About the treatise "Rule of Theology" by St. Nile Cabasilas and "Theme of the Distinction between the Light and Heat of Fire" by St. Nile Cabasilas and St. Gregory Palamas

This article uses materials from a study carried out with the support of the Russian State Science Foundation; project No. 13–33–01299. I express my gratitude to V.L. Ivanov for kindly providing information on the topic of the difference between the Divine essence and attributes in Western scholasticism, given in approx. 9 of this article. – Source of publication: Biryukov D.S. About the treatise “Rule of Theology” by St. Nile Cabasilas and the theme of the distinction between light and heat of fire in St. Nile Cabasilas and St. Gregory Palamas // EINAI: Problems of philosophy and theology. 2012. Volume 2. No. 1–2 (3–4). pp. 423–440. In this article I will review the main provisions of the treatise of St. published above. Neil Cabasilas “Rule of Theology” 1 and analyze the background in Palamite theology of one important topic for this theological tradition touched upon in the treatise, namely, the topic of the distinction between heat and light of fire (the Sun). As an analogy used to explain the doctrine of the distinction between the Divine essence and energies, and the energies among themselves, this topic touches on the central issue of the Palamite controversy. So, Cabasilas begins his treatise by saying that he intends to distinguish between the meanings of the concept “nature”, used by theologians in different senses, which will allow, according to Nile, to come to an understanding in what sense the words of St. Gregory of Nyssa that there is nothing uncreated except the Divine nature 2, and, accordingly, to avoid a misunderstanding of the relationship between the Divine essence and energies (chapter 1). Thus, “nature” is used in the sense of “essence”; but in ancient theological language this concept could also be used in the sense of hypostasis. In addition, “nature” can refer to natural properties, as well as God Himself. It is in this latter sense that the word “nature” should be understood in the discussed phrase of Gregory of Nyssa (Chapter 2). The word “God” covers everything related to God: essence, hypostasis and natural uncreated Divine energy (chapter 3). Those who claim that the word “nature” in this statement of Gregory indicates only the general being (essence) of the Trinity and therefore the Divine energy, differing from nature (essence), represents something created, are wrong, because, if you follow their logic, the hypostases, differing from the essence, are created, which is absurd and represents wickedness worse than Arianism. If we recognize the difference in God between essence (nature) and hypostasis, which, as shown, does not contradict the statement of Gregory of Nyssa (since in his statement the concept of “nature” indicates God as such), then the doctrine of the difference between the Divine essence and Divine energy also does not contradict the said statement (chapter 4). The difference between the Divine essence (nature) and the Divine hypostases and their non-identity can be seen at least from the fact that the Divine essence represents unity in the Trinity, while the Divine hypostases are different from each other; Accordingly, that on the basis of which something is one and that on the basis of which there is difference in it cannot be identical to each other (Chapter 5). And in the oros of the First Ecumenical Council it is affirmed that the Son of God is not of a different essence and hypostasis than the Father, which, as St. explains. Basil the Great, testifies that essence and hypostasis are not the same thing (chapter 6). There is also a difference between the Divine essence and the natural properties of God. The essence and properties of God relate to each other as unity and plurality; as cause and caused; (further Nile, without specifically stipulating this, replaces speech about properties with speech about energies) as non-participatory and participle; as that from which the Divine hypostases are, and that from which created beings are; as the unknowable and the knowable (chapter 7). Neil then turns to the question of the difference between the categories of hypostasis and energy in God. The first is countable (there are three hypostases in God) and definite, the last is innumerable and limitless; the former exists independently, but the latter has no independent existence and finds its existence in the former; the former is not participatory, the latter allows participation in itself (chapter 8). Having said above about the difference between the Divine essence and energies, Neil balances this position and talks about the fact that the energies in God, although different from the essence, are truly Divine, i.e. they are uncreated. According to Neil, the uncreatedness of Divine energies is evidenced by the V and VI Ecumenical Councils: the V Council in the context of condemning the teachings of Origen in words about the unlimited power to creation that God possesses from eternity, and the VI Council in the words that Christ possesses two natural energies - uncreated according to His Divinity, and created - according to humanity (Chapter 9). Unity and trinity are related in God as follows: God is one not in number, but in nature; in relation to number, God is threefold. The properties in God are spoken of as manifold. That is, the nature of the Divine includes unity, which is not the number 3; the number, according to Neil, refers to hypostases and natural energies (chapter 10). Let us note here that, bearing in mind this thesis of Neale, it remains unclear how it is consistent with his own statement made in Chap. 8, according to which energies are innumerable (this is stated in the quotation from Basil of Caesarea 4, which Nile cites) and infinite (indefinite). Thus, either Neale’s text is self-contradictory, or, according to Neale, energies are spoken of as innumerable in the sense of the impossibility for a person to count them, despite the fact that they themselves are countable, but in relation to the infinity (uncertainty) of energies, either we are talking about energies as infinite in the sense of uncertainty for knowledge, but having a limit in themselves, or the infinity of energies is still spoken of in the sense of actual infinity 5, and the applicability of the category of number to them in this case could be understood in a similar way to the role of number within the framework of understanding the different cardinality of infinite sets in modern mathematics. So, since the unity of the Divine nature is higher than number, and number refers to the hypostases and natural energies of the Divine, then - as far as one can understand Neil's thought - one cannot speak of complexity in the Divinity and there is no difference in relation to uncreatedness between the essence of God and His hypostases and energies (chap. 10). It should not be considered that the doctrine of Divine energies presupposes dissection and division in God, as introducing otherness into God, since it should be recognized that the principle of otherness takes place in the Divine, namely, thanks to the hypostases of the Holy Trinity; if the hypostases of the Trinity, being different in relation to each other, do not divide It, then this cannot be said about the energies (chapter 11). Number distinguishes, but does not divide. Despite the fact that essence and hypostasis are different from each other, nevertheless, one does not exist without the other. The same is true for essence and energy. They are not identical to each other and the relationship between them is described by Nile through the categories of unity and difference: despite the fact that the essence and energies are not identical, the unity between them is real, while Kabasila speaks of the difference between essence and energy as mental (obviously, unity is spoken of here in a different sense than when the category of unity was applied above to the Divine essence) (chapter 12). Cabasilah goes on to use the example of light and heat emanating from fire. These forces are not identical to each other, but are different both from each other and from their essence - fire, however, they do not exist separately from each other (I will touch on the topic of light and heat in Palamite theology below) (Chapter 13). Thus, if among physical phenomena there is something that is separated from each other only in speculation - when certain things that are not identical to each other are distinguished without separation, then in the Divine, where unity prevails over differentiation (here Neil uses the formula of Ps.-Dionysius) 6, one should also think of differentiation in a similar way (chap. 14). This is where the treatise ends. In general, Neale's treatise has a certain school flavor. Its “scholastic” component consists, in particular, in a consistent discussion of the differences between the essence, hypostases and properties = energies of the Divine; First, during the treatise, the relationship between essence and hypostases is discussed, then - between essence and properties = energies, and then - between hypostases and energies. Terminologically, Neil distinguishes in the treatise the category of distinction (difference) (διάκρῐσις), applicable to beings that are not identical with each other, but coexist inseparably from each other (this, according to Neil, is the way of coexistence of hypostases, essence and energies in the Divine), and the category of separation (διαίρεσις), indicating, obviously, things that can coexist separately from each other. In addition, Neil (in my opinion, not entirely successfully) combines this terminology with the language of the speculative and the real: in order to emphasize the inseparability when distinguishing non-identical ones, he speaks of their mental difference and real unity (in relation to the difference of the Divine essence and energies, as well as energies as such) and uses for the same purposes the verb χωρίζω, indicating the separate existence of coexisting, coupled with an indication of its speculativeness (chap. 12:14). We can propose the following diagram representing the relationship between the concepts of “essence”, “hypostasis” and “energy” (“property”), on the one hand, and some other categories, on the other, as described in Neale’s treatise: It should be noted that, speaking about the mental distinction between the essence and energies in the Deity in the treatise under consideration, Nilus Cabasilas follows a line that can be traced both among some anti-Palamites and among many Palamites, who, according to John Dimitrakopoulos, sought to somewhat soften the emphasis of St. Gregory Palamas on the difference between the essence and energies in God and reject the accusation of polytheism from the anti-Palamites [Demetracopoulos 2011, 264]. It is not surprising that this theme occurs in Neil Kavasila. He, like another Palamite who taught about the mental distinction between the Divine essence and energies, St. Philotheus Kokkin 7 is one of the authors of the Palamite synodal tomos of 1351, which also talks about the fact that the difference between the essence of God and His energies is speculative, while their unity is real 8 . In addition, as Dimitrakopoulos notes in his summary article on the topic of the mental distinction between the Divine essence and energies in the controversy surrounding Palamism, the authors of the era of Palamite disputes, who taught about the mental distinction between the Divine essence and energies, were often influenced by Latin scholastic thought, known to them through translations of the Summa against the Gentiles, the Summa Theologiae and On the Potency of St. Thomas Aquinas 9, executed by Demetrius (a student of Nile Cabasilas) and subsequently the author of an anti-Nile treatise 10 and Prochorus Kydonis 11–12. Neal Kavasila is undoubtedly one of these authors. Being the author of anti-Latin works, Neil, as Jon Van Rossum notes, not only attacks Thomas, but also refers to him several times as an authority [Van Rossum 1985, 35]13. Van Rossum even calls him a latent “palamite Thomist” [ibid., 38]). In this regard, we can say that the doctrine of the mental distinction between the Divine essence and energies is the fruit of influence, including the Western scholastic tradition. I, however, do not agree with the line of understanding of this topic among the Palamites, including Nilus, pursued by D. Dimitrakopoulos in his article, in the sense that the formula for the mental distinction of the Divine essence and energies refers to a difference only in the mind (in this regard, Dimitracopoulos argues that Palamas would hardly approve of the Palamites’ position regarding the mental distinction [Demetracopoulos 2011, 264]14). And although Neil’s indication of the mental nature of the difference (διάκρῐσις) between essence and energies undoubtedly introduces terminological ambiguity into the text of the treatise, it seems to me that in his treatise Neil teaches about the difference between essence and energies in the Divine as real and only comprehended in speculation, as evidenced, in particular, by his repeatedly voiced thesis about the non-identity of the Divine essences and energies; the theme of mental differentiation appears in him for polemical purposes, and this theme in Nile does not contradict the traditional Palamite teaching about the really existing, and not just mental, distinction in God of essence and energies, which is carried out by Nile in his treatise. In fact, Nile devotes a special chapter of the treatise, namely, chapter 7, to justifying the non-identity of the Divine essence and energies (properties). In addition, from the thesis expressed by Neil Cabasilas in chapter 5 of the treatise: “...God’s nature - I mean the common essence of the three hypostases - is not at all identical to the Divine hypostasis, as well as its natural and essential energy,” it follows that Neil uses the category of “non-identity” in the same way, speaking about the non-identity of the essence and hypostases in the Divine and the non-identity of essence and energies. Bearing in mind that essence and hypostasis, according to Nile and orthodox Byzantine theology in general, differ from each other in reality, it can be argued that in Nile’s words about the non-identity of the Divine essence and energies, the concept of non-identity refers specifically to the reality of the difference between them and cannot be understood in chapter 12 of the treatise (where their mental difference and real unity are discussed), for example, as non-identity only for the mind. Therefore, in my opinion, the words about the mental difference of the Divine essence and energies in the treatise of the Nile should be understood in such a way that they indicate the presence in the human mind of their actually existing difference. The only illustration of the thesis about mental difference with real unity in Neil’s treatise is the analogy he draws between light and heat, which is an echo of light metaphysics, which has a long history in the European philosophical and theological tradition,15 but in Neil it finds a special application. As already noted, the theme of the difference between light and heat emitted by fire appears in chapter 13 of the Rules of Theology by Neilos Cabasilas. Neilus uses this distinction as an analogy to illustrate the principle of distinction without division which, according to the Palamite doctrine he advocates, takes place between the essence, hypostases and energies in the Godhead. The immediate meaning of the analogy of light and heat in the Rule of Theology is to illustrate the real unity and mental distinction between the essence and energies in the Deity, and the energies themselves. Based on this analogy, Neil speaks of real unity, in the sense of the unity that heat and light have in relation to their essence - fire, and mental difference, in the sense of the mutual difference of heat and light, as well as their general difference from fire as the single source of their existence. Here the problematic contexts of the Palamite proper (see below), Areopagite (in the sense of the Areopagite’s statement about the predominance of unity over distinction in the Divine) and, probably, Thomist (see above) traditions are mixed. Below I will point out the Palamite background of the theme of heat and light in Nilus Cabasilas as referring to distinction and unity, namely, on the one hand, the distinction of the Divine energies as such, and on the other, the distinction and unity of the energies and essence in the Godhead. In Gregory Palamas, the analogy of light and heat appears in various works. First of all, he uses it to illustrate the dual nature of uncreated Divine energies: on the one hand, these energies are creative and by them all created things are preserved in being, on the other hand, they are idolizing (deifying), i.e. leading Christians to unity with God and making them gods by grace. Palamas likens the first aspect of the Divine energies to the warmth of the Sun, the second to its light. He talks about this, in particular, in the treatise “One Hundred and Fifty Chapters” (1349/1350): Just as the Sun, without being diminished itself, transmits heat and light to those who participate [in them], possessing this heat and light as natural and essential energies, so the divine distributions, in an indiminutive way united with the Distributor, are His natural and essential energies, and therefore uncreated. The light of the sun leaves no trace when the sun sets underground and leaves those on earth, and therefore it is impossible for the eye that enjoys its radiance to connect with it, and through it with the one shedding light; however, the solar heat and the consequences of this heat, contributing to the birth and growth of sensual [creatures] and producing differences in [their] juices and qualities, do not leave those who are on earth, even if they do not come into contact with the Sun through its radiance. In the same way, as if according to a vague sensual image, only those who strive towards the supernatural and most divine Light (the Tabor Light - D.B.) are able to partake in a pure way of deifying grace and through it unite with God. All other [things] are consequences of creative energy; they are brought [into being] from non-existence and represent a gift, and are not sparkles of grace; God's Radiance is called grace. (Gr. Pal. Сapita 150 2.4.92) This analogy with the light and heat of the Sun, as used by Gregory Palamas, is intended to clarify one of the problematic areas of the Palamite doctrine, which was the subject of polemics between the Palamites and their opponents: if Divine energies are uncreated and through them Christians become uncreated by grace, then since the world was created by uncreated Divine energies, there is a danger of thinking of it as uncreated or possessing Divine properties. The distinction between idolizing and creative energies, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the likening of idolizing energies (the Tabor Light) to the light of the Sun, and creative energies to the warmth of fire, which can be perceived without the perception of light, offers a way to clarify this issue17. Although in Palamas's use of the example of the distinction between light and heat to illustrate the two types of Divine energies, the paradigm of discrimination without separation is not explicitly stated, it is implicit in that the Divine energies are implied to be distinct from each other but not separate. In the “Triads” (1338–1340), Palamas, using the analogy of light and heat in a similar context, likens heat to only one type of natural ability given by God to created beings - the rational and intelligent ability of man (in total, Palamas distinguishes, descending in terms of the measure of generality, six such abilities that created beings possess, depending on their place in the hierarchy of created being: existential, vital, sensual, rational, intelligent and spiritual18). According to the idea that Palamas holds in the Triads, the ability to possess knowledge and the rational ability of a person can be put in correspondence with the heat emanating from fire; these abilities also occur when a person’s mind is subject to various passions. The ability of the mind to perceive the Divine deifying light - the mental feeling, or the eye of the soul - which is actualized when the mind is freed from passions, correlates with the light emitted by fire. Just as sensory vision cannot function without light from the outside and, seeing illuminated objects, it itself becomes light, thus arising together with light, so the mental sense is actualized through the descent of the Divine Light to a person capable of perceiving it. Connecting with this Light, the mind itself, as it were, becomes it and sees in itself and in everything this diffused light: Just as fire, covered with an opaque substance, can heat it, but not enlighten it, so the mind, when a dull veil of evil passions lies on it, can produce knowledge, but not light. Since the mind is not only the intelligible light and even not only the highest of the lights visible in this way, but also the contemplating light, like the eye of the soul - “the mind fused with the soul is its vision” according to Basil the Great19 - then, just as sensory vision cannot act without the light shining on it from the outside, so the mind, as the owner of the intellectual sense, could not see and act in itself if it were not illuminated by God’s light. And this is how vision, beginning to act, itself becomes light, and arises simultaneously with light (μετὰ τοῦ φωτὸς συγγίνεται) and sees, first of all, this same light, spread over all visible things; in the same way, the mind, when it reaches the fullness of mental feeling, is itself entirely like light and arises simultaneously with the light and with the help of light clearly sees the light, rising not only above the bodily feelings, but also above everything cognizable and in general above everything that exists. People who, having not experienced God and not seen Him, do not believe that He can be contemplated as some kind of radiant light, and think that He is accessible only to rational speculation, are like the blind who, feeling only the warmth of the sun, do not believe the sighted that the sun also shines. If the blind begin to dissuade the sighted, saying that the Sun, the brightest of all sensual things, is not light, they will become a laughing stock for the sensually sighted. (Gr. Pal. Tr. I.3.9–10) Returning to the Nile, let us once again note that the context of the use of the theme of light and heat emanating from fire in Chapter 13 of the Rules of Theology indicates that this theme illustrates in this case not only the difference between the Divine essence and energies - which would be logical, bearing in mind the idea carried out at the end of Chapter 12 of the Rules - but also the difference within the Divine energies themselves. Indeed, Neale distinguishes the essence of fire and that which surrounds it, distinct both from this essence and from each other, and then points to the various properties and powers of fire (corresponding, in this analogy, to Divine energies), among which are light and heat. At the same time, Neil emphasizes the difference, without separation, between these forces, which are not identical to each other, but exist inseparably. Bearing in mind the context of the use of the analogy of light and heat by Gregory Palamas, within the framework of which light and heat refer to two types of Divine energies, one can think that heat in this analogy in Nile, just like in Palamas, corresponds to the creative energies of the Divine, and light corresponds to idolizing energies, i.e. that here Nile implicitly appears the same problematic as earlier in Gregory Palamas, namely the problematic of distinction (without division) between creating and idolizing Divine energies. In this case, the category of distinction, first used by Neil in relation to the essence and hypostases of the Divine, then in relation to the Divine essence and energies (properties), is also extended by him to energies as such. An important nuance of Neil's teaching on the distinction and unity of Divine energies is the theme of (out)temporality, which appears in Neil's treatise when he talks about heat and light; this theme, as presented in Nile, also has a Palamite context. According to Neale, the action of thermal force is a function of time, while light enlightens instantly, timelessly (ἀχρόνως) those who are capable of perceiving it. If we correlate this with the fact that Gregory Palamas, as already noted, uses sensual light as an analogy to designate the Divine Tabor Light, then we can see in Nilus Cabasilas an allusion to the concept of light in Palamas, according to which the sensual light, arising, simultaneously gives rise to the acquisition of vision by those who have the ability to see (see above: Gr. Pal. Tr. I.3.9), and - the prototype of sensual light - Taborsky light (the most important aspect of Palamas's concept of light) is understood as timeless (ὑπέρχρονον) (Gr. Pal. Tr. III.3.9), or non-temporal (ἄχρονον) light (Gr. Pal. Tr. I.3.28), perceived by the mental sense, or the eye of the soul. Neil Kavasila also talks about the case when something incapable of perceiving the light emitted by fire (the hand) perceives only the heat of fire, illustrating the difference (without division) between the two most important forces of fire - to shine and to warm, which, however, do not exist separately from each other. Gregory Palamas also mentions the same situation, speaking about people who cannot perceive the uncreated Divine light and therefore deny it and insist on knowing God only through rational ability; Palamas likens these people to blind people21 who perceive only the heat of the sun and do not believe that the Sun, in addition to being a source of heat, is also a source of light (see above, Gr. Pal. Tr. I.3.10). The indicated distinction between the temporary nature of the spread of heat and the timeless nature of the spread and perception of light, pronounced by Nilus Cabasilas in the same chapter 13 of the treatise, is also implicitly contained in Gregory Palamas, when he illustrates with an example of the distinction between light and heat the difference between, on the one hand, the rational and cognitive ability of a person, corresponding within the framework of this metaphor to heat, and on the other, the intelligent feeling corresponding to light (see above). As far as can be judged, Palamas's general understanding of mental and cognitive processes, in their difference from the activity of the mental sense, is that the former is possible only in time,22 while the latter, bearing in mind the timeless nature of the Tabor Light, represents a timeless event. Thus, the reference to temporal extension, explicitly expressed by Neil when mentioning the mechanism of heat propagation, is also assumed in Gregory Palamas when he relates the rational and cognitive abilities of man to the heat of fire; at the same time, the reference to timelessness, explicitly stated by Neil in his words about the perception of light by a sighted person, is assumed by Palamas when correlating the ability of intelligent feeling with the light of the Sun (fire). The noted intersections between the 13th chapter of the treatise of the Nile and the above texts of Palamas indicate the dependence of the Nile on the problematic presented by Gregory Palamas related to the difference within the Divine energies. However, in Gregory Palamas the analogy of light and heat has another context of use. This context makes it possible to clarify the relationship between energies and essence in the Divine, namely, the difference and unity of Divine energies and essence. In the Triads, Palamas speaks of heat and light emanating from fire (without emphasizing the difference between these forces), as does Neil Cabasilas in the context of an explicit paradigm of discrimination without division, in connection with the doctrine of the Tabor Light (Divine energy) as a natural symbol of the Divine nature. Gregory Palamas, based on St. Maximus the Confessor, distinguishes between natural symbols (when the symbolizing comes from the symbolized) and non-natural ones (when the symbol and the symbolized relate to each other in an external way), citing the warmth of fire and the light of the Sun as examples of natural symbols. Palamas develops this theme in order to illustrate, on the one hand, that the Tabor light (Divine energy) is co-inherent in the Divine essence, and on the other hand, that in the case of naturally related beings, in which one is the cause of the existence of the other (Palama speaks about them in the language of natural symbols), cognition and communion occurs with the symbol, and not with the symbolized, i.e. cognition and communion with fire and the Sun occurs not to themselves, but through heat and light, just as the Divinity is cognized and becomes communion through Divine energies (Taborian light), while remaining unknowable and uncommunal in Its hiddenness23. The noted relationship between the discourse of heat and light and the theme of natural symbolism in Gregory Palamas allows us to point out another, not fully expressed explicitly, meaning inherent in the analogy of heat and light emanating from fire in Nilus Cabasilas. This meaning refers to the context of natural symbolism in Palamas, as suggesting that the Divine essence is not simply different from the energies (the aspect of difference), but is also present in a certain way in the energies (just as fire - which, according to Cabasilas, is the essence of heat and light - is present in them), which are therefore uncreated (the aspect of unity). Accordingly, due to the connotations that the images of heat and light have in the context of the discourse of natural symbolism in Gregory Palamas, it can be argued that when the theme of heat and light of fire arises in Chapter 13 of “Rules of Theology” by Neilos Cabasilas, he has an implicit appeal to the thesis of Chapter 9, namely, to the position about the uncreatedness of Divine energies, as naturally related to the Divine. It should be noted that the very theme of natural symbolism refers not only to the aspect of unity, but also to difference, i.e., real, grasped by thought, and not just mental difference, since the difference between the symbolizing and the symbolized (which, within the framework of the theme of natural symbolism in the Palamite tradition, refers, respectively, to the difference in the energies and essence of the Divine) is exactly that. Thus, behind the words of Neil Kavasila about the mental difference between the Divine essence and energies, as well as energies among themselves, one can find a deeper context, referring to the teaching of Palamas about natural symbols. 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Ascoli, Wylton, and Alnwick on Scotus’s Formal Distinction: Taxonomy, Refinement, and Interaction // Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century / Ed. by Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender, Theo Kobusch. Leiden: Brill, 2009, pp. 127–149. Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita 1990 – Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De divinis nominibus/Hrsg. v. B. R. Suchla, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990 (Patristische Texte und Studien, 33). Rubio 2007 – Rubio M. Aquinas and Maimonides on the Possibility of the Knowledge of God: an Examination of the ‘Quaestio de attributis’. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007. Van Rossum 1985 – Van Rossum J. Palamism and Church Tradition: Palamism, Its Use of Patristic Tradition, and Its Relationship With Thomistic Thought. N.Y.: Fordham University, 1985. [Ph.D. Theological Faculty of Fordham University]. Wippel 1984 – Wippel J. F. Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984. Biryukov 2012a – Biryukov D.S. Τό ἄπειρον: aspects of understanding in John Philoponus, the later Platonists and St. John of Damascus // EINAI: Problems of Philosophy and Theology. Online scientific peer-reviewed periodical (www.einai.ru). St. Petersburg, 2012. No. 1 (1). pp. 325–342. Biryukov 2012b – Biryukov D.S. David Disipat, his teaching and place in the Palamite disputes // Monk David Disipat. Polemical works. History and theology of Palamite disputes / Ed. ed. A.I. Solopova; scientific ed. D.S. Biryukov; comp. YES. Pospelov; lane FOR. Barzakh, A.I. Volchkevich, A.V. Markova, D.A. Pospelova, D. A. Chernoglazova. M.: Pustyn New Thebaida of the Athos Russian Panteleimon Monastery, 2012 (Byzantine Philosophy. Vol. 9; Smaragdos Philocalias). pp. 7–62. Gregory Palamas 1995 – St. Gregory Palamas. Triads in defense of the sacredly silent / Transl., last. and comm. V. Veniaminova [V. V. Bibikhina]. M., 1995. Gregory Palamas 2006 – St. Gregory Palamas. One hundred and fifty chapters / Trans. and approx. A.I. Sidorova. Krasnodar, 2006. Gregory Palamas 2007 – St. Gregory Palamas. Treatises / Transl. and approx. archim. Nektary (Yashunsky). Krasnodar, 2007. I give the short title of the treatise given to it by the publisher. See: Greg. Nyss. C. Eun. XII.2: ΙΙ.1.213.3 [GNO 1960], PG 45, 981B. Perhaps this thesis follows from the understanding that the Divine nature is unique in its kind, not having anything similar to itself, and therefore it cannot be counted with something else; for countability implies that those counted always belong to the same species or genus. See: Bas. Magn. De spiritu sancto 19.49.1–2 [Pruche]. On the two meanings of the concept of infinity in the philosophical and theological literature preceding the Nile, see our article in the previous issue of this journal: Biryukov 2012a. Ps.-Dion. De div. nom. 2.11:137.5–6 [Suchla]. Philotheos Kokkinos. Antirr. 5, PG 151, 878C, 880D; 8, PG 151, 983AB, 994C Philotheos Kokkinos. Antirr. 5, PG 151, 878C, 880D; 8, PG 151, 983AB, 994C. Tomi synodici tres in causa Palamitarum 27, PG 151, 737B–C, 739A–B [Καρμίρη 1952, 325–326, 327]. It should be noted that the history of the question of the type of difference/distinction between the divine essence and essential properties (standardly called “attributes” in the West), as well as between these properties as such, in Western scholasticism is generally insufficiently studied and very complex, both because this question turned out to be associated with a number of the most important theological and metaphysical problems, and because the problem of the type of difference itself was significantly modified during the scholastic discussions of the mid-XIII century - the beginning XIV century, acquiring different significance from different scientists. The question of the status of the difference between the divine essence and properties was initially discussed only in the context of consideration of divine names (within the framework of the tradition defined for the West by Ps.-Dionysius, but primarily by Augustine) and the problem of their plurality in comparison with the unity of essence, later it was primarily considered systematically either in the 2nd distinction (about the unity of God) or in the 8th distinction (about the simplicity of God) of the first book of the scholastic “Commentary on the Sentences of Peter” Lombardsky." Bonaventure (ordination version - c. 1253-1257) only briefly mentions the problem of the plurality of attributes in the course of his discussion of the divine names and the personal properties of the persons of the Trinity (Sent. I d. 22 a. un. q. 4, d. 26 a. un. q. 1). Thomas Aquinas initially poses this problem in the form of the traditional question about the plurality of divine attributes in the early (ordination version - about 1256-1259) Commentaries on Sentences (Sent. I d. 2 q. 1 a. 2), however, his solution turns out to be ambivalent, probably due to the lack of need for special explication, since the problem by this time is not yet assessed in the theological environment as a subject of actual controversy. This is probably also an explanation for the fact that there is no such explicit discussion in his main treatises, later translated into Greek; nevertheless, in the treatises “Summa against the pagans”, “Summa Theology” and in the debates “On potency” there are enough passages from which one can draw a conclusion about the difference in the properties of the secundum rationem (according to reason, that is, about the rational difference), and about their unity in a thing (God). This question is traditionally raised by Thomas mainly in the context of the problematic of divine names and the argumentation as to why divine names are not empty synonyms, but have some real basis in God himself (see first of all: De potentia q. 7. a. 6 et 5 (about 1265–1268), Summa theologiae I. q. 13 a. 4, also a. 2, 6 et 12; q. 3. a. 6; q. 4 a. 2 (c. 1265–1267); However, Thomas was forced to speak out on the issue of the type of difference between attributes more explicitly and extensively: in 1265–1267. in Rome he held a disputation, which was later (possibly around 1269) specially revised by him and included retroactively as section 3 of question 1 of distinction 2 in the early Commentary on the Sentence. This text, known in modern scholarship as The Question of the Attributes, has had the greatest influence on subsequent tradition and is considered the definitive version of Thomas's solution to the problem. Despite the already explicit formulation of the problem here, the solution itself (in short, it consisted in the fact that although the attributes are truly in the thing itself, their multitude stems from the fact that this thing - the divine essence - exceeds our intellect, which attributes simple perfections to God, based on the knowledge of the creature, see: Sent. I d. 2 q. 1 a. 3 co), turned out to be largely unsatisfactory for subsequent theologians. Rather, it was precisely after the death of Thomas Aquinas (from about the 1270s) that the problematics associated with the question of the status of the distinction between the divine essence and attributes, as well as attributes as such, became their own subject of theological debate, so that in the period from the 1270s to the 1330s. we will not find a single significant theologian who would not devote a separate discussion to it. During these school discussions, the main positions were formulated on the question of the type and foundation of the difference between the essence and attributes in God, namely: is it rational/intentional/mental (here it was specified what kind of intelligence, in what way and on the basis of what it thinks - the Dominicans, Aegidius of Rome, Godfrey of Fontenay and Henry of Ghent), or real (from the nature of a thing or as a formal non-identity of the attributes of the essence and among themselves - Duns Scotus), or connotative-conceptual (position of Aureoli), or purely nominal (Occam). It seems that the theme of the mental distinction between essence and properties in the Godhead came to Byzantine theology from these school discussions in Western scholasticism, being borrowed as a kind of general place. A detailed study of the problem of distinction between essence and attributes in High Scholasticism in the form of a published monograph does not exist today, although Garrett R. Smith at the University of Notre Dame (USA) is preparing a study on the topic: “The Multiplicity and Distinction of Divine Attributes: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus” as a dissertation (Ph.D. in Medieval Studies). For the general theory of the divine attributes in Thomas Aquinas, see the section in the classic book: Wippel 1984, 215–241. The historical circumstances of the creation of the “Question of the Attributes” of Thomas Aquinas are consecrated by M. Rubio [Rubio 2007]. A brief overview of the history of the development of the problem can be found in M. J. F. M. Hoenen [Hoenen 1993, 35–62]. History of the discussion of Thomas’s position and this problem in general in the last third of the 13th century. the classic article by L. Hödl is devoted [Hödl 1978, 113–134]. A large article by M. McCord Adams [McCord 2008, 101–168] is devoted to the study of types of discrimination in the context of trinitarian problematics (i.e., the constitution of persons) from Thomas Aquinas to Occam. She also studied Scotus’s formal discrimination and its criticism by Occam [McCord 1976, 5–74]. For analyzes of the history of scholastic discussions of distinctions within the horizon of Trinitarian theology, see Iribarren 2005 (esp. 29–88) and Friedman 2013 (ad indicem). In this regard, see also the hard-to-find dissertation of H. G. Gelber [Gelber 1981]. For contemporary studies of the topic of formal distinction in Duns Scotus and his early followers, see Dumont 2005, 7–62, and Noone 2009, 127–149. For the later history of the scholastic doctrine of distinctions, see: Knebel 2002, 145–173, idem 2006, 415–437. Namely, the treatise “Against Nilus Cabasilas’ denunciations of the chapters of Blessed Thomas on the procession of the Holy Spirit” (not published). This treatise by Demetrius Kidonis is dedicated to the polemic with Nile’s treatise “On the Procession of the Holy Spirit.” 11–12 Dimitrakopoulos writes: “On the one hand, the anti-Palamites liked this idea, because it served their abasement of the ontological status of the divine ‘energies’. On the other, the Palamites felt it necessary to soften the harsh Palamite distinction between God’s ‘essence’ and ‘energies’ as well as between the various ‘energies’ themselves and adopted the Patristic idea that God is simple ex parte objecti but multiple ex parte subjecti (κατ᾽ επίνοιαν or λόγω, i. e., conceptually or by reason); and they interpreted Palamas’ distinctions this way. Further, in so doing, most thinkers on both sides were influenced by Demetrios and Prochoros Cydones’ translations of Thomas Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles, Summa theologiae, and De potentia” [Demetracopoulos 2011, 264; cf.: ibid., 370, n. 330]. On the Thomist tradition in Byzantium, see: Fyrigos 2004. – It should be noted that the translations of Thomas Aquinas by Demetrius Kydonis appeared after the synodal tomos of 1351 (where the theme of mental distinction is spelled out) and, apparently, after Neil wrote the Rules of Theology; namely, Demetrius completed his translation of the Summa Theologiae in 1354. Therefore, if we accept the thesis about the Thomist influence on Byzantine thinkers on the issue of mental difference (which seems justified to me), then we can assume that this influence took place thanks to the personal communication of the Palamites with Demetrius Kydonis, who was well-read in scholastic literature, or accept in relation to the Nile (as is done in the work: Goltsou 1988:17) that he knew Latin and read Thomas himself - which seems unlikely to me. 13 For example: Nilus Cab. De Processione Spiritus Sancti: 206.21–26 [Candal]. 14 Dimithrakopoulos seems to follow M. Jugie in this regard [Jugie 1932, cols. 1795, 1797]. 15 See, for example: Beierwaltes 1957. 16 Per. A.I. Sidorov, cit. according to the edition: Gregory Palama 2006, with minor changes. Wed: Gr. Pal. Capita 150 2.4.94. The same idea is held by St. Gregory in the treatise “On Divine Separation and Distinction” (1341–1342): “And just as the sun, without diminishingly imparting warmth and light to the participants, has them as its inherent and essential energies, so the divine teachings, without diminishing, immanently inherent in the Teacher, are His natural and essential energies, and therefore uncreated. After all, just as not even a trace of sunlight remains when the sun [hides] underground and leaves those who are on earth; and it is impossible for the gaze enjoying its radiance not to mingle with it [i.e. e. radiance], and through it - not to connect with the light pouring out [the sun], but [happened