О социальном идеале

Man recognizes himself as free. The present and the future appear to him not as a series of causes and consequences, the only possible one under given conditions, but as a series of different possibilities, and the implementation of one or another possibility depends on his will, on his actions. The possibility of choice and the denial of necessity as the only possible course of events is the specific content of the idea of ​​freedom, which is revealed to everyone in their immediate consciousness. This does not mean, of course, that a person has freedom of execution or, in other words, has omnipotence; he is subject to the iron law of objective causation and can influence it only as one of the causes, one of its elements. And this also does not mean that a person acts completely without reason, i.e. apart from any motives, on the contrary, all his actions are necessarily motivated or causally determined. Nevertheless, a person recognizes himself as free to incline towards one or another motive and makes a choice between them. The freedom of choice that each of us directly experiences, we also recognize in relation to other people. Although we are sometimes able to predict how this or that person will act under given circumstances, we are not able to rid ourselves of the idea that he can act differently and that at the same time he has the same freedom of choice that we attribute to ourselves. Our practical attitude towards other people, exhortations, requests, agitation, etc. are based on this idea. The feeling of freedom is irreducible from our consciousness, whatever our metaphysical explanation of this fact. We can completely deny free will in the metaphysical sense and consider the feeling of freedom we experience as a unique mental state accompanying volitional acts; we can, on the contrary, see in this feeling a manifestation of our true essence, a free, self-determining spirit. This question is finally resolved only in connection with the general metaphysical worldview (and above all ontological teaching), but one or another solution to the metaphysical question has no significance for the existence of a sense of freedom as an immediate fact of consciousness. In any case, this fact cannot be eliminated from consciousness, even if we deny free will in the metaphysical sense. One can assume, together with Spinoza, that the magnetic needle, if it had consciousness, would consider its movement to the north to be its own free doing, 227 or, together with Kant, make a similar assumption regarding the rotating skewer. 228 But the illusory nature of this self-awareness of the arrow and the skewer can constitute a fact only of our, human, or even other people’s consciousness, but neither the arrow nor the skewer are capable of simultaneously recognizing themselves as both free and unfree. Likewise, there is no reason not to admit that for some being alien to us, our freedom is likened to the freedom of a magnetic needle and a skewer, but we ourselves, while the field of our consciousness is occupied by the feeling of freedom, cannot simultaneously recognize ourselves as unfree, i.e. not only theoretically allow, but also practically experience two mutually exclusive states. In practice, we recognize ourselves as free, and in view of the complete indisputability of this epistemological fact, we can leave aside here the metaphysical question of free will. Since freedom in our consciousness sets the limit of mechanistic causality in everything that concerns our desires (as well as the desires of other people), it is obvious that these desires, according to the law of causality, turn out to be unknowable for us. Further, an already accomplished act of will, an act, but not the desire itself, which precedes it and is accompanied by a feeling of freedom, is subordinated to psychological causation or motivation. Therefore, no matter how much we postulate the universality of the law of causality, and in particular the regularity of social phenomena, we will involuntarily think of ourselves as free and place ourselves outside this regularity, considering it as the external limit of our freedom. We cannot think of ourselves under the exclusive dominance of the category of necessity, and on this basis social science, which would show us our future actions not as free, based on free choice, but as necessary and the only possible, leads to unbearable contradictions in our consciousness, therefore it is impossible. Of course, such cognition of everything that exists is logically conceivable, in which it all appears as one coherent act, united by the unity of a causal connection, but such cognition is possible not for us, but for the absolute spirit, standing above us with our limitations and with our consciousness of real or illusory free will. We must jump out of our own skin in order to recognize our own subjectively free actions as subjectively necessary. Therefore, social prediction, in which our future free actions are depicted as necessary, includes an epistemological contradiction and is an ideal unattainable for humans. We are unable to consistently implement the doctrine of determinism without ceasing to be ourselves. Whether this is happiness or misfortune for a person, but this is a fact, moreover, a fact associated not with one or another level of development of social science, but with the fundamental properties of our spirit, with the constant content of our consciousness. This fundamental impossibility of exclusive determinism was demonstrated with sufficient clarity by Stammler in his famous study “Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtauffassung”, and this is his enormous merit to social science. Stammler clarified the contradictions of consistent determinism using the example of so-called scientific socialism, which, on the one hand, postulates the need for the onset of a socialist system of society, but at the same time appeals to the free will of man, inviting him to a certain course of action to achieve this result. As Stammler rightly notes, it is impossible to found a party with the goal of promoting the onset of a lunar eclipse, which will already come in its own time with natural necessity. One of two things: either the socialist system of the future society is necessary like a lunar eclipse, then an appeal to human freedom is unnecessary, or it cannot be thought of by us as necessary and is in fact only the goal of our free aspirations. There is no middle ground or compromise between freedom and necessity as states of consciousness and cannot exist. Therefore, any doctrine of consistent determinism, regardless of its particular content, is subject to these irremovable contradictions. 229 In particular, the idea of ​​“scientific socialism”, according to which the socialist system seems to be both a necessary result of the causal dependence of phenomena, and an ideal or obligation for free will, in other words, the idea of ​​causal obligation or free necessity is a kind of wooden iron or iron tree. The freedom of human will in the above sense is expressed, as said, in the ability to choose. Choice presupposes discrimination and comparative assessment. Among the motives that appear to our consciousness, we condemn some, approve or justify others. The ability to evaluate, the difference between good and evil, is to a greater or lesser extent characteristic of everyone, at least of adult and healthy people. The possibility of such an assessment obviously presupposes the presence in our consciousness of some criterion or norm for this assessment. This norm may be clearly or unclearly recognized in each individual case or in each individual subject, but its very consciousness is an indisputable fact, and we state this fact in every judgment: this is good, and this is bad. Since we are specifically interested here in the question of social relations or social behavior, we will focus our attention precisely on the question of social obligation. The norms of social behavior that are present in everyone’s consciousness presuppose a certain social ideal, from the height of which social reality is assessed, and in accordance with such an assessment, people’s activities are determined. What is the content of this ideal and how is it justified? Does its justification extend beyond the boundaries of political economy and experimental science in general, or, on the contrary, is it possible within these limits? First, let's look at the latest opinion. It is expressed most decisively in the teachings of scientific socialism, which in theory eliminates any independent meaning of ought. There is not a single grain of ethics in Marxism, as Sombart once formulated this feature. Here the concept of natural necessity and class interest, as a natural reflection of objective economic phenomena, is put in place of what should be. Is it possible on such foundations to build a coherent system of social policy, which, undoubtedly, in general, Marxism is, and does it remain true to its own theoretical principles during this construction? As for natural necessity in general, this principle gives nothing as a guiding principle of social policy, because it gives too much. The entire future, from the point of view of consistent determinism, is equally necessary. Therefore, all the abominations and abominations that still have to be committed in history are necessary, along with the exploits of love and truth. The idea of ​​natural necessity therefore does not provide any criterion for distinguishing between the phenomena of reality, and yet the assessment is necessarily based on distinction and choice. And, of course, Marx’s followers have always made and are making this choice, distinguishing between positive and negative phenomena, progressive and reactionary, and in the antagonistic system of capitalist society, consciously taking the side of the workers and not the capitalists, although both classes represent an equally necessary product of the social history of modern times. On the basis of what criterion is such a distinction made, if any independent significance of the ideal and the ought is denied in advance? However, a correction is introduced here in the form of the concept of class interest as a natural criterion of politics. But does this criterion also prove to be sufficient, and does not even with it excessive borrowing from the rejected ethics take place? If we accept class or group interest as a norm of politics as a natural fact, then we will get as many such norms as there are individual class interests. From this point of view, which does not allow any assessment of various class interests according to their ethical value, the working class turns out to be just as right in its demands as the classes of landowners and capitalists, for all these interests are equally presented as naturally necessary. At the same time, humanity is, as it were, divided into several castes or different breeds in accordance with the difference in class interests. However, all classes - hypocritically or sincerely - strive to justify the seemingly natural fact of their class interest in a certain way, to reduce it to the highest demands of justice or social obligation. On the other hand, there are also class defectors, traitors to their class, and some of them for some reason suddenly declare themselves to be representatives of the interests of the working class, to which, however, in fact they never belonged and do not belong. This is how the non-class intelligentsia defines itself. 230 How can this class reincarnation be explained if one does not recognize the independent significance of the obligation in the name of which this reincarnation is carried out? But let's go further. Does the very concept of class interest have such definite and indisputable features that would clearly delimit it? First of all, it is obvious that it is not class that defines class interest, but, on the contrary, the existence of class interest itself is determined depending on the presence of such a general interest. A class is a group of persons having the same economic interests. Therefore, the only sign of class and class politics remains a community of economic interests. In theory, it is usually accepted a priori that homogeneous social groups also have common economic interests, and this assumption is considered to correspond to concrete reality. However, if we begin to build the concept of class not from above, but from below, a posteriori, and we look for actual unity of interests in concrete reality in order to determine class groupings on its basis, then we will not find the expected unity of interests of vast social groups that have many similarities in their external position. Let us take for example the working class, which is generally distinguished by the greatest unity and is often considered to have homogeneous economic interests. In fact, within this class there are a wide variety of groupings of different interests, and it is quite possible that a worker, while with some of his interests belonging to one group, with others belongs to a completely opposite one. Between workers belonging to different national economies, conflicts are possible due to competition on the world and even on the domestic market - both goods and labor (a classic example of the latter is, for example, the current desire of American workers to limit the immigration of foreign labor, and, as is known, this movement has already led to a number of laws that extremely limit and complicate the immigration of Europeans and actually prohibit the immigration of the Chinese). Divergence of interests is also possible within the same country regarding workers from different industrial regions competing with each other. This is observed even more often in relation to workers employed in various branches of production; for example, in Western Europe, and especially in the United States of America, the interests of industry and agriculture currently clash hostilely, and this, to a certain extent, is expressed by the mute and open antagonism of the corresponding categories of workers. Finally, workers employed in the same branch of production, under certain conditions, may have unequal or even opposing economic interests. We have a striking example of such a temporary opposition of interests in cases of violation of a strike, the so-called Strikebreaker. 231 Some workers start a strike in the name of their economic interests, others violate it in the name of their own economic interests. Who is right here if we remain on the basis of the consistently pursued doctrine of economic class interest? Consequently, if we turn to concrete reality to define the concept of class interest, we will find ourselves completely helpless in the face of the complexity and contradictory nature of individual interests and positions. Not only do we not find a stable definiteness of economic groupings, which is assumed in the teachings of Marxism as if it were self-evident, on the contrary, here we observe endless diversity and constant change. The consistent development of the doctrine of class interest as a norm of social policy necessarily leads to the denial of any norm, any general principles, leads to social atomism (Benthamism). 232 The last concept to which this logical regressus leads 233 will not even be the individual, for the same individual at different times and in different situations may have different and even opposing interests, but each individual act of economic activity. Class interest turns out to be a shadow and slips out of our hands as soon as we try to grasp it. And along with it, the concept of class escapes, since it is constituted by the sign of the unity of class interest. A policy of class interest, consistent and consistent, obviously must be able to understand this sea of ​​concrete contradictions of economic interests and have a criterion to justify some economic interests as correctly or ideally understood class interests and condemn others from the same point of view, for example, sanction the interests of strikers and condemn the interests of Strikebrechers. In this case, class interest turns out to be not a naturally necessary fact, but an ideal norm. In the name of an ideally understood class interest, you must act this way and not otherwise; this is the real content of the idea of ​​class politics, which is revealed to us by analyzing the concept of class. And if so, the doctrine of class politics has no right to oppose itself to social idealism or the doctrine of the independent role of the social ideal or obligation. It is only a separate case of this obligation, its particular formula, which is subject to discussion in terms of its special content, but is not at all a fundamental negation of obligation in general. So, if we openly reveal the entire content of the idea of ​​class politics, which is hidden in this teaching, then it will be completely as follows: of all existing social groupings, the requirements of justice correspond to the economic aspirations or interests of the working class, however, it is understood in a certain way why the policy that meets the ideal of justice is a policy in the direction of the interests of this class. But the real interests of this class can serve as the norm of politics only insofar as they meet the requirements of justice or class interest, ideally understood. One has only to turn to the popular literature of the Social Democratic Party, to its newspapers, leaflets, views, etc., and in different forms, but at every step we encounter a repetition of this very motif: in the name of class interest, understood as an ideal norm, as a demand for social justice, agitation is carried out, literary polemics are conducted, the enemy is denounced, tireless struggle is preached. All Social Democratic propaganda, one might say, is imbued with the very ethics of which Marxism does not want to introduce a single grain into its doctrine. Although this is inconsistent, it is quite natural and inevitable, for a person cannot renounce his ethical nature even if a doctrinaire scheme prompts him to do so. In this case, we can apply to Marxism the words of Marx himself that a person is not really what he thinks about himself. Denying ethics in theory, in practice social democracy is one of the most powerful ethical movements in modern social life. But what in Marx’s teaching is tolerable only against the will and, as it were, contraband, for us constitutes the central problem: what determines social obligation, what is the content of this social ideal, which imparts the quality of justice or injustice to individual social aspirations and actions, what is its nature? First of all, it is obvious that this obligation is not inextricably linked with any specific economic requirements; on the contrary, as a predicate it can be combined with economic content that is directly opposite and generally very different (for example, in England during the time of Ad. Smith, liberation ideals were associated with the demands of economic individualism - Laissez faire, laissez passer, 234 and at present with the diametrically opposed demands of socialism). Otherwise, this ought would not have the character of universality, general applicability, which is necessarily characteristic of it. And if the predicate of what should belong to a given economic requirement not because of its special content, but only its relation to the social ideal, then this latter also cannot be a definite requirement of an economic nature and, being higher and general than any economic content, can be rooted not in social economy, but only in morality. This brings to the fore the question of the nature of the mutual relations between morality and social policy. In Marxism we saw an attempt to cut off morality from social policy, sacrificing the latter. There are also opposing attempts - to destroy the independent field of social policy for the sake of monocracy of morality. From this point of view, it is considered sufficient to have personally good, loving relationships with everyone and everything; moral life is limited here to the area of ​​​​so-called personal morality. This is how the question of the relationship between morality and politics is resolved by two otherwise extremely distant doctrines, both of which strive to give a correct interpretation of Christian teaching: the Byzantine-ascetic worldview, on the one hand, and the teaching of L.N. Tolstoy - on the other. Extremes meet. The first doctrine denies the independent scope and significance of social and political reforms; at best, it simply ignores it; treats the idea of ​​social progress with distrust and suspicion, if not outright hostility; the only real reform of human relations can only be effected in the human heart. Therefore, only personal piety and morality are of paramount importance, perhaps even mores, but not institutions. (It is known that this Old Testament and fundamentally false view entered into the political worldview of the old Slavophiles, who denied the significance of legal guarantees, 235 even treating them with disdain, as a bad invention of the rotten West.) The teaching of L.N. leads to the same final result. Tolstoy about non-resistance to evil; limiting itself only to negative commandments of non-participation in evil, without a positive requirement to fight evil, this teaching naturally approaches the same socio-political nihilism as the Byzantine-ascetic doctrine. Both of these teachings must be contrasted with the moral axiom that morality, whether autonomous or religious, must still give an answer and guidance to all the demands of life and not turn away from any of them. We cannot build reality according to our own wishes, arbitrarily closing our eyes or declaring important aspects of it non-existent or unimportant. And in this reality, undoubtedly, there are relationships that go beyond the personal relations of a person to a person and therefore remain outside the sphere of personal morality. This includes public life, the field of law and socio-economic relations. Each specific issue in this area has to be resolved on the basis not of mediocre feelings, but of abstract rational principles. To fundamentally exclude this area from the sphere of morality and its tasks means to consciously give it over to the undivided dominance of dark instincts and elemental forces. But besides this, living in a certain environment, we cannot even implement the non-interference and abstinence that are required by the teaching in question. After all, it is not difficult to understand that non-participation is only a certain form of participation (just as in political economy everyone recognizes that Laissez faire politics is still a certain form of politics). Living under a well-known government organization and consciously removing myself from political issues, I nevertheless passively support this organization (not to mention the direct financial support that I provide as a taxpayer). Equally, we are all conscious or unconscious social politicians - not only Bismarck, who carries out the workers' insurance law, but also the last worker who takes part in a strike or rejects it. Therefore, there can be no talk of fundamental non-participation in public life, because it is generally impossible. This is why, by the way, very often, especially among clerics, this speech is simply a mask for protective tendencies or a bad cover; public morality is placed next to personal morality, representing its necessary development and continuation. Morality develops into politics. At the same time, politics, of course, cannot be something independent or alien to morality in relation to the basic and guiding principles, although the principles of morality are necessarily refracted in the social environment. The highest standard of personal morality is the commandment of love for one's neighbor. Applied as a criterion for social policy, this principle turns into a demand for justice, recognition of everyone’s rights. Justice is a form of love, as Vl rightly notes. Soloviev (in “The Justification of Good”). In fact, love for one’s neighbor simply as a person presupposes an equal attitude towards every human person, alien to any arbitrary preference for one over another, presupposes, in other words, justice as a self-evident and in this sense a natural norm of human relations: fair and unfair are concepts that we constantly use in our lives. A dispute about social ideals is nothing more than a dispute about justice and the correct understanding of its requirements. Let us try to reveal the main content contained in the concept of justice as a norm of human relations. The formula of justice is suum cuique, to each his own. Each person is recognized as having an inalienable suum, a sphere of his exclusive right and dominion. On what does this recognition of each human personality of such a sphere rest? This question cannot be answered without resorting to the concept of natural law, ridiculed and forever, as it seemed at one time, eliminated, but in fact irreducible from human consciousness. Natural law is a legal and social obligation; these are those ideal norms that do not exist in reality, but which should exist and, in the name of their objective obligation, deny the current law and the existing social way of life. Criticism of law and social institutions is an integral and inescapable human need; without this, social life would stop and freeze. And this criticism is carried out, of course, not empty-handed - such pointless criticism would be simple grumbling - but in the name of a certain ideal, an ideal ought. The existing historically established and therefore necessarily imperfect way of life is contrasted with the ideal, normal system of human relations, and this idea of ​​ideal, or natural, law provides a criterion of good and evil for assessing concrete socio-legal reality. Based on such an assessment, certain demands for reform are developed, and these demands, of course, change in history and are subject to the law of historical development (these are the so-called das natlirliche Recht mit wechselndem Inhalt). 236 But the legal ideal itself, the ideal norm of human relations, representing natural law in its own sense, is absolute and, therefore, must have an absolute sanction. Natural law in this sense, as an ideal and absolute norm for assessing positive law, comes down to several moral and legal axioms that are consciously or unconsciously implied in any legal judgment. The first of these axioms concerns the equality of people. People are equal to each other as moral persons; human dignity, the holiest of human titles, makes everyone equal. A person must be of absolute value to a person; The human personality is something impenetrable and self-sufficient, a microcosm. This position is firmly rooted in the consciousness of modern cultural humanity; if we mentally try to remove it, all morality is destroyed, all values ​​are devalued. (As you know, this experiment was carried out by Nietzsche). 237 On what is it based, on what basis can this teaching be affirmed, the inviolability of which is only confirmed by attempts to shake it? First of all, it does not belong to the number of innate and therefore irremovable data of human consciousness. It is not likened, for example, to the forms of sensory perception - space and time, which we cannot eliminate from consciousness, even if we wanted to. On the contrary, the idea of ​​the absolute dignity of the human person and the equality of people as bearers of this dignity enters the consciousness of humanity gradually; in this sense, it is a product of historical development. This idea was unknown to ancient antiquity, whose greatest thinkers - Plato and Aristotle - did not extend human dignity to slaves. 238 Although the idea of ​​equality of people was characteristic of the Stoics, 239 it received worldwide significance only in the preaching of the Gospel. 240 The idea of ​​equality does not represent an irreducible fact of consciousness in the sense that it does not at all correspond to our actual psychological experiences on this matter. In too many respects we feel unequal to other people - above or below them - and in any case deeply different from them (on which the sense of individuality is based). If we finally turn to empirical reality, then here too we will find that the indisputable fact of this reality is not the equality of people, but, on the contrary, their inequality. People are unequal in nature, unequal in age, gender, talent, education, appearance, conditions of upbringing, success in life, character, etc., etc. Consequently, we could not draw the idea of ​​equality from experience; from experience we could rather get ancient or Nietzschean ideas. The equality of people is not only not a fact, but cannot even become one; it is only a norm of human relations, an ideal that directly denies empirical reality. However, if the idea of ​​equality was recognized by humanity only in historical development, then perhaps it is simply a prejudice of our era, its taste, a whim? The ancient Hellene and the modern European have different culinary tastes, fashions and costumes, different astronomical, physical, etc. scientific views; Perhaps these differences should be compared with the difference in attitude towards the human person? But try to actually equate this difference with all the other features that distinguish us from the Hellenes, and we will immediately see the huge and fundamental difference that exists here. I can dress in a frock coat and an antique toga; I may have certain eating habits; I can finally have certain chemical, physiological, etc. views - all this does not in the least affect or characterize my moral personality, and these differences seem to her to be accidental and insignificant. On the contrary, in order to renounce the idea of ​​absolute human dignity, equal both in me and in my neighbors, I must morally fall, become brutalized, become bitter, and betray my moral self. This idea turns out to be more stable and more significant for determining a moral personality than the countless individual characteristics that in their totality form my empirical self; it constitutes, as it were, an integral part or core of it. My consciousness gives me a definite indication that this idea does not have a subjective and therefore only accidental meaning of whim or taste, which I can change daily, but objective and essential. This is the truth about me and about my neighbors. By affirming the equality of people, despite their empirical inequality, and the absolute dignity of the individual, despite its existing humiliated position, we deny empirical reality and, behind the “bark of nature,” we discern the true, divine essence of the human soul. People are not equal, and people are equal, these are two contradictory positions that we need to agree on. They can be reconciled only by classifying these contradictory predicates as different subjects. People are not equal in the natural order, as empirical beings, but are equal in the ideal order, as intelligible entities, as spiritual substances. But at the same time, the ideal order provides a norm, natural law, for the natural order. Only in this way is it possible to think without contradiction, equally for us, indisputable truths about man both as a natural and as an ideal being. It follows that the doctrine of the equality of people and the absolute dignity of the human person, which constitutes the moral foundation of the newest democratic civilization, necessarily implies a transcensus beyond the limits of empirically given reality, into a super-experiential region, accessible only to metaphysical thinking and religious faith, and this transcensus itself leads to dualism, to the bifurcation of reality into the world of truly existing, ideal, and the empirical world, reproducing the eternal antiseme of Platonism. It is based on religious teaching about the nature of the human soul and its relationship to the Divine. We have already mentioned that the idea of ​​the absolute dignity of the human person and the equality of all before God, as “sons of God,” is preached in the Gospel and is inextricably linked in it with the teaching about God and the world, with the basic tenets of Christian doctrine. All democratic ideals of our time are nourished by this idea. But - in a strange way - not only the origin of this idea is forgotten and its real foundations are lost, but over time the ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity began to be considered something alien and even contrary to Christianity. There is no need here to examine all the reasons for this unfortunate historical misunderstanding; but this misunderstanding leads to the fact that the mentioned ideals, torn off from their natural and, moreover, only basis, find themselves hanging in the air and open to all kinds of attacks (Darwinistic, Nietzschean, etc.), for they can have only one indisputable basis - religious-metaphysical. Only faith in God gives grounds for faith in man. And if faith in man remains in the modern soul, then it is supported by an old habit of consciousness that has long outlived its foundations, by unconscious religiosity. On the contrary, holding on to the ground of consistent positivism, judging a person by what empirical reality gives us, we have every reason to draw a conclusion about the inequality of people and, based on this actual inequality, to reject the preaching of equality as harmful and utopian. This is what the intrepid positivist Nietzsche did, who deeply and rightly understood his anti-Christianity as a denial of the ideas of equality and democracy, both political and economic. (One cannot, therefore, help but be surprised at the blindness with which they are currently trying to adapt Nietzsche’s preaching to the ideals of democracy and decorate with bright feathers borrowed from Nietzsche the lifeless skeleton of the most ordinary positivism.) In this point, Nietzsche is more consistent with Comte and more consistent with Marx, for he reveals everything, without any borrowing from religion. The idea of ​​equality necessarily leads to the conclusion that no person has or can have a natural right to suppress the moral personality of another by violent means. The idea of ​​equality of people necessarily includes the idea of ​​freedom as the norm of human relations or the ideal of social order. “Right is freedom conditioned by equality. In this basic definition of law, the individualistic principle of freedom is inextricably linked with the social principle of equality, as a synthesis of freedom and equality. The concepts of personality, freedom and equality constitute the essence of so-called natural law.” 241 Here some clarification is needed as to what real meaning the idea of equality and freedom can have. The idea of ​​equality of people as moral individuals does not and cannot destroy their empirical inequality and difference, which is not only secondary, created by social conditions, but also given as an initial fact. It is impossible to make differences in gender, age, intelligence, talent, and inclinations non-existent. Mechanical equalization under one would be the greatest inequality, a gross violation of the principle of suum cuique, and, moreover, it would be virtually impossible. The ideal of equality has meaning and significance, corresponds to the supreme idea of ​​justice only as a requirement for possible equality of conditions for the development of the individual, for the purpose of his free self-determination, moral autonomy. In other words, the entire practical content of the idea of ​​equality comes down to the idea of ​​personal freedom and the requirement of social conditions for its development, which are most favorable to this freedom. However, the demand for freedom does not deny any dependence of the individual on society. Such freedom is possible only on Robinson Island; it must be sought in that prehistoric era when man wandered as a solitary savage. The life of people in society necessarily determines the interaction between people, which represents a certain dependence of people on each other. This dependence takes on a wide variety of forms, due to the existing empirical inequality of people. It is easy to distinguish between internal, or free, and external, or forced dependence. The first we have in the relationship of a student to a teacher, a reader to a writer, a son to a father, etc. Such dependence not only does not violate the spiritual freedom of the individual, but, in fact, it represents a field for its manifestation, because personal freedom is actually realized only in communication with other people. Dependence of the second type is created by the conditions of human existence as a physical being, connected with the outside world by the iron necessity to defend one’s physical existence. The consequence of this necessity is the emergence of a state and economic union, and a person becomes dependent on the forced organization of both. He cannot completely free himself from this dependence, remaining a slave to physical necessity. The ideal of personal freedom in this case comes down only to weakening or neutralizing this dependence as much as possible, turning it from external to internal, from forced to free. Dependence on the state seems to us to be political oppression not as such, not because the state exists at all with its own demands, but only at those points where these demands contradict our moral sense and cannot be accepted and fulfilled freely, without coercion. It does not seem to us, for example, that the prohibition to steal or kill is a violation of freedom; receiving full sanction from moral consciousness, these demands of the state are fulfilled by us freely. On the contrary, restrictions of a private and public legal nature, those that meet with decisive condemnation from our moral consciousness, are experienced as political oppression. The ideal of political freedom therefore lies not in the abolition of the state (which is the theory of anarchism), but in transforming it into compliance with the requirements of moral consciousness. Economic dependence occurs when the organization of production, the economic system, determines the external and forced subordination of some to others. This kind of dependence, based on the separation of labor from the instruments of production, is naturally experienced as economic oppression. Determined in its details by a thousand individual circumstances, the existence of such oppression allows one person to powerfully limit the will of another, therefore, here, in any case, there is a violation of the natural right of personal freedom. However, the ideal of freedom here cannot consist in the destruction of the economic union in general - such a senseless demand would be tantamount to an invitation to general suicide, and, therefore, not in the dissolution of economic ties between people, which, along with economic progress, as we know, do not weaken, but become stronger and more complex, but precisely in the neutralization of this dependence. It can only be neutralized by destroying the personal character of this dependence, for it is precisely this that offends moral feeling. This, so to speak, depersonalization and at the same time the destruction of economic dependence occurs with the growth of economic collectivism, along with which the place of the private entrepreneur or capitalist is increasingly taken over by society or the state, which represents an abstract personality (more precisely, even impersonality). And every step forward that is taken in the direction of replacing or limiting personal dictatorship—whether it be a factory law or a municipal enterprise or a cooperative—marks a gradual increase in the liberation of the individual from personal economic oppression. However, from this point of view, some forms of economic individualism are also equivalent to economic collectivism, namely, small individual farming, an example of which we currently have in the peasant economy that is progressing in the West. If one can still argue against independent peasant farming for reasons of economic expediency and progress, then, from the point of view of the social ideal, this kind of individualism is quite equivalent to collectivism. That is why, by the way, considering purely economic arguments against peasant farming to be erroneous, I include in my economic program, along with collectivism in industry, peasant individualism in agriculture 242 (of course, complemented by the development of agricultural cooperatives), and from the point of view of the general ideal of freedom, such a seemingly contradictory combination turns out to be consistent and internally consistent. Based on what has been said so far, it is clear that the moral basis of socialism is given by individualism, the ideal of personal freedom. Socialism and individualism are not only not opposite principles, but mutually determine one another. Only their correct combination and balance ensures the possible fullness of individual freedom and its rights. At the same time, despite the inseparability of both principles, their connection contains an irreconcilable antinomy: for the sake of freedom, the individual must submit to society, and this dependence of the individual on society intensifies as his freedom increases. On the other hand, taking upon itself the task of protecting individual freedom, a public organization can carry it out only by energetically maintaining the legal order against the encroachments of the arbitrariness of individuals. It is impossible even in theory to delimit precisely and indisputably where the rights of society and the state end and the area of ​​inviolable individual rights begins. In history, this border constantly moves in one direction or another, it is constantly being found anew along with changes in historical conditions. Thanks to this irreducible antinomianism, there is always a silent struggle between the individual and society, and it can always flare up, turning into open disobedience, on the one hand, or violent actions, on the other. Due to this antinomianism, even the most ideal social structure can only have an unstable equilibrium. Both members of this antinomy, taken in isolation and transformed into “abstract principles,” provide the basis for the ancient ideal, on the one hand, and the anarchist ideal, on the other, these two poles of social and philosophical thought. The ancient world recognized only society, before which the individual is destroyed; The idea of ​​natural duties for the ancient mind seems much more indisputable than the idea of ​​natural rights. The ancient ideal of communism, just like the primitive or patriarchal communist system, cannot now serve as an ideal for us, because it lacks precisely what in our eyes gives moral value to communism, to which it serves only as a means - personal freedom. On the contrary, anarchism wants to know only the rights of the individual, only Max Stirner’s “dem Einziden und sein Eigenthum” with his “Ich habe meine Sach’ auf Nichts gestellt” 243 and the denial of duties towards one’s own kind. (Nietzsche’s ideal of the superman is also antisocial.) This is the content of the social ideal: the commandment of love = social justice = recognition of equal and absolute dignity for each person = the demand for the greatest fullness of individual rights and freedom. The justification for this ideal is given by the religious and ethical teaching about the nature of the human soul and the ensuing duties of man to man. The ideal of freedom, which forms the moral core of modern democracy (political and economic), is not revealed in political economy or the science of law: in experimental knowledge, man seeks only the means to realize the absolute ideal. At the same time, the political and social ideals that inspire modern humanity are undoubtedly Christian ideals, since they represent the development of the doctrine of the equality of people and the absolute value of the human person brought to the world by Christianity. To understand the nature of the social ideal, it is essential not to forget that it, being a priori or given from the outside for social policy, cannot serve as a historical goal, one of those goals that can be achieved and left behind. 244 Only specific goals are achievable in historical development, while the ideal of justice is abstract and, by its very meaning, can be combined with various concrete contents. It is only a regulative idea, providing a scale for moral judgment and evaluation. Changing specific conditions bring new data to solve this problem for a new finding of this world-historical sought-after. We cannot imagine without contradiction the complete resolution of this problem in history (“heaven on earth”), because this would mean the end of all history, the immobility of death, or absolute perfection, which is unattainable in the conditions of empirical existence. Let us not forget that the ideal of equality and freedom is a negation of these conditions, and therefore cannot be fully embodied in them. However, if the concept of history implies the idea of ​​​​infinite development, this latter takes place in a certain direction and has an ideal goal; From here the idea of ​​progress receives a very definite meaning. The entire course of historical development seems to us to be continuous (albeit zigzag) progress, the triumph of freedom and justice in the external forms of social life, the emancipation of the human personality, the gradual gathering and external unification of historical humanity. One of the most important tasks of world history lies in the emancipation of the individual and the socialization of humanity. But here we are already on the threshold of the philosophy of history, which there is no need to cross in this presentation. Let us only note that a philosophical discussion of the social question, the problem of social obligation, necessarily leads us to the philosophy of history, to the problem of social and historical existence, which, in turn, is connected with all the main problems of philosophy. This connection exists equally for both the metaphysical and the positive thinker, not only for Hegel, but also for Marx. It should also be especially emphasized that the ideal of personal freedom differs significantly from the utilitarian or hedonistic criteria with which it is often replaced by positivists. A person should be free because it corresponds to his human dignity; external freedom is a means, or rather, a negative condition of internal, moral freedom, which is the image of God in man. Kant expresses the idea that man, as a freely rational person, is the goal for which God created the world, that world necessity exists for the sake of human freedom. 245 This idea should be strengthened and especially confirmed in relation to the history of mankind, for which the development of individual freedom is the supreme ideal. But, putting forward this requirement of freedom as an absolute religious and moral postulate, we do not at all connect it with the question of how exactly a free person will want to use this freedom, as well as whether he will be happy with it. A person can, as a moral person who knows good and evil, decide in one direction or the other, and none of the people can predetermine or decide for him. Only free human actions have moral value; only in them does a person discover the true nature of his spiritual self, realize the person in himself. It is also unlikely that anyone will dare to confidently say that by becoming more conscious and free, a person in general becomes happier; In general, hedonistic progress is more than doubtful and remains, in any case, controversial. But even if it were proven absolutely indisputably that, in a hedonistic sense, civilization is accompanied by a positive regression, then even then it would be necessary to call humanity forward, to freedom and towards this regression, and not back, to sleepy contentment - freedom is such an invaluable good that can redeem everything, and birthrights should not be sold for any lentil stew. The question of the autonomy of the social ideal and the value of human freedom is posed with stunning force by the Grand Inquisitor (in Dostoevsky's legend), who seems to be bargaining with Christ for human freedom. For the sake of people’s happiness, which consists of satiety, contentment and peace, the inquisitor deprives them of what should be for a person above all earthly goods - their moral freedom. Dostoevsky rightly sees here a denial of the main idea of ​​Christian morality and portrays the inquisitor as a conscious enemy and adversary of Christ. The commandment of freedom, as history shows, is one of the ideas most difficult and reluctant to assimilate by humanity. That is why the inquisitor has always collected and now still collects many, many. Moral violence, violent virtue, these are the behests of not only medieval, but also modern inquisitors, with the difference, however, that in accordance with the general softening of morals, fires have now been replaced by prohibitive and punitive laws. Since the social ideal provides only a scale for assessing social phenomena, in itself it is not yet associated with any specific specific content, the discovery of which is an independent task. And if the social ideal appears to be given or given for social science and, therefore, in a certain sense, superscientific, then in finding its specific content one can and should use the data of scientific experience with all possible completeness; a concrete ideal must be constructed scientifically, and this is the truth of so-called scientific socialism. According to Marx’s absolutely fair demand, the means for realizing the ideal should not be invented out of the head, but found through a scientific analysis of reality. 246 Idealistic politics should not be utopian, but realistic; idealism in politics can and should be practical. The logical possibility and even the necessity of combining idealism with sober realism is still not sufficiently understood due to the completely erroneous and arbitrary confusion of idealism with utopianism, when in fact there is nothing in common between the two. On the contrary, utopianism is more likely psychologically connected with positivism due to the fact that in the latter the absolute is sought in the relative, while in idealism the correct philosophical perspective is observed. Socio-political realism, based on philosophical idealism and fundamentally opposed to unprincipled practicality and adaptation, does not at all mean that the ideal should be exchanged for trifles and drag along the earth. The demands of a realistic policy, guided by an absolute ideal, can in no way be a preaching of small things and a denial of broad historical and social tasks. Of course, any practical activity consists of small things, i.e. from separate isolated actions, but these actions can and should be considered in organic connection with the great historical tasks that revive them. These tasks are historical in the sense that they do not represent abstract postulates of morality, but very specific, feasible demands for the reorganization of reality in the direction of the ideal. It is precisely such tasks, and not abstract moral principles, that determine the programs of political parties and give a certain content to political and social struggle. These tasks can, of course, differ from each other in their breadth and require different amounts of time for their implementation; If sometimes one parliamentary session is enough to implement a factory law, then for a radical social reform or political liberation of the country the combined work of a number of generations is required. It is quite possible, therefore, that such a task, without losing its historical character, in relation to the individual life of an individual, plays the role of only a regulatory idea that determines the direction of activity, but does not fit entirely into it. There is therefore a gradation between specific historical tasks according to the degree of their breadth and difficulty; The deeper the spiritual needs of a person, the broader the historical tasks with which he connects his activities. Wide horizons are necessary not only for the eye, but also for the spirit. The ideal of justice is inherent in every person. There is no person who would rebel against justice as such, who would consciously want to be unfair in his actions. The moral nature of people is the same, and there is no reason to divide humanity in this regard into sheep and goats simply on the basis of the fact that they belong to different socio-economic and political groups. And at the same time, it seems impossible to find two people who would agree in understanding the specific requirements of justice in all the smallest details, and all of humanity, as we know, is currently breaking up into a number of parties or groups with different, even diametrically opposed understandings of the requirements of justice. How can this be explained? One can point out a number of reasons due to which a variety of demands are put forward in the name of a single ideal of justice. First of all, we need to take into account the complexity of social life and the resulting possibility of completely sincere and conscientious disagreement in assessing the same phenomena; Of course, this disagreement does not destroy the central significance of a single ideal of justice, just as scientific disagreements do not destroy a single truth as an ideal or norm of scientific knowledge. A striking example of such sincere and conscientious differences of opinion are the socio-political views of Eug. Richter, the leader of the freethinkers, on the one hand, and the Social Democrats, on the other. The ideal of Richter and Bebel is the same - personal freedom; but one, in the name of this ideal, puts forward the demands of socialism, and the other, fearing the possibility of despotic absorption of the individual by the state in a socialist society, puts forward the opposite program of Manchesterism. On the basis of different understandings of the specific requirements of justice, principled disputes and principled struggles are generally conducted. The possibility of equally deep and sincere disagreements exists in the assessment of individual activities - small and large matters that make up social policy. Experience shows that on every question of a practical nature there are endless disagreements between social politicians, even with complete commonality of guiding ideals: for example, it is enough to cite the disagreements on the peasant question, on the question of workers' unions, cooperations, parliamentary activities, etc., that exist among the present-day German Social Democracy. The third and, perhaps, the most important reason for differences in the understanding of justice is the fatal limitations of man, the narrowness of his spiritual horizons. Each person’s worldview is formed depending on a whole sum of individual conditions, which differ sharply for different social groups. Prejudices absorbed with mother's milk, upbringing, ignorance of many aspects of life, involuntary and unconscious adaptation of the worldview to living conditions, a natural tribute to human weakness, all this creates a peculiar mental makeup of entire social groups, as they say, class psychology. To explain the characteristics of class psychology, there is no need to reduce them to naked class interest, which has nothing to do with ideas of justice; they are completely sufficiently explained on the basis of a general fact - the empirical limitations of man, thanks to which different understandings of the requirements of justice become completely bona fide. 247 An individual, to the extent of his spiritual strength and development, can weaken or break this empirical limitation of his worldview and become psychologically declassed. One must not, however, forget that such declassification requires absolutely exceptional spiritual strength, sometimes heroism. For all these reasons, if people were guided in their actions exclusively by the demands of justice, as everyone understands them, then there would inevitably be a struggle between them, due to the difference in this understanding and the natural desire of each to defend their truth, and on this basis civil strife and wars would arise. But not only ideal motives, ideas about what is proper and fair, but also selfish motives and personal interests have power over people. Extreme need or predatory instincts, weakness of will or lust for power, hatred or guile, envy or greed - in a word, a variety of motives can cause actions committed either directly contrary to the requirements of justice, or, even more often, in addition to considerations about them; a habit is created in a whole series of actions to be guided by an egoistic instinct, without at all asking questions about justice; a kind of practical amoralism is established regarding entire aspects of life, of course, for everyone in their own way and to varying degrees. The similarity of economic status and, thanks to it, the same direction of personal interests creates class or group interests that play the role of levers in social life. The individual life of every person is a psychological tangle of a wide variety of motives, both ideal and base, and there is no way to determine which of them plays a major role in a person’s life. Therefore, by the way, the doctrine of the dominant role of class interest, understood in the sense of the egoistic instinct, is, at the very least, an unprovable statement. However, if we are unable to unravel or take into account the motives of actions, then these very actions, accessible to direct observation, can be subjected to study and grouping. No matter how important knowledge of internal motives is for moral assessment, for the purposes of social policy, knowledge of the usual course of action of individuals or social groups, no matter what motives it may be, is sufficient in order to be able to practically take it into account. In the ranks of the same political party, there will undoubtedly be people motivated by very different motives, with different convictions and moods; however, this difference is extinguished by a certain unity of action corresponding to the objective goals of the party, and this practical unity makes it possible to ignore all other differences, no matter how great they may be. Such a view does not sin with moral indifference and is not a compromise, because the party and socio-political group, and by its very task, does not take the whole person, but only a certain aspect of his activity, demands from him certain actions, without searching for their innermost motives. Party discipline cannot and should not go beyond what is absolutely necessary for the purposes of party action, providing in all other respects complete freedom of individuality. 248 Unfortunately, a correct understanding of the boundaries of party discipline is poorly instilled in practice. Since in life there are different and even diametrically opposed aspirations, it is obvious that they cannot all seem equally fair to us if we have a certain ideal, our own understanding of justice. Otherwise, we would have to turn all logic upside down and abolish the basic logical laws, especially the law of identity, contradiction and the excluded middle, and immediately justify black and white. Or we are left with criminal and flabby indifferentism, the homeland of chaos and darkness, as Kant beautifully puts it. 249 Approaching life with certain requirements and finding in it a discord of interests and aspirations, which does not depend on my will and therefore must be accepted by me as a fact, I must necessarily take a clear and unambiguous position in it, joining any of the existing trends or taking my own direction. Consequently, any form of active participation in life fatally, against our will, draws us into struggle, for life is a struggle, and the truth in it not only unites, but also divides. Bright festive vestments can only be preserved by those who are leaving life, and every active person puts on a work apron or battle armor to work for their truth or fight for it. Therefore, a specific superclass or universal politics is impossible, it is an empty place, in reality there is only class, party or group politics, a politics not of unity, but of division and struggle. But aren't we falling into hopeless contradiction with ourselves? After all, at first we denied the independent foundations of class politics and established a universal ideal of social policy, and now we come to the conclusion that in reality only class politics is possible, and that universal politics is an empty phantom? The apparent contradiction, however, disappears if we pay attention to the real meaning of both supposedly contradictory statements, the first of which concerns the ideal goal, and the second the specific means leading to its implementation. It remains indisputable that the ideal of social policy, the criterion for assessing certain specific phenomena and activities, is given by the idea of ​​​​the equivalence of the human personality and its natural rights, which flow from here. This absolute requirement of morality determines the direction in which social development should take place. All means of social policy, which are determined in detail by specific conditions, must be assessed in relation to this absolute goal. From this point of view, class politics also has an ideal value, not because it is class or because the interests of a given social group are something sacred or preferable in themselves, but simply because in this case these demands coincide with the demands of social justice, and this connection is purely historical and not logical. The demands for social reforms, which are currently emanating from the working class and in its main features coincide with its class interests, receive their ethical value not due to this coincidence, but due to the fact that these demands can be supported in the name of universal human interests, alien to the capitalists, whose human dignity is also not consistent with the voluntary or involuntary position of the exploiters. Of course, the ideal interests of the human person collide with the material interests of a given subject, placed in certain external conditions of life, and on this basis a struggle arises. But in this case, struggle is the only path to a future, albeit distant peace, a peace based not on cowardly reconciliation with untruth, but on the victorious triumph of truth. On the basis stated above, denying the socio-philosophical doctrine of Marxism and proceeding from completely different philosophical grounds, I still remain faithful to it in everything that concerns the main issues of specific social policy, deviating from it only in those points of the economic doctrine where the latter seems to me erroneous, due to arguments of a special economic nature (for example, in the agrarian question). Theoretically, we distinguish two ideals that give life to political economy: economic 250 and social. Of course, in concrete life there is no division between economic and social phenomena, which is only possible in abstraction. In reality, economic demands also have social significance and vice versa. Social liberation by the force of things is also connected with economic liberation; freedom from social oppression is inseparable from freedom from poverty. However, although the demands of social and economic policy can run parallel and merge to the point of indistinguishability, their artificial isolation and even opposition is theoretically possible. Each of the two ideals of political economy can be turned into an “abstract principle” and, if developed one-sidedly, lead to socio-political absurdity. In this case, the question naturally arises, what is more important and what is easier to give up: freedom from poverty or from slavery, economic or social freedom. There is no way to give a satisfactory answer to this question, just as it is impossible to answer, for example, the question of which death penalty is preferable: through promotion or guillotine; the question of which is worse must be answered here: both prospects are worse. Both economic and social freedom constitute an equally vital, albeit negative, condition for the development of the human personality. It is therefore fairer to consider both ideals of political economy as equivalent, in the complete absence of any grounds for giving preference to one or the other. The correct policy must therefore be recognized as one which pays equal attention to the interests of both social and economic progress. These requirements, at least in theory, are satisfied by the social policy of Marxism, which consciously seeks to reconcile the interests of economic progress with the demands of social justice. An example of a one-sided passion for economic progress is given by bourgeois English and non-English apologists, who looked at man exclusively as an instrument for the production of wealth and subordinated their socio-political demands to this one-sided aspect. This was accompanied by the most shocking indifference to the suffering of the working class, which bore on its shoulders the burden of accumulating wealth. An example of the opposite extreme - the recognition of the demands of social justice alone, without any attention to the requirements of economic progress, is the doctrine of simplification by L.N. Tolstoy. Outraged by modern disasters and all social injustices, Tolstoy proposes a simple and immediate way to destroy them by simplifying and eliminating the division of labor with all its consequences. In addition to the various and numerous objections that are easy to make against this teaching, we should not forget that the fulfillment of Tolstoy’s sermon, perhaps destroying social slavery, would probably plunge humanity into economic slavery, i.e. into hopeless poverty, which, given the current population density, could easily lead to starvation. This is exactly what the Germans characterize as throwing the baby out of the bathwater. So, the requirements of economic and social policy must always be consistent with each other, and such coordination in each individual case is a questio facti, sometimes very difficult to resolve. But this question is resolved on the basis of data provided by empirical political economy, and goes beyond the boundaries of social philosophy. In Spinoza, as an example of the absence of free will, it is not the “magnetic needle” that appears, but a stone thrown up. “Imagine,” Spinoza wrote in a letter to G.G. Schuller in October 1674 - that the stone, continuing its movement, thinks and realizes that it strives with all its might not to stop this movement. This stone, since it is conscious only of its own desire and since it is by no means indifferent, will think that it is eminently free and continues to move for no other reason than that it desires it. The same is human freedom, the possession of which everyone boasts and which consists only in the fact that people are aware of their desires, but do not know the reasons by which they are determined” (Spinoza B. Selected works: In 2 volumes. M., 1957. Vol. 2. P. 592). This refers to the following reasoning by I. Kant in the “Critique of Practical Reason”: “. If the freedom of our will were only as an automaton spirituale (“spiritual automaton” - Leibniz’s term from “Theodicy”), then in essence it would be no better than the freedom of a device for rotating a spit, which, once wound up, automatically performs its movements” (Kant I. Soch. M, 1965. Vol. 4. Part 1. P. 426). In my old article about Stammler’s book (“On the Law of Social Phenomena,” Vopr. Philos. and Psychol., 1896, V), I objected to this basic position of it. Thinking about this question again, I finally came to the conclusion that my objections circumvent the question and in fact do not destroy Stammler’s argumentation at all. To avoid misunderstandings, I note that the exclusively epistemological formulation of the question of free will, in which we find it in Stammler, and also in the present presentation, while completely sufficient for the purposes of social science, is, of course, in no way exhaustive and final. On the contrary, the main problem of freedom (or non-freedom) of will in the metaphysical sense is not touched upon here, although the question of free will in the epistemological sense necessarily leads to this metaphysical problem. Sometimes this is motivated by the fact that the conditions of economic progress are linked to the interests of the working class. It is not difficult, however, to see that in this case the norm of politics is no longer class interest, but economic progress; consequently, the original criterion is replaced by another. Strikebreaker literally means “strikebreaker” in German. “Benthamism” is the ethical teaching of I. Bentham, according to which morality is based on the concept of “benefit,” understood as the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. From this doctrine grew utilitarianism. In 1861, an essay by J. St. was published. Mill's "Utilitarianism", in which, in addition to external motivation (like Bentham), the principle of the internal dictate of conscience is formulated. In logic, “regression” means a proof in which the course of reasoning goes from consequences to reasons. Let whoever does what he wants (French) is the principle of “non-interference” of free trade economists, supporters of free trade and government non-interference in the sphere of economic life and economic relations. The denial of “legal guarantees” was characteristic of the majority of Slavophiles (primarily the younger generation and “epigones”), but K.S. became especially famous in this “field”. Aksakov, who argued that “while Western humanity” moved “the path of external truth, the path of the state,” the Russian people followed the path of “internal truth.” Therefore, the relationship between the people and the Sovereign in Russia, especially pre-Petrine Russia, was based on mutual trust and on a mutual sincere desire for benefit. “However,” he assumed, “they will tell us: either the people or the government can betray each other. We need a guarantee! - And to this he replied: “There is no need for a guarantee! A guarantee is evil. Where it is needed, there is no good; let it be better for a life in which there is no good to be destroyed than to stand with the help of evil” (quoted from: Vekhi. From the depths. M., 1991. P. 127; see also: Aksakov K.S. Pol. sobr. soch. M., 1889. T. 1. P. 9). B.C. Solovyov wrote the following about this: “In general, this glorification of the Russian person, who so rises above legality, so compromises the legal principle that he even neglects the honesty of the promissory note, is only a translation into prose and the dissemination of the witty poems of B.N. Almazov, which he put into the mouth of one of the main Slavophiles (K.S. Aksakov): Common legal sense, (Soloviev V.S. Works: In 2 volumes. M., 1989. T. 1. P. 596). Natural law with variable content (German). This refers to “The Revaluation of All Values” by F. Nietzsche, which is one of two continuations of his book “Human, All Too Human.” In Russian translation, it was published under the not entirely accurate title “Revaluation of Everything Valuable” (see: Nietzsche F. Collected works. M., published by bookseller V.K. Klyukin, b/g, vol. V). Here are a few typical aphorisms from “The Revaluation of All Values”: “Just as justice often serves as a cover for weakness, so it is vice versa: people who are fair, but weak, often resort to pretense out of vanity, deliberately acting cruelly and unfairly in order to give themselves the appearance of firmness.” “All moralists are timid, because they know that they will be confused with spies and traitors as soon as their inclination is noticed, and besides, they are generally aware of their powerlessness in matters; after all, having started some business, they focus all their attention not on it, but on the motives of their activity.” “There is a slow and gradual path that leads to vice and to all kinds of meanness. At the end of this path, people walking along it no longer even feel a shiver of remorse, and such a person, having become a complete scoundrel, walks in complete innocence” (Nietzsche F. Op. op. pp. 40, 42, 45). According to Aristotle’s famous definition, “a slave is an animated instrument”; and in general “some people are free by nature, others are slaves, and it is both useful and fair for the latter to be slaves” (Aristotle! Works: In 4 volumes. M., 1984. Vol. 4. pp. 236, 384). In Plato this idea is expressed only implicitly. In the dialogue “State,” the slave class is not envisaged at all as one of the main classes of the ideal state (and the word “slave” itself appears only six times), since the denial of personal property for rulers-philosophers and guards excludes the possibility of owning slaves. But Plato’s last dialogue “Laws” contains an idea that later became the starting point for Aristotle’s “slave-owning” theory. ". Slaves, argues Plato, the Athenian, will never become friends of their masters, just as worthless people will never become friends of decent people, even if they occupy positions of equal honor. For for those who are unequal, what is equal would become unequal if the proper measure were not observed. The ancient proverb is true that equality creates friendship.” A few pages later, the same Plato, “The Athenian,” teaches: “We must punish slaves fairly and not pamper them, like free people, with admonitions. Almost every address to a slave must be a command. In no way and never should you joke with slaves - neither women nor men. Many pamper slaves very recklessly; by doing this they only make their subordinate life more difficult, and they also make it difficult for themselves to manage them” (Plato. Collected works: In 4 volumes. M., 1994. Vol. 4. pp. 207, 229). This refers to the so-called "late (or Roman) Stoics", which include Marcus Aurelius, Seneca and the former slave Epictetus. Many of the ethical ideas of the Stoics are consonant with later Christianity; Seneca has especially many such ideas, whose texts sometimes coincide almost word for word with the writings of the New Testament. This already in ancient times gave rise to the legend of Seneca’s Christianity and gave rise to the compilation of a mythical pseudo-correspondence between Seneca and the Apostle Paul. In one of his letters to Lucilius, Seneca cites the popular proverb in Rome “how many slaves, so many enemies” and, characterizing it as “immoral”, writes further: “They (slaves) are not enemies. We ourselves make them our enemies. Was he not, whom you call your slave, born of the same seed, walking under the same sky, breathing like you, living like you, dying like you? In the same way, you could see him as a freeborn, and he as a slave” (Seneca. Moral letters to Lucilius. M., 1977. Letter XLVII, 5. P. 77). The Christian idea of ​​equality is formulated by the Apostle Paul: “There is no longer Jew, nor Gentile; there is neither slave nor free; there is no male or female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3:28). Vl. Soloviev. Law and morality. Collection cit., vol. VII, p. 499. See my book “Capitalism and Agriculture”, 2 volumes. St. Petersburg 1900 “The One and His Property” (German) is the title of M. Stirner’s book, which begins and ends with the words: “I founded my business on nothing.” Stirner borrowed this expression from Goethe’s poem “Vanitas! Vanitatum vanitasi": "I bet on nothing." (Goethe I.V. Collected works: In 10 volumes. M., 1975. Vol. 1. P. 273), who, in turn, repeated the beginning of the saying from the collection of Michael Neander (1585). Stammler, who has excellently explained the regulative nature of the social ideal, quite rightly points out that such an ideal cannot be thought of as achieved, the movement towards it is endless, and therefore, in this sense, the social question within the limits of history cannot be finally resolved. In “Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals” Kant wrote: “. I affirm: man and, in general, every rational being exists as an end in itself.” “From here,” he continues in the “Critique of Practical Reason,” “the conclusion naturally suggests itself that in a series of goals, man (and with him every rational being) is an end in itself, i.e. can never be used by anyone (even God) only as a means, without at the same time being an end.” (Кант И. Критика практического разума. СПб., 1995. С. 89, 234). See: Marx K., Engels F. Soch. 2nd ed. T. 19. Conscientiously, innocently (lat.). It goes without saying that a certain ethical minimum is required here too, but it consists mainly of demands of a negative rather than a positive nature. In the Preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant wrote: “At the present time, when (according to the conviction of many) all paths have been unsuccessfully tried, disgust and complete indifferentism reign in science - the mother of Chaos and Night.” (Kant I. Critique of Pure Reason. M., 1994. P. 8). Wed. previous article “On the economic ideal”.