St. Apostle Paul and Stoicism

The anti-Christian nature of the basic doctrines of Stoicism and its external coincidences with Christianity while deviating from its theoretical principles. – Analysis of particular analogies. For all the noted features, Stoicism - as a syncretic-popular ethical philosophy 1 - was the common property of the later Greco-Roman enlightenment 2 and therefore could not serve as a special supplier of understandable doctrines. As for his typical properties, which gave him an individual physiognomy, here the genetic kinship of Christianity with him is incredible on fundamental grounds. Let us highlight everything private, random and improper. With these exceptions, we end up with a scheme that is almost directly anti-Christian. In essence, the Stoics were the most complete materialists in their understanding of being 3, in its entirety 4. They preached transcendental materialism 5 , which included the deity itself 6 , since they recognized only substance and quality 7 , or matter and force 8 . Of course, with them, matter is destroyed in the mind, but then everything rational is materialized, not excluding πνεῦμα 9. Thus pantheism was resolved by organic-dynamic materialism 10. From time to time it is said that the latter was still relative 11. And, without a doubt, it is true that the Stoics often talk about spirituality, but we must not forget that everywhere here one simply thinks of a refined materiality 12, which appears not due to the weakness of pneumatic contemplations, but due to the requirements of a system alien to pneumaticity. In Seneca we find that he sometimes distinguishes the supreme principle from materiality 13 and even strives to maintain their isolation 14, but in fact his God is “an extensive and materially widespread pneuma throughout the entire world,” which is why the world itself is in the totality of visible and invisible things 15. With such absolute materialism, a single fundamental principle is necessarily assumed, penetrating everything and producing everything from itself. The soul of the whole world inevitably merges with the deity 16, and all phenomenality acquires a certain divine dignity, being a form of manifestation of the highest principle in external expression 17. The result is pure materialistic pantheism, which permeates all Stoic metaphysics 18, where the identity natura = deus = ratio 19 is categorically affirmed, so much so that God without the world is already a simple potentiality 20 or pure abstraction 21. This property appears in all the most important Stoics of the era we are interested in. It is said about Seneca that his personal element was very noticeable in the concept of deity 22, depicted with individual traits 23, but in the end it turns out that here God and nature are just different names 24 and are not actually separate from each other 25, since deity is actually a refined ether 26, actually coinciding with the world 27. It is clear that with such fundamental vagueness, this philosopher was not firm in his religious views about God 28 and sometimes leaned toward skepticism 29 . Epictetus was the best theologian of the school 30 and served as a reliable bearer of the views of the ancient Stoa 31 . He also does not reject pantheistic premises at all 32. Like others, all his efforts are aimed at reconciliation with polytheism 33, in which different deities were represented as particular manifestations of a common divinity 34. Rationalistic dogmatism, being a true signature of Stoicism 35, was also reflected at this point, where he, trying to save pagan mythology 36 with various clever reinterpretations 37, defended popular beliefs 38, justified them 39 and himself was imbued with characteristic contemplations 40. Marcus Aurelius freely introduced popular mythological elements and pagan rituals into his design 41 . Likewise, Seneca mixes in a lot of mythological elements, 42 when he tries to give more of a fundamental formula, according to which the deity is generalized to the point of loss of certainty with nature 43 or immanent reason 44 . In the end, among the Stoics, God disappears behind the world and the blind law of naturalness, 45 whereby ἕπεσθαι τοῖς θέοῖς or τῷ λόγφ καὶ τῷ θέῷ was absorbed into ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζέῖν 46. Under such conditions, the objectivity of the very idea of ​​​​deity was doubtful for Seneca 47, and religiosity was deprived of a real basis 48. Pantheistic-materialistic views necessarily had to be crowned with the conviction that everything that exists is divinely normal 49 . Stoicism was naturally resolved by optimism 50, which prevails in Epictetus 51, while Seneca’s pessimistic tone was a deviation from logical consistency 52. Behind all this, deep down, lies an unshakable confidence that everything is happening and developing steadily and no arbitrary fluctuations are allowed. The deity itself is certainly bound by this necessity 53 or fate, although such is itself an expression of the will of God 54 ; therefore, when mentioning the latter, everything is limited to the recognition that it has been established and unchangeable from eternity 55, is actually fate 56. This is how no less absolute determinism arises. His influence is undeniable in many ways. Since everything in the world flows with normal and natural correctness, there is no room left for external control. Free divine guidance is decisively eliminated. Even with shades of personal understanding, the God of the Stoics, being, as it were, an individual, does not descend to earth from his throne at all 58, or the deistic does not care about little things 59. From this side, it is true that the philosophical ideas of providence - with all their similarities - do not coincide with the Judeo-biblical ones both in justification and in particulars 60. Stoicism rested on the dogma of fate 61 and here was a contradiction of Christian providence 62, which sometimes comes into contact only with elements of Semitic origin 63. Providence turns into blind inexorability, acting fatalistically 64 - and in Marcus Aurelius, omnipotent fate reigns everywhere 65, although he was the best stoic moralist 66. Everything in the world moves with pre-destiny steadfastness. There is neither support nor motivation for human moral development, for the freedom preached by the Stoics is actually an illusion 67 . This is indisputable from all points of view. True, man serves as the greatest manifestation of divinity and thereby seems to receive a supreme purpose. But at the same time, the moral ideal itself is lost as the desired goal. On the contrary, it will be in the personality itself according to its highest drives, which require empirically - the most precise expression. In this case, everyone is God for himself and, under the guise of the latter, honors himself as his equal 68. Stoic morality, being a system of extreme rationalism 69, was a product of pride 70 self-deification 71 and could only influence morally proud minds 72. She had nothing in front of her and everything was behind her, or in her immediate possession. There is no point of attraction for human aspirations. Equally, there are not enough incentives. Everything, being divine, will be ethically normal to one degree or another. Then it is inevitable that there is no real sinfulness, and that existing moral evil is partly even necessary in the world 73 . Although the ancient Stoics stated a tendency towards sin 74, they denied its innateness 75 and looked for reasons for it in ordinary human weakness 76. It reflected only the simple limitations of logic 77, which caused deviations from the natural laws of nature and eliminated the moral need for repentance 78. The truly ethical moment was completely smoothed out and partly destroyed. It is clear that along with this, any need for progressive improvement both for individuals and for the whole cosmos disappeared. It is not surprising that Epictetus did not allow redemption for a world that, although disastrous, was quite normal 79 . Under such conditions there was no way out and no provision was made for getting rid of the world's disorder. In the interests of achieving harmony, it was necessary to cherish hope for the suppression of spontaneous anomalies, meanwhile for Stoicism they were legitimate phenomena, and their inevitability was confessed even with the gloomiest look, if, for example, Seneca said that we were, are and will remain evil 80, living among the bad 81. The only remedy was to move away from ghostliness and leave its painful sphere by ending subordination. Since the latter was created by life itself, then it was precisely this that had to be interrupted. Hence, the Stoic preaching of suicide (patet exitus; ἐξαγωγή) as a radical panacea for all evils is logically natural 82 . In this case, later Stoicism, operating in an era of moral decline and social disorganization, 83 gave philosophical sanction to the general mood. If Hegel’s formula is true that philosophy is a focus, reflecting the entire corresponding age, then Stoic was here the embodiment of the intellectual and moral decay that reigned around the time of Christ the Savior 84. It was a product of despair 85 that dominated Roman society 86, amid general religious skepticism 87, and it sanctified the natural result of such currents. All the Stoics actually taught only how to die well 88 . For all, the proclamation of suicide was an essential dogma, 89 and the beneficent Epictetus recommended it 90 in the spirit of the ancient stoa 91 no less than Marcus Aurelius 92 and Seneca 93. In this regard, the Stoic system was truly morally unnatural 94 and decisively opposed to all Christian hopes 95. Lacking a higher goal and ethical motivation, it necessarily pushed a person to terrible arbitrariness. This was also facilitated by the fact that no perfect justification for moral human tensions was found. For them, ideals, motivations and means are gleaned from humanity itself, and therefore the final crown of all exploits must lie in this sphere of what is accessible through human effort. Stoic virtue is absolutely self-sufficient 96 and proudly withdraws into itself 97 without demanding higher rewards. For this reason, the Stoics had no ethical need for the immortality of the soul 98. Along with this, there was no metaphysical basis for this. Since personality is simply a mode of divinity, then the first must only be resolved into the second, which, in turn, is devoid of individuality. A person is expected to be completely absorbed with his peculiarity 99. Therefore, the Stoics, often keeping silent about God, spoke with uncertainty about the future life 100. According to the Roman Epicurean skepticism, known from the inscriptions 101, the latter has always been controversial 102 and is not mentioned at all by Epictetus 103, being a problem for Cicero 104. Stoicism almost directly denied the idea of ​​immortality 105, which was extremely vague for him 106. Seneca on this point was alien to Christian hopes 107 and not only hesitated 108 and was confused 109 in his views, but was sometimes inclined to deny the afterlife 110 and preach the complete destruction of man 111 . If the Romans considered the soul to be an incorporeal divine part, 112 this did not at all ensure indestructibility. Cornutus (under Nero) - like Panetius (b. 185-180, d. 111-109 BC) 113 - recognized its destruction along with the body 114, and Marcus Aurelius taught that the human soul dissolves in the world or in the deity, just as a bodily organism disintegrates into its elements 115. Only Posidonius (born after 135, died no later than 51 BC) allowed immortality 116. Finally, another important feature is that the contingent hopes of the future were not ethically illuminated; they do not at all notice any attitude towards the issue of eliminating prevailing anomalies and rewarding moral zeal 117 . Stoic ethics, having no religious motivation 118 and eschatological support, becomes egoistic 119 and is least suitable for Christian ethics. For all fundamental reasons, Stoic morality, although similar in appearance 120, is contrary to biblical Christian principles, but it loses ground even when actually discovered, which turns out to be no less different. If everything is divine, then evil is necessary and normal 121. In this capacity, it, being an integral link in the chain of being, serves to ensure its integrity and from this side it turns out to be beneficial. On the contrary, good, breaking into this combination and disturbing the balance, will be an ethically harmful violation of the “laws of nature,” when life in accordance with them was the greatest Stoic ideal. Given such premises, there was a very strong and dangerous inclination towards the most extreme theories, and here the possibility was not excluded that evil was portrayed as good, which was only transformed into evil 122. Empirically, morality seemed to be completely abolished and deprived of practical effectiveness, 123 because it had to chase ghosts. Then any ethical activity could be carried out only in the personal interests of developing abilities to the highest degree. Here morality ceases to be objective and is imbued with unsympathetic subjectivism. Having no external ideal, it uses only individual resources, building each on its own strengths 124 . This isolation necessarily imparted to all moral tensions the deeply egoistic character of proud self-exaltation 125, which significantly suppressed glimpses of religiosity 126 and significantly distinguished it from Christianity 127. The Stoic works not for the sake of achievement and not for the benefit of another, but - first of all - for himself, since his neighbor is actually a simple means for exercising virtue 128. In this light, all Stoic expressions, similar to Christian ones, take on a completely opposite meaning if Marcus Aurelius commands to love our enemies more because they cannot harm us 129. It is rather selfish pride 130, destroyed only by Christianity 131. Mercy itself is based entirely on egoism, for for the Stoic philosopher it stemmed from caring not for others, but – mainly – for oneself 132 . Even Epictetus reveals severe astringency and a lack of benevolent sympathy, according to the precepts of the school 133. In connection with this, contempt for the needy was necessary and all true sympathy for weakness, as deserving of healing, was eradicated. Everything is directed towards achieving equanimity of spirit 134, whereby the coldness of lifeless and deadening dispassion reigns 135, if virtue is only apathy 136. The wise do not mourn the dead 137 and shun everything weak. Without sanctioning the widespread barbaric custom of throwing away children 138, Seneca found it prudent to kill freaks and sickly babies 139. His clementia should not have misericordia 140, and the second does not allow condescension towards the inferior and helpless 141, otherwise it itself will be a weakness 142 and even a vice 143. The Stoic sage does not want and does not know how to forgive 144, and his restraint declares love for his wife reprehensible, an excess 145. Such unnatural morality 146 could not have practical effectiveness and turned into sterile creative reasoning, strong only in rhetoric 147 . There were two significant reasons for this. The optimism of stoic fatalism saw an equal divinity everywhere, which penetrates everything and is reflected in everything with its characteristic energy. Then everything turned out to be equally divine with the same value. It is not surprising that here both virtue and truth, like evil and lies, did not have gradual gradations, 148 being always integral. In the absence of objectively ideal tasks, all attention is focused on the details of behavior in order to maintain stoic importance everywhere. This is why Epictetus is so persistent in his instructions regarding clothing and tries so hard to convince people not to cut their beards. Instead of an ethical system, we get scrupulous casuistry 149, reminiscent of the Jesuit in its bad manifestations 150. This pettiness of pompous scrupulousness is least suitable for the flourishing of true morality, which can kill in the very bud. She did not have the strength for vital effectiveness, but at the same time there was no extensive ground for application. Stoicism built everything with its own human means, based on the fundamental recognition of Epictetus that God is reason, which, of course, was sufficient for all religious and moral needs. On this side, a special intellectual culture was necessary in order to provide oneself with the very opportunity for stoic growth according to the precepts of the school. It is inevitable that the latter, while portraying itself as humanitarian and universal in principles, was in fact aristocratically isolated 151 and recruited only from learned confessors of the Stoic symbol 152 . In it we see only the history of individuals 153, since it was designed for idle intelligent people and its abstract reforms did not affect the people 154, who - in turn - remained far from any philosophical aspirations 155. The practical lifelessness of the system led to real futility 156. On this subject, Mommsen remarks extremely caustically that the actual result of Stoic propaganda was simply the fact that in two or three noble houses the food was not so tasty 157. This exaggeration is only limited 158, but the main idea does not waver at all if one sees the glory of Stoicism in the fact that it created Musonius Rufus (2nd half of the 1st century), Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius 159. The already exceptional rarity of such isolated examples, given the prevalence of Stoicism, irresistibly testifies that fruitfulness was not necessary for the latter by its very nature, why it is a school of individuals, and not of the masses, and in general achieved the most insignificant results 160. It had absolutely no reserves for renewing the world 161. Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus gave only good books, while Christianity conquered and revived the universe 162. It is clear that Christian morality is not at all a plagiarism from Stoic 163, and one cannot think of the Apostle of Languages ​​that the Stoic ore was refined and turned into gold 164. On the contrary, Christian success convinces with certainty that everything here was not done according to stoicism, and contrary to it, salvation was not based in man himself, but in Christ 165 as the source of spiritual life, pouring out on all those who suffer and are burdened. The Stoics, on the other hand, focused entirely on what was accessible to human means, from which it is clear that the final Stoic tendencies are certainly different from Christian ones. Stoic wisdom tries to protect the spiritual elements and sharpen the contrast with the lower ones, which it cannot overcome and subordinate. At best, the world fire will consume all discord 166, but then the former wandering between διακόσμησις and ἐκπύρωσις to παλιγγενεσία and ἀποκτάστασις 167 if nirvana does not occur. This means that Stoic philosophy - in an ethical sense - affirms the dualism of God and nature, when in the Christian religion they are reconciled 168. Stoic unification can only be ensured by the crowning of human efforts, in which one’s own energy achieves supremacy over all. Here humanity rises to the level of deity, displaces and absorbs it, which is why Stoicism was actually a non-religious system 169. A new antithesis regarding the completion of the world's destinies is outlined before us: according to the Christian hope of St. Paul, and God will be all in all. (1 Cor. 15:28), the Stoics believed that man himself would be “all in all” 170. We have outlined in general terms the most important Stoic doctrines and now see that on all essential points they are directly opposed to Christian ones, or are completely disparate 171. Despite the external similarity, internal contradiction 172 prevails everywhere, for similar ideas always rest on different principles 173. Christian evangelism and Stoicism were only parallel, but qualitatively they did not coincide with each other at all 174. True, there was quite a bit in Christianity that was prepared naturally in the historical process 175, and from this side there is no reason to consider all consonant elements 176 to be necessarily borrowed from the Christian environment. It is impossible to deny in advance the Christian “infiltrations” 177 - especially - from Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius 178, but neither one nor the other had any meaningful Christian borrowings 179; if for the first, so lofty in his views 180, the opposite is sometimes allowed 181, they nevertheless state that the basic Christian principles were theoretically unacceptable for him 182. Based on the strength of this, the independence of Christianity will be all the more indisputable. It took advantage of the prepared mood, but genetically it is in no way connected in its origin and content with Stoicism, since they were mutually opposite in nature or simply incompatible. There are not and cannot be any strictly Stoic elements in the essence of Christian contemplation. Naturally, Stoicism somewhat resembles Christian truths only when it deviates from its fundamental foundations and - mainly - in the ethical field of universal human desires. In this case, with Marcus Aurelius, all good things come not from philosophy, but from the kindness of the heart 183 - he was the best of his contemporary people only when he was the worst Stoic 184. Epictetus almost completely loses his Stoic appearance in examples of similarities with Christianity 185, and for him glimpses of faith in a personal God are “the violence of the human heart over the doctrine of the philosopher” 186. In Seneca, humanity often triumphs over the system due to the influence of feeling 187, which is heard in cosmopolitan hopes and regarding universal brotherly love 188, just as in other cases common sense fights with philosophical consistency 189. The religious conscience of the Stoics sometimes instinctively rejects school theology 190, and on the issue of recognizing freedom we see in them “a logical inconsistency that honors their character, but condemns their principles”, why “their morality is good only because it is untrue to dogma” 191. These observations clearly reveal that the main theoretical principles of Stoicism were dissimilar and hostile to Christian ones. Here, the closer the contact, the stronger the internal difference 192. All the main analogies and particular parallels convince us of this. It is said that there was an intimate relationship between the new faith and the Stoic teaching 193, and with the Apostle Paul the personal divine mediator in the Son of God and in Christ is a transformation of the Stoic Logos; with an ascetic and derogatory view of man, the latter acquired from the Stoics the personal character of an incorporeal being who serves to unite people with God and is capable of supporting mortals in struggle and suffering with his sympathy and assistance 194 . Based on the above, it should be indisputable that all such hints have a metaphorical meaning in Stoicism, and not at all their own. True, Seneca states Therapeutic features 195, for in connection with ethical contrasts - sensuality and rationality, materiality and spirituality 196 - he sometimes puts forward personal understanding against pantheistic 197, but still does not go beyond the Stoic boundaries 198 and does not achieve a distinct idea of ​​​​divine individuality 199. And this is natural, since if the deity itself could not be a stable hypostasis in the Stoic system, then it is all the more doubtful that such a quality belongs to a secondary principle. For the root cause, it is even more acceptable that, due to its reasonable activity, it was drawn with personal properties, but they were not required for the executive body. That is why we see that the Stoic God is sometimes rewarded with personal attributes, but they are never assimilated to the Logos 200. On the other hand, there is no need to exaggerate the personal predicates of the Stoic mediator - and careful interpretation opens up a completely different perspective. The pantheistic impersonality of the divine principle poorly explained the personal rationality of the divine dispensation and government, which direct consciousness assessed from observations of human behavior. The general-divine referred to the particular-definite, while the latter received the imprint of an individual agent realizing ideal plans. But the producing soil and supporting basis for this illusory individuality will always be pantheistic, which is why it absorbs all isolation in its abysses. The Stoic Logos postulates pantheism and is its own God, devoid of personal merits, 201 for ontologically it merges with the universal divinity, and under personal epithets it again indicates it in rational action, which to our imagination seems personal, although it is simply necessary. On the contrary, at St. Paul confesses a strict personality in the Son of God, from which it is inevitable that at this point the Apostle of the tongues denied all Stoic dogma, which was not suitable for him even as material. For these reasons, it is absolutely impossible to accept the hypothetical conjecture about the possibility that the Stoic concepts are somewhat reflected in the apostolic view regarding the Spirit of God or the glorified heavenly Christ living in those blessed 202 , as others assimilate the apostolic doctrine of the second or last Adam 203 to the influence of Judaism. There are a lot of misunderstandings here, and without them, all rapprochements will be mythical. First of all, the Holy Spirit is unfairly and tendentiously considered impersonal for the Hellenic evangelist, since the very mission of the personal successor of the feat of the personal Son of God - the Redeemer obligated him to accept a personal personality in Him. Without it, the Apostle imagines only a spiritual-divine mood in Christians as perceived from the life-giving spirituality of Christ. In this case, the personal influence of the Lord Savior is certainly assumed, Who communicates to people His personal acquisitions by the title of the Son of Man. No less than that, personal assimilation is affirmed with the active participation and reasonable aspiration of individual forces. Before us is a living interaction between two personalities. This is not the case in Stoicism and is not allowed. According to him, a single divine energy is conceived everywhere, developing with steady and predetermined naturalness. At the same time, a person does not have the spirit of God, as a property borrowed from the divine essence, but the same one as in God, from Whom a mortal differs only in the degree of detection, and in the superiority of his own moral achievement is even higher than a deity, as perfect only by nature or without any personal effort 204. Of course, this excludes actual personal communication. There is no soil for it. Even if both sides are understood personally, there is still no direct mutual relationship between them, since they are not connected by themselves, for they communicate through their primary principle, which produces both equally and therefore unites in itself. Their contact inevitably loses its personal character, and it will not be a free union, but a forced subordination according to the primordial laws of existence. This is a necessity, equally obligatory for God and for people - and here Stoicism radically diverges from the apostolic gospel 205. It also emphasizes Stoic analogies in fatalistic terms - especially in the doctrine of election, formulated in the letter to the Romans 206. But in any case, St. Here, too, Paul departs from the idea of ​​a personal God and does not defend predestinatism itself, protecting only the sovereignty of God in historical destinies, where the wise and good will of God always and certainly triumphs despite all the deviations of human freedom, which serves divine plans even in its very anomalies 207. All these moments are far from stoic. They are not seen in anthropological questions either. The parallelism 208 regarding trichotomy is rather illusory, for for the Apostle (in 1 Thess. 5:23) this idea is very doubtful 209 and is not important in his system, which is almost indifferent to such theories. They also point out that not without philosophical and Stoic participation from St. Paul, the irreconcilable opposition between spirituality and physicality is eliminated if it is expected (in 1 Cor. 15:44) σῶμα πνευματικόν 210. But this bright hope confirms nothing more than that the evangelist did not recognize the dualistic incompatibility of these principles and accepted the possibility of subordinating one to the other. Their real unification rests on particularity and does not at all resemble the Stoic transformation of the spirit itself into bodily forms 211. This latter is normal under the “all-materialism” and “pansomatism” of the Stoics 212 and can be found in the Apostle only through a tendentious conviction, as if for him spirituality was material, and corporeality was spiritualized in the “flesh” 213. Such stretches only expose the unnaturalness of rapprochement. They see no data even when considering the fate of a person. To much astonishment, it is said that redemption is outlined in St. Paul postoically 214 . The fact is put forward that in Stoicism the sage was the deliverance of the ignorant and the salvation of the world, just as in the Apostle humanity through Christ is freed from sin and oath. This is explained by the apostolic innovation, which changed the “autosoteric” doctrine of “self-salvation” among the Synoptics with the “etherosoteric” teaching - about the possibility of being saved only through another. External similarity does not indicate internal affinity in this subject either. It is forgotten that we are talking about commenting on a fact, which is reflected in the interpretation, where the fidelity of reproduction eliminates any guesswork about external dependence, conceivable only with inaccuracy in the understanding of the event. The question immediately takes on a tendentious direction with a pre-occupied solution of many fundamental aspects. But with any understanding, it will remain an unshakable axiom that the idea of ​​​​substitutionary propitiation is typically biblical and its apostolic form and application are entirely borrowed from biblical contemplations. Pagan-Hellenic concepts could not provide special shades of the apostolic image. It is dominated by the Semitic terminology of cult language when it is interpreted about the reconciliation of humanity by the blood of Christ 215. This further exacerbates the difference in anthropology between Christianity and Stoicism, which, naturally, turn out to be not so consistent in ethics. The latter was a favorite area of ​​research for the Stoic school, which achieved the best success and greatest glory in it, while Roman Stoicism was actually practical, being more a religious and moral sermon than a special philosophy 216. Here mutual contact is most likely, and it is stated for the most important parts of Christian morality. Everything here is based on the principle of freedom; They think about her that she is described by St. Paul is not Jewish 217 and is colored by a Stoic flavor 218, which is noticed 219 even in the corresponding Jewish doctrines 220, since there were Jewish Stoics and Jewish Stoicism 221, and “the sect of the Pharisees (supposedly) had an essential affinity” with the latter 222. According to this, external Stoic participation is accepted. This is concluded by coincidence with Epictetus regarding human helplessness under the pressure of passions and the impossibility of getting rid of them in an original way (Rom. 7:14–15:18) 223. The main thing is that the idea of ​​freedom is fragmented by the Apostle and presented in different meanings, the lack of unity of which seems to convince us that in the Christian gospel different elements merge that do not flow organically from the Christian essence itself 224. This reasoning would, perhaps, be solid if the incriminated “various caliber” of the apostolic teachings were not exaggerated to such an extent that it turns out to be fictitious. There is no dispute that the evangelist mainly puts forward three points - freedom from the law, from sin and from the world, with its joys and sufferings - but for him they were not at all disparate and irreconcilable in the highest principle. In fact, there is absolutely the opposite, that all these sides are a threefold refraction of a common force, which acts and is commented on differently, depending on the characteristics of a particular environment. According to the apostolic conviction, in Christianity a person is truly adopted by God, for he is mysteriously identified with the Son of God. Each of those blessed fundamentally possesses sonship with God, and therefore enjoys filial unhindered access to the Heavenly Father and, with filial independence, disposes of himself in the sphere of God’s inheritance. With such dignity, the believer is free from constraining legalistic norms, suitable only for slavish sinfulness, since he enjoys a free-filial closeness to the Almighty and in religious and moral behavior is determined by the own nature of his filial title. Naturally, by holding the sons' prerogatives and living in God, a Christian is beyond sin and above the world 225. All these external manifestations rest on sonship with God, and it is essentially Christian, which is why those particulars that cannot be assimilated by Stoicism, which suffered from fundamental instability on the issue of freedom 226, will be entirely Christian. This difference can be seen from the actual comparison with Epictetus. They find in him a particularly close relationship with Paul's epistles in ideas, language and forms of rhetorical expression 227. However, everyone is forced to agree that, in revealing liberation from passions as opposed to enslavement to them, St. Paul gives thoughts a turn that is extremely unstoic, 228 eliminating human autonomy in salvation, which inspired the Stoics. For them, the world was an obstacle, insurmountable with the help of their own activity, and they felt alien on earth, like involuntary strangers and wanderers, trying to get rid of the constricting prison bonds. Something similar is found in the Hellenic evangelist (1 Cor. 7:29, 32–35), but still this is not an imitation of Stoic lamentations 229. A Christian is not bound by worldly relationships, exceeding them by his constant dwelling in God. Nevertheless, these everyday bonds - like our entire cosmic existence - do not have a fundamental hostility to Christian ideals, from which the ethical task of subordinating everything worldly and transforming it in the Christian spirit is outlined. The world itself is a temporary refuge only because it does not accommodate Christian purity, but it is accessible to Christian transformation into a “new land” worthy of habitation for the children of God, and until then to serve as a field and means for the ethical growth of people as created beings, who by their own feat must secure for themselves the grace-filled privileges of redemptive rebirth. Stoicism recommended a completely different attitude of constant opposition to the cosmos, and it did not have Christian hopes and apostolic hopes. The difference is undeniable on both sides. Stoic morality energetically promotes abstinence and renunciation (ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου of Epictetus in Gell. N. att. XVII, 19:5) and outwardly resembles Christian morality. Despite all this, the main motives and interests are not at all similar. The Stoic is unable to conquer the world and conquer his goals. Then the only way to realize school requirements will be through the greatest possible withdrawal, which is exhausted in itself and does not promise anything in the future. Everything is done out of necessity and without any enlightenment about the upcoming crowning; there is neither Christian voluntariness nor apostolic joyfulness here 230. Ethical action seems to be unequal both in its normal course and in its deviations. It is very characteristic here that the Apostle omits the most important terms with which virtues are described in Stoicism 231. And if they assert the influence of the Stoic catalog of vices on Christian lists 232, then 1) for this there are closer parallels 233 and 2) in St. Paul's classification will be built from purely Christian principles 234. The latter oblige a person to continuously guard his grace-filled prerogatives and guarantee him filial autocracy in the possession of God's property. In Stoic dogmatics, the proud self-awareness of adherents is inseparable from the powerlessness to triumph over cosmic obstacles and strengthen themselves in the higher spheres, which is why the abandonment of the ethical struggle with the cessation of the conditions causing it or human existence itself is inevitable. It is necessary that the result of ethical feat is indicated differently - among the Apostles in the triumph of sonship with God, among the Stoics in suicide 235. With such a difference in mood, the internal moral regulator should have been depicted differently in both, just as the object of moral perception was not commented on in the same way. But they say that the concept of conscience in St. Paul's Greek 236, for he agrees with the interpretation of secular writers, meaning the act of συνειδέναι εαυτώ, i.e. a person’s cognition of something together with himself - with the participation of his own assessment of the innate internal criterion 237. In particular, the Stoic medium 238 comes to the fore here. The Hellenic origin of this doctrine is all the more significant because it is one of the most important provisions of the life-practical teaching of the apostolic 239. This is seen as an example of the acquaintance of St. Paul with Stoic vocabulary 240 from which knowledge of the doctrines or writings of the school 241 is argued. We can agree that the pagan world was the basis for the emergence of theoretical concepts of conscience 242. It is also impossible to argue that the Stoics worked a lot on developing this issue, and they come across correct judgments such as Seneca’s view that conscience is the guardian of human moral dignity 243 . For Stoicism, this is the final arbiter and decider of human moral behavior, since the goal and motives for it are gleaned from human nature, which ethically commands through conscience. It contains the fullness of moral self-awareness and serves as an organ for determining qualities in its empirical manifestations. Naturally, in Stoic views the difference between these two moments is smoothed out, 244 which is why conscience turns out to be both an ethical legislator and a moral judge. At this point, the apostolic teaching about the innate internal law (Rom. 2:14-16) is not of Stoic origin 245 not only because of its dependence on personal experience 246, but also because of its fundamental dissimilarity, since the Greeks and Romans knew only the judging conscience 247. For Christianity, this natural voice of God does not have such unconditionality. He is not at all an absolute bearer of moral impulses and is actually only a sensitive metronome of moral phenomena (cf. Rom. 2:15), acting in the role of an instinctive connoisseur of empirical moral acts. Here he notes the actual negative aspects - and conscience is not the producer of perfection, in which it is silent, but a protest against abnormalities, although even here it is not final, since it is sometimes “weak” (1 Cor. 8:7), “burnt” (1 Tim. 4:2), “defiled” (Titus 1:15), or “evil” (Heb. 10:22). This difference is rooted, in essence, in the view of man as a willing subject. According to Stoicism, he is autonomous and absolute in his activities, which he himself must judge. The reason for this is that we each have ourselves in our own way, by virtue and to the extent of our natural independence in our actions. Where the source of the latter is, there is their equalizer. And this is man himself, due to his inseparable freedom in his moral structure. On the contrary, in Christianity such privileges are borrowed from a sphere beyond human potentiality. He who has been blessed is free only because he is adopted in Christ and can dispose of things with filial independence. Christian freedom follows from sonship with God and is its manifestation; it serves as a correlate to it. The natural abilities of the will are for her more an instrument of execution, but not a source that produces them and completely covers them. This is the idea of ​​St. Paul is purely religious and supranatural, while the Stoic concept is empirical-psychological in nature 248. Christianity exceeds the Stoic level, and Stoicism by itself is not able to rise to Christian pomp. They are on different planes and open up different prospects for human domination. But they claim that it is precisely at this point that the most striking analogies are observed. The Stoic, retreating into himself from the world, felt everywhere alien to him, and for him every place was equally indifferent, for his true life was concentrated exclusively in himself. It is not surprising that his fatherland was the entire universe 249, hence Stoic universalism 250. They think that these contemplations were allegedly reflected in apostolic cosmopolitanism with the recognition of heavenly citizenship and universal brotherhood of members of a single organism, destroying external gradations (1 Cor. 12:12 f. 27; Phil. 1:27, 3:20; Eph. 2:19; Rom. 12:5; Gal. 3:28; Col. 3:11). The transition from the early Christian Judeo-nationalist particularism to the later universality is explained by the Stoic influence 251 when - in parallel to the Stoic equation of all according to participation in the Logos - St. Paul also began to preach in relation to the Lord the Redeemer 252. This resemblance is completely deceptive, although from the ostentatious side it is quite dazzling. We know that Stoic logology is inseparable from Stoic principles. In a fundamental sense, the Stoic Logos coincides with the human mind, as an individual reflection of the deity, and therefore, for example, in Epictetus, man is revered as the son of God pantheistically 253, as the bearer of the divine spirit. Stoic “universality” actually means that all people have rationality. The theoretical support will again be psychological, but so will the empirical justification, which is drawn from the equal unsuitability of cosmic conditions, since they are insurmountable for human energy. A person is at home everywhere only because he does not find it anywhere outside himself. In Christianity, all the prerequisites are completely different. In it, the actual equality of people is ensured by the same advantages in sonship to God, and everyone is brothers with each other. This concept is essentially religious and is psychologically supported by the conviction of ultimate human helplessness, in which humanity is incapable of mutual fraternal unity. It is obvious that the idea here is anti-Stoic, from where the disagreement extends to the result. Actually, Christian brotherhood actually embraces only actual children of God by adoption in Christ. Christian universalism - (actual right, not an abstract possibility) - coincides with sonship of God and does not go beyond its limits, which is why in the empirical revelation of the kingdom of God it is always narrower than human quantity and will merge with it not before the completion of world history, when “God will be all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28) 254. According to these properties, Pavlov’s universalistic schemes are not at all Stoic 255, for they are drawn from the teachings of the Lord Savior and are extracted through penetration into the mysterious depth of His redemptive feat 256. Accordingly, the attitude towards the world is different. A Christian is independent of him only due to the fact that the roots of Christian existence lie outside worldly limitations. By virtue of the dignity of the son of God, the believer leaves the cosmic framework and is regulated in a new area by the divine laws. Ordinary human norms are left behind, but are not crossed out, despite the factual presence of an indisputable existence. Christianity does not force an unnatural denial of the gradations existing in humanity, but rises above them and strives to bring them closer to itself through internal transformation. There is no barbarian, no Scythian, no male or female (Rom. 10:12; 1 Cor. 12:13; Gal. 3:28, 5:6; Col. 3:11) only due to the strength of their complete presence in Christ, where everything is determined by divine principles; however, empirically no one ceases to be himself, and the Negro retains his national identity no less than a Greek or Russian. All remain in the rank in which they are called (1 Cor. 7:20), although they are not in the least subordinate to the blessed privileges and try to adapt everything external to them. Equally, family-state ties are not violated, for the new universal Christian citizenship relates only to the religious sphere of sonship with God, and not to civil-political obligation before the father and the fatherland. Christian cosmopolitanism is religious-supranatural and by its nature different from Stoic, as psychological-political. For empirical reality, in the first case it will be an acquired ideal that contributes to its implementation and illuminates the way for this, in the second case it will be a utopian illusion and illusory self-deception. Naturally, for a Stoic and a Christian the world is not depicted in the same way. True, both note the superiority of the sage and his triumph under the most external constraints (see 2 Cor. 6:4 ff., esp. 8 ff.); here they see a reflection of the lessons of Stoicism learned by the Apostle back in the Stoic Tapse 257 along with the Greek language of the Stoic type, such as St. Pavel had excellent command of 258. There are many other analogies here in the depiction of the bearer of wisdom (see 1 Cor. 4:8, 10, 3:22; 2 Cor. 6:10, 9:8, 11; Phil. 4:11, 13:18) 259 according to his royal dignity in every situation (1 Cor. 4:8) 260 since he is always and only rich (2 Cor. 6:10 and cf. Matthew 5:5) 261, an exclusive judge for himself (1 Cor. 2:15) 262, not subject to the deadly law 263, rejecting worldly knowledge (1 Cor. 1:27, 13:9) 264 and fulfilling only one virtue - love 265, preferring abstinence from women 266 in the spirit of Epictetus 267. These parallels seem so significant that the Apostle seemed to have directly before him the ideal of a Stoic philosopher 268 . The putting on of Christ is supposedly described in this tone (Rom. 13:14; Gal. 3:27), similar to the Stoic commandment about lifting up the souls of great men 269. Then - in evasion of Judaistic baseness - the kingdom of God turns out to be supremely free (Gal. 4:26) in the spirit of stoic autonomy and universality 270. All these particulars are similar only in appearance 271. In Stoicism they are based on a psychological basis and affirm only the intellectual dignity of a person who, according to it, recognizes himself as autocratically rich and independent of worldly ties (for example, family), united with rational beings by the mutual attraction of love and together with them forming a union of free citizenship with mutual imitation in the great. Christianity is built on the religious basis of its triumph in Christ through the power of grace-natural fusion with Him. Hence two fundamental features: 1) there it is treated about cosmic phenomenality, here about supranatural reality; 2) there is the utopian dream of proud despair, here the living possession of enthusiastic and reverent faith. It is clear that both look at the world and activities in it very differently. At this point, Epictetus often comes into contact with the apostolic gospel, but a careful analysis convinces of mutual non-subordination 272. Here's a visual illustration. 273 The characteristic consonance regarding God's calling for man on earth is emphasized (cf. Epict. Diss. I, 29 and 1 Cor. 7:20; Eph. 4: 1; 2 Tim. 1: 9), but a great disharmony is hidden here. The pagan sage compares human life with acting on stage, 274 where, despite any mask, the actor’s voice is the same; Likewise, in the arena of life one must play, keeping unchanged the “calling” to testify to God through self-affirmation of good will. The thought, of course, is sublime, but it does not at all coincide with the apostolic one, which confirms the “title” of communion with God, independent of appearance, according to our sonship with God in Christ 275 . The cardinal difference is that in the first case the naturalistic-psychological autonomism of self-deluded arrogance is protected, in the second the dominion of the power of God, triumphant in human weakness, is stated. This in Christianity ensured a corresponding crowning in the future according to its inherent energy. Under such conditions, it is extremely surprising to hear that the Christian religion is developing the Greco-philosophical, Stoic doctrine of immortality, since there was no such thing in the Old Testament 276. But the last statement is factually false. Even admitting that Israel’s faith in the afterlife developed gradually 277, it is emphatically stated that in the Hellenistic book of the Wisdom of Solomon, the foundations of eschatology remain biblical 278, and it accepts the bodily resurrection of the dead (saints) 279. In general, Christianity would not need outside help, having support for its hopes in the restorative vitality of the risen Christ. Here, the least conceivable thing is the assistance of Stoicism, which was particularly vague in this subject 280 and was generally full of controversy and heteroglossia in the highest questions of existence 281 . This means, both in principle and in particulars, that the Stoic view itself either disagrees with the Christian view or is contrary to it. Consonances are usually only external. They are often found in “common places” of the then mental heritage, in other cases they refer to points where Stoicism betrays its school principles. This, for example, is observed in ethics, where the most sympathetic Stoic moralist Epictetus most deviates from Stoic foundations 282. It should not be distorted by terminological coincidences, which are most deceptive. Stoic language was in many ways superior to the ultra-materialism of the system, 283 which often used unusual Orientalist phraseology 284. This simply once again refutes the exaggerated thesis that Seneca and Marcus Aurelius are dominated by an entirely Greek spirit 285 . On the contrary, when approaching Christianity, completely different trends of a non-original origin of a Semitic-Orientalist nature are noticed among the Stoics 286 . Historical connections in no way affirm an internal genetic affinity - and this must be recognized by rationalism, which reveres the Stoic system above Pavlova 287 . Let it be true that Paulinism is brought into actual connection with Epictetus through Nicopolis (Titus 3:12), in which he once labored 288; let it be certain that St. Paul directly pointed to Stoicism 289, the Christian features of which have been noted for a long time 290. All these are purely external contacts, and a detailed study of them only more clearly reveals that Christian contemplation and Stoic speculation were either disparate or antithetical 291 and developed from completely different sources, although in the later course there were undeniable contacts between them 292 . S. F. Nösgen, Geschichte der neutestamentliclien Offenbarung IL (München 1893), pp. 160–161. Prof Dr. Joh, Weiss, Die christlichie Freiheit nach der Verkündigung des Apostels Paulus (Göttingen 1902), S. 8. Lie. theol. Privatdoz. Johannes Leipoldt, stating this, testifies that Stoicism penetrated even into Palestine (Christentum und Stoizismus in “Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte” XXYII James Drummond, Philo Judaeus I, p. 77, 80, 81, 83, 85. Prof Max Jieinze, Art. "Religionsphilosophie" in RealencyklopAdie von Herzog-Hauck XVI (Lpzg 3 1905), S. 601. Anathon Aall, Der Logos I (Lpzg 1896), S. 105 ff. Amédée de Margerie, Stoïcisme et christianisme in "Annales de philosophic chrétienne" LXIX (Avril 1899), p. 23. Prof. Paul Feine in Theologisches Literaturblatt XXYI, 7 (17. Februar 1905), Sp. 73. 75. Prof. William L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed (Edinburgh 1907), p. 93–94. I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian moral teaching, pp. 16 ff. See above pp. 400, 1183. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophic chrétienne LXIX (Avril 1899), p. 21. Gaston Boissier, Roman religion from Augustus to the Antonines, translated by Maria Korsak (Moscow 1878), p. 428. I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian moral teaching, p. 14 ff. B. N. Chicherin, History of political doctrines I: Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Moscow 1869), pp. 74. Prof. William L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, p. 87 sq. 94–95. Here, from the point of view of his understanding, Tertullian rightly emphasized the similarity of the Stoics with Christianity in the doctrine of souls (Liber de anima. cap. 5: Migne lat. II. col. 653). Prof. Dr. Max Heinze, Art. "Pantheismus" in Realencyclopädie von Herzog-Hauck XIV (Lpzg 3 1904), S. 630. Book S. N. Trubetskoy, The Doctrine of Logos in its History I (Moscow 1900), p. 42 and in “Questions of Philosophy and Psychology” VIII, 36 (book 1 for 1897), p. 114. Prof. Dr. Paul Wendland, Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum in Handbuch zum Neuen Testament herausg. von Hans Lietzmann I, 2, S. 64. Prof. Dr. Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen III, 1 (Lpzg a1880), S. 702. Ed. Zeller ibid. III, 1, S. 3 704. Ed. Zeller ibid. III, 1, S. 3 703. M. Guyo, Collected Works, vol. IV (III), St. Petersburg. 1900 (1899), p. 272. Adolf Bonhöffer, Epiktet und die Stoa: Untersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophie (Stuttgart 1890), S. 50, 2. J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10 294–296, 319 sqq. A. Chiappelli, I caratteri orientali dello stoicismo, p. 10. Adolf Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet; Anhang: Exkurse über einige wichtige Punkte der stoischen Ethik (Stuttgart 1894), S. 243. Prof. Francesco Orlando, Lo stoicismo a Roma, p. 144 states materialism, dynamism and pantheism among the Stoics. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophie chrétienne LXIX (Jilin 1899), p. 320. William Edivard Hartpole Lecky's Sittengeschichte Europas von Augustus bis auf Karl den Grossen; nach zweiten verbesserten Auflage übersetzt von Dr. H. JolowiczI (Leipzig und Heidelberg 1870), S. 180. Privatdoz. Johannes Leipoldt in "Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte" XXVII (1906), 2, S. 143. Lie. Dr. Theodor Simon, Der Logos; ein Vorsuch erneuter Würdigung einer alter Wahrheit (Lpzg 1902), S. 24. Prof. Dr. Michael Baumgarten, Lucius Annaeus Seneca und das Christenthum in der tief gesun-kenen alten Weltzeit (Rostock 1895), S. 116. Ad. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, S. 248. Prof. Dr. Chr. Ernst Luthardt, Die antike Ethik in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung als Einleitung in die Geschichte der christ lichen Moral (Lpzg 1887), S. 152–153. Fred. Chr. Baur, Drei Abhandlimgen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie, S. 387. Ferd. chr. Baur ibid.. S. 388. Ferd. chr. Baur ibid., S. 387. Victor Faminsky, Religious and moral views of L. Anneus Seneca (philosopher) and their relationship to Christianity (Kyiv 1906), pp. 71, 106–107, 319–320. Dr. pbil. Walter Ribbeck, L. Annaeus Seneca der Philosopher und sein Verbӓltnis zu Epikur, Plato und dem Christentum (Hannover 1887), S. 14. Dr. Salomon Rubin, Die Ethik Senecas in ihrem Verhӓltniss zur ӓlteren und mittleren Stoa (Mümchen 1901), S. 10. Dr. Salomon Rubin, Die Ethik Senecas, S. 9. Dr. Salomon Rubin, Die Ethik Senecas, S. 8. J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10,317. Ad. Bonhöffer: Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, S. Ill; Epictet und die Stoa, S. V. Th. Zahn, Der Stoiker Epiktet und sein Verhӓltniss zum Christentum, S. 34. Th. Zahn, Der Stoiker Epiktet, S. 18. Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen III, 1, S. 3 745. 212) Wed. I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian moral teaching, p. 22; N. P. Bogolepov, The meaning of popular civil law (jus gentium) in Roman classical jurisprudence (Moscow 1876), pp. 63 ff., as well as prof. A.I. Sadov, Religious skepticism in Rome before the Nativity of Christ in “Christ. Readings" 1889, No. 3–4, p. 429 and with the academic report for 1888 (St. Petersburg 1889), p. 41. 212) Prof. Dr. Paul Wendland, Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum in Handbuoh zum Neuen Testament herausg. von Hans Lietzmann I, 2 (Tübingen 1907), S. 16. Prof. Carl Clemen, Paulus II, S. 12. Bishop J. W. Lightfoot, The Apostolie Fathers II, 2 (S. Ignatius. S. Polycarp), London 1889, p. 526. Prof. Paul Wendlond, Die hellenistiscli-römischc Kultur in Handbuch zum Neuen Testament herausg. von Hans Lietzmann I, 2, S. 05. Prof. D. Otto Pfleiderer, Vorbereitung des Christentums in der griechischen Philosophic in "Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbticher" herausg. von Fr. Michael Schiele III, 1 (Halle a. Saale 1904), S. 59. Privatdoz. Johannes Leipoldt in “Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte” XXYII (1906), 2, S. 155. Prof. Art. V. Eshevsky Works, part I (Moscow 1870), pp. 340–341. Prof. D. O. Pfleiderer, Die Entstehung des Christentums, S. 1 34. Bishop I. B. Lightfoot, The Apostolic Fathers I, 2, p. 465–466. Chr. Bang, Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie, S. 450. Ford. Chr. Baur ibid., S. 445. Ferd. Chr. Baur ibid., S. 447. Prof. E. W. Mayer, Das christliche Gottvertrauen und der Glaube an Christus; eine dogmatische Untersuchung auf biblisch-theologischer Grundlage und unter Berfücksichtigung der symbolischen Litteratur (Göttingen 1899), S. 8. On the question of the personality or impersonality of the deity among the Stoics, see also Prof. William L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, p. 214–216. Prof. Francesco Orlando, Lo stoicismo a Roma, p. 175. See Epictetus Enchiridion, ch. 49 (73) no ed. Prof. Joh. Schweighaeuser, Lipsiae 1798, p. 99, Johannes Uptoni I, Londini 1741, p. 733, Fred. Dubner, Parisiis 1840, p. 13, Nic. Schwebelii, Norimbergae 1771. p. 144–145, translated by Grieg. Politicians, ed. 2 (St. Petersburg 1767), p. 127, V. Alekseeva (St. Petersburg 1888), p. 15. Ferd. Chr. Baur, Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie, S. 443, 447. See above p. 389. Chr. Ernst. Luthardt, Die antique Ethik. S. 117–118. See I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian Moral Teaching, pp. 24 ff. See and Prof. William L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, p. 93. 103. 209 sq. Th. Simon, Der Logos, S. 23. Ad. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, S. 134. Prof. Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie I (Berlin 3 1867). S. 191 (§ 52). Ad. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, S. 134. See Prof. Francesco Orlando, Lo stoicismo a Roma. p. 158. Cp. A. Schmekel Die Philosophic der mittleren Stoa in ihrem geschichtliclien Zusammenliange (Berlin 3892), S. 244 ff. 318 if. Ad. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet. S. 249. Amédée de Margerie in “Annales do philo ophie chrétienne” LXIX: Avril 1899, p. 23 suiv.; Juin 1899, p. 310. M. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian Moral Teaching, p. 103. Victor Faminsky, Religious and moral views of L. Anneus Seneca, pp. 85 ff. Ad. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet. S. 249. 233) See, for example, Senecae ad Lucilium Naturalium quaestionum II, 45 (after L. Annaei Senecae opera quae supersunt, recogn. Fridericus Haase, Lipsiae 1894, p. 204): “Vis illum (Jovem) fatum vocare: non errabis. Hic est, ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum. Vis ilium providentiam dicere: recte dices. Est enim, cuius consilio huic mudn. providetur, ut inoffensus exeat et actus suos explicet.” On fate among the Stoics, see also William L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, p. 227 sq. Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Grieehen III, 1, S. 3 747 (ob. Epictetus). Ferd Chr Baur, Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschiclitc der alten Philosophie, S. 449. Cp. Cicero, De natura deorum II, 66: "magna di curant, parva negligunt". Prof. Mich. Baumgarten, Lucius Annaeus Seneca und das Christenthum, S. 117. Prof. William L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, p. 211. See in detail S. G. Monteftore, Hebrew and Greek Ideas of Providence and Divine Retribution in The Jewish Quarterly Review V, 20 (July, 1893), p. 517–590. I. A. Nevzorov. Stoic Morality and Christian Moral Teaching, pp. 21–22. Wed. J. M. English, Elements of Persuasion in Paul's Address on Mars' Hill, at Athens in The American Journal of Theology II, 1 (January 1898), p. 104. See also The Critical Review X, 1 (January, 1900), p. 5. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophie chrétienne LXIX (Avril 1899), p. 23–24. This is also stated by Privatdoz. Johannes Leipoldt, noting here the complete mutual opposition of Stoicism and Christianity (in “Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte” ΧΧΥΙΙ Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophie chrétienne LXIX (Juin 1899), p. 325. I. A. Nevzorov., The morality of Stoicism and Christian moral teaching, pp. 29–30. Amédée de Magdegge in Annales de philosophie chrétienne41 LXIX (Avril 1899), p. 29. I. A. Nevzorova Morality of Stoicism and Christian moral teaching, pp. 38, 40–41, 55, 79, 84. Wed. Amédée de Magdegge in “Annales de philosophie chrétienne” LXIX: Avril 1899, p. 28–29; Juin 1899, p. 310. W.Edw. H. Lecky, Sittengeschiehte Buropas iibers. von Dr. H. Jolowicz 1, S. 173, 178–179, 224. For Seneca, see Lie. Emil Weber, Die Beziehungen von Röm. 1–3 zur Missionspraxis des Paulus in “Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie” herausg. von Proff. A. Schlatter und W. Lütgert, IX (1905), 4, S. 104. K. Martha, Philosophers and Moral Poets in Roman Times, p. 255. See I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian Moral Teaching, pp. 25–26, 34. Ad. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet. S. 137. Ad. Bonhöffer ibid., S. 136. Th. Zahn, Der Stoiker Epiktet und sein Verhältniss zum Christentum, S. 26. Ad. Bonhöffer, Die Kthik des Stoikers Epictet, S. 134 (about Epictetus). M. Guyot, Collected Works IV (III), p. 243. W.Edw. N. Lecky, Sittengeschiehte Europas übers. von Dr. H. Jolowicz I, S. 177, 203, 231. Th. Zahn, Der Stoiker Epiktet und sein Verhiiltniss zum Christentum, S. 33–34. Ferd Сhr. Baur, Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie, S. 410. Privatdoz. Johannes Leipoldt in "Zeitschrift für Kircliengeschichte" XXVII (1906), 2, S. 147–148. Victor Faminsky, Morality of the pagan philosopher Seneca and modern attitudes to moral issues in “Proceedings of the Kiev Theological Academy” 1905, No. 5, p. 102. See and Joh. Jos. Ign. Döllinger, Heidenthum und Judenthum; Vorhalle zur Geschichte des Christenthums (Regensburg 1857), S. 727–728. Prof. Сhr. Ernst Luthardt, Die antike Ethik, S. 116–117. Dr. Salomon Rubin, Die Ethik Senecas, pp. 88–92. Prof. William L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, p. 150–151. 201–203. I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian moral teaching, pp. 50 ff. M. Guyot, Collected Works IV (III), p. 260. Amédée dc Margeric in “Annales de philosophie chrétienne” LXIX (Avril 1899), p. 15. Rev. Edw. L. Hicks, Traces of Greek Philosophy and Roman Law in the New Testament, p. 10. J. W. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10,271. See also Alfred Edersheim. The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah I (London 2 1884), p. 259–260 and according to the translation by Fr. M. Π. Fiveyskago I (Moscow 1900); pp. 328–329. See also Prof. A.I. Sadov in “Christ. Readings" 1889, No. 3–4, pp. 428 ff. and in the academic report for 1888, pp. 40 ff. K. Martha, Philosophers and Moral Poets in Roman Times, p. 14. Ad. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, S. 29–39, 188–193. W.Edw. H. Lecky, Sittengeschichte Europas übers. von Dr. H. Jolowicz I, S. 195–203. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophie chrétienne LXIX (Juin 1899), p. 322. Th. Zahn, Der Stoiker Epictet und sein Verhältniss zum Christentum, S. 23. Prof. Chr. Ernst Luthardt, Die antike Ethik, S. 169. Priest N. Pobedinsky, Thoughts of L. A. Seneca on death and immortality in the magazine “Faith and Reason” 1898 No. 16, pp. 151–152, that this philosopher apologized for suicide, proving (p. 135 ff.) that death is not evil at all, since it saves from fleshiness and gets rid of the body, and the former is a burden (Viktor Faminsky, Morality the pagan philosopher Seneca and the modern attitude to issues of morality in the “Proceedings of the Kiev Theological Academy” 1905, No. 5, pp. 99–100), the second serves as a prison for a person (V. Faminsky, Religious and moral views of L. Annaeus Seneca, p. 111), from which self-mortification is inevitable and salutary (p. 156 ff.). J. W. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 321. Wed. and below pp. 401 323. Wed. I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian moral teaching, pp. 137 ff. In relation to Seneca, see Viktor Faminsky, Religious and moral views of L. Anneus Seneca, pp. 379 ff. Amédée de Margerie in "Annales de philosophie chrétienue" LXIX (Avril 1889), p. 30. Wed. I. L. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian moral teaching, p. 85. Ad. Bonhöffer, Epictet und die Stoa, S. 55. Wed. in I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian Moral Teaching, pp. 30 ff. Charles Aubertin, Etude critique sur les rapports supposés entre Sénèque et saint Paul (Paris 1 1857), p. 8. See and Prof. William L. Davidsov, The Stoic' Creed, p. 97–99. Gaston Boissier, Roman Religion from Augustus to the Antonines, p. 243. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophie chrétienne LXIX (Avril 1899), p. 33. Am. de Margerie ibid. LXIX (Juin 1899), p. 325. Am. de Margerie ibid. LXIX (Mai 1899), p. 181. Cp. Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen III, 1, S. 3 668. L. H. 0. Müller, Die Eschatologie Platon’s und Cicero’s in ihrem Verhältnisse zura Christenthume (Jewer 1854), S. 19 ff. 27 ff. Prof. Art. V. Eshevsky, Works I, p. 331. J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians. p. l0 324. See and Prof. C. F. G. Heinrici, Der erste Brief an die Korinther y H. Aug. W. Meyer V (Göttingen 8 1896), S. 443–444. W.Edw. H. Lecky, Sittenireschichte Europas übers. von Dr. H. Jolowicz I, pp. 164–166. Prof. V. I. Modestov, Philosopher Seneca and his letters to Lucilius (in the Kiev “University News” 1871, No. 12, and separately), p. 22. M. Guyot, Collected Works IV (III), p. 267. Priest N. Pobedinsky in the magazine “Faith and Reason” 1898, No. 22, p. 419. Dr. Salomon Rubin, Die Ethik Senecas, S. 19–21. Priest N. Pobedinsky in the magazine “Faith and Reason” 1898, No. 22, p. 409. Victor Faminsky, Religious and moral views of L. Anneus Seneca, p. 151. Dr. Walter Ribbeck, L. Annaeus Seneca der Philosoph, S. 88–92. Gaston Boissier, Roman Religion from Augustus to the Antonines, p. 114. V. Faminsky, Religious and moral views of L. Anneus Seneca, pp. 441, 6. Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen III, 1, S. 3 693. Ed. Zeller ibid. Ill, 1, S. 3 760. V. Faminsky, Religious and moral views of L. Anneus Seneca, pp. 438 ff. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophie chrétienne LXIX (Avril 1899), p. 33. Wed. I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian moral teaching, p. 82. It is rightly pointed out that morality, which was the most important thing in Stoicism (M. Guyot, Collected Works IV [3], p. 280), itself supported religion here, and not vice versa (p. 282), as is the case in Christianity. Wed. and O. Gr. M. Dyachenko, Towards the apology of Christianity: on the preparation of the human race for the adoption of Christianity (Moscow 1884), pp. 430–431. This is also undeniable from the other side: among the Stoics, love for one’s neighbor rests not on a union of will, but of minds (M. Guyot, Collected Works IV [3], p. 248) and therefore precisely becomes egoistic (p. 266). Wed. in I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian Moral Teaching, p. 72. Amédée de Margerie in “Annales de philosophie chrétienne” LXIX (Avril 1899), p. 25. Prof. William L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, p. 223 sq. J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. l0 325. Prof. Chr. Ernst Liithardt, Die antike Ethik, S. 112. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophie chrétienue LXIX (Juin 1899), p. 320. Prof. Chr. Ernst Liithardt. Die antique Ethik, S. 121 W. Ediv. H. Lecky , Sittengeschichte Europas übers vou Dr. H. Jolowicz I, S. 224 ff. V. N. Chicherin also emphasizes that - for all its similarities with Christianity - Stoicism also has a fundamental difference even on the issue of universal brotherhood and mutual love, since among the Stoics these sentiments manifest themselves more in internal complacency than in active love for the benefit of others (History of political teachings I, p. 77). Prof. Chr. Ernst Luthardt, Die antike Ethik, S. 151. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophie chrétienne LXIX (Juin 1899), p. 327. Prof. Dr. M. Ott, Die Humanitätslehren heidnischer Philosophie um die Zeit Christi in "Theologische Quartalschrift" 1870, 3, S. 376, 368, 308. Prof. M. Ott ibid. 1870, 3, pp. 378–379. Gaston Boissier, Roman Religion from Augustus to the Antonines, p. 385. J. W. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10,316. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophie chrétienne LXIX (Juin 1899), p. 312. Wed. in I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian Moral Teaching, pp. 64 ff. Prof. Chr. Ernst Luthardt, Die antike Ethik, S. 109. J. R. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10,323. Paul Wendland, Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe (Berlin 1895), S. 87–38. See also H. Leclercq. Art. "Alumni" in Dictiomiaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie par le R. P. dom Ferdinand Cabrol I, 1 (Paris 1907), col. 1288–1294. Rev. David Smith, Recent New Testament Criticism: Jesus in The Expositor 1901, IX, p. 213. Prof. William L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, p. 203. Gaston Boissier, The Roman Religion from Augustus to the Antonines, p. 471. On Plato and Aristotle, see Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophic der Griechen II, 1 (Lpzg 3 1875), S. 771; II, 2 (Lpzg 3 1879), S. 731. However, Musonius protested against such barbarism and defended many children; 1115, 1116. Ferd. Chr Baur, Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie, S. 399. Η. P. Bogolepov, The meaning of popular civil law (jus gentium) in Roman classical jurisprudence p. 32 ff. Amédée de Maryerie in “Annales de philosophie chrétienne” LXIX (Juin 1899), p. 313. Gaston Boissier, Roman Religion from Augustus to the Antonines, p. 386. Prof. Mich. Baumgarten, Lucius Annaeus Seneca und Christenthum, S. 131. Ferd. Chr. Baur, Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie, S. 399–400. Gaston Boissier, Roman Religion from Augustus to the Antonines, p. 514. Wed. at Prof. V. P. Modestova, Philosopher Seneca and his letters to Lucilius., p. 23. Cf. and above pp. 396, 272. Prof. Chr. Ernst Luthardt, Die antique Ethik. S. 170. Prof. Chr. Ernst Luthardt ibid., S. 108. W. Edw. H. Lecky, Sittengeschichte Europas übers. von Dr. H. Jolowicz I, S. 174, 176. B. N. Chicherin, History of political teachings I, p. 76. S. Govorov, Moral philosophy of the Stoics in relation to Christianity in the magazine “Faith and Reason” 1888, No. 1, p. 37 ff. 43, 44. I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian moral teaching, pp. 55 ff. Wed. in Carl Schmidt, Geschichte der Pädagogik; zweite Aufl., besorgt durch R. Lange: I (Cöthen 1868), S. 354–355. Gaston Boissier, Roman Religion from Augustus to the Antonines, p. 405. Johannes Kreyher, L. Annaeus Seneca und seine Beziehung zum Urchristentum (Berlin 18S7), S. 41. J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10322. Prof. Chr. Ernst Luthardt, Die antike Ethik, S. 116. Prof. Dr. Paul Wendland, Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum in Handbuch zum Neuen Testament herausg. von Hans Lietzmann I, 2, S. 132. Charles Aubertin, Etude critique sur les rapports supposés entre Sénèque et saint Paul, p. 1 8. J. W. Lightfoof, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10,319. Gaston Boissier, Roman religion from Augustus to the Antonines, p. 636. Dr. Franz Vollmann, Ueber das Verhältnis der späteren Stoa zur Sklaverei im römischen Reiche, S. 29. Amédée de Margerie in “Annales de philosophie chrétienne” LXIX (Avril 1899). p. 27. “According to Cicero, Stoic philosophy remained sterile for politics,” and “practical people - even those who were admirers of their (the Stoics') teachings - did not find in their writings anything that would be useful for citizenship": see B. N. Chicherin , History of Political Doctrines I, p. 79. Theodor Mommsen, Römische Geschichte II (Berlin 91903), S. 418; Russian translation by N. D. Akhsharumov: Roman history, vol. II (Moscow 1878), p. 397. See N.P. Bogolepov, The meaning of popular civil law (jus gentium) in Roman classical jurisprudence, pp. 69 ff. Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen III, 1, S. 3 763. J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. l0 309. Prof. Joh. Weiss, Die christliche Freiheit nach der Verkündigung des Apostels Paulus, S. 10. Prof. Cheetham, The Mysteries of Pagan and Christian (London 1897), p. 29. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophic chrétienne LXIX (Avril 1899), p. 13. Al. Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle I, p. 340. See also J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians. p. 10 327–328. Fred. Chr. Baur. Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie. S. 466. About the Stoic έχπύρωσις, echoes of which are found even in the Epistles of Peter (Nathan Söderblom. La vie future d'apres le mazdéisme à la lumiére de croyances paralléles dans les autres religions: etude d'eschatologie comparée, traduit par Jacques de Coussanges in "Annales du Musée du Guimet: Bibliothéque d'études" IX, Paris 1901, p. 290), see Prof. Dr. Max Heinze, Art. "Pantheismus" in Realencyklopädie von Herzog-Hauck XIY, S. 3 630–631, and Prof. Francesco Orlando Lo stoicismo a Roma, p. 150; Wed at Prof. Iv. G. Troitsky, Talmudic teaching on the posthumous state and the final fate of people (St. Petersburg, 1904), pp. 200, 1. See and Prof. Dr. Ραul Wendland. Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum in Handbuch zum Neuen Testament herausg. von Hans Lietzmann 1, 2, S. 64. Prof. Francesco Orlando, Lo stoicismo a Roma, p. 150–151. Prof. William L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, p. 91. Ferd. Chr. Baur, Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie, S. 452. See also I. A. Nevzorov. Stoic Morality and Christian Moral Teaching, p. 82. Ferd. Chr. Baur, Drei Ablumdhmgen zur Geschichte dor alten Philosophie. S. 443. From this side there can be no internal similarity between the Apostle Paul and Stoicism in psychology in general - contrary to Privatdoz. Johannes Leitpoldt in "Zeitschirift für Kirc hengeschichte" XXVII (1906), 2, S. 147. Amédée de Margere in Annales de philosophic chrétieime LXIX (Juin 1899), p. 328. Ferd. Chr. Baur, Drei Abhandlungen zur Gesehichte der alten Philosophie, S. 453. M. Guyot, Collected Works IV (III), pp. 270 ff. 273 words 279. Prof. Leopold von Ranke. Weltgeschichte III, 1 (Lpzg 4 18S6), S. 183. Prof. Dr. Paul Wendland, Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum in Handbuch zum Neuen Testament herausg. von Hans Lietzmann I, 2, S. 53. In this regard, the following observation is also remarkable. Privatdoz. Johannes Leipoldt energetically emphasizes the “undeniable affinity of the preaching of Jesus with the philosophy of the Stoics” (see “Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte” XXVII J. W. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10 293–294. Ferd. Chr. Baur, Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschicht.e der alten Philosophie, S. 472. Ferd. Chr. Baur ibid., S. 464. See M. Guyot, Collected Works IV (III), pp. 273–274. Dr. Franz Vollmann, Ueber das Verhältnis der späteren Stoa zur Sklaverei im römischen Reiche, S. 19. 20. See also J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10 313–316. Th. Zahn, Der Stoiker Epiktet und sein Verhältniss zum Chistentum, S. 26 ff. E. Teichmüller, Der Einfluss des Christenthums auf die Sklaverei im griechisch-römischen Alterthum (Dessau 1894), S. 15. J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10,317. J. B. Lightfoot ibid., p. 10,316. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophie chrétienue LXIX (Juin 1899), p. 321. J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10,298. Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen III, 1, S. 10 721, 723–724. K. Martha, Philosophers and Moral Poets in Roman Times, p. 102. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophie chrétienue LXIX (Avril 1899), p. 24. Amédée de Margerie ibid. LXIX (Avril 1899), p. 26. J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10 303. Prof. D. Paul Feine in Theologisehes Literaturblatt XXVI (1905), 7, Sp. 77–79, 79–80. Bruno Bauer, Christus und die Caesaren (Berlin 3 1879), S. 59. Bruno Bauer ibid., pp. 55–56. Privatdoz. Johannes Leipoldt also admits in “Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte” XXVII (1906), 2, S. 149 Stoic features in the depiction of the person of Christ by the Apostle Paul. Prof. Dr. M. Ott, Dio Humanitätslehren heidnischer Philosophie um die Zeit Christi in "Theologische Quartalschrift" 1870, 3, S. 398. Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen III, 1, S. 3 705. Ed. Zeller ibid. III, 1, S. 3706. See above pp. 1011–1012. Anathon Aall, Der Logos I (Lpzg 1896), S. 166. Th. Simon, Der Logos, S. 32. O. Pfleiderer, Das Urchristentum 1 (Berlin 2 1902), S. 267, 268, 269. So is Lie. Dr. Martin Bruckner, Die Entstehung der paulinischen Christologie (Strassburg 1903), S. 25, 76, 204 ff. 209. See above pp. 996, 116. 998. See also prof. Art. V. Eshevsky, Works, part I, p. 378; Victor Faminsky, Religious and moral views of L. Anneus Seneca, pp. 345, 196. James Freeman Clarke, The Ideas of the Apostle Paul, p. 419. AI. R. Eagar, The Hellenic Element in the Epistle to the Hebrews in "Hermathena" XI, 27 (1901), p. 265 and not. 1. For details, see above, p. 725 ff. Wed. also in M.E. Posnov, On the fate of biblical Israel (Rom. 9–11) in “Proceedings of the Kyiv Theological Academy” 1907, No. 2, pp. 151–194; No. 4, pp. 490–512; Rev. Canon Prof. Kennett, “Was not Esau Jacob's Brother? saith the Lord: yet I loved Jacob, and I hated Esau" in The Interpreter IV, 1 (October, 1907), p. 39–40. Al. Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle I, p. 4,365. See our book about this. 1, pp. 368–370, and cf. in L. A. Vygotsky, Anthropology of St. ap. Paul (teaching about the essence of man) in the Tauride Diocesan Gazette, 1902, No. 11, p. 671 ff. Prof. S. F. G. Heinrici, Erklärung der Korinthierbriefe II, pp. 588–589. Many emphasize that by σώμα the Apostle denotes more an organism or an organic whole, although in connection with materiality in σάρξ, why such a “body” fully allows for spiritualization and in itself is in no way ethically opposed to the divine or spiritual: see Prof. Dr. Georg Ludwig Halm. Die Theologie des Neuen Testaments I (Lpzg 1854), S. 431–432; Privatdoz. Lie. Alfred Juncker, Die Ethik des Apostels Paulus I (Halle a. S. 1904), S. 38; Rev. H. A. A. Kennedy, St. Paul's Conceptions of the Last Things (London 1904), p. 91, 146. Anathon Aall Der Logos I, S. 105 ff. So does Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophic der Griechen III, 1, S. 3 293, 297. The Apostle Paul does not even have ethical dualism with a materialistic overtone (see M. Steffen, Das Verhältnis von Geist und Glauben bei Paulus in “Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft” II William Mackintosh, The Natural History of the Christian Religion (Glasgow 1894), p. 409. At Rev. Prof. Sam. For Ires Curtiss, see also the article The Semitic Sacrifice of Reconciliation in The Expositor 1902, XII, p. 461–462, a equals avg. his The Origin of Sacrifice among the Semites' as Deduced from Facts Gathered among Syrians and Arabs ibid. 1904, XII, p. 461 sqq. See Privatdoz. Johannes Leipoldt in "Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte" XXVII (1906), 2, S. 133, 134. Prof. Joh. Weiss, Die christliche Freiheit nach Verkündigung des Apostels Paulus, S. 7. Prof. Joh. Weiss, Die christliche Freiheit nach Verkündigung des Apostels Paulus, S. 8. Privatdoz. Johannes Leipoldt in "Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte" XXVII (1906), 2, S. 150. Prof. Joh. Weiss, Die christliche Freiheit nach Verkündigung des Apostels Paulus, S. 34. For Jewish teachings on free will, see Prof. D. W. Lütgert, Das Problem der Willensfreiheit in der vorchristlichen Synagoge in "Beiträge zur Förderung christliclier Theologie" X (Gütersloh 1906), 2, S. 66 ff. Prof. W. Lütgert ibid. X, 2. S. 88. J. H. A. Hart, Corban in The Jewish Quarterly Review XIX, 76 (July, 1907), p. 617. Prof. Joh. Weiss, Die christliche Freiheit nach Verkündigung des Apostels Paulus, S. 20–21. Prof. Joh. Weiss ibid., S. 11. See here, in the book: Evangelize Christian freedom in the message of St. Apostle Paul to the Galatians (St. Petersburg, 1902), pp. 116 ff. and in “The Wanderer” 1902, No. 7, p. 30 ff. See about this in M. Guyot, Collected Works IV (III), pp. 263 ff. Prof. Joh. Weiss, Die christliche Freiheit nach Verkündigimg des Apostels Paulus, S. 8–9. Prof. Joh. Weiss ibid., S. 21. I am inclined to accept the opposite. Prof. Joh. Weiss ibid., S. 26. See about this Dr. Karl Franke, Stoicismus und Christenthum: eine religionsphilosophische Abhandlung in Programm des stättischen Gymuasiums zu Strehlen Nr. 164, 1876 Jahrh., S. 6. 7–8. Rev. Arthur Carr, The Use of Pagan Ethical Terms in the New Testament in The Expositor 1899, VI, p. 447. Albrecht Dieterich, Nekyia: Beiträge zur Erklärung der neutestamentlichen Petrusapokalypse (Lpzg 1893). S. 170 f. 172. 174–175. Wed. Hans Vollmer, Die alttestamentlichen Citate bei Paulus (Freiburg i. B. und Leipzig 1895), S. 83. See above 795–796, as well as in our book: Proclaim Christian freedom in the letter of St. Apostle Paul to the Galatians. page 124 seq. and in “The Wanderer” 1902, No. 7, p. 40 ff. Wed. Amédée de Margerie in Annales de philosophie chrétienne LXIX (Juin 1899), p. 318, 328. I. A. Nevzorov Morality of Stoicism and Christian moral teaching, pp. 134 ff. Emil Sokolowski, Die Begriffe Geist und Leben nacr den Scliriften des Paulus (Göttingen 1903), S. 250. Emil Sokolowski ibid., S. 136 et cf. Prof. Dr. Hermann Cremer, Biblisch-theologische Wörterbuch der neutestamentlichen Gräcität (Gotha 2 1902), S. 397 ff.; Prof. H. J. Holtsmann, Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie II (Freiburg i. B. und Leipzig 1897), S. 12; Privatdoz. Johannes Letpoldt in “Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte” XXVII (1906), 2, S. 150. Even Fr. Protopresbyter I. L. Yanyshev admits (Orthodox Christian teaching on morality, 2nd ed., St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 125–126); as if “the concept of conscience was formed by the priest. writers little by little under the influence of classical antiquity, in which conscientia and συνείδησις were used as generally understood terms.” Alfred W. Benn, The Ethical Value of Hellenism in International Journal of Ethics XII, 3 (April, 1902), p. 298. Prof. C. F. G. Heinrici, Erklärung der Korinthierbriefe II, S. 593. J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10,303. J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10,304. See prof. M. A. Olesnitsky, From the system of Christian moral teaching; revised edition (Kiev 1896), p. 92. N. J. Bestmann, Geschichte der christlichen Sitte I: Die sittlichen Stadien in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Nördlingen 1880), S. 224. See also I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian Moral Teaching, p. 75. Prof. S. F. G. Heinrici. Erklärung der Korinthierbriefe II, S. 592. The opposite is also stated by Prof. Dr. Paul Wendland, Die Hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum in Handbuch zum Neuen Testament herausg. von Hans Lietzmann I, 2 (Tübingen 1907), S. 141. Wed. Paul Du Bois, La rôle de la loi mosaïque dans l'enseiguement de St. Paul (Neuchâtel 1902), p. 82. Prof. M. A. Olesnitsky, From the system of Christian moral teaching, p. 123. So does Prof. Joh. Weiss, Die christliche Freikeit nach der Verkündigung des Apostels Paulus, S. 22. Al. Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle I, p. 4 339–340 et cf. 326, 338. Prof. Dr. Paul Wendland, Die Hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum in Handbuch zum Neuen Testament herausg. von Hans Lietzmann I, 2, S. 17; Prof. William L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, p. 165 sq., 180 sq. Heinr. Axel Winchler, Der Stoicismus eine Wurzel des Christenthums, S. 4. W. D. Ross, Art. "Stoics" in Encyclopaedia Biblica ed. by Rev. Prof. T. K. Cheyne and J. S. Black IV, col. 4799. H. A. Winckler, Stoicismus eine Wurzel des Christenthums, S. 36. Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen III, 1, S. 3 746. In this regard and in view of the analogies with 4 (3) Ezra 7:23 and Apoc. Bar.74, 2 about the finality of the kingdom of the Messiah F. Waltlter Schiefer notes that the Apostle Paul, being a son of his time, “could not completely free himself from the shackles of religious popular opinion, from the bonds of the Jewish fundamental principle”: see Zwei Randbemerkungen zu neutestamentlichen Stellen (Matth. IV, 1–11; 1 Cor. 15:28) in “Zeitechrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie” XLVI (N. F. ΧΙ), 2 (1903), S. 318. However, the Savior Himself always said that He came from the Father, does the will of Him who sent and will come to Him, and therefore at this point one can rather find the agreement of the evangelist with Christ. Wed. in S. Govorov, Moral philosophy of the Stoics in relation to Christianity in the magazine “Faith and Reason” 1888, No. 7, pp. 337–338. Rev. Robert J. Drummond, The Relation of the Apostolic Teaching to the Teaching of Christ (Edinburgh 1900), p. 156–157. William Mackintosh, The Natural History of the Christian Religion, p. 409 (according to Mahaff). See Privatdoz. Johannes Leipoldt in "Zeitsehrift für Kirchengeschichte" XXYII (1906), 2, S. 146–147. Al. Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle I, p. 4,339. Rev. Edw. L. Hicks in "Studia bibliea et ecclesiastica" IV, p. 9, Wed. Heinr. Axel Winckler, Der Stoicismus eine Wurzel des Christenthums, S. 31. See also W. D. ROSS, Art. "Stoics" in Encyclopaedia Biblica ed. by Rev. Prof. T. K. Cheyne and J. S. Black IV, col. 4,799. H. A. Winckler, Der Stoicismus eine Wurzel des Christenthums, S. 30–31. H. A. Winckler ibid., S. 49. H. A. Winckler ibid., S. 32. 36. H. A. Winckler ibid., S. 47. Prof. C. F. G. Heinrici, Der erste Brief an die Korinther y H. Aug. W. Meyer V, S. 8 243. Prof. W. M. Ramsay, Historical Commentary on the Epistles to the Corinthians in The Expositor 1900, II, p. 93. Prof. W. M. Ramsay, Historical Commentary on the Epistles to the Corinthians in The Expositor 1904, II, p. 93. Heinr. Ax. Winckler, Der Stoicismus eine Wurzel des Christenthums, S. 38,126. H. A. Winckler ibid., S. 40 For the approximations for 1 Cor. 4:9 against E. L. Hicks, see S. D. F. Salmond in The Critical Review VII, 1 (January 1897) p. 98, but in general wed. in S. Govorov in the magazine “Faith and Reason” 1888, 6, p. 280 seq., and in I. A. Nevzorov, Morality of Stoicism and Christian Moral Teaching, p. 168 seq. Prof. S. F. G. Heinrici, Der erste Brief an die Korinther y H. Aug. W. Meyer V, S. 8 VI. 32. And in J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p., 10,314.3. Epictetus Enchiridion ch. 17 (23). See Epicteti quae supersunt Dissertationes ab Arriano eollectae nec non Enchiridion et Fragmenta graece et latine cum integris Jaeqbi Scheckii et Hieronymi Wolfii selectisque aliorum doctorum annotationibus recensuit Joannes Uptonus, t. II (Londini 1741), p. 699. Epicteti Enchiridion in usum studiosae juventutis ex recensione et cum notis Nicolai Sehwebelii (Norimbergae 1771), p. 37–38. Epicteti Manuale et Cebetis Tabula graece et latine recensuit curavitque Prof. Johannes Schweighaeuser (Lipsiae 1798), p. 30. Theophrasti Characters, Marci Antonini Commentarii, Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano literis mandatae, fragmenta et Enchiridion cum commentario Simplicii, Cebetis Tabula, Maximi Tyrii Dissertationes graece et latine cum indicibus... emendavit Fred. Dübner (Parisiis 1840), p. 4. Epictetus of the Stoic philosopher Enchiridion and Apophoegma and Kevitus of Thebes Painting or depiction of the life of a man trans. from Greek language Grigory Poletika, ed. 2nd (Sib. 1767), pp. 78–79. Rules of Epictetus translated from French. M. A. Engelhardt in M. Guyot, Collected Works IV (III), pp. 307–308. Epictetus, Foundations of Stoicism translated from Greek. V. Alekseeva (St. Petersburg, 1888), p. 6: “Don’t forget, you are an actor and you play a role in the play assigned by the author. If the play is short, so is the role; if the play is long, so is it. He will give you the role of a beggar; try to create his type, as well as the type of a cripple, a high government official or a private official; It’s your responsibility to fulfill your roles impeccably; it’s someone else’s responsibility to distribute them.” N. J. Bestmann, Geschichte der christlichen Sitte. I, S. 181, 1 Heinr. Oh. Winckler, Der Stoicismus eine Wurzel des Christenthums, S. 52. See above p. 1000. See Rev. S. F. Burney, The Rise of a Belief in a Future Life in Israel in The Interpreter III, 3 (April, 1907), p. 240 sq. See R.P. Fr. M. Lagrange, La livre de la Sagesse, sa doctrine de fines dernières in "Revue biblique internationale", nouvelle sèrie IV, 1 (Janvier 1907), p. 85–104. See above pp. 983, 5. Rev. C. F. Burney in The Interpreter IV, 1 (October, 1907), p. 54–56. Gaston Boissier, Roman Religion from Augustus to the Antonines, p. 641. Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen III, 1, S. 3 750–751. Rev. Edw. L. Hicks, Traces of Greek Philosophy and Roman Law in the New Testament (London 1896), p. 97. J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10,319 sqq. Thus Alfred W. Benn in the International Journal of Ethics XII, 3 (April 1902), p. 298. Prof. William L. Davidson, The Stoic Greed, p. 20, 22, 169.1. Prof. E. A. Sonnenschein, The New Stoicism in The Hibbert Journal V, 3 (April 1907), p. 552. Prof. William L. Davidson, The Stoic Greed, p. 240. This is noted, for example, by Prof. A. Hausrath, Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte IV (Heidelberg 2 1877), S. 302. So for 2 Timothy 2:23 and Col. 2:8 again. Clement al.: see Amédée Fleury, Saint Paul et Sénèque II, p. 228–229, and for speech in the Athenian Areopagus see Priyatdoz. Johannes Leipoldt in “Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte” XXVII (1906), 2, S. 138, in particular on the reduction of the beginning of the verse in Acts 17:28 to Epictetus, see Prof. J. Rendel Harris, A Further Note on the Cretans in The Expositor 1907, IV, p. 333. See about blessed. Jerome in J. W. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, p. 10,294. See and Prof. Francesco Orlando, who states the profound difference between the doctrines of Christianity and Stoicism (Lo stoicismo a Roma, pp. 116–117). For example, let us point out that one moral-ascetic guide, incorrectly assimilated by the teacher. Nile of Sinai, is undoubtedly a reworking of the Stoic model, for which see prof. A. A Bronzova, Christianized Enchiridion of the Stoic Epictetus in “Christian Reading” 1904, No. 7, pp. 59–74, No. 8, pp. 187–203 and separately, St. Petersburg. 1904; Wed also Privatdoz. Johannes Leipoldt in “Zeitschrift für Kirсhengeschichte” XXVII (1906), 2, S. 131 u. Anno. 5, where also on later Christian literature (S. 153–163), and also Franz Xauer Bürger, Minucius Felix und Seneca (München 1904).