Religion and politics

A few words about the publication of the collection “Essays on a Realistic Worldview.” St. Petersburg. 1904.) We are now experiencing a unique and in many respects interesting moment in the spiritual development of Russian society. In the worldview of the educated part of it, there is undoubtedly a crisis occurring, a turning point is clearly indicated. At present, the outcome of this crisis has not yet been determined, but we see its symptoms in the confusion and vacillation that characterize modern social thought. Until recently, the worldview of our intelligentsia was determined by the dominant influence of a particular doctrine (populism, Marxism). Marxism was the last to achieve, although short-term, quite complete dominance over the minds, which it partly still holds today. And yet, autocracy, and especially confidence in this autocracy, even just confidence in the future, has been irretrievably lost by Marxism. Moods that do not fit within the framework of Marxism and are breaking them began to declare their rights; voices began to be heard that, while fully recognizing the practical tasks and activities of the supporters of Marxism, completely deny it as a theoretical worldview, trying to substantiate a one-character practical program on different theoretical principles. We mean the newest idealistic movement in Russian thought, which directly from its representatives appeared among some to replace Marxism 1 . The idealistic trend is young in all respects. As a literary group, its representatives appeared for the first time a year ago with the collection “Problems of Idealism.” Until now, idealists do not yet have their own literary organ, the acquisition of which in our country usually marks the civil coming of age of a new trend; they remain persecuted or are admitted only as rare exceptions to the general press; in other words, idealism is still in the literary age that Marxism experienced in the period before the acquisition of the “New Word” (and which is still well remembered by the writer of these lines). But in addition to the external signs of youth of the idealistic trend, there are also internal ones. For a reader familiar with “Problems of Idealism” and other writings of idealists, it is clear that not all of them have or even pretend to have an established philosophical worldview, being in a period of quest. On the other hand, since they have already made up their minds, the idealists do not at all represent a coordinated, united group that has completely homogeneous opinions on the main issues of the philosophical worldview; here you can find quite different, although not yet sufficiently differentiated, shades of thought, making some of them not companions, but only fellow travelers with each other (and the most profound differences concern, it seems to me, the attitude towards religion and the understanding of religious problems). And this obvious disagreement, completely inevitable and completely understandable in philosophy, does not, however, prevent idealists, at least for the time being, from acting as representatives of one direction, defending some common philosophical positions. In the theoretical field, idealists are united in one direction not so much by what they have already found in their philosophical quests, but by what they have left behind and rejected as a step that has been forever passed. They rejected the denial of philosophy and its independent problems, which we, in essence, have in so-called positivism and in particular in Marxism. Idealists can no longer come to terms with the simplicity and crudeness with which the most important questions of life and spirit were resolved, or rather, eliminated in Marxism and positivism in general - supposedly in the name of science and its rights: about truth and its knowledge, about good and evil, about morality and ideals, about free will, about the meaning of human life, human history and the entire world existence. All these questions that make up the content of philosophy are naturally further generalized into a comprehensive and universal religious problem, which was not even posed in Marxism. Of course, the religious problem that philosophy poses and solves is not yet a religion, for religion is life, and a positive solution to a religious problem in philosophy does not yet make a person truly religious in his life. However, we should not forget that in our rationalistic age, even the most ardent religious faith must receive philosophical justification and be tempered in the crucible of philosophical doubts. Therefore, philosophical idealism is a necessary path to religion; it represents a station that modern man cannot avoid in his quest for a religious worldview. The right of disbelief, like the right of faith, must be acquired by thought. Thus, the idealistic direction again brought to the surface of public consciousness forgotten or rejected, but in no way yet resolved questions; it posed “problems of idealism” to Russian thought. Another distinctive feature that characterizes idealism as a social trend is well-defined political and social ideals and the resulting likes and dislikes. In general, representatives of idealism share the program that, in its fundamental principles, has been generally accepted in the advanced strata of the Russian intelligentsia from time immemorial. In its socio-political worldview, idealism, therefore, does not differ and consciously does not want to differ from the existing sentiments of the advanced part of Russian society, striving only to provide a new theoretical basis for the old ideals. Truly, books have their own destiny. The book “Problems of Idealism” also had its own fate, strange and interesting. It cannot be said that it has gained many conscious supporters of idealism. And it is impossible, as already indicated above, to simultaneously share several different points of view outlined in the “Problems”. The Problems staff themselves do not have a common catechism or a common creed. Therefore, in order to become an “idealist,” you need to go through a long process and do more or less lengthy independent work; under this condition, the ease and speed of success of the idealistic worldview would be downright suspicious and compromising. The purpose of the collection could only be to arouse interest in the “problems of idealism” and to place them before the reader’s mental gaze. And we can say with confidence that this collection has accomplished this task. The best proof of this is the abundance of articles recently devoted to “Problems of Idealism.” True, the overwhelming majority of these critics are characterized by hostility, reaching the point of bitterness. However, why was “Problems” destined to cause such bitterness? The crusade against idealism cannot at all be explained by considerations of practical necessity, in view of the fact that the number of its proselytes is not yet so significant that it would be necessary to waste so much ink and bile on it. And it’s not because of the same thing that all this fuss arose, that several former Marxists turned out to be among the idealists - bad grass out of nowhere, this even corresponds to the current policy of the Marxists. I can only explain this by the fact that the arguments of the idealists made an impression on the critics themselves, and these latter, while anathematizing idealism, essentially seek to convince and reassure themselves, first of all. They feel that there is a hole in their own worldview that needs to be filled and that is depriving them of calm and self-control. In a word, when reading all these formidable rebuke, I involuntarily remember Heine’s playful poem (translated by I. I. N.). A decisive rejection of idealism is also given in the just published collection of articles entitled “Essays on a Realistic World Outlook,” which is a “notebook” of 676 pages. This collection is a good opportunity to eliminate one of the very serious misunderstandings that exist regarding the idealistic worldview, and to clarify an important question: what does true realism consist of? Which of the two worldviews, positivism or idealism, has more rights to consider itself realistic? The word realism, like most common expressions, has many different meanings, depending on the relationship in which it is used in any given case. For example, in the Middle Ages, during the clash between the followers of Plato and Aristotle, the concept of realism had a meaning completely opposite to that in which it was used in the title of the “Essays”: then this name was given to a philosophical movement that affirmed the real existence of general concepts or ideas and was approaching modern metaphysical idealism, and it was opposed under the name of nominalism to a direction that considered concepts to exist only in logical abstraction. In the field of the theory of knowledge, realism again has a special meaning (here it is contrasted with the so-called illusionism or subjective idealism). Do the objects of our cognition have an independent existence, independent of us and outside of us, are they things that exist not only for us and our consciousness, but also beyond us, by themselves or for themselves (realistic point of view), or are they completely resolved into our predictions (subjective-idealistic point of view)? And again, it should be noted that in the theory of knowledge, many metaphysical idealists (including the author) stand precisely on the basis of realism, while many positivists stand on the point of view of subjective idealism. Finally, in the field of social policy and practical life, realism is most often contrasted with utopianism, which does not know how to take into account the conditions and possibilities of reality, due to a lack of familiarity with them or one or another preconceived opinions and prejudices. Therefore, the concept of realism here almost coincides with the concept of scientificity in social policy. It would be possible to give other examples of the different meaning of the concept of realism depending on the relationship in which it is used. Obviously, the meaning given to the word realism in the case we are interested in is taken from everyday usage; here it means fidelity to reality, sobriety, scientificity, combined with the elimination of all illusions, phantasmagoria, deception and self-deception. The desire for realism in this sense, without excluding, of course, the possibility of private errors and misconceptions, requires unconditional recognition of the needs and facts of reality, a truthful and attentive attitude to them. Sobriety, scientificity, truthfulness and sincerity - this is what the word realism can mean in the connection as it is used by the authors of “Essays on a Realistic World Outlook” (otherwise it is completely impossible to understand the plan of this book); in this sense we will use it in the following presentation. And here it is necessary, first of all, to point out that although the “realistic” worldview is opposed to the idealistic one and is obviously recognized as alien to idealists, these latter have a claim to consider themselves representatives of a truly realistic worldview, and on this basis such a opposition to them seems completely erroneous and illegal. The stated statement probably contradicts the usual ideas of many readers, for a common accusation against idealists is that they betray realism. Therefore, let us examine in more detail the main grounds on which such an accusation is asserted. The first and most important reason is that the idealists came out in defense of the rights of the human spirit, again putting forward “damned questions” of a philosophical and religious nature, which were openly persecuted or simply ignored by the dominant philosophy of positivism. In this regard, they posed the general and fundamental question of the philosophy of realism: how to think about that mysterious fundamental principle from which the changeable and transitory phenomena of existence grow? What is the world or everything, and what makes the world a world, that is, what connects disparate, fantastic phenomena into a single, logical whole? In philosophical language, this question (the so-called ontological) is formulated as follows: what is the substance of the world - matter or spirit? Yielding to the arguments of philosophizing reason and the data of internal experience - moral and religious consciousness, most idealists recognize that the world of the real is not limited to phenomena observed by us through the five senses, that this world of phenomena is only a revelation of the spiritual world substance, which is why the realm of being turns out to be wider and, so to speak, deeper than the sensory cognizable world of phenomena. Therefore, idealists consciously expand the sphere of the real, truly existing beyond the limits of the sensory cognizable and do this not in spite of the philosophy of realism, but precisely in the name of the requirements of this latter. Some idealists even went so far as to be so insolent that they openly returned to the “uneducated faith in God,” for which Dostoevsky had received punishment from “educated” people in his time. On the contrary, the position of the philosophy of positivism, which considers itself scientific and therefore realistic, in this case seems to us to be actually anti-realistic. After all, “damned questions” represent the same fact of real life, the same indication of consciousness, as the data of the five senses, and spiritual, religious-metaphysical thirst is just as real as physical thirst, and in some cases reaches even no less intensity. And how does positivism act in view of this? He simply brushes aside these questions and says: don’t ask, because this question cannot be answered by experimental science (i.e., science that studies the world of phenomena), and everything that is outside it does not exist and has no right to enlightened attention. However, nowadays one rarely encounters such straightforward frankness of dogmatic positivism. Now, as the last word of philosophy, critical positivism is proposed, where the same answer is wrapped in the vague form of a theory of knowledge. With the help of dialectical twists of the teachings of the theory of knowledge (which in this case follows exactly the same path as ancient sophistry), it is proven here that “damned questions”; These are not questions at all, for they are devoid of any content and thus represent a kind of philosophical thoughtlessness. The philosophy of this trend examines the husk, having previously taken out the nut, and to satisfy the spiritual hunger of mankind it has only a pedantically arrogant statement that it is a simple misunderstanding, which is sufficiently eliminated by the critical theory of knowledge. This point of view can and in fact is proven in different ways, because the formal capacity of our mind for abstraction and logical constructions is practically limitless. We do not set out here to criticize this point of view, and in general we think that it is virtually impossible to completely destroy the theoretically many-headed hydra of critical positivism due to the diversity of its forms: positivism needs not so much to be refuted as to be outgrown. This is a philosophy that fully satisfies the spiritual needs of man at a certain stage of development; it must be fought by awakening new needs and showing that a worldview is possible that is fuller, richer, more scientific, even more realistic. Yes, more realistic, because, really, which of the two worldviews is closer to life and reality: the one that defends the spiritual needs of a person, or the one that arrogantly calls an attempt to answer them a misunderstanding or simply and frankly nonsense. Socrates, without refuting the sophists with the arguments of the theory of knowledge, helped humanity to outgrow sophistry, actually showing it its limitations, opening for it a new world of the real. And we leave it to the impartial reader to decide who was more realistic: the sophists, who with their skeptical theory of knowledge shook all reality, or Socrates, who discovered a new reality, in addition to the reality of transitory phenomena, the moral world of man? True realism is equally alien to both the worldview in which man is viewed as an incorporeal spirit and the one in which he appears only as an animal. This is easy to explain using the example of artistic movements. It is known what the features of the naturalistic movement associated with the name Zola are. Man is depicted here as an animal with physical needs and various lower feelings. Naturally, with such an understanding of human nature, the world turns into a zoological museum, and Zola shows us individual chambers of this museum in his novels. Is this kind of naturalism realistic? Doesn’t it contain the same lie, the same falsification of life, as false classicism or extreme romanticism, to which it is opposed? Who is more of a realist: Zola and his imitators, or Goethe and Byron, Pushkin and Lermontov, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, who know the depths of the human spirit and its ideal needs? Which of them really knows more about the human soul and living reality? In philosophical idealism, Russian thought enters the path of that realism that Russian art, which generally goes ahead of Russian thought, has long discovered. Idealists can consider Pushkin and Lermontov, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy their philosophical teachers, who revealed in artistic images those principles of true realism that philosophical thought seeks through logical abstraction, and joyfully follow in the footsteps of such teachers... The second reason that opponents of idealism like to cite as proof of its anti-realism is its supposed anti-science. A realistic worldview must be scientific; more precisely, it must be in agreement with the data of scientific knowledge and cannot contradict them; every teaching that goes against science in our days thereby signs its own death sentence (although this in no way means that it should limit the circle of its problems and teachings to the boundaries of experimental science). But no worldview is capable of asserting the rights of the cognitive mind and scientific knowledge to such an extent as idealism; faith in reason, characteristic of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, was affirmed by none other than the great representatives of philosophical idealism, starting with Kant. For a positivist, reason, the cognitive and thinking ability of a person, is only one of the many consequences of numerous causes, a simple weapon in the struggle for existence, one of the incidental results of adaptation in this struggle, and nothing more; the concept of truth is established by utility in the struggle for existence, so that truth and utility are almost united by an equal sign. If the positivists were more consistent, they would have to come to a skeptical view of science and the possibility and even expediency of knowing the truth. On the contrary, for an idealist, reason is an absolute world principle, a universal principle that reigns both in the world and in our consciousness; The unity and identity of the objective mind of things and the subjective knowing mind only makes the existence of science possible and understandable and sets it the specific task of knowing the truth of the world mind. For the idealist, reason (Λόγος) is divine, it is an obvious and immediate revelation of the deity, “the light of the world,” and, therefore, science is also divine, the scientific genius of humanity is divine, revealing endless horizons before it. And it is the idealists who are credited with the denial of science, medieval obscurantism! But, of course, unreasonable worship can make an idol out of everything, and the positivists have turned science into such an idol, with which they want to replace and eliminate philosophy. The idealists incurred these charges only because they objected to the prejudices associated with the incorrect expansion of the rights of science; but, fighting for the real rights of science, which are violated by positivists, even if they exaggerate them, idealists come out precisely in defense of true science, scientific realism. And here they want to be nothing other than realists. Finally, there remains one more side from which idealism is opposed to the realistic worldview, namely the area of ​​practical life, practical reason. Idealism leads to quietism, strives to establish a passive and indifferent attitude towards life, distracts from the most important practical tasks of the historical moment - these are the current accusations that are endlessly repeated by critics. The accusations are heavy, especially for a worldview for which the highest moral dogma should be the words of the great apostle: “If I speak in the tongues of men and angels, but do not have love, then I am a ringing brass or a sounding cymbal. If I have the gift of prophecy, and know all mysteries, and have all knowledge and all faith, so that I could move mountains, but do not have love, then I am nothing.” Is it possible to reconcile this teaching with passivity, indifference, quietism? In the midst of fanatical intolerance, the legend about the “reactionary nature” of idealism was created and maintained. Idealists only have to wait patiently for this prejudice to dissipate on its own, and in response to this, point out again and again that in the light of religious idealism, historical tasks take on the meaning of unconditional duties, and life, “a vain gift, an accidental gift” for the positivist, acquires an eternal and deep meaning of the mission that we must fulfill by making our contribution to the historical process of building the kingdom of God. But how do idealists relate to realpolitik and positive social science, on which this policy is largely based? Do they really not want, as can be read or heard, to replace exact scientific research with decrees of the absolute, not considering the despicable “empirical reality” worthy of their attention? The only indirect confirmation of this fantastic opinion can be seen in the fact that the collection “Problems of Idealism” consists exclusively of articles of a philosophical nature, but, of course, this does not mean at all that the authors indifferently ignored political economy, statistics, etc. Due to the impossibility of covering the immensity in one collection, as well as in the interests of literary self-determination, the idealists focused only on those issues in which they differ from existing trends, keeping silent or limiting themselves to short statements on all other issues on which they are more or less aligned with existing trends. True, idealists deny positive social science the right to solve purely philosophical problems related to the foundations of the worldview, but for this reason, with all the greater success it can perform the modest and unassuming task of resolving special issues within the specialty. In particular, in economic matters, idealism, as a worldview, is characterized by comparative neutrality in relation to the two existing trends in our country, i.e., Marxism and populism. These directions differ from each other not so much in philosophical opinions (they are simple varieties of positivism and both are currently hostile against idealism with equal bitterness), but in their economic worldview, where they defend different understandings and interpretations of the facts of Russia's economic development. The peculiarity of both worldviews is that questions of economic reality, questions of fact, receive in them the meaning of questions of principle, directional dogma. This is easy to understand if we take into account that, according to these teachings, those ideals that determine such an interest in economic issues are justified within the same economic science, i.e. not on eternal, indisputable philosophical principles, but on the actual, historical course of things. Marxism is only more consistent than populism in formulating this point of view, but there is no fundamental difference between them. According to the logic of Marxism, one should be consistent with the laws of social development, which determine the future with iron necessity: on this basis, it is reasonable and natural to strive for collectivism, because its onset is determined by the internal (“immanent”) laws of development of capitalist society, which can neither be prevented nor changed. The vocabulary of strict Marxism does not even include the word ideal; here the words are heard: natural necessity, the law of development, the iron course of things, the pangs of childbirth, the wheel of history. In “subjective sociology” the word ideal is more commonly used, but, according to its philosophical structure, it has as little place here as there. With such a worldview, it is natural to attach the exclusive, i.e. not only socially political, but also the fundamental philosophical significance of this or that solution to issues of economic development, since all issues of worldview are resolved in these issues. However, from the outside it is clear that Marxism, to a lesser extent, and populism, fall into an illusion here, believing that in social science the question of social ideals themselves is being resolved, which in reality is predetermined in a well-known way. For the intellectual, the ideals of freedom, equality and brotherhood became second nature, as if a priori, fused inextricably with his heart. Naturally, if social science yields to this ardent desire of the heart, and “inexorably objective” research gives precisely this predetermined result, in the form of one or another factual doctrine. For social science, and even statistics, which impresses many with its numerical language, is not at all an exact science and too easily gives way to preconceived opinions, especially if they have indestructible strength. It is clear that such a distortion of the meaning of certain issues, i.e. the transformation of social sciences, which solve only special questions, into worldview sciences, which pose general philosophical questions, is extremely unfavorable for special scientific analysis, which requires internal freedom from preconceived opinions. On this basis, both economic trends turn out to be hostile to actual scientific realism precisely in the field of economic issues, because they inevitably introduce dogmatism that is not at all relevant to specialized areas of knowledge. In this state of affairs, special sciences are approached not only for the purpose of special teaching, but with ready-made theses that must be proven at all costs under the threat of breaking the entire worldview. That is why Marxist economic literature is often characterized by such tendentiousness both here and in the West; the same can be said about the populist 2. Possible neutrality, in the sense of the absence of bias in relation to the possible solution of this or that issue of economic and political life, creates the most favorable conditions for scientific realism, and at least predisposes it to the greatest extent. This neutrality is precisely what characterizes the position of idealism in the field of practical politics. As such, it does not have definite, preconceived opinions on issues of economic and social policy, and can be combined with various practical solutions to these issues, while maintaining, of course, the general ideal; he can recognize these decisions in accordance with the instructions of science and life, without fearing because of this the breakdown of his worldview and the collapse of his basic ideal. Neutrality in this case has nothing to do with unprincipledness and indifferentism. Idealism is as little indifferent to questions of politics and economics as populism and Marxism, and it is animated by the same ultimate ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity as these two movements. He differs only in the way he substantiates these ideals, for he substantiates them philosophically, and not historically and sociologically, as they do. In history and social science, idealism does not seek justification for the ideal, but the most suitable and practical means for its implementation under given circumstances, in a given historical situation. An ideal is a general guiding goal, which is embodied in life in a variety of specific specific goals and practical tasks that grow out of known historical conditions. And these conditions must be carefully studied and taken into account in order to most successfully transform reality in the direction of the ideal. We study, for example, the situation in industry and, in particular, analyze the conditions for the development and competition of large and small industry. Based on this analysis, we come to some general conclusions regarding the viability of one or another form of industry and, accordingly, develop a plan for practical policy. For the idealist, the burning question for the Marxist about establishing at all costs the “law of development” of modern society, on the basis of which the actual course of future development could be predetermined, is completely irrelevant. Idealism completely denies the possibility of such historical predictions and even the very existence of such iron and inevitable laws of development that would allow such a prediction to be made. All attempts at predictions, which were sometimes made by very outstanding people (for example, Marx), were soon refuted by history, and the very concept of historical law is full of logical misunderstandings and contradictions. In any case, the iron laws of mechanical necessity have no place where human will operates. The practical motive for which Marxists value their idea of ​​iron laws of social development so much is that by establishing such laws, they hope to strengthen their faith in goodness, to create confidence in the triumph of ideals. As noted above, they are on a completely false path, which cannot lead them to the desired and, moreover, completely legitimate goal. Denying this path and not needing such reinforcement, idealists in the field of social policy are guided by the principle: its evil prevails over the day. For the challenge of our day, we need to know our current conditions and, on the basis of this knowledge, prepare for tomorrow (although, of course, this does not mean that idealists are inclined to preach so-called small things and do not recognize the great historical tasks that our time poses to us). In other words, the attitude of idealists to issues of social science is exclusively practical, free from extraneous theoretical goals. For them, there are no Marxist or populist, petty-bourgeois or any other opinions in economic science, but only true or false, proven or unproven propositions of science. On this basis, idealists on certain specific issues can join both Marxism and populism, while remaining themselves; They also retain the precious right, without being bound by dogmatic boundaries, to develop and change their practical opinions along with life and developing social science. At the moment, some idealists in their economic worldview combine features on the basis of which they could be classified as both Marxists and populists. In their understanding of the general economic development of Russia as a capitalist process, and on the labor issue, they stand close to Marxism; on the contrary, on the agrarian and peasant issue they are more likely to approach the populists (without, however, sharing their prejudices and their idealization of communal land ownership). In general, recognizing the complete dependence of their practical program on historical conditions and with full readiness to change it in accordance with the requirements of changing life, idealists still have a definite political and socio-economic program. Summing up what has been said, we state that in all of these respects, idealism has every right to consider itself a realistic worldview par excellence; between idealism and realism not only is there no opposition, but there is a significant internal affinity, so that, if not for the inconvenience of introducing a new and unusual term, the idealism in question here should be called, in order to avoid misunderstandings, ideal-realism. Now let us turn to the “Essays on a Realistic Worldview” and see to what extent it satisfies the above established requirements of realism, and whether it really is what it claims to be. We will not go into consideration of individual articles and their arguments; we are only interested in the starting points and final conclusions. We intend to use it mainly as a negative illustration of the understanding of realism outlined above. What is pleasantly striking in the collection is, first of all, the section devoted to the same issues as “Problems of Idealism.” So, the latter finally receive the rights of citizenship, and the positivists deal with philosophical problems with no less zeal than the idealists. I still remember well the time when this was considered reprehensible (so, for example, my dispute with Mr. Struve about freedom and necessity was recognized by competent judges as completely unnecessary for Marxism). Kant, who is quoted in the collection incomparably more often than Marx (and sometimes with respect), was simply declared to be a representative of the “petty-bourgeois” form of thinking, and this qualification was enough to put an end to the Socrates of Königsberg. In the first section of the collection, new trends are so strongly reflected that one can positively forget about the Marxism of their authors, who only occasionally and as if out of duty remember the sacramental formulas about the “economic basis” and some other, if not forgotten, then undoubtedly already forgotten words. There is so little specifically Marxist in the articles of the first section that even a free-thinking populist and even - horribile dictu - a representative of the “bourgeois worldview”, completely alien and even directly hostile to the ideals of Marxism, can almost entirely subscribe to them. In general, we have here a range of problems and ideas that are completely alien to Marx and Engels, 3 but for that reason they are significantly closer to Nietzsche and the newest representatives of German school philosophy (Mach and Avenarius). We, of course, will not reproach the participants in the collection for this; on the contrary, we, as realists, can only welcome the inclusion of “problems of idealism” in it, for this inclusion is really caused by the requirements of correctly understood realism. Unfortunately, this greeting can only refer to a formal statement of the problem. Once it is resolved, the authors cease to be realists. With a completely anti-realistic doctrinairism, they decree the destruction of those very spiritual requests and needs for the sake of which only the “problems of idealism” exist; with a utopianism that is also completely unrealistic, they hope that humanity will follow these decrees and drown out these demands and needs within themselves. Let us clarify what has been said on two main issues. The first question, the question of all questions, concerns what seems to us, on the one hand, the closest and most immediate, and on the other, the most problematic, our life, its meaning and value. Our life contains so many contradictions, represents such a mixture of high and low, understandable and incomprehensible, that human consciousness does not and cannot accept it as a fact that does not raise any questions, understandable by itself; it is looking for a guiding thread in this labyrinth, for light in this chaos. Let us remember our great poet, who asked in despair: A vain gift, a random gift, Life, why were you given to me? Who makes me a hostile power Filled my soul with passion, Has my mind been agitated by doubt?.. There is no goal in front of me, The heart is empty, the mind is idle, What answer to Pushkin’s question do we find in the collection? And here it is: “the meaning of life is life. Having arisen on earth, life strives to persist, but, having strengthened in the struggle, it takes on an offensive (?) character. The meaning of life for a person is its expansion” (180). To answer with a similar phrase, which is diligently repeated in different ways by different authors, means, in my opinion, one of two things: either to laugh at the questioner, repeat the question in the form of an answer, or to answer: don’t ask, because there can be no answer to this question and there is nothing to ask. The old, naive positivism acted more seriously and directly than the modernized one, directly and openly excluding these questions, limiting the scope of reasonable research only to the question of why, but not why. By admitting that a person can follow this directive and ask only about what is permitted, and not about what is necessary and important, positivism falls into obvious utopianism. And the history of philosophy actually confirms that the dominance of positivism in human thought has never been durable, and the suppressed demands of spiritual life arose before thought with renewed vigor; this is still happening today. The tautological answer “the purpose of life is life” cannot be considered an answer also because life is a concept of indefinite and, one might say, literally unlimited volume and content. On this basis, in the formula under consideration, with the unchanged meaning of the concept “life” as a subject, “life” as a predicate can receive the most varied, although implied, meaning, and under this meaningless etiquette, any, even the most smuggled cargo can be carried. “Drinking Cypriot wine and kissing beautiful women” or fighting for the liberation of humanity (Lassalle’s famous dilemma), both are equally “life”. As you know, several poems were written about Pushkin’s stanzas, and one of them (Klyushnikova) also completely repeats the indicated formula: An instant gift, a beautiful gift, The mind is silent, but the heart is clear: Life was given to me for living. But here's how this formula unfolds later: Everything is beautiful in God's world: The Creator world is hidden in it... But He is in feeling, but He is in lyre, To know Him in creation, To see with the spirit, to honor with the heart - This is what purpose means This is what it means to live in God. It is unnecessary to emphasize how opposite the content is put into the same vague formula by the authors of the collection and Klyushnikov. The second touchstone for testing the realism of the authors of the collection is the question of morality. Good and evil, duty, conscience - we cannot remove all this from our consciousness, tear it away from our personality, even if we wanted to. This is an incessant and mysterious voice that tells a person about his highest dignity and highest destiny. The moral problem has not been as acute for a long time as it is now in Russia, firstly, because life poses it in a very sharp form, often requiring heroic self-sacrifice in the name of an ideal and moral duty, and secondly, due to the general crisis of the philosophical and religious worldview. For positivists, the moral problem is the most inconvenient because it persistently takes thought beyond the limits of the sensory, empirical world, the realm of causes and effects, into the area of ​​free self-determination of the human spirit, which has no place in positive philosophy. And at the same time, for the majority of its supporters, morality is too dear in practice to be sacrificed for the sake of a theoretical prejudice. The problem of morality therefore takes on a downright tragic character. There are three possible ways to solve a moral problem. The first method is characterized by the fact that the justification for morality is sought in truths of a religious and metaphysical nature; from this point of view, morality necessarily leads to metaphysics and, ultimately, to religion. The second way is that they try to establish morality by means of science. The result is the so-called. scientific morality. But can science, which asks only why and wherefore, provide grounds for ought, for that order of conscience that characterizes moral life? In this basic characteristic, morality is something so unique, extra-scientific and super-scientific that it cannot be scientifically substantiated. Therefore, the third way to resolve the issue of morality seems more decisive and consistent to us, which consists of nothing more or less than eliminating the problem itself, in the name of the triumph of scientific positivism. This is indeed consistent, but is it fair and is it possible? Does denial alone destroy the question of the mysterious fact of morality? By denying morality and its problem, are we not like a person who closed his eyes to get rid of the question about the content of the picture, or deliberately covered his ears so as not to hear objections? Is this realistic? It is the latter view of morality that is presented in the collection (especially in the article by Mr. Bazarov). The question is resolved very simply and radically: morality is removed here from the consciousness of a “free” person in the name of this fantastic freedom (whatever meanings cannot be given to the word freedom if desired: at the moment, internal freedom is called freedom from morality, the next step will probably be freedom from logic). But at the same time, those tragic tones that the destruction of morality evokes from those who really care about it are completely absent; denial of morality, immoralism or, more precisely, antimoralism, appears among our decadents from Marxism, clothed with some kind of bravado; tragedy turns into vaudeville with cross-dressing. New aesthetes express the wish and hope that conscience will eventually lose its ethical character, replacing it with an aesthetic one; At the same time, the Kantian principle is eliminated: for man, man is an end in himself; all the difficulties and inconveniences resulting from these devastations are eliminated with one gibberish word “harmonization of internal experience”, supported also by the contradictory concept of “hedonic norms” (with the help of which, by the way, all morality expelled from the front porch can be let back in from the back porch). The final ideal is declared (ideals are still retained) to be the complete abolition of the concepts of good and evil, conscience and moral consciousness, i.e. that state which, as an exception, has already been achieved by some completely “free” individuals, but... mentally ill people. Insanilas moralis as an ideal, this is the last word of Marxist decadence. However, all this is not as scary as it seems. Our “realists” only scare people with their immoralism, but in fact they are very well-intentioned and extremely virtuous people. You can rest assured that they will, and indeed do, draw the proper conclusions from any premises and will always leave a loophole through which they will bring back the exiled virtue. They will not proclaim, like Raskolnikov, the rights of crime, will not share the anti-democratic teachings of Nietzsche, will not elevate either Napoleon or Lucrezia Borgia to an ideal. In due time, they will develop both a “direct” (and on this basis for some reason they consider it non-moral) or “aesthetic” aversion to vice, and the ideals of freedom and equality (which are, after all, of Christian origin). Fasters and vegetarians, they preach an Epicurean amoralism, which is more befitting of Petronius and Lucullus. How this reminds us of the heroes of Chernyshevsky’s novel “What is to be done”, who, having internalized a utilitarian morality that is completely unusual for them, diligently justify themselves from any virtuous act, proving that it stems from considerations of personal benefit. It’s true that Vl’s words are not yet outdated. Solovyov, who long ago wrote: “people who demanded moral regeneration and selfless deeds for the good of the people associated these demands with such teachings that abolish the very concept of morality: nothing exists except matter and force, man is only a kind of monkey, and therefore we must think only about the good of the people and lay down our souls for our smaller brothers.” The Russian intelligentsia tried on many costumes from someone else's shoulder, fortunately, despite all these disguises, remaining themselves; Obviously, it was not enough for her to step into the neckline of immorality and declare war on morality in the name of... morality. Honny soit qui mal y pense! 4. Such is the quick and short reprisal that the authors of the Essays inflict on the most important “Problems of Idealism.” However, such philosophical surgery was permissible at the time of the primitive compulsion of Marxism, but now, when philosophical virginity has been lost almost everywhere, heroic means are unlikely to lead to the goal. We, from our point of view, completely refuse to recognize this course of action as realistic and see here not the triumph of realism, but the completely opposite. It is very characteristic of the current stage of decomposition of theoretical Marxism that the collection is given primarily defensive, apologetic tasks; there are no attempts to further develop and improve the doctrines of Marxism, for example. economic materialism, the doctrine of social patterns and laws of history, historical predictions, the role of the individual in history, etc. Today's Marxists are busy not so much developing their own worldview as defending positions that are not at all characteristic of Marxism as such, but are more or less common to all representatives of positivism; That’s why, by the way, there are now quite a few new Sauls among the prophets of Marxism, but these new allies are by no means its proselytes; They are united not by common love, but by common hatred. The second part of the collection seems to seek to give an economic expression of orthodox Marxism. It is, in particular, quite difficult to understand the plan according to which it was drawn up. If we leave aside the settling of accounts among various economists, we have to conclude that the orthodox Marxist understanding of economic issues, especially agrarian ones, is proposed here as realistic, and anything else, no matter how scientifically substantiated, is rejected in advance as unrealistic. The criterion of realism here is the recognition of the economic tenets of Marxism. Such dogmatism in positive science, elevated to a principle, is a complete denial of the requirements of scientific realism. When we say this, we do not mean the merits of this or that article. We are interested in the general plan from the point of view of the initial task, the general formulation of questions, since it characterizes the worldview that the authors completely mistakenly call realistic. I would not have dwelled on the words and titles if the title of the collection had not hidden a polemical edge directed against idealism, if it had not implied a completely incorrect characterization of idealism. With regard to a worldview that is young and not sufficiently defined in literature, all sorts of misunderstandings easily arise. One of the most annoying misunderstandings, which I tried to dispel in this note, is that idealism is hostile or opposed to realism, while the idealistic worldview is in all respects fundamentally and deeply realistic. The supreme task of this realistic worldview was formulated by the brilliant realist Dostoevsky as follows: with complete realism, to find the person in man 5 . In conclusion of this note, I must nevertheless welcome the appearance of the collection “Essays on a Realistic Worldview” not in the interests of the present day, but from a broader historical point of view. For today, the preaching of immorality, if successful, can only bring harm. But viewed from a historical perspective, the collection represents a striking symptom of Marxist decadence. It clearly shows how deep the crack has run through the core of Marxism and, intended to cover up this crack, it undoubtedly only widens and deepens it. Idealists have every reason to consider such opponents as their allies and co-workers in the difficult task of building and establishing a truly realistic worldview in the minds of Russian society. We attribute a genetic connection with Marxism to the newest idealistic trend, of course, only as a well-known social trend. As a direction of theoretical philosophy, idealism in Russia was born much earlier and has a completely different genealogy. Taking Marxism and populism into one bracket in what they have in common, we by no means ignore the differences between them precisely in the degree of their approximation to the ideal of scientific realism. Due to its general historical position, Marxism turned out to be generally much more realistic than populism, as a later movement, wise by the historical experience of the same populism and new facts of history. So, for example, the statement on page 181 (in Mr. Lunacharsky’s article) is completely contrary to the basic idea of ​​Marxism about the natural, scientifically calculated necessity of the onset of the future kingdom of light: “it is not faith—confidence—in the fatal onset of the kingdom of happiness, which makes us passive, making our efforts unnecessary, but faith—hope—that is the essence of the religion of mankind.” It would seem that it would be more natural to find such a judgment on the pages of “Russian Wealth”, or even “Problems of Idealism”, and not in a Marxist collection. I personally fully share the point of view expressed here. The most authoritative of the modern German representatives of orthodox Marxism, K. Kautsky, undoubtedly disagrees with this, who says: “We Marxists in no way deny the power and significance of morality, we only deny that it comes from a world other than the one with which only we deal, the world of phenomena. It is a product of social life, and itself becomes the most important link connecting society. Without morality there is no society. Each social form, each social class has its own special morality, but it never represents something purely conditional, over which everyone can control at will, but something necessary, necessary not only in the sense that it necessarily grows out of social conditions, but also in the fact that it is inevitable. At the present time, when bourgeois class morality is in complete disintegration, many elements that are not able to assimilate proletarian well-being and proletarian class morality throw away all morality along with bourgeois morality, but the proletariat should not encounter such forms of overcoming bourgeois morality" (Article on the Dresden Partytag: Nachklänge zum Parteitag in Die Neue Zeit, Jahrgang 1903 – 4, No. 1, dated October 3, 1902). There is no doubt that if Kautsky had tried to substantiate the absolute nature of morality that he asserted, he would have had to give up a lot from Marxism. I will quote this wonderful fragment from Dostoevsky’s notebook in its entirety: “with complete realism, find the person in a person. This is a Russian trait par excellence, and in this sense, I am, of course, a people’s person (for my direction flows from the depths of the Christian spirit of the people) - although unknown to the present Russian people, I will be known to the future. They call me a psychologist: it’s not true, I’m just a realist in the highest sense, i.e. I depict all the depths of the human soul.” Realism “in the highest sense”, characteristic of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, can truly be called Evangelical realism.