II. Полемика

Book Evgeny Trubetskoy. 432 From private correspondence. In memory of V.S. Solovyova Open letter to S. N. Bulgakov Dear Sergei Nikolaevich! Welcoming the editors of the journal “Problems of Life” 433 in your person, I cannot help but remember my dearly beloved deceased friend, V.S. Solovyov, of whom you are a follower. It is clear that for you now the topics that this name involuntarily suggests should be in the foreground. On this matter, let me say a few words. First of all, of course, it should be remembered that Solovyov’s main idea was the idea of ​​God-manhood, which was personified for him in the image of Christ crucified and risen. This idea, even at the moment when it was first expressed, was “a temptation for the Jews, and madness for the Greeks” 434. This is how it remains today. The tragedy of Solovyov’s entire life lay precisely in the fact that his preaching was a temptation for some, madness for others. This is understandable: those Jews and Greeks about whom the apostle speaks personify not only tribal groups, but enduring human types: by “Jews” one should understand all those who crucify Christ under the pretext of religion, and by “Greeks” - all representatives of purely secular, pagan wisdom. Why was the teaching of Christ a temptation for the Jews? Those Jews about whom the Holy Scripture speaks did not at all belong to the number of “shakers of the foundations”: they were, first of all, “well-intentioned guardians”, zealots of what in those days was revered as Orthodoxy. They constantly declared their loyal feelings towards Caesar and combined piety with Caesarism, because to protect their shaken rite and to carry out their hierarchical desires they needed Pilate and his soldiers. And here we have a series of eternal types: the Pharisees, who try to “catch it in the word” and ask hooked questions about the delimitation of religious and loyal duties, the high priests, the Sanhedrin 435, Pilate, who betrays, and himself nods to another department (“I am innocent of the blood of this righteous man” 436), and, finally, the scourging soldiers. The texts of Holy Scripture related here are so full of modern meaning that one can only wonder how they passed through our spiritual censorship. The entire life and work of Solovyov can serve as an illustration of what has been said. When he announced to us the Kingdom of Christ, when he declared publicly that Christ is the High Priest and King, to Whom all power was given, not only in heaven, but also on earth, then the old scenes, long familiar to us, were repeated. The Sanhedrin was worried, false witnesses were inventing slander, the high priests tore their vestments and said: “What blasphemous words, who can listen to this?” 437 And the friendly chorus of zealots of the law cried out incessantly: “Not the imams of the King, only of Caesar, whoever thinks differently from us is not a friend of Caesar, crucify him, crucify him” 438. However, regarding the crucifixion as applied to Solovyov, I hasten to make a reservation that “this must be understood spiritually.” As is known, things did not come to a literal crucifixion; but if the Jews—Christ’s contemporaries—had the same means of fighting against “false teachings” as our contemporary zealots of the law, then, in all likelihood, there would not have been the slightest need for them to crucify the Savior. Until recently, such was the strength of the “Jews” that they alone were given freedom to speak: they could force any opponent to silence. This entails a number of considerations regarding the topics to be discussed on the pages of your magazine. First of all, of course, you should be interested in issues related to Christian politics. These questions arise by themselves, since the very idea of ​​Christian politics is inextricably linked with the name of Solovyov, with the basic principle of his teaching. But as soon as we enter this area, we willy-nilly have to deal first of all with the “Jews,” whose power has not yet been shaken. The question is, is Christian politics possible under these conditions, is it possible in the absence of formal guarantees of the printed and spoken word, in the absence of freedom of conscience guaranteed by law? Where are the organs that could carry it out, how and under what conditions is it even possible? And of course, this general question should be raised before proceeding to specific, special questions. The difficulty of realizing those wishes that we can express on this matter should not stop us. If only the seed was thrown into the ground! Soloviev has already abandoned him: we can only continue his work, in the firm confidence that this seed will grow, ripen and bear fruit, although we cannot expect immediate fruit. Perhaps, however, our work in another area may turn out to be even more fruitful, precisely in the one where we have to deal with the Hellenes. Here the moral atmosphere is purer, because the Hellenes are not among the persecutors and crucifiers of Christ: they are ascetics of thought, people of free research who present completely legitimate theoretical queries and doubts about Christianity. On this occasion, let me turn to my memories. Twelve years ago I defended my master's thesis on St. Augustine 439 at Moscow University. Soloviev, who was present at the debate, addressed me regarding my opening speech with words that will forever remain memorable to me: “You called on Christians of all faiths to unite for a common struggle against unbelief, but I, on the contrary, would rather unite with unbelievers to fight against modern Christians.” On this occasion, it would not be amiss to remember that in ancient times the teachings of Christ were accepted by the Hellenes, and not by the Jews; and at present our hopes should be directed mainly towards the Hellenes. But here, however, I am somewhat confused by the words that I recently heard in Germany: “Wladimir Solowieff, ein verrückter russischer Philosoph” 440. Here it is - the voice of modern Hellenes: for them, Solovyov’s teaching is “madness”. There is undoubtedly a gulf between this teaching and the prevailing currents of modern thought. And if we want to fill this gap, if we want to convince the Hellenes that Solovyov’s preaching is not “madness,” then we have to enter the very depths of modern Hellenic wisdom, in other words, make a trip to Athens. There we will find, firstly, a series of antitheses against Solovyov’s teaching, and secondly, a vague consciousness of the unsatisfactory nature of these antitheses, a search for something higher and better. This is the same thing that the Apostle Paul once found in Athens: firstly, the Greek Olympus, the world of deified human beings, - the personified antithesis against Christianity, and secondly, an altar erected by someone ... to the “unknown God” 441. Before our eyes, ancient Olympus is resurrected in a whole series of images - in the humanism of modern thought, in the cult of man and humanity, in the idea of ​​the superman, in modern social ideals, in a whole series of individualistic and socialist teachings. And next to this, the “unknown God” manifests itself in the consciousness of the meaninglessness of existence, in the search for the purpose and meaning of existence, in that pessimism that represents the judgment of Olympus and, finally, in the unconscious faith in progress, which should lead us to something better: for this faith in progress, by its very essence, rests on the assumption of a goal underlying world development: it can be justified only in the assumption of a providential plan underlying history. She is that unknown God who personifies the hope of modern Hellenes. On this occasion, I consider it my duty to remind you that Solovyov’s literary activity began with a trip to Hellas: otherwise I cannot name his master’s and doctoral dissertations - his “Crisis of Western Philosophy” and “Critique of Abstract Principles”. Here he tried to combine in a harmonious synthesis everything that was beautiful and valuable that European philosophical thought had produced. The awareness of the insufficiency, the “abstraction” of the principles developed by it led him to the idea of ​​God-manhood: in it he discovered that “unknown God” whom the pagan wisdom of the New Age was looking for. As successors to Solovyov's work, we must follow his example. Let us expand the range of issues subject to our discussion. We should talk not only about Solovyov himself, in connection with his name we must raise all sorts of topics in relation to the Jews and Hellenes, with whom he had to constantly come into contact and fight. We have to: firstly, discuss issues of Christian politics, and secondly, like Solovyov, travel to Athens and build a bridge across the abyss. S.N. Bulgakov. No plan 442 About Solovyov’s path - the book’s answer. E. N. Trubetskoy. (Philosophy and religion. - Further tasks of the idealistic movement. - Religious-philosophical society in St. Petersburg. - About Christian politics. - Letter from L.N. Tolstoy in the Times and the word of Bishop Anthony in Moskovskie Vedomosti. - About the book of Pastor Kutter. - Which of the three is more right?) Book E.N. Trubetskoy sent an open letter to my address entitled “In memory of V.S. Solovyov”, which combines with extreme grace and noble conciseness of form a very serious and significant content. This letter outlines a whole program related to the basic ideas of Solovyov’s worldview and obligatory for those who share these ideas. Fully accepting this program 443, in these notes I want to highlight from the point of view of this worldview some phenomena of the spiritual life of the modern moment. Soloviev, characterizing the general tasks of philosophy, as is known, defined the latter as free theosophy 444, that is, as a free investigation by reason of the basic questions of religion, the content of religious consciousness. Thus, in the eyes of Solovyov, there was no fundamental difference between what, as a direct experience, fills religious consciousness and what, as a subject of philosophical speculation, determines the content of philosophical problems. This should not be understood in the sense that Solovyov denies the independent rights of philosophy and its independent problems. No one familiar with Solovyov’s system will say this: in the latter, epistemology, logic, dialectics, history, philosophy, etc. have their place. But his entire system has one internal center, follows from one plan, and it is the internal plan, its seriousness, significance, depth that determines the value of the entire structure and its plan. Solovyov’s idea is that philosophy, although it has its own paths, tasks, methods, in a word, its own technique, cannot be divorced in its foundations from universal human issues, which find direct expression only in religion. Philosophy essentially has only one task, only one question - about the meaning of individual and universal life, poses a riddle about man and his relationship to the world and the principle that substantiates this latter - matter, force, mechanism, deity. Modern philosophical thought has grown and become more complex in its technique, and there are many undoubtedly philosophical questions that do not contain this general question; one might even say more, namely, that this question is not contained entirely in any of the particular philosophical questions - it fills and connects them all, forming their vital nerve. But it is necessary that philosophy really have this nerve, otherwise philosophy ceases to be philosophy and turns into a logical game of the mind, into sophistry. At the present time, as indeed at all times, but now more than ever, thanks to the complexity of philosophical technology, there are many professional philosophers who internally remain completely alien to philosophical quests and philosophical suffering; they deal with individual technical philosophical questions in exactly the same way as any other specialty that only needs leisure and training, but does not require the human soul. As elsewhere, many are called, but few are chosen. At one time, Socrates aroused the enmity and contempt of learned epistemologists, professional philosophers of his time - the sophists, by the fact that he began to make truly philosophical demands on philosophy. Isn’t modern philosophical thought also experiencing a state reminiscent of sophistry? However, if many professional philosophers are internally alien to philosophy and are even proud of this, considering it a guarantee of their “scientificness,” the more important are those philosophers who combine with professional experience the seriousness of philosophical inquiries, for whom philosophy is not reduced to solving epistemological charades of a purely rational nature, but at the same time is a matter of life, the cherished aspirations of the heart, the search for the highest meaning of existence, the search for God. Philosophy must seek God; this is its highest and last, perhaps its only task. At the same time, she may come to the conclusion that God does not and cannot exist, but even for this answer she must persistently ask about this, knock on the closed door of the world labyrinth, certainly sooner or later come to it, stubbornly stand before it. If, as is natural to expect from a serious and deep philosophy, it comes to a positive decision, then the main question is posed to it: what do we know and what can we know about God, and, consequently, about the world and about ourselves. Philosophy in this case, in its subject matter, is inevitably, as Solovyov put it, theosophy, or, in a more familiar term, theology, but free theology, in contrast to the dogmatic systems known by this name. But to say that the determining motive of this philosophical system is religious interest means the same as saying directly - interest in the Christian religion. For it is impossible to imagine that serious and sincere religious interest could bypass Christianity, could not focus on its teachings, exclusively or along with other religions. All the problems that philosophical thought necessarily encounters and plagues are posed and resolved in a certain way in Christianity, which in this sense is the most complex and multifaceted of all religious teachings, has the most subtle and deep metaphysics. That is why, no matter how you feel about Christianity, but given the presence of a certain religious development, you cannot pass by it without noticing it, you cannot help but focus your attention on it, and by a certain attitude towards it you cannot determine your own worldview. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the history of thought Christianity occupies, perhaps, no less place in the hearts and attention of its deniers, those who are at odds with it and those who hate it, than it does among those who see in it an absolute religion. It is not surprising that there is almost no great philosopher of the New a time that would not have declared itself to have a completely definite attitude towards Christianity, would not have developed, so to speak, its own theological system: everyone interested knows what a deep, indelible mark Kant and Fichte, Schelling and Hegel left on German theology. But it is impossible to talk about Christianity without making the central subject of discussion the question of the personality of its Founder or, to put it in technical terms, the Christological problem. This one problem is the whole of Christianity. It is resolved in one way - and we have one thing, in another - completely different. In modern understanding, this exceptional significance of the Christological problem has been somewhat obscured, due to the latest aspirations, discarding all Christian metaphysics, leaving only morality, vaguely close to Buddhism, Stoicism, etc. In Russia, this road was widely paved by Tolstoy, in Germany - the entire new theological school 445. It has always remained incomprehensible to us what motives explain the desire of thinkers of this type to call their worldview Christian, after the main teaching about the God-manhood of Christ, without which all Christianity loses its meaning, has been removed from it. But we will talk about this more than once, but now it is important for us to note that even with such a negative resolution of the Christological problem, it attracts exclusive and ever-growing attention. Humanity cannot put an end to it once and for all; it constantly returns to it again and again hears the question addressed to itself: what do you think about the Son of Man? In the recently published German books on Christianity, of a very “scientific” direction, we read the following characteristic confessions. “Question: Who was Jesus? occupies the people of our time more than, perhaps, any previous generation. With the disintegration of primordial forms and institutions and with the beginning of the great renewal, for which although everyone hopes, but of which no one knows, the gaze is directed more strongly than ever to Jesus. That it is now that He has something to tell us, that it is now that we need Him, is for us a subject not so much of knowledge as of powerful feeling” 446 . “It can be said that never before has a single century been so intensely occupied with Jesus and asked so much about His significance as the last century.”447 It’s as if a new era in the spiritual history of mankind is really beginning. The period of Enlightenment philosophy is ending, philosophical rationalism ceases to satisfy the most sensitive souls, mystical hunger is growing. And along with this turning point in spiritual life and in connection with it, the eternal question emerges with renewed vigor in consciousness: “Who is He, what does He say, as one in power?” 448 In sensitive souls, first a vague, and then more and more conscious longing for Christ, some kind of acute dissatisfaction with the successes of civilization based exclusively on positive science without higher sanctification, the consciousness of the impossibility of living without Him, awakens again. This is a fact of great historical and world significance, although so far invisible and inaudible to the majority living in everyday interests. However, present-day humanity, represented by its cultural representatives, can no longer return to immediate, childish faith - having tasted from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, it already needs a philosophical justification of faith. Meanwhile, the philosophical and theological thought of modern Germany, which still retains philosophical hegemony, is developing rather in the opposite direction; it itself suffers from religious anemia, an excess of rationalism, which is most strongly reflected in the formulation of the Christological problem. Here the significance of Solovyov becomes clear. In contrast to the currents of German philosophical and theological thought, Solovyov, having made the Christological problem the center of his philosophy, resolved it in a positive sense, and his entire philosophy is the doctrine of God-manhood. Solovyov could quite rightly say about himself that he did not have his own teaching, professing the teachings of Christianity, and, however, it is equally certain that he had his own philosophical system, original and independent. But this system is nothing more than a philosophical Christology that meets the needs of modern consciousness. In order for modern man, who has tasted the civilization of the 19th century with its scientific and philosophical conquests, with its rationalism and positive prejudices, to begin to listen to the teaching about the God-manhood of Christ, it is necessary to find a language that is accessible and convincing to him, it is necessary to express this thought in terms and concepts that are characteristic of modern humanity. The official church has not had this language for a long time. It has at its disposal only the philosophical and theological apparatus dating back to the era of the Ecumenical Councils, beyond which church thought has not gone. For all the greatness and even grandiosity of the philosophical and theological thinking of this era, it is removed from modernity by an entire culture, and, in addition, this healthy grain is now clothed in the husk of medieval scholasticism and saturated with the bitterness of dogma and ritual intolerance. But if we see the absolute truth in the truths of Christianity, then it is necessary to recognize that the methods of knowing this truth and even the degree of this understanding are subject to historical development, and therefore its understanding is posed as a task for the thought of each era. Soloviev solved precisely this problem. He became a Christian apologist of the New Age, showing that both the centuries-old development of philosophical thought and the results of scientific knowledge, connected and united in a higher understanding, necessarily lead to the central problems of Christianity and, in the end, to the most central of these central ones - to the question of the personality of Christ. Few, of course, even now listen to this philosophical sermon, for few still experience religious hunger, but for these few the path has been shown which can be followed. Of course, the philosophical justification of religion, the philosophical doctrine of God-manhood play only the role of propaedeutics; what matters is only the elimination of theoretical obstacles and an indication of their surmountability 449 . But for modern “Hellenes” this theoretical justification, or rather the confidence in the possibility of such justification, the conviction that they should not sacrifice the God of Truth to the God of love, is of great importance, and this alone, in addition to everything else, determines the significance of Solovyov in the Russian Reformation. Solovyov’s path here leads to reviving frozen religious thought and awakening it in those who were completely alien to it. To find a form of thought that would satisfy the needs of modern philosophical and scientific consciousness and the highest mystical-religious impulses of the soul, in which the eternal truths of Christianity would seem to be the necessary conclusion of free philosophical thought, which would allow for the highest sanctification of life and culture - this is the highest task for modern “Hellenes”, who have understood the full significance of religious issues. Historical Christianity in the first centuries of its existence from the “Hellenes”, from Greek philosophy and culture, received its philosophical formulation in the bold and sublime speculations of Christian apologists, especially the Alexandrian school 450 (it is known that modern German science finds the Greek influence even excessive and speaks of the “acute Hellenization of Christianity”). Now we need our own Alexandria, and one of the founders of this New Alexandrian school was undoubtedly Solovyov (preceded here by some of the Slavophiles). “To justify the faith of our fathers, raising it to a new level of rational consciousness; show how this ancient faith, freed from the shackles of local isolation and national pride, coincides with the eternal and universal truth,” in such words Soloviev defined the task of one of his works, but they also express the entire direction of his activity. So, to “raise” the “eternal and universal truth” to a new level of rational consciousness, to reveal again the vital force and unmanifested, and perhaps not yet realized, potentials of Christianity - this is what Soloviev calls modern “Hellenes” to. It cannot be said that this call has already been heard by those to whom it was addressed. It is difficult to think that in general it will be heard by many of those who have their own gods on modern Olympus and are completely satisfied with this cult. But this call has not yet reached the ears of even those who are able to hear it. In modern times, only the very first and still weak symptoms of a religious awakening can be noted, which at first should be expressed primarily in the liberation of thought from the captivity of positivism, moreover, positivism of two kinds: “scientific” and church. With all the differences and even antagonism of these two worldviews, they have a common psychology, a well-known Old Believer fold: without us it is supposed to lie like that forever and ever. Against the desire to maintain this immobility of thought, after Solovyov’s death, a struggle flared up on two opposite points: on the flank of “scientific” positivism, the so-called idealist movement 451 emerged, on the flank of official-church positivism, the Religious-Philosophical Society 452 opened its activities. These phenomena seem to be largely unambiguous in their general historical meaning and significance, but at the same time they also have sharp differences. Let us try to express in a few words how their relationship seems to us, what their similarities and differences are. The idealistic trend, as it was expressed in the collection “Problems of Idealism” 453, has so far been defined mainly in opposition to dogmatic positivism. The latter worldview, which still retains power over the minds of a significant majority of the Russian intelligentsia (and, of course, reinforced by the latest mental stagnation, which is caused by the circumstances of our inner life), considered itself the only one capable of providing ideological justification for the ideals of social progress, the reorganization of political and social relations on the basis of freedom and justice. The purpose of the collection “Problems of Idealism” was, therefore, first of all to shake this fundamental dogma and show its complete inconsistency with the truth. The common theme that permeates the entire collection and, to a certain extent, unifies its rather diverse content, was proof of the position that dogmatic positivism is a completely untenable theory and that advanced social programs can only and, therefore, must be based on the premises of philosophical idealism. The purpose of the collection was philosophical and journalistic, so a more accurate title would be: problems of social idealism. The uniqueness and significance of the collection lies in the decisive and clear formulation of the problems of social idealism, in the disclosure of the socio-ethical value of philosophical idealism in general. Beyond these boundaries, he ceases to satisfy the requirements sometimes placed on him. Already in the field of philosophical and metaphysical questions, the situation becomes precarious and uncertain due to the undoubted and, so to speak, deliberate presence in the collection of various shades of philosophical opinions that are not easily consistent with each other. However, it is, of course, impossible to completely avoid these questions, given the more or less serious formulation of the problems of even just social idealism; in view of this, the collection in general still has a moderately metaphysical coloring. But he is completely devoid of any coloring and certainty regarding the problems of religious idealism. The collection does not deal with issues of religious philosophy almost at all and, in general, stands in this sense outside of religion and, in particular, outside of Christianity. Exceptions to it only confirm the general rule. True, since he fights against positivism in general, his position is also favorable for the religious worldview, in relation to which positivism is the first and irreconcilable enemy. But this service is unintentional, incidental, and was not part of the original plan. The position taken here by the collection is explained not only by the properties of the worldview of the individual authors, but also by the general objectives of the collection itself, the circle of readers for which it was intended, the general conditions of the historical moment, and finally, the youth of the movement, and this position was chosen absolutely correctly for its time: even the one who intends to say B cannot avoid A. However, now we must add that whoever said A must also say B, and, in the interests of ideological clarity and ideological progress, in At present, it is necessary to move forward from the position taken by “Problems of Idealism.” This position can generally be considered only as transitional and temporary, and now it is necessary to bring greater clarity regarding both the metaphysical and religious worldview. “Idealism” is sufficiently defined both in its rejection of philosophical and sociological positivism, and in terms of its political and social worldview. He now faces further development and self-determination. For me personally, the significance of the idealistic movement at the present time is taken into account primarily by its religious value and is determined depending on the extent to which it can serve in the interests of religious revival, the reformation movement, in other words, to what extent it will be able to follow the path of Solovyov, not in the sense of necessarily assimilating his philosophical doctrines, but in the sense of taking over the leadership of the main tasks of his philosophical activity. Philosophy, as has been sufficiently indicated in the previous one, has a completely independent significance, and is of too irreplaceable value to be belittled. But “idealism”, which would like to freeze in this primary stage of abstract idealism and would be unable - whether due to indecision or indifference - to determine itself sufficiently from the metaphysical and especially religious side, hardly has any great advantages over simple-minded positivism, which believes in its Comte 454 or Spencer, not realizing its shortcomings and not suspecting the existence of broader horizons. In any case, the role of the idealist movement in its first phase, since it opposed positivism and defended the general theses of social idealism, should be recognized as positive from the point of view of metaphysical-religious idealism. Whether it will remain the same in the future, the future will show. For now, we will limit ourselves to these general remarks in the belief that the development of ideas will force us to return to this issue of colossal importance more than once. Approximately at the same time as “Problems of Idealism” was being prepared, a significant initiative was made in St. Petersburg, which will undoubtedly be inscribed in the history of Russian self-awareness: a group of writers, among whom were names known throughout Russia, partly even in Europe, together with some representatives of the capital’s clergy, organized a series of interviews on religious and philosophical issues. The minutes of these interviews were published in the magazine “New Way”, which was founded at the same time and also set as its task the fight against positivism in defense of the latest religious and philosophical quests. Although these protocols were published with censorship cuts, even in their current form they are of great interest and still remain largely dead, unused capital. In general, the activities of the religious-philosophical society have not yet found the appreciation they deserve. Secular people came with the demands of awakened religious and philosophical thought and refined cultural needs and tastes, which they did not want and could not refuse, because this would require moral suicide, and they wanted to cross the threshold of the church not as dead corpses, but as living people. At these interviews (partly on the pages of the “New Way”), a number of problems of a religious-social and religious-philosophical nature were raised, which until now did not fit into the traditional horizon of the church worldview. You could feel the beating of the vital pulse, your thoughts became intensely tense. The meetings were stopped forcibly, by order of the highest authority, the result was a fragmentary episode, with which Russian life in general is rich, of all punctuation marks, ellipses are especially often used. The last word was not said. The path that the founders of the assemblies set out on has not been completed, but only interrupted, therefore, under favorable circumstances, it is possible to return to it again. Of course, we do not mean a literal repetition of the same thing (this is both impossible and undesirable), but the idea of ​​spiritual communication based on the discussion of religious and philosophical issues of persons sincerely interested in them should in no way be buried. No matter how we feel about individual opinions or even entire movements of thought in Religious and Philosophical Assemblies, it cannot be denied that they set themselves a necessary, timely, even urgent task. The position of the literary group that spoke at Religious and Philosophical meetings and on the pages of the “New Way” (the original edition) at that time differed quite significantly from the position of the “idealists,” despite the undoubted spiritual affinity between both. First of all, it was distinguished by the fact that, in contrast to the religious uncertainty, one might say, the amorphousness of “idealism” in general, the “new pathists” came out with a religious worldview and religious preaching, and some of them stood quite definitely on Christian soil. Those preliminary questions that largely absorbed the attention of the “idealists” were alien to them and in themselves could not interest them. They addressed, in addition, a completely different audience than the “idealists,” for they opposed church positivism, presenting new demands to the official church and encouraging it to emerge from a state of mental stagnation, while the “idealists” fought against “scientific” positivism. This partly determined both the means of struggle and its entire apparatus. As a result, the “new pathists” in their field had a success similar to that of the “idealists” in theirs: both were greeted with generally the same hostility and bitterness - the first by Missionary Review and Moskovskie Vedomosti, the second by the organs of the positively minded progressive press. This latter completely ignored (with minor exceptions) both “religious and philosophical meetings” and their literary reflections. Their influence among the secular public, among the “Hellenes,” was weak and limited to the “Jews,” for whom it was undoubtedly beneficial. The weakness of the impression made on secular society, in addition to the general historical conditions and the real difficulty of going against the grain, against centuries-old opinions and prejudices, is explained by the originality and some general defectiveness of the position of the “new way people,” thanks to which they turned out to be, to a certain extent, “foreign-speaking.” We have already said that, standing on religious grounds themselves, they did not indicate the path, acceptable even for the Hellenes, that would lead from the old traditional positivism to a religious worldview. This path for our rationalistic time, which treats everything “mystical” with distrust and cold suspicion, cannot be exclusively mystical (or rather, it can only be for a small category of “Hellenes”), but must at the same time be rationalistic: from positivism to mysticism leads only salto mortale 455, but from positivism to a religious-philosophical worldview, which also includes mystical experience, and religious experiences, can be built as a bridge to religious idealism, theoretical philosophy, the interests of which remained undeservedly neglected by the “new way people”. A trip to Athens is necessary, as the book aptly puts it. E. N. Trubetskoy. This is a journey that Russian thought can best undertake under the leadership of Solovyov, to whom the language of both modern Hellenic wisdom and direct mystical revelation was equally accessible. Idealism, anemic in a religious sense, and mysticism, helpless in a rationalistic sense, can here reach out to each other and complement each other, united by a common desire for a religious worldview and religious life. Therefore, we think that, on the one hand, the sacred rights of theoretical philosophy should be equally recognized, and on the other, the limitations and powerlessness of any rationalism, positivistic or idealistic, no matter if it wants to remain only rationalism and deny the rights of the integral and indivisible human spirit, which finds in its depths both mystical experiences and revelations. And we find this happy connection precisely in Solovyov, in whom rational philosophy determined the rights of mysticism, and mysticism penetrated philosophy. We allow ourselves to express the hope that it is precisely this path that our philosophical and religious thought is now embarking on, now that the idealistic and mystical currents are clearly drawing closer to each other, and at the same time the similarity of their ultimate aspirations is becoming clear. There was another, even more significant gap or defect in the St. Petersburg religious and philosophical movement (and its literary organ): it lacked a healthy public. Preaching the religious sanctification of life and culture, it at the same time maintained a certain height above life, remaining outside of it, not connecting itself with a living and blood connection with the current demands of this life, with historical tasks and the needs of political and social progress. We know that this was not explained by a denial of the legitimacy of these needs and not by social indifference - an assumption that was common among many - but by a certain incompleteness of the worldview, a certain abstraction of the representatives of this trend, who are currently completely adjacent to the liberation movement. A religious and philosophical movement must be thoroughly imbued with the public, be organically connected with the socio-historical tasks of the time, this is the guarantee of its vitality. In making this demand, we are not striving for a forced, mechanical connection of heterogeneous elements; the connection between religion and society is internally necessary. Social indifference is a sin and a crime. Christianity is a religion of love, that is, of the public, it calls for the implementation of the Kingdom of God on earth, peace and goodwill among people, therefore, it presupposes social and political progress and requires active participation in it. And here again Solovyov’s teaching on Christian politics involuntarily comes to mind. Solovyov precisely taught that the historical process is a divine-human process, in which the totality of humanity is arranged and organized into a single collective organism. From this point of view, the social aspirations of modern humanity for the triumph of democracy and socialism correspond to the requirements of Christianity - not in its theoretical - positive materialist - justification, which is contradictory, false and wretched - but in its moral content. Christianity is not a preaching of quietism 456 10 and non-doing, but of activity and struggle; it is not a teaching of enslavement, but of liberation. And the great liberation movement, which has now shaken up our life to the bottom, no matter how much contemporary Annas and Caiaphas 457 speak and write against it, in its ultimate aspirations corresponds to the requirements of Christian politics, although it is created in most cases by people who stand outside of religion. But more on that below. The true content of the ideals of Christian politics, so clearly revealed by Solovyov and applied by him to a whole range of social relations (best of all and most consistently to the national question), is constantly subject to distortions or, in Solovyov’s expression, “fakes,” and therefore it is extremely important to eliminate the constant distortions and misunderstandings that arise on this basis. First of all, the situation in general is extremely obscured by the fact that on behalf of the official representatives of Christianity many official lies are now written and spoken, which the speakers themselves do not believe: centuries-old servility and stagnation of thought, social indifference cause many well-known sad phenomena in this area. Nowhere is there a more suffocating, stagnant and unhealthy atmosphere than in the “department of the Orthodox confession.” The unnatural alliance with the state left a deep mark on him, and the age-old paralysis that Dostoevsky wrote about makes itself felt at every step. The officials of this department, who are officially representatives of the Christian religion, in the vast majority have adopted a political worldview that is based on the deification of the holding power as such and dates back to imperial Rome. Life constantly gives us examples of this; we find them in almost every issue of newspapers lately; Let's limit ourselves here to one, but a large one. Recently, in the columns of the newspaper Moskovskie Vedomosti (dated March 2, 1905), the word of one of the most authoritative hierarchs in the church world appeared, whose sincerity, moreover, we have no reason to suspect - Anthony, Bishop of Volyn (Khrapovitsky). This word “On the Last Judgment” is generally characteristic of the monastic-Byzantine understanding of Christianity, which denies all earthly tasks and Christian politics and, feeding exclusively on ideas about hell and eternal torment, turns Christianity into a religion of the grave and death 458. Now, however, we will not dwell on this medieval perversion of Christianity, hostile to life and culture, but will focus on its journalistic part. Here we are once again convinced that no matter how much we turn away from the earth in theory, in reality we cannot completely free ourselves from earthiness and corporeality. Therefore, representatives of the monastic-Byzantine worldview are not alien to politics, which apparently seems to go beyond their interests, but this improvised political worldview is characterized by ardent conservatism, the poor fruit of political indifference. This is the characteristic of the modern social movement that we find in the word bishop. Anthony Volynsky 459: “Let us subject to an impartial assessment the subject of their false boasting, that is, their social activities, their social aspirations. Is this a matter of love? Filled with primordial malice, hatred of everything Russian (?!), the leaders of this movement stop at nothing to fill the hearts of young students and those layers of common people who may be accessible to their influence with the same malice. Taking advantage of the frivolous inexperience of some and deceiving others through various kinds of disguised impostors, they draw them to participate in street riots, under bullets and lashes, having in mind only that one (!) goal, so that they can then shout about strict punishment by their superiors and spread resentment against the government. Heated, disappointed youths, both students and factory workers, really cannot figure out who is to blame for their misfortune, and are ready to believe, from the words of their crafty leaders, that the inevitable severe reprisal against them is the arbitrariness of the government, towards which they become even more embittered and then even more blindly surrender to the power of the instigators of the rebellion, like rabbits rushing into the mouth of a boa constrictor.” The Christian bishop considers “bullets and whips” on the part of the authorities to be a normal, natural reaction on the part of the Christian government. He sees here only “the inevitable severe punishment of the government.” And this is not an official letter of duty and position, which can be considered the “message” of the Synod, this is a voluntary, unforced sermon, sanctioning the “legality and inevitability” of “bullets and lashes” for dealing with the people. Where is your spirit now, St. Philip of Moscow 460, a merciless denouncer of the oprichnina and autocracy? What speeches we now hear from your successors! But let’s arm ourselves with patience and listen further: “What can we say about the transformative sentiments in our press and in various public meetings? Maybe this shows concern for the well-being of the homeland? Alas, something completely opposite! What are they worried about in all their decisions? Only about what is beneficial for the rebels themselves. About sharing power with the legitimate government, and about the unhindered spread of rebellious ideas through the press and other means, so that no one has the right to restrict such criminals except through judicial red tape. This is what is easy to understand by the cries for freedom of the press and the abolition of administrative expulsions and administrative arrests. They don’t know how to talk about anything else, and what can I say to them about Russia, about the Russian people, whom they don’t know, whom they don’t want to teach, whom they deeply hate in their souls?” Therefore, the preacher concludes, “we will multiply our prayerful sighs so that He will not allow the simple Russian people to become infected with social darkness - so that the people continue to clearly understand who their enemies are and who their friends are, so that they always maintain their devotion to the Autocracy as the only Supreme Power friendly to them, so that the people remember that if it hesitates, they will be the most unfortunate of people, enslaved by the no longer former harsh a landowner, but an enemy of all the foundations of his thousand-year life that are sacred and dear to him.” And this is all that the bishop considers possible. Anthony says about the modern liberation movement 461, these words, as he sees reader, are no different from the usual speeches of the Greenmouth newspaper. This is the worst sermon against religion that can be preached, especially in such crucial days as ours. At the same time, it shows to what extent our official hierarchy has dried up under the system of Caesaropapism, with the unnatural union of a certain political form and the official representation of the Church, to which police functions were imposed. “Paralysis” has already caused partial necrosis, and this smell of corpse rot spreads far. An attentive observer may, however, notice the first, albeit faint, signs of an incipient reaction. We have no doubt that at present there will be those among the clergy who will not subscribe to the words of Bishop. Anthony or the messages of the Synod, which, in their social sympathies and political ideals, belong to the advanced intelligentsia. For obvious reasons, the voice of such shepherds is little heard and weak, but the future undoubtedly belongs to this trend, and not to the ideas of the bishop. Antonia. Here, for example, are some wonderful lines we read in the last (9) issue of the Church Messenger. organ of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, in the editorial department: “The Lord is clearly punishing us for our grossest national sin - “quenching the spirit.” We treated the expansion of the most sacred rights of the individual with disdain unworthy of Christians; we systematically suppressed his free life activity, created a way of life in which personal initiative was allowed only as a tolerable evil and was replaced almost everywhere possible by passive submission to the prevailing forces. Due to some mysterious misunderstanding and strange hardness of heart, we have doomed an absolutely valuable and god-like human personality to endless work for an abstract, soulless principle of the general order, a pagan, anti-Christian principle.” (Cf. religious and social chronicle.) These words give an assessment of the political and social worldview of the bishop. Anthony and his like-minded people: it is built on the principle of deifying power and order at all costs, even “bullets and lashes,” and no matter how many texts of Holy Scripture they cite in their sermons, it will not become more Christian from this. That is not why we started talking about the word bishop. Anthony, so that they fear that it may succeed and have a harmful effect with its ideas. There is no reason to fear this, but there is a danger of a completely different kind: this and similar “counterfeits” of Christian politics easily lead to temptation, are mistaken for the original, and become an argument against religion. Therefore, it is necessary to fight with all our might, to fight in the name of religion, with this illegal combination of the preaching of the Moscow Gazette, the preaching of violence, autocracy, extinguishing the spirit with the religion of love and freedom. We have already had to note 462 that monastic-Byzantine Christianity of the bishop type. Anthony and the individualistic Christianity of L. Tolstoy, with all the abyss that exists between them in dogmatic terms, agree in the denial of active social activity. Both teachings are teachings about personal salvation, about personal improvement - and nothing more, and the social program in one case is expressed in passive admiration of the “power in power”, in the other - in the preaching of non-doing (combined, however, with the most harsh and radical criticism of the existing). In this sense, it seems to us a coincidence that it is not accidental, but deeply significant, that on March 2, when the word bishop appeared in the Moskovskiye Vedomosti. Anthony, the Russkie Vedomosti contained a summary of L. N. Tolstoy’s article in the Times, devoted to the issue of the modern social movement. Tolstoy speaks out against him, since the welfare of people depends, in his conviction, not on changes in the political system, but on his own moral and religious improvement. “Instead of liberating others, we must liberate ourselves first of all, and political activity is incompatible with the matter of moral self-improvement. People realize that much in their life is bad and much needs improvement. But we can only improve what is in our power, that is, ourselves. To do this, however, we must first of all recognize our shortcomings, turn our attention to them, and not to external conditions, the change of which can no more improve the situation of people than pouring from one glass to another can improve the quality of wine... The essence is not in the form of government, but in the very fact of its existence, in the power of a few over the masses; and to free yourself from this power there is no need to fight by external means, but you just need not to take part in it, not support it, you need not to be weak, not to fall into a snare, not to become a slave, but to think only about your relationship with God and live according to the highest law that comes from this relationship, that is, to be a religious and moral person. The less people see and realize the evil of governments, the acts of senselessness, cruelty, deceit that are committed, the victims of which are hundreds of thousands of people, from which millions are killed and corrupted, the more urgent should be the desire for a clear and firm religious self-consciousness, the more immutably we must fulfill the law of God emanating from this consciousness - a law that does not require us to correct the existing government and establish such a social order, which, in our limited views, should ensure general prosperity, but which requires from us only one moral self-improvement, that is, self-liberation from all those weaknesses and vices that make us slaves of power and accomplices in its crimes.” Russian society knows how to forgive Tolstoy his eccentricities - he is too dear to him and they love him too much, because the same merciless truthfulness that is found in them inspires both his great speeches and his truly prophetic denunciations. From time to time the voice of the highest truth speaks through his lips, and can we refuse Tolstoy, even if he himself refuses us. But it seems that never before has the strength of our feelings for a great writer been subjected to such a severe test as now. There is no need to hide the fact that Tolstoy’s letter (and not the first of its kind) makes a downright depressing impression. It is not a surprise for those familiar with his worldview; on the contrary, one can only be surprised at the stubborn consistency that Tolstoy showed here, who previously knew how to be inconsistent and use this inconsistency to get out of difficult situations. And the particular mistake of historical and moral judgment, which, without a doubt, Tolstoy makes, turning his back on the liberation movement, is only a derivative of his main mistake, the one-sidedness and defectiveness of his entire religious worldview. I recently spoke with a reader about the lack of historical perspective, which is determined by Tolstoy’s social moralism and utopianism. These features are now evident in the details of the argument, precisely where he, based on the anarchist ideal and the undoubted imperfection of all, including constitutional, forms of government, completely denies the necessity, expediency and value of historical progress and does not want to make in this regard a distinction between the Russian regime and the freest constitutional or republican form of government. But these are only private and relatively innocent mistakes, pale in comparison to Tolstoy’s main religious and moral error. Tolstoy wants to base his antisocial preaching of social idleness, purely passive protest on Christianity, and presents it as the correct interpretation of the ideas of Christianity in public matters, whereas in fact, in our deep conviction, this is a perversion of the ideas of Christian politics. That individualistic, antisocial morality that Tolstoy preaches is anything but Christian morality. In Tolstoy it flows from that truncated, distorted teaching, reduced to a meager truism of morality, into which genuine Christianity, devoid of any metaphysics, apocalypticism, or philosophy of history, has become in Tolstoy’s hands. A sermon that calls itself Christian and leads to the conclusions that Tolstoy now comes to is a sermon against Christianity, just like the sermon of Bishop. Anthony, and it is precisely this pseudonym of Christianity that makes it harmful and dangerous for the real understanding of Christianity, obscures concepts that are already obscured in history. One cannot remain indifferent at the sight of such a darkening, which for our society, inexperienced in religious matters and mired in religious indifferentism, gives an easy reason to say to oneself with a clear conscience: tantum potuit religio suadere malorum 464, and thereby thickens the already thick wall. This also explains why Soloviev, in the last years of his life, spoke with such passion in defense of the ideas of true Christianity and Christian politics against its “counterfeits,” meaning by this name clerical-Byzantine Christianity (it’s not for nothing that Bishop Anthony dislikes it so much) and Tolstoyism. “The idea of the kingdom of God,” wrote Solovyov in the article “On Forgeries,” “necessarily leads us (I mean every conscious and sincere Christian) to the obligation to act - within the limits of our calling - for the realization of Christian principles in the collective life of humanity, for the transformation in the spirit of the highest truth of all our forms and relationships - that is, leads us to Christian politics... If, as the supporters of pseudo-Christian individualism claim, all political and social forms are alien or even contrary to Christianity, then it directly follows that true Christians must live outside of all political and social forms. But this is an obvious absurdity, exposed by their own lives and activities. And if, on the one hand, there is no doubt that these forms in their given reality are far from being introduced into the Kingdom of God, then the task of Christian policy directly follows from this: to improve, to elevate these forms, to transform them into the Kingdom of God” 465. We consider these provisions to be indisputable and fully applicable to the case under consideration. The political liberation of Russia, which will eliminate the hereditary disease that corrodes both the body and soul of the Russian people, turning them into a cripple, a beggar, a slave, and at the same time a rapist, which will put an end to this boundless sea of ​​tyranny, legalized crimes, is not “pouring wine from one glass to another” (the hand refuses to write these terrible words), but is a holy cause, a truly Christian cause. Out of darkness and chaos, a new world is created by the power of freedom, and the creative Spirit of God blows over the agitated elements, for it is said that “where the Spirit of God is, there is freedom.” The days of the Last Judgment are coming - not the one that Bishop Anthony spoke about and about the time of which we are not given and do not need to know, but the Last Judgment of history. The ax is already lying at the root of the tree. Will we be ready for this judgment? It is interesting and instructive to compare with the judgments of Bishop. Anthony and L.N. Tolstoy on issues of Christian politics is another opinion related to the same area, but belonging, however, to a foreigner, the Zurich pastor Hermann Kutter. Last year Kutter published a book entitled “Sie mossen. Ein offenes Wort an die christliche Gesellschaft” 466, which made quite a strong impression and almost cost the author the loss of his pastoral pulpit. Kutter's book is extremely interesting (it would be desirable if it appeared in a Russian translation). This book, full of noble inspiration and genuine religiosity, is nothing more than an ardent defense of the Social Democratic Party from the attacks to which it is subjected from the bourgeoisie, as well as from the clergy, and this defense is accompanied by the most harsh accusations and denunciations against the official Church, which has betrayed true Christianity. Not particularly deep philosophically and arousing serious objections, especially from the religious and philosophical side, this book is nevertheless very timely and useful, it excites the public conscience, like an alarm bell awakening those who have fallen asleep. Maybe another time we will have to dwell in more detail on its religious and philosophical side; now it interests us mainly as an expressive contrast to the opinions of Bishop. Anthony and L.N. Tolstoy. In his famous essay “On the Decline of the Medieval Worldview,” Soloviev, among other things, expressed an idea that met with great and understandable opposition among reactionary representatives of official Christianity. “The majority of people who have made and have made social, moral and mental progress in recent centuries do not recognize themselves as Christians. But if Christians by name betrayed the cause of Christ and almost destroyed it, if only it could perish, then why cannot Christians by name, who renounce Christ with their words, serve the cause of Christ? In the Gospel we read about two sons; one said: I will go - and did not go, the other said: I will not go - and went. Which of the two, Christ asks, fulfilled the will of the Father? 467 It is impossible to deny the fact that the social progress of recent centuries has been accomplished in the spirit of philanthropy and justice, that is, in the spirit of Christ. The abolition of torture and cruel executions, the cessation, at least in the West, of all persecutions of Gentiles and heretics, the abolition of feudal and serfdom - if all these Christian transformations were made by unbelievers, then so much the worse for believers... Judas greeted Christ with a word and a kiss. Thomas declared his disbelief to his face. But Judas betrayed Christ and “he hanged himself” 468, but Thomas remained an apostle and died for Christ” 469. Approximately the same basic idea is developed in Kutter’s book. He claims that God currently lives and acts not in the official Church, which has submitted to mammon, the powers that be, and the powers that be in general 470. Kutter explains the denial of religion as the fault of representatives of the Church, whose practice contradicts the principles they profess (at the same time, in our opinion, he also oversimplified the matter). Social democracy is a creative force, the force of the future, and Kutter turns his calling word “let there be” towards the clergy, inviting them to recognize the ideals of social democracy and sharply criticizing the compromise represented by the moderate, partly even reactionary, trend of “christlich-sociale Partei” 471. “Shouldn’t we (says Kutter) be confessors of Jesus on earth? Shouldn't we bear His cross, shouldn't we endure persecution and death in His name? Did He not stand in diametric opposition to this world? Otherwise, why the cross? Does believing in Jesus only mean consolation in sins and hope for a heavenly homeland? Have not the powers of heaven been revealed in Him? Doesn't He say that He came to create life and fullness? Doesn't He want to redeem the world? Does He not contrast Mammon, the prince of earthly affairs, with God? To believe in Jesus is to say to sin: you must cease, and to evil: you must disappear. To believe in Jesus means to protest against the forces that are hostile to Him. To believe in Jesus means to feel in the power of the living God, who will come and prepare the time for the triumph of his justice. To believe in Jesus means to blaze for right and against injustice. Measure the depth of grief, and not coldly calculate and reason. This means nothing more than to testify against vice. This means making the impossible feasible, the inaccessible accessible, and the unprecedented existing. For Jesus, precisely Jesus, “makes all things anew.” Jesus, precisely Jesus, inspired people to believe in the kingdom of heaven on earth. Would this be Jesus if he could acknowledge the ideals of our Church as his last word? Believing in Jesus means loving. But love burns and shines. God is love and God is burning fire” (pp. 52–53). Dwelling on the theoretical worldview of social democracy, Kutter points out that in essence it is not the theories of social democracy that are important. “Isn’t the most significant thing about them an amazing and irresistible inspiration, imbued with a mission to create something new? Let the social-democratic theorists sit on their theories - whoever now thinks that, for example, in Marx’s teaching on surplus value beats the pulse of a new, eager spiritual force, does not know how world history moves, does not know its hidden depths from which each new movement draws its strength. After all, Social Democrats think about a completely new social system, although at the same time they one-sidedly see only economic factors, and not even this or that idea about this system, but the conviction regarding the transformation of life in general, such is - precisely in this uncertainty - the great element of their creativity. They carry amazing hope in their hearts, they talk and sing about the brotherhood of all people, about the golden age of freedom and equality. They laugh at them - they endure it. They are reviled - they remain unshaken. They are ridiculed - they expect nothing else. They know that there is no place for them in the modern world, so they prepare a place for the future. They learned that the god of this world, Mammon 472, must fall. They do not enter into an alliance with him, they do not waste many vain words, they do not split hairs and do not resonate, no, they decided and speak openly, even if the whole world laughed at them: mammon is the hereditary enemy of man. But he cannot fall from good intentions alone, he falls only through deeds... This is their great duty (mössen), which rewards them for all the misfortunes brought upon them by a frightened and increasingly blinded society. Shouldn't they say that differences between people should end? Do they not arise from the dominion of Mammon? Shouldn't they demand that humanity form a unity if it is mammon who creates its fragmentation into thousands of fragments? Should they not wish that the boundaries of nationalities should disappear, for it is an accepted truth that wealth, mammon, constitutes the strength of a nationality? Shouldn't they herald the coming of a new age, although the centuries that have passed so far are a reflection of mammon?.. " It is not difficult to guess who Pastor Kutter would have joined if he had lived not in Switzerland, but in Russia, and what content his “Sie mössen” would have received on Russian soil. He would be able to discern the religious grain of the liberation movement, and he would not be hindered by the fact that people who are alien to any religion are participating in this movement. He would remember Thomas and Judas and would easily determine where the right side is and where the left side is. Who stands closer to Christianity and more correctly expresses the true demands of Christian politics: Bishop. Anthony, Leo Tolstoy or Vl. Soloviev and Pastor Kutter? The answer is clear. Priest N.S. Open letter to S.N. Bulgakov 473 Let me bring you my sincere gratitude for your religious and social chronicle in book 4–5 of “Questions of Life.” You have said many bitter words about the Orthodox clergy, but everything said is fair. Yes, a great sin is incurred by that part of the Orthodox clergy who, at such a historical moment when the fate of the future Russia is being decided, instead of walking in the forefront of the intelligentsia, having forgotten the precepts of the Gospel, joined the ranks of dark elements and engaged in provocation. From the church pulpit she sanctions the activities of dark forces, sends blessings to their defenders and curses to their enemies. The judgment of history on these figures will be harsh, and this judgment may not be so far away. But I deeply believe that this part of the clergy is an insignificant minority, that the rest of the clergy should read and hear with indignation about such activities of this minority and by all possible and available means protest against these activities and against the identification of the entire clergy with its unworthy minority. If the majority is silent for now, it is because its lips are under seven seals, that it does not yet know how to speak out loud, that it is impossible to speak alone. Scattered throughout remote villages and hamlets, deprived of the right to free meetings and congresses, this majority cannot yet give a proper rebuff, cannot unite for such a rebuff to the minority, at whose service is the spiritual seal and other means of protection. Then, this majority is not properly informed about everything that is happening in Russia. Sufficiently educated in one area, it is amazingly ignorant in another. God, how ignorant it is in this area, how far it is from understanding the true nature of what is happening around it! How it still cannot give up the habit of looking at everything through the eyes of synodal messages, the patriotic howls of the “cheap” periodical press and its diocesan bodies. One cannot help but regret that the best periodicals, for many reasons, have not yet received wide access to his environment. How useful this seal would be for him at this time. No, our clergy, I repeat in conclusion, cannot be denied a deep love for the people, a readiness to serve them unselfishly, an understanding of their true responsibilities, but for a long time they were under the double oppression of the offices and therefore cannot so easily and quickly navigate new social movements. S.N. Bulgakov. Religion and Politics 474 (On the issue of the formation of political parties) In this note, I want, taking advantage of the hospitality and wide tolerance of the editors of Polar Star, to touch upon an extremely burning and very important, although not raised with sufficient urgency in the public consciousness, question - about the relationship between religion and politics. The question itself sounds wild and alien to the ear of a modern reader. What other conversation can there be about religion, this historical shadow that will soon fade into the past, especially in connection with politics? However, such an attitude, especially in the mouths of those who want to conduct “real politics,” is completely erroneous, because the existence of religion is a fact that a politician has to reckon with, even if he completely denies religion on general philosophical grounds. We mean not only religion in the proper sense of the word, but also atheistic religions, the existence of which, whatever their quality, is beyond doubt. The religion of humanity, faith in progress, Zukunftstaat 475, heaven on earth and the like - all this is the essence of a variety of atheistic religion; a person cannot live alone in the present, in the everyday world alone and, by his divine nature, one way or another “seeks the coming city” 476. And this fact of the universality of religion or, what is more important here, the existence of various religions, religiosity in the sense of the absence of indifference to a religious (in the broad sense) problem and at the same time the fact of diversity, people belonging to different religions, extends its influence to all areas of human life, and in particular to politics. The political values ​​that guide the political activities of people do not represent, or, more precisely, should not represent the highest, independent and self-sufficient values. The independence of political values ​​is characterized only by unprincipled politics, guided by interest, personal or class, as a direct expression of personal or group egoism. Such a policy, devoid of any ideal and based on the lower, crude instincts of natural man, is, of course, alien to any religion (except for the cult of one’s womb), and it is difficult to talk about the ethical or religious, generally the highest value of such a policy. In contrast to this class or egoistic politics, ideological politics, guided by a certain ideal, without representing an independent value, is a means to serve the ideal, inspired by a higher, not political, but ethical or religious value. From here she draws her enthusiasm, her pathos, her spiritual power. The ideological moment represents, therefore, a completely real force, for what could be more real than inspiration by an ideal. Hence the direct conclusion regarding the significance for politics that the general worldview or religion of a given person has, for only it leads him to this or that program of this or that political party and revives the dead letter of party demands, which, without this binding cement, crumble into separate paragraphs, partial and individually uninspiring demands. Parties form spiritual organisms, full of ideological inspiration not only in the business, practical part of their programs, but also in their common faith. And this faith, in accordance with its nature, emphasizes and makes this or that part of the practical program more significant, establishes a spiritual perspective and a comparative assessment of various requirements. So, here is the first classification of political parties or various forms of attitude towards politics: an egoistic attitude, determined by class or group interest, and an ideological or religious attitude, which brings political activity into connection with the highest spiritual values. In the future we will, of course, talk only about this second one. One can imagine two types of party unity: in one case, it occurs on the basis of a common worldview, so to speak, on a maximum program, or, in other words, it is based on complete unity of faith, not only political, but also ideological, religious - such are both of our socialist parties 477, which can be considered parties to the same extent as religious sects - without taking this circumstance into due account, it is impossible to understand their activities and properly assess their influence on life. A similar religious party (we mean here, of course, a purely formal similarity) is the Catholic Center Party in Germany, groups of Christian socialists in different countries, our Old Believers and... our “Black Hundred”, as far as it includes sincere, fanatical supporters of the worldview expressed in the motto: Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality! (To see the Black Hundred as government agents alone, as many in our educated society are, is, in my opinion, an amazing frivolity that exposes the lack of historical thoughtfulness.) The second type of party unity does not require common faith, it is reconciled with religious diversity, if only these different faiths lead to practical unanimity, recognition of the next historical demands formulated in the party program. Sometimes this indifference to religious differences of opinion stems simply from the lack of ideas of the party, driven by self-interest and hiding behind only one or another motto. But such tolerance can quite sincerely be elevated to a principle, so that party unity rests only on the identity of the practical program. In essence, with such fundamental unprincipledness, each member represents, as it were, a separate party, based on a maximum full program and uniting with others on a common practical bloc: this is a federation of autonomous and, to a certain extent, heterogeneous states. Such is the constitutional democratic party at present, which does not ask those who come to it what they believe, demanding only recognition of its program, and, like imperial Rome 478, atheists and believers, positive supporters of the religion of man-divinity of Kant and Feuerbach and neo-Kantian idealists, rabbis and Christian clergy, Old Believers and Mohammedans, socialists and individualists. Thus, everything that separates, but at the same time gives the highest value and meaning to practical requirements, is left in a bracket, and these latter, which in themselves still speak little to the heart and mind, are taken out of the bracket as something common and unifying. A practical bloc for practical purposes and the desire for unification is undoubtedly a wonderful and commendable thing, especially here in Russia, where everyone is now pulling in their own direction and wants to found their own party. But the fact of the matter is that we are not talking about a bloc, but about a party, about a party of the entire people and the whole people, as it is portrayed in the eyes of its best representatives. Such a party must represent a single spiritual organism, have a common soul, a common thought, a common will, and must represent a super-individual collective organism. A union of human atoms, separate, autonomous individuals who retain their entire individual worldview when joining the party, can exist in big cities, in closed intellectual circles, where it is well known what Professor A, journalist B, lawyer C thinks, and where they generously forgive each other’s individual free-thinking. But since it is necessary to go beyond the living rooms and go to the people, intellectual individualism weakens and harms, the atomistic totality must turn into a more complete, true conciliarity, having one soul and one sermon, for a sermon is needed to the people. What kind of general sermon, that is, on behalf of the party, can an atheist and a priest, a rabbi and a Muslim, etc. deliver? After all, one of two things: either in order for a sermon to be effective and full of enthusiasm, the preacher must put all his faith into it, expound his entire religion and pour out, as a conclusion from it, the actual program of the party - but then, obviously, the party splits into several, for one and the same party cannot sanction all these sermons at once and publish them all at once with the stamp of the party as party publications - or the party preacher must to leave at home everything that is most dear to him: a Christian - his religion, a rabbi - his, an atheist - his - and limit himself only to preaching a practical program. But will it not suffer from that practicality, confined only to the lowest practical interests, as among unprincipled, crude class parties? After all, what for the preacher or agitator himself is a conclusion from his general worldview, broader and more distant ideals, he will report only in a deprived form, proving the practicality and profitability of these demands. And no matter how sincere, sober and real this sermon is, the stick will be knocked out of the hands with the first blow of the sword, when, next to this practical and sober sermon, the political intoxication of social utopianism and broad perspectives enters the heads. After all, when clashes occur between the Cadets. and Social-Democrats, then both sides speak completely different languages: on the one side all the advantages of knowledge, sobriety, caution, real humanity, on the other, most often fanatical fervor, often combined with weak knowledge, completely impossible demands, although they, according to the usual phraseology, are covered with words about “scientific law,” “class interests,” etc. And if victory among the working masses still remains not on the first, but on the second side, this is explained, of course, not by the fact that the real policy of the Cadets. promised less to the real “interests” of the workers, but to completely different ones. Preaching to the masses of the people, in whom the feeling of conciliarity and “catholicity” is still alive, lost by the individualistic, “solitary” intelligentsia, must be religious if it hopes to capture the soul of the people in the person of the most ardent representatives of the people, and not only catch the “moderate and careful”, “economic peasants”, sensible hoarders. Therefore, we think that preaching Christian socialism or, more broadly, the Christian public, can have widespread success among the people. Among the people, or rather, in one part of them, divorced from Christianity, the preaching of atheistic socialism, the religion of the “state of the future,” class hatred and enmity is successful. This socialism is not religiously indifferent even in the narrow sense of the word: both theoretically, at the basis of this entire worldview, and practically in the tactics of the party lies militant atheism, conscious and militant anti-Christianity. In Social Democracy, as in the Cadets, a Christian who agrees to hide his religion in his pocket and an atheist who condescendingly forgives his party members’ religious prejudices cannot combine; no, here the question is posed acutely and irreconcilably, as it is posed by the very nature of religion and the essence of the matter. For, no matter how great the similarity and closeness between the practical programs and demands of atheistic and Christian socialism, there is the greatest polarity and irreconcilable opposition between them - there must be a struggle that goes on between Christ and Antichrist. In the party, the Cadets a kind of truce has been concluded, existing contradictions have been extinguished. Everything is recognized as unimportant in comparison with the practical program, but what is left essential if what a person believes in, in the name of which he lives and acts, is unimportant? They will say that Russia needs to be saved. Yes, it is necessary, but that is the damned question: how can one save it (both in the historical and religious sense) and is mutual spiritual self-castration really the surest way of salvation? Even in a practical program, where differences of faith do introduce some nuances, the desire to maintain neutrality has led to omissions or reticences. I will point out, as the most striking example, a church issue that affects the vital religious interests of the multi-million Orthodox population and the influential clergy, especially in the countryside. The oppression of the autocracy over the Orthodox Church (as I pointed out on the pages of “Liberation” 479 in articles on “Orthodoxy and Autocracy”, published under the signature of Ak.) is strongly experienced by all Christians who are not poisoned by officialdom, and in the desire for the liberation of the Church, among other things, lies for them one of the strongest motives in favor of the liberation movement. The question of the emancipation of the Church from the state, of the future destinies and position of the Church occupies the first place in their souls and cannot occupy any other place in their preaching 480. What do such members of the Cadets find? party in spe 481 in its program on the church question? An indifferent, carelessly thrown clause, corresponding to the liberal “Roman” tolerance of all beliefs and all errors, with the following content: “The Orthodox Church and other faiths must be free from state tutelage.” This point remained without any change or extension at the 2nd Party Congress, when it was again discussed. Is it possible to imagine a party publication of the Cadets? on the church issue, which does not at all contradict the program point about “liberation of the Church from state tutelage,” but, of course, interprets this issue from the only possible and appropriate positive Christian point of view? Of course not, perhaps an individual party member can do this, but not the party, which remains “religionslos” 482. Meanwhile, isn’t it natural, for example, for the clergy to wait for clarification first of all on this pressing issue? I understand that the Cadets Party acted in this case quite correctly, because she could not say more without going beyond the boundaries of her ideological block, without violating neutrality in any direction. And, however, it is equally certain that little has been said, and it would not be surprising (albeit regrettable) if the union of October 17, 483, which in the religious question, due to its more homogeneous composition in this regard, took a more decisive and definite position, and showed much more attention to the currents existing in the church environment in favor of a comprehensive restoration of conciliarity and electivity in church life, will win over many to its side. I do not presume to judge whether those who deny religion can refuse to preach their negative views covertly or openly, but sincere Christian faith cannot tolerate the second role or be deliberately left in the shadows, especially when it comes to preaching among the masses and a popular movement. It is possible to coincide with other parties in practical demands and, for the purposes of practical politics, enter into certain agreements with them - but in their preaching, Christians can speak only in the name of Christ and, therefore, remaining true to themselves, cannot and should not participate in any ideological bloc based on silence, mutual politeness and leading to littering life with the unprincipled practicality of irreligious politics, which for the religious man is the greatest evil of our time. Therefore, in view, on the one hand, of the obligation for Christians to participate in public and political life in order to transform it in the spirit of the commandment of love, freedom, equality and brotherhood, and on the other hand, in view of the difficulty and even outright impossibility of walking in an ideological bloc, silently renouncing Christ, it must be admitted that sooner or later we must have a purely Christian party, completely alien to clericalism, obscurantism and other signs of the past, but inspired by the Christian faith, and in the name of this faith, and the ideals of democracy and socialism (which, of course, in their Christian understanding have nothing to do with atheistic social democracy). The first embryo of such a party can be considered the illegal “Christian Brotherhood of Struggle”, little known to the general public, 484 and the “Union of Christian Politics” 485, which I am projecting, is pursuing essentially the same task. The centuries-old oppression that has weighed on the Russian Church makes it very difficult to quickly implement such undertakings due to the unpreparedness of the spiritual soil for them, but I am convinced that the time will come for this, and perhaps it is not far off 486. The emergence of such a movement, in addition to its religious meaning, can also have enormous cultural and social significance; only it can knock the weapon out of the hands of the leaders of the Black Hundreds, for, standing on a religious basis, only it can show the religious deception and untruth of this preaching of misanthropy and reaction in the name of faith 487. Returning again to the Cadets. party, I will repeat in conclusion that the main obstacle to its transformation into a national party (which P. B. Struve and, of course, many other party members dream of) is its fundamental irreligion or non-religion in the above-explained broad sense of the word. Representing not only a practical (and completely acceptable and expedient) block of at least regular demands, but also an ideological block of contradictory and partly irreconcilable worldviews, eliminating the possibility of common faith and party enthusiasm, it is in a state of unstable balance, reflecting the transitional nature of our era. Such a bloc was possible within the limits of the intellectual, conspiratorial and closed in its composition “Union of Liberation”, but it is bursting at the seams as soon as it comes to talking about a nationwide broad party and preaching to the people, requiring complete sincerity, not allowing any silences and ideological blocs. One of two things: either the Cadets party. it will have to finally decompose into several heterogeneous spiritual bodies that are now included in its composition, and realize the various ideological possibilities inherent in it, or turn into a block of different currents, united on common practical requirements. But such a conscious and lasting union must be preceded by a preliminary and fundamental separation, the work of in-depth self-knowledge. What has been said applies, of course, exclusively to the question of the formation of parties as durable structures in which everyone finds their own ideological home and dear spiritual benefits. As for the next question about the upcoming elections to the State Duma, which find us unprepared and disorganized, there can be no doubt in my mind that here the Cadets’ program is parties should be a common bloc for these elections, because only a sincerely democratic composition of the Duma has some chance of pacifying Russia, and supporting sincerely democratic candidates for the Duma in the elections is our general patriotic duty. P.B. Struve. A few words about the article by S.N. Bulgakova 488 The topic raised by S.N. Bulgakov, is very broad and little developed. In presenting to him the pages of the Polar Star for the presentation of his interesting and deeply thought-out considerations, we consider it our duty to determine, at least in the most general outlines, our own position on the issue raised of enormous theoretical and practical importance. More than once by me and my co-editor S.L. Frank 489 explained that the “Polar Star” is philosophically free from any dogmatism and that, in particular, the dogmatic understanding of religion is completely alien to it. Of course, in a certain philosophical sense it is true that every policy and every political system is ultimately based on certain religious ideas. Error S.N. Bulgakov lies in the fact that he, as a dogmatist, understands religion in the church sense, in the sense of an objectively ordered system of beliefs and the structure of believers based on this system. Unlike Bulgakov, we believe that a Christian and an atheist, an idealist and a positivist can have a common policy that has a single religious root. In this sense, Vladimir Solovyov aptly pointed out that the free thinkers of the 18th century in politics were better Christians than the representatives of the Church in the corresponding era. Even the broad masses of the people - contrary to Bulgakov's opinion - are able to very well separate the ecclesiastical or religious element from that super-church or extra-confessional "truth of God", the recognition of which underlies such broad political programs as, for example, the program of the constitutional democratic party. That is why the same political “truth of God” can be preached in a true religious spirit and with true religious fervor by an Orthodox priest, a Mohammedan mullah, a Jewish rabbi, and a minister of any other religious community. What seems to an idealistic clergyman to be religious unprincipledness, in fact, can and often does consist of the highest – compared to any churchliness – religiosity. On the other hand, in Bulgakov’s idealistic-church reasoning, that real, cruel and unsightly anti-Christian churchliness, which is so easily and so confidently strengthened in “religious” positions, is lost sight of. S.N. Bulgakov fell into error in two directions. Firstly, he lost sight of the fact that the connection between politics and church or denominational religiosity is essentially always a double abuse: politics in the name of religion and religion in the name of politics. This connection is always artificial and often of poor quality. Secondly, S. N. Bulgakov forgets that any kind of deep and sincere politics, no matter how seemingly irreligious it may be, is essentially close to the deepest, inner, subjective religiosity. And both of these mistakes of Bulgakov stem from that dogmatic mindset of his mind, due to which he cannot help but be a churchman, that is, an objectivist in religion. If we add to this that reality is not as straightforward, not as geometric, as Bulgakov wants and needs, then we cannot help but admit that the desire to connect politics with church religiosity can in practice turn out to be either fruitless or extremely dangerous. This is clear to those who, like the writer of these lines, are deeply convinced of the supreme importance of religious values ​​and at the same time internally tolerant even of church religiosity. As for that irreconcilable struggle between Christian and atheistic socialism, which, according to Bulgakov, is essentially inevitable, this struggle is really necessary, again, only from a dogmatic point of view, and it makes absolutely no difference what is dogma: atheism or the teaching of the Church. In its truly religious essence, any true socialism, based on the recognition of the human person as the highest value, is completely independent of any dogma, be it materialist or theological dogma. S.V. Lurie. Sectarianism and partisanship 490 The question of the formation and existence of political parties during the political crisis we are experiencing has become one of the burning issues of Russian reality. With all the richness and diversity of the political forms of Western European countries, the experience of our cultural neighbors in this case has only relative and conditional practical significance for us. Ready-made templates, given the obvious uniqueness of the emerging special political factors, turn out to be unsuitable for direct use, and we, apparently, are destined to make our own way through our own efforts. Difficult, but historically inevitable. You have to walk continuously, often groping your way, under the pressure of rapidly unfolding events; the guiding light of distant goals is obscured or illusoryly refracted in the midst of contradictory and intersecting demands of the current political moment; other people's experience provides only a conditional and incorrect criterion of what is essential and accidental; deviations and delusions, fatally irremovable, are painful and difficult. Under these conditions, it may not be useful to revive from time to time in the mind those basic ideas that give rationality and meaning to the chaos of reality and justify all the pain of the process of political growth. What is a political party and what should it be? We know two answers, coming from apparently opposite sources, but mutually complementing and clarifying each other, and equally dogmatically defined. For a social worldview that recognizes the opposition of the material interests of individual social groups as the main factor of life, and the class struggle as a phenomenon that exhausts the entire essence of social evolution, there can be no doubt or hesitation in the answer to the question posed. An organized political party is a form of organization of economic struggle, and this should sufficiently determine the composition, character and activities of the party. Essentially irreconcilable, this doctrine does not allow agreement and compromise in the organization of political parties; she does not know and does not recognize the complex range of colors and shades and sharply emphasizes only the contrasts of white and black in a bleached and simplified life. We know how the ideology of social democracy arose historically in Germany and how practically it was embodied in an organized political party. Thanks to a relatively healthy political atmosphere, the possibility of open speech in strictly legal forms, significant culture and discipline of the population, the “party of destruction” found itself face to face with real public and national interests. Under the pressure of the insistent demands of life, the orthodox doctrine and the resulting irreconcilable tactics of passive resistance retreated and are retreating, it is true, slowly and in perfect order, but further and further, and one must think that the further evolution of Social Democracy in Germany will lead to the liberation of its political and economic program from the traditional structures that are oppressing its path. Just the other day, at a congress in Mannheim, the venerable leader of Social Democracy openly admitted “the stupidity of the tactics” that he himself preached 30 years ago 491 . Perhaps the time is not far when Social Democracy, without reservations or fictions, will participate in the creative legislative work of the German chambers and the Reichstag 492. The social democratic doctrine, unfortunately, migrated to us only as a doctrine, of course, without the living environment that gave birth to it. Thanks to the peculiarities of our Russian life, ideology always went far ahead of life, and a change of ideas was carried to us by the western wind, sometimes yielding only more or less lush barren flowers on our unprepared soil. But social democracy has given us something more and something worse. According to the conditions of our recent past, it had to hide from the light - in the unhealthy atmosphere of the underground it acquired the features of sectarian exclusivity and dulled any sense of life among its faithful adherents. The persecution to which the party and its press were subjected surrounded it with an aura of martyrdom, only strengthened its position and strengthened the belief in the infallibility of its dogmas. It is no longer possible to fight it with arguments and evidence; these means are exhausted and powerless; Only a free social life and the cultural and political education of the broad masses of the people can defeat it, separate the healthy core from the random rubbish. It is instructive to compare the view of the essence of the political party of Social Democracy with the requirements that are presented to the political party by idealist philosophers. The business political program cannot and should not serve as the sole organization of a political party. “Independence of political values ​​is characterized only by unprincipled politics, guided by personal or class interests, as a direct expression of personal or group egoism” 493. Without complete unity of faith, not only political, but also religious and philosophical, this unification is impossible, which draws its strength from inspiration by the highest spiritual values. A national and national party “must represent a single spiritual organism, have a common soul, a common thought, a common will, and must represent a super-individual, collective organism.” It is not difficult to see that these requirements are almost completely satisfied by the political sectarianism of “social democracy” (Prof. Bulgakov himself emphasizes this), and if there were no other objections to the thesis of S.N. Bulgakov, then this one fact would be enough to question its correctness and significance. Let us note in passing that no matter how great the gulf is that separates Marxism from the idealism of which Prof. is a representative. Bulgakov, according to their psychological basis - the belief in the exhaustive meaning of dogmatic constructions - they are internally related: the transition from Marxism to idealism, just as possible as the reverse transition from idealism to Marxism, we should rather look at as a kaleidoscopic transformation than as a natural evolution of a religious and philosophical worldview. In the statements of Prof. Bulgakov contains some significant misunderstandings that need to be revealed to fully illuminate the issue. First of all, doubt naturally arises whether this connection is possible between the “highest spiritual values” and the practical program of a political party, in which the program was only a necessary “conclusion”. I think that establishing this kind of logical relationship between religious and philosophical views and a practical program is a psychological mistake and an oversimplification of what is actually a very complex relationship. The conditions of political, cultural and economic life are so diverse, form such a numerous combination of plexuses in all possible directions, that there is no way to always and invariably reduce them to the basic general principle and political figure, which, according to Prof. Bulgakov, must “put all his faith into the sermon, expound all his religion and pour out, as a conclusion from it, the real program of the party,” a task is imposed that exceeds human strength and is even, probably, insoluble at all. In certain areas of life, we constantly encounter combinations and groupings of facts for which general criteria turn out to be completely unsuitable; the desirability or undesirability of including certain provisions in a practical program can be clarified not on the basis of their logical connection with religious and philosophical premises (often this connection cannot be established at all), but independently of them for reasons of expediency and feasibility. It goes without saying that ethical ideas about the common good and social justice are ultimately the general background against which the politician paints the details of his business program; but these ideas are too general and, so to speak, too elementary for certain practical consequences to be drawn from them logically. Finally, there are often cases when the establishment of a well-known practical requirement turns out to be in conflict with an abstractly taken general and obligatory principle, and the exclusion of this requirement causes a conflict with another principle, equally universal and obligatory in its abstract formulation. Any kind of restrictions on individual freedom logically undoubtedly contradict the principle of self-integrity and the highest value of the human person; unlimited individual freedom, on the other hand, is obviously incompatible with the basic requirements of the common good. Even if we assume that mutually exclusive principles can be united in some higher synthesis, constituting the subject of religious belief or philosophical belief, then even then the unthinkability of its application as a criterion to individual categories of phenomena of practical life is clear by itself. In another respect, the view of Prof. Bulgakov is puzzling. In the human psyche, religious elements are so intertwined with ethical, aesthetic and philosophical elements and their combination is so diverse that when faced with nature and life, which in turn is infinitely diverse, the isolation of certain elements and the analysis of their relationships can be a task full of deep interest for a psychologist, but completely pointless from the point of view of practical politics. There is therefore no reason to connect the party program in particular with a person’s religious beliefs, ignoring the single and complex apparatus of mental life. For a political party, all that is important is a certain uplift of spirit, which makes it possible to unite on the basis of a program that promises the maximum possible good. Here we seem to come to an essential point in the question of political parties. If political parties were the spiritual organisms that Prof. talks about. Bulgakov, and each would consider herself the owner of that highest religious truth, from which the actual program of the party follows as a conclusion, it is difficult to take into account all the complications that would arise from the political struggle: it would acquire a tendency to degenerate into a civil and religious war. The highest religious truths, or revered as such, are jealous and domineering; they do not allow agreements and concessions; they demand everything for themselves and are merciless towards the enemy. What could we expect from the political struggle of our Social Democracy with the “true Russian people” if there were no neutral environment that would take some of the blows from both sides? Let no one object that this is an unconvincing example of opposing extreme parties. For the possessors of absolute truth, all parties that do not completely accept it are equally extreme, equally hateful and, taking into account the psychology of the struggle of the masses, equally subject to extermination. What we can and should strive for, and which for our barely born constitutionalism is one of the necessary conditions for healthy growth, is the elimination from the actual political struggle of those highest values ​​that are the highest good of a cultured person. Prof.'s view Bulgakov demands that political differences of opinion begin from the very depths of the soul, from the most intimate and dear shrines of religion, ethics and philosophy to the individual. I believe that a healthy and normal (insofar as there can be any kind of normality here at all) political life can be realized only when the spiritual work of the intelligentsia and the widespread dissemination of education among the masses create a certain cultural sphere, which, while remaining outside the political struggle, outside its passions and inevitable extremes, will be its basis and starting point. All political activity presupposes opportunism, compromise and agreement; straightforward “maximalism” is political madness. Therefore, it is necessary, if possible, to eliminate from the struggle that which, in its essence, cannot make concessions and compromises. Not to mention the fact that a high cultural environment is a buffer that softens collisions and blows; it elevates and ennobles the struggle itself, giving it a truly human form that saves the fighters themselves from cruelty and moral savagery. Anyone who has had the opportunity to observe political life in the cultural countries of the West could not help but see the calm and friendly attitude with which political opponents find it possible to work together in areas affecting common cultural interests, and what unworthy forms, as in some cases in France, the struggle takes, as soon as “higher values” are drawn into politics. Only one practical conclusion can be drawn from this. The differentiation of social groups into political parties must always presuppose some common cultural ground and be based on it. The work to establish this cultural community, a necessary condition for healthy political evolution, is as valuable politically as it is culturally. In the difficult times that we are going through now, all our efforts must be directed to ensuring that party differences of opinion, which are necessary and legitimate, do not go beyond their inherent limits. Let us remember that our culture is in danger, the moral foundations of society are in danger, the best and most valuable human benefits are in danger. Let us remember the “intelligible world” of everything that humanity has experienced and achieved at the cost of incredible stress and incalculable suffering; Let us remember that we are not only the legal successors, but also the executors of this great heritage, and it is our duty to courageously and steadfastly repel any encroachment on it, no matter who it comes from - from the revolution or from reaction. E.N. Trubetskoy. Two words about the polemic between Mr. Lurie and S.N. Bulgakova 494 Mr. Lurie's interesting article, which does not entirely correspond to the views of the editors, requires significant reservations. It raises an interesting question about the essence and tasks of political parties, which needs comprehensive coverage. In a dispute between the author and prof. S.N. I cannot become Bulgakov on either side. Sharing the completely religious and philosophical worldview of S.N. Bulgakov, I, however, do not share his attitude towards political parties. First of all, the very idea of ​​​​forming a “Party of Christ” seems to me to belittle the importance of Christ and Christianity. Christianity does not fit into the framework of one political party or another. By its very essence it is outside and above parties. Christianity shows man the eternal goals of his existence; politics is the area of ​​means that must be subordinated to these goals. There cannot be a single Christian political program and party for the simple reason that Christianity provides wide scope for individual conscience in the assessment and choice of these changing means. Therefore, a wide variety of political opinions can be combined with the general profession of Christianity. Regarding the article by S.N. Bulgakov, which aroused objections from Mr. Lurie, I remember one interview in which S.N. participated with me. Bulgakov. All interlocutors were not only sincere Christians, but also undoubted followers of V.S. Solovyov, and nevertheless, in the sphere of political issues, complete disagreement reigned between us. One of the interlocutors turned out to be a supporter of autocracy and an unconditional opponent of popular representation; the other allowed the Zemsky Sobor as a compromise; I declared myself a strong constitutionalist. The fourth was S.I. Bulgakov, who stands somewhat to the left of the cadets, while I stand somewhat to the right. And this gradation can be continued even further to the left. Under these conditions, is it possible to dream of a single Christian party, or even of a “union of Christian politics”? These dreams are refuted by the very clear texts of Scripture, which directly say that it would be a mistake to look for Christ “here or there,” especially in the “secret rooms” in which all constitutional parties will soon be forced to operate. Refuting S.N. Bulgakov, Mr. Lurie, however, falls into another error. He demands “the elimination from the actual political struggle of those highest values ​​that are the highest good of a cultured person.” There is an obvious misunderstanding here. If the highest values ​​are completely eliminated, then, the question arises, in the name of what to fight? Can political struggle have any meaning for us if it is somehow not subordinated to those “highest values” that constitute the meaning of all human life in general? The author himself gives the answer to this. “In the difficult times that we are going through now,” he says, “all our efforts must be directed to ensuring that party differences of opinion, which are necessary and legitimate, do not go beyond their inherent limits. Let us remember that our culture is in danger, the moral foundations of society are in danger, the best and most valuable human goods are in danger,” etc. I am ready to subscribe to these lines with both hands, but only because here the author introduces into politics those very “most valuable goods,” those same ethical, and therefore unconditional, values that he wanted to remove from it. It would be more correct to say that these values ​​are not outside politics, but outside the party. They constitute that common, supra-party thing on which different parties can converge and which should serve as the basis for uniting their activities. “All political activity,” according to Mr. Lurie, “presupposes opportunism, compromise and agreement: straightforward maximalism is political madness.” And here Mr. Lurie would be absolutely right if it were not for the word “opportunism”, which hardly corresponds to his thoughts. Political opportunism is that direction which, for the sake of certain temporary benefits, makes deals with conscience. I completely agree with the author that in politics one often has to make agreements and concessions, because real politics should not go beyond the limits of what is feasible. But in these cases, agreements and compromises are necessary in the name of moral demands: compromise within the limits allowed by conscience has nothing to do with opportunism, which is nothing more than the subordination of morality to politics. In conclusion, two words pro domo. Belonging to the number of “idealist philosophers,” I by no means share S. N. Bulgakov’s point of view on political parties. Mr. Lurie completely incorrectly identifies this point of view “with the demands made on the political party by idealist philosophers” in general. S.N. Bulgakov. Three ideas 495 In the face of great historical events in the life of the Balkan peoples, Rus' remains motionless and calm, and only newspaper ripples reflect the excitement of its surface layer. Does the immobility of the sea of ​​the people mean deadness and stagnation, or does it indicate that the time has not yet come for it to stir to the depths? Both explanations are possible, but to dwell on the first would mean falling into despair and pronouncing a death sentence on one’s people. Russia, great and broad, can afford itself the luxury of slowness; it does not move quickly, but it exists, and exists as an Orthodox-Slavic country. She showed herself to be such, having fed the sprouts of Slavic freedom with her blood, she remains the same even now, no matter how many spiritual poisons have entered into her over the past quarter century. The Russian people for the most part do not consist of abstract “les hommes” 496 and not of soulless and peopleless “citoyen” 497; their concrete self-awareness includes the Orthodox-Slavic element. Moreover, in a certain sense, Russia itself is a Balkan state: it is connected with the Balkans not only by the blood shed there and not only by tribal kinship, but also by pressing political interests, for the question of the Black Sea coast and the straits, as well as the fate of Constantinople, is of the most vital importance for it 498 . And although Russian diplomacy may be sluggish and indecisive, the people's self-consciousness, if it is awakened from its slumber by events, will have its say over the heads of diplomacy. Russia, while it exists, cannot but be a stronghold of the Slavs, and silently it was and remains so during the present war. What ideas will determine the content of the new act of world-historical drama, what words will be inscribed on the newly turned page of world history? What is the ideological content of the Balkan events? 499 When answering this question, of course, the very foundations of the worldview inevitably emerge, its religious and philosophical roots are exposed. For some - and probably the majority of the Russian intelligentsia - the Balkan War has the right to sympathy only as a struggle for freedom, understood abstractly and negatively (not freedom for what, but only from what?), for “human and civil rights”; for them, nationality is only an ethnographic fact, and a controversial one at that, while religious assessments refer without further discussion to “medieval fanaticism”. Publicists of this type are directly shocked by the mention of the “cross and crescent,” seeing here the incitement of religious hostility, and try in every possible way to make it clear that for their enlightened egalitarianism there is no difference between the Turks and the Slavs. And for representatives of this cultural Volapuk, the Slavic idea, taken outside the struggle for political liberation, gives rise to a suspicious, if not hostile, attitude towards itself 500 . Already during the revival of the Slavic movement (“neo-Slavism”) and the discussion of its ideology, the entire poverty of the rationalistic understanding of the national question was revealed. In the name of what ideological foundations can one cherish the dream of Slavic unity? After all, only one reason was put forward, and, moreover, of a utilitarian-political nature: the fight against the onslaught of the Germans, anti-Germanism, not common love, but common hatred. However, in political utilitarianism one can go further and replace Germanophobia with Polonophobia or Russophobia (which is what is being done). And, on the other hand, how then does Slavic unity differ from any other, politically advantageous combination, for example, a marriage of convenience with France (in which there is a lot of political intelligence, but the heart is not involved at all)? Only by ceasing to see in people geometric figures or intelligible atoms of Bentham's interests 501, only by sensing the individual and the particular in them, can one notice the general and related, and for this, first of all, of course, one must free oneself from the barbarism that declares every religious idea “medieval fanaticism,” because the nature of nationality is religious, or it does not exist at all. Nationalities are religious-cultural types, determined by the difference in religious callings and the resulting cultural tasks, and everything else is only the body of the nationality or even its soul, but not its spirit (on the contrary, modern rationalistic nationalists, rejecting the spirit, cling to the body the more tightly; examples of this could be given from the latest intellectual nationalism). Of course, all races and all tribes are more or less the product of a mixture of blood, as supporters of the cosmopolitan idea point out; there is no pure blood, and every nation is, as it were, a clot of a certain mixture. But it will be born only with its own special idea. This is the immediate consciousness of ancient and modern peoples, for which the people are not even a language (although this is an extremely important constitutive element of nationality), but a faith. This same thought received philosophical expression in Schelling (in a certain sense, also in Hegel) and among our Slavophiles: Dostoevsky, Vl. Solovyova. The basis of the competition between peoples, aroused in connection with the Balkan events, is the clash of three ideas or vital principles: Turkish, German and Orthodox-Slavic. And no matter how much the guardians of the liberal order cry out against this, here there is a struggle between the “cross and the crescent”, in the sense of the last clash of these historical principles, and “enlightenment” is beyond the power to wash off this color and remove this smell 502. The Turkish idea is defined by Islam as a religious principle that initially gave birth to and still defines the Turkish statehood as a monarchical theocracy 503. Turkey is a church-state, and the padishah is the 504th head of both, no constitution can change this, and if D. S. Merezhkovsky’s construction on the inseparability of “Orthodoxy” and autocracy is appropriate, then, of course, it is here, and only here. An attempt to break the ring of Islam that holds Turkish statehood together, to pour the wine of French egalitarianism 505 into Ottoman wineskins, revealed an internal contradiction between the ideas of a theocratic and a more or less secular, “legal” state: civil equality without distinction of religions is incompatible with theocratic statehood, and sooner or later a choice would have to be made between egalitarianism and Islam, which gave birth to the Turkish state. Turkish violence in the Christian vilayets 506, if we ignore their cruelty in form, does not represent abuse, but something fundamental and legitimate, for a true-believing Turk should not recognize the abstract equality of infidels 507. Therefore, the war is, of course, not with Islam as a religion and not with Muslims as its followers, but with Muslim statehood. For the tragedy of Turkish statehood, deep and ultimately destructive for it, lies in the fundamental impossibility, while remaining on the basis of Islam and theocratic statehood, to resolve national issues in the spirit of modern culture, and national diversity is naturally characteristic of a state that arose through conquest. And although now Turkey no longer has to wage a war of conquest, but a defensive one, this does not stop it from being a completely special state-cultural type, deeply different from the European one. One can have different attitudes towards Islam (I personally put the serious and strict monotheism of Islam in any case above Parisian librpanserism 508 or Epicurean nihilism), but there cannot be two attitudes towards Muslim statehood: as a purely religious principle, it should be limited only to Muslim nations. It must be added that the principles of Turkish-Muslim statehood, confused or passed off as Christian, of pseudo-Christian pseudo-theocratism, constantly break into our lives (it was not for nothing that V.S. Solovyov accused Katkov 509 of political Islam). State theocracy is generally contrary to Christianity, and only its painful perversions (in the papal hierocracy 510) or direct abuses (in Caesar-papism) bring it closer in this regard to Islam. Having recognized the state-Church, putting an equal sign between these principles, Christianity would have to identify the earthly city with the heavenly one and change the basic idea of ​​​​the difference between these two cities in the conditions of earthly life. The state for such an identification is something human, too human and earthly, too earthly - this is the area of ​​morality and utilitarianism, “human and civil rights,” and not church-mystical communion, brotherhood in Christ. Now, what is the behind-the-scenes ally of Turkey and the rival of the Slavs in the historical arena - Germanism as a spiritual principle? It is worth paying attention to what German identity itself says. Currently, the school of Hartmann 511 (“concrete monism”), especially Drews 512, persistently emphasizes the idea that Christianity is a Semitic graft, distorting with its theism the religious soul of Germany, its mystical pantheism (approximately in the spirit of Wagner’s “Ring of the Nibelungs” 513). Immanentism, which closes itself to the transcendental, mystical impersonalism, merging the deity with the world, and perceiving the world as a deity, is, of course, the most opposite pole in relation to Christianity, which is based on faith in a personal and transcendental God the Creator and calls for liberation from the iron shackles of the “prince of this world.” Is Drews, a fanatic of “monism” and Germanism, right in his definition of the nature of the latter? I think he is right: indeed, Germanism as a natural element is perhaps further removed from Christianity than other European nations: where the frivolity of the Gauls childishly rebels against God or drowns in the Epicurean gastronomy of life, becoming lower than religion, Germanism contrasts Christianity with a special religious worldview, moreover, it is Christianity itself, wanting to “purify” it, all over again and again again adapts it to his pantheistic immanentism: is this not what the religious essence of the Reformation, this reaction of the German spirit to Christian seeding, boils down to? The internal development and maturation of Protestantism with inexorable logic leads it before our eyes to pantheism and decisive immanentism. But isn’t the same thing happening in German philosophy, starting with Kant? Isn’t the prevailing neo-Kantianism only the self-consciousness of immanentism expressed in different ways, which has covered all the entrances and exits to the transcendental with an epistemological web? It is in immanentism as an ethical force that lies the secret of the exceptionally high personal suitability of Germanism in all areas of culture, science, and economics. Who doesn’t know that in everything related to the earthly structure, Germany occupies first place, plays the role of a school of civilization, it now holds cultural hegemony, for the entire modern factory-capitalist and scientific-idealistic culture, to a certain extent “made in Germany” 514, bears the stamp of the German spirit, and therefore is poisoned by the poison of immanentism; it serves the “prince of this world”; it is, in the deepest and subtlest sense of the word, an anti-Christian culture that establishes man on earth, but at the same time covers the sky above him and covers the abyss below him. From here follows the principle of Germanism applied with usual consistency and consistency in politics - the cult of disciplined strength, hence that calm, systematic “Drang” 515 of Germany, the ideological and methodical, and therefore so dangerous, Germanization of the Polish provinces (in comparison with which our internal Germanism, various attempts at Russification, are inept experiments). Hence Germany’s support for Turkey, contrary to the Christian feelings of the emperor (the sincerity of which, of course, there is no reason to doubt): in the way of the expansion of Germany stands the Slavs, which must be absorbed in order not to be absorbed by them - such is the historical position of German policy. In it the greatest cultural suitability is combined with the greatest ideological poverty. “Genghis Khan with a telephone,” as Herzen put it, and of the two accidental allies, Turkish politics is ideologically richer, because it still serves a religious idea. But what is the Slavic idea? We have already said that in recent years it has turned into the desired X; before the task of cultural self-determination of the Slavs, at its very emergence, the neo-Slavic movement stopped helplessly, which did not want to accept the religious ideology of Slavophilism, but turned out to be powerless to give birth to its own. After all, negative self-determination is not enough for him: Slavism is anti-Germanism. The new Germans topsy-turvy, the Slavic Germans of the second edition, are inevitably worse than their original, even if other blood is not capable of giving them originality. In the fight against a stronger enemy, using his own weapons, it is too easy to become like him and, even with external successes, to be internally defeated by him, and if the Slavs bring with them nothing into the world except a new edition of Germanism or abstract intellectual cosmopolitanism, then it does not have sufficient grounds to claim cultural originality. Language? Of course, this is the most authentic document of national identity, but it is not the only one, and what value does it have if the national soul that gave birth to it is damaged! Blood? Yes, this is a “liquid of a very special kind,” it obliges, but blood is only the biological basis of a nationality, its soul, but not its spirit. Only the old Slavophiles gave a definite answer: the spirit of Slavism is determined by Orthodoxy. However, in view of the fact that Orthodoxy is characteristic not only of the Slavs, but, first of all, of Byzantium, the birthplace of Orthodoxy, and, on the other hand, entire Slavic tribes belong to Catholicism, one should speak generally about the Orthodox-Slavic element. The fact that Orthodoxy does not coincide with the Slavs, and the Slavs are not covered by Orthodoxy, should have extremely valuable and important consequences. Orthodoxy cannot be considered as a national or even racial faith; its multi-tribalism externally expresses its universal character. At the same time, the Slavs as a race have elements in themselves that are favorable to Orthodoxy, with its freedom as the main element of the church: it recognizes itself only in Orthodoxy. Therefore, the Catholic Slavs, even in the person of Hus 516, were instinctively drawn to the freedom of Orthodoxy, are called upon to introduce a Slavic element into Roman Catholicism. In the diversity of beliefs of the Slavic tribes lies, undoubtedly, a great obstacle to the unity of the Slavs, of course, not where this issue is removed from the queue due to the prevailing indifference to religion, as among the current descendants of Hus, but, most noticeably, in the Russian-Polish discord, which is rooted precisely in this 517. As simple as the Polish question is in the police sense, for there is only a question of changing the political course, it is just as difficult (why be disingenuous!), since in Polish Catholicism a stream of Jesuit ultramontanism 518 and the associated aggressive polonization can be found - features that are imprinted in history on the Russian-Polish feud. The genius of the Polish people is a religious genius, just like the Russian people, and therefore their mutual understanding and reconciliation would be especially valuable and beneficial here. The mission of Polish Catholicism, as the Catholic branch of Slavic piety, is indeed a mediation between East and West (as Vladimir Soloviev dreamed of), however, not on the basis of local narrow-mindedness and Catholic exclusivity, but only on the basis of a truly universal church identity. These are the tasks and opportunities that are vaguely outlined on the path to the unification of the Slavs and this unprecedented merging of the rivers of the Orthodox-Slavic world into one stream, unprecedented in history. Isn't a new cultural era emerging, an era of new Byzantinism, isn't new ferment being poured into the old ferment of civilization? Only in this light do current events receive their meaning and significance and cease to be just one of the episodes of the liberation wars or a page from the history of European diplomacy. Of course, these ideal possibilities may not be realized, and these tasks may be rejected or not realized by cosmopolitan rationalists - a calling does not force, it is realized only by an act of free will. But in the latter case, it should be said directly that the Slavs, as a single whole, simply do not exist, but there are only related ethnographic groups. The talent will be taken away from the unworthy slave and transferred to the most worthy 519. And, observing the growing depersonalization and despiritualization of both Europe and the Slavic peoples, their growing religious deadness, it is difficult to escape the thought that this mission comes too late. However, the eyes of the entire Orthodox world involuntarily turn to the dome of St. Sofia, who once united him. May St. herself direct the path of history. Sofia! V.P. Sokolov. Open letter to S.N. Bulgakov 520 Dear Sergey Nikolaevich! With pain, contrary to usual, I read your article about the Balkan events. Your understanding of life is so dear and close to me, as far as I know it, that I dare to ask you for clarification about this article: it seems to me that it contradicts both your basic views and the very nature of the issues being treated. The views expressed in it cause me a number of bewilderments, and I think not only me. You are talking about the “ideological content of the Balkan events.” Balkan events - war. In this war you see a “clash of three ideas,” more precisely, a “struggle between the cross and the crescent,” and next to German “immanentism” and atheism, for the Slavic idea is universal Orthodoxy. My first bewilderment is how can the cross (of Christ, of course) fight anyone with the same means as the fight is now being waged in the Balkans? I am least inclined to Tolstoy's understanding of Christianity; I recognize that the Gospel requires the Christian's active participation in the fight against evil. But I cannot understand how the sword ends up in the hand of the ideologist of the Gospel. There is violence and violence. There is educational violence that does not destroy the personality of the person being raped, and human conviction cannot refuse it. But war is evil, and a crusade is nonsense 521 for a believing consciousness. How can a believer in the Church and the truth of Christ bless the war, investing in it the ideological meaning of the struggle for faith? “Those who take the sword will perish by the sword” 522, and you, as a believer, must also believe that, if necessary, God is able to “present more than twelve legions of angels” 523. It is not passive fatalism that I defend, but the impossibility of attaching a religious meaning to a war where everything is a bloody horror of extermination, bitterness, and revenge. I understand that natural human feeling cannot resist trying to protect both oneself and loved ones from the suffering and oppression of a foreign and other faith yoke. But this natural feeling cannot be sanctified religiously. “The things of God to God, and the things of Caesar to Caesar” 524, this principle of separating natural life from religiously sanctified life is applicable here as nowhere else. The process of Christianization in history is not over; the Christianization of the Slavic peoples can hardly be considered complete. Hence - wars, courts, administration. The embodied ultimate ideal of Christianity is anarchism, anomism 525 and cosmopolitanism. National division is a natural organic fact, and as long as it exists, competition between peoples is inevitable, the feeling of slavery under the rule of another nation, the desire for political independence is inevitable. But the Gospel cannot sanctify wars. To the unbelieving eye this may seem a risk; in fact, the history of martyrdom proves how new masses of believers grew from the corpses of martyrs... The natural instinct of self-preservation is not condemned, but it is not elevated to “ideological content.” If we take your point of view, then our missionaries are right in using police measures to protect the Church from sectarians and Old Believers. Then why not apply your principle to the internal religious enemies of “Orthodox Rus'”? “Orthodox Rus'” is not Russia with Buryats, Finns, Tatars, but part of the Slavic tribe. But what would you say if our Orthodox guardians declared war on the Kazan Tatars or Bashkirs in the name of the fight between the cross and the crescent? Will it then be necessary to sanctify Jewish pogroms as well? The oppressed position of the Slavs adds nothing to the religious idea of ​​war. It is impossible not to fight against oppression. One cannot help but sympathize with those who are struggling; one must bless them, but with a brotherly, and not a gospel, blessing. Perhaps I didn't understand you clearly? Perhaps you are not blessing the Slavs, but are only interpreting the meaning of facts given by reality? And then I can't agree with your comment. What was the impact of the religious essence of the Slavic spirit, making it the bearer of truly Christian universal consciousness? As far as I am familiar with the history of the South Slavic churches, this is a history of hierarchical changes, administrative reforms, etc. I have not noticed the living existence of religious life either here or in Slavic literature. I don’t dare characterize the mood of the Slavs en masse 526, but I can’t help but remember that my Slavic comrades at the Kyiv Theological Academy, whom the Slavic hierarchy sent there quite a few as selected religious figures needed in the future for their native churches, these Slavs showed absolutely no symptoms of a national religious ideology, which even we, students of the scholastic seminary, children of the caste clergy, were not alien to. I do not at all want to discredit the Slavs, but I absolutely do not see any data that substantiates the providential significance of the Slavs that you indicate to them. You yourself talk about “the prevailing indifference to religion among the current descendants of Hus.” The center of Slavism, of course, is Russia. Here again I am perplexed by the “religious genius” of the Russian people: do we, as Slavs and as Russians, have the right to dream of a special election from God to be bearers of “truly universal church identity”? Will there be worthy hands to erect a cross on St. Sofia? This question also affects your attitude to the “German” idea. It seems to me that Germany and the Slavs are an adult and a child, and in their difference you see the very essence, a characteristic, unchangeable sign of the nation. Slavism is young, very young. At the dawn of its days, the West also lived through the Crusades 527 and was as connected with a religious worldview as ancient Rus', from which the Slavophiles draw the foundations of their views. Piety as a mood flourishes in Germany even today. As for German religious thought, its direction is far from being as one-sided as it seems to you. It is curious that the very idea of ​​nationality, which you have in common with the Slavophiles, your epistemology, anti-rationalism - all this was made in Germany and from there was adopted by Russian thinkers 528. We Russians also have a lot of rationalism; This is an inevitable moment in the development of the believing spirit, and not only the Germans, but all thinking peoples, for example, the Greeks, went through a period of rationalization of faith and skepticism. Mysticism, the universality of religious consciousness, on the other hand, were inherent in many, many Protestant thinkers, including Kant, who “cleared the way for faith.” At the very basis of Protestantism is the principle of faith; even though it was mutilated by scholasticism, the role of this principle is such that the modern mood of Protestant thought evokes in my mind the image of the Savior: “If the grain does not rot, it will not bear fruit” 529. Recently, a parallel has been persistently drawn between the spiritual development of the individual and the people. For individual growth of faith, rotting is doubt, rationalism. German culture seems to you “in the deepest and subtlest sense, an anti-Christian culture.” Well, are we, Russian Orthodox people, standing under the banners of Christ? Isn't our religiosity a soulless materialization of Christianity? Our theologians could learn from the Germans the reverence and religiosity of scientific research into faith. The people, supported in this direction by both priests and theologians, evaluate religion purely practically, buying salvation, and more often using religion for their material needs; we have prayers for all occasions in earthly life, but the sacrament of the Eucharist was hidden behind the iconostasis in the secret prayers of the priest, and the whole religion was included in an artificial ritual that is rarely understood by anyone. I can’t help but remember the words of the Right Reverend Innokenty of Pereyaslavsky 530 about the reason for our failure in the Japanese war. He paints such a bleak picture of moral decline, which horrifies even now, which has given foreign newspapers a reason to liken our eastern cities to Sodom and Gomorrah 531. Your voice in the article about the elections to the State Duma also sounds consonant with the voice of the hierarch. It is true that the Slavic soul is broad and feminine-intuitive. But it is far from here to carry universal Christian consciousness. Our literature is very religious, but it cannot be called Christian. You refer to Drews, the scientific school, as proof of German immanentism and pantheism; but these are the pinnacles of individual labor of thought. And we have a great artist, who does not fit into any school framework in terms of depth and breadth, the most popular of folk writers, L.N. Tolstoy was a pantheist, immanentist, impersonalist. And this mood was especially pronounced during the years of his deep thought, when there could be no question of imitation of the West, when he became closer to the soul of the people, when he embraced the Gospel with all his heart: from the Gospel he drew only immanentism. And the poet is especially close to the spirit of the people who nurtured him. Our intelligentsia still lives by faith in the educational ideas of the 18th century. Religious and mystical movements begin in the West, and here, adopted, they are only being comprehended and realized. There is no doubt now that we have our own independent literature and philosophy. There is no doubt that both are moving in a religious direction. But Greece fell politically so quickly after Socrates and Plato! Can we hope for a popular religious genius? Modernity speaks of the immensely growing hooliganism of the countryside, that even there, not only in the intelligentsia and the city, everything sacred is thrown out of life, an orgy of selfishness, savagery, bestiality is developing... All this is painful, and I would so much like a great future for my people, namely inner greatness! But our dreams are not the lever of history. And we, or another people not of Slavic origin, will preserve the Church, the universal Christian consciousness - it is not for us to know: “In Christ Jesus there is neither Greek, nor Jew, nor barbarian, nor Scythian” 532. Now, I want to believe in the providential meaning of the reference to the Scythian in these words. I would like to believe in the providential significance of my native people! And your dreams are dear to me. But when I think about them, it seems to me that your faith is based only on passionate desire, and not on reality. Or do you have other reasons, of a different order? S.N. Bulgakov. Answer V.P. Sokolov 533 I will try to answer the main points of your letter as briefly as possible. 1 I see the historical significance of the war of the Balkan peoples with Turkey not only in the fact that it is a war of liberation in general, but also that it completed the liberation of Christian Europe from the power of Islam, which, as the beginning of state building, turned out to be incompatible with the equality and free development of Christian peoples. Therefore, at the heart of this war is the clash between Christianity and Islam (“the cross and the crescent”), not directly as faiths, but as the principles of culture and statehood. Therefore, everything you say regarding the inadmissibility of religious violence to affirm faith does not apply to me at all. You would not need to dispute this idea at all, but consider whether the special nature of Islam and Christianity, in this case Orthodoxy, as historical principles matters in this struggle or not. This question has nothing to do with Jewish pogroms, missionaries, etc. 2 Your own attitude towards the war seems to me to be completely unclear. If war is the unconditional evil that you consider it to be, then how can you “bless those who are fighting,” albeit with a “fraternal, and not evangelical (?) blessing”? If you were to take Tolstoy’s point of view, there would be no such difficulties, but you declare yourself to be a supporter of “active participation in the fight against evil” and allow “educational violence that does not destroy the personality of the person being raped” (although the personality is in fact destroyed by the death not of the body, but of the soul: “Do not be afraid of those who kill the body, but kill the soul.” 534 Obviously, you recognize the state and the law, which is protected, as you know, by organized force and, moreover, armed force - otherwise it does not achieve the goal. But from this point of view, is there a fundamental, not quantitative, but qualitative difference between state and military violence? Of course, war is evil and horror, but prison is also evil and horror: is a jailer necessarily more virtuous or more loving than a warrior as a type, as a profession? War is the greatest horror of suffering and death, but whether it is the greatest horror in the sense of evil - one can even argue about this 535. 3 It seems to me very doubtful that you contrast the “natural” and the religious, to what extent they are separated and even opposed to each other. The category of natural is too broad and vague. The natural element is precisely that material that should not remain in its immediacy, but should be religiously enlightened, in the personal life of each of us and in human history. This enlightenment has its own stages and ages, which are characterized by their own special sense of well-being, and, consequently, norms of behavior. The Gospel is a seed that grows in the soul of everyone, a leaven that takes possession of the dough, but not immediately and not entirely. This is precisely Tolstoy’s short-sightedness in understanding the Gospel, that it is not one morality, a set of rules and all sorts of nons - it opens up a new life, with which what was previously natural becomes incompatible. The Gospel covenants have the meaning, first of all, of indicating what this new life is accompanied by and leading to, and only then of commandments or prohibitions. Non-doing and non-resistance, which is usually considered the simplest fulfillment of the Gospel, in its real meaning is the most difficult, as the discovery of the highest work, the highest achievement. The fullness of Christianity is power, not flabbiness, love, not sensitivity, faith, not doctrine and not manilovism, holiness, not morality, humility, not cowardice, spiritual poverty, not squalor, crying, not tearfulness, etc. The most terrible parodies and counterfeits of Christian virtues stem precisely from their internal groundlessness: false monasticism, False humility, false love, false patience, which is also non-resistance. Christian life is not just correct behavior or ethical correctness, tested according to a moral recipe - it is born from the inspiration of goodness, it is creativity of the spirit, “art” (in the words of the ascetics). Isn’t there, as it were, artistic and creative inspiration in the life of St. Seraphim, whose external position was destined to become a small shopkeeper (and morality would demand - not to measure, not to deceive)? or the life of the son of Peter Bernardone 536, or St. Alexy, the man of God 537, or the brilliant rhetorician Augustine, or the capital's lawyer - John Chrysostom, etc. They, indeed, seem to become “beyond good and evil”, free from morality. But this also forces us to admit that religious life has its own types and ages, which correspond to their own truth, which contains only a ray from the light of the Eternal Book, even if this is not the integral truth of the Kingdom of God, but this truth (partial “Christianization”, as you put it) is not separated from its source, although it does not contain it. Here's an example. The first Christians did not want to reckon with statehood, which they saw as a “beast,” St. Paul proclaimed the fundamental recognition of statehood (“power comes from God” 538) and state coercion (“the boss carries the sword not madly” 539, recognition of taxes) and thereby actually introduced Christianity into the mainstream of history, with its incomplete, conditional, relative truth. Is this a falling away from the purity of the Gospel, a betrayal of it, or is it a recognition of the fact that Christianity is doomed to a history in which it is destined to play the role of leaven? Strictly speaking, between the Sermon on the Mount and Chapter 13. Romans 540 There is an obvious difference; what is the meaning of this difference? Is there a compromise being introduced here (as you put it, a preaching of the sword on the part of the “Gospel ideologue”) or is it something else entirely? At the stage of development at which present-day humanity is, for it the norm in the fight against evil is not non-resistance, but resistance, by those means that turn out to be possible. And if you choose between passivity and connivance, which has nothing to do with the gospel non-resistance, or the resistance that receives extreme expression in war, then you must prefer resistance. Religious truth is also on his side. We can and should want humanity to become incapable of war, to become above it, but the doctrinal denial of war according to the texts of the Gospel 541 does not seem to me to be a solution to the issue in its vital, concrete complexity. Since you recognize the right purpose of the war, you justify the ethical war; ethics is inextricably linked with religion. And, I think, Rev. Sergius knew what he was doing when he blessed the Russian army in the person of Dmitry Donskoy at the Battle of Kulikovo 542, of course, not with a “brotherly, but with an evangelical blessing.” Although he was at that height of holiness at which the gospel virtues are a “natural state,” he did not apply this standard to the Russian army, for he knew that for the latter resistance is higher than non-resistance, and war is holier than peace. Between the first, liberating, Balkan war and the second, fratricidal, there lies a whole abyss - everyone must admit this; but on what should this distinction be based? If it is based on ethical criteria, then there should be no ethics independent of religion for a religiously minded person. This means that one inevitably has to make an assessment, although historically relative, but still religious. Tertium non datur 543. 4 Now about German immanentism. This part of your letter arouses the greatest surprise in me, and even what appeared on the pages of this magazine serves here as a sufficient answer to many things. Apparently, you decided that the mention of Drews has the significance of a decisive argument for me, and hasten to assure that “the direction of German religious thought is not as one-sided as it seems to me.” But what I had to express in the essay “Three Ideas” in a randomly encountered form actually represents one of the main and most summarized impressions that I gained from many years of diligent study of German religious, philosophical and scientific literature. It is possible that it is incorrect or inaccurate, but it was formed not from a fleeting impression, but after a concentrated and intense look into the spiritual face of Germanism. I believe that the German genius must inevitably enter into the self-determination of the modern spirit, simply by virtue of its exceptional role in the development of modern culture, and it is undoubtedly imprinted with a special spiritual anointing, which I define as immanentism (which is by no means the same as atheism). German mysticism: the author of “Das Büchlein vom vollkommenen Leben” 544, the mysterious Eckhart 545 with his students (Taüler, Seuse 546), Sebastian Frank, Angel Silesius, even the great J. Boehme 547; German philosophy: Kant and neo-Kantianism, Fichte, Hegel, Hartmann and his school, even Schelling; German theology: religious-historical school, Richlianism 548, modern apostles of immanentism Troeltsch and Hermann 549, monism 550 (in its religious branches); German art: Goethe (even despite the mystical epilogue of the 2nd part of Faust) and Wagner, creator of the captivating Siegfried; German science, at least political economy - all of this, in different aspects, reveals the same bias. But this is most clearly revealed in the Reformation, which, although itself a spiritual creation of Germanism, essentially gave birth to the newest culture of Germany - its economy, its science, its philosophy. The Reformation is the triumph of immanentism in Christianity; it was at the same time both the secularization of Christianity and the Christian ethicization of culture. Two principles struggle in it, and its fatal anti-Christian bias is associated with the beginning of immanentism (which does not at all contradict the sincerity of Protestant piety). This is the type of the German genius, his noumenal appearance. And I consider this in him precisely what must be surpassed, against which one must always be on guard, and this is all the more so since, as I said, Russian culture cannot bypass Germanism, although as a school. You are absolutely right, of course, that between the Slavs and the Germans there is a difference in cultural ages, and this difference should be fully taken into account when making comparisons; It is also true, of course, that German ideas had a strong influence on the teaching of the Slavophiles 551, continue to do so now, and will inevitably and should have it. However, all this does not destroy the difference between spiritual types and, so to speak, their hierarchy. The Orthodox-Slavic, i.e., mainly, of course, Russian idea in its tasks goes above and beyond immanentism, just as Orthodoxy, with all its present image of a slave, is a spiritual force of a different order than Protestantism. The spiritual struggle of Russia with Germany should determine the future fate of Christianity, and in particular, Christian culture. It is not without reason that the question of the religious sanctification of culture provides the main content of Russian religious thought, starting with Vl. Solovyov and Dostoevsky (the latter, blinded by hostility to Catholicism, by the way, did not appreciate the full significance of Germanism and its world-historical role). It is not for nothing that even Tolstoy, who in his theology was so close to immanentism, in his philosophy of culture turned out to be so irreconcilable and did not want to accept the culture that bears the stamp of the “prince of this world,” and in this intransigence he discovered his popular element much deeper than in the crude rationalism that made him an outcast from the people 552. 5 I do not forget for a minute how far Russian and Slavic reality is from its ideal, defined objectively by Orthodoxy, which, to a greater extent than other religions, gives room to the aspirations of the “coming city,” and subjectively by the nature of Russian religiosity. But no matter how much the soul is tormented by doubts, transitions from despondency to cheerfulness, from despair to faith, we must not forget that no reality can justify (or perhaps only excuse) our despondency, cowardice and unbelief. We must believe, first of all, because the homeland is not only our mother (or stepmother), but also our creation, our deed, our courage, our faith, our will. Are objects of faith by their nature can and should be proven more geometrico 553? But in this case, where would there be a place for our freedom, love, effort, if not in the fight against the deadly spirit of apathy, fear, disappointment? Did its prophets derive their faith in the “holy remnant” of Israel 554 from “facts,” during times of general corruption, on the ruins of Jerusalem 555, in the anguish of exile? But they were not utopians who constructed subjective fantasies for themselves, for their faith in a national calling was given to them in their religious hope and was interpreted by them in connection with all the impressions of thought and life. And our faith in Russia was given to us in religious faith, organically included in it. Death occurs when the heart stops. And Russia, as what we are looking for, as an ideal task, can only die in us and through us, in our hearts. There is no need for self-blinding, but there must be a measure of self-abasement. Russia has its word in universal Christianity, and this word has not yet been said, but it must first be suffered, experienced by us, the Russian people, as pain, as anxiety, as a question, for man always has the first word in the divine-human process; God is waiting for us to ask a question in order to give His answer. And no one else can do our part in history for us. To know and understand oneself is the great task that the Sphinx of history sets before Russia. S.N. Bulgakov. Athos case 557 I do not intend here to touch upon the factual side of the Athos events that have played out over the past year - the press has devoted a lot of attention to them, and an impartial and verified history of them cannot yet be written. I want to dwell on the fundamental clarification of their ecclesiastical significance, for these events, after a centuries-long break, again raise before consciousness the most basic and burning questions of Orthodoxy - about the nature of the Church and about its dogmatic self-awareness. The question arose about a new dogma, and in connection with it, questions naturally arise, so to speak, of dogmatic epistemology, or about the conditions of dogmatic self-consciousness: what makes a known teaching a dogma, gives it objective dogmatic significance, puts the stamp of catholicity, church truth? Everyone knows with what geometric clarity this issue is resolved in Catholicism thanks to the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope. Roma locuta est 558, - this is the highest criterion of church truth, the verdict of the Pope finally and absolutely resolves the issue, or, expressing the same thought in a negative form, - the Pope ex cathedra cannot be a heretic, fall into religious error, he is a living instrument of the Holy Spirit. True, the ex cathedra sign establishes a difference between the church-administrative power of the Pope as the supreme pontiff, the bearer of the highest church power (Orthodoxy does not have such a sole head, and therefore does not know the complete parallel of this function of papal power; within local churches it corresponds to the patriarchs and our Holy Synod), with his powers ex cathedra. Not every action of the Pope is endowed with infallibility; the Pope may make mistakes in administrative orders (for example, he may mistakenly include a completely Catholic book in the Index librorum probibitorum 559). However, we should not close our eyes to the fact that potential infallibility creates a sufficient aura that overshadows all the actions of the Pope. The infallible ex cathedra high priest and as a church administrator is a power of a completely different nature than the corresponding governing bodies of the Orthodox Churches, for the possibility of confirming this order ex cathedra in any case remains in reserve, and therefore, even the compulsory teaching of theology according to the system of Thomas Aquinas or the anti-modernist 560 oath receives a peculiar dogmatic flavor. Therefore, in Catholicism, dogmatic disagreements are possible only until Rome has spoken; every true Catholic is obliged to submit to the pronounced sentence of the Pope not only out of fear, but also out of conscience, and the dissenter must call himself out as erring 561 . In particular, the dogmatic dispute about the meaning of veneration of the name of God 562 would receive a final decision before the court of the Pope, and the condemned works would not only be removed from institutions subordinate to church authority (monasteries, theological schools, spiritual libraries, etc.), but also from the library of every Catholic believer, and the authors would have to admit their error and renounce their brainchild. The same question stands completely differently in Orthodoxy. There is no external dogmatic authority in Orthodoxy. Neither the bodies of the highest church government or hierarchy are such, nor even the so-called “Ecumenical Councils”, which, in essence, only proclaimed and approved dogma, which, however, was accepted by the entire body of the Church; Although the Council is a natural and therefore necessary means of establishing dogma, it cannot be considered as a parliament with a decisive vote, and, of course, its “universality” is not understood in the sense of electoral districts, which, by the way, was rarely realized. But let us give the floor to a recognized authority on the issue of the Orthodox Church - A. S. Khomyakov 563. He believes “that the division of the Church into the teaching Church and the Church of Disciples is recognized in Romanism as a fundamental principle,” on the contrary, “its absence in the Orthodox Church most decisively determines the character of the latter...” “The feature I have indicated is an indisputable dogmatic fact. The Eastern Patriarchs, having gathered at the Council with their bishops, solemnly proclaimed in their response to the district message of Pius IX that “infallibility rests only in the universality of the Church, united by mutual love, and that the immutability of dogma, as well as the purity of ritual, are entrusted to the protection not of one hierarchy, but of the entire people of the Church, which is the body of Christ” 564. This formal announcement of the entire Eastern clergy, accepted by the local Russian Church with respect and fraternal gratitude, acquired the moral authority of a universal testimony. This is undoubtedly the most significant event in church history for many centuries. In the true Church there is no teaching Church. The whole Church teaches, otherwise: the Church in its entirety: the Church does not recognize the teaching Church in a different sense” 565. This point of view was invariably put forward in polemics with papism; in particular, A. S. Khomyakov relies on it. Otherwise, it would be difficult to dogmatically understand, for example, the history of ecumenical disputes, in which heresies sometimes embraced secular and ecclesiastical authorities, the emperor and the patriarch, and the truth found defenders in the person of a few and uninfluential clergy (Deacon Athanasius!) and laity. This explains the internal necessity of unction, and therefore of councils on dogmatic issues in the Orthodox Church. Based on what has been said, how is it now possible to establish a new dogma? First of all, the external organ of universal (in the geographical sense) consciousness has now been completely lost, for the Church has been split for many centuries into at least two parts, Eastern and Western, and each of them lives a separate life. However, the principle of unction, the acceptance and preservation of dogmatic teaching only by the entire body of the Church remains in full force in Orthodoxy and cannot be replaced by anything; only what is perceived as dogmatic truth by the general church consciousness, what has become a fact for it, can be proclaimed as a dogma, and this right cannot be unilaterally appropriated by the highest hierarchy, which is authorized in the order of church administration to condemn only such opinions that contain a direct or indirect negation of already recognized dogmas and in this sense are clearly heretical. In new questions, posed for the first time in church-historical development, until the onset of dogmatic maturity for this or that teaching and its fixation in the church consciousness, there remains freedom for personal search, for what is technically sometimes called “theological opinions” (as opposed to dogmas). And this is freedom in Orthodoxy: thanks to the absence of external infallible authority that could powerfully extinguish personal quests, here the possibility is created, with the internal fidelity of the Church with its already accepted dogmas, of dogmatic questioning: in necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas 566. This is essentially the situation in which such thinkers lived in Orthodoxy and unhypocritically felt themselves faithful to it, such thinkers as Bukharev 567 , Dostoevsky with his chiliastic hopes, V. S. Solovyov with his teaching about Sophia, N. F. Fedorov 568 with the doctrine of the resurrection, Tyutchev, A. Tolstoy, K. Leontiev with his stormy aestheticism, some modern thinkers who consider themselves unhypocritical sons of the Orthodox Church. This freedom of dogmatic quest is the vital nerve of Orthodoxy and its most sacred palladium, which must be zealously defended by the faithful sons of the Church. Its fundamental denial would, indeed, be the extinguishing of the spirit. Of course, it is precisely here, in these aspirations, that the danger of self-will and deviation into heresy always lurks; however, heresy itself becomes possible only with the presence of dogmatic life. “It is fitting for heresies (αίρεσεις) to be among you, so that the most skillful ones may be revealed” (1 Cor. 11:19), the apostle condescendingly notes. Paul, always irreconcilable with persistent heresy. Theoretically speaking, heresy is possible in two directions – thinking and will. The first occurs when one or another “theological opinion” or new teaching comes into clear contradiction with an unshakable dogma already accepted by the Orthodox consciousness. The second is when an individual or group of individuals ascribes to their “theological opinion”, no matter what it is, the nature of a generally binding dogma and, therefore, stands out from church society, branding its members as heretics or spiritually dead people, therefore, when an attempt at dogmatic self-affirmation occurs (this is the original meaning of heresy - αίρεσις, - separation, one-sided assertion). Thus, it should be recognized that Orthodoxy, through its members, is constantly (or rather, should be) in the process of searching for dogmas, their new formation; in the dogmatic development of the Church, the one truth turns into different and new sides. Now let us turn to the Athos turmoil, which arose over the proclamation on Athos as a new dogma, which in the eyes of its adherents constitutes the main criterion of Orthodoxy - the doctrine of veneration of the name of God. The question of the essence of names in general (philosophy of name) and the name of God is one of the most basic, and therefore most difficult to understand, religious and philosophical problems. It is not at all surprising that for rationalistic thinking it seems like a complete misunderstanding, and the new “dogma” is simply “stupid” (for example, private assistant professor A.I. Pokrovsky and Archbishop Anthony agree on this). No less fatal for this teaching is its excessive “pragmatic” simplification, which can lead, indeed, to “moetheism,” that is, to the direct deification of the letters and sounds of the name of God, to a mechanical or at least magical interpretation of prayer (this is exactly how the new teaching is understood in all three reports on this issue presented in St. The Synod, and in its resolution 569,) and against such a coarsened understanding of it, it directs its main struggle; if this, indeed, were all that “imslavity” boiled down to, then this struggle would be completely legitimate and sufficiently motivated). However, the teaching about the name of God has an incomparably deeper meaning; it was an attempt to theologically comprehend the religious experiences experienced by ascetics during prayer (especially the “Jesus Prayer,” constantly repeated first in the mind and then in the heart, this is the so-called “mental doing” 570). Thus, in the new teaching the question is about the theory of prayer: how to understand the real effectiveness of prayer, in which the invocation of the name of God, and therefore the very name of God, has the main meaning? Obviously, this issue can be approached from different sides: from the side of theoretical philosophy, namely the doctrine of names, and from the church-historical side, bringing the new question into connection with previous dogmatic discussions, and from the religious-practical side, and from the experience of “smart doing” (and therefore it is not at all surprising that this question arose precisely in the monastic environment). However, its vitality also corresponds to its difficulty. It is not at all surprising that in church circles this question even now not only does not find unanimity, but even understanding, and in any case it is still premature to talk about its dogmatic maturity 571 . Its immediate solution, which also claims to have dogmatic significance, would be direct violence against the religious conscience of either one side or the other, and even more so of those vast circles that are completely neutral on the issue. Essentially, the question has not yet left the stage of preliminary discussion, or, according to the terminology we have adopted, it is at the stage of “theological opinion” and has barely been raised in the general church consciousness. Most are taken by surprise by this question, and the Athos formula proposed by Fr. Anthony Bulatovich (“the name of God is God”) still causes misunderstanding and misunderstanding equally among the intelligentsia and ordinary believers, among the clergy and monastics. The church authorities, instead of helping to clarify the issue, resorted in this case to their favorite method of clamping their mouths and actually removed this issue from the discussion of spiritual journals. Thus, this discussion, by the power of things, became the property of the Orthodox laity, thanks to which the only attempt to date to systematically present the issue of venerating the name of God, written by Fr. Anthony Bulatovich, could see the light only in a private publication, precisely under the company of the “Religious and Philosophical Library,” led by such an unhypocritical, but also independent representative of Orthodoxy as M. A. Novoselov. Even today, the ecclesiastical responsibility of the laity remains to take care not to let the dogmatic movement that has begun die out and to maintain ideological interest in it. How did such a difficult dogmatic question serve as a reason for monastic civil strife and the entire Athonite movement in general, which caused the pastoral-pacifying expedition of Archimandrite Nikon? On Athos, and as a result of the general tension of religious life, and as a result of the peculiarities of monastic psychology, national passions, personal temperaments, and, finally, economic interests (to all this was added the frivolous and tactless behavior of Archimandrite Anthony, who immediately cursed the new movement without any analysis or even acquaintance with it and thus added fuel to the fire), - on Athos the new teaching about the name of God was immediately and, of course, premature proclaimed a dogma and even made a criterion of Orthodoxy 572. Two warring monastic parties emerged, each of which claimed leadership in the monastery. The “Imeslavtsy” party overthrew (and, unfortunately, not without violence) the “Imeslavsky” abbot of St. Andrew’s monastery 573, but the new administration was deprived of the opportunity to receive cash and mail, which the consulate refused to do. This created a protracted crisis on Russian Mount Athos. It must be added to this that the supreme church power on Athos belongs to the Patriarch of Constantinople, who, for national-political reasons, is generally inclined to cleanse Athos from the Russians who have multiplied recently, taking advantage of the favorable international position: Athos, liberated from Turkish rule, still remains some kind of political res nullius 574, belonging to the primo occupanti 575, and one day there a Greek detachment had already appeared. In view of this, not only the church, but also the civil and political situation on Athos has long been very confused (back in the spring, from a prominent representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I heard the opinion that the inaction of the authorities on Athos, unfortunately, is impossible, and sooner or later it will have to give the final advantage to one or another of the irreconcilable and fighting parties). After the patriarch, with very suspicious speed and ease, spoke out against “imeslavia,” the Greeks had a completely legal and canonical opportunity to remove heretics from Orthodox Athos, which was subordinate to the patriarch, in order to give a numerical advantage to the Greeks, who already had legal dominance. At this time (in the spring) the condemnation of the new teaching by the Holy Synod took place, and it was followed by the Athos expedition of Archimandrite Nikon, which began with exhortations and ended with the “transfer of powers to civil authorities.” A color of shame, indignation, grief, resentment for the Church appears on the face when thinking about this expedition and about the sad role to which the Orthodox archbishop allowed himself to play, not avoiding moral complicity in the vile massacre; with Athonite monks. This expedition was condemned with complete unanimity by all independent press organs, right and left, Orthodox and non-Orthodox. Archimandrite Nikon did not consider it necessary to visit Athos and listen to the Athonite “confessors” even during the preparation of his report to the Holy Synod, when it was possible to freely exchange opinions; he came there with a ready-made sentence and a demand for obedience under the threat of excommunication and... expulsion, and at the same time he also complains that he was met with coldness and distrust. Instead of wise tolerance and benevolence, the church authorities showed a jealous lust for power, for the sake of which the emerging shoots of church life were torn out and trampled, and where? on the Holy Mountain, from time immemorial revered as a shrine of Orthodoxy, as “the inheritance of the Most Holy Theotokos.” By its actions, the Synod seems to want to complete the long-standing rupture of the moral connection between it and the church people, and, of course, the suicidal means for it is the resettlement of Athonite “confessors” throughout the cities and towns of Russia, who have tasted the sweets of the archpastoral rod. This gap may not be felt while church power is covered by the fence of the state, but it will be revealed immediately as soon as, by the will of fate, this fence collapses. After all, what kind of power and authority would the envoy of the Synod, Archimandrite Nikon, have on Mount Athos without the Donets and military force?.. Distracting from the Athos events and focusing on the religious-dogmatic side of the issue, it must be said that the Athos people nevertheless sinned by excessive and premature dogmatization of their teaching and, in particular, their (and generally hardly successful) formula that “the name of God is God.” We do not forget, of course, that they were excited both by the articles of Archimandrite Anthony and by the defiant behavior of their opponents, but even a true opinion, if it becomes a means of church division and creates the will to it, can take on a heretical connotation. In this sense, it is also accepted by the premature dogmatization of the Orthodox teaching, which is what is supposed to be like at its core. There is also no doubt that among the mass of monastics, among whom the new teaching has spread, it does not and cannot find complete understanding and is capable of causing misunderstandings, especially on the basis of its fanatical defense 576 . Nevertheless, these hundreds of monks, now deprived of their spiritual homeland, ready to die for the faith, represent the best proof of the vitality of Orthodoxy, capable, as in the past, of giving birth to both martyrs and confessors, and this movement itself, testifying to the underground movement of waters in Orthodoxy, is essentially a joyful event in the life of the Church. If the people of Athos are from Fr. Anthony Bulatovich at the head of 577 even fell into exaggerations and simplifications, then their service to the Church remains enormous, it consists in decisively raising the question of the name of God before the church consciousness, and, according to the fair remark of the preface to the “Apology,” 1912 in future church history will receive the name “the year of the Athos disputes about the name of God.” Having eliminated the possibility of preliminary theological discussion of the new teaching, the Holy Synod itself began to judge it. Three persons were entrusted with the preparation of reports: first of all, of course, the universal Archimandrite Anthony, although he himself is a party to this matter and for this reason, it would seem, should be “removed”, Archimandrite Nikon, who was suddenly elevated to the rank of a first-class theologian and with seminarian importance instructing ignorant monks, and the hitherto unknown teacher of the theological school, Mr. Trinity. Why only this gutta-percha theologian, convenient for his portability (he, together with Archimandrite Nikon, represented the Russian Church on Athos), turned out to be the only representative of the laity in discussing this question of paramount importance, why theological academies, prominent representatives of the Orthodox pastorate and the laity were not surveyed, in general why at least the outer decorum of “conciliarity” was not observed, there cannot be a satisfactory answer to this 578. The issue was resolved in a clerical and private way, and on the basis of three reports a synodal message was drawn up, claiming to set forth “Orthodox wisdom” about the name of God (all three reports and the message were published in “Church Gazette”, No. 20). One must mentally put oneself in the position of a monk, to whom this message and the reports supposedly clarifying and supplementing it must be accepted “not out of fear, but out of conscience” and who would really try to do this. If we exclude the fair condemnation of those obvious errors to which the teaching of the “Imeslavists” (mechanical or magical understanding of prayer) can lead dark people, then on the essence of the question of the name of God, even among the speakers there is no unanimity at all, and from the extreme rationalism of Archimandrite Anthony (I leave aside his unbearable journalism) we move on to an unstable, but very close to “Imeslavstvo”, albeit veiled position Troitsky, in the report of Archimandrite Nikon 579 there are at least three different versions of the teaching about the name of God, which are difficult to reconcile with each other (here I am unable to confirm what has been said with quotations). Finally, even on the fundamental question of whether the name of God is divine “energy,” there turned out to be a completely irreconcilable disagreement, for, whereas in the synod message, as “Orthodox wisdom,” it is stated that the name of God “is not the energy of God” (p. 285), - in Trinity’s report, as “Orthodox teaching,” it is directly proclaimed that “the name of God, understood in the sense of the revelation of God... is the eternal energy of God, inseparable from God” (p. 906). I don’t know my own. The operative part of the Synodal message is formulated hastily and vaguely (see decisive paragraph 1, p. 285), so that it does not fix the dogmatic idea at all 580 - it is known how difficult it was to give dogmatic formulas in the history of the Ecumenical Councils. Therefore, I have to say that all these reports and the resolution leave the issue open, and in my opinion there is no possibility of accepting them into the leadership even with the full desire (this should be even more said about the patriarch’s resolution). Although the Synod currently invests these decrees with its authority of the highest church authority, it can still do this in a disciplinary manner, but by no means dogmatically. No matter how our Holy Synod tries to copy the Pope, it does not have the same power over the conscience of believers that legitimately belongs in the eyes of Catholics to the Roman Pontiff. Here we should return to the fundamental question with which we began. Even if the synod's reports and resolutions were free from these shortcomings and provided a clear and intelligible formula, could they even then lay claim to dogmatic significance? Orthodox teaching forces us to answer this question with a decisive no. The very claim to the autocratic establishment of new dogmas (and here we are talking about a new dogma) would not only be non-canonical, but would actually lead to a real heresy, to a perversion of Orthodoxy, to usurpation. Neither the Synod 581 nor the Patriarch is characterized by dogmatic infallibility. Therefore, the resolution of the Synod on the issue of a new dogma can have the force of at most only a conditional (donec corrigetur), temporary and preliminary determination, in other words, the action of church authority in the order of governance, but by no means the indisputable voice of the Church. The situation is no different in the case of imeslaviya. By its very nature, the message of the Synod can be considered only as such a preliminary determination, more precisely, as an action of church authority, subject to appeal, change and even cancellation, but not as a final dogmatic determination that can only belong to the entire church body. “Imeslavtsy” can also adopt this point of view in principle, of course, in order to continue for themselves and for others to deepen and clarify the issue of honoring the Name of God. From the point of view of the Orthodox teaching about the Church, it remains unshakable that there is no dogma on this issue yet, for neither the Athonite monasticism, nor the Holy Synod, nor the patriarch has the power to establish it by their individual will, and therefore it is necessary to give room to free “theological opinions”, eliminating only gross perversions generated by the fanaticism of both sides. The events of this year cannot be seen as a final solution to the issue; on the contrary, this is only a prologue to a further dogmatic movement, and participation in it as possible should be a natural duty of living members of the Orthodox Church. S.V. Trinity. About the names of God and name-worshippers 582 They want to be believed when they do not know how they themselves believe. St. Athanasius the Great 583. District message against Arians In the short but sad history of the name-worshipers’ movement, a role that is subtle in appearance but quite significant in essence was played, and is still being played, by persons who are, so to speak, not actual members of the new sect, but only collaborators. They do not include themselves in the sect, they do not take on any obligations, but to the best of their ability, willingness and skill they support it. Even before the publication of his “Apology,” Bulatovich notified his like-minded people that his books were sent for review to “theologians and professors of the Theological Academies” and were approved by them. The correctness of this statement is confirmed by the very publication of the book, in the preface of which there is a review of the work, “belonging to the pen of one of the most respected and honored theologians of our homeland.” Here it is announced that “the apologist (i.e. Bulatovich) is far from ignorant and not formally developed (does this need to be proven?), and on the contrary, complete ignorance and misunderstanding of the matter is on the side of the reviewer (i.e. the monk Chrysanthus, who first pointed out the wrong thoughts in the book of Hilarion). In addition to the professors, members of the Religious and Philosophical Library publishing house in Moscow spoke out in defense of the name worshipers. This publishing house not only published Bulatovich’s “Apology” and placed in the “Materials for the Dispute about the Veneration of the Name of God” three other works by name-worshipers (“Open Letter of the Holy Mountain Confessors of the Name of God to His Eminence Bishop Nikon”, “Confession of Faith in the Name of God” and “Proof from Holy Scripture and the Holy Father of the Teaching about the Name of God, set out in six points") 584, but even in the preface to the first work, written “from the Editor,” he completely sided with the name-worshipers. In this rather strange and extremely pompous preface, the new false teaching is called a “spiritual eruption.” “The nickname 1912,” in which this “spiritual eruption” occurred, according to the editors, should be “the year of the Athos disputes about the Name of Jesus.” On the side of the opponents of the name-worshipers, who are called “name-wrestlers,” the editors see only “a rationalistic mentality, frivolous swearing and slanderous slander,” while the editors directly cannot find words to praise the name-worshippers. The name-worshippers allegedly “performed their church obedience under the thunder of the Balkan War, under the whistle and hiss of name-wrestling libels, and in the shameful silence of theological journals.” The proud and very “searching” monk Hilarion is extolled here as one of the most prominent representatives of the spirit of the ancient hermitage of Thebaid 585 and Syria, etc. Although the editors find it necessary to further discuss the issue from a philosophical, psychological and historical point of view, it is quite desirable, but at the same time it recognizes as completely true the main idea of Bulatovich’s book, “that the doctrine of the Divinity of the names of God is nothing more than a special case of the general church teaching about the Divinity of all energy of God.” In order to confirm their high assessment of Bulatovich’s work, the editors further include the aforementioned “authoritative” review of one of the most respected and authoritative theologians, declaring that he is “personally entirely on this side,” that is, on the side of Bulatovich. In addition to advertising and publishing the works of name worshipers, assistance from the circle grouped around the publishing house was expressed in direct anonymous cooperation in the preparation of the Apology. Such cooperation is noticeable especially where the Apology treats the Palamites and Barlaamites 586 and the author of the Apology himself mentions it, saying that “this book was written with the assistance of highly enlightened Russian theologians” 587. Of course, such active support for the name-worshippers on the part of their mysterious patrons could not but have its consequences. And she had them - in the intensification and aggravation of the Athonite turmoil. The Athonite name-worshipers imagined that their superstitions were stamped with true theological learning, and everything that the Orthodox wrote and said against them began to seem to them, at best, a misunderstanding, and at worst, a betrayal of Orthodox teaching in the name of personal and party interests. Meanwhile, events took their course. The Holy Synod joined the opinion of the Ecumenical Patriarchate regarding the teachings of the name-worshippers, but the name-worshipers, fueled in their jealousy beyond reason by mysterious theologians, did not pay much attention to the resolution of the Holy Synod, and the relationship between the two parties on Athos became so aggravated that every minute one could expect a bloody outcome. Both parties came to the conclusion that their further life together in one place was impossible, and both parties turned to the authorities with the same request - to take one or the other away from Athos. And at one time there was a danger that it would be the Orthodox who would have to be taken away. When it was decided to take away only the name-worshipers from Athos, they, although they themselves asked for this, demanded that the monastic millions be divided among them, and when this impossible condition was not met, they showed open resistance to the authorities and yielded only to the pressure of the water. The rest is known. At a time when the unfortunate Athonite monks, confused by their leaders and highly enlightened Russian theologians, handed over their clean shirts and prepared to die for the name of Jesus, and the author of these lines worked in the monastery library from early morning until late evening, argued until hoarse with the sect’s agitators, drove around Athos in the July heat, not knowing whether he would have to make acquaintance with the bullet of a Greek Chetnik or with the stone of a name-worshiping fanatic, the leaders of the sect, proud of the consciousness of fulfilling their duty, abandoned their supporters and were complacent. Bulatovich lived on his estate, Kusmartsev secretly left for Russia in advance and robbed pilgrims on the way, and upon arrival he did the same thing, only on a larger scale, Grigorovich threw off his monastic dress and went to Russia with an officer’s passport, and Parfeny wisely sent a renunciation. What did “highly enlightened Russian theologians” do during this time? It would seem that after the new teaching was condemned by the Church and the struggle against it led to such sad incidents, they must do one of two things: either recognizing the support they provided to the name-worshipers as an erroneous step made out of man-pleasing, lack of awareness and, in general, human weakness, hasten to openly admit this and dissuade the simpletons seduced by them, or, on the contrary, prove that by supporting the name-worshipers, they supported a just cause and that The church authorities of both the Constantinople and Russian churches fell into error when they condemned this right teaching. Such an alternative would be inevitable for someone for whom the interests of truth are most valuable, and not the interests of personal pride, the interests of a publishing company or a circle. But the “highly enlightened theologians” turned out to be “neither cold nor hot.” In their hearts, of course, they understood perfectly well after the Synodal Message that name-worship is a false teaching, but they did not have the decency to admit that what they had done earlier was wrong. But, on the other hand, it was impossible to remain silent. They were looked at, an explanation was expected from them, and it was not only the name-worshipers who waited. What to do? Where is the way out of such a difficult situation? And the exit is very convenient. It’s just to essentially bypass the question, direct the reader’s thoughts towards more general issues and, without giving the appearance that they themselves are in a false position, praise themselves and begin to scold others, the Holy Synod and the Patriarch for allegedly exceeding their competence and for an inappropriate course of action. Scolding the ecclesiastical department has now become simply a “façon de parler” 588, and if you curse with a certain gusto and with civil-ecclesiastical grief, then the touched and enthusiastic reader, of course, will not notice that the position of the scolder himself is not a beautiful one. And in the magazine “Russian Thought” 589, which was recently fined for pornography, an article by S. N. Bulgakov, “The Athonite Case,” written according to this recipe, appeared. Applying to this content of the article, we will firstly clarify the techniques that Mr. resorts to. Bulgakov, in order to avoid considering the issue on its merits; secondly, we will consider whether there was an abuse of power in this case and finally, thirdly, we will find out the true situation in which this matter took place. In his article, Mr. Bulgakov constantly beats around the main question: whether a new teaching is true or false, but every time he has to answer it, he makes do with crafty half-answers and omissions, and sometimes he directly writes lies. “The question about the essence of a name in general (the philosophy of a name) and about the name of God, S. N. Bulgakov disingenuously, is one of the most basic, and therefore the most difficult to understand, religious and philosophical problems. It is not at all surprising that for rationalistic thinking it seems to be a simple misunderstanding, and the new “dogma” is simply “stupid” (for example, private assistant professor A. I. Pokrovsky and Archbishop Anthony agree on this). In fact, both the authors of this question do not consider it a misunderstanding at all, but they only consider the answer that the name-worshipers give to it to be stupid, and Mr. Bulgakov should have tried to prove the opposite. “No less fatal for him, continues to hide behind the words of Mr. Bulgakov, is his excessive pragmatic simplification, which can, indeed, lead to “moetheism,” that is, to the direct deification of the letters and sounds of the name of God, to a mechanical or at least magical interpretation of prayer (this is exactly how the new teaching is understood in all three reports on this issue presented to the Holy Synod and its resolution and against such a coarsened understanding of it, he directs his main struggle).” One can only write about reports in this way either without reading them, or wishing to mislead the reader. In fact, for example, in my report such “pragmatic simplification” is not at all considered the main content of name-worshipers, but only a characteristic feature of one group of name-worshippers 590 and, moreover, not the main one, while the main trend of name-worship, for which “highly enlightened theologians” broke their feathers and which was condemned by the Holy Synod, consists of a theoretical, rather than pragmatic exaltation of the name of God. “If this is what “imslavity” really boiled down to, then this struggle was completely legitimate and sufficiently motivated,” Mr. Bulgakov continues to dissemble. But that’s the trouble, we answer, that the teaching of the name-worshippers comes down to more than just this; if it were reduced only to the pragmatic deification of sacred symbols, then it would be only superstition, but it is not limited to this, but looks for dogmatic premises for this superstition and thus becomes a dangerous heresy, the fight against which, of course, is the direct duty of the Church. But this is what Bulgakov does not want to admit and is trying his best to somehow obscure the essence of the teachings of the name-worshippers. “The teaching about the name of God,” he writes, “was an attempt to comprehend the religious experiences experienced by ascetics during prayer. Thus, in the new teaching the question is about the theory of prayer: how to understand the real reality of prayer, in which the invocation of the name of God, therefore (why “it became?”), and the name of God itself has the main meaning.” This is not true. The main content of this teaching is not the “theory of prayer,” but the deification of the name, the assertion that the name of God is a divine action, or even a personal spiritual being of divine dignity, which one can please and not please. The theory of the prayer of the name-worshipers is only an application of this teaching to a particular issue, to a certain type of relationship between the “Name of God” so understood and man. In the teachings of the name-worshipers, the theory of miracles, the theory of sacraments, the theory of sanctification, etc. occupies the same place with the theory of prayer, but all these are only particular points of this teaching and conclusions, and not at all its main content. Then to say that name-worship is a theory of prayer does not at all mean to prove that the Church should not have condemned it as a heresy. After all, the theory of prayer can be heretical. Both Indian yogis and Jewish rabbis had their own theory of prayer, and can the Church really approve of an attempt to replace the completely clarified Christian teaching on prayer with a similar pagan teaching? No matter how unpleasant it is for Mr. Bulgakov, he still has to touch on the main position of the teaching of the name-worshipers, but here again he does not say anything clear and definite. “The Athos formula,” the publishing house’s apologist deliberately makes foggy, “proposed by Fr. Anthony Bulatovich (“the name of God is God”) still causes misunderstanding and misunderstanding equally among the intelligentsia and ordinary believers, among the clergy and monastics... Focusing on the religious-dogmatic side of the issue, it must be said that the Athonites still sinned by excessive and premature dogmatization of their teaching, and in particular, their (and generally hardly successful) formula, that “the name of God is God.” Even a true opinion, if it becomes a means of church division and creates the will to it, can take on a heretical connotation.” These phrases in the article by the evasive friend of the name worshipers raise almost as many perplexed questions as there are words in them. In fact, if the formula proposed by Bulatovich (or rather, Hilarion) arouses bewilderment everywhere, then the article should begin with an explanation of this formula. Why doesn't he do this? Why does the apologist leave his readers essentially in complete ignorance of what the question is about? Why does he omit an opportunity to attract readers to the side of his clients with the sublimity, depth and harmony of their teaching? Is it because he secretly realizes that it is enough to clarify this formula the way the name-worshipers themselves clarify it for anyone, even a slightly educated person, to understand that Archbishop Anthony and Privatdozent Pokrovsky were not far from the truth in their assessment of the new teaching and that the publishers of the “Religious and Philosophical Library”, by patronizing them, found themselves in a very, very embarrassing position? It is further unclear why he speaks only about the formula and not about the teaching itself. What does “hardly a successful formula” mean? Is it that it does not correspond to the teaching that it should express? But in this case, tell me, finally, Mr. Bulgakov, what does this teaching consist of? Or is it unsuccessful because it contains a wrong idea? But in this case it is not only unsuccessful, but also false. What is this thing, finally, “excessive dogmatization? “Does dogmatization have its own gradations? How, finally, can a true opinion acquire a heretical connotation if it is true? And if the teaching of the name-worshippers is essentially true, but only has a heretical connotation, then is it not necessary to show what this connotation consists of? Skillfully avoiding resolving the issue on the merits, Mr. Bulgakov here and there prepares loopholes for his like-minded people who have fallen into trouble, and at the same time scatters flowers of compliments at their address. It turns out that the circle only sought to bring this seemingly completely new issue up for discussion. “In church circles,” he writes, “even now this question not only does not find unanimity, but even understanding, and it is in any case still premature to talk about its dogmatic maturity. This point of view was also expressed by the editors of the “Religious and Philosophical Library”, which published the works of the Athonite hieroschemamonk Anthony Bulatovich... in the preface,” and then provides an excerpt from this preface, which says that for the church resolution of disputes a lot of preparatory work is required and that this work requires new work in a different (italics by Mr. Bulgakov) direction. But this, again, is a technique on Mr. Bulgakov’s part to cover his tracks. In fact, as we have seen, in the preface to the Apology, the circle that published it very decisively takes the side of its author, and the expression “in a different direction,” if taken in context, does not mean at all that the circle admits the validity of other points of view, but only that it finds it desirable to supplement Bulatovich’s work, elucidating the biblical and patristic teaching about the name of God, with data from philosophy, psychology and history. This would have been clear if Mr. Bulgakov had not used a little trick - he had not replaced with dots the phrase that subverted his apologetic efforts. Trying to “put a good face on a bad game,” Mr. Bulgakov even praises the circle that published the Apology, to which he himself belongs. According to his statement, only thanks to the circle “the only attempt so far to systematically present the issue of venerating the name of God, written by Anthony Bulatovich, could see the light only in a private publication, precisely under the company of the Religious and Philosophical Library, led by such an unhypocritical, but at the same time independent representative of Orthodoxy, as M. N. Novoselov.” The word “come to us, you bought from us”; and the thin goods are shown with deft hands by the face. But Bulatovich’s book published by the “library” does not speak at all about the veneration of the name of God, but mainly about its nature, and it actually hardly speaks about veneration, since it teaches to give the name of God not veneration, like icons and the cross, but service, like God. The assertion that Bulatovich was the first to attempt a systematic exposition of the doctrine of the name of God only testifies to the lack of knowledge of the publishers of his work in patristic literature. It is not clear why this book could only be published under the library brand? Couldn’t Bulatovich himself have published it, as he published his other works? Yes, even if she had not seen the light at all, the trouble would have really been small. As for independence, this independence is not the independence of the one who “spoke the truth to kings with a smile,” but the independence of a fable lamb scolding a wolf from the roof of a high stable, and it’s really somehow awkward to boast about such independence. Having praised his circle, Mr. Bulgakov begins to denounce the church authorities, who condemned name-worship. He accuses her of two errors: firstly, of exceeding her competence, and secondly, of an inept, inappropriate course of action. The excess of its competence by the authorities, in the opinion of Mr. Bulgakov, was expressed in the fact that the Greek Patriarch and the Russian Holy Synod allegedly created a new dogma on the veneration of the name of God, while new dogmas can only be established by the entire Church, the entire body of the Church, not just the hierarchy, but together with the laity at the Ecumenical Council. In clarifying this idea, Mr. Bulgakov first makes an excursion towards Catholic practice, where the question of establishing new dogmas is resolved “with geometric clarity”, thanks to the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope. But “in Orthodoxy there is no external dogmatic authority. The same is true of neither the bodies of the highest church government, nor even the most so-called (?) “Ecumenical Councils,” which in essence only proclaimed and approved a dogma that was, however, accepted by the entire body of the Church.” “How is it now possible to establish a new dogma? "- asks Mr. Bulgakov answers: “First of all, the external organ of universal (in the geographical sense) consciousness has now been completely lost, for the Church has been completely split for many centuries, at least (!) into two parts, eastern and western. However, the principle of unction, the acceptance and preservation of dogmatic teaching only by all members of the Church remains in full force in Orthodoxy and cannot be replaced by anything; only what is perceived as dogmatic truth by the church consciousness, what has become a fact for it, can be proclaimed as a dogma, and this right cannot be unilaterally appropriated by the highest hierarchy, which is authorized in the order of church administration to condemn only such opinions that contain a direct or indirect negation of already recognized dogmas and in this sense are clearly heretical. In new questions, raised for the first time in church-historical development, until the onset of dogmatic maturity for this or that teaching and its fixation in the church consciousness, freedom remains for “personal search”, for “theological opinions”. And this is freedom in Orthodoxy... in necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas.” G. Bulgakov agrees that the danger of heresy lurks here, but this does not frighten him. “It is fitting for heresies to be among you, so that the most skillful ones may be revealed (1 Cor. 11:19), the apostle condescendingly notes. Pavel,” he writes. Next, he points out two types of heresy - denial of unshakable dogma and dogmatic self-affirmation of a new theological opinion. In the case of the name-worshipers, he sees only the latter, and in excessive dogmatization, i.e., in the second type of heresy, not only the name-worshippers, involved in this mistake by representatives of the church authorities, are guilty, but mainly the church authorities themselves, which dogmatized their opinion, to which they had no right. “The very claim to the autocratic establishment of new dogmas (and here we are talking specifically about a new dogma),” writes Bulgakov, “would not only be non-canonical, but would actually lead to a real heresy, to a perversion of Orthodoxy, to usurpation. Neither the Synod nor the Patriarch is characterized by dogmatic infallibility. Therefore, the resolution of the Synod on the issue of a new dogma can have the force of at most only a conditional (donec corrigetur), temporary and preliminary determination, in other words, the action of church authority in the order of governance, but by no means the indisputable voice of the Church.” The final dogmatic definition can only belong to the entire church body. From the point of view of the Orthodox teaching on the Church, it remains unshakable that there is no dogma on this issue yet, for neither Athonite monasticism, nor the Holy Synod, nor the patriarch has the power to establish it by their individual will.” Reproaching the Synod, the Patriarch, and even his clients for abuse of power, Mr. Bulgakov gives an extremely honorable role to the members of his circle, the role of an arbitrator between name-worshippers and church authorities. He complains about violence against the conscience of those who “treat the issue completely neutrally,” and says that it is necessary to eliminate “gross perversions generated by the fanaticism of both sides.” “In the events of this year,” he says in conclusion, “it is impossible to see a final solution to the issue; on the contrary, this is a prologue to a further dogmatic movement, and participation in it, as much as possible, should be the natural duty of all living members of the Orthodox Church.” We have outlined in detail the train of thought of Mr. Bulgakov, who in this case is an expression of the opinion of many, and we must say that his entire construction is the result of applying to an event that took place in the Orthodox Church a criterion completely alien to Orthodoxy. The starting point of all his reasoning is the doctrine of dogmatic development, alien to Orthodox dogma. Being at this point a follower of V.S. Solovyov, as well as many other “secular theologians” who dream of a “new revelation”, the kingdom of the Holy Spirit, etc., Bulgakov puts forward as an axiom the position that there can be new dogmas in the Church. This aspiration for new dogmas partly explains the support that secular theologians provided to the name-worshippers. The expectation of the appearance of a new dogma, which would ipso facto 591 confirm its existence, their doctrine of dogmatic development, was so intense that they were not able to notice its conspicuous absurdity, but, as if in a hallucination, they saw in it only, in Bulgakov’s words, “sprouts of a new life,” “the subsoil movement of water in Orthodoxy.” But Orthodoxy does not know any new dogmas at all. According to Orthodox teaching, absolute, divine, unchangeable truth was announced to the Church by revelation, returned by the Holy Spirit in all its fullness even by the apostles, according to the promise of the Savior: “He will teach you everything and remember everything to you” (John 14:26), “guide you into all truth” (John 16:13), and the apostles “to the Church, as if into a rich treasury.” reported in full everything that relates to the truth” 592. From the very foundation of the Church, it contained the same dogmas and in the same quantity as now, and the Church has never established and does not establish any new dogmas, but only preserves unchanged all the dogmas that were originally devoted to it. But this storage is not only the storage of known formulas in immutability. No, this is, first of all, the constant storage in the church consciousness of known ideas about God and salvation, introduced and strengthened by the action of the Holy Spirit in the heart of man and the gracious influence of the sacraments of the church - a kind of initial vision of God, an anticipation of the state when members of the Church will see God face to face. The truths professed by the Church are expressed in well-known verbal formulas, but verbal formulas in themselves do not constitute dogma, but only its expression, a symbol. Since the word can only partially express the dogma that is invariably stored in the church consciousness, dogmatic formulas can be changed, improved, and some of them, as the most accurate expression of dogmas, are made mandatory at the Ecumenical Councils for all members of the Church, but the adoption of these formulas by the Ecumenical Councils is not the establishment of new dogmas, as Mr. Bulgakov and our other “modernists” imagine. And before the Ecumenical Councils, when there were no such generally binding formulas, the Church had the same dogmas and therefore condemned as heretics all those who considered their teaching correct, deviating from the teaching preserved in the Church by the grace of the Holy Spirit. And the Ecumenical Councils, “followed by the divine father,” as they declared, did not establish new dogmas, but only formulated what the whole Church believed from the very beginning, and it was not the formula that gave birth to the dogma, but the dogma to the formula. Therefore, as before the Ecumenical Councils, so at the Ecumenical Councils the Church condemned those who taught incorrectly even before the exact wording was established. For example, at the V Ecumenical Council of 593, Theodore of Mopsuestia was anathematized for his incorrect teaching about the Person of Jesus Christ, although the exact formula of this teaching was established for the first time at the III Ecumenical Council of 594 four years after the death of Theodore († 426). Here the name worshipers themselves denounce their defenders. “Anyone who sins against the dogma of St. is considered a heretic. Churches, we read in their “Response to the Letters of the Holy Ecumenical Patriarchs,” “therefore, the name fighters, as those who reject the dogma of the veneration of the name of God by God and the worship of it, are heretics. But it may be objected to us that the doctrine of the name of God does not yet have a precisely established formulation (definition) on the part of the Holy Church, therefore, it cannot be considered a dogma; This means that those who sin against him cannot be considered heretics. To this we will answer that such an objection cannot be valid, since dogmas, i.e., the revealed teaching about God, were not invented by people, but are eternal truths that have existed since the beginning of Christianity, and some from eternity, and are not subject to expulsion, like rituals, rules, etc. Therefore, those who err in understanding and presenting them, hateful because these dogmas are formulated (defined) by St. Church or not, they are truly heretics. This is how St. looked at this matter. fathers, calling heretics those who sin against any dogma before its exact formulation at the Council” 595. Thus, Mr. Bulatovich’s clients themselves recognize his point of view as false, and Mr. Bulgakov’s words “not knowing your own” are best applied to him himself. Moreover, the name worshipers themselves refer to a church decree that is very unfavorable for the position taken by their defenders. “We consider it not superfluous to indicate an anathema,” they write, “against those who, out of kindness and human-pleasing, communicate with heretics: “Whoever defends someone committed to heresy... is anathema to him” (Nikolsky K. Anathema in the 1st week of Great Lent. 1879. P. 19)” 596. The theory of the development of dogmas, which your neo-Christians adhere to, is an excellent refuge for all existing heresies and fertile soil for the generation of new ones, and the supporters of this theory are always heretics, either de facto or in spe 597. This theory, of course, is not new. For example, the forerunner of today’s name-worshipers, Eunomius, adhered to it, for which St. Gregory of Nyssa 598, insisting on the immutability of not only the content, but also the letter of the dogmas, since they were established by the Church 599. For V.S. Solovyov, this theory was needed only as a means to justify the newly invented dogmas of the Catholic Church. Why Mr. Bulgakov and our other neo-Christians like the developed theory of dogma so much, he himself perfectly explained this in his confession, published under the title “Heroism and Asceticism” in “Vekhi”. “At the present time,” Mr. Bulgakov confesses, “one can also observe the intelligentsia’s counterfeiting of Christianity, especially characteristic of our era, the assimilation of Christian words and ideas while preserving the entire spiritual appearance of intellectual heroism. Each of us, Christian intellectuals, deeply finds this spiritual fold in ourselves. The easiest way for intelligent heroism, dressed in Christian clothing and sincerely accepting its intellectual experiences and habitual heroic pathos as Christian righteous anger, is to manifest itself in church revolutionism, in opposition to its new holiness, new religious consciousness of the untruths of the “historical Church.” Such a Christian intellectual, sometimes unable to truly satisfy the average requirements of a member of the “historical Church,” most easily feels like Martin Luther or, even more, a prophetic bearer of a new religious consciousness called not only to renew church life, but also to create new forms, almost a new religion” 600. And so, we continue Bulgakov’s speech, the developed theory of dogmas most of all corresponds to the spiritual structure of such mummered Christians, and new dogmas are as necessary for those who adhere to this theory as rain on dry earth; and Bulatovich’s absurd teaching found protection among them because it made it possible to talk about that “necessary dogma that does not yet exist” 601 and which not only Bulatovich, but also the mummered Moscow neo-Christians so wanted to create. According to the teachings of the Orthodox Church, no new dogmas have ever appeared in the Church and cannot appear, and if a well-known teaching presents itself as a new dogma, then ipso it is a heresy. Even the Ecumenical Councils never spoke about new dogmas, and saw their task only as accurately expressing the apostolic faith, “the fatherly faith, the universal faith” and, by the power of ancient tradition, to strike new and hitherto unheard of teachings in the Church.”602 Moreover, a private person or circle does not have the right to talk about any new dogma. The very thought of a new dogma already testifies to the criminal pride of the spirit, which places itself above church teaching and therefore separates itself from it. This is the origin of all heresies, such, in particular, is the origin of the heresies of Hilarion and Bulatovich. Every heresy is a break with those experiences by which the whole Church lives. Bulgakov's reference to the formula “in necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas” is a reference to the Protestant formula falsely attributed by some illiterate theologians to St. fathers. No less unfortunate is the reference to the words of the Apostle Paul: “It is fitting for heresies to exist.” This is not talking about dogmatic disagreements at all, but about disorder during meals in the Corinthian community. “Under the name of heresies, writes the most authoritative interpreter of the Holy Scriptures, St. John Chrysostom, he does not mean errors regarding dogmas, but these very discords... That the apostle really calls heresies the disturbances at meals and the disagreements and discord that occurred during this, he clearly expresses this in the following words. Namely, having said: I hear the strife that exists among you, he did not stop there, but, wanting to explain how he understands the strife, he further says: each one precedes his supper (v. 21), and also: for you do not have food in the houses to eat and drink? Or are you neglectful of the Church of God” (v. 22)? It is obvious that he is talking about these riots; and whoever calls them strife, do not be surprised; he wanted, as I said, to have a stronger effect on them with this expression. If he had understood dogmatic strife, he would not have spoken to him so briefly. When he speaks about them, listen to the power with which he both protects and denounces; He protects when he says: if an angel gives you more blessings than he eats, let him be accursed (Gal. 1:8, 9); he denounces when he says: He who is justified by the law has fallen away from grace (Gal. 5:4); and he calls troublemakers either dogs: watch out, he says, from dogs (Phil. 3:2), or those who are seared in conscience and servants of the devil (1 Tim. 4:2) 603. Blessed Theophylact of Bulgaria 604 understands this passage in the same way. And these words of St. Fathers can serve as the best objection to Bulgakov’s assertion that the Apostle Paul was “condescending” towards heresies if they were not of an irreconcilable nature and that the movement of name worshipers “is essentially a joyful event in the life of the Church.” It is completely in vain that Mr. Bulgakov also refers to the district message of the Eastern Patriarchs on May 6, 1848, which only says that “the guardian of piety for us is the very body of the Church,” that is, the people itself, but this church body does not at all acquire the right to accept new dogmas, as Bulgakov does. But if not only the Patriarch and the Holy Synod did not establish new dogmas, but new dogmas are generally not conceivable in the Orthodox Church, then what does Mr. Bulgakov see as an abuse of power in the matter of the name-worshipers? The fact is that false teaching was condemned without a Council. He accuses both Patriarch Herman and the Russian Holy Synod of neglecting conciliar principles. According to Bulgakov, “the patriarch’s modus operandi in the Athos case, where he directly states that after the synodal consideration, “we unanimously condemned the above-mentioned new teaching and declare in the Holy Spirit this teaching as blasphemous and heretical,” does not agree with the definition of the mentioned message of 1848, and “the patriarch in this document terminologically, outwardly portrays himself as infallible Dad." But one has only to read the message in Greek, and all accusations will disappear like smoke. After all, σύνοδος means Council, and the words “after synodal consideration,” if you replace the Greek word with Russian, should be translated “after synodal consideration.” The Synod of Constantinople is the Council of Hierarchs, only not temporary, but permanent (σύνοδο ἐνδυμοδσα), and does the Council really acquire power only from the fact that it meets periodically? The expression “in the Holy Spirit” is quite appropriate, for both the entire Church and each individual member of it maintains fidelity to Orthodox teaching through the action of the Holy Spirit in it. The falsehood of the Catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope lies mainly in the fact that the Pope is declared infallible non ex consensu ecclesiae 605, while the Patriarch refers to the unanimous condemnation of the Council, and therefore does not at all portray an “infallible pope,” as Mr. Bulgakov writes. Only a person who has not read the Acts of the Ecumenical Councils can write that the patriarch’s denial of the possibility of new dogmas is also a new dogma. The Holy Synod reproaches Bulgakov for claiming to expound “Orthodox wisdom about the names of God.” But not only the Synod, but also every Orthodox layman can expound such wisdom. Apparently, Mr. Bulgakov is dissatisfied mainly with the fact that the Holy Synod managed in this case without the assistance of the laity. According to his theory, the teaching Church does not exist in Orthodoxy and “the whole Church teaches, otherwise the whole Church in its entirety; The Church does not recognize the teaching Church in any other sense,” and therefore, in this case, the hierarchy allowed the usurpation of the power that belonged to it together with the laity. But it is impossible to agree with this theory, although Bulgakov refers to Khomyakov’s recognized (by whom?) authority in this matter. If the whole Church teaches, then the question is: who does she teach? Obviously teaching someone outside the Church. But if so, then speeches about the universal teaching of Christians have the same meaning as speeches about the universal priesthood of Christians. All Christians are priests for non-Christians (just as in the Old Testament the Jews were a priesthood for pagans), and because of their priestly dignity, they are also teachers and even performers of the sacraments, or rather the only sacrament available to non-Christians - baptism. But just as in addition to the universal priesthood within the believers within the Church there is a hierarchical priesthood, so in addition to the universal magisterium, in the Church there is a magisterium that belongs exclusively to the hierarchy. The right of such teaching is as inextricably linked with hierarchical dignity as the right to administer sacred rites, and the denial of such a connection is, in essence, an attempt to replace the Orthodox teaching on the priesthood with Protestant teaching. When it is said that “we have the entire body of the Church, that is, the entire Christian people, as the guardian of piety,” what is meant here is only private teaching, and not official, or rather, the confession of faith, which is the duty of all believers, but not the formulation of dogmas, which, according to the clearly expressed teaching of the Church, is the work of bishops alone. “Let there be a Council of Bishops twice a year, says the 37th Apostolic Canon, and let them reason with each other about the dogmas of piety and let them resolve church disagreements that happen” (cf. Chalcis. 19) 606. “It is not proper for a layman to pronounce a word or teach before the people, and thus take upon himself the dignity of a teacher,” commands the 64th rule of the Trullo Council, 607 but to obey the order handed down by the Lord, to open the ear of those who have received the grace of the teacher’s word, and to learn from them the divine. For in the one Church God created different members, according to the word of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:27), which, explaining Gregory the Theologian 608, clearly shows the order that is in them, saying: this, brothers, let us honor this order: let this be the ear, and that the tongue; And after a few words he further says: let the student be obedient, the one who distributes, let him distribute with joy, the one who serves, let him serve with zeal. May we not all be apostles, nor all prophets, nor all interpreters, even if this is the closest thing. And after some words he also says: what do you do for yourself as a shepherd, being a sheep; Why do you become the head when you are the foot? almost attempted to become a military leader, having been placed in the ranks of the warriors 609. “Dogmas are the work of bishops, since we have the mind of Christ,” the words of St. were read at the VII Ecumenical Council of 610. Grigory Dvoeslov 611. St. teaches the same. John of Damascus 612. True, the teaching of the hierarchy should not occur in disunity from the laity, and therefore the cooperation of the laity, which took place at the Councils, is permissible and even desirable, but it is desirable because disunity is not characteristic of the Church at all and the Holy Spirit is given to the hierarchy, united by the union of faith and love with the flock and protects the infallibility of the teaching of the former, and not at all because the consensus laborum 613 is some kind of higher authority of the Ecumenical Councils themselves. But if so, it means that both the Patriarch and the Synod acted quite correctly in condemning the newly invented teaching and expressing the Orthodox teaching about the names of God. Both in Constantinople and St. Petersburg, this issue was considered by the Council of Bishops, and the decision was also issued on their behalf. This order has always existed in both churches, and until recently the Holy Synod condemned the Johannite sect in exactly the same order, 614, and for some reason the publishers of the Religious and Philosophical Library did not then find it necessary to protest. “Why weren’t the theological academies, prominent representatives of the Orthodox pastorate and laity surveyed, and in general why was the outer decorum of conciliarity not observed,” writes Fr. Bulgakov, “there can be no satisfactory answer to this.” But where did Mr. Bulgakov get the idea that the decorum of conciliarity consists in questioning the laity? Let him indicate where, in what church decrees such decorum is prescribed and before which Council it was carried out. Nothing of the kind is prescribed anywhere and has never been practiced, and if the church authorities did so, and turned to the laity with bewilderment as to how a well-known dogmatic question should be resolved, then this would be tantamount to a renunciation of its right and duty of teaching. However, in this case, the church authorities did not show any desire to separate themselves from the laity. The opinion (but not the decision) of representatives of theological science was sought where there was a need and opportunity to do this, that is, in the Church of Constantinople, in which this question arose and which had more time to consider it. The Russian Church did not intend to resolve the issue on its merits, since reconsidering an issue already resolved by another Church in the Russian Church would be tantamount to appropriating the right to judge it. In the Holy Synod, the issue was considered not so much on its merits, but from its practical side, from the point of view of those practical measures that needed to be taken in order to assist the Church of Constantinople in its fight against false teaching. And in such a question, a survey of representatives of theological science was hardly necessary. And most importantly, there was absolutely no time for him. For the Russian Holy Synod, the question arose unexpectedly and, moreover, immediately in the most acute form, requiring the immediate adoption of practical measures to pacify the unrest, which threatened every minute to turn into a bloody battle. Mr. Bulgakov himself knows this very well. “Back in the spring,” he writes, “I heard from a prominent representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the opinion that the inaction of the authorities on Mount Athos, unfortunately, is impossible and that sooner or later they will have to give the final advantage to one or another party.” But telegrams and letters from Athos and from name-worshipers, and from Orthodox Christians, and from government officials all agreed that one side or the other should be given an advantage immediately, and not “sooner or later.” And then, and most importantly, Mr. Bulgakov contradicts himself, without noticing it, when, on the one hand, he demands a survey of prominent representatives of the Orthodox pastorate and the laity (out of modesty, he does not add the publishers of the Religious and Philosophical Library), and on the other hand, he constantly repeats that this question is so extraordinarily difficult that even in “church circles he does not find not only unanimity, but even understanding (!) - that the majority are caught by this the question by surprise,” etc. If, after the publication of the Synodal Message, the question still could not be understood, then why bother asking people who did not even understand the question? Is it really in order to listen to the statement of “neutrality” that Mr. Bulgakov is now making. But perhaps Mr. Bulgakov will say that there were those who understood. But if so, then who stopped them from enlightening others and publishing their opinions? In fact, apart from the publication of Bulatovich’s absurd book with an equally absurd preface and brochures in which, under the neutral flag of “Materials,” smuggling of heretical teachings were smuggled, which only intensified the unrest, prominent representatives of the laity did nothing, and the majority, like Pilate, only washed their hands. It is not without reason that the publishers of the Apology themselves call the silence of theological journals about the teachings of the name-worshippers “shameful.” Mr. Bulgakov gives the hierarchy the right “in the order of church administration to condemn only such opinions that contain a direct or indirect denial of already recognized dogmas and in this sense are clearly heretical. In new questions, posed for the first time in church-historical development, until the onset of dogmatic maturity for one or another teaching, there remains freedom for theological search.” Among such new questions, in his opinion, is the question of the names of God, a question that does not find not only unanimity, but also understanding. In fact, it is not the question that is new, but the knowledge of some people who, in the simplicity of their souls, imagine themselves to be theologians, is too new, too recent and shallow. But you can’t blame the mirror if the facial features are not entirely correct, and you can’t consider a question new just because the person who took it up knows too little in this area. In fact, for any person who has received a complete and systematic theological education, the falsity of the teachings of the name-worshipers is so obvious 615 that it somehow seems strange to refute it. As explained in detail in our article “The Teaching of St. Gregory of Nyssa on the names of God and the name-worshipers,” the question of the nature of the names of God and man’s relationship to them was discussed in detail in the fourth century during the struggle of the Church with the false teaching of Eunomius 616, similar to name-worship, and in the eighth century a precise positive formula was developed and approved by the entire Church about the veneration of all images (εἰϰών) of God, which include names God's 617. The radical discrepancy between name-worship even with the recognized, in Mr. Bulgakov’s terminology, dogmas is obvious, and therefore, even from his point of view, the hierarchy had the right to condemn this teaching. Blaming the hierarchy for what it did not do, for neglecting the external decorum of conciliarity, Mr. Bulgakov condemns even more severely both the patriarch and the Russian Holy Synod for what they did. Patriarch Mr. Bulgakov reproaches for simplified proceedings, for the fact that he declared the new teaching “blasphemous slander and heresy” based on the report of the Khalkin theologians, who themselves admit that due to lack of time and ignorance of the Russian language; they could not familiarize themselves with the “Apology” of Fr. A. Bulatovich and based their judgment on “other” (?) Russian and Greek manuscripts, “either in the form of confessions or also in the form of instructions and teachings.” “On the basis of such dark sources and with such haste such a decisive verdict was pronounced!” - exclaims Mr. Bulgakov. It is completely in vain that Mr. Bulgakov puts a question mark after the word “others” and calls others - these manuscripts “dark sources.” The name-worshipers, in addition to the Apology, had dozens of works and works that even more accurately expressed their teaching than the Apology, in the compilation of which the participation of “highly enlightened Russian theologians” had a significant influence. The confessions to which the report refers are a kind of symbolic books of the sect, for they were read and adopted at their “councils.” And in addition to confessions, Khalkin theologians even had at their disposal books in Greek compiled by name-worshippers. This is, for example, the brochure compiled by Bulatovich “Ἡ δόξα τοῦ Θεού εἵναι Ἰησούς” 618. It is true that the Khalkin theologians had to hurry, but it is not they who are to blame for this, but those who threw Orthodox monks out of the windows of St. Andrew’s monastery. We must not forget that the issue of name worshipers was considered in Constantinople three times: the first time by the late patriarch, the second time by the Khalkin school and the third time by the synod, among the members of which were persons who knew the Russian language and had read Bulatovich’s “Apology”. Another rather nasty hint from Bulgakov addressed to the patriarch is also completely unfair. He writes that the patriarch spoke out against the name worshipers “with very suspicious speed and ease.” Apparently, this hint was inspired by the assurances of the name-worshipers that the patriarch was bribed. In Odessa, a comic incident occurred regarding such an accusation of the patriarch by name-worshipers. Name worshipers spread a rumor that the patriarch was bribed by Panteleimon's abbot, sending him seven pounds of caviar, as it appears in the books of the Odessa courtyard. We looked at the books. It turned out that the courtyard sent 3 pounds of caviar for the patriarch’s name day and, moreover, was stingy and bought two rubles worth of stale caviar, so they had to send another three pounds. On similar grounds rests the vile slander of heretics against the High Hierarch of the universal Church. If Mr. Bulgakov wants to say that the patriarch in the matter of the name-worshipers was guided not by justice, but by national Greek interests, then this is also not true, for neither the patriarch nor any of the Greeks took any part in the compilation of the heretical writings of the name-worshipers, but on the contrary, the patriarch at first only took measures against their dissemination and reading on Athos (letter of Joachim III), and it is not the fault of the Greeks if the Russian monks did not heed his admonition and his successor had to raise the issue of eviction of wrong-minded people from Athos, since non-Orthodox people are not allowed to live here and all efforts, for example, by Catholic monks to found their monastery on Athos were unsuccessful. The Russian Holy Synod condemns Mr. Bulgakov even more severely. The old yeast has obviously fermented in him, and he throws thunder and lightning against the church authorities with the same passion with which he once threw them against the “hated government.” He accuses, first of all, the Holy Synod of a policy of gagging. “The church authorities,” he writes, “instead of helping to clarify the issue, in this case, resorted to their favorite method of clamping their mouths and actually removed the issue from the discussion of spiritual journals.” It is difficult to say on what Mr. Bulgakov bases this accusation. We can assure readers that no, absolutely no such order was made by the church authorities. There was only a rumor that the rector of one of the theological academies, on his own initiative, after the publication of the message of the Holy Synod, suggested to the editors of the academic journal not to publish articles on this issue. But to speak on the basis of this fact about the gagging of church authorities means deliberately deceiving readers. After all, from the beginning of the Athos disputes, more than one year had passed before this order, and even after it, no one stopped those who wanted to discuss the issue as much as they wanted in any other academic or private spiritual journal, or in separate brochures, and even if nothing appeared in academic journals, except for rather stupid antics against the church authorities, inspired by secular newspapers 619 *, then the church authorities had nothing to do with it. In this case, those who complain about “clamping their mouths” resort to a well-known technique: a person has nothing to say, but words are expected from him, and he begins to complain that he is not allowed to speak. If academic journals freely published antics against the church authorities, borrowed from the Russkie Vedomosti, then, of course, a serious article on the issue of the teachings of name worshipers would only be met with sympathy. We think that both Bulgakov and the publishers of materials are complaining about the non-existent “gagging of mouths” simply for reasons of a “tactical” nature. After all, so far not a single well-known Orthodox theologian has openly spoken out for the name-worshippers, and the authority of Moscow’s home-grown theologians is very small. And so, willy-nilly, they have to explain this strange circumstance with the myth of “clamping their mouths.” Mr. Bulgakov is also dissatisfied with the judgment of the Holy Synod over the new teaching; he is dissatisfied with absolutely everything here. He does not like, first of all, the choice of persons who were entrusted with drawing up the reports. Archbishop Anthony, in his opinion, is a party to this matter and therefore, it would seem, should be removed. The requirement is more than strange, because if it were fulfilled, then, perhaps, it would be necessary to “remove” all the bishops who defended Orthodoxy at the ecumenical councils. Archbishop Nikon is credited with his seminary education. Unfortunately, the one who reproaches himself does not have any academic theological degree. But the author of these lines especially gets it, and Mr. Bulgakov carefully looks for the most offensive and malicious epithets, apparently to repay “tit for tat” for my disrespectful review of the publishers of Apology 620. Mr. Troitsky qualifies here as a “hitherto unknown,” “gutta-percha,” and “portable” theologian. Remembering that, according to the fair remark of St. Gregory of Nyssa, “the attempt to insult is a disease of thinking and a misfortune of the soul in which common sense is distorted” 621, we will not follow the example of Mr. Bulgakov, and would willingly prefer to leave the question of ourselves completely aside, if not for one circumstance. Although responding to Mr. Bulgakov’s accusations means resorting to self-promotion, in this case it is necessary to do so, because Mr. Bulgakov also casts a shadow on the church authorities, which took into account the report of such a theologian. That I have not yet been known to Mr. Bulgakov - I readily believe this, but in general he does not know much in the area about which he so cavalierly judges, but that I was generally unknown as a theologian before, I cannot agree with this, for over the past eight years my articles, in addition to many other magazines under my signature, appeared in almost every issue of the organ of the Holy Synod “Church Gazette”, and “Church Gazette” Vedomosti" is received not only by all the clergy of the Russian Church, but also by other autocephalous Churches, and many of my articles have been translated into Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian and other languages, and flattering notes about my books and articles have been published in foreign magazines 622. Many major questions that have worried our and other Orthodox Churches in recent years, for example, about the second marriage of the clergy, about the means of supporting them, about the restoration of the order of deaconesses, etc., received the most complete explanation in my books. In this case, my report was taken into account simply because there was nothing else at hand, and it was impossible to wait, but I had to deal with the issue of name worshipers because this movement took place outside the borders of the Russian Church, and monitoring the course of church life abroad is my direct responsibility as a permanent employee of the Church Gazette. The accusation of gutta-percha on the part of persons playing out the comedy of the loyal opposition in the field of church life, of course, must inevitably affect anyone who does not want to participate in this comedy, and in the mouth of Mr. Bulgakov it takes on an all the more strange character because, as we will see later, it is confirmed by a very, very “gutta-percha” technique - the replacement of my words with ellipses. As for portability, of course, I don’t know whether Mr. Bulgakov ever had to perform the duty of a coolie and how competent he is in this area of ​​​​work, but I firmly remember that I never sat on Mr. Bulgakov’s back and therefore he cannot judge my portability. If he sees portability in the fact that, despite the fact that I was tied up by urgent matters, after repeated refusals, I nevertheless went on the orders of my direct superiors to Athos, then he should remember whether one of the employees of the Religious and Philosophical Library had not done the same thing a little earlier than me. Or Mr. Bulgakov adheres to the Hottentot morality: when I do it, it’s good, when others do the same, it’s bad. Mr. Bulgakov is dissatisfied not only with the speakers, but also with the reports. “We must mentally put ourselves in the position of a monk, to whom this message and the reports supposedly explaining and supplementing it must be accepted “not out of fear, but out of conscience,” and who would really try to do this.” But it is difficult to admit that Mr. Bulgakov does not understand that the reports published in the unofficial part of the Church Gazette are not binding on anyone and that no one had to accept them, and therefore it seems that he is simply being deliberately naive in order to confuse the reader. Mr. Bulgakov's indications of disagreements between reports are either too general and vague, or incorrect. In Archbishop Anthony, Mr. Bulgakov finds extreme rationalism, in Troitsky - “a veiled position approaching name-glorification”; Archbishop Nikon has “three different versions of the doctrine of the name of God,” but what this rationalism consists of and whether it is not simply a merciless exposure of an unreasonable teaching - Mr. Bulgakov does not say, just as he does not say whether the “three options” in the doctrine of the name of God by Archbishop Nikon are not simply a disclosure of different sides of this teaching. As for the “veiledness” of my position, again, Mr. Bulgakov seems to deliberately not say what exactly he sees as this veiling and thereby deprives me of the opportunity to respond to an extremely vague accusation. That I sought to present the doctrine of the name of God in a form most acceptable to name worshipers is true, but this has nothing to do with the position between two chairs that Mr. Bulgakov now finds it necessary to occupy. “Finally, even on the fundamental question of whether the name of God is divine “energy,” there turned out to be a completely irreconcilable disagreement,” Mr. Bulgakov makes the only definite accusation, “for, while in the synod message, as “Orthodox wisdom,” it is stated that the name of God is not the energy of God” (p. 285), - in the report of Mr. Troitsky, as an Orthodox teaching,” it is directly proclaimed, that “the name of God, understood in the sense of the revelation of God... is the eternal energy of God, inseparable from God” (p. 906). But here Mr. Bulgakov’s dishonesty exceeds all boundaries. He replaces our words with dots, “and, moreover, on its objective side, that is, in the sense of revealing truths to man,” and skips it because if he had cited them, it would have immediately become clear that there is no contradiction between my report and the synodal resolution and that what Mr. Bulgakov’s phrase only means that the expression “the name of God” has several meanings in biblical language, in particular, the meaning of the being of God and the action of God, but it does not at all follow from this that the name of God in the sense of the name, the name of God was the being of God or the energy of God, just as from the fact that a lip in the sense of a bay can be several tens of miles in length and serve as a harbor, it does not at all follow that this can be said about a lip in the sense of a part of the body or in sense of an administrative unit. That the name of God in the sense of naming, whether by it we mean the sounds of names or the idea expressed by sounds, is not the energy of God - this, I also say, as in the synodal message (see, for example, p. 905, etc.). That there is no complete coincidence between the reports compiled independently of each other, this, of course, was inevitable, since the individuality of the authors should have been reflected, but there is no complete coincidence between the Gospels, and meanwhile, according to the thought of John Chrysostom, the dissimilarity in particulars and complete agreement in the main thing serves as proof of the truth of their content. I hope that Mr. Bulgakov will not conclude from this that we equate reports with the Gospels. Mr. Bulgakov does not approve of the very message of the Holy Synod. “The operative part of the Synod message,” he writes, “is formulated hastily and vaguely (see decisive paragraph 1, p. 285), so that it does not fix the dogmatic idea at all. The first half of paragraph 1 is “imeslavical”: “the name of God is divine, because it is revealed to us by God” (therefore, energy); the second half limits this judgment in every possible way and says that the name of God is only a name, and not God himself and not His property,” but then how is it divine and how can it be “revealed”?” This remark by Mr. Bulgakov exposes only his infantile ignorance in the area in which he wants to act as almost an arbitrator. The word “divine” (θείος) in theological language does not at all mean only “having a divine nature or dignity,” but often means only having something to do with God, with religion. All sacred symbols are also called divine, and among the Greeks the title θείος is usually attached even to bishops. “It is revealed to us by God - therefore, energy,” concludes Mr. Bulgakov. It is not at all “therefore, energy,” but “therefore,” Mr. Bulgakov does not know that, according to Orthodox teaching, revelation is a two-way act in which grace, the energy of God, acts on the human soul acting in accordance with it, but still consciously and freely, and that therefore, from the fact that the name of God is revealed by God, it does not at all follow that it is the energy of God, and is not a manifestation of human energy, putting the act of influence in a form accessible to people at her from above. Mr. Bulgakov reaches his “fortissimo” 623 philippic when he moves on to what he calls “the pastoral pacifying expedition of Archbishop Nikon.” It is not surprising when you encounter swearing without the slightest desire to delve into the matter in the Jewish periodical press (and, according to the latest data, there is 95% of it in our country). For this press, it is highly desirable to present the actions of the church authorities in a possibly nasty and ridiculous form. But it is strange to see such childish gullibility and such a complete reluctance to learn the truth and correctly evaluate the facts on the part of persons claiming to be bearers of a new religious consciousness. Mr. Bulgakov considers it necessary to completely take the side of his supposedly offended clients. “Two warring parties emerged, each of which claimed leadership in the monastery,” he writes. Thus, it turns out that it was as if the Orthodox were only a party equal in rights with the name-worshipers. In fact, the Orthodox did not at all claim leadership in the monastery, and in the hands of the Orthodox both in the monastery and in the monastery there was legal power, since both there and here the drunken abbots were Orthodox. “The party of the “Imeslavtsev” overthrew (and, unfortunately, not without violence) the “Imeslavsky abbot” of St. Andrew’s monastery,” writes Mr. Bulgakov and adds in defense of his clients: “According to the understanding of the “Imeslavtsy,” the Athos Constitution represents the choice of abbots for the brethren.” But if Mr. Bulgakov, instead of the soft, as if casually dropped word “unfortunately, not without violence,” would have painted the true picture of this overthrow of the abbot, when a group of name-worshippers, organized by the brave Bulatovich, beat and threw dozens of Orthodox monks out of the monastery gates, and then, having locked the gates, forcibly forced the rest to sign a new confession and for several months did not let anyone out of the monastery, so that the Orthodox monks at night threw themselves out of windows or climbed down ropes and ran to their rightful abbot, forced to live on alms, then the impression would have been different. Then the point is not in the “understanding” of the name-worshippers of the Athos Constitution, but in its requirements, and according to these demands, the name-worshipers did not have any right to change the abbot in the St. Andrew’s monastery, for the monastery is not an independent unit and without the consent of the monastery does not have the right to change the abbot, in this case there was no consent of the monastery (Vatopedi) to change the abbot, and, on the contrary, the monastery itself initiated the case for recognition arbitrarily and in violation of the election procedure the illegitimate abbot appointed by the name-worshipers and the deprivation of those who chose church communion. Therefore, the Russian authorities, depriving the “new administration” of the opportunity to receive a cash register and mail, acted quite legally. “At this time (in the spring) the condemnation of the new teaching by the Holy Synod took place,” Mr. Bulgakov continues his philippic, “and it was followed by the Athos expedition of Archbishop Nikon, which began with an exhortation and ended with the “transfer of powers to civil power.” We dare to assure Mr. Bulgakov that participation in what he liked to call the “expedition” of Archbishop Nikon consisted only of exhortations and there was no “transfer of powers to civil authorities,” because Archbishop Nikon could not convey what he himself did not have. “A color of shame, indignation, grief, resentment for the Church,” exclaims Mr. Bulgakov with feigned pathos, “appears on the face at the thought of this expedition and the sad role to which the Orthodox archbishop allowed himself to play, not avoiding moral complicity in the vile massacre of the Athonite monks.” Less pathos and more reason, Mr. Bulgakov! In what way this moral complicity of the archbishop was expressed in the vile massacre of the monks, it would be necessary to say more clearly. It is also completely incomprehensible what Mr. Bulgakov “disgusting massacre of monks. Is it that the name-worshippers were taken away from Athos? But after their teaching was recognized as incorrect by both the Greek and Russian church authorities, this was inevitable. The “Constitution of the Holy Mountain” does not allow non-Orthodox people to live on it, and on April 5, the patriarch stated in a message that “it is by no means impossible for such people to remain (on Athos) and discredit your honorable place with their stain” 624 . In the same way, the highest administration of the Holy Mountain, the protate of Athos, declared to Archbishop Nikon that all those who disobey the patriarchal charters must leave the Holy Mountain. And the Russian authorities could not but agree with the legality of this demand, especially since leaving the name-worshipers on Athos meant giving them the opportunity, hiding behind the authority of the Holy Mountain and using enormous monastic funds, to carry out their plan - to flood all of Russia with leaflets directed against church authority and in defense of false teaching 625. The Orthodox Athonite monks also tearfully begged for this or that party to be taken away from Athos, saying that more than once the name-worshippers had attempted to set fire to the monastery in order to take advantage of the confusion to rob the cash register. And most importantly, the name worshipers themselves asked in writing to be taken away from Athos, since the impossibility of further life with the Orthodox was clear to them 626. Thus, the only question was whether the Russian government should take away the name-worshipers from Athos or the Greek one. It is unlikely that Mr. Bulgakov will argue that it would be more expedient to first, for some time, leave the Orthodox name-worshippers to the arbitrary rule, and then the name-worshipers themselves and Russian monasteries to the authorities of another state. But perhaps Mr. Bulgakov is outraged by the coercive measures taken in relation to the name worshipers? It should be noted that arch. Nikon, nor the author of these lines were eyewitnesses to these measures, contrary to the assurance of “Materials” 627, and therefore I cannot judge how inevitable they were. But I know that these measures were taken only in one Panteleimon monastery, and the monks left St. Andrew’s monastery without any coercive measures. The question arises, who prevented Panteleimon’s name worshipers from doing the same thing that their like-minded people did in the monastery and voluntarily boarding the ship, which they themselves asked to be sent? And in the monastery, most of the monks wanted to do the same, but they were prevented by a group of troublemakers who understood how beneficial the role of sufferers for the faith was for the success of false teaching and, in order to play this role, presented the consul with a rather prosaic demand for the division of monastic capital. I don’t feel competent in a purely police matter, what measures should have been taken by the consul, who did not have the opportunity, on the one hand, to leave the name-worshipers on Athos, and on the other hand, to divide the monastic millions for them, but I think that if tomorrow the St. John’s Monastery in St. Petersburg was captured by the St. John’s and the St. John’s, despite all the admonitions, agreed to leave the monastery only on the condition of dividing up all the monastic property, measures would eventually have to be taken against them like those applied to the name-worshipers on Athos. If Mr. Bulgakov knows another outcome, let him indicate. Whether the measures taken were a matter of inevitable necessity or not, in any case there was no “moral complicity” on the part of the archbishop in them, for no one asked about them and no one could foresee that the name-worshippers, who themselves had previously asked to be taken away from Athos, would show stubborn resistance to the civil authorities. Having forgotten that he himself had just accused only Archbishop Nikon of some kind of “moral complicity,” Mr. Bulgakov now attacks the entire church authorities. “Instead of wise tolerance and benevolence, the church authorities,” he writes, “showed a jealous lust for power, for the sake of which the emerging shoots of church life were torn out and trampled, and where? on the Holy Mountain, revered as a shrine of Orthodoxy from time immemorial!” But precisely because the Holy Mountain is a shrine of Orthodoxy, these, in the words of Mr. Bulgakov, “sprouts of church life,” but in fact quite lush flowers of arbitrariness and superstition, had to be removed from there, and the wisdom of this decision has already been witnessed by the peace that came on the Holy Mountain after the removal of these “sprouts” so dear to Mr. Bulgakov. Not content with reproaches, Mr. Bulgakov proceeds to threats. “With its actions,” he frightens, “the Synod seems to want to complete the long-standing break in the moral connection between it and the church people, and, of course, the suicidal means for it is this resettlement of Athonite “confessors” throughout the cities and villages of Russia, who have tasted the sweets of the archpastoral rod.” “Even though you have a new skin, I want to say to Mr. Bulgakov in response to this tirade, but your heart is still the same.” In fact, just replace the word “synod” with the words “Russian government” and throw out the word “church” that seems to be squeezed into the speech, and we have before us a typical excerpt from a revolutionary proclamation intimidating the government with the consequences of breaking it with the people and sending revolutionaries “to places not so distant.” How can one not remember the wonderful words of Mr. Bulgakov himself, written in a moment of spiritual enlightenment, about “intellectual maximalism, which constitutes the content of revolutionary programs and is only seasoned with Christian terminology and texts and passed off as true Christianity” 628 . Throughout the entire article, Mr. Bulgakov transfers the spirit and methods of intellectual heroism into the church sphere, which is completely inappropriate for it. According to its main idea, his article is an apology for the circle of which Mr. Bulgakov is a member, an apology for the success of which he, without hesitation, sacrifices both the interests of the Church and the interests of truth, just as political circles do not take into account the interests of the state and society. And in its general cheerful tone, in its attacks on representatives of the church authorities, in its childish claims to force others to believe in itself, without knowing what it itself believes, Mr. Bulgakov’s article is more reminiscent of the proclamations of these same circles than a serious article on a theological issue that worries many. If Mr. Bulgakov, threatening the Synod with the severance of the moral connection with the “church people”, by this church people he means people with a similar disposition, then he takes for churchism “an arbitrary gathering of uneducated people,” in the words of Basil the Great 629 (pr. 1), or in other words, circleism, which once prepared the leaders of the schism in Moscow and which never contributed to the true interests of the Church. “It is a shame to say, but it is difficult to remain silent,” we will end with an excerpt from the Acts of the VII Ecumenical Council, “those who until now should have been under guidance and who should have been taught, without blushing, appear as teachers, are not afraid and are not ashamed to take upon themselves the guidance of souls, while the duty of teaching is completely unfamiliar to them, because they do not even know where they themselves should go” 630. “The uncontrollable spreaders of this innovation could not bend their necks to church tradition, but blinded by the selection of passages that suited their thoughts and the conviction that they had comprehended the truth, they rejected the pious tradition” 631. S.N. Bulgakov. The meaning of the teachings of St. Gregory of Nyssa on names 632 The “trial” of the Athonites is approaching, and not for disciplinary offenses, but for “heresy.” The church authorities continue to take the erroneous point of view that the issue of venerating the names of God was finally resolved in the unclear and ambiguous synodal message and calmly intends to use it as a guide for judging the issue on its merits. I have already had occasion to express my conviction 633 that there is no Orthodox dogma about the meaning of honoring the name of God, and therefore the trial of “heretics” is violence against the Orthodox conscience, which does not have internal church persuasiveness. The question should be raised for free discussion on the pages of theological journals. The extent to which such independent and unbiased research is really necessary here is shown, by the way, by a new work by the patented specialist in imeslavia, Mr. Troitsky 634 . Here is the teaching about names by St. Gregory of Nyssa, and the great teacher of the Church is brought in to strengthen the synod’s position; this is done with great thoroughness, diligence and apparent persuasiveness. The teaching of St. Gregory on names, in connection with the guiding ideas of his theology and anthropology, is difficult to systematically and consistently interpret, in it one can distinguish several ideological layers, and, in the end, determine the true teaching of St. Gregory on this issue is not an easy matter. He developed his worldview not as a systematic thinker, but as a preacher, apologist and polemicist, and in the fight against a certain heretical bias he himself sometimes had to fall into one-sidedness, apparent or actual self-contradiction 635, or simply into the opposite extreme, which we generally see more than once in the history of dogmatic movements. Therefore, when using textually some of its expressions, one must exercise considerable caution 636. The doctrine of names refers to the relationship between concepts with the words expressing them and the objects of these concepts. This problem of knowledge and knowledge of God was posed in a polemic with the Arian Eunomius, in which St. Gregory continued the work of his brother St. Basil the Great. Eunomius asserted the complete cognizability of the Divine in concepts (such a concept, which gives an adequate expression of the essence of God, for him was unbornness - αγέννητος - deity). For Eunomius, there is no mystery in the Divinity, nothing fundamentally inaccessible to knowledge or beyond (transcendental) for him, and therefore the essence of religion is in knowledge, piety is the knowledge of God. Words-concepts not only express the essence of the Divine, but are also the Divinity itself - at least in this form this teaching is presented by St. Vasily V. and Gregory N. The teaching of Eunomius is metaphysical rationalism, which in the new philosophy has an analogy in the teaching of Hegel (and is only mistakenly identified with Platonism). Against this megalomania of rationalism, both Church Fathers defended the Orthodox teaching about the unknowability and generally transcendence of the very essence of God 637 (ουσία), God reveals himself to the creature in his actions or energies (it is not for nothing that the opposition of essence and energy occupies a central place in the Eutychian disputes, and, later, in the Palamite, and in modern imeslavic). Philosophical, or rather epistemological, defense of this idea is accomplished with the help of the doctrine of names, and on this occasion St. Gregory N. and sets out his thoughts on the nature of thought and words. What does the word represent? Externally, the flesh of the word is the movement of the lips, larynx, air, auditory organs, it is different in different languages ​​of different peoples, there is nothing immutable and abiding in it. However, this series of considerations, extensively developed by St. Gregory (VI, 328–329, 331, 344 ff., 365–368, 377), could be freely accepted by Eunomius, for it is clear to him that the concept of αγέννητος can be expressed in different languages, said loudly, in a whisper, or simply thought, and its inner strength will not change from this (even today’s opponents of name-glory, who persistently replace it with “name-godliness,” i.e., the deification of the given flesh of the word, its sounds). The following series of ideas regarding the word in St. Gregory already touches on its nature and challenges its objective significance, making it a human invention through human “invention” - διάνοια and completely anthropologizing it. According to this understanding, which explains the origin of the word from human needs, “pragmatically”, “names come from us” (VI, 337–338 ff.) and are significantly related to human limitations, angels no longer need the word (VI, 418–419). Metaphysical rationalism of St. Eunomius Gregory here contrasts rationalism, but of the opposite nature - anti-metaphysical or skeptical; if for the first names are adequate, equal to essences (“things in themselves” in Kant 638), then for the second they are completely separated from essences, have no connection with them; they have meaning only for human thinking. In the new philosophy, this corresponds to the “transcendentalism” of Kant and his school, with its completely unacceptable conclusion for Orthodoxy that no positive knowledge about God, no revelation of Himself (except for the moral law) can be expressed in human language. Of course, this skeptical position is characteristic of St. Gregory N. only in individual turns of his thought, and, of course, he finds important additions and changes. Namely, in a series of expressions, although not sufficiently defined, it indicates the real relationship or the connection that exists between the word and its subject; so he speaks of a certain “similarity of the human with the eternal”, “the Divine with ours” (34-35), about the “power granted to us” to find a name indicating a higher nature (V, 271), that “the name agrees with the subject” or “the nature of the thing” (VI, 373, 376). What is especially important here is that St. Gregory repeatedly speaks about the “power of invention” invested in us by God, about the “divine nature of our mind, (VI, 337–338, 420–423), which is given the general ability to invent names, i.e. the power of speech and thinking, and a person is given freedom in its development and implementation. In this case, one must especially bear in mind the high appreciation of reason that is characteristic of St. Gregory N. in his anthropology, for it is in reason, combined with freedom, that he sees the image of God in man 639). Everything that has been said convinces us that the teaching of St. Gregory N. about words cannot be characterized by his individual judgments in the spirit of transcendentalism, and therefore the very method of presentation by Mr. Trinity, which represents a purely external comparison of his individual words and expressions, without philosophical analysis and mutual verification, generally without a critical study of the entire worldview of St. Gregory N., should be considered unsatisfactory. For St. Gregory N., the word, undoubtedly, is not just a human invention; it has some positive, essential relationship to things, although it does not directly express their essence. How can we characterize this relationship more closely? This question contains the philosophical grain of the dispute between the Imeslavites and the Imeborians, and if on one side of his teaching St. Gregory is turned towards extreme anti-mobism, this Kantianism in theology, then another, and moreover, more significant one - towards his opponents 640. We see the same feature in the teaching of St. Gregory about the names of God as a means of knowledge of God. First of all, it is obvious that the essence of God, as an unknowable and unconditionally transcendental creature, cannot have a name or be expressed in words. “The Deity is known only by its activity (δια μόνης της ένεργείας)” 641. “By many names, according to different concepts, expressing one or another idea of ​​Him, we call His Divinity, extracting from His varied and varied designations some general names for the knowledge of what is sought” (VI, 322, cf. 490-491). “This formation of names is in the power of people who assign names to objects as they see fit” (VI, 323). However, this cannot at all be understood in such a way that only subjectivity and arbitrariness reign here, for St. immediately adds. Gregory: “He receives names from actions that, as we believe, concern our life” (VI, 324), in other words, the names of God, although they exist for man and arise regarding the relationship between him and God, express the “actions” of the Divine, His revelation of His will and power, they are thereby objectively justified, are in some positive relation to the Divine, although how exactly this relation must be determined, St. Grigory does not explain further. He examines individual divine names from the point of view of their content in order to show that the naming αγέννητος does not at all have the exclusive meaning attributed to it by Eunomius. We do not have judgments specifically about the name Jesus that would answer modern questions of worship; they were not the focus of attention and were of little interest to the saint. Gregory 642. However, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that in his anti-Eunomianism, trying to completely defeat the peculiar panlogism of Eunomius, St. Grigory sometimes approaches alogism or even antilogism, and becomes suspicious of words in general. This mood is reflected in a number of his judgments, for example, in the place where he tries to prove that in the story of the creation of the world, the word of God must be understood only as will (see VI, 347 ff.). “The expression: speech does not indicate the voice and speech of God, but, signifying the power inherent in the will of God, it represents intelligible teaching with greater accessibility to our senses” (VI, 356). “The command must mean the will, and the names of the created must mean the essence of the created” (VI, 358, cf. 365). “The creative principle of everything created by Divine power is the will of God” (VI, 371, cf. 378, 381 ff.). But how can this teaching be combined with the revelation about God the Word, about whom it is said: “all this happened”? Trying to deepen the gap between the Word and words and diligently emphasizing the entire temporality and conditionality of their verbal flesh, St. Gregory seems to deprive this flesh of the word of all spirit, separates external words from the internal Word and absolutely does not find any relationship between the Word and words. After all, based on these thoughts, one can come to the conclusion that in the world created by the Word of God, there is no place for the Word itself? However, an erroneous conclusion would be made by someone who, on the basis of individual deviations of thought and polemical passions, would attribute St. Gregory N. to the “Imebortsy”. The most important and practically interesting side of his teaching for us is his mystical attitude towards the names of God, the veneration of which, along with the sacraments, he considers an essential part of Orthodoxy, and he reproaches Eunomius precisely for impiety towards the names of God. Citing the words of Eunomius that “the secret of piety does not actually consist in sacred names and not in special customs and mysterious signs, but in the accuracy of dogmas” (VI, 231) and considering this opinion to be characteristic of all the main heretics (Manichaeus Nicholas, Akolufu Aetius, Arius 643, etc.), St. Gregory establishes that “the secret of piety lies precisely in the confession of the names of God, - I mean the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, while Eunomius “disregards the divine names, upon the invocation of which, by the power of divine birth, grace is given to those who approach with faith.” “Don’t you see,” exclaims St. Gregory, - what is this persecutor of the faith, causing those who trust him to deviate from Christianity? For if the confession of the sacred and venerable names of St. The Trinity is useless, and church customs are of no use, and among these customs are the seal, prayer, baptism, confession of sins, zeal for the commandments, moral advancement... then isn’t he clearly preaching to people nothing else but that they should regard the Christian Sacrament as nonsense, laugh at the venerability of the names of God, recognize church customs and all the sacraments some kind of idle talk and stupidity? Do they not turn the honoring of the names on which our faith is established into a reason for laughter?.. So, what are they if not criminals against saving dogmas, because in fact they reject faith, condemn rituals, despise the confession of names, and impute consecration by mysterious signs to nothing” (VI, 232-234). I don’t know how one can relate this categorical demand for the veneration of the names of God by St. Gregory with some biases of his epistemology and whether it is possible to do this at all, but if he is not invulnerable in philosophy, then religiously he is completely free from rationalism, putting the veneration of names on a par with the sacraments of the church, and isn’t it clear that here he is on the line of “his-glorification”, and the whole difficulty of the theological and philosophical development of this teaching, hitherto absent, is revealed. Let the reader, after all that has been said, appreciate the main thesis of Mr. Troitsky, “that the teaching of the name-worshipers is the second edition of the teaching of Eunomius” 644. If we put aside the unfortunate expressions that are understandable given the general philosophical helplessness of the “Imeslavists” and give rise to such rapprochements 645, then in essence there is no similarity between Imeslavism and Eunomianism. In particular, Eunomianism is rationalism, for it religion is knowledge, the word is an adequate expression of the very essence of God, “having glory” is a mystical movement, it comes from the idea of ​​​​the complete transcendence and unknowability of the essence of God (ουσία), the Divinity is revealed to man by His actions, “energies,” and such energy is inherent in the name of God. Consequently, the names of God have meaning not as instruments of knowledge, but as a source of the power of God inherent in them, and there is a very clear distinction between the flesh of the word (“words and sounds,” changeable, empirical in the word) and the inner word, the actual name embodied in the word. Further, the main tendency of Eunomius was the Arian denial of the divinity of the Son, the affirmation of His creatureliness, while “imeslavia,” which is nothing more than an attempt to theologically understand the effect of the “Jesus Prayer,” is characterized by the deepest and most sincere faith in the Son of God. Finally, it was characteristic of Eunomius, as we just saw in St. Gregory, a mockery of the veneration of the name of God, but the “imeslavtsy”, if they sin in this direction, is perhaps only by zeal in this veneration... However, the court is busy; an article of law is needed on the basis of which the accused can be convicted. And now the helpful expert prosecutor reports: “If the teaching of the name-worshipers coincides with the teaching of Eunomius, the condemned man and St. fathers and the entire Church at the Second Ecumenical Council 646, then one indication of such a coincidence is already a complete overthrow of the teachings of the name-worshipers” 647. S.V. Trinity. The teaching of St. Gregory of Nyssa on the names of God and “relative” worship (Response to S.N. Bulgakov) 648 In “Results of Life” (No. 12–13), regarding my book: “On the names of God and name-worshippers,” there is an article by Mr. S. Bulgakov “The meaning of the teachings of St. Gregory of Nyssa about names." Mr. Bulgakov finds that the teaching of St. Gregory in my book expounds and contrasts the teachings of the name-worshipers with “great thoroughness, diligence and apparent persuasiveness”; and then proves that in fact St. Gregory, one cannot find a refutation of the teachings of the name-worshippers. This statement of Mr. Bulgakov is completely incorrect and receives “apparent convincing” only because, on the one hand, he incorrectly judges the teaching of St. Gregory incorrectly states the essence of the teachings of the name-worshipers, and on the other hand, for some reason he completely ignores the main idea of ​​my book. First of all, Mr. Bulgakov seeks to undermine the authority of St. Gregory, pointing out that in polemics he sometimes fell into one-sidedness, apparent or real contradiction, and that therefore considerable caution must be exercised in the textual use of some of his expressions. This warning in this case is completely inappropriate, since the teachings about the names of St. Gregory does not touch upon it in individual terms, but devotes entire books to it, and moreover, this teaching is so connected, harmonious and consistent that there is no need to talk about any random slips of the tongue. In the note, Mr. Bulgakov tries to undermine the authority of St. Gregory with a reminder of his teaching on apokatastasis. “To those who defend every judgment of St. Gregory in particular and in epistemological matters,” he writes, “one would have to accept a teaching so essential for him as that of universal restoration.” But, firstly, there is no connection between the epistemology of St. Gregory and his unique eschatology do not exist, and therefore, accepting the first, you can not accept the second, and secondly, in my book I constantly compare his teaching with the teaching of other Church Fathers and come to the conclusion that in this case St. Gregory was the exponent of the teachings of the general church. Further, Mr. Bulgakov tries to find some contradiction in St. Gregory about names. But this contradiction is really only “apparent”. Mr. Bulgakov in the thought of St. Gregory that all names are created by human invention, finds Kantianism “with its completely unacceptable conclusion for Orthodoxy that no positive knowledge about God, no His revelation about Himself (except for the moral law) can be expressed in human language,” and on the other hand, finds in him expressions that contradict this, indicating a real connection between word and object. There is absolutely no contradiction here, for St. Gregory sees this real connection between objects and their names not outside of man, but in man himself, in this same creative ability in the same power of invention that created the names themselves. He does not at all suspect the truth of the “invention” like Kant, who casts suspicion on “theoretical reason,” and does not identify subjectivity with unreality, but, on the contrary, begins with the statement that the “invention” is put into our soul by Divine Providence (VI, 337), which, in his opinion, is a guarantee of the correspondence of names to objects, for the ability invested in us by the Creator of objects cannot, in its normal state, give us false ideas about them. Thus, a comparison of the teachings of St. Gregory of Nyssa about names with Kantianism is completely unsuccessful. If we look for analogies to the teaching of St. Gregory in the new philosophy, then the closest thing to him will be the epistemology of Descartes, who found in the idea of ​​the truth of God, the Creator of both the laws of thinking and the laws of being, the highest guarantee of the reliability of our knowledge. Eunomius can rather be considered a Kantian, for Eunomius was skeptical about the ability of invention and did not consider it possible to attribute to it the creation of the names of God. Mr. Bulgakov incorrectly attributes to St. Gregory that Kantian, in his opinion, idea that no Revelation of God can be expressed in human language. St. Gregory expresses only the idea that the revelation of God cannot be adequately expressed in human language, as a creation, albeit a God-given, but still limited ability of man, and the idea that all the words of Holy Scripture are only a symbol of Divine Truth not only cannot be called unacceptable for Orthodoxy, but must be recognized as the true teaching of Orthodoxy, which has never deified the words of Holy Scripture, which is found, for example, even among Lutherans. Mr. Bulgakov’s reference to the mention of St. is very unfortunate. Gregory about the “similarity of the human with the eternal”, as evidence of his teaching about the real connection between word and object. “Similarity” or homonymy refers to identity only by the name of objects that are different from each other, and the concept of similarity does not presuppose any real connection between them. The reproach made by Mr. Bulgakov that in my research only individual words and expressions of St. Gregory without philosophical analysis and mutual (?) verification, is unfair, because, we repeat, the book is not about individual words, but about the holistic, systematically presented teaching of St. Gregory, in which every thought is internally connected with another, the only way to be convinced of this is to look at the book itself, without relying on Mr. Bulgakov’s unfounded statement, which, moreover, is refuted by other reviewers of the book 649. Moving on from the presentation of the teachings of St. Gregory about names in general to his teaching about the names of God, Mr. Bulgakov says first of all that “specifically about the name Jesus we do not have judgments that would give an answer to modern questions of name-glorification,” and in a note he cites the words of St. that were clarified in our book. Gregory regarding this name, and notes that “if desired, this place can be interpreted in both senses.” All that is true here is that St. Gregory finds no reason to distinguish the name “Jesus” from a number of other names of God, and since he speaks about all the names of God and sometimes emphasizes that not a single name of God can be an exception to the general provisions that he establishes, it is clear that his judgments about the names of God also apply to the name “Jesus.” And the name worshipers themselves singled out the name “Jesus” only at the beginning, and then they began to equate and deify all other names of God with this name. But besides this, those expressions that are found in St. Gregory regarding the name “Jesus” quite clearly refute the teaching of the name worshipers. While name worshipers consider this name to be the eternal name of the Son of God, St. Gregory says that it was given to the Son of God only during the incarnation (VI, 57–58), which is why he calls this name “human” (VI, 62, 64, 65, etc.). What St. Gregory does not call the name “Jesus” “the name above every name,” as the name-worshippers claim, and what Mr. Bulgakov apparently admits is clear enough in our book. St. Gregory clearly says that here “one cannot understand any one (name) preferred among others, but that He truly is above every name” (VI, 224). In the teaching of St. Gregory of Nyssa about the names of Mr. Bulgakov finds an obvious contradiction - on the one hand, an approach to alogism or even antilogism, and on the other, a mystical attitude towards the names of God, the veneration of which he, along with the sacraments, considers an essential part of Orthodoxy. “I don’t know,” declares Mr. Bulgakov, “how one can connect this categorical demand for the veneration of the names of God among St. Gregory with some biases of his epistemology and whether this can be done at all.” It seems to me that Mr. Bulgakov simply did not finish reading my book, which he is writing about, otherwise he would never have written these lines. First of all, there is no antilogism in St. There is no Gregory, just as there is no Kantianism or skepticism. He only refuses to give the word the meaning of absolute value that Eunomius attached to it, but considers it only a tool necessary for the knowledge and interaction of created and limited beings. “The suspicious attitude of St. Gregory by the way, writes Mr. Bulgakov, is reflected in a number of his judgments, in the place where he tries to prove that in the story of the creation of the world, the word of God must be understood only as will. But how can this teaching be combined with the revelation about God the Word, about Whom it is said: “All things came to pass”? Trying to deepen the gap between the Word and words and diligently emphasizing the entire temporality and conditionality of their verbal flesh, St. Gregory seems to deprive this flesh of all spirit, separates external words from the internal Word and absolutely does not find any relationship between the Word and words. Indeed, based on these thoughts, one can come to the conclusion that there is no place in the world for the Word itself.” This peculiar criticism of the teachings of St. Gregory, which reveals that the critic himself lacks the most elementary theological knowledge, is essentially a criticism of the general church teaching, since in this place St. Gregory says only what all the Fathers of the Church say. The Son of God is one of the persons of the Holy Trinity, and the difference between Him and the other persons of the Holy Trinity is only that He is pre-eternally born of the Father. This very Son of God is called the Word in order to designate the impassibility of His birth. The similarity of the name of the Son of God with the word of man should not, according to patristic teaching, lead to temptation to draw conclusions about the similarity of the Son of God to the word of man. That abyss between words and the Word, which, according to Mr. Bulgakov, deepens only in St. Gregory, is no less deep in other saints. fathers. Excerpts related to this can be found in our book on p. 26–27 in the note. Mr. Bulgakov unfairly accuses St. Gregory, as if he deprives the flesh of the word of all spirit. Speaking about the word, St. Gregory speaks not only about sounds, but also about the thought expressed in them, and sometimes he speaks about one thought, but he does not find it possible to deify it either. But other Church Fathers also say the same thing. “So that no one considers Him (the Word) to be only a spoken or mental word,” writes, for example, Chrysostom, “for this purpose, by adding a member (“about”) and another expression (“to God”), such a thought is eliminated” (VIII, 26). It is just as impossible to deify a thought as it is to deify a person’s volitional act or feeling. “Based on these thoughts (of St. Gregory),” writes Mr. Bulgakov, “one can come to the idea that in the world created by the Word of God, there is no place for the Word itself.” How one can come to such an idea is not at all clear. It is not clear what “place” Mr. Bulgakov is talking about. If we talk about spatial things, then spatial definitions do not apply to the Word as God. If we are talking about the manifestation of the power of the Word in the world, then this power was manifested even when there were no people or words. What St. Gregory taught the veneration of the names of God, this is also stated in my book and, moreover, in even greater detail than in Mr. Bulgakov’s article (see pp. 45–46), but at the same time, the book reveals a complete absence of contradiction between this teaching of St. Gregory and his epistemology. Such a confusing contradiction for Mr. Bulgakov finds an explanation in the doctrine of “relative” worship established at the Seventh Ecumenical Council, this “Omega” of the Ecumenical Councils 650, in the prophetic (at least for a certain era) expression of its chairman 651. In this teaching, the theological thought of the Eastern Church in its highest tension found the opportunity to reconcile in a precise formula both the concentration and intensity of religious feeling that monotheism gives, and the richness of forms of cult, while the Western Church barely restrained itself from falling into the Mohammedan narrowness, and subsequently fell into it in Protestantism. According to this teaching, objects created by man can also be objects of religious veneration, if they are placed by him in a mental connection with God, since in this case these objects are symbols, images of God, and worship through them is given to God Himself... This is the meaning of the teaching of the Seventh Ecumenical Council on the veneration of icons. It is indisputable that the purpose of the works of the council was to formulate church teaching about one of the types of inanimate, man-made images of God, pictorial icons, for only the veneration of this type of images, έκιύν, or icons, was attacked. But there is no doubt that both the Council itself and the works of the holy fathers, which served as the basis for its definitions, proceeded from a broader understanding of the term έκιύν, meaning by it any image of God with colors or sounds, regardless. If we reduce the Council's reasoning to one syllogism, it will come out in this form. Big premise: All images of God are worthy of relative worship. Minor premise: Picturesque icons are images of God. Conclusion: Therefore, they are worthy of relative worship. That is why the Council repeatedly compares St. icons with the words of Holy Scripture, as worthy of equal worship, and St. John of Damascus directly writes: “The fourth type of icons are the books of the Holy Scriptures.” But if icons serve as objects of worship, as symbols, then the question of their origin recedes into the background, for the symbol itself may have nothing in common with what it means, and stand only in a conditional connection with it. And so, if we take the point of view of the Seventh Ecumenical Council, then the epistemology and mysticism of St. Gregory will be in complete harmony with each other. The names of God are worthy of relative worship, as the very first and most common of the inanimate images of God, although they, like icons, are created by human creativity and although they, like icons, are not an adequate expression of His Prototype. Just as knowledge of their human origin does not interfere with the mystical attitude towards icons, so it does not interfere with the mystical attitude towards the names of God. Thus, the key to resolving the imaginary contradiction between epistemology and the mysticism of St. Gregory lies in the definition of the Seventh Ecumenical Council, and it is completely incomprehensible to me why Mr. Bulgakov ignores this main idea of ​​my book. If he does not agree with her, he should say so and motivate his disagreement. The only explanation for such ignoring can be seen in the fact that if he brought this idea up, all the final conclusions of his article would fall like a house of cards. In contrast to my assertion that the teaching of the name-worshippers is the second edition of the teachings of Eunomius, he decides to assert that “if we discard the unfortunate expressions that are understandable given the general philosophical helplessness of the name-worshippers and give rise to such rapprochements, then in essence there is no similarity between name-worship and Eunomianism.” But I wrote not about name-glorification, but about name-worship. That the name of God must be glorified, this is also evidenced by church acts that condemned name-worship, and therefore name-glorification is a completely Orthodox teaching, which St. Gregory of Nyssa. Name-worship begins when the question is raised regarding the clarification of the reason and manner of venerating the names of God, in other words, it begins when mysticism ends and dogmatics begins. And the name-worshipers, starting with the denial of the identical meaning of the names of God with icons, are forced, willy-nilly, to see this reason in the very nature of the names of God and thus, although from the other side, still embark on the path already outlined earlier by Eunomius, and teach, like Eunomius, that all the names of God are objectively inseparably united with God, eternal, like God Himself, and, being His energy, express His essence. Mr. Bulgakov deals with our comparisons of the words of the name-worshipers themselves with the teachings of Eunomius, which personally prove this similarity, very simply, declaring these words to be a consequence of the “philosophical helplessness” of their authors. But these are not random slips of the tongue, but the very grain of their teaching. If the name-worshipers reject the comparison of the names of God with icons, then the only way to explain their venerability lies in the deification of the names, in elevating them to the level of either the energy of God, or some third nature in Jesus Christ. Mr. Bulgakov writes a lie when he declares that, according to the teachings of the name-worshipers, the energy of God is only “inherent in the name of God.” No, according to their teaching, the name of God is not characterized only by the energy of God, for this can also be said about St. the cross and about icons, and the name of God is the very energy of God. And such a deification of our word, of course, is the same rationalism as the teaching of Eunomius was. It is a pity that Mr. Bulgakov does not say directly which expressions of name worshipers he considers to be random slips of the tongue. If he had done this, then undoubtedly the name-worshipers would have begun to protest against their defender, for even their basic formula: “The Name of God is God itself,” Mr. Bulgakov would have had to consider it a slip of the tongue, since if the power of God is only inherent in the name of God, then that means that the name of God itself is not God. And if Mr. Bulgakov, instead of criticizing our work and the teaching of St. Gregory of Nyssa, completed this work, he would have been much more useful for clarifying the truth. Mr. Bulgakov, as an argument for name worshipers, puts forward the fact that they distinguish between the flesh of the word (“words, syllables and sounds”, changeable, empirical in the word) and the inner word, the actual name embodied in the word. “And clear grace will leave your sons’ thoughts,” Khomyakov’s verse comes to mind when reading this phrase. What this inner word or “name” actually is, apparently, Mr. Bulgakov himself does not clearly understand. According to the clear and correct thought of St. Gregory, every name consists of sounds (pronounced or thought) and the thought expressed in them. Therefore, there cannot be a name without sounds. A name without sounds is no longer a name, but a pure thought. And if the name-worshipers (and their defenders) did not mean to talk about sounds, they should talk about thoughts, and not use the word “name”. In fact, as it is clarified in our book, by “name” the name-worshipers actually mean a name, an “articulate word” (Apology, 177), that is, not only a thought, but also the letters expressing it, and letters and sounds are denied only in order to facilitate the apology of their teaching (see “On the Names of God,” p. 70–72). Mr. Bulgakov sees the difference between Eunomianism and name-worship in that the Eunomians denied the deity of the second Hypostasis, and the name-worshipers recognize it, but, firstly, this does not apply to the question of the names of God, and secondly, the Arian tendency is also reflected among the name-worshippers, when by the Hypostatic Word they mean the name of God, i.e., in their understanding, the energy of God, and such places in there are quite a few scriptures. Mr. Bulgakov is quite right that in the doctrine of the veneration of the names of God there is no similarity between Eunomianism and name-theology 652. But why break open doors when I am not talking about the similarities at this point at all, but pointing out the similarities between the teachings of the name-worshippers about the divine, and not relative, veneration of the name of God with the rabbinic teaching about the veneration of Memra 653. One might add that the teaching of the name worshipers has many similarities with the Mohammedan teaching about the names of God, which is genetically dependent on rabbinism. In general, everywhere outside of pure Christian teaching, the name of God can find support for itself, for in its essence it is one of those waves of Judeo-pagan superstition that has long been beating the rock of church teaching. Mr. Bulgakov’s personal antics against me (“a patented specialist,” “a helpful expert, the prosecutor reports”), I leave unanswered. Let Mr. Bulgakov’s sense of tact tell how appropriate they are in a theological dispute, but in any case they cannot compensate for the weakness of his argumentation. I will only note that my book was written at a time when there was confidence that the name-worshipers would not be tried in Russia and, therefore, it was impossible to think about reporting to the court. For the first time: Questions of life. 1905. No. 2. February. pp. 386–390. Published from this edition. Trubetskoy Evgeny Nikolaevich - see above, note. 12 to a fragment of Bulgakov’s memoirs “My Ordination”. The magazine "Problems of Life" appeared as a continuation of the magazine "New Way", which was founded as an organ of the "idealistic trend" in Russian philosophy. “New Way” was closed partly due to financial problems, partly due to different ideas of its founders - D. S. Merezhkovsky, on the one hand, and N. A. Berdyaev and S. N. Bulgakov, on the other - about the goals of this publication. “Questions of Life” was edited jointly by Berdyaev and Bulgakov. The Sanhedrin (Greek council, according to the Talmud, “bekhdin” - house of court) is the highest court of law among the Jews. Consisted of 71 members (high priest, priests, elders and teachers of the law), sat on all days except Saturdays in one of the rooms at the church and dealt with all sorts of matters, but especially closely followed religious matters. The entire Sanhedrin did not have to meet to make a decision; the quorum was 23 people. Jesus was condemned by the entire Sanhedrin (Matthew 26:59; Mark 14:55). This refers to the following fragment of the Gospel: “The chief priests and elders and the entire Sanhedrin looked for false testimony against Jesus in order to put Him to death, and did not find it; and, although many false witnesses came, they were not found. But finally two false witnesses came and said: He said: I can destroy the church of God and build it in three days. And the high priest stood up and said to Him: Why don’t you answer? What do they testify against You? Jesus was silent. And the high priest said to Him: I adjure You by the living God, tell us, Are You the Christ, the Son of God? Jesus says to him: You said; I even say to you: from now on you will see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of power and coming on the clouds of heaven. Then the high priest tore his clothes and said: He is blaspheming! What more need do we need witnesses? Behold, now you have heard His blasphemy! what do you think? They answered and said: He is guilty of death. Then they spat in His face and strangled Him; others hit Him on the cheeks and said: Prophesy to us, Christ, who hit You? (Matthew 26:59–68). The words quoted by E. Trubetskoy are not in this fragment. This refers to the following fragment of the Gospel: “Then it was the Friday before Easter, and it was six o’clock. And Pilate said to the Jews: Behold, your King! But they shouted: take him, take him, crucify him! Pilate says to them: Shall I crucify your king? The high priests answered: “We have no king except Caesar” (John 19:14-15). As a master's thesis, E. N. Trubetskoy presented the monograph “The Religious and Social Ideal of Western Christianity in the 5th Century. Part I. Worldview of St. Augustine.” The book was published in 1892 in Moscow, a debate on it took place at the beginning of 1893, and V.S. Solovyov was present. Vladimir Solovyov, mad Russian philosopher (German). For the first time: Questions of life. 1905. No. 3. March. pp. 388–414. Published from this edition. Of course, I mean here only the general ideological foundations of the worldview, which fully admit of different shades in some practical issues. In particular, in the field of topical politics between me and Prince. E. N. Trubetskoy, there is undoubtedly a difference in shades of political coloring (although not ideals). The practical side of Solovyov’s worldview was not sufficiently developed and suffered from contradictions and ambiguities. The concept of theosophy in the mouth of Solovyov has nothing in common with the meaning attached to this word in the so-called theosophical movement. He never had anything to do with the latter at all. (Cf. his notes about Blavatsky. (Blavatsky Elena Petrovna (1831–1891) - Russian writer and theosophist. Wandered throughout Europe, North Africa, Asia Minor, North and South America, India and China. In 1859 she returned to Russia and from 1860 she organized spiritualistic seances. Having left for the USA in 1873, she published articles on the subject in the American press spiritualism. Accepted American citizenship (1877). Under the influence of Indian philosophy, she founded the Theosophical Society in New York in 1878. In 1878, she left for India, where the Theosophical Society settled in 1878. In 1884, she returned to Europe, where a number of Blavatsky’s letters were made public, from which it became clear that many of her “phenomena” were a hoax. Blavatsky's main works: Isis Unveiled (1877), The Secret Doctrine (vols. 1–3, 1888–1897). This refers to German Protestant theology, which undertook a rather radical scientific and historical study of the Bible. The Tübingen school is especially famous - a direction of Protestant theology that developed at the University of Tübingen. The first period of its development occurred at the end of the 18th century. (G.K. Storr); in 1830, the so-called new Tübingen school arose, founded by F. K. Baur, which played a significant role in the analysis of the text of the Bible. Of particular importance were the works of D. Strauss and B. Bauer, which influenced J. E. Renan. Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher. Herausgegeben von Fr. Michael Schiele – Marburg. I. Reihe. 1. Heft. Die Quellen des Lebens Jesu von Professor D. Paul Wernle – Basel. Halle. 1904. Vorwort. Heinrich Weinel. Jesus im neunzehnen Jahrhundert. Tübingen; Leipzig, 1904. S. 3. This refers to the following fragment: “And when Jesus finished these words, the people marveled at His teaching, for He taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes and Pharisees” (Matthew 7:28–29; cf. Mark 1:22; Luke 4:32). We strongly emphasize this limited significance of philosophical propaedeutics, because no philosophy can teach religion, that is, a certain kind of experience and the corresponding structure of the soul, just as no theoretical aesthetics will make a person a poet and will not teach the deaf to feel the beauty of a Beethoven symphony. Religious feeling is given to us before any reflection on it, and in whom it is weak, philosophy will not warm it up. But what is directly revealed to a person in the recesses of his soul cannot and should not contradict the voice of the thinking and knowing mind; this is where the work of the philosopher begins. The Alexandrian school is a series of philosophical and literary movements in Alexandria in the 3rd century. BC e. – IV century n. e. The same term also denotes a school of theologians: the older one (2nd–3rd centuries AD) worked to harmonize Christianity with the teachings of Platonism and Stoicism (Clement of Alexandria, Origen, etc.); the younger one fought against heresies (Athanasius, Cyril, etc.). This refers to the intellectual movement to which, in addition to Bulgakov himself, such famous thinkers as P. Novgorodtsev, P. Struve, S. Frank and others belonged. Religious and Philosophical Society (Religious and Philosophical Meetings) - a philosophical movement initiated by D. Merezhkovsky and his wife Z. Gippius; The movement set as its goal the renewal of religious life and the development of new forms of combining religion and culture. N.A. Berdyaev, V.V. Rozanov, Vyach took an active part in developing the principles of the “new religious consciousness”. Ivanov and others; Religious and philosophical meetings in St. Petersburg took place in 1901–1903; in 1907 they were resumed as meetings of the Religious and Philosophical Society and continued until 1917 The activities of the journal “Questions of Philosophy and Psychology” cannot be described in general terms, because there was no unity here, but different directions met and intersected. Wed. our note about this magazine in the previous issue of Questions of Life. I take this opportunity to point out an omission I made in this note. I did not mention in it the interesting in the topic and content of the article by Prof. L. M. Lopatina (Lev Mikhailovich Lopatin (1855–1920) - Russian philosopher and psychologist. Editor of the journal "Questions of Philosophy and Psychology", Chairman of the Moscow Psychological Society (since 1899). Interpreted the doctrine of monads by G. Leibniz and R. T. Lotze in the spirit of personalism, substantiated free will.) "Scientific worldview and philosophy" (started in 1903, but not yet completed). Works of Prof. Lopatin generally represent an as yet unappreciated contribution to Russian philosophical literature. We hope that the work of this thinker will be assessed on the pages of our magazine in a special article. Comte Auguste (1798–1857) - French philosopher, one of the founders of positivism and sociology. Positivism was seen as a middle line between empiricism and mysticism; Science, according to Comte, does not know essences, but only phenomena. He put forward a theory of three stages of intellectual evolution of humanity (theological, metaphysical and positive, or scientific), which determine the development of society. Developed a classification of sciences (according to the degree of reduction of their abstractness). Major works: “A Course in Positive Philosophy” (vols. 1–6, 1830–1842), “System of Positive Politics” (vols. 1–4, 1851–1854). a sharp change in views, ideas, etc. (literally, a deadly coup is the name of an acrobatic exercise). Quietism (from the Latin quietus - calm, serene) is a religious teaching that brings the ideal of passive submission to the will of God to the requirement to be indifferent to one’s own “salvation.” Originated in the 17th century. within Catholicism, was condemned by church authorities. In a figurative sense - contemplation, inaction. Annas (merciful) - a member of the Sanhedrin who served as high priest until Caiaphas. He apparently enjoyed great influence. Participated in the trial of Jesus and later of the apostles Peter and John (Luke 3:2; John 18:13, 24; Acts 4:6). Caiaphas (suppression, depression) - high priest in the year of the suffering and death of Christ, chairman of the Sanhedrin that condemned Christ (Matthew 26:3, 57; Luke 3:2; Acts 4:6). It was precisely this understanding of Christianity that V. Rozanov sharply criticized in his famous speech “On the Sweetest Jesus and the Bitter Fruits of the World” at one of the Religious and Philosophical Meetings in St. Petersburg on October 21, 1907 (see: Rozanov V.V. Collected Works. In Dark Religious Rays. M., 1994. pp. 417–426). It was with the sorrow of acute disappointment that we read this word from Bishop. Antonia. The beginning of his activity - social (as the rector of the Moscow Theological Academy) and literary (in the three volumes of his works there are many bright thoughts and beautiful, heartfelt pages, although even here the polemic with Solovyov already makes a heavy impression) did not at all allow us to expect from this shepherd by vocation the current darkening. But the more instructive is the metamorphosis that befell the bishop. Antonia. Philip (Kolychev Fedor Stepanovich) (1507–1569) - Russian metropolitan since 1566. He publicly opposed the oprichnina executions of Ivan IV. Deposed in 1568. Strangled by order of the Tsar. The preacher further speaks of “stubborn and cruel enemies who will begin by depriving the people of the opportunity to study the Law of God in schools, and will end by destroying holy churches and throwing out the relics of St. saints, gathering them into anatomical theaters (?!).” Even if we recognize this fantasy as corresponding to reality, then even in this case one should ask, is the current Caesaropapism not worse than open persecution against religion? When did great life manifest itself in the original Church, in the era of persecution and catacombs or after Christianity was made the state religion? See in the collection “From Marxism to Idealism”, in the article “On the Social Ideal”. Article “Carlyle and Tolstoy” in “Questions of Life”, January. Religion (lat.) was able to approve so many troubles - a quote from the book of Lucretius (c. 99 - c. 55 BC) “On the Nature of Things” (1, 102). Solovyov V.S. Collection. op. T.VI. P. 307. They should. Open speech to Christian society (German). “The Church, whether we call it Catholic or Protestant, submits to the spirit of mammon. Look at how she treats the rich and noble, and compare with this her treatment of the poor and unknown - and then tell me whether we are telling the truth. The Church submits without the slightest protest to the commands of rulers, whether they be an autonomous people or individual monarchs! With praying hands she stood behind the English government when, in the interests of Mammon, it started this shameful war in southern Africa... It is completely in the hands of secular rulers” (pp. 56–57). Christian Socialist Party (German). Mammon, mammon - among the ancient Syrians, and then in Christianity, a deity who personified wealth and earthly goods. In the apocrypha, the demonic character Mamon is one of the representatives of the “demonic force” opposing God and the angels. This image apparently arose as a result of a popular rethinking of the gospel image of mammon. For the first time: Questions of life. 1905. No. 8. August. pp. 232–238. Printed from the first edition. For the first time: Polaris. 1906. No. 13. pp. 118–127. Republished in: Bulgakov S.N. Christian socialism. Novosibirsk, 1991. pp. 60–68. Published according to the latest edition. state of the future (German). This refers to the parties of Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries. Imperial Rome was distinguished by religious tolerance; churches of various religions coexisted peacefully there. See note. 9 to the fragment “Five Years” from Bulgakov’s memoirs “Autobiographical”. I myself had to hear from the lips of representatives of the clergy, who in general sympathized with the Cadets party, the wish that its program would find a clearer solution to the ecclesiastical issue. in the future, “in hope” (lat.). See note. 31 to the fragment “Five Years”. “Christian Brotherhood of Love” is an illegal religious and political organization, which included V. F. Ern, V. P. Sventsitsky, P. A. Florensky, A. V. Elchaninov and others; existed in 1905–1907. See my article “An Urgent Task” // Questions of Life, 1905. No. IX (published as a separate brochure in Moscow. Price 15 kopecks, published by I. D. Sytin). Let me make a small explanation about this pro domo sua (about myself, in my defense (lat.; lit. “for my house”)). Despite all my sympathy for the tactics and practical program of the Cadets Party and my sincere and deep respect for many of its leaders (with whom I am associated through joint work in the “Union of Liberation”), I cannot join this party for the indicated reasons of a religious and philosophical nature, considering at the same time my duty provide her with all possible assistance in the field of purely political actions. The reader will find a more detailed presentation of this issue in the essay “Church and State”, which will appear in the soon-to-be published collection of articles by various authors “On the Eve of the Church Council” (publishing house “Religion and Freedom”) (The collection was published under the title “Questions of Religion” (M., 1906. Issue 1). For the first time: Polaris. 1906. No. 3. pp. 128–130. Republished in: Bulgakov S. N. Christian socialism. Novosibirsk, 1991. pp. 316–317. Published according to the latest edition. Struve Petr Berngardovich - see above, note. 15 to a fragment of Bulgakov’s memoirs “My Godlessness.” Frank Semyon Ludvigovich (1877–1950) – Russian religious philosopher. In 1922 he was expelled abroad. From “legal Marxism” he moved to religious philosophy, developing the doctrine of unity in the tradition of apophatic theology and Christian Platonism. He opposed socialism as an extreme form of social rationalism. Main works: “The Subject of Knowledge” (1915), “The Meaning of Life” (1926), “Spiritual Foundations of Society” (1930), “The Incomprehensible” (1939), “Reality and Man. Metaphysics of Human Existence" (published 1956). For the first time: Moscow weekly. 1906. No. 31. pp. 28–36. Published from this edition. Lurie Semyon Vladimirovich (1867–1927) – publicist, translator, employee of the magazine “Russian Thought”. Apparently, this refers to Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932), one of the leaders of German Social Democracy and the 2nd International. At the congress in Mannheim in 1906, he opposed the course of exacerbating the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and put forward the idea of ​​​​the peaceful development of capitalism into socialism. Reichstag (German: Reichstag) - in the “Holy Roman Empire” since the 12th century. - a body of class representation under the German emperor, called the Imperial Diet. In the German Empire - the constituent assembly, and then the lower house of the North German Confederation (1867–1871); in 1871–1918 – an elected body involved in legislation, budget adoption and control over the executive branch. The Bundesrat was considered the highest representative body. S. N. Bulgakov, prof. Religion and Politics // Polar Star. No. 13. For the first time: Moscow weekly. 1906. No. 30. pp. 37–39. Republished in: Bulgakov S.N. Christian socialism. Novosibirsk, 1991, pp. 317–318. Published according to the latest edition. For the first time: Russian thought. 1913. Book. II. pp. 142–149. Published upon first publication. This article contains the development of thoughts expressed in a speech at the Slavic banquet in Moscow. – Note. author. Without sharing the historical and philosophical ideas expressed in S. N. Bulgakov’s article, we willingly give them a place on the pages of “Russian Thought” as an expression of such an understanding of things that both individually and socially deserves attention. – Note. ed. Here Bulgakov joins the well-known point of view of the later Slavophiles - J. Danilevsky and K. Leontyev - about Russia’s destiny to unite the Slavic peoples for the sake of the conquest of Constantinople and the restoration of Byzantium as a pan-Slavic power. This refers to the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. The 1st Balkan War (October 9, 1912–May 30, 1913) took place between the Balkan Union (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro) and Turkey. According to the London Peace Treaty of 1913, defeated Türkiye lost all of its European possessions except Istanbul and a small part of Eastern Thrace. 2nd Balkan War (29.6–10.8.1913) – a war of Bulgaria against Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, which were joined by Romania and Türkiye. It ended with the defeat of Bulgaria, which, according to the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1913, ceded Southern Dobruja to Romania, Southern Macedonia and part of Western Thrace to Greece, and almost all of Northern Macedonia to Serbia. The Balkan Wars led to an aggravation of international contradictions, accelerating the outbreak of the 1st World War. It is interesting to observe how Sofia prof. Shishmanov tries (Russian Ed. 1913. No. 4–5) to defend himself from the cosmopolitan maximalism of Kokoshkin (Kokoshkin Fedor Fedorovich (1871–1918) - Russian lawyer, publicist, leader of the Cadet Party. Deputy of the 1st State Duma. In 1917, state controller of the Provisional Government. Killed by anarchists.) at least some right to the independent meaning of national feeling, while taking all measures to protect both themselves and their people from the “medieval worldview,” “fanaticism,” and “mysticism.” I believe that, based on political utilitarianism and cosmopolitanism, Kokoshkin’s non possumus (we cannot (Latin)) is more consistent than Shishman’s evasive nationalism, and if we cut out the national idea with a rationalist knife, then it will be clean. Jeremiah Bentham (1748–1832) - English philosopher, sociologist, lawyer. Founder of the philosophy of utilitarianism. Of course, one can point out that Muslims live in the Balkans and Christians live in Turkey, life is replete with mixtures, but it is unlikely that anyone will argue that the statehood of the Balkans becomes Muslim, and Turkey becomes Christian. Vl. Solovyov, in his youthful speech “Three Forces,” speaks about this: “In the social sphere, Islam does not know the difference between the Church, the state and society itself or zemstvo. The entire social body of Islam represents a continuous indifferent mass, during which one despot rises, uniting in himself both spiritual and secular supreme power” (Collected works, 1st ed. TL. P. 216). Padishah (Persian - ruler, lord) is the title of a monarch in some countries of the Near and Middle East, in the Ottoman Empire since the 15th century. to 1922 Egalitarianism (French egalitarisme, from egalite - equality) is the concept of universal egalitarianism as a principle of organizing social life. Adherents of egalitarianism - Jean Jacques Rousseau, Jacobins, G. Babeuf; characteristic of “barracks communism.” Egalitarianism is a vulgar perversion of the principle of social equality. Vilayet (il, il) is an administrative-territorial unit in Turkey (since 1866). Gyaur (Turkish gavur, Persian gebr, from Arabic kafir - non-believer) - among those professing Islam, mainly in the Middle Ages, the name of all non-Muslims. Libertarianism is the freedom to practice any religion. Katkov Mikhail Nikiforovich (1818–1887) – Russian publicist, publisher of the magazine “Russian Herald” (since 1856) and the newspaper “Moskovskie Vedomosti” (1850–1855, 1863–1887). In the 30s joined the circle of N.V. Stankevich. In the 50s moderate liberal, supporter of the English political system. Since the Polish Uprising of 1863–1864. one of the inspirers of counter-reforms. Hierocracy - the power of the clergy. Hartmann Eduard (1842–1906) – German philosopher, proponent of panpsychism. He considered the absolute unconscious spiritual principle – the world will – to be the basis of existence (“Philosophy of the Unconscious”). In ethics, following A. Schopenhauer, he developed the concept of pessimism. Arthur Drews (1865–1935) – German philosopher, follower of E. Hartmann. Popularizer of the so-called mythological school in religious studies. Richard Wagner (1813–1883) – German composer, conductor, music writer. Opera reformer. In opera-drama he carried out a synthesis of philosophical, poetic and musical principles. In his works this was expressed in a developed system of leitmotifs and a vocal-symphonic style of thinking. Innovator in the field of harmony and orchestration. Most musical dramas are based on mythological stories (their own librettos). Operas: “Rienzi” (1840), “The Flying Dutchman” (1841), “Tannhäuser” (1845), “Lohengrin” (1848), “Tristan and Isolde” (1859), “Die Meistersinger of Nuremberg” (1867), “Parsifal” (1882); tetralogy “The Ring of the Nibelung” - “Das Rheingold”, “Valkyrie”, “Siegfried”, “Death of the Gods” (1854–1874). Journalistic and musical-aesthetic works: “Art and Revolution”, “Artwork of the Future” (1848), “Opera and Drama” (1851), etc. "Made in Germany" (English). Hus Jan (1371–1415) – national hero of the Czech people, ideologist of the Czech Reformation. In 1402–1403, 1409–1410. Rector of Prague (Charles) University. The inspirer of the popular movement in the Czech Republic against German dominance and the Catholic Church (he condemned the trade in indulgences, demanded a return to the principles of early Christianity, equal rights of the laity with the clergy). Condemned by the Church Council in Constance and burned. In this sense, I already had to speak out on the Russian-Polish question in a French questionnaire, carried out several years ago on the initiative of G. Sienkiewicz21. However, I did not have to see it in the printed edition. Ultramontanism (from the Latin ultra montes - beyond the mountains, i.e. in Rome) is a direction (since the 15th century) in Catholicism that defends the idea of ​​​​the unlimited supreme power of the Pope, his right to interfere in the secular affairs of any state. From the 16th century active supporters of ultramontanism are the Jesuits. For the first time: Russian thought. 1913. Book. VII. pp. 104–109. Printed from the first edition. Sokolov Vasily Pavlovich (1854–?) – writer, teacher of Latin at the Saratov Theological School; studied at the Kazan Theological Academy, where he received a master's degree. He published articles in the Church-Public Bulletin, Church Bulletin, Strannik, Nedelya and other publications. Since Mr. Sokolov’s letter was written, events in the Balkans have become very complicated and extremely confused. It is unlikely that in this complication one can see confirmation of the abstract view of the Balkan-Turkish War that S. N. Bulgakov developed and before which his opponent stops with amazement. – Ed. Anomism is illegality, denial of laws. The Crusades are campaigns (1096–1270) in the Middle East (Syria, Palestine, North Africa), organized by Western European feudal lords and the Catholic Church under the banner of the struggle against the “infidels” (Muslims), the liberation of the Holy Sepulcher and the Holy Land (Palestine). The 1st Crusade (1096–1099) ended with the capture of Jerusalem from the Seljuks by the Crusaders and the formation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The 2nd (1147–1149, occasioned by the capture of Edessa by the Seljuks in 1144) and the 3rd (1189–1192, occasioned by the conquest of Jerusalem by Salah ad-din in 1187) were ineffective. The 4th Crusade (1202–1204), organized on the initiative of Pope Innocent III, was directed (mainly through the efforts of the Venetian merchants) against Byzantium, on part of whose territory, after the capture of Constantinople by the crusaders, the Latin Empire (1204–1261) was created. The last campaigns – the 5th (1217–1221), 6th (1228–1229), 7th (1248–1254), 8th (1270) – did not play a significant role. With the transfer of Acre to the Muslims (1291), the crusaders completely lost their possessions in the East. As is known, both the senior Slavophiles (A. Khomyakov and I. Kireevsky), and Vl. Soloviev, in his thoughts about the limitations of classical Western European rationalism and about the special mission of Russia, relied on the ideas of the Western (primarily German) mystical tradition, especially in the version that Schelling gave it. Many of Solovyov’s ideas, including two central ones - the idea of ​​unity and the idea of ​​God-manhood, can, without much of a stretch, be considered simply a “translation” of the corresponding ideas of Schelling from “German” to “Russian”. Apparently, this means Innocent (in the world Ivan Vasilyevich Belyaev) (1862–1913) - a spiritual writer and preacher. A graduate of the Kazan Theological Academy, Innokenty was the vicar of the dioceses of Kharkov and St. Petersburg, the bishop of Tambov, and from 1909 the exarch of Georgia. He was close to Metropolitan Anthony and was considered a supporter of reforms in the Church. Sodom and Gomorrah - in the Bible, two cities at the mouth of the Jordan River or on the western coast of the Dead Sea, whose inhabitants were mired in debauchery and for this were incinerated by fire sent from heaven. God only brought Lot and his family out of the flames. In a figurative sense - disorder, chaos, debauchery. For the first time: Russian thought. 1913. Book. VII. pp. 109–115. Printed from the first edition. And it is wrong to call war murder in the sense in which this crime is spoken of, which was already prohibited by the Mosaic Decalogue (For forty days Moses was on the top of Mount Sinai, accepting the laws and regulations that the Lord inscribed with His hand on two stone tablets - the ten commandments of the Decalogue (Ex. 33): the will to kill a certain person and the criminal intent associated with it are completely absent in the psychology of war. In the first case, murder is the goal, in the second it is only a means that must be limited in every possible way; Moreover, in war, the one who kills is also the one killed, by the very essence of the relationship. Peter Bernardone - cloth merchant, father of St. Francis of Assisi. Alexy (helper, helper) - a man of God, came from Rome from noble and wealthy parents, at whose insistence he entered into marriage, but then, leaving his bride, retired to Edessa, where for 17 years he ate alms in the church; then he returned to Rome, to the gates of his father's house. He was recognized only after his death in 411, during the reign of Onopius and Arcadius. “Let every soul be subject to the higher authorities, for there is no authority except from God; the existing authorities have been established by God. Therefore, he who resists authority resists God’s ordinance” (Rom. 13:1–2). “Do you want not to be afraid of power? Do good, and you will receive praise from her, for the ruler is God's servant, for your good. But if you do evil, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain: he is God’s servant, an avenger to punish those who do evil” (Rom. 13:3–4). In chapter 13 of the Epistle to the Romans, St. Paul, from which the words quoted in the two preceding notes are taken, speaks of the need for obedience to earthly authorities and fulfillment of the law, while Christ asserted that his Kingdom was “not of this world.” By the way, the words of the Savior you quote were spoken by Him to the apostles who tried to defend Him in the Garden of Gethsemane (See: Matthew 26:52–53 (notes 2 and 3 to the “Open Letter” of V.P. Sokolov), and their widespread interpretation does not correspond to the context and is as arbitrary as if someone for the opposite purpose began to quote the Savior’s words about “two swords”: “Sell your clothes and buy a sword” (Luke 22:35–38). Sergius of Radonezh (c. 1321–1391) - founder and abbot of the Trinity-Sergius Monastery. He actively supported the unification and national liberation policies of Prince Dmitry Donskoy, to whom he was close. He blessed the latter to fight the Tatars before the Battle of Kulikovo. Canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church. Dmitry Donskoy (1350–1389) – Grand Duke of Moscow (from 1359) and Vladimir (from 1362), son of Ivan II. Under him, in 1367, a white stone Kremlin was built in Moscow. He led the armed struggle of the Russian people against the Mongol-Tatars; led their defeat in the battle on the river. Leader (1378). In the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 (upper Don) he showed outstanding military leadership talent, for which he was nicknamed Donskoy. During the reign of Dmitry Donskoy, Moscow established its leadership position in the Russian lands. Dmitry Donskoy for the first time transferred the great reign to Vasily I without the sanction of the Golden Horde. Canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church. There is no third option! (lat.). A little book (brochure) about modern life (German). Eckhart Johann (Meister Eckhart) (c. 1260–1327) - a representative of German medieval mysticism, approaching pantheism; Dominican, preached in German. In the doctrine of the absolute, he singled out the groundless divine nothingness (“the abyss”) as the basis of God and all existence. In 1329, a papal bull declared many of Eckhart's theses to be heretical. Tauler Johann (c. 1300–1361) – German mystic, Dominican, preacher, student of I. Eckhart. Influenced the leaders of the German Reformation. Suso (Zoyse; Seuse) Heinrich (c. 1295–1366) - German mystic, Dominican, student of I. Eckhart. Suso's sermons were distinguished by poetic imagery. Boehme Jacob (1575–1624) – German pantheistic philosopher. Shoemaker by profession. Boehme's mysticism and natural philosophy are permeated with elemental and dialectical ideas. He had a great influence on German Romanticism. Ritschl Albrecht (1806–1876) – Protestant theologian. Troeltsch Ernst (1865–1923) – German theologian, philosopher, historian of religion; one of the founders of the sociology of religion. Apparently, this refers to the so-called “union of monists” - a movement founded by A. Drews for “religion without God,” for religiosity aimed at the impersonal irrational principle of existence. But, of course, it is not true in such a general form that “religious-mystical movements begin in the West.” Our current religious and philosophical movement, whatever it may be, arose completely independently of Western influences and to a certain extent forestalled similar Western movements. For the development of these thoughts, see my articles in the collection “The Religion of L. Tolstoy.” Ed. "Path". Moscow, 1911 Geometrically (Latin) is a famous expression of Spinoza. This refers to the words from the Book of the Prophet Isaiah: “And it will come to pass in that day that the remnant of Israel and those who escaped from the house of Jacob will no longer rely on the one who defeated them, but will put their trust in the Lord, the Holy One of Israel, wholeheartedly. The remnant will turn, the remnant of Jacob, to the mighty God. For even though your people, O Israel, were as many as the sand of the sea, only a remnant of them will be converted; destruction is determined by abundant righteousness; for the LORD, the Lord of hosts, will bring about a certain destruction upon all the earth” (Isa. 10:20–23). Jerusalem suffered catastrophic destruction during the suppression of an anti-Roman uprising in the Roman province of Judea (66–73). The Romans, led by Vespasian (Roman emperor from 69), after a 5-month siege, taking advantage of the internecine struggle in Judea, took and destroyed Jerusalem, including the church (70). The rebels' resistance was broken by the capture of the Masada fortress (73). Sphinx (Sphinga) - in Greek mythology, a winged half-woman, half-lion who lived on a rock near Thebes; asked passers-by an unsolvable riddle and then, receiving no answer, devoured them. The riddle of the Sphinx (“who walks on 4 legs in the morning, on two at noon, on three in the evening”) was solved by Oedipus (his answer: “Man - in childhood, maturity and old age”); after which the sphinx threw herself off the cliff. For the first time: Russian thought. 1913. Book. IX. pp. 37–46. Published on first publication basis. Rome has spoken (lat.). Roma locuta, causa finita (Rome has spoken, the matter is over), this statement meant that the papal curia had made its final decision. Thus began a special bull of Pope Innocent, who in 416 approved the decision of the Synod of Carthage to excommunicate the opponents of Blessed Augustine from the Church. catalog of books prohibited by papal authority for Catholics to read (lat.). Modernism is a direction in Catholicism of the late 19th – early 20th centuries, which sought to update Catholic teaching and “harmonize” it with modern scientific and philosophical thinking. The Anti-Modern Oath was introduced to protect the Catholic Church from attempts to change its teachings. Therefore, the Index is binding on the faithful Catholic not only as a simple prohibition, but also as a requirement to renounce a condemned opinion. On the contrary, the Index in Orthodoxy, if it existed, could only have the force of a disciplinary and pedagogical measure, but cannot receive the shade of a dogmatic decision. A. F. Losev gave a brief description of the history of the birth and official condemnation of the name-glorifying movement on Mount Athos: “...The history of name-glorification in the 20th century. briefly it looks like this: in 1907, a book by an anonymous author (as it later turned out, monk Hilarion) appeared entitled “On the Caucasus Mountains.” In this book, in addition to describing the life of hermits and zealots in the Caucasus mountains, the traditional Orthodox teaching about the Jesus Prayer and mental ascent was outlined, and it was especially emphasized that outside the name of Jesus, no salvation was possible for either a monk or a layman. The name of God is already in its essence holy and is God himself, for it is inseparable from His essence. The book contained many wonderful mystical descriptions of the nature of the Caucasus and the lifestyle of hermits who left monasteries, secluded themselves in monasteries and through the Jesus Prayer acquired mystical unity with God. The book, which was also approved by spiritual censorship, did not, in fact, awaken any response in Russian society. The only place in which she made a strong impression was Athos with its ancient Orthodox monasteries. Thus, two parties hostile to each other were formed, similar to those that we spoke about above in connection with the issue of veneration of the image and the Light of Tabor. Some, and these were mainly representatives of the administration, taught that the name of God is just an empty sound and does not stand in any relation to God himself, that it has the same beginning as all created things, and therefore its deification, they said, is pagan pantheism and magic. Others, on the contrary, defended the divine nature of the name of Jesus and argued that the energy of God resides in the name of God, inseparable from His essence, and therefore it cannot be created. The name of God is God himself. Representatives of the latter point of view were mainly monks, zealots and hermits who used to perform the Jesus Prayer and took a vow of silence. The dispute, which began on Athos with casual, insignificant conversations, continued until in 1912–1913. The name-glorification movement did not acquire a certain scope and its connections with the hesychast movement of the 14th century did not yet become clear. Hieromonk Anthony (in the world - Bulatovich) declared himself a convinced supporter of the name-glorifying teaching, who owns two fundamental books for the name-glorifying teaching, namely “Apology of faith in the name of God and in the name of Jesus” (Moscow, 1913) and “Apology of faith in the invincible, incomprehensible divine name of our Lord Jesus Christ” (Petrograd, 1917). His book “My Thought in Christ” (Petrograd, 1914) is also significant. In addition to Hilarion and Anthony, a major role in the formation of the name-glorifying teaching belongs to Archimandrite Arseny, Archimandrite David and monk Irenaeus. Adherents of name-glorification were accused of pagan pantheism (remember that the iconoclasts accused the Orthodox, in addition to idolatry, of magic, since the latter claimed that the sacrament was performed in the name of Jesus, and of bigtheism). Informed in this spirit, Patriarch Joachim III of Constantinople, in his message of September 12, 1912, condemned the book “On the Caucasus Mountains” for the fact that it “contains a lot of erroneous things leading to errors and heresies.” January 12, 1913 he persuaded the Athonite residents of the Vatopedi monastery, the brethren of the Athonite residents of the St. Andrew's monastery, where name-glorification was especially developed, to abandon the “newly appeared heresy.” On February 2, the council of all abbots of the Athos monasteries promulgated the “Prohibition to perform divine services” for supporters of the name-glorification who lived in St. Andrew’s monastery. The new Patriarch of Constantinople, Germanus V, demanded that supporters of imiaslaviya appear at trial. On March 30, 1913, in response to a request from the patriarch, the Khalkin theological school described imiaslavie as pantheism. On April 5, Herman V sent a threatening letter to Mount Athos, in which he defined onomatodoxy as a “blasphemous and heretical teaching” and threatened its supporters with all sorts of punishments. The final point in this matter was put by the Holy Synod in Petrograd. Bishop Nikon was sent to Athos, taking with him the military in order to easily use force against heresy, as a result of which more than a thousand monks - supporters of name-glorification - were forcibly removed from Athos and sent to different regions with a ban on holding services. In the message of the Holy Synod of May 18, 1913, the following three points were highlighted: "1) The name of God is holy and venerable and desirable, because it serves for us as a verbal designation of the most exalted and Holy Being of God, the Source of all good things. This name is divine, because it is revealed to us by God, speaks to us about God, lifts our mind to God, etc. In prayer (especially the Jesus prayer), the name of God and God Himself are recognized by us inseparably, as if identified, they cannot and should not even be separated and are opposed to one another, but this is only in prayer and only for our heart; in theology, as in practice, the name of God is only a name, and not God Himself and not His properties, the name of an object, and not the object itself, and therefore cannot be recognized or called God (which would be meaningless and blasphemous), nor Divinity, because it is not the energy of God. 2) The name of God, when pronounced in prayer, can create miracles, but not by itself, not as a result of some Divine power forever, as it were, contained in it, attached to it, which would act mechanically, but in such a way that the Lord, seeing our faith (Matthew 9:2) and by virtue of His false promise, sends His grace and with it performs a miracle. 3) In particular, the Holy Sacraments are performed not by the faith of the performer, not by the faith of the recipient, but also not by the utterance or image of the name of God, but by the prayer and faith of the Holy Church, on whose behalf they are performed and by virtue of the promise given to it by the Lord. This is the Orthodox faith, the paternal and apostolic faith.” This case was also completed through purely police measures. As for the doctrine itself, the Synod adopted an ambiguous decision, permeated with strong nominalism and positive sensationalism, in the old English spirit. Strictly speaking, even today the question of the name of God continues to remain completely unclear and confusing for church authorities. In 1915, Moscow Metropolitan Macarius and, independently of him, Kiev Metropolitan Flavian ordered that those expelled from Athos without repentance be again accepted into the monasteries, because their teaching was acceptable to the Orthodox. Neither the Synod nor the episcopate as a whole opposed this decision, although the teaching of the name-slavists is still considered heretical today. As soon as the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church was convened after the revolution, on September 2, 1917, a representative of the group of imyaslavtsy conveyed the demand to re-examine the entire matter, including the actions of the Synod and especially Bishop Nikon. The council kept postponing and postponing the matter until it itself, due to well-known events, was closed. The newly elected Patriarch Tikhon made a very diplomatic decision, quite kind to the name-slavers, even performing divine services with them. However, he did not openly reverse the previous conviction. Such a highly anti-church approach to the matter, when dogmatic teaching is sacrificed to church politics, could not in itself, of course, resolve the entire complexity of the issue. The Patriarch showed himself to be a rather cautious hierarch and thereby missed the opportunity to seriously raise this important and eternal question for Orthodoxy. A completely different position was taken by some representatives of the intelligentsia, who had no relationship with the church bureaucracy and showed a keen interest in the mysticism of the Orthodox East. They collected extensive patriotic, liturgical and religious-philosophical materials and presented a number of popular science articles, which, unfortunately, due to the censorship conditions of our time, cannot be published in Russia...” (Translation from German by A. G. Vashestov, edited by L. Gogotishvili and L. Takho-Godi; source: “Golden Philosophy”, link. Khomyakov Alexey Stepanovich (1804–1860) - Russian religious philosopher, writer, poet, publicist, one of the founders of Slavophilism. Khomyakov combined his orientation towards eastern patristics (the doctrine of “conciliarity”, etc.) with elements of philosophical romanticism. From a liberal position, he advocated the abolition of serfdom, the death penalty, the introduction of freedom of speech, the press, etc. The poetic tragedies “Ermak” (1832) and “Dmitry the Pretender” (1833), lyrical poems imbued with civic pathos (“Russia”, etc.). The note to this place in the Russian edition contains the original paragraphs of the district message of May 6, 1848 (This refers to the district message of the Eastern patriarchs to the Anglican Church with an explanation of the foundations of the Orthodox faith. Later it was more than once used for pedagogical purposes as a clear and accessible presentation of the foundations of the dogmatic teaching of Orthodoxy.): “§ 16. We do not have any secular supervision or, as his beatitude says, sacred management, but are only united by a union of love and zeal for a common mother, in the unity of faith, etc. § 17. With us, neither the patriarchs nor the Councils could ever introduce anything new, because the guardian of piety for us is the very body of the Church, that is, the people themselves.” Wed. With this definition, the modus operandi of the current Patriarch Herman of Constantinople in the Athos case, where he directly states that after the synodal consideration, “we unanimously condemned the said newly revealed teaching about the name “Jesus.” and we declare in the Holy Spirit (this teaching) as blasphemous and heretical. demand on behalf of us and the Church that everyone completely reject the blasphemous error, carefully avoid various alien teachings and remain faithful only in the faithful dogmas and in the taught teaching of the Church, beyond which and apart from which no one should innovate" (Materials on the dispute about the veneration of the Name of God, ed. "Religious and Philosophical Library", Moscow, 1913 g., p. 47). In this document, the Patriarch of Constantinople not only externally and terminologically portrays himself as the infallible Pope (cf. underlined places), but also, in essence, authoritarianly introduces, under the pretext of denying innovations, a completely new dogma, namely, that there cannot and should not be new dogmas in Orthodoxy. On the contrary, even for Archimandrite Nikon it is clear that the decision of the patriarch (and, consequently, the Russian Synod) cannot be considered final: “Only the Ecumenical Council or, at least, the episcopate of the entire Eastern Church would have had the power to rebel against this court and judge such power in the Church” (Material to the Honorable Name of God. Issue I. M., 1913. P. 8). Khomyakov A. S. Works. T. II. pp. 61–65. In need there is unity, in doubt there is freedom (lat.). Bukharev Alexander Matveevich (in monasticism Theodore; 1822–1871) – Russian theologian and philosopher, the forerunner of the so-called “new religious consciousness” in Russia at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th centuries. A conflict with church authorities prompted him to resign his rank in 1863. Essay – “On Orthodoxy in relation to modernity” (1860). Fedorov Nikolai Fedorovich (1828–1903) - Russian religious utopian thinker, put forward a “project” for the general resurrection of the dead (“fathers”) and overcoming death by means of modern science (“Philosophy of the Common Cause”). See: Church Gazette. May 18, 1913. No. 20. “The Jesus Prayer” and “smart work” are concepts that occupied a central place in the teachings of the hesychasts. The spiritual practices of hesychasm led to the unity of man with God through “purification of the heart” and self-concentration of consciousness. It arose in the 4th–7th centuries, and was revived at the end of the 13th–14th centuries (Gregory of Sinaite, Nil Sorsky). The main theoretician of hesychasm was Gregory Palamas. This point of view was also expressed by the editors of the Religious Philosophy Library, which published the work of the Athonite Hieroschemamonk Anthony Bulatovich, “Apology of Faith in the Name of God and in the Name of Jesus,” in the preface: “As a central question, the question of the Name of God is connected with all points of the spiritual understanding of life, with the entire circle of faith, and it is not surprising that in the disputes that have arisen, the most diverse motives appear. To solve them in the church, quite a lot of special preparatory work is required... this work not only does not exclude, but also requires new work, in a different direction, in different sections, investigating the same issues.” The adoption of this teaching at the Council of Monks in the Thebaid Skete is called in the local language the “triumph of Orthodoxy.” According to the understanding of the “Imeslavtsy”, the Athonite constitution provides the choice of abbot for the brethren. The value is insignificant; quantity that can be neglected (French) – a mathematical term by B. Pascal. “To the first to seize” (lat.; a provision from Roman law about the right of ownership belonging to the one who first occupied a place or seized a thing). Despite the unbearably smug and false tone of Archimandrite Nikon’s report on his Athos expedition, which was also marked by the usual habit of giving any independent movement a seditious character, it does indicate some features that testify to the power of the “psychology of the masses” on Athos. See: Church Gazette. August 24, 1913. Report from Archimandrite Nikon. In disputes about the name of God, the book of the Caucasian hermit Hilarion “In the Caucasus Mountains” (or about the Jesus Prayer) is often mentioned. This book contains the most fragrant pages of religious poetry from the life of the hermits of the Caucasus, alternating with the author’s ingenuous, sometimes downright seminary, reasoning and extracts from spiritual literature. It is completely unusual for the unassuming author of this remarkable book, a very old man who is currently living in the obscurity of a hermit, to act as the leader of a dogmatic movement, and he himself leaves his judgments at the stage of “theological opinion.” An even more simplified procedure was applied by the Patriarch Herman of Constantinople, who declared the new teaching “blasphemous slander and heresy” on the basis of the report of the Khalkin theologians, and the latter themselves admit that due to lack of time and ignorance of the Russian language they could not familiarize themselves with the “Apology” of Fr. A. Bulatovich and based their judgment “on other” (?) Russian and Greek manuscripts, “either in the form of confessions or also in the form of instructions and teachings” (Matthew to the name of God, 41). On the basis of such dark sources and with such haste such a decisive verdict was pronounced! I highly appreciate certain aspects of the previous spiritual and educational activity of Archimandrite Nikon, expressed in the publication of numerous leaflets and books, mainly for the people, and it is all the more regrettable to note the current course in the literary activity of the archbishop. The first half of paragraph 1 is “imeslavical”: “The Name of God is divine, because it is revealed to us by God” (therefore, energy); the second half limits this judgment in every possible way and says that “the name of God is only a name, and not God himself and not His property,” but then how is it divine and how can it be “revealed”? This is how one of its most influential members characterizes the significance of the Synod: “The Orthodox Church, dominant on paper, but in reality enslaved more than all faiths, is deprived in Russia of what the Latins, Protestants, Armenians, Mohammedans, and Lamaites have - is deprived of its legitimate head and given over to the enslavement of secular officials, hiding behind a meeting of six, seven semi-annually rotated bishops into two priests. Who does not know that such an institution is non-canonical, that it was not approved at its founding by two patriarchs? Yes, even if it had been approved by all four, it would only speak of the illegal action of the patriarchs, and not of the canonical legality of the synodal government, since no patriarchs can approve and authorize an institution unknown to Holy Orthodoxy and invented solely (sic!) for its weakening and corruption... But the highest government of the Church is a Council? Undoubtedly so, but we must not forget that our councils ceased along with the end of the patriarchate,” with which the author attributes the cause of all the disasters of the Russian Church. But who is this merciless critic of the synodal regime? This is none other than the permanent member of the Holy Synod, now dogmatizing through its mediation about the Name of God - Archbishop Anthony (see his article “Restoration of the Patriarchate” // Voice of the Church. 1912. January. pp. 163-164). For the first time in a separate publication: St. Petersburg, 1914, pp. 180–200. Printed from the first edition. Troitsky Sergei Viktorovich (1878–1972) – theologian and historian of the Church. Graduated from the St. Petersburg Theological Academy (1901). Served as an official at the Synod. He taught canon law at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, and then at Novorossiysk University (1919). Participated in the Moscow and Kiev local councils. In exile since 1920. Professor at the University of Belgrade (1920–1929, 1941–1945). He taught canon law at the St. Sergius Theological Institute in Paris (1947–1948). Legal advisor of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Doctor of Ecclesiastical Law (1961). Athanasius (the Great) of Alexandria (c. 295–373) – church leader and theologian, representative of patristics, bishop of Alexandria; in the fight against Arianism, he developed the mystical doctrine of the “consubstantiality” of God the Father and God the Son, which became a dogma at the 1st (325) and 2nd (381) Ecumenical Councils; defended the independence of the Church from imperial power. And in the second edition, which we have just received, several more similar “creations” are added here. Thebais - in the Ptolemaic era the name of Upper Egypt, the Egyptian desert where the founders of the early Christian hermitage settled. The dispute between the hesychasts led by Gregory Palamas and the Calabrian monk Barlaam (1290–1348) was the main theme of the Councils of Constantinople in the 14th century. Varlaam accused the hesychasts of heresy because they asserted the possibility of human perception of divine, uncreated light (divine energies spilled in the world); they ended with the complete victory of Palamas and the clarification of Orthodox dogma in the spirit of hesychasm (for more details, see: Veniaminov V. Brief information about the life and thoughts of St. Gregory Palamas // St. Gregory Palamas. Triads in defense of the sacredly silent. M., 1995. pp. 344–381). manner of speaking (about a non-binding statement, about empty, meaningless words) (French). Russian thought. 1912. September. pp. 37–46. See: Church of the Vedas. 1913. No. 20. P. 889: “Among the defenders of the name of Jesus, two currents have emerged quite clearly...” by virtue of the fact itself (lat.). St. Irenaeus of Lyons. Against heresies. III. 4. The V Ecumenical Council was held in Constantinople in 553, at which a number of heretical teachings were condemned (including the teaching of Origen) and concessions were made to the Monophysites on some issues. In the 6th and 7th centuries they were the cause of many unrest. The Third Ecumenical Council, held in Ephesus in 431, finally condemned Nestorianism and Pelagianism as heresies. The Nestorians are followers of the Patriarch of Constantinople Nestorius, who organized widespread persecution of the Arians. In his teaching, he denied the supernatural birth of Christ and insisted that a simple man was born from Mary, in whom the Holy Spirit later settled and dwelt in him as in a church. “actually, in reality” or “in the future” (lat.). Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335 - c. 394) - church writer, theologian and Platonist philosopher; Bishop of Nisa (Asia Minor); brother of Basil the Great. Developed the theoretical foundations of Christian exegesis; in anthropology, he proceeded from the organic unity of humanity as a kind of collective personality. Prot. Evn. Book I. Mg. 45, 272 A; 293 A; 300 A-B; Book 2. Mg. 458 B. Apology. From the editor. XII. Acts of the All Sob. 2nd ed. T.I.S. 235. Discourse 27 on the First Epistle to Corinth. Mg., 61, 226; P and X, 268–269. not from the point of view of church unity (lat.). Σ. II, 50–52, cf. 256–267. The VI Ecumenical Council opened in Constantinople in 680–681, and its continuation took place 10 years later (in 690–691): since most of the meetings took place in the large “domed” hall of Trulla inside the royal palace, this Council is called “Trullo Council.” Gregory of Nazianzus (Gregory the Theologian) (c. 330 - c. 390) - Greek poet and prose writer, church leader and thinker, representative of patristics; Bishop of Nazianza (Asia Minor). He transferred the methods of Platonic dialectics to theology. Autobiographical poems “About my life”, “About my destiny” and “About the suffering of my soul”. The VII Ecumenical Council took place in Nicaea in 787 (the last meeting of the council was held in Constantinople in the presence of the Byzantine emperor) and was dedicated to the assessment of iconoclasm. The result of the Council was the restoration of icon veneration and the recognition of iconoclasm as heresy. Gregory I the Great (Gregorius Magnus), in the Orthodox tradition Gregory Dvoeslov (c. 540–604) - Pope since 590. Contributed to the establishment of the church state (“Patrimony of Peter”) and the strengthening of the ecclesiastical and temporal power of the papacy, was the initiator of the Christian mission in Britain, carried out the reform of liturgy and church singing (Gregorian chant). His “Moral Interpretations on the Book of Job” (35 books) became the main authority in the field of religious ethics for medieval thought. About icons, lyrics. I, conclusion; Mg. 94, 1281; R. p. 40; Sl. 2, ch. 12 and 16 and conclusion. Mg. 94, 1297, 1303, 1315; R. p. 53, 57, 83. John of Damascus (c. 675 - c. 749) - Byzantine theologian, philosopher and poet, completer and systematizer of Greek patristics; leading ideological opponent of iconoclasm; author of the philosophical and theological compendium “Source of Knowledge”. agreement (unanimity) of the laity (lat.). See: Tserkovn Ved. 1912. No. 24. The Ioannites are a sect of admirers of Archpriest John of Kronstadt (in the world Ioann Ilyich Sergiev; 1829–1908), rector of St. Andrew’s Cathedral in Kronstadt. In the 1890s. John gained fame among the common people as a man of prayer and a miracle worker. Huge sums of money donated to charity and a large number of pilgrims flocked to him. It was on this wave that the sect of St. John and St. John arose, preaching that Jesus Christ was incarnate in Father John. Sometimes they even tried to bite him in order to “partake” of his blood. John of Kronstadt himself did not recognize this hobby as legitimate. But what about the letter from the emeritus professor? Re-read it and you will see that it was all written in a tone of defense of the book, the absurdity of which the writer was aware of, but which, for extraneous reasons, he still wanted to praise. Moreover, according to rumors, this letter was published against the will of the author, who, of course, did not think that his condescending and obsequious compliments would end up in print. Eunomius (d. c. 395) was an unorthodox Christian theologian, a representative of extreme Arianism, who had numerous followers. Gregory of Nyssa’s essay “Against Eunomius” is devoted to refuting his ideas. This refers to the decisions of the VII Ecumenical Council in Nicaea in 787. “The glory of God is Jesus” (Greek). See, for example: Church Herald. 1913. No. 39. P. 1214: “Lessons of the Athos movement.” See the article “The Fight against the Athonite Troubles” (Church of Vedas. 1913. No. 36) and above, p. 177. Against Evn. Book 12. Mg. 45, 1117; R. p. VI, 507. For example, our master's thesis: “Second marriages of clergy” was translated into Serbian in the best Serbian magazine “Theological Glasnik”. See also the journals "Bessarione" (1910. ütt-dic., 74–78; 1912. ütt-dic.); Bulgarian “Tserkoven Vestnik” (1910. No. 80. pp. 376–376; no. 31–32. pp. 392–398; no. 33. pp. 408–409); Echos d'Orient. 1910. Septembre. 290–295; Serbian “Christian Vesnik” (1910. 587 pages); “Theological Glasnik” (1907. 12. 249 ff.; 1909. 2. 136–143; 1908. 14, 109 ff.); “Glasnik Orthodoxy Tsrkve” (1913. 259 ff.); “Pragled” (1907. No. 2); Slavorum Litterae Theologice (Annus III. 55; IV. 220; V. 60–63; 87. 161); Revue d'Histoire ecclesiastique. 15 Iullet. 1912. R. 613; Rivista di Apologia Cristiana. A 1913. Fasc. XLIX. Vol. IX. P. 1–15 and many more. etc. very loud, stormy (Italian; a term denoting the nature of the performance of a musical work). See the lithographed notebook of the name-worshipers - “Conversation between a novice and an elder.” “We ask the commission to take us all together and we, for the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, will submit with complete obedience to the Russian government,” they wrote in their statement signed by 66 prominent name worshipers. 2nd ed. P. 50: “Archbishop Nikon observed the picture of this massacre through a telescope.” Unfortunately, such telescopes, with the help of which one could observe through walls, have not yet been invented. Basil the Great (c. 330–379) – Christian thinker and church leader, father of the Church. For the first time: Results of life. 1914. No. 12–13. pp. 15–21. Published on first publication basis. Russian thought. September. 1913. Troitsky S. V. About the names of God and (?!) name-worshipers. St. Petersburg, 1914. Pp. V + 200 + XXVII. Price 2 rub. 50 k. Prof. V. Nesmelov in his detailed monograph “The Dogmatic System of St. Gregory of Nyssa” (Kazan, 1887. P. 14) notes that “on the one hand, he is a strict and consistent thinker... on the other hand, he is nothing more than a witty writer, and sometimes even a picky critic. Whenever he begins to use the dialectic of words, he usually only comes up with a simple play on words, most of which is extremely pretentious. Sometimes he apparently goes for effect and does not at all care about the scientific thoroughness of his, sometimes very harsh, judgments. But this was the weapon that was primarily used by heretics and which, therefore, was most convenient for their final defeat.” Nesmeloe Viktor Ivanovich (1863–1920) - Russian religious philosopher, one of the predecessors of existentialism, developed the problems of anthropology. I remind you that those who defend every judgment of St. Gregory, in particular in epistemological matters, would have to accept such a significant doctrine for him as the universal restoration (άποκατάστασις (Apokatastasis (Greek universal restoration) - a teaching put forward by Origen and suggesting that, due to the infinite mercy of God, all fallen souls (even Satan) will be forgiven and will attain heavenly existence. It was condemned as heretical.) Wed: Works of St. Basil the Great. 4th ed. 1900. Part 3. P. 29, 34–35 pp.; Creations of St. Gregory of Nyssa. Part IV. pp. 117–118, 378; Part V. pp. 234, 271–272, 415–416; Part VI. pp. 303, 319–320. Comparison of the philosophical position of Eunomius' opponents, namely St. Basil the Great, with the doctrine of Kant's Ding an sich was also done by prof. Nesmelov (op. cit., 133). “The Creator,” he says, “gave our creation some divine grace, putting into the image the likeness of His blessings... He bestowed other blessings on human nature by His grace; about reason and wisdom, it must be said that in the proper sense He did not so much bestow them as communicate them, clothing the image with the own beauties of His nature” (De hom. Opif. C. 9, col. 14913, cited in Nesmelov, 385). The review of Prof. essentially coincides with this judgment. Nesmelov, who in his study says: “Careful reading of the works of St. Gregory clearly shows that in fact he thought somewhat differently from what he said in his polemic with Eunomius. All his categorical judgments have their proper meaning only in relation to the same judgment of Eunomius regarding the complete intelligibility of God; regardless of this judgment, they must be accepted with great limitation” (153–154). In cant. Hom. XI, op. 1. 1, p. 101313 (cited by Nesmelov, op. cit., 154). Wed. r. lane VI, 325. One of the most important passages relevant here is this: “Whoever has risen from man through perception to divinity, who is different in being and has become something else, it is said in the proper sense and rightly that he has been made Christ and Lord, because God made him Lord from a slave, from a subject a King, from a subject of Christ, exalted what is humble and has given to him who has something else human a name, which is more than any name ( Phil. 2:9). And thus, an indescribable mixture and connection took place, connecting human smallness with Divine greatness. Therefore, great and divine names are rightly applied to humanity and, conversely, the Divinity is called by human names. For He has a name above every name, and in the human name Jesus receives worship from all creation (text follows: Phil. 2:10–11)” (VI, 65). If desired, this passage can be interpreted in both senses. Manichaeus Nicholas - it is not clear who we are talking about. Akoluf Aetius is the author of the only work that has come down to us entitled “On the Unborn and Begotten God,” which is important for the history of theological thought. Here Aetius tries in 47 theses (or “chapters”) to prove the essential difference between the “one true God” and the “born Hypostasis” of the Son on the basis of the unbornness belonging to the being of God (akoluf is one of the lowest positions in the hierarchy of clergy). Trinity. Decree. op. P. 56. The Second Ecumenical Council took place in Constantinople in 381. It was attended by bishops only from the Eastern Empire; no significant dogmatic issues were raised at the Council: the condemnation of the Eunomians, or Anomoeans, Arians, or Eudoxians, Semi-Arians, or Pneumatomachians, Sabellians, Marcellians, Fotivians, Apollinarians was stated; The Nicene Creed is once again reaffirmed. For the first time: Results of life. 1914. No. 17. P. 1–8. Published upon first publication. For example, A. Stolypin in “New Time”, prof. A. Bronzov in the Church Gazette, an anonymous reviewer in the Missionary Review. This means that the VII Ecumenical Council was the last to make significant changes to the dogmatic system of Orthodoxy. The Council was presided over by Patriarch Tarasius of Constantinople. But, on the other hand, there is no similarity between the teaching about the veneration of the name of God among the name-worshipers and St. Gregory of Nyssa, for the former insist, in contrast to Orthodox teaching, that it is appropriate to render the names of God not worship, but service, while St. Gregory speaks specifically about the worship of the names of God (VI, 235), since he does not consider the very names of God to be grace, or the energy of God, but says that “when they are invoked, grace is given to those present with faith” (IV, 232). Memra is in Judaism the highest being, the angel of Jehovah, the word through which the Lord not only created the world, but also maintains constant relations with it. Perhaps this teaching influenced the formation of the Christian concept of the creative Logos (through Philo of Alexandria). In Judaism, the doctrine of the creative word (memra) was a side phenomenon, since it contradicted traditional monotheism, placing another God next to Jehovah.