim distinguishes in opusc. 7 two moments in the Gethsemane prayer - in the first (here it is called avoidance of the Cup, there it was called “constriction” before the threat of death) 411 our nature and its will are economically revealed and confirmed (in their difference from the Divine and as evidence of the weakness of the flesh), in the second - that human nature in Christ and its will are deified, and as such this will fully agrees with Divine. Moreover, in opusc. 7 prp. Maxim makes one more clarification, describing the transition from the manifestation of the human will in Christ in the old tropos to the manifestation of it in a state of complete unity. He says that “He made the final decision (ἐπίκρισις τελείως) 412 based only on the Father’s will; According to this [decision], He, as a man, said: “But not Mine, but Thy will be done.” 413. At the same time, if there is a concept of a “final decision”, Rev. Maximus gives no reason to believe that Christ had hesitation in choosing between two decisions (obedience and disobedience to the will of the Father) or at least the possibility of such hesitation, that is, resistance to the will of God (in opusc. 4: PG 91, 60, as we have seen, he rejected the possibility of such resistance) 414. The status of the words about evading the Chalice, besides the fact that this is an economic manifestation of our weakness to confirm Christ’s human nature and its will, remains not entirely clear. Should this avoidance be understood as resistance? The Monothelites, in principle, did not deny that Christ could, by permission, manifest the weakness of the flesh, in particular, in evading the Chalice; They denied, as a rule, the possibility of calling this a manifestation of will. They obviously believed that if you call such deviation by will, it would become conscious resistance, which could not have happened in Christ. It was on this basis that they said that in this case it cannot be considered that the will of man, “whom we mean in Christ,” was manifested here, for Christ is holy and could not show resistance. From this it was concluded that this is a manifestation of the will of “a man like us” (both expressions from Word 30 of St. Gregory the Theologian), that is, it should be thought of “according to assimilation” (and therefore as our opposition imprinted by Christ). St. Maxim does not directly enter into a dispute with the point of view of the Monothelites, but in every possible way proves the presence of human will in Christ, manifested economically in Gethsemane, first according to the old tropos, and then according to the renewed one. However, like the Monothelites and like himself in amb. 7, prp. Maximus speaks of the teaching role of the Gethsemane prayer, noting that in the words “not my will, but yours, be done,” Christ “gives us a model and example so that we renounce our will for the sake of the perfect fulfillment of [the will] of the Divine, even if we see that because of this we are in danger of death” 415. But unlike the Monothelites, St. Maxim believed that the Gethsemane prayer not only teaches obedience to God even to death, but also testifies to the reality of human nature and its will in Christ. The only thing we still learn about the relationship between the two manifestations of human will in Gethsemane - in the old tropos and in the renewed one - is that, according to St. Maxim, Christ first, economically manifesting his natural will, evaded death, and “then rushed against it [death] through a perfect convergence with the will of the Father” 416. In other words, Rev. Maxim makes it clear that the “final decision” about which he spoke above, consisting in following the will of the Father - to accept the Cup, took place with the complete convergence of the human will in Christ with the will of God. Doucet expressed the opinion in connection with this place that, according to St. Maxim, one cannot talk about the contradiction (contradiction) of the human will of Christ with the will of God (even in the initial deviation from the Chalice), but one should talk about the difference (or otherness, altérité) of the human will from God and about the struggle (although not in contradiction) in the human will of Christ 417. One cannot but agree with the first part of his statement; as for the second, such a way of expression as “the internal struggle in the human will of Christ” 418 is used by St. Maxima does not occur 419. Judging by the text opusc. 7, we can say that he speaks of Christ’s struggle with the fear of death, freely experienced by Christ, which is overcome by His deified human autocracy. Be that as it may, the above interpretations of the Gethsemane prayer do not say that avoiding the Cup or “squeezing” in the face of death is a contradiction to the will of the Father. Moreover, Rev. Maxim specifically emphasizes in opusc. 7, that “the [human] will (θέλειν) of the Savior... was in no way contrary to God” 420. Moreover, he says this, referring to the words of St. Gregory the Theologian about the deification of the human will in Christ, and it is in this context (emphasizing that Christ did not have a gnomic will) 421 affirms the absence in any respect of opposition to God: “the great theologian Gregory in the Second Word about the Son ... says [the following]: “His will, as completely deified, is not contrary to God” 422. So, according to this Divine teacher, the Savior’s will (θέλειν) was human; it was not in any respect contrary to God, for it was by no means gnomic, but, in the proper sense, natural, always imprinted by His essential Divinity and moved towards the fulfillment of the economy” 423. It is clear that avoiding death was the same moment in the fulfillment of the economy - necessary for the manifestation of the authenticity of the perception of our nature along with its will, as was the next moment corresponding to the “final decision” in the Gethsemane prayer. So, since the deviation from the Chalice was accomplished according to God’s will, which allowed the human flesh of Christ to experience the “compression” and deviation from death that was natural for the old tropos, then there was and could not be any contradiction with God’s will in such a deviation. As for understanding St. The maxim of how exactly Christ suffered compression in the flesh in the face of death, we can assume that he understood this in the same way as St. John Chrysostom, to whom he refers with one amendment, which will be discussed below. This is the interpretation of Chrysostom, which St. Petersburg cites twice in different theological and polemical works. Maxim: “After all, [the words] “not as I will, but as You will” [Matthew 26:39] express nothing more than the fact that He was truly clothed with flesh, which fears death, because it is characteristic of it to fear death, shy away from it and indulge in grief. He sometimes leaves His flesh alone and deprived of His [Divine] energy, in order, by showing its weakness, to inspire confidence in its [human] nature, and sometimes He covers it, so that you know that He was not an ordinary man. This might have been thought then if He had constantly shown human actions; just as if He constantly performed what is characteristic of the Divine, they would not believe [the doctrine of] economy” 424. That is, in Gethsemane, during the prayer for the Cup, as Chrysostom understands it and, probably, after him, St. Maxim, there was a temporary “deprivation” of human flesh of the action of Divine energy, which was replaced by its “covering” of the flesh 425. It was in the first state that Christ experienced a free “compression” in human flesh before the threat of death. Let's return to opusc. 7. In contrast to the theme of resistance in the prayer for the passing of the Cup, the theme of assimilation, although latent, ultimately appears in this work: “He appears [to us and] as a man - being, at the same time, by nature God - when he economically desires that 'the cup should pass from Him', and... imprints [in Himself] what is inherent in us (τυπῶν τò ἡμέτερον) ... in order to expel from human nature all compression in the face of death and to harden 426 us and raise us courageously to fight against it, that is, death” 427. Expressions such as “economically” and “impresses [in Himself] what is inherent in us” are clear signs of the doctrine of assimilation 428. But in this essay, Rev. Maxim has not yet developed it, and it remains not entirely clear what kind of assimilation we are talking about, since in this context the theme of “resistance” in the prayer for the Chalice is not discussed, although, as we remember, in the interpretation of the Monothelites of the Gethsemane prayer these themes were central. So, a real “meeting” of the arguments of St. Maximus and the Monothelites have not yet happened - he uses terms characteristic of the concept of “assimilation”, but does not yet discuss either the concept itself or the nature of the assimilation described above. In fact, on the main position of the Monothelites in the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer by St. Maxim replied in opusc. 20 429, where he directly addressed the question of in what sense one should speak in relation to Christ about reproachful passions, in particular about resistance. First Rev. Maxim rejects that reproachful passions can be applied to the human nature deified in Christ (which he repeatedly repeated before), then, without stopping there, he adds that these passions, including resistance to God’s will, can be applied to Christ, but only in the sense of compassionate assimilation, the essence of which is revealed here: “As for the fact that, as most befits nature, we adapt, in turn, each of the qualities that have become the subject of censure 430, such as confrontation or confrontation, and everything that comes across from this list... then humanity corresponding to Christ is by no means supposed to be among them. After all, if these qualities do not look natural, but are contrary to nature and reason even in us, then how can they be tied to Him, even through thought or, better yet, speculation? Unless by assimilation (ἀλλ’ οἰκειώσει), through sympathy (δι’ οἶκτον), “as to the Head of the whole body” 431; just like to a doctor - the sufferings and passions 432 of the patient, until God, who became human for our sake, frees us from them - not otherwise than completely spending for us and expelling us from us by the power of the possession of the body corresponding to Him” 433. Here Rev. Maxim largely repeats what he said with reference to St. Gregory the Theologian in opusc. 4 the thought that “it is said of Christ that He is “disobedient” in relation to what concerns us, until He frees us from this confrontation by the power of His incarnation” 434. But in opusc. 4 the concept of “assimilation” had not yet been introduced, but now St. Maximus (probably following the tradition of St. Eulogius of Alexandria and responding to the arguments of the Monothelites) 435 uses it, clarifying the meaning: reproachful passions are adopted by Christ not as characteristic of His deified humanity, to which they are completely alien, but out of compassion for us. But how should “compassion” be understood, and what does all this have to do with the Gethsemane prayer and the doctrine of two wills in Christ? First of all, we must say something about the thought of St. Maxim, coming immediately after the above excerpt from opusc. 20 and explaining it. Here we distinguish between reproachful and blameless passions - the latter (illnesses, suffering, natural passions in the old tropos) St. Maxim calls it punishment. Corruption and death are the punishment for reproachful passions; such is the verdict regarding our nature, which Christ came to cancel. It is in this context that Rev. Maxim says that Christ was “recognized” as “one of us,” that is, as the same person as us (more precisely, as one of us), assimilating our disobedience - an unambiguous reference 436 to the Gethsemane prayer: “After all, suffering and passions are spoken of, respectively, in two senses: in one they are punishment (ἐπιτιμία) 437, and in dishonor to another (ἀτιμία) 438; and in the first they manifest, and in the second they completely distort the character of our nature. So, He, as a man, for our sake, of His own will, essentially accepted [the impeccable passions], at the same time becoming a guarantee of our nature and canceling the sentence passed on us; and this [that is, the reproachful passions], in turn, as a lover of mankind, he internalized for himself economically, recognizable as one of us and by our rebellious disposition [tropos], so that, having completely destroyed it for us, like fire wax or the sun of the evaporation of the earth, He could give us His properties and make us dispassionate already here, and incorruptible according to promise” 439. Here Rev. Maxim already clearly makes it clear that he recognizes the applicability of the concept of assimilation to the Gethsemane prayer, on which the Monothelites insisted, proceeding from the origin of St. Gregory the Theologian traditions, which St., of course, also knew. Eulogia. He obviously means that Christ, proving the reality of the nature He received from us with the irreproachable passions essentially received with it, allows us to endure fear of the threat of death (impeccable passion). With us, blameless passions for the most part (although not always, as emphasized elsewhere, referring to St. Gregory the Theologian, St. Maxim) 440 are accompanied by reproachful passions, that is, sin. For example, fear of death gives rise to resistance to God's will, in turn, corruption of the flesh is punishment for ancestral sin. Reproachful and non-reproachable passions are connected with each other, although not necessary, but for the most part by an existing connection. In any case, the punishment of decay and death is, due to this connection, a sentence for our entire nature, but Christ came to cancel the sentence - on the one hand, freely enduring blameless passions, on the other, showing in Himself our nature free from reproachful, and ultimately from blameless passions. But what, exactly, does the compassionate assimilation of our reproachful passions by Christ mean? Does it mean that Christ, out of compassion for us, actually showed at least some resistance to God’s will when he prayed for the passage of the Chalice? Already in opusc. 4 prp. Maxim unequivocally said that there was not only sin, but also the possibility of sin in Christ. And since resistance to God’s will is a sin, then the compassionate assimilation of our resistance cannot mean any real resistance to God’s will. How can we understand it then, because it is not just about the fact that Christ in Gethsemane allowed Himself to freely experience the fear of death (“compression”) and avoidance of it, both of which are blameless passions, but we are trying to understand in what sense the reproachful passions were compassionately assimilated by Christ in prayer for the Cup. The answer to this question is Rev. Maxim does not give, but the totality of his statements about what Christ accomplished in Gethsemane allows us to make the following assumption about this 441. In fact, Rev. Maximus says that compassionate assimilation, as applied to Gethsemane, means that Christ is “recognizable [from the prayer for the Cup] as one of us and by our rebellious disposition [tropos]” 442 . From this we can conclude that, although Christ in no way came into conflict with God’s will and could not, that is, even the possibility of hesitation in making a decision was excluded for Him, whether or not to follow God’s will to accept the Cross, allowing Himself to freely experience “constriction” in the face of death, Christ uttered the following words (we are obviously talking about the words: “My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from Me” [Matthew 26:39 ]), which (if we consider that they were uttered by a person like us, that is, one of us) can be interpreted (and St. Maximus has precisely this interpretation in mind) as meaning that he - this man - is opposing the will of God 443. Christ Himself was not such a person (His human will was not gnomic and could not even possibly resist God), but, firstly, as evidence of the reality of His acceptance of our nature and in fulfillment of the economy, He allowed Himself, as God in Gethsemane, to experience “compression” before the threat of death (impeccable passion), and secondly (which for Him did not directly follow from this passion, since it was free for Him), out of compassion for man and for the sake of teaching him that even in mortal danger one should obey God’s will, he took upon himself the image of such a person as one of us (“recognizable by his rebellious disposition”) in order to confirm us in fulfilling God’s will even in the face of death. As such a person, “like us,” Christ, uttering the appropriate words, first imprinted in Himself our resistance, and then the transition from resistance to submission to God’s will 444. This, obviously, is the meaning of St. Gregory the Theologian that Christ appropriates to Himself our “disobedience” in their interpretation of St. Maxim as compassionate assimilation. They should not be understood in the sense that He becomes disobedient Himself, but they cannot also be understood in such a way that Christ in Gethsemane “portrayed” a man similar to us, without being such in any respect, as was actually asserted by the Monothelites, who denied that evasion from death and the subsequent determination to accept the Cross could testify to the presence in Christ of a natural human will. Unlike them, Rev. Maxim insisted that Christ had not a different, but the same human nature as ours. That is, although He experienced the compression before the threat of death voluntarily, this compression was fundamentally the same as that experienced by people who are passionate about Him, that is, natural, and testifies to the presence in Christ of a common human nature with us, and its will - first in its difference from God, and then (while maintaining the difference) - in complete unity with it. At the same time, Rev. Maxim also speaks of another, compassionate assimilation of the reproachful passion of resistance, which, as we noted, was not the resistance of Christ and even the possibility of such, but was the compassionate assimilation of the resistance to God of a person like us, which Christ was not, but which He “portrayed,” at the same time “depicting” his submission to God’s will (the transition from a state of disobedience to a state of submission). This understanding of the Gethsemane prayer is finally consolidated with the help of the distinction that St. Maxim spends in opusc. 19: PG 91, 220B between essential assimilation and relative assimilation. This term is not found in opusc. 20, but actually prp. Maximus uses this distinction when he talks about the assimilation of reproachful passions through compassion. In opusc. 19 he does not turn to the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer, but only objects to Deacon Theodore, who, as we wrote, sought to bring the manifestation of human will under the same category of assimilation of reproachful passions as ignorance and disobedience (surely referring to the Gethsemane prayer, although he does not say this directly), but St. Maxim categorically objects to this, insisting on the essential assimilation of will. A little later, in opusc. 16, prp. Maximus again turns to the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer, already directly refuting the teaching of the Monothelites (probably already finally formulated by that time) that only in Gethsemane did Christ demonstrate by relative assimilation the human will 445. Arguing with this, Rev. Maximus uses terminology that St. Gregory the Theologian used it in relation to relative assimilation, but apparently also applies it to essential assimilation, in relation to which one cannot speak of resistance: “He did not resist at all, but said “if possible” and “not as I want, but as You do,” and combined with compression a strong and decisive movement against death. Indeed, through natural struggle (ἀγωνίας) in relation to a small [period of time], He actually captured in Himself what is inherent in us, in order to free us from this [struggle], and confirm [the truth of] the nature of our own flesh, and show the economy to everyone pure from false images (φαντασίας); in addition, He simultaneously showed the strongest impulse against death, and the complete fusion and unity of His human will with His own and Fatherly - [showed by] deciding [or defining - ἐπικρῖναι] in this way and saying “not my will, but yours, be done.” 446. The statement that the words of the Gethsemane prayer do not express opposition does not contradict what is elsewhere - in opusc. 4, 20 and 19 – St. In connection with them, Maxim speaks of resistance. At this point opusc. 16 he speaks of essential assimilation, i.e., that Christ, according to His humanity and the state of His human will, in no way opposed God’s will, even when He allowed it to manifest itself in the old tropos, imprinting ours in Himself 447. This does not negate what was said above, that these same words about carrying the Chalice, if they are understood as spoken by one of those like us (and Christ spoke such words out of compassion that they can be understood this way, and should be understood this way), then they contain resistance, which turns into submission-yielding to God’s will, about which St. Maxim spoke already in amb. 7. So, the same formula “impressed in Himself what is inherent in us” can be used by St. Maxim also means the relative assimilation of a reproachful passion (for example, disobedience), or perhaps the free manifestation of a reproachable passion, manifested in Christ due to His assimilation and perception of our nature and its natural will, which He allowed for a completely determined “measured” period of time to manifest itself in the old tropos in carnal weakness. Thus, Rev. Maxim expands the meaning of the patristic concept of “assimilation”, which he adopted from St. Gregory, including in his horizon not only relative assimilation, but also essential 448. It can be assumed that by this time, around 643–644, the teaching of St. The maxim about the Prayer of Gethsemane was developed in its main points, as was all the theological apparatus necessary for its description 449. The very concept of relative assimilation will be required by him (in addition to the Disputation with Pyrrhus, where he will confirm the incorrectness of the application of human will to Christ in the sense of relative assimilation) 450 one more time - in opusc. 1: PG 91, 29C–D, where, answering the charge that he, who now denies deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) in Christ, previously wrote about him in Thal. 42, prp. Maximus says that προαίρεσις in this context should be understood either in the sense of natural will or as “our own deliberate choice, inherent in the incarnate God by assimilation (κατ’ οἰκείωσιν).” In the second case, we are obviously talking about relative assimilation, since the human will (which in the early writings of St. Maximus, following the terminology of some fathers, calls προαίρεσις or even γνώμη) was essentially assimilated by Christ. So we can say that, denying the possibility of Christ’s hesitation in making a decision in the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer, St. Maxim, at the same time, allowed the application to the understanding of this episode regarding the learned process of choice, that is, Christ’s “depiction” of our process of choice between following our (human) will and the will of God, in which we, but not Christ, have the opportunity to resist God. So, the analysis of the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer by St. Maxim from amb. 7 to opusc. 1 (from approximately 630 to 646) shows that the monk remained faithful to the original understanding, when the entire episode was considered within the framework of “assimilation,” but deepened and clarified it, highlighting and emphasizing in the course of polemics with the Monothelites in the interpretation of this episode those moments that are associated with the evidence of the reality in Christ of the human will, manifested as in the tropos of complete convergence with God’s will and unity with her, and in the old tropos - freely manifested compression before death and evasion from it. In the dispute with the Monothelites, the emphasis was on the latter and on the transition from one tropos to another, but on the very concept of assimilation of prp. Maxim did not refuse, which allowed him to fully answer the arguments of the Monothelites, who relied specifically on her. 15. New in the position of the Rev. Maxima after 643 – opinions and hypotheses As we have already said, in the works of St. Maximus, starting around 643, any mention of “one energy” in Christ in a positive way disappears, and in general there are noticeable changes in his approach to polemics 451. It is enough to give the following example. In opusc. 20 prp. Maximus, discussing the expression “one energy” of St. Patriarch Anastasius, said that it indicates the inseparable unity and interpenetration of the two energies, their perichorisis, as well as the general result of their action 452, and insisted that this protects against the division of actions in Christ 453. In the Disputation with Pyrrhus 454, when Pyrrhus says that he understands one action “not in the sense of nature [and its energy], but in the form of union (ἑνώσεως τρόπῳ) (340D),” it is similar to what St. Maxim in opusc. 20, and also in opusc. 7 and 8 455 - he unexpectedly declares that it is wrong to say this, that is, he rejects the correctness of the expression “one energy” even when interpreted in the sense of the image of the connection 456 and / or the result of the action 457. Probably even before the dispute with Pyrrhus, in 643 458, when it became clear that the authorities in Constantinople would not refuse to confess one will 459, St. Maxim takes the position of strict dioenergism, that is, he does not recognize the expression “one energy,” and especially “one will,” as Orthodox in any sense. At first glance, there is a radical change of position, and even a seemingly “betrayal” of the Venerable. Maxim to his previous views. The nature of this change requires analysis and explanation. Of the explanations put forward recently, I would like to dwell on two. The first, church-political, was proposed by D. Batrellos 460, who more than others focused on the issue of changing the position of St. Maxima 461. The second explanation, theological, belongs to V. M. Lurie 462, who describes differently the essence of the changes in the position of St. Maxim, which we will discuss below. Battrellos believes that, having united with the strict diophelites in the West, St. Maxim took the position of hard dioenergism for ecclesiastical and political reasons. Here is what he writes: “It can be assumed that rigid diophelitism and dioenergism spread in Italy and Sicily, which did not allow the cautious Maximov to accept the expression “one energy.” This dioenergism and diopheliteism found expression in the Lateran Council’s anathematization of those who profess simultaneously one and two energies and wills 463 . If the hypothesis is correct, then St. Maximus was faced with a choice: either to unite with the position of hard diopheliteism, which was characteristic of the West, which had the determination and ecclesiastical power to oppose monothelitism, or to adhere to his previous openness to the expression “one energy” and thus jeopardize the unity of the anti-monothelitism camp along with his personal reputation and the reputation of his Christology. It is unlikely that it was difficult for him to make a decision” 464. Battrellos's explanation is based primarily on opusc. 9 (c. 646–648) - a work addressed to the Sicilian monks and the Orthodox people of Sicily and which is apologetic in nature. In this letter to Rev. Maximus responds to the Sicilian Orthodox accusation against him (based on his early letter to Pyrrhus (ep. 19) and letter to Marinus (most likely opusc. 20 and/or opusc. 7, but he himself says about some kind of forged work)) that he professes one and two energies and wills at once. We will return to this work, where St. Maximus explains his previous writings, for which he was accused of ambiguity, and calls for peace among like-minded people. In addition, Rev. Maxim confirms in him his diophelite and dioenergist positions and rejects accusations that he professes one and two energies and wills at once. Battrellos's hypothesis, according to which St. Maxim, starting from a certain point, became a hard dioenergist for tactical reasons, in order to oppose the heretics in a united front with Rome, seems quite justified. However, the transition to a more rigid position after 643 may have been due to the clarity that the doctrine of one will, which in the context of the Ekphesis served as an argument against two energies, would not be abandoned by the Monothelites. So Rev. Maxim could have hardened his position not only out of a desire to present a united front with the West, but also due to the entry of the entire controversy into an acute phase, when it became clear that the church authorities in Constantinople would not give in 465. In addition, there is also a hypothesis by V. M. Lurie regarding the theological and philosophical reasons for the new trends in the polemics of St. Maxima with Monothelites. In any case, Batrelos’s considerations about the church-political and polemical motives for changing the position of St. The maxim must be supplemented by consideration of its theological implications. 16. Opusc. 16 and the question of natural and gnomic will In the context of the questions posed in the previous chapter, the most important for us is the extensive theological and polemical work written immediately before the dispute with Pyrrhus (took place in 645) - opusc. 16: On the two wills of the one Christ our God 466 - a very important work of theological and philosophical content, written after opusc. 19 and before the dispute and second in volume only to the text of the Disputation. When accessing opusc. 16, it can be clarified whether St. appeared in theology. Maxim something new after opusc. 19, and if so, what exactly. This is especially important because, according to Lurie's hypothesis, under the onslaught of the Monothelite arguments contained in opusc. 19 (that is, Deacon Theodore), Rev. Maximus had to formulate the essential points of his theology differently than before 467. Larcher, following Sherwood, dates the opusc. 16 "after 643" 468, but it can be said with high probability that the work was written before the dispute with Pyrrhus, which took place in 645, and after opusc. 19, dated by the same Sherwood "after 642" 469. So it can be conditionally classified as opusc. 16 to 644, insisting not so much on the exact date as on the place of this work in the theological and polemical works of St. Maxima. Unlike Batrellos, who saw the novelty of the position of St. Maxim in his complete rejection of unitary formulas, Lurie focuses on the well-known fact that during his polemics with the Monothelites, St. Maximus refuses to apply to Christ γνώμη (gnomic will) and προαίρεσις, which he previously, probably following a certain tradition 470, considered possible to use in relation to Christ. Moreover, this change in the theology of St. Lurie dates Maximus not to the very beginning of the controversy surrounding Ekphesis, but to the mid-640s. 471. Lurie connects this change in the position of St. Maximus regarding the application to Christ of γνώμη and προαίρεσις with the argumentation of Deacon Theodore in opusc. 19, which Lurie, in turn, connected with the need for St. Maximus avoids accusations of admitting “ignorance” in Christ - the condemned heresy of the Agnoites 472. We will not here reproduce the argumentation of Lurie, who, in our opinion, made a mistake in translating Theodore’s main thesis, which resulted in a misunderstanding of the essence of the polemic in the opusc. 19 (we dwell on this in a note to the translation of this work) 473. Let us only note the following: the thesis that Christ’s human will “was not in any respect contrary to God, for it was by no means gnomic, but, in the proper sense, natural, always imprinted by His essential Divinity and driven to the fulfillment of the economy” 474, is found before opusc. 19 in such a relatively early work of the period of polemics with the Monothelites as opusc. 7 475, written, we believe, not only before opusc. 19 (of which there is no doubt), but also before opusc. 20,476. Moreover, in an even earlier, probably opusc. 14 definitions of natural and gnomic will are given, deliberately distinguished from each other 477 (however, without an explicit application to the Christological polemic, but in its context). Analysis of theological and polemical works, taking into account the order of their writing, does not allow us to admit that St. Maxim formulated his position that in Christ the human will was natural, and not gnomic, only after opusc. 19 under the pressure of the arguments of Deacon Theodore. The reason for this should be sought in something else. When addressing this issue, one must keep in mind that during the polemics with the Monothelites, the gnomic will was discussed in different contexts, which should not be confused with each other. On the one hand, the Monothelites themselves, at a fairly early stage of the controversy, began to contrast the doctrine of two wills in Christ with the doctrine of one will, which they called “gnomic” (θέλημα γνωμικόν) or “arbitrary” (θέλημα προαιρετικόν) 478 (in another translation: “deliberately choosing”) 479. In at least one place in the Dispute with Pyrrhus, ex-patriarch Pyrrhus, one of the main ideologists of monothelitism, refers to the one will of Christ, professed by Ekphesis, in this way 480. In opusc. 16, the distinction between natural and gnomic will is introduced for the first time immediately before the reasoning of St. The maxim that one cannot confuse, as monothelites do, desire as a natural ability, desire as an act and the object of desire (desired) 481. He probably objects here to the Monothelites, who, on the basis of the fact that the single hypostasis of Christ always had one object of desire (two objects of desire would mean division and contradiction) 482, concluded that there was one will (or desire) of the one Christ (at the same time, the Monothelites probably had in mind the “gnomic” will) 483. Anticipating this reasoning, Rev. Maxim speaks for the first time in opusc. 16 (but not generally for the first time in his writings!) about the difference between natural and gnomic will. The Monothelites obviously believed that the single choice of the one Christ (which they called gnomic), i.e. the fact that He always had a single goal corresponds to one (gnomic or voluntary) will, and St. Maxim, in distinguishing between gnomic will and natural will, probably wants to say (he has not yet done this directly) that from the unity of what is desired it does not necessarily follow that desire is one, since natural will or desire is not identical with what is desired 484 . Next, he gives his well-known argument, coming from a completely different perspective: since there are two natures in Christ, then there are two wills, 485 implying that the unity of the human will with the Divine (and therefore the unity of purpose) is ensured thanks to the deification of the human will in the hypostasis of the Son of God, and not in any other way (which he has already repeatedly said in other Theological and polemical works). Along with the so-understood one “gnomic” or “arbitrary” will of Christ, the dispute with the teaching about which begins, although not fully developed, by St. Maxim in opusc. 16 486 (without even calling the will he disputed “gnomic”), in the course of polemics with the Monothelites, he discusses another “gnomic will” - applied to Christ according to His humanity. The Monothelites did not profess such a will from Christ (since they did not profess two wills at all), however, for St. Maxim's denial of the presence of such a “gnomic will” in the humanity of Christ while simultaneously confessing His natural human will became an important component of his polemics. For the first time, Christ's explicit denial of the gnomic will is found in opusc. 7 in relation to the human nature of Christ, which, according to St. Maxima, did not possess a gnomic will, which could come into conflict with God, but a natural will, 487 which does not contradict the will of God as created by Him, but in Christ was deified, imprinted and moved by His Divine will, so that not only was it not gnomic, but also could not become one. In opusc. 16 prp. Maxim expands the dogmatic context in which he develops the idea of ​​the absence of a gnomic will in Christ according to His humanity. This time he compares his Christological teaching with the teaching of Nestorius. In fact, already Ekphesis contains a reproach against the diophelites with reference to the teachings of Nestorius: “For even if the vile Nestorius, dividing the Divine Incarnation of the Lord and introducing two sons, did not dare to talk about two wills (θελήματα), but on the contrary, glorified the identity of the will (ταὐτοβουλίαν) two persons invented by him, then how is it possible for those who profess the right faith and glorify the One Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the true God, to accept in Him two and such opposite wills? 488 St. Maximus, of course, shared the understanding characteristic of all “neo-Chalcedonites” that in Nestorius the unity of two natures in Christ was thought of as relative, that is, the unity of two “persons”. He wrote about such unity (as opposed to the unity of two natures in one hypostasis of the incarnate Logos) in opus. 14: “Relative unity (σχετικὴ ἕνωσις) is a unity that brings different intentions (γνώμας) into one will (θέλημα)” 489. Accordingly, Rev. Maximus, in order to distinguish his teaching from the teaching of Nestorius, by affirming two wills in Christ, was necessary, preserving a natural will for each of the natures, to insist on the absence of a “personal will” in human nature (however, he says the same about the Divine) in Christ, so that the union of natures in Christ would not be formed according to the Nestorian type (as St. Maximus formulates it) of the relative unity of two converging personal wills 490. Thus, starting from this argument of the supporters of Ekphesis, St. Maxim, obviously, comes to opusc. 14: PG 91, 153A, and then in opusc. 7: PG 91, 81D 491 and even more explicitly in opusc. 16: PG 91, 185D to the distinction between natural will (θέλημα φυσικόν) and gnomic will (θέλημα γνωμικόν), of which the first, as can be seen from its name, he attributed to nature, and the second began to characterize his person or hypostasis (and of created nature in an undeified state). So, since the human nature of Christ was taken into the hypostasis of the Logos and completely deified, then we can speak about the gnomic will, which would only be in some kind of deliberate convergence and agreement with the Divine will 492, in relation to this nature, according to St. Maxim, you can’t. This seems to us to be the logic of the polemics of St. Maximus with the argument of Ekphesis with reference to Nestorius. This logic, obviously, gradually led St. Maxim to the refusal to apply γνώμη and gnomic will to the human nature of Christ, and then προαίρεσις, which St. Maximus will be characterized by created hypostases, and in an undeified state (since in the deified state, more precisely, in the state of saints after the resurrection, there is no longer προαίρεσις) 493 . Evidence that dissociation from the teachings of Nestorius served to form the teachings of St. The maxim on the distinction between natural and gnomic will is opusc. 16, where, on the one hand, apparently for the first time since the beginning of the polemic against Ekphesis, St. Maximus explicitly began to polemicize with the Nestorian Christological model in its application to the doctrine of wills 494, and on the other hand, most clearly and consistently from the beginning of the polemic, he drew a distinction between natural and gnomic will, affirming the first and rejecting the second in relation to human nature in Christ. Thus, by defining natural will: “the ability to strive for what is in accordance with nature” 495 – and distinguishing from it gnomic will, which characterizes hypostasis: “[gnomic will] is a spontaneous impulse (αὐθαίρετος ὁρμή), inclined towards one of two [possibilities]. It is determining (or: separating – ἀφοριστικόν) not for nature, but, truly, for person and hypostasis” 496, - St. Maximus immediately, in the next sentence, gave an example of the teachings of Nestorius, which the Monothelite Ekphesis reproached the Diophelites. St. Maximus gave an explanation of his teaching in his own terms, saying that in Nestorius, instead of the unity of the human will with the divine by virtue of deification in one hypostasis, there was a unity of intentions (or two “gnomes”): “who professed separation (διῃρημένος), the man-worshipper Nestorius, recognizing this [that is, what is decisive for the hypostasis of which he revered the human nature of Christ, which is precisely the gnomic will], wickedly proclaimed the unity of intentions (γνωμῶν ἕνωσιν) in order to establish one hypostasis through the other; so that, according to his teaching, a simple person would be preserved, who, through a certain intention (γνώμῃ) and a spontaneous movement towards God the Word, as [Nestorius] says, accomplished unity [with Him]; based on this [unity, Nestorius] he affirms the identity of wills (ταὐτοβουλίαν), or, more accurately, the plurality of wills (πολυβουλίαν). With each movement of the gnomic will, [this hypostasis], according to Nestorius, gradually moves from the imperfect to the perfect, rushing and breaking through - but by no means [unites with Him] from the most ineffable conception, when the Divinity of the Word is perfect, with all His [peculiarities], united into one and the same hypostasis with our whole nature and all its [peculiarities]" 497 . Immediately after this, as an alternative to the teachings of Nestorius, St. Maxim formulates his teaching (in opusc. 16 he refers to a certain pious monk, but most likely speaks of his own teaching) 498, in which natural wills are recognized in Christ and gnomic ones are rejected: “So, in order to clearly indicate the perfection of nature in the incarnate God and to refute the opposite [opinion], the mentioned monk affirmed the natural will of the Savior, and denied the gnomic one” 499. So, we believe there is no reason to accept Lurie’s hypothesis about the failure of the prp. Maxim from the recognition of the gnomic will in Christ under the pressure of the arguments of Deacon Theodore from opusc. 19, where the latter says that Christ's human will and His "ignorance" are to be understood in the same sense. In addition to all the arguments expressed above, one can also add that if the theme of ignorance and the reference to the heresy of the Agnoites really played such an important role in the refusal of St. Maxim from the recognition of the gnomic will of Christ, as Lurie speaks about this, then in opusc. 16, written after opusc. 19, the theme of ignorance in this context with a high degree of probability should have been heard, but St. Maxim never talks about her. This topic, in connection with the refusal to recognize “dwarves” in Christ, does appear, but later, in the Dispute with Pyrrhus, where St. Maximus says that the choice of alternatives, which presupposes a gnomic choice, implies ignorance, which Christ, due to the complete deification of human nature in Him, could not have 500. But this is another reason for the rejection of the “dwarves” in Christ compared to the one we talked about when examining the relevant passages from the opusc. 16. In addition, in the Orthodox (and even Monophysite) environment it was traditionally believed that Nestorius’s ignorance of His humanity was characteristic of Christ, 501 so that the general attitude of St. The maxim on the rejection of the “gnomes” by Christ, which arose, as we tried to show, in the context of the “Nestorian argument” of Ekphesis, does not contradict, but is completely consistent with the “Agnoitic argument,” although the second was probably still derivative in comparison with the “Nestorian.” This did not hinder him in the later polemics of St. Maxim, say, in opusc. 1, come out on top - both arguments are closely related to each other. We should not discount the motive that we identified when analyzing the beginning of opusc. 16, - the distinction between gnomic and natural will allows us to show that the unity of the object of desire (desired) in Christ does not necessarily mean that He has one will, since there is no one-to-one correspondence between the unity of the desired and desire as a natural ability. This argument will be significant in the polemics of St. Maximus with the doctrine of one gnomic will of Christ later, in opusc. 1, where a special theory of the volition will be presented, in which the natural will will be distinguished from deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) and intention (γνώμη). Ultimately, in the Dispute with Pyrrhus and in the later writings of the period of polemics with the Monothelites, St. Maximus will reject the possibility of applying to Christ the “gnomic will,” as the Monothelites called it, 502, as well as deliberate choice, to whatever in Christ, in their opinion, they are applied 503, whether we are talking about the “hypostatic will,” or about the will of any of the natures, or about some will of the “nature of Christ,” formed from two 504. In the next chapter we will consider this issue in more detail. 17. Refusal by Rev. Maxima from γνώμη and προαίρεσις in Christ. Philosophical and theological aspects Statement about the absence of gnomic will and arbitrariness in Christ in the writings of St. The maxim of the period of polemics with the Monothelites, as well as his doctrine of natural will and the volitional act in general, in recent years has again and again attracted the attention of researchers 505. It is not our task to review and analyze all works devoted to this topic. Many of them are just being prepared for publication and are unknown to us in their final form. Nevertheless, I would like to address a number of questions raised in recent studies that in one way or another touch on this topic and are directly related to the understanding of theological and polemical works. The most pressing of these questions is posed in Steenberg's article: “If the “dwarves” were taken away from the hypostasis of the incarnate Christ, then does He meet the definition of “similar to us in all respects” from the Chalcedonian oros? If the incarnate Lord has taken away from His personality the internal disposition common to all men since Adam, which actively struggles with the right use of the will, can He be considered a “true man” in the sense in which other men are men?” 506 The same author also poses a soteriological question, referring to the famous formula of St. Gregory the Theologian - “what is not accepted is not healed” (ep. 101): if Christ did not have a gnomic will, and it is precisely this will that seems to be in us what requires healing, then how can Christ be a Savior? 507 At the same time, Steenberg, referring to the fact that in the earlier works of Rev. Maximus applies γνώμη and προαίρεσις to Christ, and suggests taking into account the statements in the later writings of St. Maxima, taking into account their polemical nature, believes that γνώμη and προαίρεσις can and should be applied to Christ in a certain sense (although he does not write in detail in what sense). The same question, formulated more precisely, is repeated by Ian McFarland, speaking about the humanity of Christ: “the defense of the consubstantiality of Christ with the human race seems to be immediately undermined, since the significance of Jesus' solidarity with us due to the possession of a natural will is apparently undermined by the denial that His will is marked by those features associated with choice that we tend to consider most central to human freedom.”508 Nevertheless, McFarland, unlike Steenberg, believes that the refusal to apply the gnomic will to Christ has a deep, lasting meaning, emphasizing the very title of his article, “Willing Is Not Choosing,” 509 the difference between the action of the natural will and the process of choosing, implying ignorance, hesitation, and so on, and characteristic of man in his sinful state. Such a difference in the opinions of researchers, or at least a difference in emphasis when understanding the legacy of St. Maxim requires close attention to this topic, especially since in the report on the one mentioned in the approx. 505 of the Belgrade Conference, the famous specialist in the field of philosophy of late antiquity and Byzantium, David Bradshaw, again returned to these issues and again proposed to consider the refusal of St. The maxim from the application of προαίρεσις to Christ is a tribute to controversy. Let's take a closer look at Bradshaw's train of thought. At the beginning of the passage devoted to this topic 510, he describes the well-known arguments of St. Maxim in favor of the rejection of γνώμη and προαίρεσις from Christ, stating that it was due to the course of the controversy, in which the very understanding of γνώμη shifted: “Under the pressure of his dispute with the Monothelites, Maxim proposed... a narrower [than in his other writings - G. B.] understanding of three key terms - gnomic will, γνώμη and προαίρεσις. In the Disputation with Pyrrhus, he defines γνώμη as “some kind of desire (θέλησις), relatively adhering to the real or imaginary good,” which “judges opposites, seeks out the unknown and deliberates about the obscure” 511. Γνώμη here is not a disposition [as in some of his other works - G. B.], but rather an act similar to βούλησις and προαίρεσις (or, perhaps, meaning the breadth of description, the naming of the entire act, the stages of which are βούλησις and προαίρεσις). To attribute γνώμη to Christ in this sense is to make Him, according to Maximus, “a mere man, pondering as we do, ignorant and doubting and having the opposite,” 512 which would imply that He is sinful because He does not have a clear knowledge of the good. Γνώμη, and especially the gnomic will, should in no way be attributed to Christ. Elsewhere, Maximus strengthens and expands this position, arguing that προαίρεσις is also, of necessity, a choice between good and evil, and in relation to Christ it must be rejected 513.” Bradshaw goes on to suggest that "these statements are based on a different understanding of γνώμη and προαίρεσις than that which Maximus proposes when he uses these terms non-polemically." Paradoxically, he cites opusc as an example of the non-polemical use of γνώμη. 1, which, of course, was written in a polemical context - in the midst of preparations for the Lateran Council of 514. But let us turn to Bradshaw: “Γνώμη, as it is defined in opusc. 1 is a standing inclination or state of character, formed through judgment and deliberation. In turn, an estimate is simply “a desire (desire) that explores (inquisitive – zētikēn) what is in our power” 515. Bearing in mind that estimation implies a state of uncertainty as to what should be done, it does not imply ignorance of the good, for the subject of estimation may be a choice between two different paths, each of which is good. Likewise, προαίρεσις (deliberate choice), understood as a desire based on estimate and judgment, is not necessarily a choice between good and evil, but it can be a choice between different goods. As noted by D. Battrellos, it seems that Maximus was motivated to deny the gnomic will, γνώμη and προαίρεσις in Christ by the fact that the Monothelites chose these terms to describe the one will they attributed to Christ, and Maximus decided not to give them this opportunity 516.” Finally, recalling with reference to Batrellos that in the writings before the start of the polemic with the Monothelites, St. Maximus freely applied γνώμη and προαίρεσις to Christ, Bradshaw moves on to the main statement about the possibility of applying προαίρεσις to Christ with reference to the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer: “Despite this act of polemical exuberance, it seems that he is not really wanted to deny Christ's προαίρεσις in the broad sense of choice between goods, which would be completely incredible, bearing in mind the requirements (exigencies) of human life. In particular, that the human will in Christ exercises προαίρεσις, understood as a choice between goods, seems to be implied in Maximus's interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer: for Maximus this prayer expresses a movement within the human will of Christ, in which the human will is "moved and shaped" divine will, comes to accept the good of the Cup offered by the Father, instead of (rather than) the good of continuing earthly life” 517. As we see, Bradshaw comes to the conclusion that the refusal of the application of προαίρεσις to Christ by St. The maxim was determined by the needs of controversy and does not have an absolute character. Of course, as long as etc. Maximus indeed applied γνώμη and προαίρεσις to Christ before the start of the polemic; to assert that there are no such contexts and such an understanding of these terms in which they can be applied to describe the nature of volition in Christ would be incorrect. Nevertheless, a significant question remains, how, in relation to the Gethsemane prayer, one should understand the “choice” between the good of continuing earthly life and the good of accepting the Cup offered by the Father, as Bradshaw says, despite the fact that St. Does Maximus explicitly deny the presence of gnomic will and deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) in Christ? If we turn to the early works of St. The maxims referred to by Steenberg and Bradshaw, where γνώμη and προαίρεσις are applied to Christ (respectively - or. dom. 135-138 and Thal. 42.18-34), the following can be noted. In an excerpt from the Commentary on the Lord's Prayer by St. Maxim not only applies γνώμη to Christ, but also speaks of choosing death for people instead of life (we are not talking literally about the Gethsemane prayer, but it is quite likely that it is implied): “But nature [human] in its original form [the incarnate Word] restores... in that, having become Man, He preserved the will (γνώμην) free from passions and not inclined to rebellion, not wavering in its natural basis against the crucifiers themselves, but on the contrary, choosing death for them instead of life θάνατον). From this humane disposition (διαθέσει) of the Suffering One [toward the crucifiers] it is clear that He suffered voluntarily (ἑκούσιον)” 518. Bradshaw probably has in mind this passage from a relatively early work by St. Maxim, saying that in Christ the human will “comes to accept the good of the Cup offered by the Father, instead of [his rather than = ἀντί – G.B.] the good of continuing earthly life,” interpreting this as a choice between two goods. However, the question remains open whether the teaching of St. Maxim about the Gethsemane prayer in the sense that at some point in his life Christ actually made a choice between preserving life and going to death, fulfilling the will of the Father. To deny this would mean to deny the autocratic will of Christ, which St. Maxim always defended 519. In addition, Rev. Maxim speaks quite definitely about the “final decision,” which consisted in Christ’s acceptance of the will of the Father in Gethsemane 520. At the same time, in the writings of the period of polemics with the Monothelites, St. Maximus certainly rejected in Christ the gnomic or choosing will, as well as deliberate choice. How, then, should we understand the choice made by Christ in Gethsemane in the absence of His choosing will and deliberate choice? The answer to this question should be sought in the understanding of St. A maxim of gnomic will and deliberate choice. Both of these are closely connected with ignorance of the true good, which causes hesitation in decision-making and creates the possibility of sin. There could not be such hesitation in Christ due to His human nature belonging to the hypostasis of the Divine Logos. At the same time, this does not cancel the act of His decision in Gethsemane - agreement with the will of the Father, the former and His own Divine will, in accepting the Cross. The process of making this decision was different for Christ than the process of making decisions in created and non-divine human hypostases, which is characterized by hesitation, doubt, weighing (estimation), as St. Petersburg describes in detail. Maximus in Disputation with Pyrrhus and opusc. 1. According to the successful expression of A.M. Shufrin, one could say that Christ made a choice without choosing, which occurs in that mode of realization of human autocracy (as the highest component of natural will) 521, which is called gnomic (formed in the created hypostasis) will and deliberate choice 522. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Christ’s decision-making process was different from ours, and was carried out on the basis of the Divine will moving and imprinting His human will, this process took place, and it occurred during the transition from a state of voluntarily allowed “contraction” and evasion from death to a state of determination in accepting the Cross. The very transition from “compression” to making a final decision (ἐπίκρισις τελείως) was not for Christ a process of choice that allowed for the possibility of sin, similar to ours 523. It is precisely this interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer that we find in the theological and polemical works discussed above (in particular, opusc. 4, 6, 7, 20 and 16), in which (this especially applies to opusc. 20 and 19) moreover, in contrast to the earlier works of St. Maxim, a distinction is made between the relative and essential assimilation of our will, which allows us to more clearly distinguish between Christ’s own “decision” and our process of choice, which is relatively assimilated by Him, but not His own 524. If we now return to the above passage from the Commentary on the Lord's Prayer, then, obviously, the concept of the will (γνώμη), which chose (αἱρουμένην) instead of preserving life, death for the salvation of people should not be based on the sense of γνώμη, which is found in the Dispute with Pyrrhus written much later (see Bradshaw’s analysis above), then is in a sense close to the gnomic will and deliberate choice characteristic of created, undeified hypostases. Before the polemic with the Monothelites began, St. Maxim, no distinction was made at all between γνώμη and gnomic will on the one hand and natural will on the other, so when A. I. Sidorov, as in the above passage, translates γνώμη with the vague word “will” (without specifying what kind of will we are talking about and how it relates to nature and hypostasis), then this is to a certain extent justified 525. Nevertheless, already in the early writings one can find signs of distinguishing St. Maxim γνώμη and θέλημα. This can be seen, for example, from a passage from the famous Epistle to Cubular John on Love, which says that love “convinces the will (γνώμην) to move according to nature, without in the least rebelling against the logos of nature. For thanks to this, we can all have both one nature and one will (γνώμην) and one desire (θέλημα) with God and with each other, if we choose for ourselves the law of grace, through which we intentionally (γνωμικῶς) renew the law of nature” 526. If γνώμη and θέλημα were for St. Maxim are identical; he would hardly list them in the same row. One can only guess what shades of meaning he introduced into these terms, since explicitly St. Maxim does not talk about this anywhere, but judging by the word γνωμικῶς used in the same sentence, it can be assumed that already in his early writings he invested in γνώμη a meaning emphasizing the consciously accepted direction of the will, which, thanks to love, can be the same for us as for God, and one - through this - with each other. In general, according to McFarland, analyzing the relevant passages from the relatively early works of St. Maximus, where the concept of γνώμη is used (in particular Ep. 2), “early Maximus more or less equates γνώμη with will and understands the fall as an event in which the will comes into conflict with nature 527. The process of redemption consists in the fact that the will (one should add: through deification. - G.B.) could enter into renewed harmony with nature, which leads to unity with the Divine will" 528. In fact, in the Interpretation of the Lord’s Prayer, speaking about the mission of Christ and the state that is given to us in Him, St. Maximus uses the concepts of γνώμη (will) and nature (φύσις), arguing that Christ “has reconciled us through Himself to the Father and to each other. And at the same time, we no longer have a will (γνώμην) opposing the logos of nature (τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως), but both by nature and by will (γνώμην) we remain not subject to change (ἀναλλοιώτους)" 529. Accordingly, the state of healing of this division is seen by St. Maxim such that the disagreement in γνώμη ceases, but instead, as we saw from the passage from ep. 2, the unity of all people is created in γνώμη and θέλημα with each other and with God. Obviously, γνώμη of Christ, about which St. Maxim says in or. dom. 135–138, and there is that very one in which all those who are saved are united, since all of them (like Christ in His humanity) want the same thing that God wants, have the same orientation of the will 530. This, in short, was probably the concept of γνώμη in the early writings of St. Maxima. So, the application to the humanity of Christ γνώμη in the early works of St. Maxim can serve as evidence that he had previously recognized the presence of a volitional principle in Christ according to His human nature, although he had not yet called it natural will and did not distinguish it from gnomic will, as in the writings of the period of polemics with the Monothelites. Moreover, as we see, he thought primarily in terms of will (γνώμη) / nature, and not in terms of natural will / gnomic will, as in later works 531. With this in mind, it is impossible, we believe, to draw a conclusion from early writings regarding the applicability of St. Petersburg in the teachings. Maxim (taken as a whole) to Christ γνώμη and προαίρεσις, if by the latter we mean what St. Maxim invested in them during his polemics with the Monothelites. Doubts about the applicability to Christ are γνώμη and προαίρεσις as St. Maxim understood them before the polemics with the Monothelites, it cannot be. Steenberg and Bradshaw, it seems to us, are not completely clear on this issue, in particular, Bradshaw writes: “Similarly, προαίρεσις (intentional choice), understood simply as a desire based on estimate and judgment, is not necessarily a choice between good and evil, but may instead be a choice between different goods (goods),” and therefore such προαίρεσις is applied to Christ. But if προαίρεσις presupposes an estimate, then this is already a choice, and it is incorrect to attribute it to Christ. Not to mention the fact that, strictly speaking, no one chooses between good and evil, according to St. Maxim, since προαίρεσις concerns true and imaginary good, and not good and evil. In opusc. 1 prp. Maximus had to answer why, if he now rejects προαίρεσις from Christ, he applied it to Christ in Thal. 42. How does St. Petersburg explain his thought? Maximus, προαίρεσις in this context should be understood either in the sense of relative assimilation, that is, not in the proper sense, but as if Christ were in humanity “a man like us,” who in Gethsemane is in the process of choosing between following His will and submitting to the will of God, or in the sense of human natural will (which, according to St. Maximus, in Christ was deified) 532. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that the designation of the volitional principle of Christ in humanity by the terms γνώμη and προαίρεσις, as did St. Maxim in his early writings, following a certain tradition, probably dating back to St. Gregory of Nyssa 533, had the purpose of emphasizing in this volitional principle what is responsible for the direction of the will, which in Christ was invariably good, and in an undeified person changeable, but in any case belongs to the sphere of autocracy 534. In this context, it is quite appropriate to translate προαίρεσις as will 535, as, for example, A. I. Sidorov does (and in the works of the period of polemics with the Monothelites, it is appropriate to translate the same word differently, for example, as A. M. Shufrin translates - “deliberate choice” or “choice”, since its meaning is already different). The fact that in Christ the direction of the will was invariably good did not cancel its autocracy not only in Divinity, but also in humanity (although human autocracy was deified in Christ). In a situation of heated polemics (and in opusc. 1 he had to not only polemicize with the monothelites, but probably also respond to accusations of inconsistency from the hard diophelites) 536 prp. Maxim did not mention autocracy, which was obviously implied when Thal. 42 he applied will to Christ according to humanity (προαίρεσις), but in other works of polemics with the Monothelites, autocracy as an integral characteristic of natural will 537 or human “autocratic will” in Christ 538 is spoken of with all clarity 539. So in Thal. 42 prp. Maxim explicitly attributed to Christ according to His humanity προαίρεσις and spoke about the invariably good will of Christ’s human nature, contrasting it with the corruptible will of Adam: “As a result of the passionate principle, He became sin according to [human] nature for our sake, not knowing the deliberately chosen sin (γνωμικὴν ἁμαρτίαν) due to the unshakability of will (διὰ τὴν ἀτρεψίαν τῆς προαιρέσεως). With this unwavering will [the Lord] corrected the passionate beginning of nature, making its end (I mean death) the beginning of transformation to incorruption. So, just as through one man, who voluntarily (ἑκουσίως) turned away his will (προαίρεσιν) from good, the nature of all people changed from incorruption to corruption, so through one man Jesus Christ, who did not turn away [His] will (προαίρεσιν) from good, the restoration of nature from corruption to incorruption took place for all people” 540. At the same time, the unwavering will of Christ for humanity, wholly (and therefore, together with His will) received into the hypostasis of the Logos, St. Maxim, most likely, in accordance with tradition, understood it as occurring through deification 541. Later, during the period of polemics with the Monothelites, he was forced to explain why the presence of human will, rational and autocratic, in the very process of decision-making in Gethsemane cannot lead to disagreement with the Divine will, despite even its temporary manifestation according to the old tropos in compression and evasion (which he did not dwell on in the above passages from Or. dom. 135–138 and Thal. 42.22–34). It was then that he had to say that the process of decision-making in Christ was different from what it is with us - there was no choice in it, which he now described using the concepts of intention (γνώμη) (that is, this or that disposition or stable inclinations that the natural will receives in created hypostases as their “personal” characteristics) 542, gnomic will and deliberate choice (προαίρεσις), and distinguished them from natural will. Thus, the initial ideas about the invariably good will in Christ (as in Thal. 42.18–34) and about γνώμη, who chose (αἱρουμένην) instead of preserving life, death for people (as in or. dom. 135–138), were rethought in new concepts, in which the human natural will became deified in Christ (and not, as before, will), and γνώμη, gnomic will and deliberate choice were understood in a new way as modes of realizing the natural will, conditioned by the fall of the ancestors, although they began to be recognized by relative assimilation in relation to Christ, by natural (that is, in the proper sense) were denied, since the deification of the human will in Christ excluded their possibility. The terminology has changed, but the essence of the teaching of St. Maxim remained the same, having deepened, however, due to a more detailed analysis of the Gethsemane prayer. Finally, it is necessary to try to answer the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: how, in the absence of gnomic will and deliberate choice characteristic of created, undeified hypostases, should the saving mission of Christ be understood, bearing in mind the formula of St. Gregory the Theologian: “what is not accepted is not healed”? As we noted above, Steenberg, in order to resolve this problem, proposed recognizing the presence of γνώμη in Christ, while referring to the early writings of St. Maxim, arguing that the refusal to confess γνώμη in Christ in a later period is not absolute, that is, it does not characterize his teaching as a whole. Such a solution would be a solution if γνώμη itself were understood in the sense in which St. Maxim used this concept in his writings before the start of his polemics with the Monothelites. But this would mean not answering the question posed above, but evading it by returning to the theology of St. Maxim before the start of the controversy. We are interested in how we can conceive of the saving mission of Christ, taking into account the regulative formula of St. for Christology. Gregory the Theologian in relation to the writings of the period of polemics with the Monothelites and within the framework of the understanding of γνώμη, gnomic will and deliberate choice, which was formed by St. Maximus in this later period, when he rejected γνώμη and προαίρεσις from Christ. Indeed, if Christ did not take on any of the abilities of human nature, then not everything in this nature is saved. This is precisely the requirement of the St. formula. Gregory, developed in polemics with Apollinaris, when it was necessary to defend the presence of a human mind in Christ - everything from human nature must be perceived. However, γνώμη and προαίρεσις, as they are understood by St. Maxim during the period of polemics with the monothelites, in contrast to rational ability or natural will, are not the abilities (or forces) of human nature. This is the peculiarity of his later works, in contrast to the early ones, where γνώμη and προαίρεσις are a designation of the volitional principle in the human nature of Christ, that in a later period they began to be understood in a completely different way. So such phrases found in him as: “man... is an animal by nature that deliberately chooses” and “everyone who by nature is capable of deliberate choice is susceptible to opposing possibilities” 543 should not be understood in the sense that deliberate choice is some kind of ability of human nature, otherwise it would be impossible to deny it from Christ, who assumed our entire nature, etc. Maxim would be contradicting himself. We are talking in these phrases about the state of nature in non-deified human hypostases after the Fall (that is, as we usually know it) 544. That this is exactly the case is evident from his further words about the action of deliberate choice, which “now has the force of the law of nature,” which is canceled in the state of the resurrection of the saints (or, which is the same for St. Maximus, deification) 545, where there is no deliberate choice 546. We have repeatedly noted above that during the period of polemics with the Monothelites, St. Maximus began to teach that the gnomic will, like deliberate choice, characterizes not nature, but hypostasis. In particular, he wrote: “[gnomic will] is a spontaneous impulse (αὐθαίρετος ὁρμή), inclined towards one of two [possibilities]. It is determining (ἀφοριστικόν) not for nature, but, truly, for person and hypostasis” 547. But does it follow from this that the gnomic will is some kind of force or ability of the created, undeified human hypostasis? To say this would be as incorrect as to say that they are forces of nature, since the hypostases do not have any abilities of their own, but they use natural forces and abilities in one way or another, it is this method of use that characterizes this or that hypostasis 548, why St. Maxim says that the gnomic will is decisive for the hypostasis. Bradshaw briefly summarizes the teachings of St. Maxim on the basic concepts characterizing the act of will: “Maxim explains the difference between natural and gnomic will through an analogy with the ability to speak, which belongs to nature, and the way a person speaks, which belongs to the hypostasis 549. He defines gnomic will as “spontaneous (αὐθαίρετος) aspiration (ὁρμή) and movement (κίνησις) of the faculty of judgment (τοῦ λογισμοῦ) to one or to another (ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα)“ 550 . As can be seen from this definition, the gnomic will is not a capacity, which would be redundant, having in mind the role already attributed to the natural will, but rather it is an act made possible by the natural will.”551 McFarland, in turn, writes that “the gnomic will [in Maximus] is not a separate faculty along with the natural will; it is simply a name for how volition occurs... Gnomic will refers to the mode in which the natural will is represented (instantiated) by the human hypostasis before its eschatological transformation into a state of direct correspondence to the Divine will” 552. With some differences in these interpretations (which we will not go into), they agree that the gnomic will in the teaching of St. The maxim is not an ability or power of human nature, much less the ability of a hypostasis (a similar understanding applies to deliberate choice), but only characterizes the way of existence (or manifestation) of nature in a hypostasis, the way of using nature, and thus characterizes the hypostasis. And if so, then the lack of gnomic will and deliberate choice in Christ in no case can threaten the incompleteness of Christ’s perception of human nature, that is, this case does not fall under the violation of the regulative principle “what is not perceived is not healed,” which means there is no reason to be afraid in this regard. All this, of course, is not yet an answer to the question of how exactly the saving mission of Christ should be understood when perceiving our nature in relation to the will, but in comparison with the question posed above, this is a different question. It is not our task to discuss it in detail, since in the Theological and Polemical Works (unlike other works of St. Maximus) issues of soteriology are almost not touched upon. Let us note just a few points. In the Dispute with Pyrrhus, St. Maxim directly connects Christ’s perception of our nature, together with its will, endowed with autocracy, with our salvation and recalls the formula of St. Gregory the Theologian: “what is not accepted is not healed” 553. Healing, according to St. Maxim, it was necessary because our will was the first to be defeated during the Fall. This is the meaning of the word πρωτοπαθής he uses, taken from the famous letter of St. Gregory the Theologian To Kledonius, against Apollinaris 1, which speaks of the mind that first suffered in us 554. The very concept of the first-damaged or first-damaged organ comes from medical vocabulary, and St. refers to it. Gregory, - for example, it is often found in Galen. So, the unhealedness of autocratic will (i.e., such a will that can (until it is deified) consider the best not the true Good, but something instead of it, and strive for this false “best” good), according to the Disputation with Pyrrhus, is the source of sin in us and first of all requires healing. Thus, Rev. Maxim (or, in any case, his follower who presented the debate) was fully aware of the requirement of the St. formula. Gregory and even used it in polemics with the Monothelites. In addition, speaking about the soteriological aspect of the teachings of St. Maxim about the wills in Christ, we should again remember that, on the one hand, already in amb. 7 (then this is repeated several times in Opusc.) he assigns an important place to the teaching aspect of the Gethsemane prayer, that is, the example that Christ set, out of compassion for us, having internalized our resistance by relative assimilation and showing that we should submit our will - God's, freely yielding autocracy to God 555. On the other hand, in opusc. 1 prp. Maximus described the state of perfect deification as one in which there is no gnomic will and deliberate choice 556; in this state, change from virtue to vice is no longer possible, that is, variability in what relates to things that depend on us (it is in relation to them that the gnomic will manifests itself) 557. Thus, if in Christ the presence of the gnomic will of St. Maxim rejects, then among the saints in a state of complete deification (where there is no longer ignorance and changes from good-being to evil-being are impossible, but ever-good-being is granted by God), the human will becomes deified and united with God’s, which it is from the moment of the Incarnation in Christ. This is how the saints fully participate in the Body of Christ, of which they are integral members 558. Not Christ, according to St. Maximus, assimilates our gnomic wills (which would be impossible), but those deified in Christ are granted a way out of the state of hesitation, doubt and uncertainty in the outcome of the matter - all that marks our choice, that is, the process of ordinary human choice. It must be said that the teaching of St. The maxim about the absence of gnomic will in the state of deification, despite the fact that the gnomic will characterizes the hypostasis, raises the question whether such absence is not the erasure of a certain characteristic feature of the hypostasis so that salvation turns out to be the destruction of its most important moral aspect, in which it is not the person who is “saved,” but only another representative of nature (individual)? We will consider this important question, having clarified its formulation, below, in Chapter 21, devoted to current problems discussed in connection with Opusc. Here I would also like to note that if, during the period of polemics with the Monothelites, St. Maxim began to talk about the absence of γνώμη and προαίρεσις in the state of deification among the saints; before the polemic began, he described the state of deification somewhat differently, saying, in particular, that will in the saints becomes unshakable due to deification 559. That is, γνώμη and προαίρεσις (in the sense that they had at that time) were not denied then either in relation to Christ or in relation to the saints, but it was only said that they became unshakable in the Good. At the same time, we should not forget that St. In an early period, Maxim professed the doctrine of the “single energy of God and the saints” in a state of deification, and it was within the framework of this doctrine, that is, based on the perfect deification of the volitional principle in the saints (when autocracy is completely ceded to God’s will), he spoke about γνώμη and προαίρεσις unshakable in the Good. So the differences in the essence of the teaching in the early and later writings of St. There is no Maxim. Returning to the differences in the ways of formulating this teaching, we can say that the affirmation of will in God by the saints in the state of deification, found in St. Maxim, before the polemics with the Monothelites, was probably adopted by him from St. Gregory of Nyssa, who expressed, in particular, the following thought: “since vice does not have the property of being outside of will (ἔξω τῆς προαιρέσεως), then when all will (προαίρεσις) is in God (ἐν τῷ Θεῷ), then vice will come to complete destruction, because there will be no container left for it” 560. With all the similarities in this point of the teachings of St. Maxim to polemics with the Monothelites and St. Gregory of Nyssa, as P. Sherwood already noted, these teachings should not be identified, since St. Gregory, turning to the Good presupposes an aversion from evil, that is, a certain experience of it, and in this sense, προαίρεσις, established in God, bears the stamp of choosing the Good over evil 561. At St. Maxima, by contrast, is already and at a relatively early period, as can be seen from Sherwood's analysis of amb. 7, striving for the Good and being in it did not imply any comparison of it with evil - the Good is absolute, its desire is naturally embedded in our nature. Nevertheless, the very application of the term προαίρεσις to saints in the state of deification by St. Maxim and St. Gregory during this period was common. So later, during the period of polemics with the Monothelites, St. Maxim had to carry out a more clear (even at the terminological level) “shift” of his teaching in comparison with the teaching of St. Gregory (although he does not directly talk about this) 562, meaningfully distinguishing between προαίρεσις (which St. Maxim in his later works denied both from Christ and from the saints in the state of deification-resurrection) and autocracy (αὐτεξούσιον), which St. Maxim recognized it both in Christ (both in Divinity and in humanity) and in the saints (although among them it was, as he already wrote in amb. 7, completely ceded to God, but “dominated beautifully”) 563 . At the conclusion of this chapter, devoted to the refusal of St. Maxim from application to Christ and to the saints in the state of resurrection γνώμη and προαίρεσις, I would like to mention a remarkable parallel to this teaching in Neoplatonic thought of the 5th–6th centuries. We are most likely not talking about borrowing St. Maxim among the Neoplatonists (substantive differences, as we will see, remain) 564, but about some parallels (in the presence of common sources in ancient philosophy), which are all the more interesting because they allow us to better understand the similarities and differences in the teachings of St. Maxim not only in comparison with the previous Orthodox tradition (the same St. Gregory of Nyssa), but also with the pagan philosophical thought of late antiquity. Researchers have already noted more than once that the very distinction between natural will and deliberate choice that St. Petersburg makes. Maxim most likely goes back to the distinction between the concepts of προαίρεσις and βούλησις (desire) in Aristotle 565; in the patristic tradition it is found in Nemesius of Emesa 566 (he repeats Aristotle at this point), on whom St. Maximus 567, in particular, when, using this distinction, he rejects προαίρεσις in Christ or speaks of the absence of προαίρεσις among the saints in the resurrection. However, long before St. Maximus, this distinction was used by Proclus. In the treatise On Providence, in a polemic with the mechanic Theodore, who adhered to the deterministic doctrine and argued that freedom, which he identified with “depending on us” (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν), is possessed only by the Ruler (προστάτης) of all beings, and in our world everything is determined by him, Proclus makes several important statements that shed light on his understanding of what depends and what does not depend on us. To begin with, he turns to the distinction made by Aristotle, which is also found in Nemesius: “the ancients always take the expression “depending on us” as referring to the action of choice ... They do not identify choice (προαίρεσις) and desire (βούλησις): they say that desire is always directed towards the good, while choice can be directed towards things good and bad" 568. Having made this distinction, Proclus, who practically equates the sphere of προαίρεσις with the sphere of what depends on us 569, further asserts that the gods do not have a deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) 570, they have only desire (βούλησις), directed towards Good 571. Accordingly, it would be a mistake to assume, as Proclus’s opponent does, that the gods have something that depends on us, understood as an undetermined freedom, and that everything in our world is predetermined. This concept, like προαίρεσις, should be used correctly. If the gods do not have a deliberate choice, but only a good will (desire - βούλησις), then man, as being on the border of the spiritual (smart) and material world, to the extent that he is exactly that, is involved in the process of choice. This is not a choice between good and evil, since no one, as Proclus emphasizes, chooses evil 572, but the choice of evil is made by the soul out of ignorance of the true good. Here you can remember that St. Maximus in the Disputation with Pyrrhus gives a definition of γνώμη: “intention is nothing more than some kind of volition (θέλησις), relatively adhering to either a real or an imaginary good” 573. We find a similar understanding in Proclus for προαίρεσις 574. In this definition, it is important to mention, along with the real, imaginary good. A person can make mistakes, and the possibility of error is inherent, as in the just given definition of γνώμη prp. Maximus, and in the concept of προαίρεσις in Proclus. The soul by nature, says Proclus, has an inner love for the true Good, but it does not know what it is, and often makes a mistake. Since προαίρεσις (more precisely, the choice we make) deserves blame or praise, then our ability to choose belongs to a sphere where error is possible, which does not happen with either gods or irrational beings. This is a feature of the position of man in the hierarchy of beings, which Neoplatonists operate on. Προαίρεσις, says Proclus, is fundamentally dual: if we move towards the better, we behave like intelligent beings, if towards the worse (taking it for the best), we behave like sensual beings 575. If we could live only in accordance with the desire of the mind, we would live in accordance with the Good and would be truly free and godlike 576. But such is the life of gods and souls like them. As for ordinary people, they are characterized by being in the sphere of choice that depends on us. Only that which relates to our soul, that is, to the sphere of προαίρεσις 577 fully depends on us. As historians of philosophy note, this tendency - the opposition of desire (βούλησις) and deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) - can be traced in Neoplatonism starting with Iamblichus, who, in particular, wrote: “the divine desire (θεία βούλησις) of good surpasses life in deliberate choice (τῆς προαιρετικῆς ὑπερέχει ζωῆς)” 578. So, already in Iamblichus, desire characterizes the life of the gods (and the mind), and προαίρεσις - the life of the soul in the body. Proclus continues and develops this tradition. Finally, the student of Ammonius (a student of Proclus) John Philoponus is a major representative of late Neoplatonism and the Alexandrian school of commentary on Aristotle, whose philosophical works, according to some hypotheses, were familiar to St. Maxim 579 – used the distinction βούλησις–προαίρεσις, speaking about the powers of the human soul: “the practical powers of the soul are desire and deliberate choice (βούλησις καὶ προαίρεσις). Desire is directed only towards the good, while intentional choice is alternative (or ambivalent - ἐπαμφοτερίζει). Desire (βούλησις) belongs to the rational soul as such and in itself, and the deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) of the soul is gossip (συμπεπλεγμένης) with unreasonableness (τῇ ἀλογίᾳ). And when the soul is outside the realm of becoming, it acts only in accordance with desire, since it is only in the good; and when it finds itself in the area of ​​formation, irrational abilities (or forces) are intertwined with it... then it, being intertwined with the unreasonable soul, has a deliberate choice, since it sometimes comes from unreason, and sometimes from reason, and prefers one to the other” 580. Moreover, in in de anim. 2.2, 241.7–9 Philoponus says that the mind is practical only “from its relation to the body, which is why, after its liberation from the body, it is exclusively contemplative.” Despite all the differences in the shades of the teachings of the authors listed above, representing the Neoplatonic tradition, they all place the presence of προαίρεσις in direct connection with the reality of human existence in this world, claiming a hierarchically higher place for desire (βούλησις). It is βούλησις (the will of the mind, its desire for the Good and only for it) that is characteristic of deities, and for man to the extent that he is a contemplator, that is, the “mind”, and is not intertwined with irrational forces, bodily and material 581. The concept of the absence of προαίρεσις in Christ, as well as the absence of προαίρεσις in the saints in the state of deification-resurrection, which was put forward by St. Maxim, is to a large extent similar to this teaching of the Neoplatonists, if only we replace the “desire” of the Neoplatonists (βούλησις) with “natural will” (θέλημα). The difference is that the Neoplatonists did not imagine the possibility of life on earth for a person who, from birth, did not and could not have προαίρεσις, as St. Petersburg thought. Maximus of Christ (however, he was not just a man, but God incarnate, so we must talk about the absence of the Neoplatonists’ doctrine of the Incarnation in all its soteriological sense characteristic of Christians). As for the absence of προαίρεσις among the saints in the state of deification-resurrection, which St. taught. Maxim, the state of deification and striving for only the Good without the possibility of error in its choice is what we find in common in the understanding of divine life both among the Neoplatonists (according to which the souls of people, separated from the material and carnal and striving towards the One, can also participate in this life), and among the St. Maxima 582. After delving into a number of theoretical issues that arose during the period of aggravation of disputes with the Monothelites (starting from 644), it is now necessary to return to the history of the controversy itself, which entered an acute phase when St. Maxim and his comrades, in alliance with Rome, launched a strategic offensive against the official ideology of the empire, which was monothelitism, which culminated in the convening of the Lateran Council in 649. In these fairly well-known events, we will be interested in those aspects that will help us understand the context and content of the Theological and Polemical Works. 18. Alliance with Rome. Dispute with Pyrrhus: historical reality and text Next after the first strictly dioenergist and diophelite opusc. 16 (644?) opusc was sent to Cyprus to presbyter Marinus. 10, which dates back to 645 and was apparently written by St. Maximus in Carthage 583 until the dispute with Pyrrhus, which took place in July of the same year in the same place. Circumstances of writing opusc. 10, in which Rev. Maxim defends from criticism two points from the Council Epistle of Pope Theodore Patr. Paul, were discussed more than once, since one of these provisions was the confession that “the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son” (ἐκπορεύεσθαι κἀκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ) 584 . For future polemicists, this is the work of St. The Maximus became one of the arguments both in favor of the Filioque and against its later Latin interpretation - a topic carefully studied by church historians on which we will not dwell 585 . More important for us is the fact of the protection of St. Maxim (and most researchers consider opusc. 10 written by him, although there are other opinions) 586 views of the Pope of Rome during the period when Rome became the main strategic ally of St. Maximus and his comrades in the fight against heresy in Constantinople. The very fact that Pope Theodore was of Palestinian origin 587 (Greek was his native language; it is possible that even before becoming pope he had close ties with the Palestinian monastic brotherhood scattered throughout the Mediterranean), explains a lot in the further connections of St. Maximus with the Roman throne and in the influence that he had on this throne during the pontificate of Pope Theodore (however, even under Pope John IV, these ties were already quite close). In turn, the special activity that the Roman throne will show in relation to Palestine, which we have yet to talk about in connection with opusc. 15, was obviously connected not only with the initiatives of St. sent to Rome. Sophronius of Jerusalem, Stefan Dorsky and the activities of the Palestinian monks who found refuge in Rome, but also with the understandable interest in Palestine of Pope Theodore 588. It should also be noted here that in opusc. 10 at prp. Maximus for the first time encounters a polemic with the Christology of Theodore of Faran, whom from that moment on he will call one of the main ideologists of monothelitism and monoenergism 589. According to church historians, the initiative in aggravating relations between the Diophelite West (to which St. Maximus, who was in Carthage, belonged) and the authorities in Constantinople belonged to Rome. It was Pope Theodore, despite the fact that Patr. Paul, in his Council Epistle (winter-spring 643), bypassed the topic of wills; in his response letter, he insisted on condemning Ekphesis, like Sergius, Pyrrhus and Cyrus, questioning the canonicity of the Patras. Paul in the event that Pyrrhus is not convicted. Indeed, if Pyrrhus is not a heretic, then on what basis is he deposed? For a long time, Constantinople did not answer these questions, which, apparently, became more and more persistent 590. Finally, in May 645, Patr. Paul gave an answer to the demands of Rome in his letter to Pope Theodore; this letter was preserved as part of the Acts of the Lateran Council 591. In fact, Patr. Paul, apparently reflecting the general opinion of the ecclesiastical and civil authorities in Constantinople, confirmed fidelity to the confession of Ekphesis, strengthening some of his arguments 592. Two months after writing the message to Patr. Paul, in July 645, a debate was organized in Carthage under the patronage of the prefect Gregory. Maxima with the ex-patriarch Pyrrhus, which ended with Pyrrhus’s public renunciation of monothelitism and monoenergism (this is the order in which these teachings were considered during the dispute) and his agreement to bring repentance to the Pope. This renunciation, as well as the councils that followed this debate in West Africa, condemning monothelitism, marked the final break with Constantinople, first in the church, and soon, when the prefect Gregory, under whose patronage all this happened, declared himself emperor, and in political terms. There is no doubt about the close relationship of all these events, starting with the dispute with Pyrrhus and ending with the rebellion of the prefect Gregory. Based on this, one should approach the debate itself, which was as much a political event as a church one (it was not for nothing that it took place under the auspices of Gregory). One can only guess how much St. Maximus was privy to Gregory's political plans to rebel against the authorities in Constantinople; at his trial, he categorically denied this 593. However, it is difficult to imagine that, challenging the authorities in Constantinople by the very fact of the dispute and subsequent councils, St. Maxim, and even more so Gregory, did not even in general terms imagine the ecclesiastical and political consequences of these actions. As for Gregory, against the backdrop of the crushing defeats of the young Emperor Constans from the Muslim Arabs, he very likely considered himself the savior of his fatherland, especially since the Arabs came close in 645. to the borders of West Africa - the region under his command, and confronting them under the flag of the true faith was supposed to be an alternative to the failed policy of the heretic emperor in the East. The fact that heresy was confessed in Constantinople, as under the influence of St. Maximus and Rome were probably considered by the prefect Gregory, which gave his political claims additional grounds, and therefore organized by him together with St. Maxim, the dispute, quite likely, from the very beginning played both an ecclesiastical-dogmatic and an ideological role. M. Jankowiak goes so far as to suggest the existence, even before the start of the dispute with Pyrrhus, of a full-scale project to create an Orthodox empire with its capital in Africa and headed by the “emperor” Gregory, a project in which Pope Theodore participated and the repentant Pyrrhus was to play his role as an alternative, or rather true, patriarch of Constantinople 594 . We cannot say for sure how true the hypothesis is about the political aspect of the events that began with the dispute with Pyrrhus. As for St. Maxim, there is no doubt that the main thing for him in the events of 645, as in subsequent events, was the fight against heresy. No less interesting are the motives of Pyrrhus, who agreed to take part in the dispute. It would be naive to think that this major church leader and politician, who recently occupied a pulpit in the capital of the empire, went to the debate, wanting to defend Monothelitism, and then, having lost in an honest debate, sincerely repented. Even in the version of the Disputation with Pyrrhus that has come down to us (below we will dwell on the question of its reliability), Pyrrhus looks like a man who decided in advance to give in to the dispute, in order to then do what he did - go to Rome, bring repentance and receive in return recognition as the only legitimate patriarch of Constantinople (both on the grounds that Paul deprived him of his chair uncanonically, and on the fact that Paul is a heretic). It is likely that all this was agreed upon in advance between the participants in the dispute (St. Maxim, of course, knew the contents of the message of Pope Theodore Patr. Paul, where the recognition of the latter’s canonicity was made directly dependent on the condemnation of monothelitism, which Paul, as it became clear by July 645, refused), a dispute that, thus, was supposed to become something of a show trial of wrong teaching. During the dispute, Pyrrhus often took far from the strongest position 595 or completely avoided the dispute, admitting his defeat. For example, having lost the argument about monothelitism, he “gave in” to monoenergism in advance, not wanting to defend it, and only prp. Maxim, citing the need to clarify the issue completely and for the sake of convincing the gullible, forced him to continue the “dispute” 596. The most striking evidence that Pyrrhus was not in the mood for real polemics is that he did not even mention his correspondence with St. Maximus about the high praise of Abba Maximus towards Psiphos, who later formed the basis of Ekphesis. All these considerations do not allow us to accept the position of Pyrrhus expressed in the Dispute as a genuine and sincerely professed teaching. At the very least, it would be reckless to restore the teaching of the Monothelites, and indeed of Pyrrhus himself, solely according to the Dispute. However, both the teaching and the argumentation of St. Maxim, as it was at the dispute of 645, as some researchers have already begun to understand, should also be reconstructed from the text of the Dispute with Pyrrhus that has reached us with great caution. As Jacques Noret noted, it is likely that the text of the Dispute was compiled after 655 and even later than 597, that is, after the trial of St. Maximus, a little later than the Statement of the Debate was compiled, and perhaps the Dispute in Visia. The question remains open to what extent the text of the Dispute corresponds to what actually happened and was said in 645, and the authorship of the Dispute in its final edition is an open question; it is unknown whether it belongs to St. Maxim or his students. All this makes it difficult to analyze this work and understand its place in relation to the theological and polemical works of St. Maxima 598. Based on all this, as well as on the fact that its content has already been studied more than once, and individual points have been analyzed by us above, we will only briefly dwell on those aspects of the Dispute that are related to the most important question for understanding the Theological-Polemical works about changes in the way of expressing the teachings of St. Maxim. At the same time, we, following the majority of scientists in this, will accept that the Dispute reflects the position of St. Maxim in 645, but again and again we emphasize the entire conventionality of such an assumption, as well as the conclusions that follow from it 599. The historical circumstances of the dispute are well known 600. Under the patronage of the prefect of Carthage Gregory, in the presence of African bishops and people in 645, a dispute took place between the ex-patriarch of Constantinople Pyrrhus, who even in exile remained an influential person (at least among his own) 601 and one of the pillars of monothelitism, and the monk Maximus, who by that time had long been the spiritual leader in the fight against monothelitism 602. We will not analyze the dispute in detail; we will dwell (taking into account all the reservations regarding the dating and authorship of this text) only on what is directly related to the question of what is new and unchangeable in the position of the saint. Maximus compared with his writings 640–643. and earlier. Let's start (following the course of the Dispute) with a refutation of St. Maxim of Monothelitism 603. Here one can notice a certain shift in the interpretation of the expression “united will” of Pope Honorius towards its interpretation in Rome. So, if in opusc. 20 prp. Maxim emphasized that Christ was conceived without sin according to the one will of God (it was in this sense that he understood “one will” in Honorius, adding that the human will completely converges and is united with this Divine will in Christ) 604, from where he concluded that Christ could not have a will contrary to God, then in the Dispute he (or the one who compiled this text), again without questioning Orthodoxy Honorius 605, “aligns” its understanding with that given in Rome. Referring to the interpretation of Honorius's secretary Abba John, set out by him on behalf of Pope John IV in a letter to Emperor Constantine III 606, Ven. Maximus says that by “one will” Honorius meant exclusively the human will of Christ, but he called it “one” on the basis of the impossibility in Christ of the confrontation between the human spirit and the flesh 607, repeating in this the Apology of Honorius by Pope John 608. It is characteristic that the expression of St. Cyril of Alexandria “single co-natural (or related - συγγενῆ) energy,” which he previously understood in the sense of the unity in Christ of human action with the Divine 609, rev. Maximus (or the one who compiled the text of the Disputation) 610 now understands differently, namely, that even after the Incarnation the Son remained with the Divine action united with the Father (to which, however, it was added - but St. Maximus no longer says that it was “merged” with him - human action) 611. Thus, Rev. During this period, Maximus, as Battrellos noted 612, actually abandoned his previous understanding of this expression of St. Kirill as a Unitarian. However, we find the absence of a doctrine of “fusion” only in the Disputation with Pyrrhus, written, perhaps, not by the saint himself. Maximus, and most likely after 656, but in the dated 646–647. opusc. 9 we find the same teaching about fusion: “With Divine energy [He made] the Divine, and human the human, but not separately, but in mutual community and fusion [of these energies]” 613. Be that as it may, the peculiarity of the theology of St. The maxim in the Disputation is that in his polemic with Pyrrhus he does not use the previous method of describing the deification of the human will in Christ. As we have already seen more than once, he did this by speaking about supernatural “unity,” the complete “descent” and “fusion” of the human will with the Divine. This terminology is used by Rev. Maximus and in the opusc adjacent in time to the dispute with Pyrrhus. 16 614, written before the dispute. It is all the more remarkable that we do not find these expressions in the text of the Dispute. It is all the more interesting to understand how he expresses the idea of ​​the irreversibility of deification, which is core to his theology, contained in the metaphor of “fusion”, which he did not use in the Dispute. “Helps” St. Maximus expressed this idea in the Disputation of Pyrrhus himself. Having failed with his proposal to understand “one will” as a complex Divine-human one, he proposed another interpretation, based on the concept of unity that he had not clarified: “Those people [the authors of Ekphesis] said this [that is, that Christ has one will] not out of malice or out of some kind of deceit, but wishing to reveal the ultimate unity (ἕνωσιν)” 615. It would seem that Pyrrhus finally made the right move. In fact, although St. Maxim noticed that Monophysites could take advantage of such a desire to express ultimate unity; he did not reject the idea itself, but asked Pyrrhus a question, checking what he meant: “What do they want to call this one will? After all, in fairness they should give it a name” 616. And then Pyrrhus, who could no longer answer: “how complex,” uttered another fatal word: “they call it gnomic (γνωμικόν).” St. Maximus knew, as can be seen from another place in the Disputation (329D–332A), that the authors of the Ekphesis (Sergius and Pyrrhus) considered “one” will (along with the other interpretations they allowed for it) as gnomic, that is, choosing the most appropriate method of action from various possibilities. So in the Dispute, as before in opusc. 7 and more expanded in opusc. 16, which we already wrote about above, Rev. Maximus resolutely rejects the application of this concept to Christology. Unlike his early works, written before the controversy with the Monothelites, where St. Maxim used γνώμη and the closely related concept of “intentional choice” (προαίρεσις) in relation to Christ; now he stops even talking about the immutable γνώμη or προαίρεσις on the grounds that he will associate both of these concepts exclusively with created undeified hypostases, since they can introduce into the natural will the consideration of various possibilities, weighing, doubt - everything that implies ignorance. In Christ, according to St. Maximus, all this is excluded 617, about which he directly tells Pyrrhus: “In relation to the humanity of the Lord, which was carried out not just like us, but - Divinely... one cannot talk about intention (γνώμη)” 618. It is precisely the distinction between natural will (θέλημα) and “gnomes,” as well as the denial of “gnomes” in Christ, that is for St. Maxim is a means of expressing the impossibility for the human will of Christ to come into conflict with God's. In this way, the same goal was achieved as with the expressions “complete convergence,” “fusion,” and “unity.” As we see, although St. Maximus, judging by the Disputation, changed the terminology, but the dogmatic content of his faith remained the same. However, it is risky to talk about a change in terminology in 645, given the later origin of the text of the Dispute (after 655, as we discussed above). At least in opusc. 3, which dates from 645–646, rev. Maximus uses the concept of fusion in relation to the human will of Christ: “If it [i.e. e. human will] was deified, then deified, obviously due to fusion (συμφυΐᾳ) with the deifying” 619. Thus, given that the concept of fusion occurs even before the dispute with Pyrrhus in 645 - in opusc. 16, and after - in opusc. 3 and opusc. 9 (646–647), we cannot talk about a change in terminology during this period (the second phase of polemics with the Monothelites), but at most that the same idea of ​​the deification of the human will in Christ and its unity with God could be expressed in different ways - by the metaphor of “fusion” and the teaching about the absence of gnomic will and deliberate choice in Christ (positive and negative way of expressing the same teachings complement each other, outlines of which are already found in opusc. 7, where both are present) 620. At the same time, as we have already noted, analyzing the teaching of St. Maxim on the Prayer of Gethsemane, it would be a simplification to say that the process of volition as we know it, that is, with the consideration of alternatives before making a decision, has nothing to do with Christ. Already in opusc. 20 and 19, and after the dispute with Pyrrhus in opusc. 1 (645–646) rev. Maximus develops the concept of relative assimilation, and, in particular (in opusc. 1), speaks of the relative assimilation of Christ's deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) 621. This concept of relative assimilation allows St. Maxim to include in the horizon of conversation about wills in Christ the problem of the Gethsemane struggle 622. In the Disputation, the question of assimilation is first addressed by Pyrrhus, putting forward the thesis that the human natural will was assimilated by Christ “relatively” 623. St. Maxim objects to this that it was acquired “essentially” 624, that is, as necessarily inherent in our acquired nature; As for “relative assimilation,” St. Petersburg speaks about it. Maxim says that it is “by which we amicably assimilate what relates to each other... without doing or undergoing anything about it ourselves” 625. The concept of “relative assimilation” allowed St. Maxim is already in opusc. 20 to show that Christ’s request to “carry the Cup” does not indicate the possibility for His human will to come into conflict with God’s. To the dispute with Pyrrhus St. Maxim came, therefore, with the opus already formulated. 20 and 19 teaching about Christ’s “relative appropriation” of our “disobedience.” This is what allowed him, on the one hand, to reject Pyrrhus’s assertion that our natural will was adopted by Christ only “relatively”, and on the other hand, to deny Christ’s γνώμη and προαίρεσις 626, without fear of thereby giving grounds for the conclusion that some part of our nature was not “adopted” by Christ and, therefore, the famous expression of St. Gregory the Theologian, not healed. Christ also assimilated our tropos of resistance (in which the “dwarf” is manifested), but only in the sense in which a doctor “assimilates” a disease, that is, only relatively 627. Moreover, the absence of “gnomes” in Christ sets the paradigm for our deification, that is, it implies the “deactivation” of the gnomic will in the hypostases of saints. It is precisely this meaning in the light of the Disputation that is said in the Difficulties of John 7 about the “one energy of God and the saints.” As V. M. Lurie notes: “Maxim’s thought about the “single energy” of the deified and God should be clarified as follows: man uses his “autocracy” (freedom) in such a way as to abandon his gnomic will in favor of the will of God - which is the natural energy of God, acting in conjunction with the natural energy of man. In the deified man, the words of the Apostle Paul literally come true: “It is no longer I who live, but Christ lives in me” [Gal.2:20]. Like Christ, he continues to perform actions consistent with human nature, but at the same time it is not his gnomic will that acts in him, but the will of God, united not with the gnomic, but with the natural will of man” 628. So, the result of the first part of the Dispute, in which St. Maximus refuted monothelitism; one can consider Pyrrhus’ recognition of two (but not forming one complex) natural wills in Christ and the absence of any hypostatic will in Him. Having recognized this, Pyrrhus refused to even touch on the issue of monoenergism, citing the fact that now that he understood that in relation to Christ we can only talk about natural wills (and therefore actions), he could take back everything that he had previously said about one action 629. From this recognition of Pyrrhus (and from his further argumentation, which St. Maximus forces him to develop for the sake of knowing the truth and teaching from this example of “gullible people”), it is clear that Pyrrhus understood the unity of action in Christ not as formed as a result of the unity of human natural action with the Divine (as before 642 the expression “one action” was interpreted by the fathers of St. Maximus), but as arising from the unity of the Hypostasis (based on the fact that One actor cannot have more than one type of action) 630. St. Maximus easily refutes this justification of the unity of action in Christ by the unity of His Hypostasis, using argumentation similar to that which he resorted to in the first part of the debate. At the same time, it also becomes clear why he rejected Pyrrhus’s proposal to talk about one action “in the image of a union” 631 - an expression that, as Battrellos noted, resembles some of the expressions of the saint himself. Maxim to 642. The point here is not only that St. Maxim, for ecclesiastical and political reasons, switched to the position of hard dioenergism 632. No less important is that Pyrrhus, as he admitted, considered this “unity,” as we said, a consequence of the unity of the Hypostasis (the active Subject). This argument of Rev. Maximus refutes, just as he rejected a similar argument (“for the sake of perfect union”) in favor of the expression “one will” 633; namely, it refutes the expression “one action in the manner of union,” understood as “one action of one Christ,” drawing attention to the fact that “one Christ” has one (natural) action with the Father (which was before the union, that is, the Incarnation), and one (natural) action with us 634, and therefore two natural actions, and not one. In this argumentation, it makes itself felt that in the Dispute the position of St. The maxim is formulated as a position of non-alternative (tolerating absolutely no unitary expressions) dioenergism. Illustrate this, new for St. Maxim's uncontested dioenergism can be achieved by comparing the interpretation of the “God-manly” action, which St. Maximus gave in the Difficulties to Thomas 5 in 634, with how this action is treated in the Disputation. In the Difficulties of St. Maxim emphasized that Christ did not do anything only as God or only as a man, that He performed human things in a Divine way, and Divine action was manifested in His flesh. It is these two types of actions: those performed in a Divinely human way and the Divine manifested through the flesh, St. Maxim called them “God-manly”. In the Dispute, he repeats that “by denying the extreme principles” (that is, the fact that Christ does not do anything only as God or only as a man), “nothing in between is formed” 635, but at the same time he no longer says that Christ does the human in a Divine way, but the Divine through the flesh and that this is what is called “God-masculine action,” but emphasizes that Christ has one - Divine - action with the Father, and another - with us 636. However, a little higher, interpreting the Areopagite, St. Maximus, as in the Difficulties to Thomas, speaks of the interpenetration of natures and the “ineffable unity” of 637 actions; on the other hand, he had previously spoken of two natural actions (one of which Christ has in common with the Father, and the other with us). It would seem that we are talking only about a shift in emphasis, and not about a radical change in the paradigm. To notice this change, one must take into account the background of the interpretation of St. Maxim of the Areopagite formula. In the Difficulties to Thomas, since the dispute was about chapter 7 of the Nine Chapters of Cyrus, who interpreted the “God-manly action” of the Areopagite as one, St. Maxim rejected precisely this (“unitarian”) interpretation, showing that the Areopagite is actually talking about two types of “God-manly” action that are irreducible to each other: examples of one are miracles, the other is suffering. In the works of 640–642. (opusc. 7, 8 and 20) rev. Maximus is focused on defending not that the expression of the Areopagite is not unitary, but that even unitary formulas, if understood correctly, do not exclude (contrary to the supporters of Ekphesis) the possibility of talking about two energies and wills. At the same time, Rev. Maxim considers it not only possible, but also necessary, to characterize the “fusion” and “unity” of the two natural energies of Christ with the word “one” and to justify the “one will” of Pope Honorius, interpreting it as God’s with which the human is united. This correlates with the theory of deification developed by him earlier, in particular in the Difficulties to John, where, speaking of “one energy of God and the saints,” St. Maximus sees the same kind of unity between the human and Divine wills of Christ. So, let's repeat, in 640-642. St. Maxim recognizes the Unitarian formulas and even considers them a necessary part of the Orthodox confession. The situation is different in the Dispute. Here he neither explicitly nor implicitly returns to his idea of ​​two kinds of “God-masculine” action 638 . Dioenergism prp. The maxim is now based on the denial of the conceivability of natural (that is, Divine and human) actions as “one” (otherwise his main arguments in the dispute with Pyrrhus would not have been valid). It is precisely on the basis of this formulation of the question that he rejects any unitarity. It is quite expected that the change of position of Rev. The maxim is also manifested in the fact that he now interprets the patristic unitarian formulas, as we have seen, differently from the way he did it in his writings before 643. An indirect indicator of the change that has occurred is the final part of the Disputation, which begins with Pyrrhus’s proposal to speak of “one action” in Christ on the basis that human action, in contrast to the Divine one, which moves all creation, is not action, but suffering 639. This argument is interesting because none other than St. Maximus, in Difficulties to John 7, stated: “Everything that has come into being undergoes motion without being self-moving” 640. Surprisingly, St. Maximus manages to convince Pyrrhus of the fallacy of this, his last argument in favor of “monoenergism” 641. Although St. Maximus admits that the fathers, speaking about the movement of our nature (the only source of which is God), actually argued that it is not self-moving 642, and in this sense called human movement “enduring” (St. Maximus even now does not refuse this statement 643), however, the same fathers, meaning something “distinctive, revealing uniformity in all [hypostases] of the same species,” called this movement “action.” And therefore, in order not to question the consubstantiality of Christ for us, it is necessary to say that He had human action, since they say about all people that their nature has the same action 644. Satisfied with these testimonies of the fathers, Pyrrhus readily surrenders 645. So, in the course of the polemic with Pyrrhus, as it is depicted in the Disputation, St. Maxim shows himself to be a diophelite and dioenergist in a new sense, based on the absolute unthinkability of the unity of two natural wills and/or energies, Divine and human, as “one” will and/or energy, and, accordingly, rejecting all unitary formulas as heretical, regardless of the meaning put into them. On the other hand, as we have seen, the essence of the teaching about the unity of the human will with God in Christ is common to the Christology of St. Maxim and his theory of deification did not disappear from his theology, but found its expression in the statement about the absence of “dwarves” in Christ 646. The dispute with Pyrrhus in this regard is the most characteristic text, since it even lacks the St. who is present in other works. Maxim, written before and after 645, the concept of the “fusion” of human will and energy with Divine will and energy. Nevertheless, in the Dispute, characteristic of St. Maxim's doctrine of deification (despite the fact that its authorship, time of writing and relationship with the actual dispute that took place is in question) is expressed with the help of this concept, which has become truly new for the history of Orthodox theology, about the absence of “gnomes” in Christ (both in relation to natures and in relation to hypostasis). 19. On the way to Lateran. Historical events and writings of St. Maxima 645–648 The ecclesiastical and political consequences of the public dispute of St. Maximus and Pyrrhus, who undoubtedly made a huge impression on the African bishops who attended, are well known: “At the beginning of 646, perhaps on the initiative of St. Maximus 647, Councils were held in Numidia, Byzacene and Mauritania, and somewhat later in the region of Carthage, at which monothelitism was recognized with complete unanimity as a heresy. On behalf of the African Church, a message was drawn up to Patriarch Paul demanding that he renounce heresy and return to the confession of the true faith, approved at five Ecumenical Councils 648. Another message was addressed to the emperor with an urgent request to force the patriarch to renounce heretical errors 649. At the same time, the African bishops turned to Pope Theodore with a message in which they notified him of the decisions they had adopted at the Councils and ... asked him to show his supreme authority and encourage Paul to renounce his errors and, in case of persistence, to cut him off “like a sick member from the holy body of the Church of Christ” 650 » 651. Pyrrhus, as the Venerable advised him. Maximus, even during the Disputation, when he admitted his errors, went to bring repentance to Rome. It is not known, notes Larche, whether St. Petersburg went with him. Maxim 652, but we can say for sure that in 646 St. Maximus was in Rome and was in close contact with Pyrrhus there 653. As for Pyrrhus’s repentance, this is how the historian describes it: “Pyrrhus presented Pope Theodore with a confession of faith, in which he renounced his previous errors. In the Basilica of St. Peter, in the presence of the clergy and people, the pope accepted Pyrrhus into church communion and, recognizing him as the patriarch of the See of Constantinople 654, gave him the episcopal throne near the main altar” 655. In turn, Prefect Gregory, taking advantage of the accusations of heresy by the authorities of Constantinople and supported by the population of Africa, proclaimed himself emperor 656. Gregory's life ended tragically: not having time to extend his claims to the throne beyond Africa, he died in 647 in a battle against the Muslim Arabs who invaded his province 657. During the trial of St. Maximus in 655 accused him of having inspired (referring to a mystical vision) Gregory to revolt in 658, but St. Maxim categorically denied this. The seizure of Africa by Muslim Arabs led to the fact that Palestinian monks, who had previously found shelter in the vicinity of Carthage, moved to Italy. Many of them settled in Rome, which ultimately made possible the active participation of these monks, primarily St. Maximus, in preparation for the Lateran Council of 649. The theological work on the final formulation of the Diophelite teaching, which formed the basis of the decisions of the Lateran Council, is visible in the writings of St. Marinus, directed to Cyprus. Maximus, which date back to 645–646. This is opusc. 1–3, where he continues to substantiate the absence of a gnomic will in Christ in the presence of two natural ones and speaks (in opusc. 2 and 3) about the difference between Orthodox teaching, as he understands it, from the Christological teachings, on the one hand, of Severus of Antioch, on the other, of Nestorius. The most important of these three works, which not coincidentally opens the body of Theological-Polemical Works in the edition of F. Combefis, is opusc. 1. In it St. Maxim gives the final philosophical development of the doctrine of natural will and volitional act, distinguishing between what is associated with natural ability and what is determined by the nature of the existence of our nature in non-deified hypostases. This allows Rev. Maximus should speak clearly both about the presence of a natural human will in Christ, and about why it does not and cannot lead in Him to a contradiction with the Divine will (which the Monothelites feared most of all). We have already addressed some of the ideas in this work, some of them are discussed in detail in the comments, and those that cause the most controversy among modern researchers will be discussed in Chapter 21. For now, let us note that in this work, St. Maxim polemicizes not only with monothelites. He has to explain how the doctrine he formulates relates to his ideas expressed before the start of the controversy with monoenergism and monothelitism 659. Probably, even then, among the hard-line diophelites in the West there were critics who accused him of inconsistency. Perhaps this criticism also came from the Monothelite camp, who used his previous statements to criticize his current ideas. This can also be seen in the Dispute with Pyrrhus, where Pyrrhus recalls St. Maxim (without calling him by name) his teaching about the single energy-will of God and the saints, which extends to Christ. The presence of this inconvenient for St. The maxim of the question in the Disputation serves as indirect evidence that its text quite well reflects the dispute that took place, as well as the fact that Pyrrhus was allowed to ask (without getting personal) 660 difficult theological questions, which St. During this period, Maxim did not avoid, trying to formulate his teaching with all clarity, which, of course, only strengthened his authority. For this authority, however, a new threat soon arose. Pyrrhus, perhaps under the influence of the defeat of the rebellion of Gregory 661 (in this case - in 647), or perhaps for some other reason (in this case, perhaps as early as 646) 662, having visited Ravenna and having secured the patronage of the exarch of Ravenna Plato, publicly renounced the repentance he had brought in Rome for the heresy of monothelitism, citing the fact that it was forced, and returned to his previous confession. Pope Theodore responded by solemnly excommunicating Pyrrhus. Having condemned him “at his council in the Basilica of St. Peter, he went down to the cave church, where the tomb of the apostle was, and, dipping his pen in the cup with the blood of Christ, signed the letter of excommunication" 663. Probably, after this, Pope Theodore wrote his letter to Paul, demanding that he renounce Monothelitism, and having received a refusal, he not only anathematized him (that is, excommunicated him from the Church), but also deposed him 664. These turbulent events did not pass without a trace for St. Maxima. The fact that Pyrrhus, who betrayed the trust of the pope, through the efforts of St. Maxima came to Rome and that St. Maximus communicated with Pyrrhus in Rome, which for some in the West cast a shadow on his reputation. They remembered, in particular, that he once wrote a letter extolling Sergius and Pyrrhus (ep. 19). Be that as it may, after the abdication of Pyrrhus 665 St. Maximus had to give explanations regarding this letter to Pyrrhus and a number of places in his letters to Marin (apparently, we are talking about opusc. 7 and/or 20), where St. Maxim, as it seemed to his accusers, expressed a non-Orthodox teaching, recognizing one and two, that is, three wills in Christ. The answer to this accusation was the message of St. Maximus to the abbots, monks and Orthodox people of Sicily (opusc. 9) 666, in which St. Maxim responded to all charges, calling for peace and unity in the fight against heresy. As for the accusations regarding the letter to Pyrrhus (ep. 19), the overly polite tone of this letter to St. Maxim attributed it to the desire to persuade Pyrrhus to the correct faith. As for the dogmatic content of this letter to Pyrrhus, St. Maxim in opusc. 9 firmly stated that there were no statements in it that were incorrect, and that he did not share the misconceptions of Pyrrhus that were later revealed. Answering regarding the messages to Marin, St. Maxim rejected the accusation that he allegedly taught about one and two more, that is, in total, about three wills and energies in Christ. In opusc. 7 and 20 pr. Maximus actually wrote about two energies and wills, and in addition argued the need to apply unitary expressions to energies (such as “one energy” by St. Anastasius of Antioch) and justified the expression “one will” of Pope Honorius, apparently interpreting it in the spirit of amb. 7: PG 91, 1076C. However, about the three energies and wills of St. Maxim never spoke and confidently dispelled the Sicilians' suspicion on this score. Nevertheless, this is a suspicion on the part of hard-line diophelites, as well as the desire of St. Maxim's desire for unity with Christians in the West in the situation of the unfolding struggle against heresy could only reinforce his decision to adhere to strict diopheliteism and dioenergism and not return to the justification of unitary formulas 667, although this decision, as we said, was made by St. Maximus, probably back in 643, that is, before all the accusations against him. One way or another, Rev. Maximus undoubtedly managed to convince Christians in the West that he shared the same faith with them and had nothing in common with Pyrrhus. Starting from 646 and, apparently, until 651–652. St. Maximus stayed in Rome in 668, living in one of the Greek monasteries and playing an increasingly important role in church-political life under Pope Theodore, and then under St. Pope Martin, and actively participating in the struggle of the Roman throne against the heresy of monothelitism throughout the empire. You can verify this from one of the most extensive works of St. The maxim of this period is opusc. 15, which is a dogmatic and spiritual tomos, written in Rome around 646–647. for Stephen, ep. Dorsky, sent by Pope Theodore as apostolic vicar to Palestine. We will not dwell in detail on this mission, about which quite a lot has been written 669. To understand the context of the creation of this work, Rev. Maxim, it is important to know that Pope Theodore instructed Stephen to conquer Palestine for Orthodoxy, in which, after the death of St. Monothelites prevailed over Sophronius. This was especially true of the episcopate, which dates back to Sergius of Jaffa, who received from the patriarchs. Paul of Constantinople, confirmation of his canonically questionable ordination, of course, with the unconditional recognition of Ekphesis. Essay directed to Rev. Maxim Bishop Stephen, was called upon to prove the heresy of Ekphesis and the teachings professed in it. At the same time, an extensive florilegium was compiled from patristic quotations confirming the teachings of diopheliteism and dioenergism, and from quotations from heretics, illustrating the fact that they professed the doctrine of one will and energy in Christ. The florilegium was subsequently used at the Lateran and Sixth Ecumenical Councils. It is characteristic that St. Maxim no longer turns to the interpretation of the Unitarian formulas of the holy fathers relating to energy and will, but focuses on the proof of their teaching about two energies and wills, that is, he writes from the position of rigid diopheliteism and dioenergism, characteristic of Christians in the West. But let's return to church and political events. In response to his excommunication and deposition by Pope Theodore, Paul of Constantinople composed and persuaded the young Emperor Constans to issue in 647 (no earlier than September) or 648 (no later than August) in his own name an imperial decree - Typos (Sample), abolishing the Ekphesis and ordering its removal from the walls of St. Sofia. In essence, this was the response of Paul and the young emperor to the call of the African Councils addressed to them. In Typos, under the threat of severe penalties, 670 it was forbidden to argue about both two wills and actions in Christ, and about one, although each person was personally allowed to adhere to any of these confessions 671. Paul probably hoped that with such a political decision, yielding to the demand of Pope Theodore and the Western episcopate to abolish the Ekphesis and also establishing a kind of “freedom of religion,” he would be able to end dogmatic disputes and thereby restore the unity of the empire, while maintaining continuity in the ideological course pursued in Byzantium since the time of Emperor Heraclius 672. The decree was sent to Pope Theodore, but he, not having time to respond to it, died 673. From the materials of the trial of St. Maximus 674 knows of an embassy that was sent from the Emperor Constans to Pope Theodore with the command to accept the Typos, probably soon after its publication. The envoy departed with gifts, so it can be assumed that the emperor and patriarch. At this time, Paul had not yet received Rome's refusal to accept Tipos and had hopes for a peaceful resolution to the conflict 675. It is not known whether the pope accepted this embassy, ​​but it is known for sure that the emperor’s envoy Gregory, son of Photin, visited the cell of St. Maxima in Rome and that a conversation took place between them. During this conversation, Rev. Maxim explained to Gregory why it is impossible to accept Typos: the ban on disputes about wills and energies, along with the extinguishing of lies, also extinguishes the truth. In addition, Rev. Maxim rejected the claims of the emperor, of which Gregory showed himself to be the defender, to give any instructions regarding religion 676. Gregory's visit to St. Maxima indicates that in Constantinople they were well aware of the leading role played by St. Maxim in Rome. According to Jankowiak, around this time the arrival in Constantinople of the papal apocrisiary Anastasius, one of the associates of St. Maxim 677, who, being a selfless fighter for Orthodoxy, began to actively campaign against Typos. According to the same researcher, Anastasius’ first exile to Trebizond dates back to this time, where he was soon sent by order of the emperor. Two of his like-minded people and students from influential and wealthy citizens of the capital were also sent into exile - the brothers Theodore and Euprepius, the children of Plutin, the royal supplier of grain supplies 678. Thus began the persecution of the diophelites. Apparently, the ban on serving the liturgy and the destruction of the altar in the church in the palace of Placidia (the residence of the papal apocrisiaries in Constantinople) date back to the same time - a hitherto unheard of thing 679. It is clear that after this, relations between Constantinople and Rome were irreparably damaged. After the death of Pope Theodore, the next pope at the beginning of July 649 was elected - without asking for imperial sanctions (which anyway could not be obtained without recognizing the Typos) - Martin, who was supposed to respond to the Typos. Having installed the pope without the sanction of the emperor in 680, Rome entered a phase of tough opposition to Constantinople, not only dogmatic, but also political. The position of the West in the face of the authorities of Constantinople in this situation should have looked as firm and weighty as possible. St. understood this too. Pope Martin (former apocrisiary of Pope Theodore, who knew firsthand what the authorities of Constantinople were like), and St. Maximus, whose role as the inspirer of the convocation and the most active figure of the Lateran Council is recognized by most scholars 681. 20. Opusc. 11 and the status of the Lateran Council 682 We will not dwell in detail on the well-studied events associated with the Lateran Cathedral, opened by St. by Pope Martin on October 5, 649, and on the Acts of this Council 683. It is necessary, however, to say something that will help us understand the only theological and polemical work that has come down to us from those that were written by St. Maximus after the Lateran Council, in 649 - opusc. 11. Unfortunately, only a small excerpt from the opusc has reached us. 11, but it is also clear from it that the work was written in the wake of the Council in Rome shortly after it. According to Bronwen Neil 684, preparations for the Council began under Pope Theodore, since it was convened in October 649, three months after the election of St. Martin's dad. The council anathematized Ekphesis, Typos and personally Sergius, Cyrus, Theodore of Parano, Pyrrhus, as well as the then Patriarch of Constantinople, Paul. In addition, the Cathedral and St. Pope Martin turned to the young Emperor Constant with an urgent appeal to abolish the Typos and take an Orthodox position. The emperor himself was not convicted. The Council (as later during the trials of St. Maximus) tried to separate the emperor from the heretical hierarchs, placing the main responsibility for the Typos on them. In addition, the Council protested the destruction of the church in the papal residence of the house of Galla Placidia in Constantinople. Many Greek monks took part in the activities of the Council, some of whom were residents of Greek monasteries (some of them were founded by monks from Palestine) in Italy, others ended up in the West, fleeing from Muslim Arabs from Palestine, Africa and Libya. Signature of Rev. The Maxima appears in the Libellus of the Council, as does the signature of two of his companions 685 - Anastasius the Apocrisiary and Anastasius the Monk 686. However, Rev. Maxim, although many researchers call him one of the main inspirers and theological experts of the Council, apparently kept a low profile; at least his name is not among the speakers. Nevertheless, since the main materials of the Council were written in Greek and only then translated into Latin 687, there is no doubt that St. Maxim took an active part in their preparation. Ridinger suggested that the Council was convened, in fact, not for discussion and a comprehensive consideration of the issue of heresy, but in order to confirm the Latin version of the acts already prepared and translated from Greek, written during the pontificate of Pope Theodore (who was himself a Greek). According to Ridinger, these materials were compiled by Rev. Maxim. Be that as it may, at the Council there really was no discussion or discussion expressing different points of view, as was later the case at the VI Ecumenical Council. It is also considered proven that quotations from the fathers confirming the Orthodox point of view, and quotations from condemned heretics, given at the sixth session of the Council, were collected by St. Maximus - they first appeared in his Tomus Spiritualis (opusc. 15) 688. As Neil notes, most likely the extensive florilegium of 123 quotations supporting the Diophelite position, as well as forty-two quotations testifying to the heresy of the Monothelites, was largely (at least in part of the Greek sources) compiled by St. Maxim 689. The Lateran was undoubtedly his creation. The special attitude of St. Maximus to the Council can be seen from the message he wrote shortly after the end of the Council (opusc. 11), where he lists the Lateran Council on a par with the five Ecumenical Councils, while praising the Roman Church: “[All] the limits of the ecumene and [all people], throughout the whole earth sincerely and Orthodoxy professing the Lord, gaze intently, as if at the sun of eternal light, at the most holy Church of the Romans, at her faith and confession, perceiving the radiance of the paternal and holy dogmas exuded by it, according to how sincerely and all-piously the six holy, divinely inspired and revered Councils decreed, and most loudly proclaiming the Creed" 690. In connection with this passage, especially the phrase we have highlighted in italics, an interesting question arises from the field of ecclesiology. Thus, Larcher notes, referring to him, that “Reverend Maximus is considering this Council [i.e. e. Lateran] as the VI Ecumenical Council, equal to those five that established the pillars of the Orthodox faith" 691. We will not touch upon the themes of the primacy of the Roman see and papal infallibility, which also emerge in this letter 692 and which Larchet examines in detail, polemicizing with Catholic scholars who deduce from this letter St. Maximus that he believed in the primacy of Rome in the modern Catholic interpretation. In connection with posing the question of the significance of the Lateran for St. For Maxim, we are not interested in Larche’s disagreement with Catholic scholars, but in what he, judging by the above quote, agreed with them, namely, with their opinion that for St. Maximus Lateran Council was the VI Ecumenical Council. This is what J.-M. writes about this. Garrigues, with whom on the issue of relationship with St. Larche polemicizes Maxim towards the Roman primacy: “The Lateran Council of 649, in the eyes of Maxim, had the same value as the first five Ecumenical Councils. This shows that, in his opinion, in exceptional circumstances, a Council taking place at the ecumenical level... and gathering around the Pope, the custodian of the confession of the Apostle Peter, can, if necessary, have the status of an Ecumenical Council, even if the Eastern Patriarchs refused to take part in it and did not recognize it” 693. Probably for Garriga such a statement with reference to St. Maximus the Confessor has a far-reaching apologetic goal - not only to affirm the theory of Roman primacy, but also to justify the practice of Rome, which developed after the cessation of liturgical communication between it and the sees of the East, to convene “Ecumenical Councils” (without the participation of the Eastern Patriarchs) solely on the initiative of the Pope. We are, however, not interested in the later practice of Rome, but in the fact of the enumeration of St. Maximus of the Lateran Council among the five Ecumenical ones. Context opusc. 11 leaves no doubt that for St. Maximus Lateran Council had the same authority as the five Ecumenical Councils. At first glance, Garrigue’s statement is impeccable, but there is one controversial nuance in it. As we noted above, there was no discussion at the Council; its decisions were prepared in advance; Regarding the premise behind Garrigue’s statement (although not expressed by him) that the Eastern Patriarchs were invited to the Council, the question arises: where is it known about their invitation (Garrigue does not indicate his source)? Only Western bishops (mainly from Italy and the surrounding islands) 694 took part in the Council - with the exception of Stephen of Dor, who was sent to Rome by St. Sophronius of Jerusalem as his personal representative 695, but for a long time no longer had this status. We draw attention to these facts because, if we believe the text of the Disputation, answering four years before the Council to Pyrrhus, who claimed that the Ekphesis was confirmed at a council assembled in Constantinople and claiming that its decisions were binding on all Christians of the empire, St. Maxim objected: “I am surprised that you call a Council something that did not take place according to the laws and conciliar canons or rules, because there was neither a district message with the consent of the patriarchs, nor a specific place or day of the meeting. There was neither accused nor accuser. Those gathered had no accompanying letters - neither the bishops from the metropolitans, nor the metropolitans from the patriarchs. No messages or locums were sent from other patriarchates. So who, who is still in their right mind, will allow calling something that has filled the whole earth with temptations and discord a Council? 696 » 697 Larcher comments on this passage as follows: “Maxim emphasizes here that decisions on questions of doctrine, which were the object of conflicting judgments, were taken by the Councils on the principle of collegiality and that the legitimacy of the Councils depends on the consent given to their holding and to their decisions by the assembly of bishops, metropolitans and patriarchs” 698. If we apply this criterion to the Lateran Council, we will get a contradiction, since it made decisions on a controversial issue, but there was no discussion, as well as the consent of the Monothelit patriarchs to hold the Council. How then does St. Maxim, without contradicting himself, could consider him VI Ecumenical? Or did he apply different criteria to his opponents and to his like-minded people? To answer this question, let us turn to those materials from the “Documents from Exile” 699, which indicate an understanding of St. Maxim of the significance of the Lateran Council, after he was arrested and was on trial or in exile. In a document called the Disputation in Vision 700 and compiled, according to Neil 701, St. Maxim, together with his closest associate Anastasius the disciple or one of the other associates of St. Maximus in 656–657, we find the following episode. When Bishop Theodosius, sent to persuade St. Maximus to enter into communion with the Church of Constantinople, declares that he does not dare to talk about two actions in Christ, since the fathers did not say this, “Abba Maximus immediately took up the book of Acts at the holy Apostolic Council in Rome, [and] showed the fathers clearly speaking about the two wills and actions of our Savior and God Jesus Christ” 702. This is, therefore, what the Council was called among the closest associates of St. Maxima. The naming of the “holy apostolic council”, found in the Disputation in Visia, exactly coincides with how the Lateran Council is called in its own Acts 703, in the preparation of which, as we remember, St. Maxim. According to Jankowiak, calling the cathedral “apostolic” is unique; cathedrals have never been called that before and will never be called that 704. The Council is also called “Holy” and “Apostolic” in the letter from the exile of the disciple of St. Maxim Anastasius-apocrisiary Theodosius of Gangra, where he asks to send him the code of canonical decrees of the Council of 705. The organizers of the Lateran most likely saw the basis for calling the Council “apostolic” in the apostolic origin of the See of Peter, that is, Rome, where the Council was held, that convened the Council. The motive for this naming, obviously, was the desire to give the Cathedral a special, perhaps even unique status. This self-name of the Lateran Council corresponds to the fact that in the eyes of its organizers (including, not least, St. Maximus and his disciples) it had ecumenical authority, although many of the conditions necessary for the council to be Ecumenical, about which St. Maxim spoke in a dispute with Pyrrhus, 706 at the Lateran Council were not observed. These include a rule that was not written, but became part of the church tradition in Byzantium: all Ecumenical Councils were assembled by emperors 707. The Lateran Council not only was not assembled by the emperor, but also anathematized the Tipos published by him! Attitude of Rev. The maxim on the question of the sanction of the emperor as a necessary condition for the ecumenical status of the council is visible from another place in the Disputation in Visium. When Bishop Theodosius responded to the arguments of St. Maxim, who referred to the Lateran Council, objects: “The Roman Council has no power, since it was without a royal order,” St. Maximus responds, citing many examples, that the significance of councils is determined not by the fact that they were convened by emperors, but by whether the right faith was professed at them 708. To this argument, Rev. Maxim, however, adds a reference to the canons that make the convening of the Roman Council legitimate: “As my master knows and teaches others, the canon commanded that councils 709 be held twice a year in each diocese, without making any mention of the royal order for the preservation of our saving faith and the correction of everything that relates to the Divine essence of the Church” 710. As is easy to notice, St. Maximus, in his response to Bishop Theodosius, subsumes the Lateran Council under the concept of a local council (the Roman Church), which, according to the canons, can be convened without imperial sanction. To summarize, we can say that the Lateran Council in the eyes of St. Maximus and his companions had a unique status: it was a holy apostolic council with the authority of the Ecumenical, convened according to the canons of the local 711. This status implied that the significance of this Council was no less than that of previous Ecumenical Councils, i.e., that all its decisions were equally normative for all times and for the entire Christian ecumene. On the other hand, bringing the Lateran Council under the rule of convening local councils, St. Maxim defied attempts by the authorities to declare him illegal. So, Rev. Maximus nowhere directly calls the Lateran Council “ecumenical” - probably due to the absence of such signs of an Ecumenical Council as convening by the emperor and the participation of all bishops of the empire; however, he does not call him St. Maxim, as far as we know, and “local”. Listing Lather on a par with the five Ecumenicals (in the above quotation from opusc. 11), St. Maxim calls them all “saints,” without using the epithet “universal,” but noting only what unites them. The point, perhaps, is not so much that St. Maxim considered the convening of the council by the pope to be no less significant than its convocation by the emperor (whose title had no ecclesiastical significance for St. Maximus) 712, as much as the fact that the Lateran Council was, like each of the Ecumenical Councils, dedicated to the refutation of the new heresy, while the prerogative of the local council in dogmatic matters was limited, from the point of view of the church consciousness of that time, to the defense of definitions already made Ecumenical Councils 713. Rev. came out. Maximus, for these reasons or not, in his eyes the Lateran Council expressed the true faith, and, therefore, its anathemas had the force, like the anathemas of any Ecumenical Council, regardless of territorial boundaries 714. Moreover, the decisions of Lateran in the eyes of St. Maximus had such authority that the Roman Church itself could not abolish them, that is, its violation, in the person of its primate, of the decrees of the Lateran Council - the possibility of which St. Maxim, obviously not believing in the infallibility of Rome, allowed - this would not mean the abolition of the anathemas he proclaimed, but the falling under them of Rome itself (on the same basis on which any other local Church could fall under them) 715. This concludes the review of the historical, ecclesiastical and theological context of the writing of Opusc. and their main themes and theological issues, noting that these writings are interrupted at the beginning of the last period of the struggle of St. Maxim and his associates for the approval of Orthodox teaching, which should be studied from other sources. Information about this period, as well as about the history of the establishment of diopheliteism in the Church at the Sixth Ecumenical Council (680–681), and about the nature and history of reception in the Church of the heritage of St. Maxim, can be gleaned from other studies 716. I would like to avoid the illusion (we hope it did not arise) that the contents of Opusc. St. Maximus is completely understandable and a general opinion has long been established regarding him (at least among those who consider themselves to be part of the Orthodox tradition), to point out only a few problems posed and widely discussed recently in connection with these works by patrolologists and theologians. 21. Instead of a conclusion. Problem field in modern discussions of theological and polemical works Above we have already touched on a number of controversial issues related to the Opusc study. , polemics with the Monothelites and understanding of the teachings of St. Maxima. Let us briefly list the most significant of them. The history of the controversy with monoenergism and monothelitism, the participation of St. Sophronia, etc. Maxim, the dating and sequence of writing theological and polemical works, not to mention the relationship between the official (Greek) and alternative (Syrian) versions of the life of St. Maxim - these are all questions to which there is no final answer. Recently, several new hypotheses have been put forward about the course of the controversy and the participation of St. Maxima 717, which we briefly described above. The lack of a critical edition of the Theological-Polemical Works, certainty regarding the time of writing, authorship and sources of the Dispute with Pyrrhus makes it even more difficult to resolve the listed issues. However, in addition to factual problems, hermeneutic questions related to understanding the heritage of the saint are of no less interest. Maxim and essence of the controversy between diophelites and monothelites. Regarding the second topic, above we have already drawn attention to the recently published and forthcoming work of Richard Price, which makes us think about the prevailing (especially among Orthodox researchers) understanding of the teachings of the monoenergists and monothelites in the Christological disputes of the 7th century. As for the position of the Venerable himself. Maximus, then, bearing in mind his generally recognized authority as the greatest Orthodox theologian and philosopher, who carried out the theological and philosophical “synthesis” of church teaching as it had developed by the 7th century, and who largely determined his future, “a mediator between East and West,” it is not surprising that the study and interpretation of his thoughts, including those expressed in Opusc. , remains an important task for patrol research. The interpretation of the thought of St. plays. Maximus plays a significant role among those modern Christian theologians who develop their thought based on church tradition. As we can see from the example of different approaches to the issue of refusal of prp. Maxim from γνώμη and προαίρεσις in Christ 718, researchers and theologians (including Orthodox) do not have a consensus on this matter. Different approaches to the legacy of St. Maximus also influences contemporary theological debates. Evidence of the latter is the controversy surrounding the understanding of his teachings, which in recent years has unfolded between J.-C. Larche and his supporters on the one hand, and Metropolitan. John (Zizioulas) and his followers - on the other. Thus, at a conference held in October 2012 in Belgrade dedicated to St. Maxim, Zizioulas criticized the understanding of St. Maxime Larcher, responding, in turn, to Larcher’s criticism of the “personalism” of Zizioulas and Yannaras 719. The most significant points of this criticism: 1. Zizioulas’ opposition to hypostasis to nature, which is not found in St. Maxima (p. 243–244); 2. humiliation of nature and actual equating it with necessity (the point of view of Pyrrhus, and not St. Maximus!) and even with sin, which is not the case with St. Maxim, in whom Larcher finds a positive vision of nature - the beginning of the strong-willed and energetic (p. 245); 3. attributing to hypostasis, in contrast to nature, a purely positive meaning, almost identical with grace, which the saint does not have. Maxim, but Russian and French personalist philosophers have it (p. 243); 4. the actual identification of hypostasis with the concept of “way of existence” (τρόπος ὑπάρξεως) by Zizioulas, which far from exhausts the understanding of hypostasis by St. Maximus, for whom τρόπος ὑπάρξεως is the mode of existence of hypostasized nature, and the concept of existence does not refer only to hypostasis, as in Zizioulas, but means nature in its concrete hypostasized existence (p. 248–250); 5. Zizioulas’ understanding of the teachings of St. Maxim about logoi as a personal connection-relationship of the rational hypostasis with the Logos; according to Larsha, in addition to his own logos, which a person must correspond to, the logos that makes him a special and unique individual, there are many general logos - generic and natural, characterizing his being, and among St. Maximus, unlike Zizioulas, their relationship is balanced, the divine logoi themselves belong to the entire Divinity, and not just to the Logos (p. 246–247); 6. in Christology, the attribution of “renewal” (or “new dispensation”) to the so-called “mode of existence of the hypostasis,” as Zizioulas does, and not to the renewal of the mode of existence of natures (τρόπος ὑπάρξεως) in Christ and the deified (p. 250–255); 7. the attribution of freedom and will to hypostasis and the opposition of hypostasis as the beginning of freedom, the beginning of the spiritual - to nature as the beginning of necessity, deprived of freedom, which is not the case with St. Maxima (p. 258–259); 8. separation and opposition in Zizioulas and Yannaras of the concepts of hypostasis, person and individual, which in St. Maximus and other fathers, according to Larche, are used identically and are applied not only to rational creatures, but to everyone in general (pp. 260–262); 9. definition by personalist theologians of “person” as a being in relation to others, in communication; Larcher sees in this concept among the fathers an emphasis on independent, individual and special existence; the uniqueness and indispensability of man is determined not by his relations with others, but by his unique logos in the thought and will of God (p. 262–265); 10. the personalist assertion that it is hypostasis (and not nature with its abilities and energies) that makes community and communication possible (p. 266–267); 11. the contrast between the individual, characterized by his biological, psychological and social characteristics, and hypostasis, which is absent among the fathers (p. 267–268); 12. the idea of ​​“personality” as an ideal, the achievement of which should be strived for, leaving the state of “individual” (p. 268); 13. the doctrine that it is such a “person” who has freedom; according to Larsha, referring to St. Maxima (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 304C; 308A–312A), true freedom is associated with a will related to nature, and not to hypostasis, characterized in the undeified state by fluctuations of intention and will (p. 269–270); 14. the idea that love (like freedom) is something belonging to hypostasis; in fact, hypostasis can only reveal or not reveal the capacity invested in nature (p. 270); 15. false idea of ​​the struggle between personality and nature; one cannot speak separately about the ontology of personality without talking about the nature of this personality (p. 271–272); 16. the personalists’ idea of ​​the individual as something negative, low, which fathers do not have; in fact, this concept is applied by the Fathers even to the Persons of the Trinity (pp. 272–274); 17. an incorrect perspective on all the key concepts of the fathers - hypostasis, essence, individual, nature, which are different (in some cases, the concepts of individual and person are also different), but are not opposed to each other as if one is higher or lower than the other (p. 274–275). In general, Larcher considers the attempt to project the problematics of modern philosophy, in particular the philosophy of existentialism, especially Heidegger, onto patristic discourse to be unsuccessful and unjustified (p. 275). However, modern philosophy contains questions that modern man asks, and no matter how unsuccessful the attempt of Zizioulas and Yannaras was, this does not negate the need to give answers to these questions or show what is wrong with them; Unfortunately, Larcher does not set such a goal. The most significant criticism in the context of our publication is Larcher’s, directed against the teaching of personalist theologians about deification. In this criticism, he repeats the main points of his criticism of the doctrine of deification as the “adoption” of Catholic researchers St. Maxim (school of J.-M. Le Guillou). Larcher criticizes Zizioulas for identifying the concepts of adoption and deification and for understanding deification not through communion with divine energies, but through direct assimilation of the mode of existence of the Son of God in His relation to the Father in addition to the communion of Divine energies in the Body of Christ. In polemics with this teaching, Larcher refers to his understanding of adoption and deification in the teaching of St. Maximus (p. 376–381). Thus, interpreting Mystagogy (myst. 24: PG 91, 709C), Larche argues that adoption (not only to God the Father, but also to God the Son and the Holy Spirit) 720 is a condition of deification, and not identical to it. Moreover, both of them, although each in their own way, imply a new one. life by grace not only of the hypostasis, but also of nature 721. This controversy continues, and Larcher, as he told us, is going to soon publish his response to the provisions of Zizioulas’s report in Belgrade, in which the latter largely agreed in his understanding of the Christology of St. Maxim and his teachings about nature and hypostasis with a number of famous Catholic scientists and theologians of the second half of the 20th century. 722, primarily with J.-M. Garrigues, contrasting their interpretations with Larcher's understanding 723. We cannot dwell here on all the details of this dispute, 724 since it has not yet ended, and we do not have all the materials necessary for its analysis. Interpretation of the legacy of St. Maxim and, not least, his Theological and Polemical Works stands at the center of the understanding of the relationship between nature and hypostasis, natural will and the contribution of hypostasis to the act of volition, which are the subject of dispute between Larcher and Zizioulas, and before that were the subject of polemics between Larche and Catholic theologians, with whose position Zizioulas now generally agrees 725 . No less interesting are the questions of interpretation of the philosophical aspect of the teachings of St. Maxim, expressed in Theological and Polemical Writings. We are talking primarily about his doctrine of natural will and volitional act, expressed in opusc. 1 and in the Disputation with Pyrrhus. After works that revealed the originality of the teachings of St. Maxim, his contribution to the history of philosophy and roots in ancient philosophy 726, there were considerations of the famous historian of philosophy, specialist in ethical teachings Richard Sorabji, in which the originality of the thought of St. The maxim is disputed 727, and the palm in the doctrine of the will is given to the blessed one. Augustine. Sorabji, however, recognizes the influence of the teachings of St. Maxim on the will and the volitional act on medieval scholasticism, while expressing the opinion of its strong dependence on the Stoics 728. However, David Bradshaw, in his recent talk at a conference on St. Maxim in Belgrade convincingly criticized Sorabji's opinion on the influence on St. Maxim of the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις. At the same time, Bradshaw expressed in his report several new ideas on the interpretation of the teachings of St. Maxim about will and volitional act. We cannot dwell on them in detail, we will only note that Bradshaw’s proposal to consider the natural human will of St. Maxima as an ability (δύναμις) in relation to natural energy, which Bradshaw himself recognizes, in St. Maxim does not find literal confirmation. In the future, it will be necessary to evaluate the extent to which this and other ideas for interpreting the teachings of St. Bradshaw's maxims about the act of will are correct. One of them, especially essential for understanding Opusc. , - about the possibility of applying προαίρεσις to the human nature of Christ, - was examined in sufficient detail by us 729. The teaching of St. The maxim about natural will and volition continues to be the focus of attention of patrolologists and historians of philosophy. In this context, I would like to draw attention to several points that until now, it seems, have not come to the attention of researchers. As for the origins of the teachings of St. Maxim on the will and the volitional act, then, as noted above, here, in addition to the parallel passages in Aristotle and Nemesius, which are well known to researchers (we note them in the comments to opusc. 1), the distinction made by Origen (undoubtedly known to St. Maximus) between the will as a common ability for all people and one or another of its uses, which depends on us 730, is important. In the context of discussing the topic of refusal of Rev. The maxim from the application of γνώμη and προαίρεσις to Christ seems significant to us; parallels in Neoplatonic thought (in Iamblichus, Proclus and Philoponus), where, in the development of Aristotle’s teaching on the difference between βούλησις and προαίρεσις, they began to assert the absence of προαίρεσις among gods and souls similar to gods 731. It is difficult to say whether there was a direct influence of Neoplatonic thought on the new in comparison with the earlier works of St. Maxim 732 describes the state of deification of our nature in Christ and among the saints, but a certain parallelism with the terminology of the Neoplatonists is undoubtedly observed. In the future, it will be necessary to understand more deeply whether it is possible to talk not only about parallelism in terminology, but also about the similarity of ideas (at first glance, it exists). If we talk about the description of the act of will in St. Maxima in opusc. 1, then here I would like to emphasize one previously unnoted detail, which allows us to better understand the peculiarity of his thought, its methodology. In the most complete description of all stages of the act of will, St. Maxim identifies twelve “elements”, starting with the initial possession of rational nature and its will and ending with the repose of the movement directed towards the object in its use: 1) nature possessing the ability of rational aspiration (φύσις); 2) volition = desire (θέλησις = ὄρεξις); 3) thoughts (λογισμός); 4) wanting (βούλησις); 5) search (ζήτησις); 6) provision (σκέψις); 7) estimate (βουλή); 8) decision (κρίσις); 9) deliberate choice (προαίρεσις); 10) motivation (ὁρμή); 11) use (χρῆσις); 12) repose (ἀνάπαυσις) 733. Since the Venerable himself. Maxim, and even more so in the authors on whom he depends, in particular in Aristotle and Nemesius, there are other descriptions of the stages of a volitional act; this, one might say, the resulting and most complete way of describing it seems not at all accidental, that is, prp. It was no accident that Maxim divided the act of will into exactly twelve parts. Analysis of arithmology, that is, the symbolic interpretation of numbers. Maxima, based on his other works, shows that the number 12 plays a special role in it, characterizing the material world, our everyday perception of it and being in it 734. From relevant passages from the ascetic-exegetical works of St. The maxim, where the interpretation of the number 12 is given, is clear: in them this number not only correlates with our world, but they also say that the ultimate task of the ascetic is to go beyond the limits of nature and time, the basic parameters of “this world.” In turn, this formulation of the question can be correlated with the Christological teaching of St. Maxim, according to which volition in Christ (Who, of course, was not limited to ordinary, after the Fall, human existence) was not described by the scheme of our volitional act, consisting of 12 “steps”, the same act that, according to St. Maxim, corresponds to our limitation to the world in its created, spatio-temporal and sensory-species reality. Another feature of this description of the stages of a volitional act is that they are connected with each other in a kind of continuous sequence, in which each link seems to come from the previous one and forms the basis of the next one. The entire volitional act appears in the form of a movement, starting from the initial “rest” or potential state of human nature, which has will, then there is a transition to volition-aspiration, which determines the object of desire, and ends with peace in relation to the achieved goal. That the starting point of the movement is the “nature” possessing will (of course, belonging to one or another hypostasis), can be seen from the following sentence, where, speaking about the act of volition in reverse order, St. Maxim comes precisely to nature: “and no one strives meaningfully without being intelligent (that is, endowed with thought) by nature” 735. These observations suggest a deep internal connection between the early ascetic and contemplative writings of St. Maximus and his later Christological writings, written in the context of polemics with the Monothelites. The internal connection between the early and late works of St. Maxima, it seems to us, has not yet been sufficiently studied, and many unexpected discoveries await researchers here. This especially applies to the teaching of St. Maxim about deification, which is the “core” and cross-cutting theme of his entire teaching - ascetic, contemplative, mystical and dogmatic. One of the most interesting topics that can connect the early theological and philosophical works of St. Maxim and his theological and dogmatic writings are the theme of the relationship between the providence of God, understood as a type of Divine will, and the will of man. In theological and polemical works the theme of providence is not directly present. It is discussed in detail in the Difficulties to John and Questions and Answers to Thalassius, but the Dispute in Visia, which conveys the conversation of St. Maxima with Bishop Theodosius in exile during the period of polemics with Monothelitism, so that until the end of his life it remains for St. Maxima is relevant. Since providence is the will of God, the deification of the saints, their surrender of their will to the will of God, is directly related to the fulfillment of God’s providence in them. On the deep internal connection between the teachings of St. Maximus on the providence of God and deification, on the one hand, and his doctrine of the will, revealed in polemics with the Monothelites, on the other, was recently pointed out by several authors, 736 although it has not yet been developed in detail. In our introductory article, as well as in the comments to Opusc. , we did not delve into this topic, but we address it in more detail in another study 737 . Adjacent to it is the well-known topic of human freedom and its relationship with the will of God, which is not considered here, but is widely discussed in the context of the theological and polemical works and other works of St. Maxima 738. Finally, I would like to touch on one more topic related to the teaching of St. Maxim: about the absence of γνώμη and προαίρεσις among the saints. In Chapter 17 we already mentioned the question that may arise in this regard. In fact, the teaching of St. The maxim about the absence of gnomic will in the state of deification, despite the fact that the gnomic will characterizes the hypostasis in him, raises the question whether such an absence is not the erasure of a certain characteristic feature of the hypostasis so that salvation turns out to be the destruction of its most important moral aspect, in which it is no longer the “personality” that is saved (we will use this word here in the “quasi-personalistic” sense), but only another, albeit one that has its own physical (perhaps mental) characteristics of a representative of nature (individual)? Moreover, is not the abolition of the gnomic will in deification the erasure of the distinction between the human person and God? After the totalitarianism experienced in the twentieth century by peoples, many of whom were historically Orthodox, this question does not seem superfluous. In fact, St. Maxim, there are statements that can be fully understood in the spirit that the Church strives for the abolition of moral differences between people, for that unanimity and likeness that (albeit with a different idea of ​​the Good) is characteristic of a totalitarian society 739. It is no coincidence that V.V. Petrov, in his interpretation of the teachings of St. Maxim, in particular his concept of the “tropos of existence,” writes: “the tropos of existence can be discussed not only in the aspect of ontology, but also in the aspect of soteriology (earthly life is characterized by a plurality of tropos, for the life of the future century - the unity of the tropos), ethics, etc.” 740. At the same time, Petrov also refers to other fathers and teachers of the Church, who spoke of “uniformity” or “uniformity” (monotropy) of life as the ultimate goal of church paideia, finally achieved in the life of the next century 741. As if in contrast to this interpretation of the legacy of St. Maxim, some modern apologists of the Orthodox tradition (especially those living in the West) are trying to give him and the Orthodox teaching in general a different, “personalistic” interpretation. Yes, Archimandrite. John Panteleimon (Manoussakis) at a conference in Belgrade, in development of the ideas of Zizioulas 742, proposed his interpretation of the eschatological teaching of St. The maxim according to which the preservation of the uniqueness of the human personality is ensured by the fact that the gnomic will is somehow preserved in the eschaton 743. Manoussakis polemically sharpens his thesis: “one can easily predict what point of view [the researcher] will take in relation to the gnomic will: if the distinction between created/uncreated [from his point of view] is abolished for the sake of a kind of eschatological panentheism (cf. 1 Cor. 15:28), then γνώμη and personality (person) are obstacles in this process of deification, and they must also be overcome. If, on the other hand, this difference remains in some way, then it is impossible to do without γνώμη" 744. As an argument for the preservation of the γνώμη, even the gnomic will, among those saved in the eschaton, Manoussakis refers to one of the passages from the opusc. 1 prp. Maxim, which is precisely dedicated to showing that the difference between the deified and God, on the one hand, and between the deified themselves, on the other, remains. Prefacing the quotation from St. Maximus, Manoussakis states: “In it he says quite clearly that the gnomic will will survive, for he emphasizes that in the Kingdom of God there will be no identity of the Divine will with the will of the saints, nor the will of the saints with each other, but only agreement (convergence) (σύμβασις) in what they will desire.” The following is a quote: “If, in relation to the method (tropos) characterizing movement, the will is not the same for all people, then in no case will the will of God and those being saved be the same in everything, as it seemed to some, even if the object of will of God and the saints is the same - the salvation of those being saved, which is initially the divine goal. It [salvation] is, after all, the final goal, conceived before all ages, in relation to which there will be a coincidence 745 (σύμβασις) in the will of those being saved with each other and of God saving them... After all, if the will of God is salvific by nature, and the will of man is saved by nature, the one who saves by nature and the one saved by nature can never be the same, although both have the same goal - the salvation of everything, by God proposed, but chosen by the saints" 746. From this quote it is indeed clear that, according to St. Maximus, each of the saints has his own special way or tropos that characterizes his movement in God. Therefore, in the words of V.V. Petrov, that the life of the future century is characterized by “unity of tropos,” as well as in his understanding of the words of the fathers and teachers of the Church about “monotropy” (“uniformity” and “uniformity”) in the eschaton is required, if we talk about the teaching expressed in the later writings of St. Maxim, at least make significant clarifications. What kind of tropos can we talk about as one for all? We will address this issue below. Returning to Manoussakis’s thesis, it should be said that from the above quote it is also clear that, although St. Maxim distinguishes between the will of God and those being saved, but regarding the presence of each of those being saved in the state of deification, nothing is said in this passage, much less “absolutely clear.” Moreover, Manoussakis did not bother to explain how to reconcile his statement about the presence of a gnomic will among the saints in the Kingdom of God with the explicit statement of St. Maximus about the lack of deliberate choice among the saints; since there “there is no longer any ambiguity in what exists, then only the desire of the mind will act... inexpressibly achieving the only thing that is available to initiates, the enjoyment of what is the object of desire by nature” 747. If we now ask the question of what, in fact, Manoussakis means when he speaks of the preservation of gnomic wills among people in the Kingdom of God, is it really possible that, contrary to what St. Maxim, believes that for the saints there is a possible process of choice with the characteristic hesitations and doubts that happen with ignorance, then one can note with relief that after all, Manoussakis does not have anything like that in mind. At the end of his talk, he describes by means of a comparison what he understands to be the preservation of personal characteristics: “Even if at the end of time we all say the same thing, namely, “Thy will be done,” as we now all say, “Amen!” in the liturgical prefiguration of the eschaton, this unison does not abolish difference, for “the way we speak belongs to the hypostasis,” 748 so that we are allowed to pronounce our prayers and our “Amen” not only in our languages ​​and with our peculiarities, but also with our distinct accents.” 749 Leaving Manoussakis on his conscience to assert that in the Kingdom of God, service to the ineffable God will be performed in some “our” (apparently different) “languages,” we note that in general he is only talking about the preservation of individual characteristics, including what could be called an individual “style” or “character,” but not about gnomic differences in relation to the fulfillment of the will of God, characteristic of the world after the fall, when “one [man] in a greater degree follows what is [inherent] by nature, and the other does not follow it” (opusc. 10: PG 91, 137B). Let us note that Rev. Maxim, when he talks about the difference between people, which is preserved in the Kingdom of God, puts the emphasis (to use this expression of Manoussakis) not at all on the preservation of an individual style of behavior, speaking or disposition, but on something completely different - on the measure and nature of the saints’ love for God, which is different for each of them. It is in accordance with them that they move in God, it is with them that a special tropos is determined, which each saint has his own: “each [of the saints] will partake [of the Divine] so much beyond the natural measure as he has gone out of desire (ἐπόθησε) ... If, insofar as someone has gone out of desire, he will partake of what he desires to such an extent [this is the point of difference], then in relation to the logos of nature everyone’s will will turn out to be the same [this is the moment identity], and in relation to the tropos of movement – different” 750. McFarland in this context expresses the following consideration: “The deified will cannot sin, since it is established in God; but since the Divine being is infinitely rich and the divine will is unique for each rational being, then what exactly obedience to God’s will means will be different for each person - and the discovery of what it means ... in deification is not so much completed as made possible” 751. So, there is no reason to abandon the teachings of St. Maximus about the deactivation of the gnomic will and προαίρεσις (in the sense in which they are understood in the later works of St. Maximus) in the eschaton, which corresponds to the state of deification. But if we talk about the human will as a whole (that is, not only about the gnomic will), then the condition for deification is the surrender of the will to God by man, about which St. Maxim wrote already in his early works 752. All saints surrender their human will to God; in the state of deification, they are free from choice not only between the sinful and non-sinful (natural) human will, but also between the will that is natural for human nature after the Fall (for example, the desire not to die) and the will of God, completely driven by the latter. Thus, the very possibility of choice (in any of its variants) turns out to be deactivated in a state of deification. In him there is no longer a gnomic will and προαίρεσις, that is, “choosing” (in this respect, all saints are the same, the tropos of the existence of nature in their hypostases is the same - filial 753), but the fulfillment of God's will for each of them already occurs in this life in its own way, and this personal feature, according to St. Maximus, does not disappear in the eschaton, as can be seen from the passage quoted from opusc. 1: PG 91, 21D. Order is also essential here - the surrender of one’s will to God (common to all saints) precedes the acquisition of that tropos that characterizes the movement of a given hypostasis in God. Man does not choose his own way of existence in God (as Zizioulas speaks about it) 754, but cedes his autocracy to God out of love for Him, in turn acquiring, to the extent of this love, that unique image-tropos in which God’s will is fulfilled in him 755. Thus, if in such early works as Mystagogy, St. Maxim emphasized first of all the moment of overcoming in the Church gnomic sinful divisions 756 that arise during the “self-loving” and “tyrannical” captivity 757 of a person by his hypostatic characteristics 758; then, as a result of polemics with the Monothelites, he formulated the doctrine of deification in such a way that, along with the statement about the surrender of autocracy to God by all the saints, to recognize them (with the deactivation of the gnomic will) personal tropos (or way) in which deification or movement in God is carried out in each of them. So, to imagine the Kingdom of God or the Church as a totalitarian society, where everyone is “monotropic” and has the same way of existence, based on the teachings of St. Maxim is absolutely impossible. The different troposes of the life of the saints in God, however, are provided not by their different gnomic wills, which supposedly persist in the eschaton, as Manoussakis asserts, 759, and not by the gnomic choice made by man of his way of existence in God, as Zizioulas apparently believes, 760, but by the will of God, fulfilled in each of the saints in a unique way. The introductory article uses the results of my work on the project “Palestinian Orthodox philosophical and theological tradition of the 6th–9th centuries,” carried out with the support of the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Foundation. Project No. 11–63–00001a/P. In addition, in this edition we included three passages first published by S. L. Epifanovich (Epifanovich 1917, 62–63, no. XVII), which in the manuscript tradition are adjacent to the opusc. 3 (Sherwood 1952, pp. 53–54, no. 83–85; Larchet 1998, pp. 16–17). Epifanovich expressed the opinion that the author of these passages was St. John of Damascus, and indicated the corresponding places in Damascus (Epifanovich 1917, p. VIII), but Sherwood admits that Damascus depends on St. Maxima. Winckelmann also includes these passages among the works of St. Maximus, indicating, however, parallel passages in Damascus (Winkelmann 2001, p. 116, no. 95). They represent a small part of the works of St. Maxim, directed against the Monophysites, the most extensive of which were included in the collection of his letters, primarily epp. 12, 13 and 15 (see Russian translation: Maxim Confessor 2007b). Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 206–209. See Maximus the Confessor 2004. Sometimes the Disputation with Pyrrhus is called Theological-Polemical Work 28 (opusc. 28), in the Patrology of Min it comes immediately after opusc. 27, the last of Opusc. Let us note that from time to time in this study we will refer to the words of St. Maximus or Pyrrhus in the Dispute with Pyrrhus, not always stipulating that the text of this dispute is not a verbatim protocol and that the authorship of the edition that has come down to us may not belong to the Venerable. Maximus, although formally the Disputation is listed among his works (opusc. 28), unlike, for example, the Disputation in Visia. This should be kept in mind when turning to this work, about which we can only say with confidence that it reflects a rather late view of the diophelites on the history and essence of the controversy and bears the stamp of the most acute phase of the controversy with the monothelites. The probable time of appearance of the final edition of the Dispute is 656–657, after the first trials against St. Maxima (Noret 1999). See the latest edition: Maxim the Confessor 2012 and earlier in: Maxim the Confessor 2007a. Currently, plans are underway to translate these works into a critical edition. In the appendix we provide a brief overview of the history of translations of works and studies about St. Maxim in Russia and in Russia over the last millennium. At the Catholic University of Louvain, on a critical edition of theological and polemical works and the Letters of St. Maxim is working with Dr. Basile Markesinis. For a bibliography on the history of translations and the study of theological-polemical works, see Knežević 2012, p. 110–115. In working on this edition, we took into account the French translation by E. Ponsois (Maxime Confesseur 1998), but this edition, although equipped with a substantive introductory article by J.-C. Larcher, is of a popular nature, and Ponsois's translation is not very accurate. We also turned to the English translation of several theological-polemical works (Louth 1996, where opusc. 3 and 7 are translated and commented), and in a number of cases to the modern Greek translation of Sakalis (Μαξίμου τοῦ Ὁμολογητοῦ 1995) and Italian translation by B. Angelis (Massimo Confessore 2007) (this edition, in which there are almost no comments, can, like the French, be considered popular). The Italian translation differs in that the works of St. The maxims in it are not arranged in the same order as in the Patrology of Min, but in accordance with the approximate chronology proposed by P. Sherwood. Angelis, however, did not always take into account the amendments to this chronology proposed by Larcher, Batrellos and others. Unlike Angelis, we considered an attempt to position Opusc. in chronological order, premature, creating the illusion of knowledge where there is none. This can be done no earlier than the critical edition is published. In this article we will use the research written together with A. M. Shufrin: G. I. Benevich, A. M. Shufrin. “The Case of Maxim” in: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 13–154, significantly supplementing and reworking it. We have noted the most important corrections in the notes. We have tried to take into account the works of recent years, of which we would like to highlight the articles by Ian A. McFarland on the Diophelite teaching of St. Maxim (McFarland 2005; McFarland 2007), research by archim. Kirill (Govorun) (Hovorun 2008) and Pauline Allen (Allen 2009), to whom we will refer repeatedly. An important milestone in understanding the history and content of the Christological polemics of the 7th century. in Russian patrolology there were chapters devoted to this topic in the monograph by V. M. Lurie (Lurie 2006), which we partially took into account in the work of 2007. In this introductory article and comments to the translation of theological and polemical works, we take this research more fully into account and enter into a dialogue with it on a number of significant points. Recent studies include Marek Jankowiak's dissertation: Jankowiak 2009 and Philip Booth's forthcoming monograph: Booth 2013. Both authors (whose ideas are very similar) kindly shared their work with us, and we had the opportunity to discuss it with them in correspondence. The hypotheses put forward in these works, which, in relation to the issues of interest to us, are characterized by reliance on the Syrian Psogos in terms of the presentation of the course of events (both authors call it, in our opinion incorrectly, the Syrian Life), are very original and controversial on a number of points related to the polemics around monoenergism and monothelitism. Many of them require further verification, but these young scientists managed to gain some recognition in scientific circles, including from such specialists as P. Allen and B. Neil, who invited them to write an article on the progress of the controversy in Allen and Neil's Oxford Guide to the Rev. Maximus the Confessor: The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor. At the same time, Bronwen Neil was still a supporter of the Constantinople origin of St. Maxima, and Psogos considered it useful only as a source of information on the period 630–640. (Neil 2001). It is also worth mentioning recent works written by the English Catholic patrolologist Richard Price (one of them was published - Price 2010, the other - the preface to the English edition of the Acts of the Lateran Council - is being prepared for publication, the author kindly introduced us to its theoretical part), in which the maximum tribute is paid to the monothelitist position and a number of questions are posed in a new way about the essence of the polemic with monoenergism and monothelitism. In addition to the listed works, we partially took into account the materials of the recently held conference on St. Petersburg in Belgrade. Maxim: International Symposium on Saint Maximus the Confessor (Belgrade, October 18–21, 2012). The reports given at this conference are available on the Internet, starting with the recording: http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=Vgyei-Jz0h4. The conference proceedings (including some unread papers) were recently published through the efforts of the Faculty of Orthodox Theology of the University of Belgrade and Sebastian Press (see Maximus Confessor. Proceedings of the Symposium 2013). opusc. 1: PG 91, 22A8–10, trans. A. M. Shufrina. amb. 7: “...So that there is one, even only one in all [relations] action of God and those worthy of God, or rather, God alone, as [coming] in a manner befitting the Good, wholly in interpenetration with the worthy as wholes” (PG 91, 1076C10–13; hereinafter all quotations from amb. 7 are translated by A. M. Shufrin). The difficulties with Thomas and John were considered by the publishers of the works of St. Maxim in the 17th century. Thomas Gale and François Combefis as two different compositions, addressed to different recipients and written at different periods of the life of St. Maxima. However, Franz Ohler, who published the Difficulties in 1857 in Halle (using a different manuscript than Geil), believed that these two works were two parts of one large work. After the republication of Ohler's work by Abbot Min in PG 91, the title Ambiguorum liber became common for the combined work of the Difficulties on Thomas and the Difficulties on John (see Janssens 2003, p. 286). Janssens 2003, p. 284–285. "For the sake of completeness" (Ibid, p. 284). Here is his formulation: “It can be assumed with reasonable confidence that Maximus placed Ambigua ad Thomam before the more extensive Ambigua ad Iohannem, since they posit with dogmatic precision the lex credendi [the law of faith. - G.B.], the original historical form of which was expressed in the theopaschite shibboleth - Unus ex Trinitate passus est [One of the Trinity suffered. - G.B.]. Here is the hallmark of all theology” (Ibid). Read more about this conflict in the relationship of St. For Maxima with rigid diophelites, see Bathrellos 2004, p. 198–199. See disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 292B. PG 3, 1072B–C. We abandoned the usual translation of the Areopagite expression θεανδρική ἐνέργεια “God-manly action” in order to shift attention in its perception from the word “husband” in the sense of “spouse” (in the original it is not meant, but in modern Russian “-husband” in the main sense this is precisely what it implies) to the meaning “emphasizing the very definite manhood of Christ." This is exactly how V. M. Lurie characterized this expression when he wrote about its origin (Lurie 2002, p. 303), adding: “this declared the perfection of the humanity perceived by Him [Christ] - which, as is known, presupposes the certainty of gender.” Lurie uses the expression: “God-married action” (Ibid., p. 304), but it seems to us that it does not sufficiently remove attention from the connotation of “marriage” and does not bring it to the desired meaning. For an additional argument in favor of the chosen translation option, see note. 329. It should, of course, be borne in mind that in Opusc. St. Maxim solves different problems than the Areopagite who introduced this expression solved. For Rev. The maxim “masculine” is, first of all, natural human, as can be seen, for example, from the following passage: “After all, by combining parts of the word, he clearly proclaimed [two energies]: Divine and masculine (ἀνδρικήν), that is, human (ἀνθρωπίνην)” (opusc. 7: PG 91, 85A). But even from this phrase it is clear that if we translated ἀνδρική as “human,” it would be impossible to reflect the work with terms (and their meanings) that St. Maxim. As we will show, this understanding follows from the context of amb. 7, so prp. Maxim does not “rewrite the past”, embedding it in an unusual context, but simply eliminates those prerequisites for the misinterpretation of his previous thoughts, because of which they turned out to be tempting for the brothers who accused him of inconsistency. Lurie 2006, p. 309. Philip Booth does not go so far and criticizes as spurious some of the evidence in favor of monoenergism and monothelitism among the Chalcedonites, to which, in support of his thesis, Lurie refers, based on the publication of S. Broca. The same author (F. Booth) draws attention to Battrellos’ polemic with Utman (who substantiates the Chalcedonian origins of monothelitism and monoenergism). Indeed, Battrellos cites passages from the Leontief Corpus that could be considered dioenergist, however, as Booth notes, none of these passages are explicitly dioenergist. The researcher himself is inclined to believe that “The official promotion of one action under Heraclius represents not so much an innovation as a crystallization of the theological discussions that had previously existed in the Chalcedonian Church for at least a century” (Booth 2013, p. 148). In other words, unlike Lurie, he does not believe that monoenergism as a form of expression of teaching was dominant among the Chalcedonites, and unlike Batrellos, he does not believe that dioenergism was such and that monoenergism was characteristic mainly of the Monophysites. The truth is in the middle: the Chalcedonites had monoenergist and dioenergist tendencies, but the inclination to one side - monoenergism - was already a political matter, inspired by Heraclius and Sergius for the sake of union goals. This view seems to be the most balanced. It should be noted that the saints themselves. Sophronius and Maximus never refer to Leontius of Jerusalem in their polemics against monoenergism, and quotations from him are not found in any of the known dioenergist florilegies. Of the Palestinian theologians, St. Sophronius seems to refer only to St. John of Scythopolis. Post this in: Photius, bibliot. cod. 231 (ed. Henry) 3.66. On the relation of the latter's theology to the teachings of St. We'll stop at Sophrony and Maxim later. By “unitarian” we will mean expressions that speak in one form or another of one or one act or will in Christ. Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 264, approx. 90. Battrellos argues that Rev. Maximus doubted its authenticity (Bathrellos 2004, p. 90, n. 171), but these arguments are either not convincing enough or follow from a misunderstanding of the text. For example, he refers to the fact that in the Disputation in Vision, St. Maxim says that the “book” was written after the Fifth Ecumenical Council, while Mina died before it, i.e. it turns out that St. Maxim hints that Mina is not its author. However, the text of the Disputation in Visia (PG 90, 148B) does not say which council is being talked about, the context is that we are talking about the Council of Chalcedon: “You do not accept, but reject all the teachers who were after the holy council of Chalcedon, who fought against the abominable heresy of Sevirus. And how can I accept the book of Mina, which appeared after the council, in which he clearly defends Sevirus, and Apollinaris, and Macedon, and Arius, and all kinds of heresy, and accuses the council with his dogmas, or rather, completely rejects it? (translated by M.D. Muretov according to: Maximus Confessor 2007a, p. 182; translated by Allen and Neil: “the book of Mina, who lived after the council” (Maximus Confessor 2002, p. 91)). It is clear that we are talking about the Council of Chalcedon, doubts about the authenticity of the book of St. Menas. Maximus does not express it here, but rejects it essentially as contradicting Chalcedon. Among the Monophysites, by this time it was accepted almost everywhere (Hovorun 2008, p. 51). disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 333A (in the translation of D. E. Afinogenov, “him” is explained as “Arsana” (Maximus the Confessor 2004, p. 209), however, in the commentary to this place from the Dispute, other interpretations of this episode are given: Stratos believes that St. John was going to excommunicate Arsana, who was not a Monophysite, but a Chalcedonian bishop subordinate to John, as if the latter was angry with Arsan for corresponding with Sergius over his head (this version is not confirmed by the text of the Dispute, which not only says that he was a Monophysite, but also that the excommunication was prevented by the Persian invasion - it does not take much time to excommunicate your bishop), Diten adheres to the version that we find in Bolotov and Govorun, that we are talking about Patr. Sergius (Maxim the Confessor 2004, p. 280, note 111)). Doubts may be raised by the absence of this episode in the life of St. John, compiled by Leonty, bishop. Naples at the request of Archbishop. Arcadius I of Cyprus in 641–642, but the lack of mention of him during the period when the Venerable himself. Maxim justified in a letter to Marin in Cyprus (see opusc. 20) not only dioenergist, but also unitary formulas, which can be easily explained, not to mention the fact that the author of the life and his customer might simply not want to touch on sensitive topics. Another reason for his absence may be that Leontius wrote the life of St. John based on the first version written by St. Sophronius, who compiled it together with St. John Moschus (Allen 2009, p. 18) during the lifetime of Patr. Sergius and being in liturgical communion with him, so it was simply inconvenient to mention this episode. However, we should not forget that the story about St. John the Merciful comes from dioenergist sources, and the reliability of it or some of its details may be questionable, especially bearing in mind that the Disputation with Pyrrhus in its last edition, according to Noret, was written after 655, much later than it took place (645), and more than 20 years after the conclusion of the Union by Cyrus (Noret 1999). The described events of correspondence with Arsan may date back to 617, so one can only guess how reliably they were conveyed after so many years. Yankowiak expresses the opinion that although the details of the correspondence of Patr. Sergius with the Monophysite bishop Arsan, especially the description of St.'s reaction to her. John the Merciful, may deviate from historical reality towards rhetorical exaggeration (this refers primarily to the detail that St. John wanted to overthrow Sergius for this), but the very fact of such correspondence and the negative attitude towards the union activities of the Chalcedonites in Alexandria, described in the Disputation with Pyrrhus, is beyond doubt for Jankowiak (Jankowiak 2009, p, 24–26). As a digression, it can be noted here, referring to the latest research by F. Booth (Booth 2013), that in the manuscript tradition of the Spiritual Meadow, the author of which was St. John Moschus, the latter is sometimes called by the name Eucrates (Εὐκρατᾶς), the same name is mentioned in the Letter of VIII St. Maximus, directed in 632 to “the monk Sophronius, called Eucrates” Εὐκρατᾶν), however, in the lengthy version of the life of St. John the Merciful, written by Leonty Bishop. Naples, about St. John Mosche and Sophronia are spoken of as Eucratides (οἱ Εὐκρατάδες). In this context, Booth notes that, already in Carthage, in a letter dated 641 (that is, after the death of St. John Moschus and Sophronius), St. Maxim refers to the fact that he was there with St. Sophronius, together with the “blessed servants of God and our fathers, called Eucratides ἡμῶν, οἰ ἐπίκλην Εὐκρατάδες), who, as one might guess, were students and followers of these outstanding Palestinian monks - St. Mosha and Sophronia. Thus, following Booth (see Booth 2013, pp. 114–115) and Boudignon (see Boudignon 2007, pp. 245–274), we can talk about the brotherhood of Palestinian monks, to which St. Maxim and whose spiritual leaders were at first St. John Moschus and St. Sophrony, and then, after their death, the Venerable became such. Maxim, and in Palestine - Stephen, bishop. Dorsky, about whom we will have to talk more than once. Allen 2009, p. 18. As F. Booth notes, “it seems very interesting that in the late Life of [John the Merciful] Leontius of Naples (c. 641–642), which is considered a continuation of the Life written by Moschus and Sophronius, this pair is presented as the most trusted advisers of the patriarch and participants in dogmatic disputes. In one of the chapters of the Life it is said that “For the sake of this famous and all-divine man, God sent him John and Sophronius, who were godly wise (θεοσόφους) and had a memory that never forgets (ἀειμνήστους). They were truly useful advisers,” and then Leontius continues: "and he listened to them unswervingly as fathers and revered them as all-honest and courageous warriors of piety. They relied in faith on the Holy Spirit and the All-Shepherd, they declared constant war on the Severians and other unclean heretics in the province and, like good shepherds, rescued many villages and even more churches and monasteries from the teeth of the heretics... And for this the All-holy Patriarch showed them special honors" ( Booth 2013, pp. 42–43). It is possible that for some time in Alexandria, back in the time of St. John stayed and St. Maxim, at least if we assume, following many modern researchers, that he was of Palestinian origin, and received his philosophical education not in Constantinople, but in Alexandria, having moved there after the Persian invasion of Palestine in 613–614. (Boudignon 2004). Lukhovitsky 2010, p. 501. For this letter, see Allen 2009, p. 26–27. As Sergius' letter to Honorius suggests, Cyrus wrote this letter to Sergius on the emperor's orders after expressing doubt as to how to properly profess the doctrine of the energies of Christ (Allen 2009, p. 184). Jankowiak dates the command to 625 (Jankowiak 2009, p. 36). Ibid. Paul, after conversations with the emperor, did not agree to join the dominant Church, despite the willingness of the emperor and patriarch to propose a union based on monoenergism. Paul, in response, did not want to abandon his condemnation of the formula “two natures,” that is, the decrees of Chalcedon. As a result, he was sent to Cyprus under the supervision of the archbishop. Arkady, who was obviously charged with continuing efforts to persuade the Monophysites to union, for which reason it was forbidden to use the expression “two energies.” If the expression “one energy” were dominant, such a prohibition would be unnecessary. Cyr. ep. 1 ad Serg. (ed. Allen), p. 160–162 (trans. Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 186). Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 234. Cyr. ep. 1 ad Serg. (ed. Allen), p. 162. Recounting this episode in a letter to Pope Honorius, Sergius formulated the essence of Cyrus’ letter even more harshly: “he did not know exactly whether one or two actions of Christ should be taught,” and asked precisely about this (Allen 2009, p. 184). As Hovorun notes, according to one of the sources (Synodicon Vetus n. 128), before sending the letter to Cyrus, Sergius assembled a council in Constantinople from the bishops who were there (“synodos endimus”), who supported his response to Cyrus (Hovorun 2008, p. 63), however, the reliability of this information can be doubted, since Sergius’ letter to Honorius, telling this story in detail (see. Allen 2009, p. 184), Sergius does not mention such a council, but if it took place, this would be an additional argument supporting Sergius’ position. Serg. ep. 1 ad. Cyr. (ed. Allen), p. 164. Sergius here clearly shows a certain ingenuity, hoping that his interlocutor will understand him. He emphasizes that the fathers literally do not have such an expression, but unitary formulas in their literal expression are found, that is, the advantage in this regard is on the side of monoenergism. Cyrus bore the title of Augustal, that is, prefect of Egypt (Allen 2009, p. 25). In 630, probably in Aleppo (Syria), successful negotiations between Emperor Heraclius and the Nestorian Catholicos Ishoyav II took place, ending with Heraclius receiving communion at the liturgy served by the Catholicos, which symbolized the community of faith. According to researchers, agreement in faith was achieved on the basis of monoenergism, since in the Nestorian Christological model the unity of two natures in Christ was ensured through the unity of their action (Hovorun 2008, p. 64). For the correspondence between Sergius and Theodore of Parano, see disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 332C. Sergius turned to Theodore in connection with the case of Paul One-Eyed and the monoenergist union proposed to him by the emperor, asking Theodore about the legality of the monoenergist formula and its use among the patriarchs. Mines. Theodore supported Sergius, and his letter, through the mediation of Sergius Macarion, Bishop of Arsinoe, was sent to the emperor (see the translation of extracts from this letter with theological arguments in favor of monoenergism in Acts 1996, Vol. IV, pp. 189–190). That is, with persons who do not occupy the highest position in the church hierarchy, representing distant dioceses, and sometimes, as in the case of Arsan, even with Monophysites. It is clear from everything that Sergius, in order to implement his idea, was guided mainly by considerations of practical benefit, and not by the search for truth, which is not surprising. As Hovorun believes: “Monoenergism was not conceived as a new, self-sufficient teaching, but rather a broader interpretation of the Orthodox faith, aimed at leading to reconciliation among dissident groups, in other words, church oikonomia (οἰκονομία)” (Hovorun 2008, p. 60). It is necessary, however, to clarify his statement: “Later this original rational basis, assumed by oikonomia, became a precise doctrine (ἀκρίβεια), prohibiting the attribution of two energies or wills to Christ” (Ibid). As we have seen, imp. Heraclius already in 623, at the command of Archbishop. Arkady of Cyprus was forbidden to talk about “two energies.” And the Nine Chapters of the Union of Alexandria, strictly speaking, did not contain such a prohibition, while Psiphos, adopted by Sergius in 634, like Ekphesis (638), equally forbade talking about “one energy” and “two”. The strict ban in Ekphesis was only on two wills and in favor of one, and even then in Typos (647/648) this ban was actually lifted, and it was forbidden to argue about both one and two wills. So, throughout the entire monoenergist crisis, the church authorities in Constantinople alternately tightened and weakened the policy of imposing formulas directed against confessions that would prevent them from pursuing a union policy. A union in Syria with the Syrian Monophysite Patriarch Anastasius was concluded in 616, but due to Anastasia's imminent death it did not last long (Allen 2009, p. 24), a new union was concluded between Heraclius and the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch Athanasius between 626–634. and also did not last long (Ibid, p. 26). At the same time, F. Booth speaks of the literally victorious march of Heraclius’s union policy, covering new and new areas (Booth 2013, p. 156–157). The Armenians entered into a union with Byzantium under pressure from Heraclius in 633 (Allen 2009, p. 25). Wed. Hovorun 2008, p. 66–67. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 332C. This did not negate its political aspect. Let us remember that Cyrus was the governor of Heraclius in Egypt, so all his actions were ecclesiastical and political. However, Sergius, having received a message about the union from Cyrus, in a reply letter without any beating around the bush, “quoting” the corresponding place in the Nine Chapters, speaks of it simply as “one energy” (Serg. ep. 2 ad Cyr. (ed. Allen), p. 178), without calling it “God-masculine.” Not everyone on their side joined the union; in particular, the Monophysite patriarch of Alexandria Benjamin (c. 626–665) evaded it, who hid in Upper Egypt, where Cyrus soon began repressions against the Monophysites who did not want to join the union. At the same time, as Hovorun emphasizes, Benjamin in a number of ways was closer to the Chalcedonites in his Christology than many other Monophysites, and he himself was criticized by his own (Hovorun 2008, p. 50–51). At the same time, he defended the doctrine of one nature, one hypostasis and one energy of Christ, being in this respect more consistent than the monoenergist Chalcedonians, who did not abandon the doctrine of two natures and demanded that the Monophysites confess them, as well as the recognition of Chalcedon and the proclamation of the name of Pope Leo at the liturgy (see Serg. ep. ad. Hon. (ed. Allen), p. 189) “in exchange” to accept monoenergism. In this context, attention should be paid to a recent study by Larison (Larison 2011; the dissertation was later published as a monograph, but it is not available to us). The author, analyzing ideologically significant texts that circulated at the court of Heraclius, in particular the poems of George Pisis, argues with the traditional point of view on Heraclius’s union policy as a kind of compromise with the Monophysites. Larison argues that a strict anti-monophysite ideology reigned at the court of Heraclius, and the union of Cyrus with the monophysites should be considered not as a compromise with them, but as the imposition of their teaching by the Chalcedonites in power, which by that time was mono-energist. It seems that it is still impossible to talk about the conviction of the monoenergism of Heraclius and Sergius, if only on the basis of their acceptance of Psiphos, in which a ban was imposed on the expression “one energy”. It is probably impossible to talk about the absence of a “carrot policy” on the part of Constantinople in relation to the Monophysites, as can be seen from the story of the Monophysite nuns described in ep. 12 prp. Maxim (see note 280), because of the severity towards which (they, having fled from the Persians and, having received refuge in Carthage, spread Monophysite propaganda, for which they were sent to Orthodox monasteries), the prefect of Carthage George was removed. So we cannot completely agree with Larison’s opinion; it would be more accurate to say that in relation to the Monophysites, the authorities of Constantinople applied a policy of carrots and sticks alternately; this applies to both forceful methods and religious doctrine - they tried to subordinate them to the ruling Church by any means. Larison is right that there are quite obvious political goals behind the so-called church oikonomia in relation to the Monophysites. The same attitude was inherited by St. Maxim, as shown by a recent study: Ohme 2008. As F. Booth notes, following H. Homais, monoenergists in their unionist ideas could rely on the ideas of the treatise of St. Eulogius of Alexandria (581–608) on oikonomia (it came to Phot. bibliot. (ed. Henry) 4.111–113 under the title: “An accusatory word regarding the unification of the Theodosians and Gayanites”) (Booth 2013, p. 164). See the analysis of this treatise in the article by D. Shabanov “The Doctrine of Church Economy in the Treatise of St. Eulogius, Patriarch of Alexandria (581–608)": http://www. bogoslov.ru/text/1598312. html (or: Shabanov 2012). The question is whether, as Homais and Booth believe, the teaching of St. Eulogius can easily be subsumed under the case of the union of Cyrus. It is clear which particular version of oikonomia the monoenergists could have in mind - “economy in words, when the same theological thought can be expressed in different formulations” (quote from Shabanov’s article). Opponents of the union obviously believed that it was not an expression of the same theological thought in other words, but its distortion, that is, a departure from the faith that St. Eulogius considered it unacceptable in any case, and not leading to stable agreement. Subsequently, as we will see, St. Maximus will admit unitary expressions in relation to the energies of Christ, but always along with the confession of two natural energies. From this point of view, the corresponding chapter from the union of Cyrus should have been supplemented or interpreted in the corresponding dioenergetic sense, which was not done. Sherwood 1952, p. 52, #76. Nine chapters of the union pact with the Monophysites-Theodosians (Greek name of the document - Πληροφορία - Certificate), concluded by Patr. by Cyrus of Alexandria in 633 (text and English translation in: Allen 2009, pp. 169–174). These details gave Sherwood (Sherwood 1952, p. 28, #19) a reason to raise the question whether St. Maxim at this time, together with St. Sophronius in Alexandria, to which it can be objected that in the Dispute with Pyrrhus (PG 91, 333B) St. Maxim describes no less expressively (although very similar) as St. Sophrony “threw himself at the feet of [patr. Sergius]" and begged him to renounce the heretical statement from the Nine Chapters. This “detailed” description, however, cannot serve as proof that St. Maxim was then with St. Sophronius in Constantinople (a hypothesis that no one seems to put forward). Elsewhere Sherwood notes that the description of the behavior of St. Sophronia is quite traditional and does not necessarily indicate the presence of St. Maxima is with him in Alexandria (Sherwood 1952, p. 52). Wed. from Apollinaris: “For there is one Christ, moved by the only Divine will - due to the fact that we recognize in Him one energy, which comes from His one nature in various miracles and sufferings. After all, He is and is considered to be God incarnate” (Lietzmann 1905. Fr. 108, p. 233; quoted by St. Maximus in: opusc. 15: PG 91, 169C). St. Maxim, following in this, apparently, St. Sophronius, in his theological and polemical works, compared monoenergism, and especially monothelitism, with the teaching of Apollinaris, who (however, on other grounds - the replacement of the human mind in Christ by the Logos) taught about one will and one action in Christ. For a refutation of the heresy of Apollinaris, including the exposure of the contradictions that arise in this teaching in relation to the problem of the “will of Christ,” see St. Gregory of Nyssa in Antirhythics against Apollinaris. There is also a detailed “diophelitian” interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer. On the polemic against Apollinaris’ “monothelitism”, see Benevich 2009a, p. 369–378. Monoenergism and monothelitism, of course, were not any Apollinarianism (in essence of their teaching), since the mind in Christ was not denied and they spoke about one action and will in a different sense. PL 129, 575C–D, trans. from lat. Z. A. Barzakh, cit. according to the edition: Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 261–262. Allen 2009, p. 172, lane with change cit. according to the edition: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 188. Serg. ep. ad Hon. (ed. Allen), b. 186. He had in mind first of all the message of Mina, Patriarch of Constantinople, to Pope Vigilius and the famous words from the 4th Epistle of St. Dionysius the Areopagite about the “God-masculine action”, which will be discussed below. Serg. ep. ad Hon. (ed. Allen), b. 186–188. St. Maximus makes it clear that the union with the Theodosians in Alexandria was not the only manifestation of the “mono-energetic heresy” of the patriarchs. Sergius and his companions. The Disputation with Pyrrhus (PG 91, 332C–333B) gives other examples of the manifestation of this heresy that took place before the union. This is obviously about the heresy of Apollinaris, the refutation of which meant for St. Sophronia, etc. Maxim and refutation of “monoenergism”. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 333B, trans. D. E. Afinogenova, cit. according to the edition: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 213. opusc. 12: PL 129, 575D, trans. Z. A. Barzakh, cit. from: Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 262. Serg. ep. ad Hon. (ed. Allen), b. 188, per. from: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 174–175. We remember that in a letter to Cyrus, Sergius stipulates that if the expression “two actions” were found in one of the fathers, its use should be recognized not only as permissible, but also obligatory, since “it is not only necessary in spirit to follow the teaching of the holy fathers, but also to use the same expressions that they used, and not introduce anything new at all” (Ibid., p. 171). As he reports to Honorius, Sergius also asked St., who arrived in Constantinople, whether the fathers had the expression “two actions.” Sophronius, and, as Sergius writes, “he [St. Sophrony] was not able to provide the corresponding quotations” (Ibid., p. 174). As Pauline Allen notes, referring to the Library of Photius, at the end of 634, after the Council Epistle, St. Sophronius compiled an extensive florilegium, containing over 600 quotations from the Fathers, to support his position (Allen 2009, p. 32; p. 189, n. 41). Perhaps, in his letter to Honorius, Sergius means that St. Sophrony was unable to find this expression, while the expression “one energy” is found among the fathers. Theological courage of St. Sophronia, apparently, consisted in the fact that even without the literal expression “two actions,” when he encountered evidence from the fathers about the Divine and human action in Christ, he did not hesitate to speak about “two actions,” that is, he did not slave to the letter and did not hide behind it for his own purposes, as Sergius did. Sergius, in turn, in his letter to Honorius (Serg. ep. ad Hon. (ed. Allen), p. 190) and together with Heraclius later in Ecphesis (638) (Ecth. (ed. Allen), p. 214) never tired of repeating that none of the holy fathers uttered the expression “two energies”. Obviously, up to this time, the dioenergists had not been able to present a quotation from the fathers with such words that their opponents would have found convincing. Hovorun 2008, p. 70. Soon the emperor, who was absent from the capital during the publication of the patriarchal Psiphos, issued his command (κέλευσις), approving it, which Sergius reported in a letter to Honorius. Dating according to Allen 2009, p. 29. Allen 2009, p. 172, lane from: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 188. Serg. ep. ad Hon. (ed. Allen), b. 188, per. from: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 174–175. Here, according to the traditional version of his life, the saint once labored. Maxim (in some sources he appears as "Maxim of Chrysopolis"), however this traditional version has been disputed by Boudignon (Boudignon 2004, p. 11–43). St. Maxim was at that time in Africa, although, possibly, in Alexandria with St. Sophronius, but in any case far from Constantinople, so Pyrrhus’ letter to him testifies both to the fame of Abba Maximus and to the fact that Pyrrhus, who could not count on a quick response, did not have immediate goals in mind. Many researchers believe that Pyrrhus' letter to the monk Maximus was initiated by Sergius. Boudignon 2004, p. 29–30 and Boudignon 2007, p. 245–274. Before, according to the instructions of the imp. Heraclius Pyrrhus became an archimandrite in the Chrysopolis monastery in Constantinople; he was an archimandrite and abbot of one of the Palestinian monasteries - the monastery of St. Anastasia. An important episode in church history of the first half of the 7th century is associated with his activities in Palestine. It was under the leadership of Abbot Pyrrhus in Palestine that the former magician, who converted to Christianity and later became an Orthodox saint, labored in Palestine. This Persian had his own school of magic and was a famous sorcerer who converted to Christianity under the influence of the Life-Giving Cross, captured by the Persians in Jerusalem and then given to the Byzantines. He took part in Shahin's campaign in Asia Minor, then was baptized in Jerusalem, where he asked Elijah, the presbyter of the Church of the Ascension of the Lord, to be baptized. Over time, he took monastic vows and became a monk in the monastery of St. Anastasia is four miles from Jerusalem, where Archimandrite Pyrrhus was the abbot. Under his leadership, Anastasius underwent a monastic feat, learned Greek and became a real monk. Subsequently, in Caesarea in Palestine, he saw that the Persians were about to perform a ritual of pagan sacrifice, and tried to convert them, citing, in particular, the fact that he himself had once been a magician and a pagan, but was captured and suffered martyrdom. 10 years after the death of St. Anastasia, his relics were transferred to Caesarea in Palestine, then to Constantinople, and the head of the saint was transferred to Rome later, probably under Pope Theodore or St. Martina (that is, during the lifetime of St. Maximus and Pyrrhus with the support of Pope Theodore). According to Budignon, one of the reasons for the rise of Pyrrhus and his transfer as abbot to the capital monastery was that Heraclius, during his visit to Jerusalem, could enlist the support of Pyrrhus in his union aspirations. That is, long before Pyrrhus became the closest collaborator of Patriarch Sergius, he met Heraclius and supported his church policy aimed at strengthening the empire through a new unified ideology. The glorification of Anastasius the Persian (Persia was the main “counterparty” of Byzantium in the political arena), in which Pyrrhus played an important role, fit perfectly into the ideology of Emperor Heraclius (who, after the victory over the Persians, dreamed of their conversion to Christianity, which was supposed to forever seal their alliance with Byzantium), so Pyrrhus in all respects turned out to be the “right person” for him. In amb. 7 prp. Maxim points to the Gethsemane prayer of Christ, with which he compares the words of the apostle, as an example of undergoing Divine action in deification. Paul, emphasizing their similarities: “The Savior, who imprints in Himself what is characteristic of us, says [in petition] to the Father: “Not as I will, but as You will” [Matthew 26:39]. And after Him, the divine Paul, as if denying himself and no longer realizing whether he still has his own life: “I live not for anyone, but Christ lives in me” [Gal. 2:20]” (PG 91, 1076B). Just below St. Maxim writes about the deified as “one who has received the Divine action, or rather, who has become God in deification and, all the more, receives pleasure from the frenzy, [becoming] outside of what both naturally exists with him and [as such] is thought of, due to the grace of the Spirit, which has triumphed over him and shown him to have only God acting [in him] so that there is one, even only one, in all [relations] the action of God and worthy of God, or rather, of God alone, as [coming] in a manner befitting the Good, wholly in interpenetration with the worthy” (Ibid, PG 91, 1076C). From the textual proximity of both places it is easy to conclude that in relation to Christ, in Whom the will was deified, of course, no less than that of St. Paul, all the more can be said about the “one action” of His Divinity and humanity. At least, Pyrrhus could draw such a conclusion, and, as can be seen from his words in the dispute with St. Maximus (645), he actually believed that the expression "one will of God and the saints" could be a basis for accepting the expression of "one work" in Christ (disp. Pyrr. : PG 91, 292B). disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 292B, trans. D. E. Afinogenova, cit. from: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 153. Already earlier than Difficulties, letter 2 (On love, to John Cubicularius [624–625]) St. Maxim speaks of the unity of the will of God and the deified, without stipulating, however, that this is the will of God alone: “After all, the most perfect work of love and the limit of the action corresponding to it is, through a holding [together] mutual transfer, to prepare for appropriateness to each other the properties and names of those who are connected in accordance with [love,] and God to make a man, and to proclaim God as a man, and to manifest themselves through a single and indistinguishable will (βούλευσις) and the movements of both, in accordance with [their common] will (θέλημα), as we find [this] in Abraham and the rest of the saints” (ep. 2: PG 91, 401B). PG 91, 349C, op. according to: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 233. An apology for his correspondence with Pyrrhus - the very fact and nature of this correspondence, in which St. Maximus spoke extremely highly of Psiphos, Sergius and Pyrrhus himself and their theological views, St. Maxim compiled it in opusc. 9: PG 91, 129A–132C. Larchet dates this work to 646 or 647, in any case it was written before the Lateran Council of 649 (Larchet 1998, p. 97). During this period, after Pyrrhus, having first repented, renounced his repentance and returned to the camp of the Monothelites, the Diophelites in the West apparently accused St. Maxim is that he corresponded with him and acted as an intercessor for his forgiveness by the Pope after the dispute in Carthage. In opusc. 9 (see translation in this edition) St. Maximus, remaining silent about his praise of Psyphos and Sergius, concentrates on Pyrrhus's letter and his response (ep. 19). He says that he perceived Pyrrhus’s letter not as a final confession of faith, but as reasoning and questioning and, with all the politeness and praise necessary in such cases to the addressee, so that he would better perceive what was written, he tried to instill in him the correct teaching, which is in opusc. 9 he calls dioenergism. To this he adds that if someone’s praise of Pyrrhus hurts his ears, he is ready to reject them after everything that this person has done. Let us note, however, that from the own theological views of that period, St. Maxim in opusc. 9 does not renounce in the least. Εp. 19 (Letter 19. Pyrrhus, most holy presbyter and abbot): PG 91, 589B–592C, trans. E. Nachinkina cit. according to the edition: Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 206–207. This issue is specifically addressed in the articles: Doucet 1983; Doucet 1985. Quote from: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 174–175. Ep. 19: PG 91, 593A, lane. E. Nachinkina, cit. from: Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 207. PG 91, 593A, lane. E. Nachinkina, cit. from: Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 207. PG 91, 596B, op. according to the edition: Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 208. Structurally ep. 19 is deeply thought out. In the first part of Rev. Maximus praises both Psiphos and its authors, in the second he gives it his interpretation, and then notes that it is in this sense, coinciding with the teaching of the holy fathers, that he agrees with it and will maintain such faith: “this means that I discovered the accuracy that permeates your letter in the presentation of the Divine teaching, having thought about which, to the extent of my inherent small ability to think, I ardently desired to become able to preserve it and to keep the mind from any kind of oblivion without the slightest damage” (PG 91, 593C); and only after that St. Maxim asks “uncomfortable questions” about the meaning of the expression “single action” and the like. This structure of the letter will allow St. Petersburg in the future. Maximus, with a clear conscience, rejected the accusations of the hard-line diophelites that at that stage he shared the delusions of Pyrrhus. The praises of Psiphos expressed in this letter are inseparable from the interpretation that St. Maxim gives it to him. Each side of the conflict thus began had its own “sacred argument.” Archimandrite Pyrrhus became the initiator of the cult of St. Anastasia of Persia, whose relics he brought from Palestine to Constantinople, and St. Sophrony contributed to the spread of veneration of St. John Moschus, delivering his relics and burying them in the Lavra of St. Theodosius, where they and Moschus once labored. In addition, St. Sophronius brought to Palestine the main work of Moschus - The Spiritual Meadow, containing examples of monastic work. The transfer of the body of Moschus, accompanied by twelve disciples, can be compared with the entry of Joshua, fulfilling the covenant of Moses, into the land of Palestine. In any case, it had a sacred meaning, which was then clear to everyone involved in the biblical and monastic tradition. Here it would be appropriate to recall the transfer of the head of St. Anastasia the Persian from Palestine to Rome, which will be accomplished later, under Pope Theodore or St. Martine (“answer” of the Palestinian-Roman diophelite party to the monothelites in Constantinople). The Lateran Council was attended by representatives of one of the monasteries located in Italy, which had special ties with Palestine, especially with the monastery of St. Feodosia. It was here that the Palestinian monks moved the head of St. Martyr Anastasius the Persian, and from here his veneration was transferred to England by St. Theodore of Tarsus, who was influenced by the circle of St. Sophronia, etc. Maxima (see Booth 2013, p. 223). Sophron. ep. Synod.: PG 87, 3149B–C. Larchet 1998b, p. 154, n, 108; Hovorun 2008, p. 74. Booth 2013, p. 142, n. 4; 176. He believes that Sergius of Jaffa died before the arrival of St. Sophronia. Opinions that Sergius was elected only after the death of St. Sophronia, adhere to: Winkelmann 2001, S. 101f. no. 74, 260, Levy-Rubin 2001, p. 29. At the Lateran Council, Stefan Dorsky would subsequently speak about the consecrations carried out by Sergius of Jaffa, emphasizing that Sergius himself “took the locum tenensship of the throne of Jerusalem (τὴν τοποτηρησίαν τοῦ ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις θρόνου λαβών) after the departure of the Persians not in the church order (ἀκολουθία), but from secular power (ἀπὸ κοσμικῆς ἐξουσίας) [allusion to Heraclius - G.B.] and ordained several bishops, contrary to the canons, as suffragans at the See of Jerusalem" (Riedinger 1989, S. 46). Such an illegal position in the eyes of the other bishops, appointed by Sergius of Jaffa, required them to subsequently seek canonical confirmation, for which they turned to the Monothelite Patriarch Paul (641–653), sharing with him, naturally, his faith, without which such confirmation would have been impossible. Levy-Rubin 2001, p. 293. However, the Greek Life of St. The maxim is now considered by most scholars to be unreliable too (see Neil 2001). Psogos claims that, in addition to its author Gregory (George) of Reshainsky and his two disciples, the Jerusalem See was represented by a delegation of eight bishops subordinate to St. Sophronius (Maxim the Confessor 2004, p. 327). As for the “two wills,” this seems to be an anachronism, since St. Maxim at this time did not explicitly profess such a teaching, although an accusation of this kind can be imagined - after all, Psiphos already contains polemics with the possibility of a conflict of wills in Christ among dioenergists. As for the “two minds,” this was a standard accusation of the Maronites against the diophelites (that Christ has two volitional centers and therefore division is possible in Him); during the period of the proposed council, it most likely should not have been put forward. However, even here one can suspect something else behind this accusation, namely, that St. Maxim, from the point of view of those who condemned him, does not take into account the deification of the human mind in Christ. It is certain that these (or similar) accusations could not be brought against St. Maxima at this time, we cannot. Brock 1973, p. 315–317; lane A. V. Muravyova in: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 325–327. Brock 1973, p. 324. Elsewhere in the same work, Brock gives a less definite period for the time of the council: 634–638. (Ibid, p. 334). It should be noted that Larchet (see Larchet 1996, p. 8–12) and Bathrellos (Bathrellos 2004, p. 65) generally refuse to take the information of the Syrian Psogos seriously. Meanwhile, some information from it, for example, as we will see below, the polemics of St. Sophronius and Arkady of Cyprus about the addition to the Trisagion received confirmation from independent sources, which means that it would be wrong to completely reject Psogos’ information. Ibid. In the preface to the publication of translations of the works of St. Maxim in 1993. A. I. Sidorov, in his analysis of the issue of the “Cyprus Council,” the historical reality of which he has no doubt, writes that at the time of the Council of St. Sophrony and etc. Maximus had not yet received Psiphos (Maximus the Confessor 1993, Book Ι, p. 48), but does not ask the question of how, before receiving Psiphos, St. Sophronius could be patriarch if, according to Sergius' letter to Honorius, he sailed from Constantinople only after receiving Sergius's written assurance, the contents of which apparently coincided with Psiphos, and only then was chosen patriarch (see Serg. ep. ad Honor (ed. Allen), p. 192). In 2004, in the preface to the publication of selected works by St. Maxim A.I. Sidorov radically changed (without indicating this) his attitude towards Psiphos. He rejected both the version of the Palestinian origin of St. Maxim, which he accepted before, and from the recognition of the reliability of Psogos’s reports about the Council of Cyprus (Sidorov 2004, pp. 46, 57). Brock expresses the opinion that Heraclius deliberately left it vacant because he pursued a union policy in Syria, as a result of which the Monophysite patriarch of Antioch would have to become the head of all Christians in Syria (Brock 1973, pp. 322–323). Albert & Schönborn 1978, b. 170–176. Mansi X. 913E. It must be said that Sergius of Cyprus underwent the opposite evolution: having started as an ardent supporter of diopheliteism and an opponent of Ekphesis, he later “suffered shipwreck” (i.e., entered into communication with the monothelites), see Neil 1998, p. 166. Albert & Schönborn 1978, b. 176. Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 328. Albert & Schönborn 1978, p. 180. Jankowiak 2009, p. 149–160. Jankowiak 2009, p. 155–160. For further arguments in favor of this, see: Hovorun 2008, p. 62. opusc. 12: PL 129, 575B; opusc. 20: PG 91, 244B–C. In particular, opusc. 1; 2; 3; 10 (645/646); opusc. 7 (640–641), opus. 20 (c. 641–642?) and opusc. 19 (c. 642–643?). One may recall that St. John the Merciful made sure that the Trisagion was sung without the addition introduced by the Monophysite Peter Gnafevs, “crucified for us,” which is mentioned in his life, the first version of which was compiled by St. John Moschus and St. Sophronius (see Lukhovitsky 2010). Mansi X. 913E; Wed Hovorun 2008, p. 62. Sergius will go much further than Arcadius and openly declare Monothelitism a heresy (ACO 2.1.60–62). The letter of Sergius to Pope Theodore is contained in the acts of the Lateran Council (Riedinger 1989, S. 60–64), its content sheds light on some processes in the period 640–643: “Until now, they [the Monothelites] resorted to a certain kind of oikonomia (οἰκονομίαν τινά), we were silent, thinking that they would change their teachings for the better. So thought our divine Arcadius, now [venerated] among the saints, following your Orthodox teaching, to which we pray with all our strength, following in his footsteps, agreeing with your Orthodox and divinely inspired teaching, our all-holy gentlemen and fathers” [Riedinger 1989, S. 62]. These words of Sergius shed light on the position of Arcadius, who apparently maintained communication with Constantinople, refrained from direct confrontation and at the same time maintained communication with Rome, perhaps more sympathetic to the teachings of the Diophelites, which is why his closest assistant received messages from St. Maxim, and the Venerable himself. Maxim considered him Orthodox. It is also clear from the letter that until 643. (the letter dates from May of this year) the final anti-Monothelitian position in Cyprus was not accepted, and hopes for a change in the position of Constantinople apparently remained. The correspondence of St. Rev. should be understood in this context. Maxima with Marin, about which we will write below and in which up to the opusc. 19 one can notice moments of oikonomia in relation to the Monothelites, that is, such formulations of the doctrine that, without distorting it, at the same time could be acceptable to opponents (if they themselves accepted the Orthodox position). In Syrian Psogos 23, the adoption of the “teaching of Maximus” in Cyprus is associated with the Arab conquest of Cyprus, but Cyprus was captured by Muslim Arabs only in 648, and in general there was no direct connection between religion and Arab conquests - thus, in Palestine under Arab rule, monothelitism dominated (although not totally). Sherwood 1952, p. 37, no. 40. In addition, 633, following Larchet (Larchet 1998, p. 22), we also attribute opusc. 21, addressed to Theodore, deacon in Mazaria (Sicily). This work, called “On quality (ποιότητος), peculiarity (ἰδιότητος) and difference (διαφορᾶς),” is devoted primarily to polemics with the Monophysite Christology of Sevirus of Antioch, but it also states that the presence of natural characteristics and natural characteristics in Christ qualities corresponding to Divinity and humanity (which Sevier did not object to), means the presence in Him of two natures (this was recognized, unlike Sevier, by the Chalcedonite monoenergists) and the differences in energies corresponding to each of the natures. St. Maximus insists on the need to “recognize differences ... not only in natural quality, but also in the heterogeneity of essence, in order to simultaneously recognize the difference of both natures and natural qualities, in other words, essences and energies” (opusc. 21: PG 91, 253B). The topic of energies is not at the center of this work, but is mentioned in passing, so one can assume that it was written either at the very beginning of the controversy, or even before it. But a strict correlation of the differences in natures with their different qualities and differences in energies will be characteristic of all subsequent polemics and the position of the saint. Maxima is in it. Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 189–190. Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 327. In this chapter (with the exception of its last third), we follow to the greatest extent the analysis of this issue in the joint work with A. M. Shufrin “Maxim’s Case” (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 21–28), introducing, however, several amendments, the most significant of which we especially note. Larchet (Larchet 1998, p. 47) hypothesizes that Presbyter Thomas turned to St. Maxim, at the request of the monks of the Chrysopolis monastery, and, agreeing with Garrig, claims that this happened after the publication of Psiphos and the writing of St. Maximus's letter to Pyrrhus (ep. 19). Greek the numeral εἷς (μία, ἕν) has both of these meanings; we will allow ourselves to convey it, depending on the context, using one or another of them. It won't always be this way. During the period 640–642. St. Maximus will take the expression “one action” found in St. Cyril of Alexandria and Anastasius of Antioch (for more details, see: Benevich G.I., Shufrin A.M. “The Case of Maxim” in: Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 33–46). However, from 643 St. Maxim will move to the position of rigid dienergism, which excludes the correctness of the expression “one” or “single” energy. The corresponding passages in the holy fathers will be interpreted by him in the dioenergetic sense; we will dwell on this below. Dion. Ar., ep. 4:160 (Heil, Ritter), trans. G. M. Prokhorova, cit. from: Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor 2002, p. 775. For this purpose, Cyrus even resorted to the monophysite edition of the text of letter 4 of the Areopagite, from which this expression was taken, which, in contrast to the canonical edition for the Chalcedonites, speaks not of the “new” (or, as an option, “general”), but literally of “one” (“the Divine action” of Christ). Here and henceforth we give the expression “Godly masculine action” in quotation marks, since it is used not as a term, but as a quotation. The word "action" can sometimes be used as a term, sometimes as part of a quotation; hence the difference in the placement of quotation marks. Quote from: Pyrr., tomus dogmaticus: ACO 2.1.152. 37–38. amb. 5: PG 91, 1056D (ed. Janssens 218–224), trans. archim. Nektary (Yashunsky) according to: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 34. Quote from: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 191. Wed. Pyrr. tomus dogmaticus: ACO 2.1.152. The dogmatic tomos of Pyrrhus is obviously later than the Difficulties on St. Thomas. Maxim, but this does not prevent him from reflecting the essence of the controversy, which began much earlier. Dion. Ar., ep. 4, lane G. M. Prokhorova, cit. from: Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor 2002, p. 777–778. Here one can, not without reason, discern a hidden polemic with the Tomos of Pope Leo Flavian: “Each of the two natures [in lat. forma, in Greek μορφή, which in this case means essence, nature], in connection with another, acts as is characteristic of it: the Word does what is characteristic of the Word, and the flesh fulfills what is characteristic of the flesh. One of them shines with miracles, and the other is subject to suffering” (quoted from: Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 121). Quote from: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 188. Ibid, 1056A–B; (ed. Janssens 192–196), trans. archim. Nektary (Yashunsky) as amended. from: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 33. Let us note that any movement of created nature for St. The maxim is, strictly speaking, undergoing, or suffering (πάθος), and not action (ἐνέργεια): “After all, everything that has come into being undergoes motion, since it is not self-motion, or [acting] ability itself” (amb. 7: PG 91, 1073B; repeated almost verbatim in disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 352A–B). In another chapter of the Difficulties to Thomas 2 St. Maxim explains that the Divine nature of Christ is not involved in His suffering. “...The whole God, who participates in wholes...becomes the likeness of the soul in [its] relation to the body for the soul (and through the soul for the body)” (PG 91, 1088C). To feel the urgency of the issue, it is enough to cite the words of Macarius of Antioch (condemned by the VI Ecumenical Council), who summed up the heresy of monoenergism in his confession: “Just as our body is governed, and adorned, and put in order by a rational and thinking soul, so in the Lord Christ his entire human composition, governed always and throughout by the Divinity of the Word Himself, was set in motion by God” (quoted from the ed.: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 88). For example, one of the first theorists of monoenergism (as the Uniates understood it) Theodore of Faransky wrote: “Everything that is told, divine or human, about our Savior Christ in the saving economy initially, so to speak, received an impetus and beginning from the Divine, and then was completed by the body through the medium of the spiritual and rational soul - whether you say about any miraculous power or about any natural movement of man, for example, the desire for food, sleep, fatigue, getting into trouble, grief, sadness, which are called suffering out of habit, out of condescension to the names, but actually come from natural movement through an animate and sensual animal” (quoted from: Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 190). See the words of St. Maxim: “I found in your writings a statement about one action in Christ, since He is one” (PG 91, 333D). However, if the Disputation in its final form was written after 655 (see Noret 1999), then these “words of Maximus” belong to the late period of the controversy. As F. Booth notes, referring to Bathrellos and Hovorun (Bathrellos 2004, pp. 80–82; Hovorun 2008, p. 150), “both of them treat Pyrrhus’s position during the dispute as if he had composed it himself” (Booth 2013, p. 215). Booth expressed serious doubts that Pyrrhus adhered to the doctrine of one hypostatic energy of Christ, believing that such an opinion could have been held by monoenergists only at an early stage of the controversy (cf. Price 2010). However, Rev. Maximus argued with the understanding of the “single energy” as hypostatic long before the dispute with Pyrrhus (say, in opusc. 7: PG 91, 85B). Regarding the actual position of the monoenergists at the beginning of the controversy, and even later, one can at least say that it was uncertain, which was not least due to the fact that the monoenergism of Sergius, Cyrus and Pyrrhus appeared not as a doctrine, but as an ideology. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 300A. These words of St. Gregory of Nyssa (beat. 4: PG 44, 1237A) St. Maxim leads to disp. Pyrr: PG 91, 352B. After St. Maxima repeats this thought. John of Damascus: “Of course, our natural passions were in Christ both in accordance with nature and supernaturally. In accordance with nature, they were aroused in Him when He allowed the flesh to endure what is characteristic of it, and supernaturally because in the Lord what was natural did not precede His will, for in Him nothing is seen as forced, but everything is voluntary. For He hungered by His will, He thirsted by His will, He feared by His will, He died by His will” (Joann. Dam. exp. fid. 3.20, quoted from: John of Damascus 2002, p. 277). Very clearly, although perhaps too “physiologically,” this thought was expressed by Theodore Abu-Kurra: “When the eternal Son wanted to starve, He allowed the force of the air to act on His flesh... He starved of His own free will, and not of natural necessity, and the obvious proof of this is that, remaining for forty days without eating food, He after [that] became hungry. After all, if the air had ruled over His flesh, as well as over each of ours, not even one day, or two, or three would have passed before He would have become hungry, as we observe in ourselves. However, when He desired, He allowed nature to act and manifest what it should, just as He voluntarily accepted death” (ep. ad arm.: PG 97, 1520A–B, trans. F. G. Benevich). The same idea can be found among Western fathers. Wed. at St. Hilary of Pictavian: “The divine life-giving powers that filled the body of Christ overcame all the weaknesses of human nature. All acts of humiliation of Christ, such as hunger and death, were His voluntary states, not in the sense that, having voluntarily assumed the nature of man, He voluntarily took upon Himself the consequences of the incarnation, that is, the weaknesses of a created being, but in the fact that in the ordinary state He was inaccessible to these weaknesses and experienced them when, in order to renew man, He allowed their discovery. Since Christ is not only a man, but also God, He did not need food. And during fasting He did not experience hunger” (“On the Holy Trinity in 12 books”, from the 10th book, translated from: Popov 1968, pp. 164–165). St. Sophrony dedicated a large passage from the Council Epistle to the topic of the freedom of Christ to endure human suffering (see Sophr. ep. syn. 2.3.13 (ed. Allen), p. 106; in Russian translation: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 152), where he says, in particular, that in Christ (unlike us) not a single natural and bodily movement or impulse is acted as the initiator of the action, but everything happened with the permission of the Divine. As Govorun notes, St. Sophronius speaks in this context of Christ as “the master-manager (ταμίας) and, moreover, the ruler-distributor (πρύτανις) of His human sufferings and deeds” (Hovorun 2008, p. 138). So he in no way underestimated the role of the Divine in what Christ accomplished for humanity. We will return to this topic when discussing Ekphesis. According to A. M. Shufrin, he has not yet “unclenched his fist” (an exact metaphor). This is exactly how their teaching was understood by us in the article “The Case of Maxim” (see Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 24–25), at the moment we are inclined to a more cautious judgment - the expressions of some monoenergists are sloppy and ambiguous, especially at the early stage of the emergence of “monoenergism” in the 7th century, but to say for sure that they mixed two types of “God-masculine actions”, perhaps, we do not have enough grounds. In any case, it was precisely the polemics with them that St. Maxima made it possible to crystallize Orthodox teaching on this issue with complete clarity. Quote from: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 189. Price 2010, p. 221–232. In fact, he gives only two quotes from monoenergists. The first of Ekphesis (ASO 2.1.160.26–29) (that part of Ekphesis that was included in Psiphos, approved by both St. Sophronius and Maximus, so it is not indicative as an expression of monoenergism proper). A more compelling argument is a quotation from the words of the monoenergist Macarius of Antioch at the Sixth Ecumenical Council: “from one and the same Christ and our God comes in a new way every action befitting God and becoming man. For God the Word incarnate does neither divine as God, nor human as man, but (performs) some new divine-masculine action” (ACO 2.1.222.17–21, trans. on Acts 1996, IV, p. 88), but this is already 680/1, and not the beginning of the controversy (we will return below to Macarius of Antioch). Price does not analyze quotes from the Nine Chapters of Cyrus and its interpretation by Cyrus and Pyrrhus, as well as quotes from Theodore of Paran, in this article. Be that as it may, he believes that the discrepancy between monoenergism and dioenergism was purely terminological, and in essence the teachings did not differ. The author himself is a prominent English Catholic patrolologist, a specialist in the history of the Ecumenical Councils of the 5th–7th centuries. – emphasizes the difference between his vision and that set out in the books of Batrelos and Govorun. As we have learned, Pauline Allen, in an article for the forthcoming Oxford Guide to St. Maximu is going to analyze Price's arguments, which will be especially interesting since Price himself expressed the opinion that the approach to this issue depends on the church affiliation of the researchers (emphasizing that it is the Eastern Orthodox authors who insist on the difference between monoenergism and dioenergism); P. Allen, in any case, is not one of these authors. Meanwhile, F. Booth expressed his agreement with Price, seeing the difference between monoenergists and dioenergists solely in relation to oikonomia and acrivia, and not in the essence of the doctrine (Booth 2013, p. 163). Returning to Price’s argument, referring to Macarius of Antioch, the latter’s position can be clarified based on the presentation of the doctrine of “soft monothelitism” by the Syrian Constantine of Apamea during the 16th act of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Acts 1996. Vol. IV, pp. 211–213). Constantine offered his teaching as a reconciliator of both sides (as he believed). In particular, he confessed two natures in Christ and two properties (that is, idioms) corresponding to each nature. Further, he said that in this context we can talk about two actions in Christ. Moreover, he even admitted that such a property of the human flesh of Christ, as the ability to experience thirst or hunger and, accordingly, the desire to eat and drink, can be called human will or volition in Christ (ACO 2.696,19–698,15). At the same time, since by the human will in Christ Constantine understood only such carnal desires (which exist not only in people, but also in animals), without including in this concept the will of the rational component of the human soul (the will of the mind), then the same Constantine denied the presence of a human will in Christ after the Resurrection, because this state is no longer characterized by the desire to eat, drink and experience other carnal desires and aspirations. When asked by the fathers of the Council whether Macarius of Antioch shared this teaching, Constantine replied that he himself had heard this very teaching from him (Acts 1996. Vol. IV, p. 212). There is no reason not to trust Constantine on this point, and therefore it turns out that in “soft” monothelitism and monoenergism the will and action of the rational soul of Christ are not recognized, but only “animal” will and action are recognized. However, all these questions require further study. The “God-masculine” action, related to the second kind, is also, of course, “single,” but in a different sense than that related to the first, that is, not because in the suffering of Christ the Divinity supposedly “suffers”, following humanity (which would be an exact inversion in relation to what happens in the first kind of God-masculine action), but because God seems to be inactive, kenotically retreating and thereby abandoning what has been acquired and humanity deified by Him suffers in accordance with the tropos of suffering that arose as a consequence of Adam’s sin. See chap. 2 of this preface. Interesting in this regard is one place in the Second Letter to Thomas, which St. Maxim wrote to Thomas in response to the bewilderments that remained with him after his first letter (that is, Difficulties to Thomas 1–5). The text of the Second Letter has survived only in fragments, but even in them several valuable passages can be found. In particular, Thomas asks to clarify how the analogy should be understood: God moved the flesh in Christ, just as the soul moves the body, if we keep in mind the thought of St. Gregory the Theologian, that in Christ His human soul is the mediator between the Word and the body (see Greg. Naz. or. 38.13). Thomas asks: should every movement performed by Christ be considered one and at the same time Divine? St. Maxim praises his addressee for his wise question, which allows him, which is important in the context of the monoenergetic crisis, to once again emphasize that in the perceived nature its natural movements are completely preserved, without which it would be impossible to talk about the true perception of our nature. In the same context, Rev. Maximus categorically rejects the doctrine of one energy in Christ, to which are attributed both miracles performed through the flesh and the sufferings of the flesh itself (see ep. 2 Thom .3, ed. Janssens). Let us note that in the Second Letter to St. Thomas. Maximus does not yet speak of two energies or two wills, so one should apparently agree with Janssens that it was written soon after the first, and not six years later, in the year 640, as Larcher originally believed (see Maximi Confessoris, Amb. ad Thom. 2002. p. XXIII). In a review of Janssens's critical edition, Larcher agreed with his arguments regarding dating. PG 87c, 3177 B–C, trans. A. M. Shufrina. Schönborn 1972, p. 212–217. St. Sophronius mentioned St. John of Scythopolis in the anti-Monotheletian florilegium, appended to his famous Council Epistle. The florilegium has not survived, but St. has information about it. Photius, according to whom “John, like the saints, Bishop of Scythopolis, wisely and inspiredly spoke out in defense of the Council of Chalcedon” (Photius, bibliot. cod. 231 (ed. Henry), 3.66). Pope Agathon wrote about St. John of Scythopolis as one of the revered holy fathers who defended the doctrine of two natures and two actions in Christ (see Mansi XI. 270), and in this context his name was heard at the VI Ecumenical Council. Its translation in: Acts 1996, Vol. IV, c. 130. The passage contains an explicit confession of "two actions, divine and human", but the question of "Divine action" is not addressed in it. Translation of an excerpt from this scholium: “He did not say “god-man,” forming from “god-man,” but “god-man” energy, that is, the intertwined energy of God and man. Hence he called God “who became a husband”, and not a husband – God. Nowadays he called only mixed energy “god-masculine.” For He acted only as God when He healed the centurion’s son at a distance, but only as a man, although He was God, when He ate and grieved. In a mixed way, He performed miracles - by anointing the eyes of the blind and stopping the bleeding with a touch” (Joan. Scyth. SchEP 536. 1 (Rorem-Lamoreaux 1998), translated by G. M. Prokhorov, quoted from the editor: Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor 2002, p. 779). It seems that this concept, in turn, goes back to the so-called “Formula of Unity”, which at one time (in 433) was signed by the Alexandrians led by St. Cyril with the Antiochians as a result of disputes around Nestorius: “We know that theologians consider some of the Gospel and Apostolic sayings to be general, as relating to a single Person, while others are distinguished as relating to two natures; God-decent refers to the Divinity of Christ, derogatory to his humanity” (ACO 1.1.4:8f., trans. quoted from: Florovsky 1992, pp. 15–16 as amended). This passage from the “Formula of Unity” is more consistent with the theology of the Antiochenes and reproduces part of the resolution of their “small council”, convened as an alternative to the Ephesian (later recognized as the Third Ecumenical) Council of 431 (for more details, see: Benevich 2009b, pp. 560–561). As Pauline Allen notes, St. Sophrony, in his teaching, expressed in this place of the Council Epistle, follows St. almost word for word. Cyril of Alexandria (letter to Akakios Melitinsky, ch. 16), who in turn only slightly paraphrases the “Formula of Unity” (see Allen 2009, p. 113, n. 77). Allen, however, does not yet point out the parallel with St. John of Scythopolis, which there is no doubt about, and whose relevance in the context of the interpretation of the “God-manly action” (which, of course, St. Cyril does not have) is beyond doubt. At the same time, the parallels with Antiochian theology in the Council Epistle are very interesting. Yes, St. Sophronius, as Allen notes, sometimes quotes almost verbatim (referring to the “god-wise [fathers] crowned with Christ and receiving a gift from God” (Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 153)), without naming him by name, Theodoret of Cyrus (Allen 2009, p. 113, n. 74, 75, 76) (we are talking about Theodoret's work Exposition of the Right Faith, which was attributed to St. Justin the Philosopher (PG 6, 1225B–C)). Obviously, the theology of the Antiochenes turned out to be in demand when it became necessary to emphasize the presence of the actions of each of the natures, which they spoke about quite clearly. About the scholium of St. John of Scythopolis and the teachings of St. Sophronia see: Hovorun 2008, p. 114–115. Govorun suggests that there was a dispute in the interpretation of the corresponding passage in the Areopagitica between Sevier (who interpreted it in a monoenergist way) and St. John of Scythopolis, which is very likely, however, does not draw attention to the differences in the interpretation of the “God-manly action” by St. Maxim and St. Sophronius and to two different interpretations of this expression by St. John of Scythopolis. It is also true, however, that, as this researcher notes, St. Sophronius in other places of the Council Epistle speaks of the communion of actions in Christ in the spirit of St. Pope Leo, that is, emphasizing their inseparability from each other (see Hovorun 2008, p. 122). St. has Sophronia and the detailed teaching that all the sufferings and actions of Christ on humanity occurred only with the permission of His Divinity (Ibid, p. 138). In “The Case of Maximus” we interpreted the whole question of the peculiarities of the understanding of “God-manly action” in St. Petersburg somewhat differently. Maxim and St. Sophronia (see Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 27, note 37), trying to emphasize not the differences, but the commonality. Here this topic is revised taking into account the scholia of St. John of Scythopolis as a possible context for both of them, despite the fact that they took different things from them. For the latter, see Hovorun 2008, p. 115. Govorun refers to ACO 2.1.148.32–151.5. The passage he quotes from St. Pope Martin is extremely reminiscent of the teaching about the “new Godly action”, more precisely about two kinds of “Godly action” of St. Maximus from the Difficulties to Thomas. Wed. translation of a fragment of this scholium: “He says that Christ did not perform divine things as God, because he was together with the flesh, and not pure divinity, although he was divine. Likewise, He did human things not like a man, for by divine power, when He wanted, He sometimes allowed the flesh to carry out (lit.: to act) its own, but human” (Joan. Scyth. SchEP 533. 3, trans. G. M. Prokhorov, quoted from the editor: Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor 2002, p. 777). See for example: Larchet 1996, p. 17. Sherwood admits that opusc. 4, the first work related to the anti-Monothelitan polemic was written before 640 (he indicates the period 634–640), but Larchet disputes Sherwood's opinion (Larchet 1998, p. 27), and his arguments seem convincing to us, cf. Louth 1996, p. 15. In particular, Battrellos writes: “From a practical point of view, it is certain that Honorius contributed to the promotion of Monothelitism. While Sergius in the first epistle did not refer to “one will,” he does so in the Ecphesis, adopting the expression of Honorius” (Bathrellos 2004, p. 78). In fact, Sergius, in his letter to Honorius, already referred to the “book” sent to Patr. Mina Pope Vigilius, which speaks of one energy and one will and cites the testimony of the fathers in favor of this teaching, so it was not Honorius who was the first to utter the “fatal” phrase, but Sergius who planted it on him. See evidence of this in: Serg. ep. ad Honor. (ed. Allen), p. 184. In particular, in the sixth passage we read: “The divine will, which is the will of Christ himself, for He has one will, and it is divine” (ACO 2.1.122.3–4, translated from: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 190). Ekthes. (ed. Allen), p. 214. Serg. ep. ad Honor. (ed. Allen), p. 190, per. with small changes. from: Acts 1996, T. IV. c. 175. The exact text of Psiphos is unknown, but most scholars believe that this passage from the letter to Honorius (Mansi X. 533C8–533E10; ACO 2.2.542–544) forms part of it (Mansi XI. 993E10–996B7) (see Sherwood 1952, pp. 37–39; Léthel 1979 , p. 37; Doucet 1983, p. 58; However, Battrellos recently again raised the question of whether the part where the theme of “wills” is touched upon was included in the text of Psiphos, recalling that Grumel (Grumel 1928, p. 13) did not think so. Bathrellos has made several arguments for and against this (Bathrellos 2004, p. 72, n. 64). Of the arguments “against”, the most significant is the one that St. Maximus did not mention this topic in his letter to Pyrrhus (ep. 19), who sent him the text of Psiphos, from the arguments in favor - the fact that in the Dispute with Pyrrho m St. Maximus speaks of Psiphos as anathematizing those who teach about two wills (PG 91, 305A) (of course, there is no anathema against two wills in this passage, but looking back at it after Ekphesis, it can well be read that way). Batrellos notes that it is impossible to establish exactly how things are. Bearing in mind that most scientists still believe that the place of will was included in Psiphos, we will accept this as a working hypothesis, putting forward additional arguments in favor of why and so on. Maxim, and St. Sophronius did not enter into controversy on this issue at this stage (see Chapter 9, note 220 and text). See, for example, Léthel 1979, p. 37–46; Doucet 1983, p. 58–59. Usually, turning to this passage, it is noted that 1) the will in it is unambiguously correlated with the willing subject, so that it is implied that two wills certainly introduce two willers; 2) the presence of two energies in Christ entails not just the presence of two wills, but two conflicting wills (that is, a difference at the natural level entails a conflict at the moral level); 3) in this passage, the theme of the freedom of Christ’s passions, the nature of these free passions, and in connection with this, implicitly, the Gethsemane prayer is introduced into the context of the polemic; 4) already in this passage a number of concepts are involved (will, willing, desire, beckoning), which will later be widely discussed by St. Maxim. Recently, a review of hypotheses regarding the emergence of monothelitism among the Chalcedonites in the 7th century. did Bathrellos (Bathrellos 2004, pp. 89–97). However, this researcher does not accept any of the hypotheses, rejecting, in particular, the one that monothelitism among the Chalcedonites arose as a continuation of neo-Chalcedonian theology of the 6th century. Ultimately, he finds nothing better than to repeat the bishop’s words. Callista Ware, that Monothelitism was a revived Apollinarianism (Ibid, p. 96). The accusation of the Monothelites of reviving the heresy of Apollinaris, quite suitable for polemics and actually used by the Diophelites, cannot, of course, serve as an explanation of the theological and philosophical sources of this teaching (cf. Price 2010). Gr. Naz. de filio. 2. or . 30.12. 6–12, let us cite its translation for comparison: “Seventhly, consider the saying that the Son came down from heaven, not to do His will, but of Him who sent [John 6:18]. If this were not said by the One Who Descended Himself, then we would answer that these words were uttered on behalf of a person, not what we mean in the Savior (His will, as completely deified, is not contrary to God), but similar to us, because human will does not always follow, but very often contradicts and opposes the will of God. For this is how we understand the words: “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass by from Me, not as I will, but may Your will prevail” [Matthew 26:39]; and it is incredible that Christ did not know what is possible and what is not, and that he began to oppose one will to another. But since this is the speech of the One who has received (which means the word “descended”), and not of the one who has been received, we will give the following answer: this is said not because the Son’s own will is really different from the will of the Father, but because there is no such will, and the meaning contained in the words is this: “Let me not do My will; for I have no will separate from Your will, but there is only a will common to both Me and To you. Just as We have one Divinity, so we have one will” (translated from: Gregory the Theologian. T. 1, p. 436). In particular, this passage was discussed in: opusc. 4: PG 91, 61A–B; opusc. 6: PG 91, 65B; opusc. 7: PG 91, 81C; opusc. 1: PG 91, 48V; opusc. 15: PG 91, 161A; disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 316C–D. For example, without going into the subtleties of interpretation, it is easy to notice that, even formally speaking, it does not say that two energies introduce two wills, or that two wills introduce two willers, moreover, those who will the opposite. Wed. Bathrellos' arguments against such dependence in: Bathrellos 2004, p. 89–97; however, Battrellos misses the factor of controversy with the Agnoites, which Lurie draws attention to (see below). Here we present the traditional version, with which the Jankowiak-Booth version diverges. “For, as the Word, He was neither obedient nor disobedient, since both are characteristic of inferior and secondary, and one is good, and the other is worthy of punishment. But, like the image of a slave, He descends upon fellow servants and servants and takes on an alien image, carrying within Him all of me along with everything that is characteristic of me, in order to destroy with Himself the worst, just as fire destroys wax, or the sun destroys earthly vapor, and so that I may partake of what is characteristic of Him through co-dissolution. Therefore He actually gives honor to obedience, and tests it in suffering [Heb. 5:8]. Because disposition alone is not enough for [him], just as it is not enough for us if we do not accompany it with deeds. For the deed becomes proof of favor. But perhaps it is no less important to assume that He tests our obedience and measures everything that belongs to us by His sufferings, [which is] the art of [His] love for mankind, in order to learn from Himself what is possible for us, and how much should be exacted from us, and how much we should be excused, if our weakness is credited to us with the sufferings” (Gr. Naz., or. 30.6, trans. quoted from: Gregory the Theologian 1889. T. 3, p. 68). In amb. 3: PG 91, 1037D–1040D he did not make such a distinction, therefore, there, speaking about “exhaustion,” St. Maxim associated it with the fact that the Son of God in the flesh became subject to suffering. But in amb. 2: PG 91, 1036D–1039D kenosis correlated precisely with the fact of perception of our nature. The issue of “Adam’s heritage” is considered, in particular, by J.-C. Larcher: Larcher 2004, p. 108–161. We are obviously talking about the state of resurrection. PG 91, 1044A, lane. archim. Nektary (Yashunsky) as amended. from: Maxim Confessor 2006, p. 23. Gr. Naz., or. 30.6, op. according to the edition: Gregory the Theologian 1889. T. 3, p. 68. Wed. what the apostle said about Christ in Philippians 2:8: “being obedient even to death, even death on the cross.” PG 91, 1044 C, lane. archim. Nektary (Yashunsky) as amended. by Maxim Confessor 2006, p. 23–24. PG 91, 1044D, see text in note. 142. Gr. Naz., or. 30.6, op. according to the edition: Gregory the Theologian 1889. T. 3, p. 68. Here we will not dwell on how this test by Christ of our obedience through the acceptance of suffering draws the line between what is required of us and what is forgiven us. This topic is touched upon in more detail when analyzing opusc. 20. If we nevertheless leave the concept of the Son’s obedience to the Father, then within the framework of the Monothelite model it turns out that obedience to the will of the Father is attributed to the Logos, since the will belongs to Him, the Logos, which in this case becomes subordinate to the Father, not consubstantial with Him, that is, a creature, and this contradicts the teaching of St. Gregory the Theologian that as God Christ was above obedience and disobedience. Referring to lib. ascet. : PG 90, 921b, amb. 7: PG 91, 1076; Thal. 61: PG 90, 636B–C and Thal. 63: PG 90, 669B–C and some other works, Doucet, in a dispute with Letel, convincingly shows that even before the advent of monothelitism, St. Maximus, although less explicitly, taught the subordination of Christ's humanity to God's will as an important aspect of the economy. What was new during the period of Monothelite disputes was not this, but the explicit linking of this subordination (or obedience) with the doctrine of human will within the framework of the confession of St. Maxim of diopheliteism (Doucet 1985, p. 144–146). Unlike the ban on professing the number of energies, there was no formal ban on professing the number of wills until 638. These holy fathers, of course, wrote more than once about the Divine will of Christ, one with Him with the Father and the Spirit. Or: “will” (θέλησις). Opusc. 6: PG 91, 68C–D, hereinafter the translation of Theological and Polemical Works, except for the 1st and 20th, translated by A. M. Shufrin, and the 12th, translated by Z. A. Barzakh, in other cases - by D. A. Chernoglazov, is given according to this edition. See the arguments for and against this in note. 186. Taking into account the version of the majority of scientists (see note 186), we decided to consider the most difficult option for understanding the course of the controversy and discuss the motives for which St. Maxim and St. Sophronius did not (if we accept this option) object to this argument, based on the fact that it was known to them. He could have been known to him not only from Psiphos, the exact text of which we do not know and where it might not have been, but, for example, from the conversations of St. Sophronia with Patr. Sergius, after all, having expressed it to Pope Honorius, as can be seen from the message to him, Sergius, most likely, expressed it before to Abba Sophronius, with whom he argued in Constantinople before the adoption of Psiphos. From St. He could have become known to Sophronius and St. Maxim. In a word, the likelihood that this main argument of the monoenergists against two energies from the letter of Sergius to Honorius, even if it was not included in Psiphos, could have become known to St. Maxim and St. Sophronia, very great. It’s all the more interesting to think about why they didn’t immediately react to it then. See his answer to the monoenergists: “we do not call this action of them [that is, the two natures] one and only, or essential and natural and completely indistinguishable (ἀπαράλλακτον)” (Sophr. ep. syn. 2.3.10 (ed. Allen), p. 102, translated from: Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 151). Serg. ep. ad Hon. (ed. Allen), b. 188, per. from: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 174–175. As for the position of Rev. Maxim (and not St. Sophronius), A. M. Shufrin in a conversation with us made a different assumption (again, based on the hypothesis that St. Maxim knew this argument). Because in amb. 7: PG 91, 1076D prp. Maxim, on the one hand, speaks of one energy of God and those worthy of Him, and on the other hand, it is in this context, referring to the Gethsemane prayer, that in the state of the deification of the saints there is a cession of the autocracy of man to God without the loss of this autocracy, which Christ captured in Gethsemane, then we can say that the single energy in the state of the deification of human nature (which, of course, Christ initially had) was combined with the implicit confession of St. The maxim of two wills in Christ, one of which he is in amb. 7: PG 91, 1076B–C correlated with autocracy, without directly calling it “will” (cf. the words of St. Maximus from the Disputation with Pyrrhus: “the blessed Diadochos of Photica defined autocracy as desire (θέλησιν)” (disp. Pyrr. PG 91, 301C, trans. D. E. Afinogenova according to: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 169). Maxim implicitly spoke about one energy that characterizes the state of deification of our nature in the saints, especially in Christ, despite the fact that in the saints it takes place with the perfect surrender of autocracy or autocratic will to God (cf. the same thought in Questions and Perplexities, which speaks of perfect deification and the state of the human will in it: “This [will happen] when we completely surrender to God (τῷ θεῷ παραχωρήσωμεν) autocratic will (or: “free will” (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον θέλημα)" (qu. dub. 22). With all this in mind, we can say that for St. Maximus, within the framework of his teaching, as it developed in the Difficulties to John, the concept of one, and not two energies in the state of deification of our nature (which it was in Christ) was combined with the implicit teaching of His two wills, despite the fact that human will = autocracy was completely deified. And if so, then the prohibition of Psiphos on the confession of two energies in Christ, which would be. entailed two opposing wills, did not contradict the teachings of St. Maxim about one energy and two wills (with perfect human deification), since he himself professed not two contradictory (or even converging, but not united) wills, but the perfect free subordination of the human will to the Divine will and its unshakability in the state of deification. Therefore, Rev. Maxim could, with a clear conscience, not take Psyphos’ polemical attack (if, of course, Psyphos contained it) against those professing two energies, and therefore two mutually opposed wills, personally, and therefore his silence in this case was not tactical, but was entirely consistent with his teaching. When an addition appeared in the Ekphesis about the need to profess one will, the situation changed, since this was already clearly at odds with the teaching of St. Maxima, expressed in amb. 7: PG 91, 1076, implying the presence in Christ of two wills and the deification of the human will of God. In the new context - coercion to confess one will - the entry of St. Maxim's polemic with the arguments of Ekphesis, including those previously set out in Psiphos (in the new context they were read as a prohibition on the confession of two wills in general, and not just opposite ones), also organically followed from his views expressed in amb. 7, as well as the fact that he had not previously entered into polemics with Psiphos on the issue of two wills. Probably on the eve of the capture of Jerusalem in 638. See Hovorun 2008, p. 74. See Booth 2013, p. 176. In any case, it is likely that the opposition to the teachings of St. Sophronia was formed in Palestine during his lifetime (as can be seen, for example, from the Psogos of the Palestinian Bishop George of Reshain), and after his death the Monothelites turned out to be more influential than the followers of St. Sophronia (see more about the ecclesiological situation in Palestine in: Levy-Rubin 2001, pp. 283–300). For arguments for and against, see note. 186. Ekth. (ed. Allen), p. 214 = Mansi X. 991. One phrase was removed from it: “It is impossible for two wills opposed to one another (θελήματα) to be present together in one subject,” and in its place stood a whole new text with an argument about Nestorius and the confession of one will. ASO 2.2.550.16–19. We will dwell on the controversy surrounding this passage from Honorius’ letter to Sergius below. Sophr. ep. syn. 2.3.13 (ed. Allen), p. 106. At the Sixth Ecumenical Council, Monothelite Macarius of Antioch will say that he rejects not only two opposing wills in Christ, but also two identical ones (Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 88). Sophr. ep. syn. 2.3.5 (ed. Allen), p. 94. So, in opusc. 20 he will distinguish between the natural will, which moves naturally, that is, in accordance with the logos of nature, and is not yet in unity, but in agreement (or: “descent” - συμβαῖνον), and not in discord with God (see opusc. 20: PG 91, 236C), from the will that is completely united and deified (cf. Ibid, 244A). Seleznev 2005, p. 50. On the “Nestorian” interpretation of monothelitism, see, for example, in: opusc. 2: PG 91, 41A–45B; opusc. 15.: PG 91, 176A; 180A; disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 313B. The paradox is that at the Monothelite Council in 662, St. Maximus will be accused by Constantine of Perga of the heresy of Nestorianism (Jankowiak 2009, pp. 358–359) and further the Monothelites will accuse the “Maximites” of Nestorianism. “[Ekphesis] himself testifies, proclaiming that even the wicked Nestorius did not dare to recognize two wills, but professed the “identity of will” (ταὐτοβουλίαν), that is, one will in the two persons he imagined; so, if, according to [Ekphesis], Nestorius preaches not two, but one will, and this is Apollinaris and all the wicked [following] them [both], and also all of them - one energy, as [our] speech has shown; then by what he preaches, he undoubtedly shows that we, according to the holy fathers, who speak of two [wills and energies] are, of course, dissenters, and he himself, speaking of one [will and energy], is unanimous with Nestorius, Apollinaris and their followers; [he shows] that, as I have already shown, he rejects the divine [fathers], and calls the wicked [heretics] his fathers!” (opusc. 15: PG 91, 180A–B). See opusc for more details. 15: PG 91, 173C–D. This work dates from 645–646. Excerpt from the so-called "Letters A", see: Mansi X. 677A–678C (PL 129, 583D–586B), trans. Z. A. Barzakh in our edition according to: Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 256. Due to the complexity and ambiguity of translating this historically and dogmatically important passage from Letter A, we present it in Latin: Exposita vero ab eis fuerat causa facendarum in Christo Deo, id est in substantiis ejus, ex quibus videlicet et in quibus est et creditur, naturalium operationum; et ne de caetero in eo sive una sive duae penitus praedicarentur. Fatebatur autem solummodo confitendum esse, ex uno eodemque Dei Verbo incarnato Deo decibilia et humana processisse, et in unum eumdemque referend. Per. Z. A. Barzakh according to: Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 256. ep. 19: PG 91, 593A, lane. E. Nachinkina, cit. from: Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 207. We gave this explanation in: Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 256. See Jankowiak 2009, p. 150–191, especially r. 169; Jankowiak 2013. Gr. Naz. de filio. 2. or . 30.12. 6–12. Pyrrhus's letter dates from 640. These are ACO 2.2.450.8–10 (Allen 2009, p. 107); ACO 2.2.450.14–17. It can be added to Jankowiak’s observations that, unlike St. Maximus, who devoted space in his writings to the interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer and the theme of Christ’s obedience to humanity both before the controversy with monoenergism, and in the period from 633 to 639 (that is, before the controversy with monothelitism), in St. Sophronius, as far as we know, these topics are not developed, and his Council Epistle is focused on the topic of the presence of corresponding natural energies in the natures of Christ. Ibid, trans. Z. A. Barzakh according to: Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 255, emphasis added. Riedinger 1989, pp. 40–42. According to the traditional version, Stephen was sent to Rome by St. Sophronius at the end of 638. If Stephen came to Rome after the death of Honorius, then it is not clear why his mission was not successful, because the next pope, Severinus, refused to sign the Ekphesis. However, Jankowiak’s version, as we noted above, raises certain questions: it is not clear how St. Sophronius sent Stephen to Rome to Honorius to ask him to renounce the Ekphesis, shortly after the Council of Cyprus, at which he himself and Honorius’s legates (according to Jankowiak) signed the Ekphesis. The argument is that the situation in the empire changed radically after the Battle of Yarmouk and pushed St. Sophronia's call for decisive measures is not entirely convincing. It is interesting that in the surviving sermons of St. Sophronius, spoken after 636, we do not find the opinion that the seizure of Palestine and Jerusalem by the Arabs is the result of the adoption of the heretical Ekphesis. But does this indicate that St. Sophrony, who signed the Ekphesis version according to Jankowiak-Buta, kept silent about this topic, or did he say that the Ekphesis was adopted later, as is traditionally considered? What St. Maximus was prompted to speak out against Ekphesis by the Arab invasion, it is said in the Syrian Psogos, but Jankowiak himself notes that with such a speech the St. Maximus was apparently only a letter to Thalassius in 640, written many years after the Battle of Yarmouk and even several years after the capture of Jerusalem. Essential for St. Maxima was apparently the position taken by Rome and in particular by Pope Severinus and later by John, who condemned the Ecphesis. His speech against Ekphesis coincides with the speech of Rome, and further changes in the approaches of St. The maxims of the polemic against heresy largely correlate with the position taken by Rome in this polemic. Riedinger 1989, pp. 40–42, Booth 2013, p. 179. Many of its members belonged to the Palestinian monasticism, scattered after the Persian invasion, but this brotherhood had its centers not only in Palestine (where their stronghold was the Laurels of St. Theodosius and St. Sava), but also in North Africa (in particular, in Carthage), and in the vicinity of Rome (see Andia 2000). As can be seen, for example, from opusc. 15 – dogmatic tomos containing arguments against Ekphesis, written for Stephen at the request of St. Maxima. It must be said that Stephen’s mission and his specific actions will be opposed not only by monothelites, but also by many diophelites, who, obviously, will perceive his actions as canonically incorrect (see for more details Jankowiak 2009, p. 237). Stephen will be able to enlist the support of only two rural bishops. It is in this context that Rev. Maxim will write an essay addressed to Stefan, refuting Ekphesis - opusc. 15. On the ecclesiological situation in Palestine, see more in: Levy-Rubin 2001, p. 283–300, on Palestinian monasticism in Rome in the 7th–8th centuries in: Andia 2000, p. 285. See for example: Larchet 1996, p. 17. This is how we will call what is more important for St. The maxim, the denial of two wills in Christ, is in fact the main innovation of the Monothelite Ecphesis. The publication of the Ekphesis by the emperor gave it a status higher than that of the patriarchally published Psiphos. However, according to the version put forward later by St. Maximus, the emperor abdicated responsibility for the Ekphesis, transferring it to the church authorities. In a letter addressed to Pope John IV, he, according to St. Maxim, wrote: “When I returned from the East, [Sergius] asked me to sign and publish it” (rm, 9). Be that as it may, Ekphesis was not abolished during the life of Heraclius and appears in the acts of the Lateran Council as Ekphesis of Heraclius. The Ekphesis was approved a month after its publication at the Council of Constantinople, held in 638 by Patriarch Sergius. After his accession to the see, Pyrrhus convened the next council, which confirmed him (Mansi X. 674D–680A, 999–1003). This is the accepted version among church historians, which Jankowiak and Booth are currently trying to challenge (Jankowiak 2009, pp. 155–161; Booth 2013, p. 190f). It is not the purpose of our introductory article to clarify this issue. What were the actual goals and reasons for the publication of Ekphesis in 638, as Hovorun notes, is not entirely clear; none of the existing hypotheses completely convinces him (Hovorun 2008, p. 74–75). Above we presented the Jankowiak-Booth version, which copes better with this problem. What is more important to us is not why Ekphesis was published by imp at that moment. Irakli at the suggestion of Patr. Sergius (probably there was a whole complex of reasons), as much as the way St. Petersburg perceived him. Maxim. There is no doubt that in the situation of the capture of Jerusalem by Muslim Arabs and the support of Ekphesis by all Eastern patriarchates, including Jerusalem, deviation from the right faith was considered by St. Maxim as almost total apostasy, the punishment for which, in particular, was the invasion of the Arabs (see for more details Benevich 2011, p. 335–344 and the Russian version of the article: http://www.bogoslov.ru /text/1371847.html). See ACO 2.1.160.4–29 and comparison with the heresy of Nestorius, which was in fact declared to be a better confession than diopheliteism. The fact that in 647–648 Emperor Constans under the influence of Patr. Paul issued a Typos, which abolished Ekphesis, while canceling the prohibition of "two wills", is conclusive evidence that Ekphesis actually prohibited this expression. See an excerpt from the letter of Sergius to Honorius, included in Ekphesis: “the expression “one action,” although it is used by some of the holy fathers, sounds strange and outrageous in the ears of some, who assume that it is pronounced in the sense of the destruction of two natures” (Serg. ep. ad Hon. (ed. Allen), p. 188, translated from: Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 174). It is precisely in this way, that is, by the unity of the subject, that the unity of will in Ekphesis is justified. It should be noted that, although the thesis “neither one nor two energies, but one will” appears in the first letter of Pope Honorius to Patriarch Sergius, Honorius in his second letter to Sergius no longer puts forward this thesis, but adheres to the position of Psiphos: “We should not affirm either one or two actions,” to which he adds the formula of St. Pope Leo: “Both natures... acted and produced each in communion with the other” (Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 195). So, if Sergius moved from Psiphos towards anti-diothelitism (to substantiate which he used the formula of Honorius), then Honorius, on the contrary, abandoned his own formula “one will” and tried to link Psiphos with traditional Roman theology. It is possible that in the Roman Church, even during the life of Honorius, he was pointed out to him the seductiveness and even erroneousness of the expression in the first letter to Sergius, and in the second he refrained from repeating it. Nevertheless, the question is open whether Honorius Ekphesis signed (Yankowiak and Booth are sure that he signed, Govorun also thinks so). If in the Epistle of Honorius to Sergius the context still allows for different interpretations of this expression (which we subsequently find in St. Maximus and Pope John IV), then in Ekphesis this expression is used unambiguously, and signing it by Honorius would mean unequivocal evidence in favor of the fact that Honorius used it in the same (monothelitian) sense in the Epistle to Sergius. So we are again faced with a riddle - bearing in mind that in all the apologies of Honorius in the 640s. it is not the fact that he signed the Ekphesis that is mentioned, but only his First Epistle to Sergius, where this expression is used. Either we are dealing (as Yankowiak and Booth believe) with the deliberate suppression of this fact by the diophelites, including St. Maxim (until the Sixth Ecumenical Council, which condemned Honorius as one of the heresiarchs), or Honorius did not sign the Ecphesis (in the event that the Ecphesis was adopted shortly before his death in 638, since its adoption in 636 would have excluded such disobedience of Honorius to the emperor, about which we would know nothing). The apocrisiary performed approximately the same functions as the chargé d'affaires now. In particular, the exarch of the emperor in Italy sealed and then plundered the papal treasury and palace. St. Maximus was aware of all these events, as can be seen from his letter to Abbot Thalassius of Libya, this is Letter A (ep. A), Mansi X. 677A–678C, preserved only in the Latin translation of Anastasius the Librarian (see Russian translation in: Maximus the Confessor 2007b, pp. 253–256), dating from c. 640, in which he relates in detail the history of the confirmation of Pope Severinus. As Larcher notes (Larchet 2004, p. 172), this letter “undoubtedly contains the first critical statements of St. Maxima versus Ekphesis." In a letter to Rev. Maximus highly appreciates the actions of the Apocrisiari (both their diplomatic skill and firmness in faith) and removes from them any suspicion of supporting Ekphesis. Meyendorff 1989, p. 363. However, Meyendorff, it seems to us, is unfair and inaccurate when he writes about the popes of this time: “Their protests... did not entail severance of communion with the see of Constantinople: the Roman bishops of the seventh century lacked the energy and steadfastness of their predecessors” (Ibid, p. 363). If Pope Severinus did not break with Constantinople, it is difficult to blame him for this, bearing in mind that his reign lasted only four months, and before his confirmation as emperor, he and his apocrisiaries bravely held out in a difficult situation. The next Pope John IV (640–642) rejected Ekphesis, but did not break relations with Constantinople, since the new emperor definitely promised to abolish it (which we will discuss below). The next Pope Theodore (642–649) also pursued a firm policy towards heretics in Constantinople, condemning heresy and breaking off communication with Constantinople; True, not immediately, but the delay was due to the fact that Patr. Paul, in his conciliar letter after occupying the see, did not mention the controversial teachings about one or two wills (Jankowiak 2009, p. 208), and he was succeeded by St. martyr Pope Martin. So to blame the Popes of the 7th century. in weakness in relation to power is at least incorrect (especially if you compare them with the patriarchs of Constantinople and Alexandria of the same period). Mansi X. 607–610; Hovorun 2008, p. 80. In particular, interpreting Honorius, Pope John wrote that we were born from the sin of Adam and have two opposing wills - spirit and flesh, but Christ was free from his ancestral sin. Therefore, “in the operation of His flesh, that is, humanity, He did not have two opposing wills, and the will of His flesh was not contrary to the will of His spirit.” Following this, Pope John declared: “we confess one will in the action of His holy humanity” (PL 129, 563A–D). Three copies of this letter survive (none of them original), including a back translation from Greek to Latin by Anastasius the Librarian (PL 80, 602C-607C) (for more details, see Jankowiak 2009, pp. 187–191). Jankowiak 2013. In fact, Jankowiak, from our point of view, did not quite accurately understand St. Maxima. As for the polemic with Pope John, the situation here is more complicated, since St. Maximus offers different interpretations of the expression of Pope Honorius, including one different from what was given in Rome, although he does not write about this directly (opusc. 20: PG 91, 240A–C), but a little lower, referring to the secretary of Pope John, he gives an interpretation that he himself considers partly coinciding with his own (Ibid, 241B–C). We discuss this issue below. In the Roman Church there were already authoritative examples of the confession of two wills in Christ. In particular, St. Pope Leo, interpreting the free acceptance of the Cross in Gethsemane, wrote: “Superiori igitur voluntati voluntas cessit inferior (So, the lower will yields to the higher will)” (Leo. orat. 56.2: PL 54, 327B). The doctrine of two wills in Christ can also be found in the blessed. Augustine (August. en. in ps. 93.19 (CCSL 39.1319)), who, in particular, writes about the Gethsemane prayer: “He showed the human will that was in Him, but if He continued to insist on this will, He would show the depravity of the heart.” In the same passage, Augustine expounds, without calling it by this name, the doctrine of “relative assimilation.” Quote from: Kulakovsky 2004, T. III, p. 147. Kulakovsky refers to Mansi X. 682–686. Further, referring to Mansi X. 703, he writes: “John’s successor, Pope Theodore, in a letter to Patriarch Paul severely reproached him for failing to fulfill this promise” (Ibid.). In addition, he notes that Patriarch Eutyches “gives the answer to the emperor. Constantine to Pope John, in which he gives complete satisfaction to the pope and declares that Ekphesis has already been burned. This letter did not find John alive and was handed over to Pope Theodore” (Ibid., note 1). And although Kulakovsky says that “the authenticity of this document is doubtful,” the opinion was supported in Diophelite circles that Emperor Constantine III was Orthodox; in the Dispute with Pyrrhus St. Maximus even calls him a saint (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 239A), which in the context of the controversy he called everyone who professed the right faith. Modern historians, relying on a number of newly discovered documents, are inclined to believe that Eutyches’ story cannot be considered completely reliable, but they also recognize that in Constantinople there was a period when, in the face of criticism from Rome, they tried to move away from the position of rigid monothelitism, and in Rome, in turn, they showed a certain restraint and did not break off relations with Constantinople (Jankowiak 2009, p. 207–208). However, at first, according to Yankowiak, Patr. Paul and the new secular authorities in Constantinople wanted to mitigate differences with Rome in every possible way. Three messages were sent to Pope John IV in 642 - on behalf of the new emperor, from Patr. Paul and (which was an exceptional matter) from the bishops who elected him. The text of the messages has not been preserved, but one can get an impression of their content from the response messages that the new Pope Theodore later wrote. Judging by this answer, as Yankowiak notes, in Constantinople in the initial period of the reign of the emperor. Constant and Patr. Paul sought reconciliation with Rome and made it clear that they did not insist on monothelitism. However, there was no explicit rejection of Ekphesis in these letters (Jankowiak 2009, p. 208). Later Patr. Paul took a more definite position in defense of the Ekphesis, but only after Rome began to put pressure on him. The fact is that at the end of 642 or 643, Pope Theodore accepted the conciliar message of the patriarchs. Paul, without breaking off relations with him, since in this letter there was no confession of one will. However, there was no renunciation of Ekphesis and condemnation of the patriarchs. Pyrrhus, which Pope Theodore demanded from the patriarchs. Paul in a reply letter, but neither the new emperor nor the new patriarch agreed to this (Ibid, p. 209). All this should be kept in mind when reading the theological and polemical works of St. Maxima 642–643, in which, especially at the end of the opusc. 19 (opusc. 19: PG 91, 225C), where the aporia of the deacon Patr. Paul Theodore, you can find proposals for the “dogmatic minimum” that St. Maximus on oikonomia considered it sufficient to end the controversy - the adoption in Constantinople of the doctrine of the Divine and human will in Christ without indicating their number and without defining these wills as natural. This proposal was apparently not accepted. It is possible that the policy of Pope Theodore played a role here, who demanded that Constantinople unequivocally condemn Ekphesis and its authors, especially Pyrrhus. Already at the end of 643–beginning of 644, when opusc. 12, directed illustration to Peter, and opusc. 16, prp. Maxim takes a much tougher position, apparently following the policy of Rome in this regard. Let us remember that Jerusalem had already fallen, Alexandria was surrendered at the end of 641, and finally in 646, after an unsuccessful attempt to recapture it. Speaking about the direct participation in church politics of St. Maximus, it should be mentioned that in 641 he wrote to John the Cubularius, who was close to him at court, asking him to assist in the return of the Carthaginian prefect George, when he, at the request of Martina (the second wife of the late Emperor Heraclius), was removed and recalled to Constantinople (see ep. 12). It is worth mentioning the circumstances of this case. Fleeing the Arab conquest, a large number of Monophysite Christians, primarily monks and nuns, arrived in North Africa. Prefect George ordered to receive everyone in a Christian manner, they were given shelter and everything they needed and allowed to lead a monastic life. However, once among the Orthodox, they began to conduct Monophysite propaganda, apparently very aggressive. The prefect, acting in agreement with the episcopate and having received the sanction of Emperor Constantine III, began to demand that the heretics renounce their error under threat of expulsion and confiscation of property. The Monophysite nuns who abused the mercy of George were sent to Orthodox monasteries. When Martina briefly came to power, relying on a union with the Monophysites, she, having learned about these events, sent a decree to George prohibiting these actions and demanding the restoration of the Monophysite monasteries. Martina's decree caused indignation among the Orthodox population of Africa, and George, not considering it correct, declared the message to be forged, for which he was recalled to Constantinople (Kulakovsky 2004, Vol. III, pp. 164–165). St. Maxim, who was spiritually close to George (see his letter to him - ep. 1), apparently approved of his actions, and in his letters to Cubular John, probably wanting to influence the court through him, he showed the destructiveness of this heresy and its difference from Orthodoxy. This polemic by Rev. The maxim with the Monophysites and supporters of the union should be kept in mind, since in 641 it was no less relevant for him than the polemic with the new heresy. The Monophysite presence was a very significant factor in the church-political life of the Byzantine Empire in many places with which St. Maxim: this is Alexandria, where many of his letters were sent, and North Africa, where he lived, and Cyprus (remember the case of the leader of the Cypriot Monophysites, Pavel One-Eyed). The question of the presence of Orthodox Christians in Constantinople during the reign of heretics there is obscure; we have not encountered any research on this topic. One can only assume that they were there. Gregory, who arrived from Constantinople to take the place of prefect George, turned out to be Orthodox. Since 641, the former spiritual disciple of St. was also in Constantinople. Sophronia, etc. Maxima Prefect George. It is difficult to imagine that he held different views on heresy than St. Maxim. At the same time, as Kulakovsky writes, George, having returned to Constantinople, received the post of master of the army. He was later accused of a conspiracy against Emperor Constans, prepared by another high-ranking military man - Manuel. Both, along with their supporters, were executed around 648 (Kulakovsky 2004, Vol. III, pp. 163–165). It is not known whether the Manuel-George party had religious overtones, but this cannot be ruled out. Be that as it may, it can be assumed that information about the fate of George reached St. Maximus to the Lateran Council (649) and hardly left him indifferent. Let us recall that Arkady did not break communication with Constantinople and did not enter into open confrontation with it, however, as evidenced by Archbishop who replaced him at the See of Cyprus in 643. Sergius, and the Venerable himself. Maximus was an opponent of Ekphesis and tried in every possible way to convince the church authorities in Constantinople to abandon him (for more details, see notes 132–134 and the text thereto). But not Ekphesis, which he, according to St. Petersburg, abolished. Maximus, pleaded with the church authorities in the capital (see opusc. 12: PL 129, 575B). In this monastery, as was traditionally believed, St. Maximus himself at one time labored ascetic (about this in George, see Larchet 1998, p. 25). F. Booth, as part of his criticism of the Greek Life, does not agree with the inclusion of George among the Constantinople, believing that his location was either Apamea (Syria) or Palestine (Booth 2013, p. 198, n. 300). But Yankowiak and Booth believe that the letter to which Rev. responded. Maxim in Letter A to Thalassia, came to him from Constantinople (Jankowiak 2009, p. 170f), which means that according to their version of the connection with St. Maxim and his supporters remained in Constantinople. See in particular the dates in: Sherwood 1952, p. 59–60; Lethel 1979; Larchet 1998; Winkelmann 2001. We also use the considerations expressed about the dating of the works of St. Maxima Bathrellos (Bathrellos 2004). According to Sherwood, this work was written c. 640, shortly after the publication of the Ekphesis, and is one of the first reactions to it (Sherwood 1952, p. 63); according to A. Cereza-Gastaldo, it dates back to 646–647, that is, written simultaneously with the opusc. 15 (see Larchet 1998, p. 40). For the reasoning, see the notes to this essay. Sherwood (1952, p. 44), followed by Larchet (1998, p. 43), date this work to 640; It seems to us that its later dating (643 and later) is not excluded, since the work raises the question of the need to distinguish between the concepts of “natural will”, “intentional choice” and “intention” (which is more typical for the works of St. Maximus after 643, although the distinction between natural will and gnomic will actually occurs already in opusc. 7, see about this below). Since the work is short, a more precise dating based on the intended distinction between these concepts is difficult. Venerable himself Maxim does not define them, but encourages his recipients to think about it. Overall, it would be tempting to conclude that St. Maxim conducted the debate methodically carefully, first giving definitions to all concepts, studying the relevant passages from the holy fathers, and then moving on to consider individual theological problems, but we are not sure that in a situation very far from an academic dispute, this was exactly the case, we have no confidence. Some of their topics will be discussed below, in addition, they are touched upon in the notes to the translation published below. Gr. Naz. de filio. 2. or . 30.12.6 (for translation, see note 189). St. Maxim discusses this passage in: opusc. 4: PG 91, 61A–B. More precisely, it allows it only in the sense of relative assimilation, which we will discuss below. Thus, rejecting the confession of two energies in Christ, Sergius argued that to follow such a confession “would mean accepting two wills (θελήματα) that are opposed to each other, such as the [will] of God the Word, who wanted to accomplish saving suffering, and the [will] of His humanity, opposing His will, and thus introducing two wills (θέλοντας) opposite each other.” friend - which is wicked. It is impossible that in one subject there should be two wills opposite each other (θελήματα)” (Serg. ep. ad Honor. (ed. Allen), p. 190, translated from: Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 175). opusc. 6: PG 91, 65A–68A. opusc. 6: PG 91, 65B; 68C. See, for example, opusc. 7: PG 91, 81D; 88A; opusc. 8: PG 91, 96D; 100C–D about the fusion of wills and energies in Christ. F.-M. Letel, not without reason, believes that before opusc. 7 (Léthel 1979, p. 86, n. 47). Lethel 1979, p. 86, no. 47. St. Cyril uses this expression in his Commentary on the Gospel of John (Cyr. Al., in Joann. 6, 53:4. 2. ed. Pusey, I. 530); PG 73, 577C–D, speaking of Christ’s healing of the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue [Luke 8:49–56] and the son of a widow [Luke 7:11–15]. Cm . opusc. 7: PG 91, 85A–85C; Wed opusc. 8: PG 91, 100B–C. Sherwood dates the opusc. 8 – 640, and opusc. 7 – 640–642, but rather closer to 642 (see Sherwood 1952, p. 43; 51). As we will show when talking about the next work - opusc. 20, it was written later opusc. 7, so if we can be more specific about the time of writing opusc. 20 (and there is some data for this, which we will talk about), then it is possible to date opusc more definitely. 7 and 8. It seems to us that this is more likely 640-641 than 642. In any case, these works were written after opusc. 6, and what is more important to us is consistency in the development of the thought of St. Maxim, than the exact dating of the works. See “[would you call it] hypostatic? Then again [it turns out that] you alienate the Son from the Father and, introducing three wills (θελήσεις), you show them to be inconsistent with each other, as well as the hypostases” (opusc. 24: PG 91, 269Α); Wed “If this [will is not natural, but] hypostatic, then it will be a distinctive feature (χαρακτηριστικόν) only of His hypostasis; and by this [will] He will not be associated either with the Father or with us, since by hypostasis He is separated and delimited from extremes (χωρίζεται)” (opusc. 8: PG 91, 100B). Most of them relate to polemics with the Monophysites and Nestorians and are partly borrowed from Leontius of Byzantium. This part could generally be earlier, and what relates to the polemics with the Monothelites was added to it later. Here, it seems, for the first time at St. Maxim (unless this sentence is a later insertion, which none of the researchers seems to say) states that Christ’s will was natural, not gnomic: “The Savior’s will (θέλειν) was human; it was not in any way contrary to God, for it was by no means gnomic, but, in the proper sense, natural” (opusc. 7: PG 91, 81 C–D). In “Maxim's Case” (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, p. 50, note 101) we uncritically reproduced Sherwood's statement that in opusc. 7 prp. Maxim also speaks of the gnomic will of Christ, but abandons this only in opusc. 16 (see about this in our translation of Sherwood’s work in: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 471, note 197). In fact, the passage to which Sherwood refers in opusc. 7: PG 91, 80A, cannot serve as unambiguous evidence that St. Maximus at this time applied the concept of the gnomic will to the human nature of Christ, and the above (again, if genuine) is opusc. 7: PG 91, 81C–D clearly indicates the opposite. Moreover, the indicated place in the previously written opusc also inclines. 14: PG 91, 153A, although it should be recognized that one of the most important Christological positions of the later polemical works of St. Maxim - about the absence of gnomic will in Christ - in this early period of polemics with the Monothelites, if it occurs, it does not occupy such an important place as in later works, starting with opusc. 16, especially in the Disputation with Pyrrhus and in opusc. 1. Wed. Sherwood 1952, p. 43. This can even more so be said about opusc. 26: PG 91, 276–280 (after Sherwood, c. 640, see Sherwood 1952, p. 45) and opusc. 27: PG 91, 280–285 (640–646). The attribution of these works (they are florilegia and a collection of various definitions relevant to the issues of controversy), as well as the time of their writing, are very uncertain; the hypotheses that exist in this regard are discussed by us in the notes to them. Sherwood 1952, p. 41–42. May 29, 643 marked the letter of the next archbishop after Arcadius. Cyprus Sergius to Pope Theodore (Mansi X. 916C–E); Arkady probably died in the spring of 643. According to D. A. Pospelov, the Vatican Library contains manuscripts of unpublished works by Arkady of Cyprus (Vat. Gr. 729, 143 – 144, 146) of the 14th century. If these writings are authentic, their study may provide additional information about the personality and way of thinking of the archbishop. Arkady, who is also considered the author of the Life of St. Simeon the Stylite (the Younger), who labored in Syria in the 6th century. Bathrelos 2004, p. 198. Honorius' interpretation of the expression "one will" in Pope John's Apologia pro Honorio Papa was probably written in the spring of 641 (see Mansi X. 682ff) and addressed to Constantine III (d. 25 May 641) (Sherwood 1952, p. 42). It cannot be ruled out that St. Maximus wrote his apology for Honorius in opusc. 20 as an alternative to the apology of Pope John, according to Jankowiak (2013), who dates this work to 641. It is likely that all the anti-Monothelitian works we are considering above: opusc. 4, 6, 8, 7, 20 - were written during 640–641. In the work “Maxim’s Case” the chapter dedicated to opusc. 7 and 8, we have placed after the chapter on opusc. 20 (Maxim Confessor 2007a, pp. 33–46), which may give the impression that these works were written after opusc. 20. However, at that time we had not yet raised the question of the order in which the works were written, and took the dating from Sherwood and Larcher. This issue is specifically problematized in this publication. Wed. also Winkelmann's remark in: Winkelmann 2001, S. 90. Implicitly he talks about it already in opusc. 4: PG 91, 61B, which quotes a passage from Greg. Naz. or. 30.5.9, which deals with what later came to be called the “relative assimilation” of our reproachful passions; in this place opusc. 4 refers specifically to “disobedience.” We will dwell on this point in more detail in Chap. 14. Below, in chapter 14, we discuss in detail how St. Maxim approached the topic of revealing the doctrine of relative assimilation in connection with the Gethsemane prayer. Bathrellos writes that, according to Paul, "Christ in Gethsemane simply expressed our nature, which wants to live and does not want to die" (Bathrellos 2004, p. 83 citing ACO 2.1.202.10–12). Looking ahead, we note that for St. For Maxim, the matter was not limited to this, since Christ also showed His human will to be completely united with the Divine. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 304A. “It is necessary, therefore, first of all to approve the zeal and work of those who strive for such subjects for the sake of piety, but to encourage more careful care for the words of the fathers, because of the detractors of the beautiful, from excessive bewilderment, they do not concede even that which, with all their desire, is impossible for them to grasp” (opusc. 20: PG 91, 237C). opusc. 19: PG 91, 217A–B. There is no mention of him, so we can only guess who it was, Arkady or Sergius, who replaced him in the spring of 643. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 308D. opusc. 19: PG 91, 220B–C. Sherwood dates this work to 642 or later (Sherwood 1952, p. 51), based on the fact that Paul did not become patriarch until October 641 (see Ibid, p. 52). Note that Angelis (Massimo Confessore 2007, p. 7) locates the works of St. The maxims of the period of polemics with the Monothelites are in the following order: opusc. 4, 20, 14, 8, 24, 25, 26, 6, 7, 19, 16, 12, 27, 1, 2, 3, 10, 9, 15, 11. The most significant difference from our proposed order is that opusc. 20 is considered by him to be one of the earliest. Wed. words of Pyrrhus in disp Pyrr. PG 91, 301A. At first they hoped for the same thing in Rome, based on the conciliatory messages of the emperor. Constant II and the conciliar message of Patr. Paul, who bypassed the issue of wills, and apparently hoped that the removal of Pyrrhus could lead to a new church policy (Jankowiak 2009, pp. 207–208). But even before this purely theological work, he will write an important ecclesiastical and political work - opusc. 12, letter to Illustration Peter regarding the deposed ex-patriarch Pyrrhus. In this analysis, we follow the main line of analysis of the issue in “Maxim’s Case” (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 33–41), but in a number of points we clarify and supplement this analysis. PG 91, 1056A–1060C, = 184–296 (Janssens). opusc. 8: PG 91, 100D. D. A. Chernoglazov’s use of the word “masculine” in the translation of this sentence can be considered as an additional argument in favor of our chosen method of translating the Areopagite expression: “God-masculine energy.” As can be seen from this and other places in the Theological-Polemical Works written after 640, in contrast to the Difficulties on Thomas, written before the publication of Ekphesis, St. During this period, Maxim no longer observes the ban (imposed by Psiphos and repeated verbatim by Ekphesis) on the use of the expressions “one” and “two” energies, but says: two (energies), and moreover, one (see below for more details); that is, instead of what is actually affirmed by Ekphesis “neither two, nor one,” St. During this period, Maximus, one might say, professes “both two and one,” where “one,” of course, does not abolish the two, but precisely means their fused unity. Ibid. PG 91, 232A. Words of St. Maximus can be compared with the words of Patriarch Sergius from the letter to Pope Honorius: “The Only Begotten Son of God, who is true God and at the same time man, alone acts both in Divinity and in humanity, and from the same incarnate God... occurs inseparably and inseparably from the eternal divine and human action” (Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 176). If there is a difference, it is subtle, and it does not consist in the difference in the number of actions (moreover, Sergius does not say: “one,” although the word “action” is in the singular for him, and St. Maxim considers the expression “one action” in St. Anastasius to be Orthodox), but in the fact that St. Maxim speaks of the interpenetration of natural energies as a guarantee of their “fusion,” but Sergius does not speak of the “method of unity,” which implies the presence of two energies. According to A.I. Sidorov, who devoted a special article to “single action” in St. Patriarch Anastasius, “the interpretation of Maxim the Confessor ... fully corresponds to the views of the patriarch himself” (Sidorov 1989, p. 30). In his other work, A.I. Sidorov, who worked more than other domestic scientists to study the historical context of the Christological polemics of St. Maxima, suggests that the tradition, which, on the one hand, emphasizes the difference of natural actions in Christ, and on the other, their unity, goes back to St. Ephraim of Antioch (†545), who wrote in defense of the Chalcedonian creed. He uses the expression “two energies,” but he, judging by the retelling of St. Patriarch Photius, wrote about their unity: “Christ did not perform separately [actions] characteristic of Divinity and characteristic of humanity, but the one and the same He in hypostatic unity accomplished everything: both divine and human.” As Sidorov writes, “thus, he emphasized, on the one hand, the difference of natural actions, and on the other, their unity” (see: Sidorov 2003, pp. 360–361). However, the conclusion of A.I. Sidorov is that St. Ephraim emphasized the unity of actions, which seems to us not entirely correct. In the retelling of St. Patriarch Photius in the words of St. Ephraim is talking only about the unity of the actor (an obvious objection to the Monophysites who accused the Chalcedonites of Nestorianism), and not about the unity of actions. Wed. written by St. Maximus on the expression of St. Anastasia: “This father explained his thought more clearly than ever through his characteristic expressions, saying that Christ’s energy alone is not essential, so that fusion and confusion could not be introduced into His parts; and not hypostatic at all, so that disunion and separation with the poles could not occur in Him - I’m talking about the beginningless Father and His immaculate Mother” (opusc. 20, PG 91, 232C–D). Mansi X. 682–686 = PL 129, 561–566. Apology, included in the message of Pope John Imp. Heraclius, was probably written in January 641 (Heraclius died on February 11, 641, John became pope on December 24, 640). For the dating of this work, see the previous chapter. Another time Rev. Maximus will defend Honorius in 645, which is reflected in the Dispute with Pyrrhus (PG 91, 329A), where he will give his words a completely different interpretation, consistent with the new position that he himself will then take; this new interpretation will repeat that of Pope John IV (Maximus the Confessor 2004, p. 272, note 99). Compare: “He did not say this (that is, about one will - G.B.) not on the basis of denying the human and natural will of the Savior, but to the fact that the will of the flesh and passionate thoughts were by no means a prerequisite for His virgin birth and incorruptible birth” (opusc. 20: PG 91, 237). Here is this passage from the message of Pope Honorius, taken in a broader context: “We confess in the Lord Jesus Christ one will, for it is clear that our nature is accepted by the Divine, not sinful, not that which was damaged after the fall, but a nature created before the Fall... The Savior accepted... a nature that has not sinned, which is at war with the law of the mind. […] In the Savior there was no other law in the members, or a different or contradictory will, since He was born above the law of human nature” (Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 177 with amendments). Gr. Naz. de filio. 2. or. 12/30/6–12. Honor. ep. 1 ad Serg. (ed. Allen), p. 198, per. by Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 177. For more information, see chapter 14 on interpretations of the Gethsemane prayer. opusc. 20: PG 91, 244C–245A; Wed Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 272, approx. 99. Let us only note that recently Richard Price, without reference to St. Maxima largely repeated his interpretation (Price 2010). On the contrary, Batrelos, who from our point of view did not fully understand the interpretation of St. Maxima, considers this interpretation unsuccessful and strained (Bathrellos 2004, p. 79; cf. Jankowiak 2013). Researchers' answer to these questions depends greatly on their religious affiliation. Thus, the majority of Roman Catholic scholars are trying to prove the Orthodoxy of Honorius and, accordingly, the adequacy of his understanding of St. Maximus (see review by Bathrellos in: Bathrellos 2004, p. 77–79), but the majority of Orthodox researchers are inclined to believe that Honorius was a heretic, rightly condemned by the VI Ecumenical Council, and his defense by St. Maxim was due to solidarity with Rome and ecclesiastical and political motives (Ibid). Be that as it may, Rev. Maximus considered Pope Honorius to be Orthodox. As Larcher notes, in the Disputation with Pyrrhus he prefaces the name of Honorius with the title “one of the saints,” just like the name of Pope John IV; this is a reference that appears in the critical edition: Doucet 1972, p. 584, missing from the text of PG 91, 328B (Larchet 2004, p. 167). As Larcher notes, the scribes destroyed it after the condemnation of Honorius at the VI Ecumenical Council. The Russian translation of the Disputation, made by Afinogenov (Maxim Confessor 2004), follows not St. Maxim (that is, a critical edition), and copyists, although in the apparatus of this edition an alternative reading is indicated. If Jankowiak and Booth are correct in asserting that Honorius signed the Ekphesis, the interpretation of the "one will" in Honorius' letter to Sergius should be clearly interpreted as Monothelite. But St. Maximus nowhere recognized this signing of the Ekphesis by Honorius, so within the framework of the discourse that remained after St. Maxim (another question is whether it is not a “varnishing of history”), the context of Ekphesis is the relevant context for the interpretation of Honorius’ expression for St. Maxim was not there. Since we do not have the original letters of Pyrrhus in defense of Ekphesis, where those who signed it could have been mentioned, the question remains open. The fact is that Pope John’s apology for Honorius does not contain information about those who signed the Ekphesis, and the whole dispute revolves around the interpretation of the First Epistle of Honorius to Sergius, so based on the writings of the Diophelites of this period of controversy, it is impossible to assert that Honorius signed the Ekphesis. The fathers of the VI Ecumenical Council who condemned Honorius no longer doubted his monothelitism in the spirit of Ekphesis, but to the writings of St. Maximus and Pope John did not appeal to his defense at all, to which the legates of Pope Agathon also did not object. Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 178–179. The translation is given with minor changes. As we see from the above quotation, Pope Honorius considered it necessary to refrain from the expressions “one” and “two energies”, in the first case, as he explains in his letter, so as not to seem like a Monophysite, in the second - a Nestorian; the expression “one will” apparently did not cause such fears in him (one can only guess why). However, in his second letter to Constantinople, Honorius no longer uses this expression (Acts 1996, Vol. IV, p. 195). Moreover, in the second letter, the pope again insists that it is impossible to say: “one” and “two actions,” but it is possible that “both natures ... acted and produced each in communication with the other. The divine nature produced what was natural to God, and the human nature produced what was natural to the flesh, inseparably and unfused” (Ibid.). The verb συμβαίνειν, which in this case we translate as “converge,” has other meanings: “to coincide,” “to correspond,” “to agree.” We took its meaning (however, the most common one) which would be suitable for all places where this word and its derivatives appear in opusc. 20. Not in the context of the interpretation of Honorius, but analyzing one passage from the polemics of St. Anastasia of Antioch with John Philoponus. St. Maxim uses the form of the verb that we translated above as “converge,” but we are talking about convergence without unity, which in this text he distinguishes from convergence with unity. The somewhat artificial use of words (it would be more natural to say: “In agreement, and not in discord with God”) is due to the fact that the specified verb is the key term here, and therefore all its forms must be translated so that the identity of the concept they denote is not lost sight of. The following is an analysis of the interpretation of St. The maxim of Honorius’s formula differs from what I made with A. M. Shufrin in “Maxim’s Case” (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 38–40); in a number of points it was corrected and supplemented during a new joint discussion. Bathrelos 2004, p. 79; Jankowiak 2013. Compare: “in the action of His flesh, that is, humanity, He did not have two opposing wills, and the will of His flesh was not contrary to the will of His spirit” (PL 129, 563A). Compare: “He did not acquire, according to the body (through its members), any unnatural energy, nor, moreover, according to the soul, a contrary, that is, contrary to the logos, movement of the will” (opusc. 20: PG 91, 241B). It is characteristic that in the Dispute with Pyrrhus in the mouth of St. Maximus includes the interpretation of Honorius (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 329A), which practically coincides with the interpretation of Pope John (PL 129, 563A–D), i.e., it also differs from the interpretation of St. Maxima in opusc. 20, and from the interpretation of the secretary of Honorius John, which is given in opusc. 20. This can be explained either by a change in the position of the Venerable. Maxim, or the fact that the text of the Disputation with Pyrrhus was not compiled by him himself (see Chapter 18 of the introductory article). According to A.M. Shufrin, within the framework of the understanding of St. By the maxim of deification at that time, this meant the cessation of natural action, that is, a kind of deactivation of human energy, its transition to a latent state, but not annihilation - see scholia {53a} and {54} to amb. 7 (to John) in: Maximus the Confessor 2007a. This is exactly how St. Petersburg understands. Maxim in this work (written before 630) the words of Christ in Gethsemane, which would later become a classic place of Diophelite argumentation: “Not as I will, but as You will” (Matthew 26:39; see: PG 91, 1076B). Thesis of Rev. Maxim about the united energy of God and the saints from amb. 7, most likely, is therefore behind the expression “entirely converging and united”, which he uses when speaking about the human will in Christ in its relation to the Divine in opusc. 20. She not only “converges” with the Divine, but is energetically one with her, remaining distinct in her essential origin. To this consideration of Shufrin we should add the clarification as in amb. 7, interpreting the state of deification of the saints, St. Maxim stipulates that “autocracy... [although it] is free and completely surrendered (ἐκχωρηθέντος) to God... “rules perfectly” even in this state of deification and complete unity with God’s will (PG 91, 1076A–B). There is no reason to believe that during this period he denied the autocracy of human nature and Christ. Speaking about the position of Rev. Maxim during the period of writing the opusc. 20 and other works in which he gave his interpretation of the Unitarian formulas of the Fathers, it should be noted that he drew the line between correct and incorrect confession not by whether Unitarian expressions are used or not (after all, the Church Fathers also used them), but by the meaning given to them. Let us recall that during the period of polemics with the Nine Chapters of Cyrus, St. Maxim, on the contrary, ruled out the possibility of accepting the expression “one divine action” in any sense. In the first period of polemics with Ekphesis (640–643), he, as we see, found such expressions of the fathers quite acceptable, provided that the “one” energy is also confessed as the unity of “two” (which was previously proposed by the Uniates), and even considers such a confession necessary. That is, he now rejects not unitary formulas relating to energy, but an interpretation that treats the “one” energy in Christ as only one, namely either hypostatic or complex natural (but not two, as they are preserved in deification, despite their “unity” and “descent.” Wed. as he speaks of energies: "[Christ] wove together His Divine and masculine natural energies" (opusc. 8: PG 91, 100D). opusc. 7: PG 91, 88D. In The Case of Maxim, we did not pay attention to this asymmetry (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 39–41). He cites an excerpt from the treatise of St. Athanasius the Great (actually Ps.-Athanasius) Against Apollinaris: “Born of a woman, having restored to Himself the nature [form] from the first creation of man, having as proof flesh without carnal wills and human thoughts, in the form of newness; after all, there is only one will of the Divine, since all nature is Divine” (opusc. 20: PG 91, 240B). It should be remembered that the Monothelites at this stage, in principle, rejected the existence of a natural human will in Christ (see, for example, opusc. 19: PG 91, 217Aff); talking to them about the unity of wills in perichorisis (i.e., offering such an interpretation of a single will) was simply pointless. But most of the works where unitary formulas are interpreted were directed to Cyprus and were part of a dialogue-dispute (through Arkady of Cyprus) with ideologists in Constantinople. Let us note, however, that later in the Dispute with Pyrrhus St. Maximus (after he - not without resistance - agrees to recognize the human natural will in Christ) will reject the latter’s proposal to talk about one (due to the perfect union) complex will (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 295A–C), but Pyrrhus will talk about the addition of wills, as if something third (complex) arises from two, the concept of the perfect unity of the human will with the Divine St. Maxima does not imply any addition, so he immediately rejects this proposal. Next, Pyrrhus comes to another understanding of the unity of wills, which is formulated by St. Maxim helps him: will in the sense of mutual exchange (ἀντίδοσις), that is, in the sense of perichorisis (see Ibid, 297A). But such an exchange, notes St. Maxim, in any case, implies the presence of two wills. Pyrrhus, however, does not offer St. Maximus, which would be logical to recognize two natural wills that are united through mutual exchange, but instead (in response to the doctrine of mutual exchange) insists on his understanding, in which there is no place for the freely allowed manifestation of the human will of Christ, saying: “Did not the flesh move at the behest of the Word united with it?” (Ibid, 297B - here Pyrrhus repeats, even strengthens, the thought from Ekphesis - Ekth. (ed. Allen), p. 214 = Mansi X. 991.), to which St. Maxim, referring to the Gethsemane prayer, answers that in Christ there was a voluntary (on the part of the Divine) manifestation of the human will as such (that is, not at the behest of the Divine, if by the latter we mean the driving force). Thus, we cannot say for sure what the Venerable would answer. Maxim on the proposal to think in Christ two natural wills, united into one through mutual exchange. If you believe the Disputation with Pyrrhus, in the teachings of the Monothelites there was no such understanding of their unity (based in any case on the presence of two natural wills in Christ) (cf., however, the excellent opinion of Price in: Price 2010). Venerable himself Even if Maxim did not literally profess such a formula (perhaps not wanting to break tradition), then, in all likelihood, this is precisely how he understood the doctrine of the unity of two wills. So the doctrine of the perichorisis of energies in Christ had a correlate for him in the form of the doctrine of the perichorisis of wills. However, in the Disputation with Pyrrhus, he even avoids agreeing with Pyrrhus that Christ had one action “in the manner of union” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 340D), taking a tougher position than in the period 640–643. and requiring the confession of two energies (we will dwell on this topic in more detail in chapters 15 and 18). The complexity of the analysis of this issue is also due to the fact that the Dispute with Pyrrhus was most likely drawn up after 655 and it is unclear whether it really reflects the position of St. Maximus in 645, occupied by him during the dispute with Pyrrhus. St. Maxim speaks of the state of deification as one in which “one, even only one, in all [relations] the action of God and those worthy of God, or rather, God alone, as [coming] in a manner befitting the Good, wholly in interpenetration with the worthy” (amb. 7: PG 91, 1076C). How exactly such a permission was conceived by St. Maxim, can be seen from the quote from St. John Chrysostom, who interprets precisely the episode of the Gethsemane prayer and in which this is stated clearly: “He sometimes leaves His flesh alone and deprived of His [Divine] energy, so that, by showing its weakness, instill confidence in its [human] nature” (Joann. Chrys., contra anom., homilia 7: PG 48, 765, quoted in opusc. 24: PG 91, 268B). For recent work that references previous research, see Bathrellos 2004, p. 140–147 and a lengthy article by hieromonk (now abbot) Dionysius (Shlenov), dedicated to the Gethsemane prayer in the light of the Christology of St. Maxima: Shlenov 2004, p. 339–378. See also Davidson 2005, Angelis's preface to: Massimo Confessore 2007 and the article by Lafontaine 2003, not taken into account by either Shlenov or Batrellos, and a very useful publication of selections of interpretations of the Gethsemane prayer by the holy fathers, including St. Maxima, in: Congourdeau 1996; translations from prp. Maxima: Ibid, p. 26–34, for translations and analysis see also: Ceresa-Gastaldo 1985. From later works, the theme of the Gethsemane prayer by St. The maxim is addressed in the articles: McFarland 2005 and 2007 and in reports at the conference on prp. Maxim in Belgrade 2012, which we address in Chap. 17 in the context of the question of distinguishing between natural and gnomic will and in Ch. 21, speaking about the modern controversy surrounding the teachings of St. Maxim about the gnomic will. The absence of such an approach is partly explained by the lack of a substantiated chronology of the works of St. Maxim of the first period of the Ecphesis controversy, the principle of organization of which was proposed in the previous chapter. Per. A. M. Shufrina by Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 251. Duocet 1985, p. 141–142. Greg. Naz., or . 30 (= On Theology 4; = On the Son 2) 5.16–27 (ed. Barbel), which contains the words that Christ “represents us in His face” and that He “assimilates” our foolishness, sinfulness and other such passions. Joann. Dam., exp. fid. 3.24–25. Here, however, it is said, in particular, not about the Gethsemane prayer, but about the cry of Christ’s “abandonment” on the Cross (Matthew 27:46): “Therefore He prayed in this way, as if He had taken our face to Himself. You should know that there are two types of assimilation: one is natural and essential, and the other is personal and relative. Natural and essential - that is, according to which the Lord, out of love for mankind, accepted our nature and all our natural properties, truly and truly becoming a man and experiencing what belongs to our nature. Personal and relative assimilation occurs when someone, for the sake of a certain relationship, for example, for the sake of compassion or love, takes on the face of another and instead speaks in favor of his speech, which has nothing to do with him. Accordingly, the Lord took upon Himself both the curse and our abandonment, and the like, which does not relate to nature—he took it in, not because He exists or became such, but because He took on our person and placed Himself along with us. This is what the saying means: the curse came upon us [Gal.3:13]” (translated by A.A. Bronzova, ed. D. E. Afinogenova). As Shufrin noted in correspondence with us, Doucet is wrong when he says that in amb. 7 prp. Maxim means natural absorption. The purpose of St. Maxima in amb. 7 did not say anything about what actually happened in the Gethsemane prayer with Christ. Christology of St. Maxim does not directly consider this difficulty at all; he is only interested in how saints become. And this, says St. Maxim, Christ sealed it. Namely, the saints’ yielding of their (formerly) rebellious will to God. In Christ, according to St. Maxim, there never really was any disobedience. However, in the preface to the Questions and Answers to St. Thalassia. Maxim says that evil does not exist in anything that exists by natural assimilation (κατ’ οἰκείωσιν φυσικὴν) (Thal. epist. 215), but he draws the very distinction between natural and relative assimilation later. Among Christian authors, the expression “natural assimilation” can be found, for example, in Eusebius of Caesarea (Euseb. praep. evang. 4.3.8.6 (ed. Mras)). opusc. 19: PG 91, 216B. Below we will more precisely formulate the position of Deacon Theodore, but for now we are talking about it in “general terms.” This is clear from the words of Pyrrhus: disp. Pyrr. PG 91, 304B. So, around 644 St. Maximus wrote about the opinion of the Monothelites: “After all, the statement that He revealed Himself to have two wills only during saving suffering, when He actually imprinted in Himself what is inherent in us and, as a man, evaded death, is, as it seems to me, an [empty] statement, in no way substantiated” (opusc. 16: PG 91, 196C). Here is an excerpt from St. Gregory the Theologian, which the Monothelites used for this interpretation: “Seventhly, consider the saying that the Son came down from heaven, not to do His will, but of Him who sent [John 6:38]. If this were not said by the One Who Descended Himself, then we would answer that these words were uttered on behalf of a person, not what we mean in the Savior (His will, as completely deified, is not contrary to God), but similar to us, because the human will does not always follow, but very often contradicts and opposes the will of God. For this is how we understand the words: “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass by from Me, not as I will, but may Your will prevail” [Matthew 26:39]; and it is incredible that Christ did not know what is possible and what is not, and that he began to oppose one will to another. But since this is the speech of the One who Perceived (which is what the word “descended” means), and not of the One Received; then we will give the following answer: this is said not because the Son’s own will is really different from the will of the Father, but because there is no such will, and the meaning contained in the words is this: “Do not let me do My will; because I have no will separate from Your will, but there is only a common will for both Me and You. As We have one Divinity, so we have one will”" (Gr. Naz. de filio. 2. or . 30.12.6–12, translated from: Gregory the Theologian 1994, T. 1, p. Wed. “Blessed Diadochos of Photica defined autocracy as desire (θέλησιν)” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 301C, trans. D. E. Afinogenov according to: Maxim the Confessor 2004, p. 169). Wed. at St. Gregory the Theologian: “Therefore, as long as I am disobedient and rebellious with my passions and because I renounce God, until then Christ alone is called disobedient for me (ἕως μὲν οὖν ἀνυπότακτος ἐγὼ καὶ στασιώδης, τῇ τε ἀρνήσει τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν, ἀνυπότακτος τὸ κατ’ ἐμὲ καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς λέγεται" (Greg. Naz. de filio. or. 3.5.9, trans. by: Gregory the Theologian 1994, T. 1, p. 431). Greg. Naz. or. 30.12. It should be noted that in the Disputation with Pyrrhus (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 316C) an excerpt from this passage by St. Gregory was put into the mouth of Pyrrhus, who refers to him to prove the doctrine of one will, so that there is indeed reason to believe (as Léthel does (see Léthel 1979, p. 29ff)) that for the leaders of the Monothelites pat. Sergius and Pyrrhus this passage by St. Gregory was one of the most important patristic sources on which they relied. This is also evident from how often St. Maxim turns to him, refuting their opinion and finding in him confirmation of his teaching. On the relative assimilation of the human will from Christ according to the Monothelites, see the confession of Pyrrhus in: disp. Pyrr.: 91, 304A–B. opusc. 6: PG 91, 65A. For translation options συστολή, see note. 206 to the Opusc translation. That is, in relation to will and energy. On the interpretations of the Gethsemane prayer in the Christian tradition before St. For Maxim, see: Shlenov 2004, p. 342–349 and (taking into account the interpretations of non-Chalcedonites) in Bathrellos: Bathrellos 2004, p. 140–145. Below in opusc. 7 prp. Maxim will also use the word “compression” Wed. in a later work: “He simultaneously showed the strongest impulse against death, and the complete fusion and unity of His human will with His own and Fatherly - [showed by] deciding (ἐπικρῖναι) in this way and saying: “Not My will, but Thine be done”” (opusc. 16: PG 91, 197A). As can be seen from this comparison, St. Maximus speaks of a certain act of “decision” (ἐπίκρισις) performed by Christ in Gethsemane for humanity. It is worth noting here that the opinions of researchers differ regarding how the will of Christ’s human nature is involved in evading death. Thus, according to the observation of Batrellos, Doucet, following von Balthasar, believes that this deviation took place at a reasonable level, since in opusc. 19, 224C prp. Maximus uses the term βούλησις, which refers to the realm of the rational, when describing Christ's desire to avoid death. However, as Battrellos notes, in this place St. Maxim only quotes St. Gregory of Nyssa. Unlike these authors, Batrellos believes that St. The maxim of Christ's desire to avoid death is fundamentally an expression of "an instinctive inclination towards life and an aversion to pain and death" (Bathrellos 2004, p. 145, n. 273). Battrellos believes, therefore, that in evading death, that aspect of the human will was manifested, which St. Maxim calls it “vital” (that is, the desire to maintain life), and in accepting the Cross he calls it reasonable. Open in Battrellos’s interpretation is the question of the state of the “reasonable” component of the human will at the moment of “compression,” i.e., the state of Christ’s autocracy. St. Maximus does not go into such details, although in the Disputation with Pyrrhus he says that the timidity that Christ allowed Himself to experience in humanity was not due to “betrayal of thoughts” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 297D), which means that the mind was not overcome by this timidity (δειλία). It is clear that there could be no resistance to God’s will either about the final acceptance of the Cup, or, no less important, about the economically endured compression before the threat of death by Christ according to His human autocracy, and therefore, according to the mind and reason, in Gethsemane. Ibid. PG 91, 80D. Wed. in the letter of Honorius about the concluding words of the Gethsemane prayer: “This is said for our sake, to whom the Teacher of piety has given an example, so that we should follow in His footsteps (cf. 1 Pet. 2:21), teaching the disciples that each of us should not act according to his own will, but would prefer the will of the Lord in everything” (Honor. ep. 1 ad Serg. (ed. Allen), p. 198, trans. according to Acts 1996, T. IV, p. 177). opusc. 7: PG 91, 81B. Louth's translation of this passage, “he willed to entreat that he be spared from death,” (Louth 1996, p. 185) appears to be incorrect. Formally speaking, the original allows for such a translation: “and then rushed against it [the will that evades death],” but Doucet, it seems to us, rightly criticizes this understanding found in Balthasar. As an argument, Doucet refers to a passage from the same work, found just below: “in order to expel from human nature all contraction in the face of death and to harden us and raise us courageously to fight against it, that is, death” (opusc. 7: PG 91, 84C) (Ducet 1985, p. 136, n. 75). Thus, the struggle of Christ in relation to Gethsemane (at least the struggle spoken of in the context of opusc. 7) should be understood as a struggle with fearsome death (cf. opusc. 16: PG 91, 196D, which speaks of a “strong and decisive movement against death,” which is tantamount to striving against death in opusc. 7). Doucet 1985, p. 135–139. This is the title of one of the sections in Doucet’s article (Ibid, p. 135). However, about Christ’s presence in the struggle of St. Maxim definitely says, for example in amb . 4: PG 91, 1044A–C, citing St. Gregory the Theologian. At the same time, the struggle at St. Gregory and St. Maxima, following him, refers to impeccable passions (cf. Shlenov 2004, p. 368). Later Rev. Maximus will indeed speak in connection with Gethsemane about “natural struggle” (ἀγωνία), clearly referring to the words about struggle from Luke. 22, 44 (opusc. 16: PG 91, 196D). However, the context of this passage is from opusc. 16 indicates that the struggle did not take place “within the will of Christ,” as Doucet put it, but against death: “He did not resist at all, but said, “if possible,” and “not as I will, but as You will,” and [at the same time] combined with compression a strong and decisive movement against death” (Ibid). At the same time, if we talk about the relative assimilation of our resistance by Christ (about which more later), then here we could say that Christ portrayed a person who first resists God’s will, and then overcomes this resistance (that is, defeats it), subordinating his will to God’s. So one could say about Christ’s relative assimilation of our “struggle,” but St. Maxim does not speak directly about this, emphasizing the natural (and therefore irreproachable) nature of the “struggle.” This important aspect of the teachings of St. We will analyze Maximus later, but now we note that if this is not a later insertion, then we are dealing here with the first explicit denial of the “gnomic will” by Christ, which, however, is not revealed or interpreted in any detail. This explanation will only be given in opusc. 16 (see chapter 16). Joann. Chrys. c ontr. anomoeos, homilia 7: PG 48, 765.46–766.20, trans. with significant changes according to: John Chrysostom, T. I, Book. 1, p. 376, quoted from Rev. Maxima in opusc. 24: PG 91, 268B–C and opusc. 15: PG 91, 164C–D. Probably it was precisely the temporary deprivation of Christ’s flesh of Divine action in the understanding of St. Maxim Chrysostom was determined in Gethsemane by the “compression” experienced by Christ in the face of death and evasion from it. Wed. Greg. Naz., orat. 30. 5.22: τυποῖ τὸ ἡμέτερον. Jankowiak rightly considers this work to be key (Jankowiak 2013), but does not pay due attention to the fact that St. Maxim gradually approached the teaching expressed in him in previous works of polemics with the Monothelites. That is, reproachful passions. Greg. Naz. or. 30. 5.7. This place is from St. Gregory, like the one that followed him (Greg. Naz. or. 30. 5.16–27), served as the source for the development of the concept of relative assimilation. In view of the importance of these passages, we present their Russian translation: “As for me he is called an “oath” [Gal.3:13] He who breaks my oath; and “sin” [2 Cor.5:21] – He who “takes away the sin of the world” [John 1:29]; and Adam from the old is made new; so He makes my disobedience, as the Head of the whole body, His disobedience. Therefore, as long as I am disobedient and rebellious with my passions and the fact that I renounce God, so long will Christ, solely for me, be called disobedient” (trans. Gregory the Theologian 1994, Vol. 1, p. 431). And further: “It seems to me that the words have the same meaning: O God, My God, listen to Me, why have You forsaken Me [Ps. 21:1]? For He Himself was not abandoned either by the Father or by His own Divinity... but (as I already said) in His person He represents us (ἐν ἑαυτῷ δέ, ὅπερ εἶπον, τυποῖ τὸ ἡμέτερον). We were previously abandoned and despised, but now we have been accepted and saved by the sufferings of the Impassive. Likewise, He assimilates (οἰκειούμενος) to Himself both our foolishness and our sinfulness, as can be seen from the continuation of the psalm, because the twenty-first psalm clearly refers to Christ” (Greg. Naz. or. 30. 5.20–27, trans. according to: Gregory the Theologian 1994, Vol. 1, p. 431). The original has one word: πάθη. opusc. 20: PG 91, 237A–B. St. Eulogius of Alexandria († c. 608), developing the well-known thought of St. Gregory the Theologian, set forth the doctrine that some words of Christ and about Christ in the New Testament should be understood truly and in their own sense, and some others relatively ἀναφοράν) (Phot. biblioth. 230.268a.12). Moreover, among the words that must be understood relatively, we should include those in which our rebellion and ignorance are expressed (τὸ ἀνυπότακτον ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν), which Christ pronounces “as the Head of the body [of humanity],” then is on our behalf, “out of unspeakable love for mankind, appropriating (οἰκειούμενον) what is ours as His own” (Ibid, 230.268a. 18–22). "Love of mankind" by St. Eulogy in the context of the doctrine of assimilation is similar to the “compassion” of St. Maxima. That the words of the Gethsemane prayer are an example of compassionate assimilation, St. Maximus speaks directly below, interpreting the words of Pope Honorius in opusc. 20: PG 91, 240C–D. These are blameless passions - the feeling of hunger, thirst, illness, mortality, etc. For the sources of the concept of blameless passions, see note. 377 translated by Opusc. These are reproachful passions - resistance to God and all kinds of sinful passions. opusc. 20: PG 91, 237V. The end of this passage conveys almost verbatim the words of St. Gregory the Theologian (Gr. Naz., or. 30.6: PG 36, 109C), which St. Maxim interpreted in amb. 4. The understanding of compassionate assimilation outlined below was formed in a discussion of this topic with A.M. Shufrin; it differs from that stated in the article “Maxim’s Case” written with him (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 51–52); it had to be rethought in many ways. According to the thoughts of A.M. Shufrin, expressed in correspondence with us, from the approved St. Maxim in opusc. 20 understanding the first part of the Gethsemane prayer as an expression of disobedience follows (regardless of whether St. Maximus himself was aware of this consequence) the impossibility of understanding the words of Christ “My Father, if it is possible” either as an expression of the assumption of the non-omnipotence of God by a person like us, whom Jesus “depicts” (τυποῖ), nor as an expression of ignorance of God by a person like us, whom Jesus “depicts” will, that is, we are talking specifically about resistance to the will of God of a person like us, compassionately “depicted” by Christ. At the energy level, as we noticed when analyzing the use of prp. In the maxim of the quotation from Chrysostom, this “depiction” by Christ of our rebellion was accompanied by economic deprivation, and then the covering of Christ’s flesh with Divine energy. At the same time, it must be admitted, Rev. Maxim does not explicitly connect one to the other with any cause-and-effect relationship. “After all, the assertion that He revealed Himself to have two wills only during the time of saving suffering, when He actually imprinted in Himself what is inherent in us and, as a man, evaded death, is, as it seems to me, an [empty] statement, in no way substantiated” (opusc. 16: PG 91, 196C). opusc. 16: PG 91, 196D–197A. As noted in the notes to the Disputation with Pyrrhus (Maximus the Confessor 2004, pp. 249–250, note 38), in developing the concept of essential assimilation of St. Maxim develops some of the ideas of St. Cyril of Alexandria, although, it must be emphasized, the pair itself: essential assimilation / relative assimilation is in St. Maxima appears, apparently, for the first time, and even then, as we saw, not immediately. Some aspects of his teaching related to philosophical issues of polemics with the Monothelites, St. Maxim will develop it later, which we still have to talk about. Here we should also mention Richard Price’s thesis about the place of St. Maxima. In his opinion, the Monothelites did not deny - since this was in tradition - the natural desire of Christ for His humanity for food, sleep, etc., allowed by the Divine, as well as the free aversion from death in Gethsemane. In rare cases, they could even call it will, but more often they called it aspiration. But at the same time, 1) they emphasized the complete control of the Divine over him and therefore categorically objected to the doctrine of two wills, and by one they meant the complete subordination of the human aspirations of Christ to the Divinity. In Price’s opinion, there was nothing different from traditional Orthodox teaching in this interpretation; 2) they also spoke about the relative assimilation of reproachful passions (which was also in the tradition). According to this researcher, it is impossible to talk about the “heresy” of monothelitism, if by such we mean a deviation from the Orthodox tradition. At the same time, Price believes that neither the Orthodox tradition, nor the Monothelites, nor the Diophelites (except for St. Maximus) developed a doctrine of the rational, non-instinctive human will of Christ. This is precisely the teaching of St. Maxim brought it into the Orthodox tradition, and after him it was entrenched in it not through the fathers of the VI Ecumenical Council (who, according to Price, did not understand and did not confess it, but repeated the old tradition, only using the concept of “will” and talking about two wills), but through St. John of Damascus, who accepted the teachings of St. Maxima (Price 2010, p. 231–232). We cannot go into an analysis of this point of view in relation to the history of Christian theology (P. Allen's response to this reconstruction of Price will appear soon in the Oxford Guide to St. Maximus), but we note the following. Speaking about the fact that St. Maxim was able, in his analysis of the Gethsemane prayer, to emphasize the role of rational human will in accepting the Cross, which no one had done before him with such clarity (strictly speaking, he still had predecessors in both the East and the West, say, St. Gregory of Nyssa (see note 66), St. Cyril of Alexandria (thesaur. PG 75, 397A–B) and St. Pope Leo the Great (see note 275)), Price did not clearly express the teaching of St. Maxim that this will is united and deified and that it never came into conflict with God and could not enter into it, so that the acceptance of the Cross is not the result of a decision of the autonomous human mind (Price, who refers in this article to Letel, and not to Doucet or Larcher, says that according to St. Maximus “in Gethsemane the human will freely and on its own impulse accepted [the godparents] suffering” (Ibid, p. 231)), but this was due to the belonging of his deified human nature to the hypostasis of the Logos. This can be seen, for example, from the following passage: “the words “not as I want” - completely eliminating the confrontation, marks the fusion of the human will of the Savior with His Divine and Fatherly will, for the Word was fully realized in all nature (οὐσιώσει) and [by His] implementation (οὐσιωθέντος) all deified her” (opusc. 6: PG 91, 68C). So the teaching of St. Maxima emphasizes that the human will of Christ was always subordinate to God’s, was imprinted and moved by it (at this point the difference between the teachings of St. Maximus and Price’s version of “monothelitism” is not so great), which indeed did not cancel out for St. The maxim that she was autocratic and reasonable, and not just “vital”, with a desire to maintain life, the manifestation of which, according to the old tropos, was sometimes allowed by God for strictly defined periods of time. In any case, unlike the monothelites (and, possibly, some diophelites), St. Maxim's truly “vital” aspirations were controlled not directly by the Divine, but through the deified (and imprinted by the Divine will) human mind. As for the doctrine of relative assimilation, St. Maxim, as we have seen, did not abandon it, but deepened and developed it, combining it with the doctrine of essential assimilation. In correspondence with us, Price agreed with the above comment about the fallacy of Letel’s interpretation and said that the reference to him in his 2010 article, which for him was only an approach to this topic, does not mean that he still agrees with Letel on this issue, and not with Doucet. He shared with us his next work on this topic - an excerpt from the preface to the Acts of the Lateran Synod of 649, due to be published this year by Liverpool University Press (see Price 2013), where the doctrine of the complete deification of the human will in Christ is emphasized along with its autocracy in the spirit of the understanding of this issue in St. John of Damascus (Expositio fidei 62 (III. 18), 71–2, in Schriften, ed. B. Kotter, III, 160). At the same time, from his main statement - about the closeness of the teachings of St. Price does not refuse the maxim of the teachings of the most “advanced” of the Monothelites (such as Patriarch Paul of Constantinople). On the peculiarities of the teachings of Patr. Paul, as well as Price’s interpretation of it, we will dwell below in Chapter. 18 (see note 548). disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 304B. This change occurs no later than 643. It is indicated by a letter from St. Maximus to the Exarch of Africa Peter the Illustrious (opusc. 12), who asked Abba Maximus for advice on how to deal with the expatriarch Pyrrhus, exiled to Africa, who continued to be highly respected by the church authorities of Constantinople (so much so that the new Patriarch Paul and his bishops called him “most holy”). In response to a question from the exarch, who was not only a military administrator, but also a kind of guardian of religious piety in the area entrusted to him (about Peter, see the preface by Larche in: Maximus the Confessor 2007b, p. 59), St. Maximus wrote very harshly that Pyrrhus was a heretic who had recently been anathematized in Rome, and therefore it was impossible to call him “most holy” or “venerable.” The theological position of Pyrrhus and Sergius is thus directly named here by St. Maxim heretical. From this time on, Rev. Maxim conducts a polemic with Ekphesis, directly denouncing this document. opusc. 20: PG 91, 229B–233B. Here we will follow the idea of ​​most researchers that the Dispute reflects the position of St. Maximus in 645, when the dispute with Pyrrhus took place, however, in the chapter devoted to the text of the Disputation and the history of the dispute with Pyrrhus, we will clarify a number of points. As will be seen, the conclusions that can be drawn if we assume that the text of the Dispute reflects the position of St. Maxim in 645, differ markedly from those that can be made if, following Jacques Noret (Noret 1999), we consider that the Disputation was written later (after 656), especially if it was not written by the Venerable himself. Maxim. Elements of strengthening the position of Rev. Maximus and a certain shift in his emphasis in the polemic can be seen in other works of 644–646, so with a number of clarifications and reservations, the hypothesis about the shifts that took place in this area can be accepted. In the course of our analysis of theological and polemical works, especially in chapter 18, we will clarify it several times. St. Maxim adopted the expression of St. Cyril “one co-natural energy” and identified the “God-male action” of the Areopagite with the “tropos” (or image) of union ( amb. 5 [to Thomas]: PG 91, 1056D [= 217–223, Janssens]), and “one energy” with the image of oikonomia ( opusc. 7: PG 91, 88B, 108B) or “logos of unity” (opusc. 8: PG 91, 108C; opusc. 20: PG 91, 232B–C) (the latter expression is much stronger than “tropos of unity”). disp. Pyrr. : PG 91, 340D–341A. This year, Bishop Sergius of Cyprus, in a letter to Pope Theodore, whom he calls the “ecumenical patriarch” (ACO 2.1.60.31), on behalf of the “holy synod” of the Cypriot Church (1.62.34–35; it is unclear whether we are talking about the council that took place or the current composition of bishops) stated that he “anathematizes in writing and orally” (1.62.15–16) those who puts forward dogmas that “deny the confession of Pope Leo and the holy fathers” (1.62.11), and calls for all sorts of measures to be taken against them (1.62.24–25). Let us remind you that Rev. Maximus was connected with the Church of Cyprus through Presbyter Marinus. Van Dieten believes that perhaps it was Rev. Maximus and Stefan Dorsky inspired Sergius of Cyprus to write to Pope Theodore (Dieten 1972, S. 82). In any case, we must state that if Sergius' predecessor Arcadius of Cyprus did not break off relations with Constantinople, but only moved from supporting the policy of Heraclius-Sergius during the period of Psiphos to admonishing him to abandon Ekphesis (trying to mediate between the diophelites and monothelites), then Sergius of Cyprus took a tougher position, openly declaring the monothelites heretics. This period saw a series of unsuccessful attempts by Pope Theodore, elected in November 642, to convince Patriarch Paul of Constantinople to renounce the confession of Sergius and Pyrrhus. Pope Theodore's letters to the ecclesiastical and civil authorities in Constantinople were written in the winter and spring of 643, but to no avail (Hovorun 2008, p. 81; Jankowiak 2009, pp. 206–214). In particular, the letter to the young emperor contained a demand either to stop honoring Pyrrhus, abandoning his teaching, or to admit that his removal was illegal (naturally, Pope Theodore expected the first decision). The second letter sent to Patr. Paul, developed the same theme - the demand for the condemnation of Pyrrhus and the Monothelite teaching, while it was proposed either to condemn Pyrrhus in absentia in Constantinople with the participation of the apocrisiaries of the pope, or to send Pyrrhus to Rome, where his case would be examined by the Pope himself. In this letter, the pope also set out his confession of faith (since he had recently been enthroned), which contained several points that later (c. 645) had to be explained by St. Maxim in opusc. 10 (one of them contained the first confession among the Roman popes about the procession of the Holy Spirit and from the Son, which later became the controversial issue of the Filioque). Bathrelos 2004. Batrellos’s work, as J.-C. noted in his review of it. Larcher (Revue d’Histoire Ecclesiastique, Vol. 101, 2006, pp. 202–205), is far from flawless. Nevertheless, some of Battrellos’s observations and conclusions are accurate and no longer allow us to so easily dismiss the question of certain stages in the formation of the theology of St. Maxim, as would like, for example, the same Larsha (who, unfortunately, did not note these positive aspects). We use some of his observations (Bathrellos 2004, pp. 198–199). Lurie 2006, p. 396–398. Lurie, unfortunately, did not pay attention to Battrellos’s hypothesis, simply repeating Larcher’s negative assessment of his work (Ibid., p. 525). Canon 13 of the Lateran Council. See: ACO 1.376.1–10. Bathrellos 2004, p. 201. It should be borne in mind that a negative response to the demand to abandon Ekphesis Patr. Paul gave only in the spring of 645 in a letter to Pope Theodore (Jankowiak 2009, p. 215). It is also true that the emperor did not take any action to cancel the Ekphesis, which was still hung in the narthex of St. Sophia, and the embassy of Pope Theodore, which included the future Pope Martin I, was well aware of the course taken in Constantinople. It is unclear whether the title of this work belongs to St. himself. Maxim or it was learned by him later. Larchet 1998, p. 58; Sherwood 1952, p. 51. Lurie believes that St. Maximus in this regard followed the tradition of the Chalcedonian theologians of the 6th century. and after them he confessed one “dwarf” to Christ, and a divine one at that (Lurie 2006, p. 325). In this case, it turns out that his early Christology was Monothelite. But this is not confirmed, as it seems to us, by the texts of St. Maxim, nor because he opposed monothelitism (cf. Doucet’s criticism of Letel’s opinion about the “monothelitism” of the early works of St. Maximus in: Doucet 1983). Lurie missed the point that, speaking of the will or "gnomes" of Christ in Thal. 42 and in or. dom. 135–138, prp. Maximus refers to the will and “dwarves” of Christ according to His humanity. In this regard, it seems to us, Rev. Maximus does not follow the tradition of the 6th century theologians whom Lurie has in mind, but St. Gregory of Nyssenus (see Gr. Nyssenus. Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium, ed. F. Mueller, Gregorii Nysseni opera, vol. 3.1. (Leiden 1958) 198.14–16). However, here it can be noted that the immutably good προαίρεσις is also repeatedly attached to the Divine Logos by St. Gregory of Nyssa in the Great Catechetical Sermon, for example, in the following context: “Therefore, if the Word lives, being life itself, then, of course, it has the power of will (προαιρετικήν), because nothing that has no will (ἀπροαίρετον) does not belong to the number of living... It is also necessary to recognize that the will of the Word, having power for everything, has no inclination towards anything bad (πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν κακῶν τὴν ῥοπὴν ἔχειν), because any desire (ὁρμή) for evil is alien the nature of God. On the contrary, what is good wants everything (βούλεσθαι), and what it wants is, without a doubt, possible for Him; It does not leave the possible unfulfilled, but every will to do good brings into effect... So, everything is the work of the living and existing Word (ὑφεστῶτος), because He is the Word of God - the Word that freely chooses (προαιρουμένου), because it lives, the Word, capable of everything that He chooses (ἕληται), the Word that chooses (αἱρουμένου), without a doubt, good, wise and only the best in meaning" (Gr. Nyss. or. cat. magn. 1.45–74 (ed. J. Srawley), trans. with modifications from: Gregory of Nyssa 2006, Vol. 1, p. 11). In the treatise against Apollinaris, the presence of will in Christ serves for St. Gregory’s argument in favor of the presence of a human mind in Him (νοῦ δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὐδ’ ἂν ἡ προαίρεσις εἴη - if there is no mind, there can be no will (Greg. Nyss. contr. Apollo 3,1.213.1)). Here it should be remembered that in opusc. 1: PG 91, 29D prp. Maxim reinterpreted προαίρεσις as applied to Christ among the holy fathers in the sense of either natural will or the relative assimilation of our will (in this case we focus on the first interpretation). In parallel with this, we find in the anti-Monothelitian florilegium compiled by St. Maximus or his disciples, the definition of natural will, allegedly taken from St. Gregory of Nyssa, which is actually the latter's definition of προαίρεσις (opusc. 26: PG 91, 277B; cf. Greg. Nyss. contr. Apoll.: PG 45, 1217C = 3.1.198.5). Thus, Rev. Maximus or his disciples retroactively interpreted the definition of προαίρεσις given in a Christological context by St. Gregory of Nyssa, in the sense of natural will. In the same sense, probably, St. Maxim interpreted in opusc. 1: PG 91, 29D and its use of this concept in Thal. 42.18–34. To what extent such an interpretation is justified, and to what extent it is a tribute to the controversy and is conditioned by it, is a question that requires special consideration (in Chapter 17 we touch on this topic). In any case, the later interpretation of προαίρεσις in the sense of natural will in opusc. 26 says that in the circle of St. Maximus corresponding passage to St. Gregory from the treatise against Apollinaris was well known. There is no doubt that he knew him and St. Maximus, who probably followed St. Gregory in Thal. 42, when he spoke about προαίρεσις in Christ (for more information about the concept of freedom in St. Gregory of Nyssa, where his use of προαίρεσις is discussed, see Harrison 1992). See Lurie 200 6, p. 323–328. See note. 693 to the translation of Opusc. in this edition. We outlined our own understanding of the main problems associated with the first aporia of Deacon Theodore in chapter 14, dedicated to the Gethsemane prayer, and in the notes to the translation of this work. Lurie obviously uncritically followed the opinion of Sherwood, who wrote that the concept of γνώμη is attached to St. Maxim to Christ back in “or. dom.: PG 90, 877D = or. dom. 135–138 (ed. P. van Deun) (which is fair - G.B.) and opusc. 7: PG 91, 80A (which is incorrect - G.B.), written (respectively - G.B.) somewhere in 628–630 and in 642. But already in opusc. 16 (643 or a little later) Maximus's position changes (opusc. 16, 192A, 193A), and the resulting position is visible from the Disputation with Pyrrhus (opusc. 28: PG 91, 308C) (645) or from opusc. 1 (645–646) (opusc. 1: PG 91, 17C)” (translated from: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 471). Sherwood, who correctly pointed out the fact of a change in the attitude of St. Maxim to the application of γνώμη to Christ (we add that in Thal. 42.18–34 it is applied to Christ and προαίρεσις), was mistaken, however, regarding opusc. 7, because in this work (unless we are dealing with a later insertion, but Sherwood does not stipulate such a possibility) St. Maximus argues that the human will in Christ was not gnomic (allowing for resistance), but natural. Unfortunately, in “Maxim’s Case,” A. M. Shufrin and I, following Sherwood, made the same mistake as Lurie (Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 50, note 101), and now we are correcting it. Following Sherwood, directly referring to him, Steenberg made the same mistake in his short but very provocative article, in which he states that, ultimately, comparing the early and late works of St. Maxim, we can talk about the presence of a gnomic will in Christ, which simply did not incline towards sin: Steenberg 2006 (for a link to Sherwood, see: Steenberg 2006, p. 241, n. 15). Moreover, the only “evidence” that Steenberg cites is the same place from opusc. 7: PG 91, 80A, which Sherwood refers to (where it is not said that Christ had a gnomic will, but that the gnomic will - speaking about man in general - may not contradict the logos of nature), while he, like Sherwood, ignores opusc. 7: PG 91, 81C–D, where it is said that Christ did not have a gnomic will, as well as opusc. 14: PG 91, 153A, where prp. Maximus, perhaps for the first time, defines gnomic will and distinguishes it from natural will. The same mistake was recently repeated by Paul Blowers, arguing that γνώμη is attached to St. Maximus to Christ until 642 (Blowers 2012, p. 47). See the sequence of writing the theological and polemical works of St. Maxim in Chapter 12 of this article. opusc. 14: PG 91, 153A. Moreover, in opusc. 25, which Larchet, following Sherwood, dates to the beginning of the controversy with the Monothelites (c. 640) (Larchet 1998, p. 43), we meet a call to account for the concept of gnomic will, intention (γνώμη) and other related ones: “Moreover, [we should understand] what deliberate choice is (προαίρεσις) and what is intention (γνώμη), what is gnomic will, and what is elective will” (opusc. 25:91, 273C–D). disp. Pyrr. : PG 91, 312D. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 308B. opusc. 16: PG 91, 185D–188A. Wed. an argument that is already found in the message of Patr. Sergius to Pope Honorius, and then repeated in Psiphos and Ekphesis. It says there that to teach about two energies in Christ “would mean to accept two wills (θελήματα) opposing one another, such as the [will] of God the Word, who wanted to accomplish saving suffering, and the [will of] His humanity, opposing His will, and thus introducing two wills (θέλοντας) opposite each other - which is ungodly.” (Serg. ep. ad Honor. (ed. Allen), p. 190, trans. with minor changes from: Acts 1996, T. IV. p. 175). In opusc. 16 the point of view of the Monothelites on this matter is not yet reproduced explicitly, which, however, is reproduced in the Dispute with Pyrrhus, so that by that time St. knew. It is impossible to say for sure whether the terminology of monothelites is maximal or not. In opusc. 20: PG 91, 232 prp. Maximus already carried out a similar reasoning in the interpretation of St. Anastasius of Antioch in relation to energy: differences between natural energies (of which there are two) and the one work performed by Christ. At the same time, he categorically rejects the possibility of applying a single energy to Christ (in the sense of the energy of His hypostasis) on the basis of one deed performed by Him (Ibid, 232D). Paul Blowers recently noted that Rev. John of Damascus (which is typical, after St. Maximus’s denial of γνώμη in Christ and in God as a whole), on the one hand, completely sharing and repeating the teaching of St. Maxim, at the same time, allows in a certain sense the application of γνώμη both to the Trinity and to Christ: “Having just rejected the gnomic will in Christ, he can also say that in the Trinity, nevertheless, there is one γνώμη, rooted in each of the three divine hypostases, but without distinction [among Persons - G. B.] in direction to the object of their will. And further John applies this principle to Christology. If γνώμη can be understood in the narrow sense of disposition towards a common goal or object of volition (τὸ θελητόν), then one can rehabilitate the presence of the gnomic will, shared by two natural wills, Divine and human, in the complex hypostasis of Christ (Joann. Dam. exp. fid. 2.22 = PG 94, 948B–C)" (Blowers 2012, p. 48). Blowers has in mind the following words of Damascene about the Trinity: “after all, the intention is shared along with the hypostases, except for the holy and simple and uncomplicated indivisible Divinity” and about Christ: “And since there is one hypostasis and one Willer, then there is also one object of desire or the will expressed by intention, since His human will, of course, follows the divine” (translated from: John Damascene 2002, p. 221). Polemics with this argument of the Monothelites, as well as with the very application of the “gnomic will” to Christ, will occupy most of the later opusc. 1, which we still have to talk about more than once. Ekth. (ed. Allen), p. 214= Mansi X, 991. Nestorius himself, as we know, energetically denied that he professed the doctrine of “two sons” (see Seleznev 2005, p. 77), however, the answer to the question about the nature of the interaction in Christ of the will of the Divine and the will of humanity (and Nestorius recognized both) remained in his Christology, at least, ambiguous (see more in our article about Nestoria in Anthology 2009. Vol. 1). Characteristic of his teaching was what a modern researcher, although very positive about the teaching of Nestorius, called “the increase in the obedience of Christ’s humanity” in the course of His life (Daly 1983, p. 147–152) - a thing completely impossible for St. Maxima. opusc. 14: PG 91, 152С. Wed. “Unity in relation (κατὰ σχέσιν) is in intentions (γνωμῶν), [bringing them] into one will” (opusc. 18: PG 91, 213B). Larchet dates this work, in which this definition is found, to 626–633, i.e., before the start of the controversy with the monoenergists (Larchet 1998, p. 20), but this does not seem so obvious. Read more about our thoughts on the dating of opusc. 18 cm in approx. 684 to the translation of Opusc. Let us remember that St. Sophronius wrote in the Council Epistle: “We ... do not say, like the empty-headed Nestorius, that the union [of Divinity and humanity in Christ] is relative (σχετικήν) or by equal honor or identity of will (ταὐτοβουλίαν), carrying nonsense about descent (or: consent - σύμβασιν) in the impulse (ῥοπῇ) and identity (ταὐτότητι) of wills (θελημάτων)” (Sophr. ep. syn. 2.3.5 (ed. Allen), p. 94). Let us note that here, to describe the method of “convergence of wills” according to Nestorius, the concept of gnomic will, which we find in St. Petersburg, is not yet used. Maximus, although in general his description of the teachings of Nestorius in opusc. 16 is very close to this description of St. Sophronia (see below). It is important that St. Sophrony uses the concept of “convergence”, which St. Maximus uses for relative unity, distinguishing it from “union” and “total convergence” (see opusc. 20: PG 91, 236C and the next note). In a later opusc. 15 prp. Maxim characterizes Nestorius’s position as follows: “vicious Nestorius... in the [treatise] he called “Clear Dedication”, in the Second Word of this treatise, he insidiously writes: “We preserve natures without merging, for they are united not in essence, but in intention (γνώμῃ); therefore we see that these [natures] have one will, one energy and one power (δεσποτεία).” (opusc. 15.: PG 91, 176A). The authenticity of this passage from Nestorius, cited, it seems, only by St. Maxim, is doubtful, but it fully characterizes how St. Maxim understands and interprets Nestorius. The fact that this place is not a later insertion is indirectly confirmed by another place in the same work by St. Maxim: “[The Savior] is neither simply God, nor simply man, nor a separate God acting incorporeally, nor a separate person acting according to [his] intention, but God incarnate and for our sake completely made human, acting simultaneously both in God’s and in man’s ways” (opusc. 7: PG 91, 85C). And not in the unity of the deified with the deified. In later than opusc. 7, works of St. Maximus makes a clear distinction between the “convergence” or “concord” of wills that Nestorius professed, and the perfect unity of the human will with the Divine in Christ, insisting that in Him such unity in deification (without the abolition of the human will) took place not because of the moral unity of Jesus the man with the Logos (as in Nestorius), but because of the hypostatic unity of human nature with the Divine in hypostasis Logos incarnate. But already in opusc. 20, as we noted above, he distinguishes the natural will, which moves naturally, that is, in accordance with the logos of nature, and is not yet in unity, but in agreement (or: “descent” - συμβαῖνον), and not in discord with God (opusc. 20: PG 91, 236C), from the will that is completely united and deified (cf. Ibid. 244A). Obviously, the Nestorian model, as St. Petersburg understands it. Maxim, and provides for such a “convergence”, which he already talks about in opusc. 7 wrote that it does not contradict God’s will if the “gnome” corresponds to the logos of nature: “neither does the intention (γνώμη) contradict it, nor does everything that relates to the intention – only when it agrees with the logos of nature” (opusc. 7: PG 91, 80A). But such a “convergence” of St. Maxim quite explicitly distinguishes from the complete convergence and unity of the human will with God’s in Christ, which Steenberg did not take into account when referring to this place in his “proof” of the presence of a gnomic will in Christ, allegedly recognized by St. Maxim even in the forties of the 7th century. (Steenberg 2006, p. 241, n. 15). Then he will repeat these arguments repeatedly (see the extensive polemic with Nestorius, which, of course, is not so much aimed at him as an argument against the Monothelites, in opusc. 2: PG 91, 41A–45B). opusc. 16: PG 91, 192B–C. opusc. 16: PG 91, 192C–D. This is evidenced, in particular, by the fact that he made the statement about the absence of gnomic will in Christ in opusc. 7, and the very distinction between natural and gnomic will (defined similarly, but not identically, with the definitions in opusc. 16) was already made in opusc. 14 (remember that even from the point of view of Sherwood and Angelis, opusc. 14 and 7 were written before opusc. 19). opusc. 16: PG 91, 192D–193A. Bathrelos 2004, p. 154. See disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 308B (on the naming of the gnomic will) and ibid, 308–313A, where the possibility of applying the “gnomic will” to Christ is rejected. It should be noted that recently among researchers Rev. Maximus, there was a strong tendency to consider his rejection of the gnomic will in Christ to be due solely to the motives of polemics. At the same time, the opinion is expressed that the teaching of St. Maximus is more fully and accurately reflected in his earlier works, where he uses, as applied to Christ, the concept of immutable will or "gnomes", which is an important element of his soteriology in these works. Such opinions are expressed in particular by Bathrellos (Bathrellos 2004, pp. 151–152) and Steenberg (Steenberg 2006). And David Bradshaw, in his report at an international conference dedicated to the theology of St. Maxima, in Belgrade (18–21 Oct. 2012) repeated this opinion, citing in particular Batrelos and the fact that such holy fathers as Sts. Athanasius of Alexandria, Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa, one can find the idea of "choice" from God and the application to Him of the concept of προαίρεσις (he refers to: Athan., contr. arian.: PG 26, 453C; Basil., Hexaem. I.7: PG 29, 17C; Greg. Nyss. et. res.: PG 46, 124B; The maxim from this concept in his Christological polemic deviates from this tradition and is a tribute to the polemic itself (according to Bradshaw, when faced with the use of gnomic or voluntary will among the Monothelites, St. Maximus, in defiance of them, began to say that Christ does not have such a will). To take seriously, according to these authors, this refusal of St. Maxim cannot, but should, as Steenberg suggests, be considered the authentic teaching of St. Maximus is where he applied immutable will (as in Thal. 42) or “gnomes”, as in or. dom. 135–150 to Christ according to His humanity, which, according to Steenberg, will immediately help resolve the question of how Christ can save us if He did not accept the gnomic human will, because “what is not accepted is not healed” (Gr. Naz. ep. 101). If Christ had will for humanity, then this question itself is removed. We address this topic below, in chapters 17 and 21, but here we would like to note that St. Maximus denies any "choice" in God already in Thal. 44, which A. M. Shufrin draws attention to in scholium 12 to amb. 7 (Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 309). In the same scholium, Shufrin notes that Plotinus already taught about the absence of “choice” in God (enn. 6.8), so at this point St. Maxim finds himself in line with the Neoplatonic tradition. However, as we will see below, the application of προαίρεσις to God in some fathers, for example in St. Gregory of Nyssa, does not necessarily imply that they taught that “choice” applies to God (see note 535). See also our article Benevich 2014, where the corresponding issues are discussed in relation to the Thesaurus of St. Cyril of Alexandria. Here is the argument of the Rev. Maxim: “if the deliberate choice of Christ corresponds to nature, then we not only recognize them [the Monothelites] ... as boldly and thoughtlessly making the nature of Christ different - intermediate between the Divine and the creature, but we also ridicule them as insanely making Christ susceptible by nature to opposites according to the deliberate choice, like a simple person, in accordance with Nestorius. If His choice (according to them) is contrary to nature, I will pass over this blasphemy in silence, so as not to somehow accidentally defile the language with refutations against them. After all, by asserting that Christ has a choosing will, they definitely hinted that the hypostasis of Christ is capable of moving in accordance with nature and against nature. This is, as I said, a deliberate choice. And if the choice of Christ characterizes His hypostasis, then they separated Him - in accordance with this “His will” - as differing in appearance and intention from the Father and the Spirit. After all, what is observed in the Son as a feature of the hypostasis cannot in any way be common in hypostasis to the Father and the Spirit” (opusc. 1: PG 91, 29B–C). It should be noted that the teaching about one hypostatic will in Christ, St. Maxim disputes already at an early stage of the polemic with the Monothelites (without yet calling it gnomic or arbitrary - perhaps at this stage of the polemic he did not yet know in its entirety the terminology used by the Monothelites, which, moreover, was changing). Along with Christ’s denial of one hypostatic energy (see, for example, opusc. 7: PG 91, 85B; 88A; opusc. 8: PG 91, 108C–D; 109A; opusc. 20:232D), he no less definitely, arguing in a similar way, already in opusc. 8, and perhaps earlier (if opusc. 24 and 25 were written before opusc. 8), speaks of the impossibility of applying to Christ one hypostatic will, which, if applied to Him, would separate Him by will from the Father and the Holy Spirit, which would divide the Holy Trinity (opusc. 8: PG 91, 100B). This argument appears repeatedly in St. Maximus and in other works (for example, opusc. 24:269A; opusc. 25: PG 91, 272B). So, in relation to this issue, Rev. Maximus had to make a clear distinction between the natural and hypostatic planes, emphasizing that the Divine natural will in Christ was one with Him with the Father and the Holy. Spirit, and the hypostatic will is inapplicable to Him. As can be seen from the above excerpt from opusc. 1: PG 91, 29B–C, prp. Maxim uses the same argument against the doctrine of one gnomic will, if we understand it as hypostatic, which he brought from the very beginning of the polemic, without yet calling this will “gnomic”. In opusc. 1, he obviously took into account the fact that the Monothelites, for example the same Pyrrhus (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 308D), called their “one will” gnomic. In addition to the repeatedly mentioned works of Batrellos, Shlenov, Govorun and Lurie, we point out several recent articles devoted to these topics: Sorabji 2004 (Sorabji, unlike most other authors, denies the original contribution of St. Maximus to the history of the doctrine of the will); Steenberg 2006; McFarland 2005; 2007. At the recently held conference in Belgrade on St. Several reports were devoted to Maximus the Confessor on this topic or related ones. Among the most important reports: David Bradshaw. St. Maximus the Confessor on the Will; Demetrios Barthrellos. Saint Maximus the Confessor’s Contribution(s) to the Notion of Freedom (Maximus Confessor. Proceedings of the Symposium 2013, pp. 143–157); John Panteleimon Manoussakis. The Dialectic of Communion and Otherness in St Maximus’ Understanding of the Will (Ibid, pp. 159–180). Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) made a report at the conference in which he tried to respond to criticism from J.-C. Larche regarding his understanding of the teachings of St. Maxims on hypostasis, nature and the natural and gnomic will: Metropolitan John Zizioulas. Person and Nature in Saint Maximus’ Ontology (Ibid, pp. 85–114). Finally, in the Oxford Guide to St. Petersburg, currently being prepared for publication. Maxim has several articles on topics that interest us that are not yet available to us. This is in addition to the article by Ian A. McFarland. The Theology of the Will (in which this author apparently summarizes his previous articles on the topic); article Raymond J. Laird: Gnomê in John Chrysostom, in which the author sets out his dissertation on the doctrine of “gnomes” in Chrysostom, whom he considers the forerunner of St. Maxim in the development of this topic; Philip Rousseau. Maximus, "Chalcedonianism", and the Human Will. McFarland refers to a similar formulation of the question in Schwager 1986, p. 157–158 (see McFarland 2007, p. 8). The appendix to his speech is dedicated to it: Bradshaw 2013, p. 154–157. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 308C, 329D, trans. D. E. Afinogenova. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 308D, trans. D. E. Afinogenova with amendments. opusc. 1: PG 91, 28D–32B, opusc. 3: PG 91, 53C, opusc. 7: PG 91, 81D. Bradshaw discusses these passages in: Bradshaw 2013, p. 155. It is possible that the last edition of the Disputation with Pyrrhus (although the dispute itself took place before the writing of opusc. 1) was released after this work (see Noret 1999). In addition, a number of manuscripts are not taken into account in the existing editions of the Dispute. opusc. 1: PG 91, 16D. “Estimation” is the translation of βουλή used by A. M. Shufrin. Further we will use it, although Bradshaw's deliberation does not necessarily coincide with it in meaning. See Bathrellos 2004, p. 151–152; Bradshaw 2013, p. 155. Bradshaw, with reference to Batrellos, recalls here that in the writings before the start of the polemic with the Monothelites, St. Maxim freely applied γνώμη and προαίρεσις to Christ. Bradshaw 2013, p. 155–156. Unlike Steenberg, who erroneously attributed the presence of the gnomic will of Christ to St. Maxima in opusc. 7, Bradshaw does not make a similar mistake, noting in the notes this work, along with others from the polemic with the Monothelites, where St. Maxim denies the gnomic will in Christ. In addition, Bradshaw analyzes in detail the content of the concepts in which St. Maxim comprehends the volitional act of a person. or. dom. 135–142, trans. A. I. Sidorova according to: Maxim Confessor 1993, book. I. c. 187. Compare: “God Himself, Who is above nature, having received it, had it also [i.e. e. human nature] natural autocratic will (αὐτεξούσιον θέλησιν)” (opusc. 15: PG 91, 157A). Also see on the freedom of Christ according to humanity: McFarland 2007 and Bathrellos report: Bathrellos 2013. opusc. 6: PG 91, 80D and opusc. 16: PG 91, 197A. Based on the given definition of autocracy of Blessed. Diadoche of Photica: “Amocracy is the will (θέλησις) of the rational soul,” which, with some variations, appears twice in the works of St. Maxima (PG 91, 277C and 301C). I owe this discussion to A.M. Shufrin, with whom the issues raised in this chapter were discussed. According to Doucet, at the level of a reflexive, conscious desire of the human will, Christ, according to St. Maxim, never wanted anything other than the fulfillment of the will of God about the Chalice (see diagram of the act of will in: Doucet 1985, p. 185). However, to what extent Doucet rightfully applies the thoughts of St. Maxim's Thomistic concepts (see his references to Thomas - Summa theol. III, qu. 18, a. 6 in: Doucet 1985, p. 137) are an open question. The absence of this distinction in earlier writings could affect the expressions used in them, which, if incorrectly interpreted, can be interpreted in the sense of attributing our choice to Christ in Gethsemane. Like “will” γνώμη in the earlier writings of St. Maxim is also translated by Yegor Nachinkin, noting in a note: “The exact translation of this famous term, it seems to me, is “the conscious aspiration of free will,” and all four words are almost equally important” (Maxim Confessor 2007b, p. 93, note 11), Nachinkin explains his translation of γνώμη with the word “will” by stylistic requirements. According to the remark of A. M. Shufrin, it is important to note the difference between this model of the fall: the will comes into conflict with nature - from the other one, which St. Maxim also uses: a perversion of the tropos of the existence of nature itself. The first model is cruder, since it creates the impression that will is something separate from nature, and not an energetic manifestation (= way of existence) of nature. or. dom. 148–152, trans. A.I. Sidorova since betrayal. from: Maxim the Confessor 1993, book. I. c. 187. The point is not that all saints become exactly the same and go to God along the same path. More carefully Rev. Maxim will develop this topic in opusc. 1: PG 91, 24D–28A, where he defends the permanent distinction between saints in the state of deification and on the way to it. What is common is that in all of them there is a unification of the human will with God’s, deification, but it happens in different ways. According to the thoughts of A. M Shufrin, in opusc. 1 prp. Maxim explains that it is necessary to distinguish between “will” in the sense of the object of desire (desired) and “will” in the sense of desire itself (as an act). In the first sense, all saints have the same will, but in the second, they do not. But the will of each of the saints is one with the will of God not only in the first sense, but also in the second. In ep. 2 and in general in the earlier writings of St. Maxim places the main emphasis on unity, but speaks of differences in relation to the virtues in which the saints participate: “God, in His love for mankind, takes on an image corresponding to the property of everyone’s virtue, and allows Himself to be named by it” (ep. 2: PG 91, 401A–B, trans. E. Nachinkina according to Maxim the Confessor 2007b, p. 95). opusc. 1: PG 91, 29D–32A. Wed. Greg. Nyss. contr. Apollo. 3.1.213.1, where, although indirectly (starting from the denial of the mind in Christ by Apollinaris), προαίρεσις is applied to the humanity of Christ. Logic of St. Gregory of Nyssa is this: if Christ does not have a human mind, then there is no will, and what is devoid of will cannot consciously strive for good: “So, how does the writer attribute ease to something that is devoid of will (τῷ ἀπροαιρέτῳ), in which there is no personal reflection that would guide him to good? For sinlessness, which does not depend on will (προαιρέσεως), of course, does not deserve praise” (translated from: Gregory of Nyssa 2006, Vol. 1, p. 228). So, at St. Gregory of Nyssa we read: “the soul, having come into being in such a way as was pleasing to the Creator, by its very power to choose (κατ’ ἐξουσίαν αὐτὴν αἱρεῖσθαι) what it likes (τὸ κατὰ γνώμην), then becomes by the power of will (ἐκ τῆς προαιρετικῆς δυνάμεως) what she wished to be (ἐθέλει)” (Gr. Nyss. anim. res . PG 46, 120.32–36, trans. according to: Gregory of Nyssa 2006, T. 1, p. A similar use of γνώμη can be found in St. Cyril of Alexandria: “the will (γνώμη) of each is the ruler of those chosen to perform actions, and the choice (τὸ ἑλέσθαι) of doing anything, good or evil, depends on ourselves” (PG 68, 456.53–55), and in Raymond Laird’s recently defended dissertation on the concept γνώμη in Chrysostom, and the monograph published on its basis (Laird 2012) shows how widely this author uses it, and suggests a possible influence on St. Maximus (of which we are not sure, since, as we see, this concept is also used by many other fathers, for St. Maximus in the early period more significant). It should be noted that will (προαίρεσις) among the holy fathers is not necessarily associated with “choice,” especially with a moral one, but is always associated with autocracy. Yes, St. Gregory of Nyssa applies the concept of will to God and understands it as an autocratic movement of the will aimed at achieving the desired: “the aspiration of Divine will (ὁρμὴ τῆς θείας προαιρέσεως), when it wishes (ἐθέλει), happens deed, and the will (βούλευμα) is carried out, immediately turning into nature by the power (ἐξουσίας) of the Almighty, which only wisely and artistically wishes (ἐθέλῃ), does not leave the will (τὸ θέλημα) not put into action.” (Greg. Nyss. anim. res.: PG 46, 124.17–21, translated from: Gregory of Nyssa 2006, T. 1, p. 137). To this we can add that St. Gregory of Nyssa, arbitrariness (προαίρεσις) and autocracy are inseparable from each other: Cf. “according to autocracy and autocracy, the movement of human will προαιρέσεως ἡ κίνησις)” (Greg. Nyss. opif. hom. 185.5). This essay was sent to Presbyter Marinus in Cyprus. The Church of Cyprus at this time (645–646), represented by its Archbishop Sergius, was in alliance with Rome and took a position of firm diopheliteism. See, for example, opusc. 26: PG 91, 276C–277A, in particular: “The will is the natural autocratic movement of the autocratic (αὐτοκράτορος) mind, or the mind moved towards something spontaneously (αὐθαιρέτως). Autocracy (αὐτεξουσιότης) is a mind moved by nature, or a smart, autocratic movement of the soul” (Ibid, 277C). See, for example, opusc. 15: PG 91, 157A. Here it is appropriate to pay attention to one aporia associated with the autocracy of the human soul and, accordingly, the will. Commenting on the words of St. Maxim: “After all, everything that comes into being undergoes movement, since it is not self-motion” (amb. 7: PG 91, 1073B), A. M. Shufrin in the scholium {39} to amb. 7 notes that St. Maxim also has another thought about the “self-movement” of the human soul (see, for example, cap. theol. 1.11). How can these two provisions be reconciled? And he answers this aporia: “There is no contradiction with his statement that no creature is self-moving in this, as it seems to us, since the point is not that the soul in the proper sense moves itself, but that it is moved only by what it itself considers best. So understood, self-movement is identical to autocracy inherent in human nature and, together with it, perceived by the Word (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 324D–325B)” (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, p. 322). It is also appropriate to note here that already in the early Questions and Perplexities and a little later in the Difficulties to John St. Maximus mentions autocracy and autocratic will in very important contexts, speaking of its surrender by the saints to God as a condition of deification. At the same time, he emphasizes that autocracy is not destroyed even in a state of deification. Thus, in the interpretation of 1 Cor. 15:26 - “The last enemy to be destroyed is death” - he writes: “This [will happen] when we completely surrender to God (τῷ θεῷ παραχωρήσωμεν) autocratic will (or: “free will” (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον θέλημα)" (qu. dub. 22). In more detail and in the context of the Gethsemane prayer as an example (now we can say - relative assimilation) of such a concession, St. Maxim speaks about it in amb. 7: "[if] autocracy (through which, seeking entry to us, [death] asserted the dominance of corruption over us) freely and entirely [by us] ceded (ἐκχωρηθέντος) to God, although he rules perfectly, [then his lot] is subjection, due to the inaction of the will to anything other than what God wants” (PG 91, 1076A–B, translated by A. M. Shufrin with modification cit. according to the edition: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 251). A little further than the indicated place from the Difficulties to St. John. Maximus speaks of perichorisis (penetration), which on the part of God is the communication of Divine action (energy) to the creature in response to the intentional yielding (ἐκχώρησιν γνωμικήν) of autocracy to God on the part of the creature (amb. 7: PG 91, 1076B–C). Thal. 42.22–34, trans. A. I. Sidorova according to: Maxim Confessor 1993, Book. II, p. 110. He, of course, knew the words of St. Gregory the Theologian: “His will, as completely deified, is not contrary (ὑπεναντίον) to God” (Greg. Naz. de filio. 2. or. 30.12.6). In opusc. 1 prp. Maxim will say that the “human part of God” “received being in connection with God the Word (and) acquired an unwavering, or rather, stable movement in accordance with its natural desire (that is, simply, will), or, more precisely, a motionless standing (στάσιν ἀκίνητον) in God the Word Himself, completely deified according to its unmixed fulfillment in Him” (opusc. 1: PG 91, 32A). “Disposition” and “inclination” in this context are corrections to the too approximate, but well-established version of the translation of γνώμη as “intention”. opusc. 1: PG 91, 24B. On the fact that γνώμη is not a faculty of nature, see Watts 2009, p. 481–482. St. Maxim in such phrases, we believe, follows a tradition dating back to Aristotle and reproduced by Nemesius, in which deliberate choice is an integral element of the volitional act of an adult sane person (Arist. EN. III, 4–5). See the rationale for this thesis in note. 142 to Opusc. We will later turn to the question of why St. Maxim became an opusc. 1 talk about the resurrection, and not about the deification of the saints, as a state in which there is no deliberate choice, below, analyzing this work. Looking ahead, we can say that this is due to ecclesiastical and political reasons - the need to present a united front with Rome, so St. Maxim had to “reinterpret” his early “monoenergist” statements. That not resurrection, but deification is a state in which there is no deliberate choice, is clear from the fact that St. Maxim speaks not just about the resurrection, but about the resurrection of the saints. opusc. 1: PG 91, 24C. Since Rev. Maxim says that “now” (in the non-deified state) the law of nature operates, according to which we make a deliberate choice (to the extent that we are rational, sane beings), but in the state of deification = resurrection it does not exist, within the framework of the teaching of St. Maxim, the question can no longer arise (as A. M. Shufrin noted in a conversation with us) whether people had a state when there was no deliberate choice “yet”, say, among the ancestors “before” the Fall. In fact, since St. Maxim associates deliberate choice with ignorance; its absence can only be ensured by perfect knowledge. But if the first parents had such knowledge, they would have been deified and could not have fallen. This means that they did not have perfect knowledge. But then, no “stay” in Paradise, as a relatively stable and any long-term state, can be imagined, since staying in a state of ignorance entails the presence of a deliberate choice, which is already characteristic of the human condition after the Fall. As the Venerable teaches. Maximus (at least when he argues as a philosopher), Adam fell immediately (ἅμα) by his creation (see Sherwood's considerations: in Maximus the Confessor 2007a, p. 520). According to Rev. Maxim, he might not have fallen (see amb. 41), but only if his deification had occurred (implying the cession of autocracy to God), but this did not happen, and instead the person fell into choosing, which reflects the biblical narrative about the Fall. Here it would be appropriate to note that the distinction between will as a natural ability and how we use it is already found in Origen, and St. Maximus probably knew this passage from Origen’s treatise “On the Elements” well, if not as part of this treatise, then as part of the Philocalia compiled by St. Basil the Great and Gregory the Theologian, where it was included in the famous discourse on autocracy (Περὶ αὐτεξουσίου; it is customary to translate into Russian: On free will). Interpreting the words of the ap. Paul, which he slightly modifies: “both the will and the deed are from God, ἐστίν" (see Phil. 2:13, in the original somewhat differently, more "deterministically": "θεὸς... ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ "God works in you both to will and to act according to [His] good pleasure." Origen this place in: Orig., prinс. III.1.19.1–2 = Orig., philoc. 21.19.1–2); Origen long before St. Maxima makes a distinction, without using these terms, however, between the natural will and energy that is given to us by God, and how we use them (χρώμεθα). He says that from God we have been given volition as an ability characteristic of all people - “will in general, τὸ καθόλου θέλειν” (Orig., philoc. 21.19.13), or “in the generic sense (τὸ γενικόν)” - but this is what it is used for this ability - for good or evil, in each specific case depends on how we use it (Orig., prinс. III.1.19). opusc. 3: PG 91, 48A. Wed. opusc. 3: PG 91, 53C and opusc. 16: PG 91, 192B–C, where the gnomic is determinative of the person or hypostasis. opusc. 14: PG 91, 153A–B. Bradshaw 2013, p. 144–145. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 325A. Truly such are virtues and vices, that is, what relates to the inner, spiritual life of a person. In amb. 7 prp. Maximus says that this is the state of the saints already in this life; more precisely, he does not distinguish between their life in this life and after the resurrection. See: “And those who have the Holy Spirit, having received it at birth [meaning “birth from above,” which for the majority is only possibly accomplished in baptism. - G.B.] all their will, moved [it] entirely from earth to heaven and, through real and true knowledge, transformed [their] mind in the blissful rays of God and the Father so that this mind was considered for another god and experienced through grace-filled communion what God [Himself] is in essence (and does not experience) - in such [people] the will clearly became sinless in skill in virtue and knowledge, for they can no longer renounce what they have effectively and experimentally known” (Thal. 6.28–38, translated by A.I. Sidorov according to: Maxim the Confessor 1993, Book II, p. 37). Greg. Nyss. anim. res.: PG 46, 101.5–8, trans. by: Grigory Nissky 2006, T. 1, p. 128. Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 473–474. St. Maxim, as you know, highly revered St. Gregory of Nyssa, and even on the issue of apocatastasis, he preferred not to criticize, but to reinterpret his teaching in a new way, removing it from criticism from radical fighters against Origenism. amb. 7: PG 91, 1076B, see Sherwood's analysis in Maximus Confessor 2007a, p. 473–475. The influence cannot be completely excluded. In particular, the works of John Philoponus. Maxim might have known what we would focus on below. Arist. EN. III, 4.1111b.20–25. Nemes. nat. hom. 32, ed. B. Einarson. Read more about the parallels between St. Maximus, Nemesius and Aristotle, see notes to opusc. 1, in which the doctrine of the volitional act is developed. Procl. de prov. 57, p. 68 (ed. Steel). Here and below are references to Proclus's treatise according to the editions Proclus 2003 - the first link and Proclus 2007 - the second link. Below we will see that Proclus is not talking about the choice between good and evil (no one chooses evil as evil), but about a possible mistake in choosing the good. Compare: “the ability to choose and what depends on us seem to be identical” (Procl. de provid. 59, p. 69). Wed. approaches to the topic of the relationship between προαίρεσις and ἐφ’ ἡμῖν in Proclus and St. Maxim in our article: Benevich 2011. Procl. de provid. 57, p. 68. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 308C, trans. D. E. Afinogenova with amendments. from: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 175. See Procl. de provid. 58, r. 69. If in Aristotle βούλησις can be directed towards both genuine and apparent good (Arist. EN . 1113a15–25), then in Proclus βούλησις (like in St. Maximus the natural will) is directed towards good (cf. in Plato in Gorg. 468C; rep. 505D–E), but προαίρεσις in Proclus and γνώμη and προαίρεσις in St. Maxims adhere to real or imaginary good. Procl. de provid. 60, r. 69. Procl. de provid. 61, p. 70. Iambl. de myster. 1.12.8–9. The concept of "divine desire" is of great importance in the theurgy of Iamblichus. So, immediately after the above quotation, he writes: “thanks to this desire, the gods, being merciful and supportive, pour light into the theurgists in abundance, calling their souls to themselves, imparting to them unity with themselves and teaching them, even if they are in bodies, to separate from their bodies and turn to their eternal intelligible beginning” (Ibid, 9–12 trans. I. Yu. Melnikova according to: Iamblichus 2004, p. 43). In modern science, the philosophical education of St. Maximus, although with some reservations, is associated with Stephen of Alexandria, the last head of the Alexandrian school of philosophy (Stephen himself was most likely a student of Philoponus, see Tollefsen 2008, pp. 15–16). St. Maximus could have studied with Stefan in Constantinople, where, according to some evidence, Stefan was invited by Emperor Heraclius (if only St. Maximus actually lived in Constantinople). However, if Rev. Maximus (as appears from the Syrian Psogos) was of Palestinian origin and left Palestine after the Persian invasion there, moving for a time to Alexandria (see Boudignon 2004), he may have been in contact with philosophers and had access to a library in Alexandria. In any case, Abba Sophronius, the future patriarch of Jerusalem, with whom St. Maximus was closely associated, perhaps even before Carthage, but certainly from the time of his migration to Carthage, he was certainly on good terms with Stephen (for the philosophical sources of St. Maximus, which included Philoponus, see Mueller-Jourdan 2005, pp. 44–48). About the roots of St. For Maximus in the Byzantine school philosophical tradition, see Lackner 1962. Joan. Phil. in de anim. 15.5.25–33. Nemesius of Emesa, who was influenced by Platonic thought, also speaks of the possibility of unshakable affirmation in the Good in case of removal from practical activity and concentration on one contemplation. Such immutability is characteristic of the state of the angels turned to the contemplation of God and the contemplatives among people who resemble them: “of the immaterial natures (beings), those who are among the inhabitants of the earth and, due to the communication they have with people, are engaged in practical activities, are more changeable compared to others; and those (beings) who, thanks to the superiority of nature, approach God in communication and experience bliss in contemplation of Him, being focused exclusively on themselves and on God, have completely alienated themselves from activity and from matter, and brought them closer to contemplation and to God, remain unchanged. Although they are autocratic (αὐτεξούσιοι) due to the fact that they are reasonable, they are nevertheless unchangeable (ἄτρεπτοι) for the above reasons. And there is nothing surprising. After all, those among people who, having become contemplatives (θεωρητικοί), renounced themselves from activity (πρακτῶν), remained unchanged” (Nemes. nat. hom. 40.45–56, translated by F. S. Vladimirsky, modified by Nemesius of Emesa 1996, p. 177). However, Nemesius, despite the fact that he has a distinction between βούλησις-προαίρεσις, when speaking about achieving immutability in God, does not directly connect this with the absence of προαίρεσις, but rather adheres to the close St. Gregory of Nyssa terminology. St. Maxim characterizes this state as one in which “there is no... deliberate choice, since there is no longer any ambiguity in what exists”; in this state, he says, “only the striving of the mind will act (in those who by nature are capable of such striving), inexpressibly achieving the only thing that is available to initiates, the enjoyment of what is the object of striving by nature” (opusc. 1: PG 91, 24C). The “striving of the mind” that is being discussed here is extremely reminiscent of the state of divine life that the Neoplatonists talk about. The difference between the teachings of St. The maxim of the Neoplatonic may be in relation to the state of the irrational powers of the soul in deification, but consideration of this topic is beyond the scope of the present study. Links to relevant literature are provided in the comments to this work. The problem of attribution of this work by St. Maxim is connected with the fact that the well-known text of the Council Epistle of Pope Theodore, sent to Patriarch Paul of Constantinople (PL 129, 577B–578B: sanctissimi Theodori papae synodica ad Paulum patriarcham Constantinopolitanum), does not contain provisions that are defended in opusc. 10, they are not mentioned in any response message from Constantinople. From this we can conclude that either opusc. 10 – a later fabrication, or the text of the pope’s message preserved by Anastasius the Librarian has not reached us in its entirety. It is this opinion that is held, for example, by Yankowiak, who does not doubt the authenticity of this work by St. Maxima (Jankowiak 2009, p. 210). Lib. Pont., p. 331 (ed. Duchesne). opusc. 10: PG 91, 136C–D. In the Dispute with Pyrrhus, Theodore of Paran is spoken of as one of the most important ideologists and leaders of monoenergism even before the conclusion of the union by Cyrus (PG 91, 332–333). Theodore of Faran was condemned as one of the heresiarchs at the Lateran Council (his name was heard at the Council only at the second session) and at the VI Ecumenical Council. Probably, some messages of Pope Theodore, sent to the authorities of Constantinople after the messages of the winter-spring of 643 and transmitted through the apocrisiaries of the pope, have not reached us, however, judging by the message of Patr. Paul's May 645 address to Pope Theodore, which spoke of unjustified insults and unwillingness to maintain peace on the part of the latter (these insults are not in the letter of 643), the pope only increased his pressure on Constantinople (Jankowiak 2009, p. 214). Riedinger 1989, p. 205; ACO 2.2. 608.11–22; ACO 2.1.200. In particular, Paul wrote: “His [Christ’s] flesh, endowed with a rational and spiritual soul, was through the same ineffable unity enriched with the divine, for it [the flesh] had received the divine and indifferent will of the Logos, who united it to Himself hypostatically, and was aware and moved by him” (ACO 2.1.200.32–34). Richard Price, who gives as much credit as possible to the Monothelite side of this dispute, finds that Patr. Paul has an expression (we are talking about the words that one should not think that the rational soul of Christ prevented suffering for the salvation of the world (ASO 2.1.202.10–14)) which “hints at the acceptance of suffering by the rational soul,” but admits that it is “hesitant and undeveloped” (Price 2010). In fact, we have the Patr. We do not find Paul, so even if he recognized the autocracy of the soul, deified and cannot come into conflict with God’s will (as Price believes), he did not dare to say this, but he categorically rejected the expression “two wills” in any sense. In the preface to the edition of the Acts of the Lateran Council being prepared in Liverpool, Price interpreted the same passage from Patr. Paul, bringing his position even closer to that of St. Maxim: “[Christ’s] humanity was not merely tamed, its rebellion simply put away, as in many previous interpretations of Gethsemane, but it accepted the suffering [of the cross] in an intelligent act of the human will, which thereby became “one” with the divine will. This acceptance of the “divine will,” which was shared by the “reasonable and intelligent soul” even in Gethsemane itself, represents an advance over the previous tradition” (Price 2013). How adequate is this interpretation? If Price's interpretation is correct, the question arises as to why, if Patr. This is exactly how Paul understood this issue; they could not find a common language with the main theologian of the other side - St. Maxim? Were the obstacles simply ideological reasons, differences in terminology and prejudice regarding each other's positions, or is Price putting too much of Diophelite teaching (note, in the new article much more than in the first) into this far from central phrase for the letter of Paul? However, as A.M. Shufrin noted in correspondence with us, an alternative interpretation, according to which Patr. Pavel understood this question fundamentally differently than Maxim, and, as can be seen from Price’s article, it causes no less difficulties. If a reasonable human soul according to Patr. Paul was completely devoid of aspiration (which St. Maximus called “autocracy”), and did not simply have it deactivated in Christ and in the saints by virtue of deification (as St. Maximus believed), then how can one explain such a loss of his thought at this point from the entire ancient philosophical and Christian theological tradition, according to which the soul by nature strives for what seems good to it? Be that as it may, the refusal of the patrons. Paul's renunciation of Monothelitism was by no means the result of some misunderstanding. Battrellos rightly notes that Paul, unlike Sergius and Honorius, wrote after the works of St. Petersburg began to circulate, starting in 640. Maximus, with whom he may well have been familiar (Bathrellos 2006, p. 83). One of them - the most conciliatory in terms of the conditions for achieving agreement formulated in it (opusc. 19, directed to Presbyter Marin) - contained a polemic with the secretary of the patriarch. Paul by Deacon Theodore and was probably brought to the attention of the archbishop. Arcadius of Cyprus to the attention of the church authorities in Constantinople. Patr. Paul in his letter testifies that he had long conversations with the apocrisiaries of the Pope and together with them discussed the relevant passages from the holy fathers, but they obviously did not come to agreement. So his disagreement with the Diophelites was quite conscious, unless, of course, he was simply a hostage of the “Monothelitian tradition” that reigned in Constantinople and did not repeat old formulas, meaning something of his own, but this does not negate his responsibility for understanding the position of the other side in the controversy. The same can be said about diophelites. If both sides had a chance to find common ground, they did not take it. Bathrelos 2004, p. 82–84. rel. mot. 2, per. in: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 161. For example, he approached the interpretation of a single will in the sense of interpenetration (perichorisis) of wills, but for some reason did not bring this idea to the end (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 297A). Or - another example - for some reason he did not cite as an argument the indisputable fact that St. Maxim and St. Sophronius accepted Psiphos, and then in a number of his works St. Maxim justified the use not only of dioenergist and diophelite, but also of the unitarian expressions of the holy fathers, which he now began to interpret differently. He seemed to have mentioned the teachings of the early St. Maxim (however, without calling him by name) about the one will or energy of God and the saints (Ibid, 292B), but failed to pose to him the question of how this teaching is consistent with his current diopheliteism. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 333C–D. Noret 1999, p. 292–293. Previously to Nora, Sherwood dated the Dispute with Pyrrhus to 646, that is, before the abdication of Pyrrhus, but after the dispute itself (Ibid, 292). Nora’s main argument is that in the Statement of the Debate (6), i.e., the description of the trial of St. Maxim, there is an episode when the patrician Troilus comes to St. Maximus and demands to tell about the dispute that happened with Pyrrhus. Answer Rev. Maxima (like, in fact, Troilus’ question) does not imply the existence at that time of the written text of the Disputation. St. Maxim presents it from memory and does not refer to the existence of the text, as he does in similar cases. Based on this, Nore comes to the conclusion that the Dispute was drawn up after the appearance of the Statement of the Debate (i.e., not earlier than 656). To Nore's arguments regarding the late appearance of the Disputation, Booth adds his observation that some of its points indicate that the author had in mind the existence of the Typos (adopted in 648) with its prohibition of arguing regarding the number of wills in Christ. This idea is expressed by Pyrrhus and disputed by St. Maxim in Dispute (PG 91, 300C); perhaps the later position of official Constantinople in 558 was also in mind (Booth 2013, p. 214). For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that, in addition to arguments in favor of the late writing of the Disputation, arguments can also be made in favor of the fact that its text is based on the actual protocols of the dispute that took place in 645. In particular, it is noteworthy that the development of the doctrine of the volitional act in the Dispute is much more crude than in the opusc. 1, dating from 645–646. (probably after the debate in Carthage). This may serve as indirect evidence that the latest edition of the Dispute was based on real protocols or the memory of witnesses, and not on the later writings of St. Maxima. In 655–657, when modern researchers date the composition of this work, many witnesses to the dispute remained alive, and it is not so easy to prove that it was completely or mostly fabricated. Below we provide an analysis of the main theological themes of the Dispute, corresponding to the topic of our introductory article, following mainly the work “The Case of Maxim” written together with A. M. Shufrin (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 46–60), while introducing some changes and clarifications, the most important of which are noted in the notes. See, for example, the preface by D. A. Pospelov in: Maxim Confessor 2004, p. 112–124. Here and further, all translations from the Dispute with Pyrrhus belong to D. E. Afinogenov and are given according to this edition. This publication also contains an extensive bibliography, which, however, needs to be supplemented with the most complete bibliography on St. Petersburg today. Maxim, compiled by Mikonja Knežević (Knežević 2012). Pope Theodore drew attention to the fact that Paul, who had taken Pyrrhus's place, and his clergy still called Pyrrhus "most holy" (see note 451), and demanded that Paul canonically remove Pyrrhus (Mansi X. 702–708, in particular 704A and 707C). Since this was never done, after Pyrrhus' repentance in Rome (646), Pope Theodore recognized him as the legitimate patriarch. However, Pyrrhus soon changed his position again, and the pope solemnly anathematized him. About the meaning of St. Maximus is evidenced, in particular, by the appeal to him by the Exarch of Africa Peter the Illustrious (see: opusc. 12) on the issue of naming Pyrrhus “most holy.” It should be noted here that in addition to the denunciation of Pyrrhus, St. Maximus in this letter also points to the possibility for Pyrrhus of repentance, which should be brought to the Pope in Rome, which happened after Pyrrhus’s defeat in the dispute. In the same letter to St. Maximus, by the way, notes: “The one who [like Pyrrhus] thinks that people like me should be convinced” is only engaged in vain chatter (see: opusc. 12, 144C); that is, Pyrrhus probably already then sought to enter into dialogue with St. Maxim. The latter at first categorically rejected this possibility, saying that Pyrrhus should repent in Rome, but later he and Prefect Gregory apparently took advantage of this desire of Pyrrhus, so Kulakovsky is hardly right when he claims that “Maxim forced him to enter into a public competition” (Kulakovsky 2004, Vol. III, p. 166). Judging by the course of the dispute, Pyrrhus entered into it voluntarily, as we have already written about above. There were a number of inaccuracies in our presentation of this topic in The Maxim Case, which we correct here. In particular, we erroneously attributed to St. Maximus, that in earlier theological and polemical works, for example opusc. 20, he allowed the expression “one will” in relation to Christ, interpreting it in the sense of the fusion of wills. He speaks about the unity of the human will with God’s, but either rejects the expression “one will” altogether, or interprets it, when he justifies this expression in Honorius, more carefully - in the sense of the will of God, with which the human will is united. As is known, there was no condemnation of Honorius in the West before the decisions of the VI Ecumenical Council were recognized there. In the comments to the Russian translation of the Disputation, as a rule, coinciding with the comments to the German translation by Guido Bausenhart (Bausenhart 1992), it is erroneously stated that “the Roman Council condemned Honorius as a Monothelite” (Maximus the Confessor 2004, p. 270, comm. 96). Bausenhart (s. 268, anm. 51) says: “In January 641, the Council of Rome condemned monothelitism.” In fact, Hieroclone, but he is kept silent about him (see: disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 329A). Compare: “We spoke in relation to the Lord about one will, not among His Divinity and humanity, but only among humanity” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 329A). It is characteristic that Price, in his defense of Honorius's expression, gives a different interpretation, arguing that it means: in Christ the human will was in the same sinless state as in Adam, that is, united with God (Price 2010). See the chapter above on parsing opusc. 7, 8 and 20. However, there is reason to believe that Rev. Maxim did not reinterpret the expression of St. Cyril of Alexandria, and this was done by the compiler of the Disputation with Pyrrhus, no. It is enough to consider the interpretation of this expression by St. Cyril in the original work of St. Maxima – opusc. 9: PG 91, 125B, where it is not understood in the spirit of its interpretation in the opusc. 7 and 8, and close to the interpretation in the Disputation. Thus, Batrelos's hypothesis, although it does not take into account that the Dispute may be of a later origin and was not even compiled by St. Maxim, still not refuted. disp. Pyrr. : PG 91, 344B–345C. On changes in the interpretation of unitary formulas relating to energies, and a change in the position of St. For maxims during this period, see Bathrellos 2004, p. 198–201. We address this topic in more detail later in this chapter. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 308A. In particular, he denounces Sergius, who attributes a gnomic will to Christ, for the fact that he “represented the Lord not only as a simple man, but also changeable and sinful, since intention (γνώμη) judges opposites, seeks out the unknown and deliberates about the unclear” (disp. Pyrr: PG 91, 329 D). disp. Pyrr: PG 91, 309A. Here we make a clarification to what was written in “Maxim’s Case”, where we, without taking into account a number of topoi from St. Maxim and the specific origin of the Dispute with Pyrrhus, somewhat exaggerated the scale of the “change of terminology” and even the change of position of the Venerable. Maximus around 644–645. However, later in this chapter we return to the issue of changing the position, noting what it actually consisted of. This refers to the words of Christ: “Abba Father! everything is possible for You; take this cup away from me” [Mark 14:36]. disp. Pyrr: PG 91, 304B. Wed. opusc. 20: PG 91 237A–B. Lurie 2006, p. 402. It would probably be more accurate to say that it is the human will that is united in the saints with the will of God. See disp. Pyrr. : PG 91, 333C. For a hypothesis about this transition, see Bathrellos 2004, p. 200–201. See above in the same chapter and disp. Pyrr: PG 91, 308 A. disp. Pyrr. : PG 91, 348A. “The novelty [of the new “God-masculine” action] denotes a new and ineffable way of manifestation of Christ’s natural actions, in accordance with the interpenetration of Christ’s natures into each other, and His human life, amazing and unprecedented, and unknown to the nature of existence, and the way of mutual exchange in ineffable unity” (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 345D). This does not mean that he considers it unfaithful. Ultimately, Rev. Maxim did not reject any of his previous dogmatic positions. He simply put aside the idea of ​​​​two kinds of divine action for this period as not relevant for current debates. disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 349C. PG 91, 1073B. There St. Maxim argued this in the context of his justification for the unity of the energy of God and the saints; Pyrrhus repeats it almost literally, which gives another reason to assume that Pyrrhus is familiar with this work of St. Maxima. It is not so surprising, however, if we take into account Pyrrhus’ possible motives for reconciling with Christians in the West and regaining respect, and perhaps even dignity. We were unable to find such a statement in any of the holy fathers, besides St. himself. Maxima. We, however, cannot cite a single case of refusal of the prp. Maxim from his previous statements. This sameness of action of all people, distinguishing them, say, from animals, for St. The maxim is explained by the fact that the logos of human nature is different from the logos of animals. That is, although God moves all nature, he moves it in different ways. Having said about a certain nature that it “undergoes” an action, we have not yet said that it is human, but only that it is created. If he wished, he could object that Abba Maximus himself nevertheless called the movement of human nature “endure,” and therefore the expression “single action” should be considered acceptable in the context of deification. Let's take a closer look at this place. Omitting several phases of the controversy in which St. Maximus tries to fight back with the help of rhetoric (disp. Pyrr.: PG 91, 349C–349D; Pyrrhus, probably familiar with such techniques, does not accept his arguments), let's move on to the final part of the dialogue about “enduring”, in which Pyrrhus resorts to argumentation “from the fathers”: “- P. So what? Did not the fathers call human movement endurance [passion] (πάθος)? – M. They called it in a variety of ways, that is, depending on the implied meanings. - P. How is that? - M. They called it strength, and action, and difference, and movement, and peculiarity, and quality, and endurance, but not in opposition to the Divine, but as preserving and unchangeable - force; as distinctive and revealing uniformity in all [hypostases] of one type - by action... as moving - by undergoing. After all, everything that is from God and after God undergoes through that which moves, since it is not self-movement or self-power. So, not by opposition, as has been said, but because of the causal meaning (λόγον) creatively embedded in them by the Essence that made up the universe. Therefore, proclaiming it together with the Divine, they called it action. For he who said: “Acts in each of the species with the participation of the other” [Tomos of St. Pope Leo Flavian], what else did he do? Or he who said: “For, having remained inaccessible for forty days, he later became hungry: after all, when He wanted, He allowed nature to act in its own way” [St. Gregory of Nyssa. de beatud ., or. 4. PG 44, 1237A], or talking about his various actions [he also has: antirrh. adv. Apol. 32], or about double [in opusc. 15 prp. Maxim refers to St. Cyril of Jerusalem, see: PG 91, 168A], or about one and the other [that they did something else]?” This objection finally satisfies Pyrrhus and puts an end to the conversation: “- P. Truly, and the investigation of actions showed one action to be absurd when it is expressed in any way in relation to Christ. But I apologize for myself and for those before me. For we fell into these absurd concepts and logical conclusions out of ignorance” (Quotations are given in the translation by D. E. Afinogenov according to: Maxim Confessor 2004, pp. 230–232; source: PG 91 349C–352B). The decisive thing, apparently, for Pyrrhus was to attract the testimony of the fathers. St. Maximus turns his own logic against Pyrrhus. Yes, the fathers (that is, first of all, St. Maxim himself) called human movement “enduring.” But they also called it action! True, no longer as a movement as such, but only “as one that distinguishes and shows uniformity in all [hypostases] of the same type.” As a movement it was called, as follows from the words of St. Maxim, after all, “enduring”, in contrast to the movement of the Divine, which was called “action” (as movement). This circumstance seems to escape the attention of Pyrrhus. Of course, Rev. Maxim never claimed that Christ had a “dwarf” capable of hesitation. On the contrary, he justified the very possibility of our salvation already in the Questions and Answers to Thalassius (630–633) by the fact that “The Lord did not know my sin, that is, the change of my will” (Thal. 42 in the translation by A.I. Sidorov, quoted from: Maximus the Confessor 1993, Book II, p. 129). Nevertheless, this was not put forward by the Venerable before the Dispute. Maxim as proof of the impossibility of confrontation between the wills of Christ. Compiler of the life of St. Maxima credits him with the initiative to convene these councils. Kulakovsky 2004, T. III, p. 166. For an analysis of these documents and the historical context in which they were adopted, see Jankowiak 2009, p. 220–227. Jankowiak emphasizes the decisive role in the convening of these councils of Palestinian monks, headed by St. Maxim. Larcher 2004, p. 193, approx. 102. rel. mot. 2: PG 90, 112C. As we have already noted, Pope Theodore had previously insisted in his letters to Paul that Pyrrhus had been deposed illegally and that he could recognize Paul as patriarch only if Paul renounced the heresy of Pyrrhus. Kulakovsky 2004, T. III, p. 166. Nothing unusual for Byzantine history. Let us remember that the once exarch of Africa, Heraclius, similarly proclaimed himself emperor: in 610, while in Carthage, he organized a naval landing, overthrew Emperor Phocas, whom he declared a usurper, and took his place (Kulakovsky 2004, Vol. III, pp. 22–29). Despite the defeat from the Arabs (who, however, did not conquer Africa at that time, but only imposed tribute), Africa did not recognize the power of Constant until the 60s. VII century (Ibid., p. 168). Jankowiak has no doubt that Rev. Maxim was his spiritual inspiration (Jankowiak 2009, p. 228). In particular, Rev. Maximus, as we have noted more than once, had to explain in what sense he applied προαίρεσις to Christ in Thal. 42 (see opusc. 1: PG 91, 32A). He also gives a new interpretation (Ibid, 21D) to the expression about the single energy of God and the saints, which he himself used in amb. 7. If, of course, the mention of St. Maxim as the author of this idea was not subsequently crossed out by the editor. This version is supported, for example, by Haldon 1997, p. 307. Kulakovsky adheres to this version (Kulakovsky 2004, T. III, p. 168). Kulakovsky 2004. Ibid. (with reference to Lib. Pont. 332, 127; Theoph. 331, 17–24). Lat: depositio, Greek. καθαίρεσις (ACO 2.1.19.11; 1.18.13). This can be seen from opusc. 9, 132C. St. Maximus, having left Africa, probably spent some time in Sicily in 646–647. In opusc analysis. 9 we follow Bathrellos (Bathrellos 2004, pp. 200–201). In Sicily, St. Maxim, apparently, did not stay long. In dating the period of stay of St. Maximus in Rome we follow Larcher 2004, p. 201. See, for example, Jankowiak 2009, p. 273; Booth 2013, p. 221. On the ecclesiological situation in Palestine in: Levy-Rubin 2001, p. 283–300 and about Palestinian monasticism in Rome in the 7th–8th centuries. in: Andia 2000, p. 285. “Bishops and clergy were subject to defrocking, members of the synclit were subject to confiscation of property, civil and military officials were subject to deprivation of the belt, that is, resignation, monks were subject to excommunication, people of ordinary rank were subject to corporal punishment and exile for life” (Kulakovsky 2004, Vol. III, p. 168). According to Larcher, “Typos forbade “disputing, discussing and quarreling, in any way whatsoever, on the question of one will and one energy, or two wills and two energies,” and declared that “no one will be accused or condemned to this day for professing one will or one energy, or two wills, or two energies”” (Larchet 2004, p. 194, note). 104). We have already characterized this ideology more than once as Uniate; Initially, it was aimed at involving the Byzantines in the union both the Nestorians (negotiations with whom were conducted by Emperor Heraclius in 628) and the Monophysites. In the second case, in addition to the policy towards Egypt and Syria (which were lost to the empire by the time the Typos was published), Armenia was important, the political union with which was extremely important for Byzantium. However, there are different opinions about the role of the Armenian factor in Byzantine church politics, which we will not dwell on here. No matter how the question of the influence of the “Armenian factor” on Byzantine church policy was resolved, the Armenians were unreliable allies of Byzantium and were very restrained towards the union. The imperial troops, stationed in Armenia to protect the empire from the Arabs from the northeast, experienced the hostile attitude of the local population, who considered them heretics and refused church communion. In 648–649 Catholicos Nerses III convened a council in Dvina (648–649) and condemned the Council of Chalcedon, thus withdrawing from the union. Under pressure from the Arabs, the Armenians broke away from the empire (Kulakovsky 2004, T. III. p. 171; Meyendorff 1989, p. 343), so after 648–649. Byzantium immediately lost both the West and Armenia, the union with which, however, was briefly renewed in 654. May 14, 649 The delay in the pope's response was most likely due not to hesitation regarding Tipos, but to the desire to make the answer as significant as possible, which was served by the Lateran Council, the preparation of which probably began during the life of Pope Theodore. See rel. mot. 4, per. in: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 163–166. In The Case of Maximus we dated this embassy to a time after the Lateran, but it probably still predated the Council (cf. Jankowiak 2009, pp. 240–241). Let us note that the asicritist Gregory, in a conversation with St. Maximus in Rome and another representative of the authorities, the patrician Epiphanius, during the debate in Visia, insisted that the Typos should not be considered as a dogmatic work; in their opinion, this is an imperial decree that is purely disciplinary (or “economy”) in nature and has no other purpose than to stop disputes that tempt “these little ones,” and to establish peace in the Church and in the empire (which, by the way, was in great need of peace, since it was in a very difficult military-political situation). Nevertheless, both the Lateran Council and St. Venerable, who defended its position. Maximus refused to consider the Typos an exclusively disciplinary document, believing, and not without reason, that it served to preserve in the Church of Constantinople the heresy of monothelitism, which the Typos (as a personal faith) was permitted in the same way as diophelitism. From a modern secular point of view, it may seem that the West (and with it St. Maximus) opposed “tolerance.” It should, however, be borne in mind that the primates of the Church of Constantinople (Patriarch Paul and Pyrrhus, who replaced him) were Monothelites (more recently they supported Ekphesis); therefore, the recognition of Typos meant liturgical communion between Orthodox diophelites and heretics-monothelites, i.e., the actual covering of heresy and erasing the line between it and Orthodoxy. In Constantinople, they probably hoped, without losing the fruits of the former unionist ideology, to now, with the help of Typos, also embrace the Diophelite West. This new course of Uniates was rejected by the Lateran Council, the decisions of which St. Petersburg defended until his death. Maximus, refusing to recognize Typos as simply a state law, relating to local, temporary life, and not to eternal salvation. comm. 6, per. in: Maxim Confessor 2007a, p. 217. About this later St. Pope Martin spoke of an act that no heretics had ever dared to undertake before (ACO 2.1.18.23–24). Bishopric of St. Martin was never officially recognized in Constantinople: in the emperor’s order for his arrest in 649, St. Martin is not called "pope", but "former apocrisiary" (Lib. Pont. 1.337.12, ed. Duchesne). As O. R. Borodin writes, “under normal conditions, immediately after the elections (of the pope), their participants turned to the emperor with a request to approve the results” (Borodin 2001, p. 144). This order apparently went back to the short stories of Justinian (Kulakovsky 2004, T. II, p. 215). O. John Meyendorff is not entirely accurate when he writes: “The election of St Martin was in itself an act of rebellion against the established imperial order, since the candidate did not receive approval from either the emperor, or the exarch of Ravenna” (Meyendorff 1989, p. 365). The “rebellious act” was not the election of St. Martin, and his dedication without the sanction of the authorities. On the procedure for the election and confirmation of popes by the emperor or exarch Fr. John writes elsewhere (Ibid, p. 299). See, for example: Haldon 1997, p. 309: “The Council [at the Lateran Palace]... was actually organized and dominated by Maximus and Stephen of Dor and their associates... The Acts of the Council were also written by Maximus and his associates [in Greek, and only then translated into Latin]....” This chapter, with minor changes and clarifications, reproduces what we said together with A. M. Shufrin in the article “Maxim’s Case” (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 67–74). See Riedinger 1989; Riedinger 1998. The Acts of the Lateran Council will be published soon in English translation, with an introduction and commentary by Richard Price, from Liverpool University Press. Maximus Confessor 2002, p. 19. ACO 2.1.57.30, 37, 38 (= No. 27, 34, 35). Anastasius the Apocrisiary was also a monk, but in the literature dedicated to St. Maxim, it is customary to call the second Anastasius either Anastasius the monk or Anastasius the disciple. Maximus Confessor 2002, p. 20. opusc. 11: PG 91, 137D, trans. from: Larshe 2004, p. 196. There, p. 197; Wed Jankowiak 2009, p. 263. Especially in the continuation of this passage. The Holy Patriarch Sophronius had long since died at the time of the Council, and the new Patriarch of Jerusalem had not been elected, but the majority of the episcopate was monothelitic, so Stephen of Dorsky in no way represented this episcopate. Probably, we are talking specifically about the Ecumenical Councils, since they speak of patriarchs in the plural. disp. Pyrr: PG 91, 352C. This name is given by Pauline Allen and Bronwen Neil to seven documents testifying to the life and confession of St. Maxim and his associates after their arrest. The dispute took place in August-September 656. Maximus Confessor 2002, p. 36–37. disp. Biz. 4, Maximus Confessor 2002, p. 96. Jankowiak 2009, p. 264 (it links to TLG search). ep. An. 10: “I beg you... to send me the code of canonical decrees of the holy and apostolic Council, which took place in ancient Rome according to the sacred design of the holy martyr, apostolic and supreme pope Martin.” In a document called Hypomnesticon (Memories, Latin: Commemoratio), written by Theodore Spudei, one of the true Orthodox who supported St. Pope Martin during his trial, and then others persecuted for their faith, and in 668, after the death of St. Pope Martin, Venerable Maximus and two Anastasius, who visited the places of their exile, we find the following testimony about the Lateran Council and St. Pope Martin: “He himself rested in the Lord, after he had always illuminated the one and only holy catholic and apostolic glorious Church of our God with the most sacred and true dogmas and established the sacred and most pious dogmas of both the holy and ecumenical five councils... and of all our holy and illustrious fathers and true teachers. Those who, out of holy love, wish to read, will find it in the sacred acts of the holy, apostolic and most pious Council, assembled by him [St. Pope Martin] in Rome" (comm. 8) (both translations from: Maximus the Confessor 2007a). Moreover, when convening the Ecumenical Councils, not all of the conditions listed by St. Maxim were always actually observed. For example, neither the Pope nor his legates were present at the Second Ecumenical Council. Discussions and polemics with dissenters also did not take place at all Ecumenical Councils (for example, due to the absence of the latter at the III Ecumenical Council). Let us note that the council that confirmed Ekphesis, to which Pyrrhus referred, was most likely assembled at the will of Emperor Heraclius to confirm his own decree. Only in this respect was he like the Ecumenical. This is probably why Rev. Maxim, when he lists in the Dispute with Pyrrhus what formal features of the Ecumenical Council this council lacked, does not touch upon the topic of convening the council by the emperor. “If the orders of the kings give meaning to the former councils, and not pious faith, then accept the former councils against the consubstantiality, since they took place by order of the kings. I mean precisely: the first - in Tire, the second - in Antioch, the third - in Seleucia, the fourth - in Constantinople under Eudoxius the Arian, the fifth - in Nike of Thracia, the sixth - in Sermia, and after these, after a long time, the seventh - in Ephesus for the second time, over which Dioscorus presided. All these councils met by order of the kings, and yet they were all condemned due to the godlessness of the dogmas approved at them. And why don’t you reject the council that deposed Paul of Samosata under the saints and blessed Dionysius of Rome and Dionysius of Alexandria and Gregory the Wonderworker, who presided over this council, since it was not on the orders of the king? Which canon commands that only those councils be accepted that met by order of the tsar, or in general that all councils meet by order of the tsar? The pious canon of the Church recognizes those councils as holy and accepted, which the correctness of dogmas approved” (disp. Biz. 4. Maximus Confessor 2002, p. 88). This refers to canon 20 of the Council of Antioch and canon 19 of Chalcedon. disp. Biz. 4, Maximus Confessor 2002, p. 88. Jankowiak, in his dissertation two years after the publication of our study “Maxim’s Case,” independently came to similar conclusions (Jankowiak 2009, p. 264). On the history of the formation of the concept of a “local” council, defined negatively – as defective and auxiliary – in relation to the “ecumenical” ones, see: Sieben 1979, S. 357–361, 370, 378. Of the sources considered by the author, it is especially important as the context of the thought of St. Maxim, an anonymous treatise published by Beneshevich in the second half of the 6th century. about the difference between ecumenical and local councils (both are called “saints”): Beneshevich 1905, p. 73–79, esp. 78–79. With our arguments regarding the fact that for St. Maxim's Lateran Council did not have the formal status of an ecumenical council, but only its significance was like that of an Ecumenical Council; after discussion, J.-C. also agreed. Larcher. This is what he wrote to us in private correspondence: “Je pense que nous pouvons trouver un terrain d’entente en disant que Maxime ne considère le concile du Latran ni comme un concile proprement local ni comme un concile proprement œcuménique, mais comme un concile ayant, à son époque et dans les circonstances où il est placé, la valeur et l’autorité d’un concile œcuménique.” Wed. Sieben 1990, p. 233. rel. mot. 7; Maximus Confessor 2002, p. 62–63; under Pope Vitalian this actually happened. See about this in our “Maxim’s Case” (Maxim the Confessor 2007a, pp. 75–152; a re-edition of this entire volume is being prepared, in which this section will be significantly revised); Hovorun 2008; Allen 2009; Jankowiak 2009; Larison 2011 and Booth 2013. See especially Jankowiak 2009; Booth 2013. Ch. 17 of this introductory article. Larchet 2011, p. 207–396; review by P. B. Mikhailov: http://www.bogoslov.ru/text/3274925.html. See criticism of Zizioulas's understanding of St. Maxima especially in Larchet 2011, p. 244–275. Next, we briefly outline the main points of this criticism; For technical reasons, we provide links to pages on Larchet 2011 directly in the text. In turn, Zizioulas responds to some of Larcher’s accusations in his report: Zizioulas 2013, especially in the Epilogue to this report (Ibid, p. 106–113), where, however, in addition to confirming (albeit in a softened version) his previous views, he objects to the teaching of Doucet and Larcher about the perception of the common human nature in the hypostasis of the Logos (Ibid, p. 110, n. 65). See also Benevich 2014, where certain parallels are drawn between the polemics of St. Cyril of Alexandria with the Arians and Larcher's polemic in Zizioulas. The question of “intention” in God is also discussed in this context. Larchet 2011, p. 376, especially n. 662 ff. Ibid, p. 382. Wed. our understanding of the relationship between adoption and deification in approx. 753. Among them are such famous authors as von Balthasar, Dalmé, Rioux, Heinzer and Schönborn (see Zizioulas 2013, pp. 85–86; 93, where Zizioulas himself speaks of his unity with Catholic authors and the difference between his approach and Larcher’s). However, in the same report (Ibid, p. 94) he still talks about some difference between his approach and the approach of Garrigues and other Catholic authors, but what exactly it is, in our opinion, Zizioulas does not clarify (he writes about the danger of “denaturalization” of personality in their writings, without explaining what it is and how he avoids it; general words regarding the equal importance of nature and hypostasis, designed to soften the perception of his ideas, in our opinion, this the problem is not solved). Above in the introductory article to Opusc. and in the comments to them we repeatedly note points of divergence between Larcher (he largely follows M. Doucet) and J.-M. Let's fly. Let us only note that we are talking about such topics as the distinction between the concepts of an individual (ἄτομον) and a person (in the understanding of Zizioulas - “personality”, πρόσωπον, ὑπόστασις), which Zizioulas finds in St. Maxim (Zizioulas 2013, pp. 90–91), and Larcher rejects (in favor of Larcher, see the definition of ἄτομον in opusc. 26: PG 91, 276A, however in opusc. 16: PG 91, 201D it is said that the complex Face of Christ is not an individual [thing], see our note. to this place), about Zizioulas’s criticism of the interpretation of the Christology of St. Maximus in the horizon (as he believes) of the later Palamite teaching about the relationship of nature, hypostasis and energies (Ibid, p. 93). Zizioulas himself, following the Catholic theologians listed above, prefers to interpret the Christology of St. Maximus, in particular his teaching on the Prayer of Gethsemane, within the framework of concepts relating to hypostasis and interhypostatic relations, speaking in this context of Filial obedience as the central point in these relations and of sonhood identified by him with deification (Ibid, pp. 93–94), which Larcher criticizes as introducing moralism into theology. As we can see, obedience plays an important role in the Christology of St. Maxima. At the same time, he strictly distinguishes between the unity of human will with God’s due to the deification of human nature in the hypostasis of the Logos with the understanding of obedience in the moral sense, when the “relative assimilation” of our disobedience is replaced by the assimilation of our (we must have) obedience-submission to God’s will. For Christ Himself (that is, in the sense of essential assimilation), including for His human nature, the concept of obedience should not be colored in moral tones; it should be understood exclusively within the framework of the doctrine of deification, accomplished in the hypostasis of the Son of God from the moment of the Incarnation (the human will is imprinted and moved by the Divine, being at the same time autocratic, but at the same time always wanting the will of God to be fulfilled). This is precisely the essence of the polemics of St. Maximus with the Nestorian Christological model. Meanwhile, Zizioulas interprets the Gethsemane prayer as if the deification of the human will was accomplished in the prayer itself, in the act of Filial obedience to the Father (Ibid, p. 100) is Letel's interpretation, which was criticized by Doucet and then by Larcher. Another feature of Zizioulas’s position is that he insists on the meaning of γνώμη and προαίρεσις not only at the stage of asceticism, but also in an eschatological perspective. In particular, he says in his report: “personal differences will persist in the eschaton and will “hypostasize” one human nature, according to the tropos “chosen” by γνώμη and προαίρεσις in this life by each personality. As it is in the case of Christ, so it will be with people: personality determines our relationship with our nature” (Ibid, p. 103). From this passage, although its conciseness does not allow us to accurately understand the author’s thought, we can conclude that we are talking about the fact that the saints make a choice in favor of one or another way of existence - a personal tropos - and it is this personal choice that determines the specifics of their personal existence in the eschaton. But does this correspond to the teachings of St. Maxima? Below we will touch upon this topic further, examining the report of Zizioulas’ follower John Manoussakis (see note 752 and text). This controversy is contained in his seminal monograph: Larchet 1996. See Gauthier 1954; Madden 1982, the content of these works is partially reflected in our comments. It is also worth mentioning the work of Michael Frede, dedicated to the doctrine of will and freedom in Damascus, but also paying attention to his predecessor, St. Maxim (Frede 2002). See Sorabji 2000, p. 337–339. See the electronic version of this work: http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPEMPM&Volume=0&Issue=0&ArticleID=23. See Sorabji 2004, p. 20–23. See Chapter 17 of this introductory article. Orig., prinс. III.1.19.1–2 = Orig., philoc. 21.19.1–2. More details in the note. 548. Wed. this idea from St. Maxim, for example, in opusc. 3: PG 91, 48A. See note. 568–580 and text. In them St. Maxim followed rather the terminology of St. Gregory of Nyssa, who applied γνώμη (in the sense of will) and προαίρεσις (in the sense of will) to Christ and to the saints, and προαίρεσις even to God (however, προαίρεσις to God many other holy fathers also applied, see note 503). See: “After all, the rational (λογικόν) by nature, possessing as a natural ability a meaningful (λογικήν) desire (which is called the will (θέλησιν) of the thinking soul), strives, thinks (λογίζεται), and, after thinking, he wants. After all, it is stated about will (βούλησιν) that it is not just natural, but some kind of definite, that is, related to some object, will; and it seeks willingly, and seekingly foresees (σκέπτεται), and with foresight it estimates, and with estimate decides, and decisively chooses, and with choice is prompted, and being prompted uses, and using it rests from the movement directed toward that object” (opusc. 1: PG 91, 21D–24A). See note for details. 90 to Opusc. The most interesting here is the interpretation of St. Maxima on Psalm 59, which says that the devil has enslaved us to time and matter, symbolized by the number 12 (exp. Ps. 59. 38–41). It is interesting that Rev. Maxim, when discussing the number 12, does not talk about the number of apostles, but one can, developing his thought, say that if this number symbolizes “this world,” then the apostles were sent to preach the gospel throughout this world. See in particular Benevich 2009b; paper by Bronwen Neil at the 22nd International Congress on Byzantine Studies in Sofia, 22–27 August 2011: Bronwen Neil, Early Byzantine Notations of Divine Providence and paper by D. Bathrellos at the 2012 Belgrade conference (Bathrellos 2013). It is discussed in our monograph “A Brief Teaching on “Providence” from Plato to Maximus the Confessor” (Benevich 2013). However, in this work, the study of the relationship of dogmatic teaching expressed in Opusc. , and the teachings of St. The maxim about fishing is far from exhausted. Knežević 2012, p. 190–193. For recent work, see McFarland 2007 and Batrellos's St. Maximus the Confessor’s contribution(s) to the Notion of Freedom” at the 2012 Belgrade Conference (Bathrellos 2013). As part of the discussion of this topic, questions are raised about the difference between freedom of choice (between alternatives) and freedom in God, acquired by surrendering one’s autocracy to Him. In addition, the thesis of St. Petersburg, expressed in the Dispute with Pyrrhus, is discussed. Maxim about the freedom of human natural will. The following observation can be added to what Battrellos said. In his early writings, Venerable himself. Maximus writes about the violence of nature (or. dom.: PG 90, 904A) and even about the tyranny of nature (Ibid, PG 90, 880B), so when Pyrrhus says in the Disputation that calling the will natural means depriving it of freedom (disp. Pyrr: PG 91, 294B), he is quite likely referring to the thoughts of St. Maxima. Perhaps this is another example of how Pyrrhus in the Disputation contrasts the early writings of St. Maximus with the later ones. In any case, this topic deserves a more detailed analysis using the developed prp. A maxim of the conceptual apparatus, in particular, the distinction between “logos” and “tropos”. The theme of human freedom in St. The maxim is examined in Adrian Walker’s dissertation (Walker 2000), which is very interesting in its formulation of the question and methodology (it can be defined as hermeneutic), but, unfortunately, only partially accessible to us (introduction and conclusion), in which God’s creation of the world out of nothing is considered the metaphysical basis of human freedom. According to Rev. Maxim, the omnipotence of God and the creation of the world from nothing, as the author proves, is not only not an insurmountable obstacle to human freedom, but turns out (contrary to Marx, to whom the author refers) its condition. Walker made a very interesting attempt to find the intersection between Ambigua and Opusc. in relation to the topic of human freedom and God's will. His work was written taking into account a broad historical and philosophical context and, judging by the table of contents, contains an analysis of many essential for understanding Opusc. problems, so it remains to be regretted that it is impossible to get acquainted with it, as well as the fact that this interesting work is not mentioned by St. Petersburg researchers who wrote on the same topic. Maxima. Perhaps the reason is that Walker's work is more philosophical-theological than pathological. So, in the Mystagogy of St. Maxim, describing the state of people in the Church and what it does in relation to them, says: “there is a large and almost innumerable number of husbands, wives and children who differ and differ greatly from each other in gender and species, nationality and language, lifestyle and age, mentality and art, customs, morals and skills, knowledge and position [in society], as well as destinies, characters and spiritual properties. Finding themselves in the Church, they are reborn and recreated by the Spirit; She bestows and communicates to everyone equally a single divine image (μορφήν) and name - that is, to be and be called Christ's. And She also grants them, in accordance with faith, a single and simple, indivisible and inseparable connection (ἀδιαίρετον σχέσιν), which does not allow the many and countless differences (διαφοράς) of each to manifest themselves (even if they exist), raising everyone to universality (καθολικήν) and connecting them in it. As a result, no one separates anything from the general for his own sake; all grow together and are united with each other by one simple and indivisible grace and the power of faith” (myst. 1.36–54, translated by A.I. Sidorov according to: Maxim the Confessor 1993, Book I, p. 158). He quotes (Ibid.) Clement of Alexandria: “the divine Logos educates us “for one-equal (μονότροπον) salvation through faith in God” (Clem. Al. paed. 1.1.1. 2.4) and St. Basil the Great: “in the resurrection there is neither male nor female, but there is a certain one and uniform (μονότροπος) life” (Bas. Caes. in Ps. (114): PG 29, 492, 38–39). Expressed, in particular, in the recently published article by Zizioulas “Eschatology and Existence”: ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ 2012; Wed above comments on Zizioulas' report at the 2012 Belgrade Conference (Zizioulas 2013). Manoussakis’s report (Manoussakis 2013): “The dialectic of community and otherness in the understanding of will in St. Maximus” is available on the Internet: http://www.academia.edu/2301351/The_Dialectic_of_Communion_and_Otherness_in_St_Maximus_Understanding_of_the_Will. The report is interesting, among other things, because its author is a philosopher specializing in continental philosophy of the twentieth century. (Heidegger, Marion, Derrida, etc.). The theme of preserving “otherness” is close to him not only as a follower of Zizioulas, but also within the framework of the problems of modern philosophy. Manoussakis 2013, p. 173. It must be said that long before Manoussakis, Fr. Sergius Bulgakov in “The Lamb of God” (1933), however, without trying to find such a point of view in St. Maxim, and not by finding it and directly polemicizing with him (we discuss this topic in more detail in the Appendix in the article “St. Maxim the Confessor in Russia” in the section “Novoselov, Bulgakov, Florovsky and Lossky”, text in notes 56–76). Translated by Manoussakis: “will converge” (Manoussakis 2013, p. 179). Here Manoussakis quotes opusc. 3: PG 91, 48A. Manoussakis erroneously states: 43A: “the disposition to speak, which is always there, [refers] to nature, and the way someone speaks is to hypostasis.” Manoussakis 2013, p. 180. opusc. 1: PG 91, 24C–25A. See his interpretation on [1 Cor. 15:26]: But the last enemy that will be destroyed is death. “This [will happen] when we completely surrender to God (τῷ θεῷ παραχωρήσωμεν) autocratic will (or: “free will” (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον θέλημα))" (qu. dub. 22). All the holy sons of God by grace, who received adoption by surrendering their will to the will of God in the image that was revealed to us in Gethsemane by Christ. It is this surrender of one’s will to the will of God that is the condition for deification, participation in Divine life, in which each of the saints fulfills God’s will in his own way. Thus, all saints are sons of God, but each in his own way. This, it seems to us, is the general answer to the questions discussed in Larche’s polemic with Zizioulas regarding adoption and deification (see text at note 721); The filial tropos, common to all, does not exclude the existence of nature in the hypostases of saints, but is a condition for the deification of saints, who are moved in this state in God in a different way, characteristic of each of them. Wed. statement from Zizioulas’s report: “personal differences will persist in the eschaton and will “hypostasis” one human nature, according to the tropos “chosen” by γνώμη and προαίρεσις in this life by each person”, for more details see note. 724. Moreover, the point is not only that this or that saint belongs to a different “order” of holiness (there are not many of these ranks), but in a truly unique (even within a given rank) way and character of fulfilling God’s will. Compare: “after all... they will not all... be only apostles, or only prophets, and they, again, are not all, or only Peter, or only Moses, not one, but many with God and the Father and mansions for saints [John 14:2]” (opusc. 1: PG 91, 25C). We can say that in a more philosophical language, St. Maxim calls such an “abode” a unique tropos of human existence in God. In particular, myst. 1:36–54, see translation in note. 737. In this context, we should recall the well-known topos from the Questions and Answers of Thalassia, where we are talking about overcoming, by the Providence of God, the sinful gnomic division of rational creatures: “God, through [His] Providence, likens particular [creatures] to the whole (πρὸς τὰ καθόλου τῶν μερικῶν) until it unites, through the movement towards well-being, their self-willed desire (τὴν αὐθαίρετον ὁρμήν) with their natural, more general logos (τῷ γενικωτέρῳ λόγῳ) rational essence, and will not make them identically moving and consonant with each other and the whole so that the particulars do not have a gnomic difference in relation to the whole (τὴν γνωμικὴν πρὸς τὰ καθόλου τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους διαφοράν), but so that the same logos is contemplated by everyone, without being shared (διαιρούμενος) by those in whom it equally affects (τοῖς τῶν καθ’ ὧν ἴσως κατηγορεῖται τρόποις), and until He truly reveals the grace that deifies everyone” (Thal. 2.12–22, trans. V.V. Petrov according to: Petrov 2008, p. 27). However, do the words “not being separated by troposes” mean the absence of differences between the troposes of the hypostasis of human nature characteristic of each hypostasis, or does the Providence of God make those being saved “consonant with each other and the whole” even under different troposes? Judging by the thoughts expressed in ep. 2: PG 91, 397D, where ex. Maximus argues that the fall resulted in the fact that the united human nature was divided into different troposes, yet there is a high probability as in the cited passage from Thal. 2 is about overcoming the same division. In any case, in later writings the difference in tropos in the eschaton completely excludes the difference of sin - more or less adherence to what is inherent in human nature. See also ep. 2, to Cubular John On Love. You could say false identifications. This sinful division arises when a person’s “personality,” his imaginary “ego,” is constituted by identifying himself with certain hypostatic characteristics, for example, belonging to the male or female sex, this or that age, class, this or that race, nation, culture (myst. 1:36–54), even (although St. Maximus does not talk about this in Mystagogy) to this or that other religious organization, including the church with its order and discipline. In totalitarian communities, one or more of these features become dominant (for example, class, nation, religion), the symbol of which is the tyrant, the bearer of one or another ideology, and the wills of individuals submit to his will, forming “unity in the main” from the point of view of this tyranny. In fact, as we have seen, only by using the concept of gnomic will to assert the preservation of “stylistic differences” between saints, which in the context of the conceptual apparatus of the later works of St. Maxim is very problematic. The only place that seems to be able to be cited as proof of the appropriateness of such an interpretation is found in opusc. 10, where prp. Maxim seems to connect the individual tropos of discovering natural energy and γνώμη: “After all, each of us acts as what he is in the first place - that is, as a person, and not as someone [individual], and the tropos of energy reveals, [on the contrary], as someone, for example, Peter or Paul, imprinted by this [tropos] by intention (κατὰ γνώμην), whether descending or incrementing, one way or another. Therefore, in the tropos the difference of persons in action is recognized, and in the logos the indistinguishability of natural energy is recognized. After all, [it is] not as if one is endowed with energy or logos (ἐνεργὴς ἢ λογικός) to a greater extent, and the other to a lesser extent, but we all equally have both logos and its natural energy. Whether more or less, one way or another, [for example], just or unjust, [depends] on the fact that one follows to a greater extent what is [inherent] by nature, and the other does not follow it” (opusc. 10: PG 91, 137A–B). In this passage, however, Rev. Maxim speaks quite definitely about the state of people not in the eschaton, but in this life, that is, about people who are not deified, who can “by intention” (κατὰ γνώμην) to a greater or lesser extent follow what is inherent in nature, for example, “justly or unjustly” (i.e., they can sin). The question of the connection between γνώμη and the morally neutral “stylistic” characteristics of a person, St. Maxim does not seem to discuss this either here or anywhere else. In his early ascetic-exegetical works, he is interested in the question of getting rid of a sinful habit (parasitic on individual characteristics), and not in preserving personal idioms; in the later works of St. Maxim emphasizes the difference in the tropos of the saints in accordance with the measure and nature of their love for God. It seems to us that he takes the presence of individual characteristics as a given.