On some aspects of the Christology of St. Maximus the Confessor

The life of St. Maximus the Confessor (about 580 - 662) belongs to an extremely difficult era in the history of the Church. At that time, the church consciousness was preoccupied with the search for formulations that could adequately reflect the teaching of the Church about the personality of the Savior. The need for this kind of work was dictated primarily by the emergence of the Monothelite heresy, which was nothing more than a relapse of Monophysitism. Therefore, it is no coincidence that in such a historical context, the Christological theme occupies a dominant position in the creative heritage of St. Maximus 1. The main difficulty that arises in elucidating the question of St. Maximus’s views on the personality of the Lord Jesus Christ lies, first of all, in the fact that “being perhaps the most systematic thinker of all the Fathers of the Church, St. Maximus never wrote systematically” 2 . Nevertheless, despite the lack of a system in his presentation, his teaching about the personality of the Lord is distinguished by its internal logical consistency, depth of understanding of the problem and strict adherence to the tradition of Sacred Tradition. As befits a truly Orthodox theologian, St. Maximus considers the Son of God to be the foundation and head of all that exists 3: “After all, the Word, as the Creator, is the beginning, middle and end of all things that exist, intelligible and verbal” 4 - therefore, from an epistemological point of view, Christ is the “alpha and omega” of all knowledge, for “the mystery of the incarnation of the Word contains the whole meaning of riddles and symbols Scriptures, all the meaning of visible and invisible creatures. Whoever has learned the mystery of the Cross and the Sepulchre, has learned the meaning of all things. Whoever knows the hidden meaning of the Resurrection knows the purpose for which God initially created everything.” 5 As the true God, Christ is consubstantial with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and therefore the salvation of the world is accomplished not by Him alone, but with the participation of all the persons of the Holy Trinity: “The whole Father and the whole Holy Spirit dwelt essentially and perfectly in the whole incarnate Son, not being incarnate themselves, but one blessing, and the other assisting in the Incarnation the self-acting Son” 6. At the same time, St. Maximus strongly affirms the authenticity and integrity of the Savior’s humanity, the fullness of His human nature (in this matter he fully follows the opinion of St. Gregory the Theologian: “what is not received is not healed”), 7 therefore he writes: “The God-originating Word, similar to us in everything except sin, immutably clothed in our nature and becoming a perfect man, had in Himself the first Adam, who manifested itself in Him both in the manner of origin and in the manner of birth” 8 . Having pointed out the truth of Divinity and humanity in the Lord, St. Maximus proceeds to resolve the question of how the two natures coexisted in the single person of Christ. Drawing a clear distinction between the terms “nature” and “hypostasis,” Rev. Maxim, in the words of Archpriest Georgiy Florovsky, “speaks in the language of Leontius,” 9 as indicated, for example, by his use of the term “hypostasis” 10. It is quite obvious that any nature, including human nature, cannot exist on its own; it must receive its expression (that is, existence) in a specific object of existence. Already in ancient times (as indeed now), the term “individual” 11 was used to describe a single, concrete object of existence. However, the individual, as a unit of the species, does not yet carry within itself hypostasis, being nothing more than the smallest of all possible parts of the species. In this case, we are talking about the content of formal, abstract concepts 12, which serve as a tool for describing the fundamental provisions of Orthodox theology. That is why it is impossible to equate the concepts of “individual” and “hypostasis”. Hypostasis implies independent (in the sense of the possibility of self-determination) existence and therefore must also include certain personal properties. Thus, one can think of hypostasis as a certain final form of being (“individual”), in which nature (“nature”), manifested in its properties (“attributes,” in the words of medieval scholastics), and non-essential, individual characteristics (“accidents”) found their expression. It was the presence in every hypostasis of elements whose existence cannot be directly deduced from nature, common to all representatives of one type of being, that made it possible for V.N. Lossky to assert that human “personality is the irreducibility of man to nature” 13 . Thus, the hypostasis does not consist of a set of the above elements, it is the ontological flesh of nature and can exist there, and only where there is the possibility of self-determination, performing actions not determined by external reasons, that is, originality. In the true sense, only God is original, but man, created in His image and likeness, carries within himself a spark of Divine existence. And this spark is the ontological basis and realization of the existence of the human personality. What is surprising for us and from a soteriological point of view most significant is that in Christ, in the unmerged unity of natures, human nature was deified, thus becoming the beginning of the deification of each descendant of Adam. Humanity in Christ was raised to the immeasurable heights of its true destiny, which consists in the utmost likeness to God. It is important to note that humanity does not dissolve in the personality of the Savior; it receives its true significance and meaning here. From the moment of his incarnation, the Son of God, who exhausted Himself, according to St. Maximus the Confessor, no longer acts “not only as God and in His Divinity, but at the same time as a man, in his humanity” 14. These actions, or energies, about which St. Maximus speaks, are manifestations of the will. For both St. Maximus and his opponents, the Monothelites, this was obvious, but the problem was to determine what will is in its essence. Does it belong to nature or hypostasis? Monothelites were confident that will is a manifestation of hypostasis, in other words, it, like hypostasis itself, is irreducible to nature, although it manifests itself through it. St. Maximus, referring to the trinitarian dogma, pointed out the inconsistency of this position with the teaching of the Holy Trinity: Christians profess one will in God under three Hypostases. In addition, the statement of the Monothelites ran counter to the views of the holy fathers of antiquity, including those whom the Ecumenical Councils glorified as great teachers of the Church. For example, Saint Basil the Great has the following reasoning on a topic that interests us: “By nature, there is neither essence without energy, nor any energy without essence; moreover, we know essence through energy, having for identification this energy itself as an indication of essence. After all, no one has ever seen the essence of God, but nevertheless we reliably know this essence through its energies” 15. The strict dyophysitism of St. Maximus almost inevitably leads him to the conclusion about the duality of wills and actions in Christ. This circumstance probably gave Archpriest John Meyendorff reason to assert that “if it had not been for the Monothelite dispute, the Monk Maxim would still have developed his doctrine of two wills” 16. Before talking about this, apparently, the most original part of the theological heritage of St. Maximus, it is necessary to make a number of preliminary remarks of an anthropological nature and define the concepts with which he operates. Thus, the monk believes that in every person there are two types of will: natural (θελιμα φυσικον) and selective (γνωμι - choice). The first is an indispensable property of every individual, however, in man, as a rational being, manifestations of the will (acts of will) can be comprehended by the mind (νους), which constitutes a fundamental difference between him (man) and irrational beings, that is, those who are not aware of their existence and, accordingly, cannot determine themselves through their own existence. In the volitional act of self-determination, the manifestation of natural will, or will itself in the true sense of the word, occurs. As for the second type of will, gnwmi (or “gnomic will”, as defined by Archpriest John Meyendorff) 17, it is in an indirect and somewhat disadvantageous position in relation to the natural one. Choice (γνωμι) implies some bifurcation, and therefore freedom of choice cannot be true freedom, which is nothing more than a complete striving for the Good. Any hesitation is unsteadiness in relation to good and evil, that is, a belittlement and humiliation of real freedom. Since choice presupposes preference, election, this type of will distorted by sin can be called will. St. Maximus builds this part of his Christology on the opposition of will and pleasure. Christ, having fully perceived human nature, also perceived will as its integral property. However, since the assumed nature was alien to sin, His will is also alien to any hesitation between good and evil. The foundation of the Orthodox dogma about the harmony of two wills in the Lord is rooted in this entire striving of the human will for good. Man, as the image of God, is characterized by the desire to realize the Divine will, and with the integrity and immaculateness of human nature in Christ, the human will should not and could not resist the Divine will, “for through the hypostatic union it was completely deified, which is why it was completely innocent of sin” 18. In this regard, St. Maximus’s understanding of the soteriological aspect of this problem is interesting. Discussing the work of Redemption, Maximus the Confessor not only states the fact of the healing of Adam’s disobedience by the obedience of Christ - he puts the question on an ontological basis. Since the will of Adam was opposed to the Divine will by an act of disobedience, and therefore the will of the descendants of the progenitor suffers from a sinful distortion rooted in the first disobedience, this makes it necessary for its healing not only the consent of the Second Hypostasis to undergo the Way of the Cross, but the Divine perception of all human nature, including the human will, so that this very human will, having become deified, potentially integrates the will of everyone man: “Thus, through one man Jesus Christ, who did not turn His will away from good, the restoration of nature from corruption to incorruption took place for all people” 19. Concluding a brief overview of the Christology of St. Maximus, we note that although his work did not provide a scientific development of a separate philosophical and theological concept, it is distinguished by amazing depth and integrity precisely because it reflects the real worldview of the righteous man who acquired the mind of Christ (1 Cor. 2:16). On the historical context of the life and work of St. Maximus, see for example: Epifanovich S. L. St. Maximus the Confessor and Byzantine theology. M.: Martis, 2003; Sidorov A.I. St. Maximus the Confessor: era, life, creativity // Preface to the “Creations of St. Maximus the Confessor”. Book 1. M.: Martis, 1993. Meyendorff John, archpriest. Introduction to Patristic Theology. Vilnius-Moscow, 1992. P. 302. Wed: In. 1, 3: All things came into being through Him, and without Him nothing came into being that was made. Venerable Maximus the Confessor. Creations. Book 2. Questions and answers to Thalassia. Part 1. Question XIX. M., 1994. P. 40. Venerable Maximus the Confessor. Ambigua. Quote by: Clément Olivier. Origins. M., 1994. P. 40. Venerable Maximus the Confessor. Creations. Book 1. Interpretation of the Lord's Prayer. M., 1993. P. 186. On the continuity of this thesis in patristic theology, see for example: Florovsky Georgy, archpriest. Eastern fathers of the 6th century. M., 1992. Venerable Maximus the Confessor. Creations. Book 2. Questions and answers to Thalassia. Part 1. Question XXI. M., 1994. P. 71. Florovsky Georgy, archpriest. Eastern fathers of the V-VIII centuries. Paris, YMCA-Press, 1990. P. 213. Leontius of Byzantium (VI century) is the holy father of the Orthodox Church, a famous theologian of the era of Christological disputes, he is credited with the authorship of the theological term “hypostasis”, with the help of which it became possible to theologically describe the coexistence of the human and Divine nature of Christ in His one Divine hypostasis. This term with a Latin root corresponded to a term of Greek origin - “atom”. For example, the Neoplatonist Porfiry divides “everything that exists into categories of essence - such as class, genus, specific characteristics and, finally, the individual (ατομον ειdelta;ος)” ( Lossky V. The Theological Concept of Human Personality // Theology and God-vision. M.: Publishing House of the Holy Vladimir Brotherhood, 2000. P. 300. The elaboration of these concepts is of fundamental theological importance. It seems that here it would be quite appropriate to recall the well-known dispute between “realists” and “nominalists” that took place in medieval Europe. The essence of the discussion boiled down to the question of whether things denoted by general concepts really exist, or whether they are just words. Both extreme positions tended towards heresies: realism towards tritheism (or Arianism), and nominalism towards monarchianism. Lossky V. Theological concept of human personality // Theology and vision of God. M.: Publishing House of the Holy Vladimir Brotherhood, 2000. P. 299. Florovsky Georgy, archpriest. Decree op. P. 214. Saint Basil the Great. Letter 234, to Amphilochius. Quote by: Davydenkov Oleg, priest. The great mystery of piety: God appeared in the flesh. M.: Publishing house of the Orthodox St. Tikhon's Theological Institute, 2002. P. 16. Meyendorff. John, Archpriest. Decree. op. P. 305. Florovsky Georgy, archpriest. Decree. op. P. 218. Venerable Maximus the Confessor. Creations. Book 2. Questions and answers to Thalassia. Part 1. Question XLII. M., 1994. P. 129.