The secret of one of the champions of the union of churches

Raised by the new papal encyclical, the long-standing question of the reunification of churches naturally arouses interest in the history of previous attempts of this kind, and it must be said that this history has not yet been sufficiently studied, and there are many dark points in it that still await historical and critical illumination. One of these points hitherto was the mysterious role in these attempts of the most famous church and statesman in his time, monk Joseph Bryenius, and now it is interesting to report that clear light has now been shed on this point by the historical research of the famous Greek Archbishop Nicephorus Kaloger, and his abstract on this subject, made in the Athens scientific society "Hellenism", reveals one of the most interesting pages in the history of relations between the Orthodox East and west 1. Monk Joseph Bryenius was one of the most gifted Byzantine church-state figures during the reign of Emperor Michael Palaiologos (1391–1425) and since he was equally distinguished as both a theologian and a politician, the government often gave him diplomatic assignments of political and ecclesiastical nature. At the same time, in his own position he was highly respected as a preacher and teacher of theology, and he was honorably called their teacher by such learned men as, subsequently, Patriarch Gennadius Scholarius, and his principles served as the guiding thread for the leaders of the national party, such as Archbishop Marcus Eugenicus, during the Florentine and subsequent councils. He himself died before the Council of Florence 2, but left behind one secret, which serves as the subject of the study of the abstract under consideration. The fact is that Joseph Bryenius constantly spoke and tried to spread the word about the subject of his speech as widely as possible, namely, that if a council were to take place, he would make a speech at it, before the assembled bishops of the east and west, and in it would indicate the reasons for which the desired reunification of both halves of the divided church would immediately take place without any doubt or contradiction. He always cleverly evaded all attempts to find out anything more definite regarding these grounds, declaring that if he did not live to see the convening of the proposed council, he would leave his thoughts in his posthumous papers so that others could use them 3 . He really did not live to see the council and died, but at the same time he took the secret of his speech with him forever to the grave. Nevertheless, he reached the point that his secret became the subject of keen interest and many believed that, indeed, if he had lived to see the council, he could have strongly contributed to the idea of ​​​​reunification at it. That rumors of this even spread to the West is evidenced, by the way, by the speech with which Cardinal Julian Caesarini addressed the Greeks in Ferrara at a preliminary meeting 4 . No matter how mysterious and inexplicable it must have seemed how an individual person considered himself capable of accomplishing such a difficult task, however, both in the East and in the West, the more willingly they believed this, the more desirable it was for both halves to quickly take advantage of the external benefits of reunification. The only person who was not at all pleased by the rumors that were constantly spreading about the upcoming reunification of East and West was the Turkish Sultan, who was just waiting for a favorable moment to extinguish the last spark of life in the Christian Byzantine-Greek empire, but constantly retreated back - with every renewal of the unpleasant rumor. But the more we delve into the historical circumstances of that time, the more the mystery of Joseph Bryenius itself loses the character of mystery and reveals its true historical and diplomatic character. This will be quite clear if we first of all pay attention to the negotiations of Emperor Manuel regarding reunification and more accurately delve into his actual intentions in this regard. Emperor Manuel constantly showed great concern for the reunification of churches whenever he hoped through this to bring some relief to the oppressed empire. According to his inner conviction, however, he was always against the union of the Eastern Church with the Pope, because through long and bitter experience, he came to the conviction that real reunification on a true basis is impossible, and meanwhile, a simply externally concluded union, or even a far-fetched attempt at it, which inevitably had to collapse in the end, would not only not bring any benefit, but would only cause even greater harm. And yet, contrary to his personal inner conviction, during the last ten years of his life he conducted lengthy negotiations with Pope Martin V about convening a council to settle the issue of union. This strange contradiction finds explanation in view of the very position of the empire in the face of the Turks who constantly threatened it. With Sultan Mohammed, the son of Bayazet, the emperor was indeed on fairly friendly terms; and yet, he could not completely trust him, and even less his son Murad. In view of this, he resorted to a kind of political maneuver, according to which, in order to secure his state, he constantly raised and supported the question of the reunification of Christians - simply as a kind of scarecrow for the Turks, and not at all intending to lead it to a positive solution. So, in 1415, he sent John Eudaimon to Rome as a commissioner to negotiate a union. The latter was present in Rome at the coronation of Pope Martin V (1417) and began negotiations with the new pope. He informed the pope about the emperor’s desire to carry out the reunification of the divided churches, and presented him with the possibility of support in ending the papal schism and achieving universal recognition of the pope in Rome; at the same time, he informed the pope that the emperor was giving him the choice of spouses for both of his sons, the heir to the throne John and Theodore 5. Pope Martin immediately sent messages to the emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople, in which he expressed his joy at the emperor’s zeal for the reunification of the churches, eloquently exposing what benefits the east would receive if the union were realized. The emperor and the patriarch, in turn, wrote reply messages to the pope expressing warm gratitude for his favor, and stated that in order to implement the desired union by all, it was necessary to convene a council in Constantinople. The pope was quite aware of the cramped position of the Greeks, but since the implementation of the union promised to bring considerable benefits to the strengthening of his own position in Europe, he agreed to this choice of place. So the negotiations dragged on until 1422, when the pope, thinking that in view of the taxation of Constantinople made by Murad at that time, the most favorable moment had arrived, sent his legate to the emperor and patriarch to come to an agreement with them about the time of convening the council in Constantinople. But since, in view of the expected convening of the council and, as its result, support for the Greeks from the West, Murad again lifted the siege and Constantinople was saved this time by a miracle, the emperor gave the legate an evasive answer and again postponed the convening of the council until an indefinite time 6 . This was the secret political goal of the emperor. Those uninitiated in these secret intentions, however, seriously believed in the upcoming convening of the council. What served as the political basis for which the emperor constantly postponed the convening of bishops for the council, pushing it back to an indefinite time? Now we know this basis and precisely from Emperor Manuel’s own explanation. At the end of his life, he revealed this secret of his policy to his son, the heir to the throne John, in the presence of the historiographer George Franz, who speaks about it, under an oath of the truth of his narrative, in the chronicle he wrote after the conquest of Constantinople 7 . “My son,” the emperor said to his heir to the throne, “from this narrative, we undoubtedly know from the inner hearts of the infidels themselves that they harbor great fear lest we come to an agreement and unite with Western Christians. They think that if this happens, then a great blow will be dealt to them by Western Christians because of us. Therefore, take up the issue of the council and worry about it especially when you need to frighten the infidels; but at the same time do not allow the council to actually take place. For as far as I know my people, they will never agree to any other union, except for the Western ones to return to the position in which we were from the beginning. But this is impossible. I even greatly fear that an even worse division could result from this, and then it would be clear to the infidels.” This conversation between the emperor and his son, in any case, dates back to the end of his life, precisely to its last year, and meanwhile, as evidenced by a hitherto unknown historical document, namely one Moscow manuscript, he was still negotiating a union with the pope’s envoy on February 9, 1423. This was, therefore, a diplomatic secret of Emperor Manuel. Since he saw that the empire was approaching collapse, in dire need, in order to at least delay the fate that threatened it for a short time, he had at his disposal no other means of stopping the advance of the Turks, except that he continually raised the question of convening a council to conclude a union, looking at it as a bogeyman for the Turks. He knew that the pope was always ready to enter into negotiations on this issue that was beneficial to him, and at the same time, he could be sure, on the other hand, that the Sultan, who was waiting for a favorable moment for himself, in view of the persistent rumor about the council, would refrain from an immediate attack. But in order for this weapon to constantly retain its power, it only had to be constantly raised, without at the same time delivering a threatened blow, because then it would lose all power for the future. The secret of Joseph Bryenius is closely connected with this policy of the emperor. He was the emperor's trusted adviser and, in any case, was privy to the innermost secrets of his policy, and he was undoubtedly the most suitable person for the emperor to use his advice. Therefore, apparently by agreement with the emperor and with the obvious goal of supporting the emperor’s policy, Joseph Bryenius spread the rumor about his secret means, capable of immediately and without difficulty establishing a union between East and West. And the emperor himself could not achieve his goal even better than by supporting it with the statement of Bryenius. Thanks to this maneuver, among all those uninitiated into the secret, the belief in the possibility of immediately, if necessary, concluding a union was all the more deeply rooted; this, on the one hand, maintained the interest of the pope, and on the other, it also provided a serious threat to the Sultan, who therefore did not dare to make a decisive attack. Thus, the secret of Joseph Bryenius was inextricably linked with the diplomatic secret of the emperor, and both of them could only together and immediately become useless and invalid if they were revealed. This is exactly what happened when Manuel's successor, the emperor. John Palaiologos, contrary to the advice of his late father, went with the Greek hierarchs to Italy for the Council of Ferrara-Florence. As soon as he set foot on this road, he was left with only one choice - either to conclude a union at the discretion of Pope Eugene with the sacrifice of Orthodoxy to papal absolutism, or to return home, having achieved nothing and only having lost all protection from the terrible enemy. But there was no doubt that, had he acted one way or another, in any case, he would not have escaped the jaws of the Turkish dragon. Conscious of the responsibility that he thus placed upon himself, in order to reduce his own responsibility, he did not even hesitate to sin against the memory of his father and Joseph Bryenius, when, in view of the decree on union proposed for signature, contrary to his inner conviction, he told the Greek hierarchs that the work of union that had now been accomplished was not begun by him, but that its implementation had been left to him by his father, and that all outstanding representatives and teachers of the Greek church, as well as Joseph Vrienius, have long been striving for this goal 8. From what has been said, the famous secret of Joseph Bryenius is completely clear, and the latest research has shed bright light on this, hitherto so mysterious, page in the history of attempts to reunite the churches. Obviously, already at that time, in the East, the idea was fully recognized that the reunification of churches, on the basis proposed by the popes, was unthinkable, since the deepest self-consciousness of the Orthodox Eastern peoples rebelled against it, and if the emperors, and with them their spiritual advisers, supported the idea of union, and even, apparently, sought to implement it, then this was only a political maneuver, in order to ward off the impending storm, and as such, it certainly could not entail there are no serious consequences in church terms. This abstract is published in the minutes of the society: Έταιρεία σ Έλληνισμός. Τά έν αύτή γινόμενα άναγνώσματα. Τομος Α. Athens, 1894 (pp. 5–23). An extract from it was made by Prof. Lauchert in the latest book Internationale theol. Zeitschrift (No. 7, 1894), from which we borrow it. It is not known exactly in what year: between 1431 and 1438. His works were published in three volumes by Eugene Bulgaris, Leipzig, 1766–1774. Wed. Syropulos, Geschichte des Konzils von Florenz, VIII, 7 (ed. K. Creyghton, p. 228). Syropoulos, V, 4 (p. 116). Syropoulos, II, 5, 6 (p. 4). Phrantzes, Chron., II, 13 (Migne, Patrologia Graeca, t. 156, p. 784). 9 Syropoulos, IX, 7 (p. 258).