P.A. Florensky: pro et contra

Contents "Russian Way" K.G. Isupov. Pavel Florensky: legacy and heirs “Russian Way” is a long-term research and publishing project conceived and implemented by a non-state educational institution - the Russian Christian Humanitarian Institute. The project is a series of books related by a common theme and a single idea. The idea of ​​the series is to show the fate of Russian culture through an analysis of creativity, and the fate of its brightest and significant representatives. Each of the books in a subseries (philosophical, literary, political, etc.) is dedicated to the work and fate of a prominent figure in Russian history and culture - a philosopher, writer or poet, historian or statesman. Its composition is formed as a collection of studies and memoirs, quite compact in size and capacious in content, evaluating the life and work of a given representative of Russian culture and belonging to its other prominent figures, who thereby act as supporters and successors or critics and opponents of this or that subject of national cultural and historical creativity. Thus, the reader is presented with a kind of “Small Encyclopedia” about N. Berdyaev, L. Tolstoy or K. Pobedonostsev. The “Russian Way” series can also be assessed as a kind of “Life of Remarkable People”, written, however, not by one outside researcher, as in the Soviet series of the same name, but by many contemporaries and researchers, which turns each book of the “Russian Way” into a kind of mirror of a certain era of Russian culture. All publications are published in the same design: hardcover, gold embossing, each book dedicated to a particular thinker (as in the “Philosophical Heritage” series) has its own specific binding color. The publications use unique archival materials that were previously unavailable to domestic readers. Each volume is supplied with scientific apparatus (commentary and article). This makes it possible to use the books in the series for research and educational purposes. Dear Reader! You are holding in your hands another book of the “Russian Way” - “P.A. Florensky: pro et contra. The personality and creativity of Pavel Florensky in the assessment of Russian thinkers and researchers.” In two years, the “Russian Way” went from Nikolai Berdyaev to Pavel Florensky. The milestones of this movement were the publications “N.S. Gumilyov: pro et contra”, “V. V. Rozanov: pro et contra”, “K.N. Leontiev: pro et contra”, “K. P. Pobedonostsev: pro et contra”. During this time, the series gained nationwide fame; the concept and execution of the project received high marks from leading specialists from central Russian universities and scientific institutions. Evidence of the significance of the series for national culture was the financial support provided to the publishers of “Russian Way” by the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation (RGNF). “The Russian Way” will continue with the publication of an anthology about Maxim Gorky, and then books about P. Chaadaev, L. Tolstoy, Vl. Nabokov, Arch. Theodore (A. Bukharev), Dmitry Merezhkovsky. In 1997, the RKhGI publishing house plans to expand the topic of the series, namely, continuing the analysis of the personalities of Russian culture, turn to the study of its events and phenomena, spiritual and political movements (vekhovstvo, smenovekhovstvo, Eurasianism, etc.). The subject matter of the “Russian Way” will also expand through studies of the works of Western thinkers, for example, Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer, considered as phenomena of the intellectual quest of Russian culture. A book about Fr. Pavel Florensky is perhaps one of the brightest in the “Russian Way”. The creative publishing group, to all members of which I would like to say my warmest words of gratitude, worked on it for more than three years. For their part, the staff of the Russian Christian Humanitarian Institute express their heartfelt gratitude to the leaders of the State Committee for Higher Education of Russia, the Pushkin House and academician Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachev for their help and support in the implementation of the “Russian Way” project. K.G. Isupov. Pavel Florensky: legacy and heirs Among Russian thinkers of the 20th century, P. Florensky is the most mysterious and opaque figure for today’s understanding of the philosophical situation of the religious Renaissance. It cannot be said that little has been written about him (although much less than, say, about N. Berdyaev or V. Rozanov); 1 it is also difficult to complain about the paucity of critical reviews of his works. The authors of historical reviews of Russian philosophy (V. Zenkovsky, N. Lossky, S. Levitsky, B. Yakovenko, G. Florovsky, N. Berdyaev and some later ones) consider it their duty to include chapters on Florensky’s work, and these texts (as a rule, revised old reviews) become monuments of the historical self-awareness of the great era. The once relevant criticism of Florensky is strangely mixed in them with compliments and with that feeling of the invincible charm of the thinker’s prose that was experienced in his youth. Even B. Yakovenko, who, it seems, has not written a single positive review in his entire life, even Florovsky with his Orthodox puritanism, even Archimandrite. Nikanor is the author of a devastating review of “The Pillar...” (with accusations of plagiarism from Serapion Mashkin), even these people managed to say one or two kind words, as if against their own will. In communication with Florensky, the effect of the co-presence of both poles of a magnet was triggered; it attracted and repelled at the same time. This confused people and gave rise to memoirs with a dual, protean-fluid portraiture. When a contemporary wrote about Florensky, he was sometimes overcome by a certain demon of blasphemy (in extreme cases) or the desire to build the image of a philosopher, so to speak, apophatically, in the minus techniques of poetics “by contradiction” (at best). The face seen by A. Bely: “brown-greenish”; Florensky “falls at his feet”; he casts a long-nosed shadow, like Gogol’s. Marietta Shaginyan: “A fanatic with the face of Savonarola, an acute ascetic type.” 2 To N. Lossky, Florensky’s face “reminded the face of Spinoza,” and for S. Bulgakov it was the face of a Hellenic, an Egyptian, and Leonardo (for some reason everyone agreed on “Leonardo”). V. Rozanov, who felt Florensky’s personality more fully than others, said: “Cold, crystalline, everywhere, always loves form, he was instinctively afraid, in awe of the nakedness of human suffering.” 3 But about. Pavel at home: “The house is like a hut, surrounded by a garden with dense front gardens. Florensky himself, in a cassock, small, very thin, with a beard and long hair, as expected, looked handsome, quiet, tense, affectionate. The inside of the house is poor and very clean, which was taken care of by his modest, humble wife. There are many small children around. On the table there was a dish of some kind of grain, large, white (barley?), boiled with honey. Florensky treated them and explained that, according to ancient customs, they were supposed to eat on the eve of Christmas Eve. We sat for a long time, Vera spoke (Vera Konstantinovna Shvarsalon (1890–1920), daughter of Lydia Dmitrievna Zinovieva-Annibal (1866–1907) - K.I.), I was shy, but eagerly listened to every word. Florensky told us how he wanted to be a monk, how the elder, his confessor, did not allow him to do this, but ordered him to become a “white priest” and get married, how he met his betrothed on the bridge, according to the confessor’s prediction. When we were leaving, he came across, I don’t know how, the drawings that I had sketched in the margins of some sheet of paper. He looked and asked to give it to him; something about them interested him. He saw us off. We went along some roads, damp and narrow. While crossing a river, or ditch, on a wooden bridge, I noticed a pin on the ground and bent down to pick it up. “Leave her,” said Florensky, “things with points are dangerous.” They may be bewitched." 4 The memoirists especially carefully noted the exotic, for the late 20s, combination of Florensky’s priestly vestments and laboratory interior. Son of the writer Vs. Ivanova (now a well-known researcher of language and culture) recalls: “In the twenties, at the time of studying the exact sciences, my father met P. A. Florensky. He told me that he took him around his electrical engineering laboratory in an outfit that was so little consistent with it. Then they went to talk to Florensky at his apartment; he lived with his friends, it seems, in the kitchen, where Florensky’s bed stood in the corner. My father remembered the modesty of his room’s furnishings.” 5 No one could really say what kind of eyes he had (Fr. Pavel had the habit of looking down and to the side in conversation). No one seemed to remember him smiling or laughing (we would add that Florensky laughing can only be imagined “Faustian” or “apocalyptically”). The philosopher’s self-disclosure did not occur in the external world of “behavior,” but in confessional prose, which is rightly compared to the experiences of Pascal, Augustine and Kierkegaard. There is an essentially important, national feature in Florensky’s creative behavior, which S. Bulgakov accidentally let slip about in an essay in 1934. We are, in fact, talking about just two words. The first of them is “charm,” and the author of the memoir uses it not in the traditional Orthodox (and etymologically correct) sense, but as a compliment: “He had a gentle, quiet voice, great charm.” The perception of “The Pillar...” by many contemporaries as a charming book returns this word to semantics adequate to the situation. The second word, very important, if not central: “Neither his engineer father nor his gymnasium or university teachers dreamed of such foolishness as a cassock.” 6 S. Bulgakov's remark gives us a reason to look at Florensky from the angle of a very specific form of behavior (in our context, creative self-expression) - Russian foolishness. It would not be superfluous to agree that this word is used in relation to Florensky not in its literal sense, of course. We are talking about the ideological and emotive-creative sublimates of the behavior of the holy fool. What was foolishness in Russia? Foolishness is an extreme form of self-denial, a type of practical asceticism. The fool is a tragic actor, an anti-hero and denouncer of the everyday world and its imaginary values. A child of God, who despised the arrogance of earthly kings and his own body, a jester in chains (“God’s jester,” in the words of L. Karsavin (“Poem about Death,” 1932)), an actor and spectator of his own play. He may be perceived as the governor of the Last Judgment on earth. The holy fool is not afraid of anyone, he is not afraid of earthly judgment, since no one is capable of being more cruel to his body than himself. He is not afraid of other people's opinions; in his incomprehensible tongue-tiedness, people hear prophecies. In the eerie cheerful behavior of the defender of the truth, the latter is covered, like a shield, in a wretched manner. The real truth is ineffable in harmonious speech and in speech ordered according to the rules of rhetoric. There is shame of form and shamelessness of the final truth. Foolishness is the self-disclosure in a person of shame of the form of truth, its shocking phenomenon. The phenomenon of the holy fool appears initially Russian, having no direct analogies (cf. figures of a eunuch, dervish, hermit ascetic, yogi). Foolishness in its history is not exhausted by the biographies of famous holy fools and is not limited to the church fence. It receives many secular forms of expression, both at the level of everyday behavior and in literary images. Foolishness became a deeply national feature of Russian behavior and way of life, and over time, even a subject of play and mimicry (false old man G. Rasputin). The presence of traits of foolishness in the appearance of a thinker, writer, artist should not be interpreted in evaluative intonations. The ambivalent nature of foolishness combines unconscious hypocrisy with open denial of the foundations of normalized life, anguish of suffering with comic self-criticism, deep seriousness of achievement with vital clownery. Foolishness expresses despair at an imperfect life, longing for a weak person and an attempt to break through sinful physicality to the sacred opportunity of meeting God, to open up to him in sacrificial self-denial. Foolishness is a form of crisis of the spirit and eternal standing on the verge of death alive. It may indicate the tragic fragmentation of life into inadequate spheres of words and ideas, actions and statements. Thus, Prince Myshkin’s preoccupation with mental expression (“my words are different, not corresponding to my thoughts”) determines the incompleteness of his personal foolishness, which, in principle, is unable to complete the hero and leaves him at the “idiot” stage. From Makar Devushkin and Foma Opiskin, with their self-deprecating gestures, to the esthete-fool Stavrogin and the poser-fool Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov, these are the incarnations of Dostoevsky’s “main character”. Foolishness may be associated with messianic inclinations. This is the behavior of Chaadaev, the later Gogol and L. Tolstoy during periods of serious crises. The latter, in correspondence with V. Chertkov, spoke about foolishness as a condition for the spiritual growth of the individual. Sun. After meeting Tolstoy, Garshin distributed money to random people, bought a horse and rode it around the Tula province, preaching non-resistance. N.’s hermit’s lifestyle and the concept of “common cause” carry a distinct taste of foolishness. Fedorov, the lifestyle of the artist-sorcerer and storyteller E. Chestnyakov. A. Khomyakov also joins this row, capable of playing funny pranks on his friends during the day, and spending the night in tearful prayer. 7 Vl.’s “laughter,” famous for its strangeness. Solovyov, tall and abrupt, gave the impression of a shocking fool. Foolishness is associated with leaving as a type of Fronde (to a skete or from a monastery, “to the gypsies” or “to become actors,” to the city or to the village, to the people” or to emigration). Leaving for the city introduced elements of foolishness into the behavior of Yesenin, Klyuev and Shukshin (see his “eccentrics”). A. Dobrolyubov went “to the people” and disappeared (Berdyaev called this young man and L. Tolstoy “Russian Franciscans.” Compare the fate of L. Semenov). Foolishness, as a type of “God’s madness,” was observed in the behavior of V. Rozanov, A. Bely, V. Sventsitsky, Oberiuts and Futurists. If for S. Bulgakov in the “feat of foolishness” the limit of oblivion of the “self” is conceived in sacrificial standing before God, 8 then for M. Bakhtin, in this superhuman and abstract rejection, lies the sin of “proud loneliness and resistance to another. 9 Foolishness reaches a certain limit and even self-denial in the heroes of A. Platonov’s dystopias “Chevengur” and “The Pit”. In modern literature and painting of the underground that has broken free, foolishness has strengthened the elements of tortured and feigned heroism rather than pride. The dispersion of assessments of Florensky’s personality and texts is too wide to explain this by the originality of the thinker’s phenomenon itself. Those who scolded him scolded themselves in him, those who praised him praised themselves. Sometimes these positions were combined (Berdyaev). In Florensky, somehow at once, synchronously and distinctly fractionally, those qualities were observed that others received separately. He alone united in himself much that was intended for others living in the world of unequal fragmentation of the Whole. In Florensky, a whole theater of personalities played their worldview drama, so that within this capricious group the question of internal evolution did not arise. In the world of Florensky’s ideas, it was not evolution that took place, but movement in vicious circles of self-return, from the axioms of exact knowledge to magic, and then again to natural scientific postulates. What we see is not evolution, but the rhythm of an ideological swing. At the same time, the presence of the philosopher’s “I”, at one of the extreme points of amplitude, is marked by nostalgia for the opposite point. There is not even any talk about the middle moment of harmonic rest. Florensky “flies” over him and does not notice. It does not have any value attraction, and it does not have it all the more the more quickly the author’s thought flashes through it, in the space of an irreversibly growing distance between the poles. Value priority remains with antinomianism, apophatics and epistemological equivalence of “yes” and “no”. If the truth obtained by human skill is fundamentally ambivalent, and only the Supreme Truth of Revelation turns out to be the priority and the only one, then all talk about scientific epistemology can be stopped. This is the context of Florensky’s position, stated in the era of passion for Logos and modes of logical discourse. Self-valuable for such an attitude turns out to be the inner world of religious experience and the risk of immanent knowledge of God's Truth, which Florensky designated with the forgotten word ἐπоχή. The risk of an intuitionist and a symbolist gives an awareness of the humanity of error; in ἐπоχὴ the anthropological metaphor of the fear of being mistaken is presented, and, if you like, the recollection of tragic guilt (the worst thing is not to recognize your Fate, the risk of discrepancy with its plot in a personal act). Man is a tool in the tragic hunt for truth. Long before the existential hermeneutics of cognitive acts, Russian religious thought in its “Florensky” version demonstrates impressive projections of the tragedy of the life world onto the antinomies of reason. Objects of knowledge and logical mechanisms of understanding made up the Universe of oxymorons. The mysticism of inner vision divided these rules of the game and turned them into a paradox. The psychological persuasiveness of her conclusions is effective only within the framework of the “I” (beyond them, personal truth turns into a hypothesis, expressed in an intonation of humility). In the matter of human experience, human truth lives in the form of guilt before the Truth, therefore the organic “posture” for it is surprise, gratitude, humility, obedience, repentance and repentance (in defiance of the “figures of pride” - boredom, skepticism, hidden uncertainty, narcissism, jealousy and rebellion). The era of religious renaissance found its philosophemes of synthesis at the ontological level: in S. Bulgakov - Sophia, in N. Berdyaev - freedom, in P. Florensky - Truth. External representatives of truth have paradoxically become independent ontological phenomena: symbol, word, Church (liturgy, sacraments, icon). The same turned out to be the organs of created messages about Truth (i.e., Soul, Heart), and the lower regions of its manifestation between people (Eros, Friendship). A competent conversation about things of this level of complexity could only take place at the crossroads of many scientific methods, and in the traditions of comprehensive universalism. Florensky became an encyclopedist not simply out of an innate curiosity about information and the forms of its expression and exchange. The central Object of the philosopher (the meaning of the Creator, creation and creature) is grandiose not in the amount of knowledge sought about it, but in the architectonics of the multidimensional “grasping”, on the countless levels of which any science will find work and any kind of experience. From the ordinary to the prophetic, he will hear a call related to him. Florensky’s epistemologically “compulsory” encyclopedicism organically responded to the themes of his philosophical search, the nature of his talented humanity, and the main intention of churching outside the fence of abiding values. But like any encyclopedism (of the Renaissance or Enlightenment types), it could not help but show its reverse side. Encyclopedically knowledgeable people usually evoke two, formally similar reactions from the outside: “he seems to know everything,” and “he seems to know everything.” The first saying speaks of comprehensive education and creative breadth of skill, and the second speaks of erudition. Both of these are poorly applicable to Florensky. He amazed his contemporaries not with the volume of acquired information (they quickly got used to this), but with the ways of its application and the logic of complex combinatorics, for the modes of which there were no simple objects in the world. They appeared to be multidimensional phenomena capable of “generating” their own organs of self-knowledge, self-description and self-testimony. They “spoke,” they were “texts,” they lived a life of disenchanted meaning. In a word, they were eidos, semantic constructs, figurative bodies, dynamic gestures of self-examination of Being. F. M. Dostoevsky once said that he would prefer to remain not with the Truth, but with Christ. Many who reproached The Pillar for the absence of a chapter about Christ in it decided that Florensky preferred Truth to Christ. Let us answer this that the monodual Truth of Florensky is a paradox of no greater order than the dogma about the divine-human nature of the Savior or the Trinity of the Divinity. In order to remain a theologian, Florensky had to think about why the basic formulas of dogmas and sacraments (as well as the seemingly simple requirements of New Testament ethics) are built according to the laws of paradox and in the vector of supralogical-religious modality. The intention of suggestion carried out in them owes its historical success to the very magic of the “incomprehensible”, about which Florensky spoke so much and so eloquently. This poetics of the “absurd” (extramundane madness and extramundane foolishness) was remarkably revealed by the early Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky and L. Shestov. Florensky not only demonstrates in “The Pillar...” the possibility of creativity within the limits of dogma (and it is precisely this kind of creativity that he recognized as genuine), but his entire epistemology, ontology and aesthetics are formulated along the lines of a proven mythopoetic eidology. Therefore, its Truth is not provable, but demonstrable, and is a symbol. And the symbol is its own logic, memory and content of faith. A symbol is a person or an indication of a person, her autograph, a sign of presence, a trace of self-identification (a point of convergence with A. Losev). The Trinity can only be understood symbolically, but cannot be believed symbolically. The image of the Trinity is suggestive and fascinative; it radiates the energy of conviction by the very fact of its appearance, the representation of my humanity. In the symbol of the Trinity, a very ancient mechanism for generating an authoritarian paradox, more convincing for symbolic consciousness than all logics combined, carries out its mental task. The framework of the dogma of the Trinity found itself apart from the rational pedantry and centuries-old scholasticism of the Trinitarian question. Its true meaning, Florensky believes, appeared to consciousness and imagination in the field of symbolic meanings of truth, therefore, for symbolic consciousness, all truths are the latter, therefore dogmatic, and are not subject to appeal from the mind. From the experience of world skepticism and Kantian antinomianism, Florensky hastens to draw conclusions opposite to those on which reason, disappointed in its capabilities, stopped. This is the disappointment of the “intelligent” Mind, which erected the Eden of mechanical causality, for the biorobots of the deistic-spring world. In the chapter “The Creature” (“Pillar…”): “The 18th century, which was the century of the intelligentsia par excellence, and not without reason was called the “Age of Enlightenment,” of course, the “enlightenment” of the intelligentsia, consciously set itself the goal: “Everything is artificial, nothing natural!” Artificial nature, in the form of trimmed gardens, artificial language, artificial morals, artificial - revolutionary - statehood, artificial religion. The greatest representative of the intelligentsia, Kant, put an end to this desire for artificiality and mechanicalness, in whom, from the habits of life to the highest principles of philosophy, there was, and according to his own plan there should not have been, anything natural. If you like, this mechanization of all life has its own, terrible grandeur - the spirit of the Fallen Day. But all these ideas, of course, are still supported only by the creativity that they steal from the life given by God. And the same should be said about Kant’s modern improvers” (“Pillar...”, 195–296). According to Florensky, thinking, starting from the point ἐπоχή, returns to the mythological childhood of its infant memory in order to re-experience the comfort of an understandable and recognized world. In it all the contradictions are imaginary, they are reconciled in the friendly community of myth and symbol, name and everyday habit (i.e. ritual and rite). Communication with the Symbolists was of cardinal importance for Florensky. What the “Argonauts” and “Solovievites”, the authors of “Scales”, “Apollo”, “The Pass” and “The World of Art” called symbol creation and life-building, was, in fact, a renaming of reality within the framework of a ready-made (represented by cultural memory) mythological onomasticon. This is how Kant’s apriorism was lifted: by means of recalling from memory the true names of things, the world of which had replaced their conceptual pseudonyms. In the language of solid concepts, the world is not recognized, but is crookedly doubled. In its “etymological” originality, being recognizes and remembers itself in the forms of primordial nominal symbolism. Therefore, both for the entire school of Potebnians (the idea of ​​the “internal form” of a word), both for the aesthetic hermeneutics of G. Shpet (who, however, while reading “The Pillar...”, said about the author: “a skeptic inside out” 10), and for Florensky, etymology plays the role of a scientific argument. For the sake of analogy, let us recall that modern cultural studies was created by etymologists-semioticians. When A. Losev, a man of common ideological origins with Florensky, defending the need to supplement the mythosymbolic method with strict logic, irritably remarks: “No Florensky can convince of the uselessness of this purely logical point of view,” 11 and his indignation at the fact that some Lotman, who deals only with structure of language, and thought, and literary forms,” 12 and Losev was not invited. In the main cosmogonic models (Rigveda, Old Testament), the world is created by word and speech, by pronouncing names and calling out existence from non-existence. The creativity of the world is nominative, it is born as an ontological “text”, as a response to a call by name (see the mystery of cosmogonic nominations in A. Meyer’s treatise “Notes on the meaning of the mystery (Sacrifice”), 1933)). In “Yes!”, the nominating action is canceled by the “no” of non-existence. Thus, on the path of an active return to the existential-semantic adequacy of words and things, Kant’s antinomianism is removed; reason with its double truths simply has nothing to do here. The “I” either trusts the name (myth, symbol and other markings of truth), or turns away from being (and falls into the sin of conceptual pseudonymy). Reason is left with a modest role of trustful translation of the pre-logical contents of nominal memory into the language of familiar logical figures. The terms “reason” and “reason” are deprived of the usual distinction in Florensky (for which the opponents of “The Pillar..." rightly reproach him), therefore, apparently, those functions of logical control and censorship that reason takes on in Kant, within the framework of Florensky’s mental Cosmos and in the style of his worldview, are given not to the upper floor of consciousness (rational metalogic), but to the lower (primary intuition, symbolically reflected faith). This reduction of reason to the infantile-naive mythological certainty of primordial knowledge is, at the same time, the elevation of myth and symbol to the rank of super-rational (meta-rational) knowledge. This knowledge is seeing, recognizing, remembering and believing in the ineffability of truth other than in the forms of symbol and myth. This is also the reason for the specifically “Floren” baroque “tongue-tiedness” and a kind of epistemological “Tolstoyism” (non-resistance to mythological knowledge, trust in the organic mysticism of inner experience). Florensky builds an exquisite rhetoric of nominations, where the philosophemes of Sacrifice, Heart, Cross, Eros and Truth form not tables of “antinomies of reason”, but integrative symbolic compositions of a holistic worldview. Florensky realized a holistic romantic epistemology of exotic “paganism”, with all the “Dionysian” arabesques characteristic of it, but with a stubborn thirst for syncretic knowledge. The people of Florensky’s era emerged from the crisis experience, which had fallen into fragments of the classical picture of the world, by means of self-assembly of the “I” along the paths of an ambivalent synthesis of opposites. Here is the testimony of a contemporary who managed to gather the world around him in exactly this way: “I perceived good and evil, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly, strong and weak, sick and healthy, great and small as certain unities...”. 13 “Everything that was before that lived in me, all the groundless dreams, all the passion for empty idealism, all the admiration for myself, everything disappeared, stopped, died. My empty soul was waiting for something. And something began to slowly rise from its depths. I began to guess: this was the birth of a worldview in me. Not only in the mind, but in my whole being - in the heart, and in the will, and in the hands, and in the legs, and throughout the whole body.” 14 One of the most pressing moments of Florensky’s worldview is the question of man. Almost the only thing on which his critics were unanimous was the reproach addressed to the author: in “The Pillar...” there is no chapter about Christ. Both theologians and secular thinkers considered it necessary to note this. The creativity of the people of the Silver Age was accentuated by Christ-centeredness in many areas: in painting and poetry, in anthropology (starting with V. Nesmelov), in extra-church religious studies (“Jesus the Unknown” by D. Merezhkovsky) and mystical literature (D. Andreev). From the “Son of Man” archim. Anthony (A.P. Khrapovitsky, 1905) to “Son of Man” by A. Men (1969), a multidimensional retrospective of Russian Christology is outlined. The traditions of theocosmism (N. Fedorov) and “theoanthropourgy” (S. Bulgakov) have also determined their place here; studies in the field of Christian philosophy of history, which interprets the historical process in terms of divine-human dialogue; understanding the ethical norm of Christ as an ideal program for a responsible consciousness; the study of metaphysical projections of the incarnation of God onto the meaning of the individual as a god-like being who experiences this quality of his as a fundamental predetermination. The last aspect, not without difficulty, and very conditionally, was taken beyond the boundaries of a purely confessional conversation about the essence of the dual nature of Christ, into the plane of philosophical reflection on the intradivine life of the Trinity. Not without the influence of the German mystical tradition and the usual Catholic sympathies for Russian culture, several hypotheses regarding the Trinitarian problem were proposed here. Interpretations of the Holy Spirit in the female aspect (N. Fedorov), and the poetic theology of Vl. Solovyov (mythologems of Eternal Femininity and the Soul of the World), pushed Russian thought towards sophiology (E. Trubetskoy, V. Ern, S. Bulgakov, L. Karsavin, P. Florensky). The clarification of the Trinity unity in the vector of sacrificial exchange culminated in the creation of a whole collection of theories of Eros and Heart (P. Yurkevich, B. Vysheslavtsev, S. Troitsky, A. Zhurakovsky), as well as dialogic models of ontologized ethics of the existential-personalist (A. Meyer, M. Bakhtin, Ya. Druskin) conciliar (L. Karsavin) sense. The linguistic vocalization of the prayer experience gave rise to name-glorification. The complication of ontological hierarchies in favor of a “monodual” picture of the world led to the recognition of Boehm’s Ungrund (the groundless Foundation of the world) as the cardinal principle of being (N. Berdyaev). The creative accentuation of the Third Person of the Trinity gave us the theology of culture (G. Fedotov) and the mysticism of the Third Testament (in the historiosophical version - D. Merezhkovsky) in the form of capturing internal religious experience - A. Schmidt). Against this motley background, Florensky’s “place” turns out to be everywhere and nowhere. His creative “extra-presence” at all levels of the polyphonic mutual opponent of the authors of the Silver Age immeasurably complicated the usual procedures for identifying the texts of a thinker, with the context of any direction, school, etc., so that Florensky himself had to take care of outlining the traditions leading to him. We dare to suggest that the clearly ambiguous, wavering light of assessments in which the thinker appeared to his contemporaries was essentially determined by Florensky’s deepest distrust of the person-person and the person-problem. The attempt of the current researcher (who has done more than others to clarify our ideas about the true scale of the Russian philosopher’s work) to declare Florensky the founder of a new science - anthropodicy, seems purely complimentary. 15 The presence of a term does not yet mark the presence of a concept (thus, the word “catharsis” once mentioned by Aristotle, or the word “chronodicy” invented by Shaftesbury, does not yet indicate “Aristotle’s theory of catharsis”, or the philosophical soundness of the optimism of the English aestheteist). It is not difficult to see that in Florensky’s works published to date, so little is said about anyone as an individual, and what is said looks either like an unexpected switch of an associative series (“Types of growth”, 1906), or as a psychological introduction (analysis of a dream at the beginning of “Iconostasis”, 1922), or as a reference to the history of the mythologeme “macrocosm/microcosm” (in the article of the same name 1917–1922), or as a commentary on physicality (chapter “Creature” in “The Pillar...”). Even such cardinal concepts-images as “face/face/mask” or cultural perspectives are given by our author in indirect, muted intonations. In extensive discussions about friendship, the heart, eros and creatureliness, the anthropological plan itself is filled with multi-layered rows of patristic quotes, and shifted into the very depths of the problem space. The fearlessness of Florensky’s encyclopedic mind evaporates somewhere as soon as he approaches a person, which was keenly felt by such different readers as N. Berdyaev, G. Florovsky and V. Rozanov (the latter wrote with particular concern about Florensky’s “omissions”). “The author is not telling something,” - such was the vague feeling of concealing the most essential, a light shadow hovering in the patterned space of the baroque prose of the thinker. This is the shadow of half-embodied anthropodicy, a shadow with which Florensky’s relationship sadly resembles the plot of the myth of Eurydice and Orpheus. According to Florensky’s interpretation, Orpheus, a priest of Apollo, was punished by the Dionysian elements “for trying to perceive a face in Eurydice.” 16 Florensky knows the chthonic man, the man of “body” and “skin,” that is, a created being who is “decisive nothingness” (“Pillar...”, p. 289). Is it not this Orphic horror of nothing that so powerfully and so successfully resisted Florensky’s attempts to heal “the wound of loving pity for all that exists” (“Pillar...”, p. 288) a truly human eros of a non-heroic and non-ascetic path, a personality growing towards God? Let us emphasize: non-ascetic, for Florensky’s anthropology is the anthropology of extremum: the path of holiness, the path of those called to the feat of asceticism. How can one not be called? The Russian theologian considered the worldview “non-finito” to be a generic quality of the Florenskys: “None of them ever reaped the harvest from the fields they sown, and either passed away, or the matter moved away from him” (“To my children...”, p. 414). Anthropodycey remained a rough attempt at a question, because Florensky was dealing with an unfinished man in an era of crisis, with a creature becoming. It is not without reason that in his letters to V. Rozanov in the summer of 1918, he dreams of the completion of anthropogenesis in a human being of a “new” type, and in the chapter “Collapse of Memories” he dreams of a new “Cosmos”, more holistic than Humboldt’s. But it's not just that. Florensky was affected by the pan-Orthodox complex of distrust of a specific human person (contrary to the central thesis of Christianity about man as the main value of God's world). “Sobornost” and the ideology of “all-unity” are its theoretical sublimates. The more grandiose the hierarchies of the “new” Cosmos became in N. Fedorov, Vl. Solovyov, L. Karsavina, the more luxuriously the universal charm of the Century blossomed - Sophia's romance, 17 the less space in these pictures of the world was left for the individual and personal destiny. One of the remarkable achievements of Russian religious thought, the discovery of deeply human aspects of history as a divine-human dialogue, was discredited by the madness of the historical experience of the early 20th century. The image of Christ the God-Man with tragic irreversibility loses the semantic perspective of ideal intimate humanity, once given and assigned to people as the only norm and final value (“Testament”). There was a violent rupture of the dual nature of God and the Son, the Messiah and the Lamb, the Chief of Life and the Comforter, and now the God of L. Tolstoy appears as the terrible punishing Prince of Peace of the Old Testament (Is. 9:6), the God of God's Wrath, God's Fear and the Last Judgment, and the God-Man, through the efforts of demonized Nietzscheanism, is transformed into his opposite, which is fair indicated by the title of S. Bulgakov’s public lecture, given on March 14, 1912: “Man-God and Man-Beast.” It has become difficult to love a person. It is more convenient to love eidos and nature, forms and numbers, the beautiful outlines of the Cosmos, and the intelligent energies that animate it. Florensky did not like people, this is the secret of the impossibility of his “anthropodicy”. “I did not like people, that is, I did not experience hostile feelings. Even towards animals, mammals, I was rather indifferent; in them I felt too close a kinship to humans. And I loved the air, the wind, the clouds, the rocks were dear to me, I felt spiritually close to myself with minerals, especially crystalline ones, I loved birds, and most of all, plants and the sea. Let it seem like ugliness, let it be seen as a lack of moral feeling, but it was so, without ill will, with all the strength of my being - I did not love man as such and was in love with nature” (“To my children...”, pp. 70-71). It would be the deepest disrespect on our part to use this courageous confession of Florensky to accuse him of callousness or, on the contrary, to compliment that well-known aphorism that, they say, an intelligent person in his soul cannot help but despise people (let this saying remain on the conscience of the intelligent). Before the fact of the collapse of the ideals of classical humanism by Florensky’s contemporaries and opponents, the need to justify man was realized. This task is posed in the aspect of Christology. This, in particular, was the attempt of N. Berdyaev, which caused so much talk. “The new Christological anthropology must reveal the secret of man’s creative vocation and give the highest religious meaning to man’s creative impulses. The weakness of a person’s Christological self-awareness strengthens his anti-Christological self-awareness,” said in “The Meaning of Creativity” (1916). And further: “The God-man is a revelation of not only divine, but also human greatness, and presupposes faith not only in God, but also in man. Redemption itself was the inner growth of man. And in the spirit of man all the mystical events of the life of Christ take place. The human-likeness of God in the only begotten Son of God is already the eternal basis of the original creative nature of man, capable of creative revelation.” 18 In his opening speech at the defense, Florensky called Christology the central question of anthropodicy, and yet Christology was not written. Even in “The Pillar...”, having abandoned the possibility of defining a person (“You can only create a symbol of the fundamental characteristic of a person (p. 83)”), the philosopher in advance averts from himself the questions of free will, the meaning of personal life and the theology of action. They, of course, have not ceased to be themes of life and intimate reflection, but at the textual level they are present in Florensky’s works only in the form of fragmentary remarks, so it took considerable effort to restore from them some semblance of anthropodicy. According to Abbot's comment. Andronika (A. S. Trubacheva): “The justification of a person is accomplished: 1) in the structure of man as the image of God, and in his will to walk the path of life in accordance with God’s will, with the God-given charter, archetype 2) in the sanctification of a person, when he from a sinner becomes sanctified, holy 3) in human activity, when sacred (cult, liturgical) activity is primary and affects the worldview (science and philosophy), economy and art" (Florensky P.A. Works. M., 1990. Vol. 2. At the watersheds of thought. P. 355). Extremely expressive and instructive is the observation of S. S. Khoruzhy, who in the article “Gaining Concreteness” for the second volume of the Works of P. A. Florensky (M., 1990) found out that when the program of “Christian symbolism” sums up its results in “Watersheds...”, the picture of the world revealed in them “needs neither love nor Sophia” (p. 5), i.e. in the central categories of the “Pillar...”. The worst thing is that this seems to be true. In the impersonal world of symbolic correspondences, the work of... justification of the individual is taking place (which in itself is the seeking and acquisition of Divine love and the establishment of the Sophia world order). The situation, however, is not unique. The “philosophy of the common cause” of N. Fedorov is not concerned with the boundaries of the individual. She has no place in Solovyov’s picture of the world. “I” is differentiated in the “single plural Personalities” of L. Karsavin and A. Meyer. Personality is extinguished in the choral consent of the carnival crowd in Bakhtin. Berdyaev's personalism, and the possibility of justifying a person formulated by him, have direct access to the philosophy of history. No matter how you look at it, the creative priority of personal freedom is affirmed here. In Florensky’s static Universe, where only symbols live through the dynamics of expressive metamorphoses, the “historical” is at best a composition of eidos, and at worst a figurative transcription of eschatology. It is difficult to build a philosophy of history in the horizon of an impersonal world, so the contacts between Berdyaev and Florensky in this regard are purely external. 19 Florensky's asociality took revenge on him with a crisis of worldview. Just as the philosophical “sum” of “Watersheds...” in a sense negates the sophiology and anthropology of “The Pillar...”, so the last work of Florensky known to us - his Solovetsky utopia (dystopia?) finally, decisively and irrevocably abolishes all the noble promises of anthropodicy, even if we close our eyes to the incompleteness of the latter. One has only to take the thinker’s utopia seriously (and ignore the possible version of forced discharge under conditions of hard labor), then one will have to recognize in it another variation of Plato’s State, about which A. Losev once said that this is not a theory of human coexistence, but a theory of a stud farm. An expression of Florensky’s chronic distrust of social man was the project of society, which embodied the most daring projects of the most vulgar totalitarianism. But let's not rush to conclusions. Until the publication of the entire corpus of the thinker’s texts is completed, all conversations about him remain at the level of hypotheses. Like many of his contemporaries, Florensky experienced a period of apocalyptically intense anxiety, when reality itself, possessed by the demons of disorder, stood under the sign of death and the last day of history (see A. Bely’s memoirs about the “apocalyptic” sect). This mood was reflected both in the poetic memories of 1905 (the poem “Eschatological Mosaic”), and in the excited sermon on the Week of the Worship of the Cross (“The Cry of Blood”, 1906 - perhaps Florensky’s only truly Christocentric work, where the fate of a private person is comprehended in the aspects of Golgotha ​​and mystical catharsis). Fixing later this “break in world history,” the philosopher will say: “It was a feeling of mortal melancholy, and burning pain, and unbearable suffering, that something that had been built with the greatest efforts was being destroyed, I’m not talking about our own, but about common, European ones. But in this pain, burning to the point of screaming, at the same time, the beginning of liberation and resurrection was also felt, not only mine, but also everyone’s” (“To my children...”, p. 197). Over time, Florensky leaves the soil of a tragic sense of life. A person in his coordinates of being remains on one path to the end: on the position of stoically accepted creatureliness (= sinfulness) and the conviction that he can be justified in the life feat of “repetition” of kenosis, but not in the opposite direction - upward, to God, the vector of movement. It’s like Fate, and the philosopher, with detached calm, can now conclude his “Autobiography” (1927) with an intonation of eerie indifference: “Concerning my work, I believe that its current course, as fate has directed me, is the most suitable.” 20 Florensky overcomes the tragedy of life aesthetically, N. Berdyaev - in the sphere of ontology and philosophy of history, S. Bulgakov experienced it as a tragedy of gnosis. The path of A. Losev begins and ends with the thought of the tragedy of history: from the early article “Eros in Plato,” 1916 (“To accept Eros alone and in its shadow to accept and suffer all the vileness of existence, and in this latter is the religious justification of Eros” 21), and the sketches “The structure of an artistic worldview,” 1915–1916 (“Two elements are most important in the concept tragedy: cosmic chaos, and its breakthrough through space-time institutions (mainly in the individual, i.e. space-time institutions of consciousness)), 22 to the history of Platonism, which, according to Losev, is a “heartbreaking tragedy”, and further, to the cultural tragedy of the book about the Renaissance (1978). Like Florensky, Losev tries to calm the rebellious and restless “chaosocosmos” in the plasticity of name and myth. He is clearly impressed by the tragedy-free Cosmos of archaic antiquity, and the ethics of fateful obligation. He probably would have agreed with Florensky’s Reply in a letter to his family dated March 10–14, 1936: “The tragic arises from the spectacle of the discrepancy between retribution and an offense or deed, and a person cannot answer for his act, but committed it due to his hereditary properties, and therefore pays for the fatal guilt of his ancestors. Greek tragedy is the most instructive, deepest and most perfect part of world literature. She gave me a feeling of absolute perfection; it couldn’t be better and there’s no need to – the ideal has been achieved. That is why, after the Greeks, tragedy in the proper sense was no longer observed and could not have happened: the task was completed, solved; it’s over, there’s nothing more to solve it” (“My children...”, p. 424). Florensky could not have been unaware of Plato’s definition of his utopia in terms of theatrical aesthetics (which is so often quoted by Losev): “Our entire political system is an imitation of the most beautiful and best life. We affirm that this is the truest tragedy” (Zak. II, 817b). When Florensky “lost the consciousness of a simple person and a simple human measure,” he was left with “writings of the spiritual world,” transforming life into a work of art, and the philosophy of life into the aesthetics of history. He writes to his son Kirill from Solovki (1936. XI. 24): “I have such a quality, to look cheerfully and carefree at the future, counting on the creativity of life itself, without planning or wondering about the distant future” (“To my children...”, pp. 200, 231:435). This is probably why Florensky did not need a philosophy of human justification. In an aesthetically justified Cosmos, every creature is justified in absentia. And the personality, well, after all, “the boundaries of personality seem clear only in books, but in reality everything and everything is so closely intertwined that the separation is only approximate, with continuous transitions from one part of the whole to another,” and “life flies by like a dream, and you don’t have time to do anything in a moment of life. Therefore, we must learn the art of life, the most difficult and most important, saturate every hour with essential content and remember that it will never happen again” (ibid., p. 434:438). The self-abolition of anthropodicy is primarily an aesthetic action. Similarly, in the “theology of culture” by G. Fedotov (“On the Holy Spirit in Nature and Culture,” 1932), in sophiology, in the aesthetic programs of the Symbolists, F. Stepun, N. Evreinov, in the aesthetics of dialogue, in the Orthodox concepts of ascetic self-creativity, as “the art of art,” man is the heir to the universal “splendor” and a witness-accomplice to the world saved in the Beauty. Florensky not only outlived or rejected the tragedy of prosaic reality, but, as it were, “lost” the external person, translating the everyday drama of his fate into plans for the internal experience of world historical experience and modernity. Something similar happened within the personalist tradition, from F. Dostoevsky to A. Meyer. It is not for nothing that N. Berdyaev, and after him S. Khoruzhy, considered it possible to bring Florensky’s position closer to the philosophy of the existential type. 23 We are, of course, not talking about a special type of existentialism, but about the measure of existential tension in Florensky’s author’s “letter” (but on this basis, most Russian thinkers will be in the school of existential empathy, at the level of style). However, the simplest typology of existentialism, as a direction of thought of the 20th century, necessarily assumes that its adherents focus on issues of personality, freedom, alienation, communication, in a word, the problematic repertoire with which Florensky works on the sidelines of his path. Florensky’s anthropology is essentially marginal (distrust of the very word “anthropological” was emphasized more than once in the response to the dissertation of A. M. Tuberovsky (1916). 24 The author of “The Pillar...” has a striking argument at the beginning of “Letter VI. Contradiction: “There is no doubt that truth necessarily exists along with Truth, if only creation exists along with God. The existence of truth is only another expression of the very fact of the existence of creation. The presence of truth is equal to the presence of creation. But does the creature itself exist? A creature is a creature because it is not an Unconditionally Necessary Being, and that, consequently, the existence of a creature cannot be deduced in any way not only from the idea of Truth, this prime mover of all understanding, but even from the fact of the existence of Truth, from God” (“Pillar...”, pp. 143-144). This maxim alone is enough to cross out the Incarnation and history as a divine-human dialogue, Christology and sophiology, the philosophy of Eros and the doctrine of salvation. Of course, Florensky is far from such intentions, and yet, if the dialectic of the intradivine life of the Trinity is not projected onto the human plane, then the “eternal man” 25 turns into an eschatological myth. In the Eighth of the “Readings on God-Humanity” (1879) it is said: “Only with the recognition that every real person with his deepest essence is rooted in the eternal divine world, that he is not only a visible phenomenon, that is, a series of events and a group of facts, but an eternal and special being, a necessary and irreplaceable grain in the absolute whole, only with this recognition, I say, can one reasonably admit two great Truths that are absolutely necessary not only for theology, that is, religious knowledge, but also for human life in general, I mean the truths: human freedom and human immortality.” 26 On the other hand, it is unlikely that for Florensky with his Trinity Ethics of “tragic friendship” the following reasoning from “The Purpose of Man” (1931) by N. Berdyaev would be news (if he happened to read): “Personality is not absolute. God as the Absolute is not a person. God as a person presupposes his otherness, another personality, there is love and sacrifice. The Personality of the Father presupposes the Personality of the Son and the Holy Spirit. The hypostases of the Holy Trinity are also personalities because they presuppose each other, mutual love and access to another. In another aspect, the personality of God and the personality of man presuppose each other. Personalistic metaphysics and personalistic ethics are substantiated by the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity. The moral life of the individual must be understood in the image of the Divine Trinity, overturned and reflected in the world.” 27 No matter how much one sympathizes with the humanly intelligible and noble attempts to discover in the late Florensky the postulates of anthropodicy, in scale commensurate with the universalism of the “Pillar...” and responding to it with the tension of religious experience with which the main existentials of this encyclopedia of contemporary Christianity are worked out, one will have to temporarily postpone the conversation about the contours of Florensky’s philosophy of man until the near future, God willing, when the legacy of the Russian thinker will appear before us in full. The task of modern historians of philosophy is to create a Dictionary of Florensky terms. With all his special attention to the nature of the word and the term (“Antinomy of language”, 1918; “Term”, 1917–1922; “The magic of the word”, 1920; “The structure of the word”, 1922; imyaslavsky studies) and the methods of lecture rhetoric (see the preface “Lecture and lectio” to the course “First steps of philosophy” (Sergiev Posad, 1917), Florensky never refused the chance to extract additional argumentative possibilities from the play on the so-called “poetic etymology” (a Humboldtian-Potebnian habit instilled by the Kharkov psychological school in linguistics): see, for example, the impressive deepening of the “internal form” of the words “truth”, “chastity”, “heart”, “testament”, “Sophia-wisdom”, “love” in “The Pillar...” In these sketches, the empiricity of etymon coexists with the empyrean of mythopoetic insight. On the other hand, Florensky is not afraid to give art historical context to such phrases as “the power of beauty” (which “exists no less than the force of a magnet or the force of gravity”) and “the force fields of works of art.” Allows himself expressions like: “the artist saturates a certain area with some content, forcefully pumps content into it”; the work is a kind of machine, but a magical machine,” the ornament “envelops the world’s formulas of existence with clarity. 28 This invasion of physical and mathematical jargon and mechanistic metaphors into the language of describing aesthetic objects could confuse even the modern reader, who has recently experienced a wave of research into art and culture “at the intersection of all sciences,” if Florensky’s plan did not carry out the task of translating the positivist accents of these words into the intuition of a new truth. This new truth transformed the analysis of form into introspection of internal experience, and the aesthetic technology of creativity expressively externalizing it, and the set of terms for their description into a religious-aesthetic Organon. The “floating” semantics of Florensky’s terms-symbols is one of the reasons for the difficulty of his dialogue with his contemporaries. Florensky’s dictionary of terms (against the background of the main working languages ​​of theology, philosophy and aesthetics of the 20th century, and in the future the traditions leading to it) could clarify the central paradigms of the philosopher’s thinking, and hypothetically establish those levels of assimilation of his heritage that seemed sufficient for the first reviewers of “The Pillar...”, and which seem adequate to today’s view. The materials of the Symbolarium, conceived at one time, would help the authors of the future Florensky Dictionary of Terms to define themselves on such a scale and retrospective of the history of worldviews in which the Russian thinker defined his own topos. 29 During his lifetime, Florensky never received a competent monographic analysis of his activities. But he, apparently, was not really looking forward to this event. How else can we explain the fact that the philosopher practically did not react to criticism and outwardly stood outside the polemical manners of the century, although his texts themselves are literally obsessed with the completeness of ideological polyphony. This quality of his prose was reflected in everything, from the choice of genres (letter, conversation, confession, review) and intonation (the priority word of the truth being demonstrated), to bibliographic equipment (his problem-nominal diversity masks large-scale participation in the chorus of his predecessors and contemporaries). The myth of Florensky followed on the heels of its hero, then overtook him, and still carries out powerful projections on the face of the thinker, presenting masks and guises to the reader. Florensky spoke about how this mechanism of substitution works (in the fate of the “I” and in the history of its perception by others) with complete anticipation of his own fate. If he had had a chance to look closely at the picture of assessments of his work and personality in the period between the mid-30s and 90s of our century, he could apply to himself what he said about the autopsy of St. relics in the era of revolutionary defeat: “posthumous martyrdom.” Florensky’s second Golgotha ​​is still not completed, despite the efforts of many people to return the thinker’s legacy to his heirs. For a number of memoirs, see the magazine “Beginnings” (1994, No. 4). Shaginyan M. Man and time. The history of human development. M., 1980. P. 252. Cf. 3. N. Gippius about Olga Florenskaya: “Olya was the sister of a very famous in Russia, intelligent and cruel priest Pavel Florensky in the Trinity-Sergius Lavra” (Merezhkovsky D.S. December 14. Gippius Z.N. Dmitry Merezhkovsky. M., 1991. P. 436). Quote according to the article: Ivanova Evg. About the last days and death of V.V. Rozanov. Lit. studies. 1990. No. 1. P. 74. Ivanova Lydia. Memories. A book about a father. M., 1992. P. 61. Ivanov Vyach. Sun. Full of space and time. Vsevolod Ivanov – writer and person: Memoirs of contemporaries. 2nd ed., add. M., 1975. P. 349 (compare with A. S. Volkov’s memoir published in the anthology). Bulgakov S. N. Works: In 2 volumes. M., 1993. T. I. P. 539, 541. This feature of A. Khomyakov’s behavior has been noted more than once (Yu. Samarin, N. Berdyaev, P. Florensky). Bulgakov S. N. Non-Evening Light. M., 1917. P. 348. Bakhtin M. M. Aesthetics of verbal creativity. M., 1979. P. 106. See also p. 125, 128, 150, 161, 353. Shpet G. G. Consciousness and its owner. To G.I. Chelpanov from the participants of his seminaries in Kyiv and Moscow. M., 1916. For comments, see: Polivanov M.K. Essay on the biography of G. G. Shpet. Persons: Biogr. almanac. St. Petersburg, 1991. Issue. 1. P. 21. Losev A. F. Essays on ancient symbolism and mythology. M., 1930. P. 692 (M., 1993. P. 706). Losev A.F. About Father Pavel Florensky (From a conversation with P.V. Florensky, January 1988). Russian Abroad in the years of the millennium of the baptism of Rus'. M., 1991. P. 455. The criticism of semiotic cultural studies makes a sad impression: Losev A. F. Terminological polysemy in existing theories of sign and symbol (1978). Losev A. F. Sign, symbol, myth. M., 1982. pp. 220–245 (Proceedings on linguistics). These words by M. A. Chekhov, quoted. based on the book: Etkind A. Eros of the impossible. History of psychoanalysis in Russia. St. Petersburg, 1993. P. 119. Chekhov M. A. Literary heritage: In 2 vols. M., 1986. T. I. P. 244. The condition for this bodily sensation of the integral world (cf. Florensky’s reasoning about the body and corporeality: “The Pillar ...”, pp. 364–365) M. Chekhov set freedom from rational control of internal experience: “I did not invent anything, did not introduce rational measurements, did not create an artificial connection of parts - harmony arises by itself. I became interested in the process taking place in me and began to monitor it, strictly protecting it from the interference of reason” (ibid., p. 243). See numerous publications by abbots. Andronicus (A.S. Trubachev), as well as an article by priest. Ioanna Sviridov (Epistemology of Priest Pavel Florensky. Theological works. Collection dedicated to the 300th anniversary of the MDA. M, 1986. pp. 264–292). Florensky P. A. Not Nepshchev's admiration (Phil. 26–28). Theological Bulletin. 1915. July, August. T. 2. pp. 553–554. See the interpretation of the “Orphic Renaissance” in the work: Khoruzhy S.S. Space–man–mortality. P. A. Florensky. L., 1989. pp. 16–17. Berdyaev N. A. About Russian classics. M., 1993. pp. 317–324. Berdyaev N. A. Philosophy of freedom. The meaning of creativity. M., 1989. S. 325, 330. Neretina S.S. Berdyaev and Florensky: On the meaning of the historical. Question philosophy. 1991. No. 3. pp. 67–83. Florensky P. A. Iconostasis. Selected works on art. St. Petersburg, 1993. P. 361. Losev A. F. Being. Name. Space. M., 1993. P. 60. Started. 1993. No. 2. P. 26. Khoruzhy S. S. Worldview of P. Florensky (From the book). Started. 1993. No. 2. P. 26. Compare: Chesterton G.K. Eternal Man. M., 1991. pp. 93–264. Soloviev V. S. Works: In 2 volumes. M., 1989. T. 2. P. 110. Berdyaev N. A. About the purpose of a person. M., 1993. P. 64. Florensky P. A. Analysis of spatiality and time in the visual arts. M., 1993. S. 49, 184, 59, 127. See: Milk Yu. A. “Dictionary of Symbols” by P. Florensky: some marginalia. Sov. art history M., 1990. Issue. 26. pp. 322–343.