Modern Arianism

(From sketches about the religion of mankind) Vl. Soloviev in “Three Conversations” gave an artistic image of Protestantism in the person of Professor Pauli as a representative of the scientific study of Christianity. If Orthodoxy and Catholicism are represented here by Pope Peter II and the “elder” John, then the spirit of Protestantism is embodied in the university professor who, at the last minute of history, after centuries of research and doubt, will say about the fundamental truths of Christianity: “jetzt ist es ja gründlich erwiesen und ausser jedem Zweifel gesetzt.” And indeed, if you ask yourself what modern Protestantism is in its most authentic religious essence, you will have to answer that this is precisely theological science, serving God in a faithful and honest search for scientific truth. Professors of theology in Protestantism are the highest, even the only church authority: they are teachers of faith and guardians of church tradition, which before everyone’s eyes has turned into a scientific tradition or historical science. Protestantism is in this sense a professorial religion; I say this without any shade of irony or praise, simply stating a historical fact. This is both very much and unusually little. This is a lot because in our era science has occupied such a huge place in life and has left its mark on all aspects of modern consciousness. Therefore, questions of religion must necessarily be passed through the crucible of science; in a certain sense, religion itself (not to mention philosophy) becomes scientific, and therefore whoever masters this science receives enormous power over souls and influences their religious life. And almost all of the newest science of religion is spiritually nourished by Protestantism, and religious-scientific thought is now spiritually dependent on it, with all its strengths and weaknesses. It is impossible, of course, to say that this science did not exist outside of Protestantism, but throughout the entire 19th century, as now, at the beginning of the 20th, the leading role in the scientific movement belonged to Protestant countries and, above all, of course, Germany 1 . New scientific impulses come from here; real, correct, collective scientific work is in full swing here. But this is all that is, internally, mystically, in Protestantism, the pure “service of the word” in its modern form. And this is unusually little for religion. Morbid individualism and intellectualism are not overcome here in church reality, living church tradition is more and more replaced by historical science, the church by religious society, the sacraments and mystical cult by the conventions of symbolism. Conciliarity is abolished in this division between scientists and unlearned, the experience of spiritual life is replaced by a university seminary, and the place of a saint is taken by a learned theologian. Protestantism has no ideal and path of holiness, without which there is no real religion, just as there is no art without artistic genius. Therefore, although Protestantism carries out its world religious mission, embodying the inquisitiveness of an unbeliever or conscientiously doubting Thomas, it pays dearly for this service. From the very beginning, Protestantism contained an internal contradiction, which only matures in its history and in its development determines its inner life. Luther and the reformers, having left the Church, rejecting its living tradition, based on faith in its mystical unity, in the Church Reason, took with them, however, the written part of this tradition, i.e. Bible. It, as a literary monument, was supposed to become the basis of religious doctrine, but it also inevitably became the subject of scientific research, the paths and methods of which became increasingly more complex. Hence the question of the nature of divine inspiration (Inspirationsbegriff) receives such central importance in Protestantism, and the current view has prevailed, according to which the Bible is only a literary monument, like any other. For purely scientific research it cannot be otherwise, but Protestantism, even in its extreme representatives, does not at all want to renounce the former, ecclesiastical meaning of the Bible; this is best seen in the exceptional attention that is devoted to her. Its study still remains theology in the same sense as it was under Luther. And in this need to combine the religious, i.e. in any case, the non-scientific attitude towards the Bible, and at the same time its scientific understanding, is the internal difficulty of Protestantism. It is characteristic of all modern religious consciousness in general, but in church Christianity, based on living tradition, it cannot achieve such acuteness as in the pure biblicalism of Protestantism. And this gives rise to his incessant internal anxiety, the constant search for new paths, the continuation of the reformation, which by no means stopped with Luther. The German genius can, rightly, be proud of this science of his. After the flowering of German classical idealism, it produced nothing more majestic than the science of religion, and at the present time the first-class scientific forces of Germany are devoting themselves to its problems, and one cannot help but express amazement at the strength of this scientific discipline, tradition, hard work (but however - and this is very characteristic - not genius, for genius has no place in this work, the entire value of which is still conditional and relative). Our ignorance often imagines that questions of religion have already been dealt with in the enlightened West. In fact, everything suggests that we have entered a period of new religious revival, which in Protestantism is expressed in a special rise in scientific interest in religion. Issues of religion are again coming to the fore. Disputes about Christ excite hearts as they have not worried them, perhaps, since the Reformation. A deep religious crisis is brewing, reflected in both science and philosophy, although its outcome has not been determined and it remains far from full maturity. And the democratic character of our century also leaves its mark here; disputes are gradually transferred from university classrooms to rallies among the masses. I will draw the reader’s attention to some of the symptoms of this movement, as well as its factors. Since 1904, a series of brochures began to be published under the general editorship of M. Schiele under the following title: “Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher” (religious and historical books for the people). This publication, which continues until recently, is conceived according to the broadest plan and is divided into 5 sections: “religion of the New Testament”, “religion of the Old Testament”, “general history of religion”, “history of the church”, “worldview and religious philosophy”. Each of these sections is presented in the form of a number of monographs, and all together amount to dozens of books costing about a mark each, so that the entire series forms a kind of folk religious encyclopedia. These books are sold everywhere and sell in thousands and tens of thousands of copies. I do not hesitate to rank the very fact of the appearance and distribution of these books among the people as one of the most important events in the cultural life of our era. During the implementation of this program, all the wealth of the scientific forces of Germany was revealed. Each topic is processed by a specialist, sometimes one of the best experts on the issue, and scientificity is combined here with the general accessibility of the presentation. Somewhat later, from 1908, under the editorship of the same Schiele and then Zscharnack, a publicly accessible religious encyclopedia began to be published under the title: "Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Handwörterbuch in gemeinverständlicher Darstellung". (Religion in history and modernity. Dictionary in a publicly accessible presentation). This dictionary, which has numerous employees from among the best specialists, has articles in the following departments: Old Testament, New Testament, history of the church and dogmas, dogmatics, ethics, apologetics, practical theology, education, art, extra-Christian history of religions, social science, church law and church politics, modern religion, German Protestant theology in the 19th century. In contrast to the monumental 22-volume Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche von Herzog und Hauck (3rd ed.), referring to scientists, this encyclopedia, designed for 4-5 large volumes, is intended “für alle religiös interessierten Gebildeten”, i.e. for intellectuals of all professions interested in religion. The common purpose of both of these publications is twofold: religious and scientific. They pursue not only the popularization of scientific knowledge, but also the religious and educational task. In the spirit of the entire enterprise, this task is religious and apologetic in the sense in which it is understood by its participants; one might even say, moreover, it is ecclesiastical, of course, in the modern Protestant understanding of the church. The editors of the "Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher" in their prospectus define their general task as follows: "Rg. Vb. do not represent tendentious works. They strive to teach a historical and critical understanding of religion, Christianity and the church. They seek this understanding in the strict science of the history of religion. Therefore, they (unwittingly) will destroy many things among the people that now have the claim to be considered proven truth, but in reality does not stand up to the criticism of scientific research. They will (without directly seeking to do so) assert among the people what has been established by honest science as reality. only one thing: to open questions, give scientifically based answers frankly and modestly. There are many such open questions. Now alienation from religion is no longer considered “progress” by the German people. Religion is again becoming a vital problem for the people and their leaders. We do not ask ourselves whether our work is an inconvenience to the “church.” But we nevertheless believe: the church, which was born out of zeal for the pure word of God and is based solely on faith, should not be afraid, but rejoice at this publication. For, although history with its research does not yet give bliss and “rebirth through science” is nonsense, it frees us from many burdens and strengthens man’s courage to base his inner life, instead of alien teaching, on himself and on what he experiences from the living God.” The purpose of the series is to serve religious enlightenment through religious-historical science, to inculcate “scientific” religion, in parallel with how “scientific” philosophy is now cultivated, to “orient” religion towards science. Here the scientific researcher enters the church (in the broad sense of the word) pulpit. However, is such a “religious-historical religion” obtained through scientific analysis of literary monuments and comparative historical study possible and feasible? First of all, philosophically speaking, radical consistent historicism inevitably leads to relativism and extreme skepticism. The religious-historical method would only be capable of fostering religious unprincipledness, and universal skepticism serves as a weapon against religion in general, for every religion lays claim to a certain absolutism and has its own dogmatics, independent of history 2 . In addition, even methodologically, such a study, free from any dogmatic preconditions and from any bias, is impossible. As Rickert showed in his subtle, albeit half-thought-out study on the methodology of historical sciences, 3 the object of historical research is established through “reference to value,” or, if it is easier to express the same idea, science with all its empirical data is constructed as an answer to a certain question, which already contains an internal criterion for the selection of material and the construction of the object. And therefore, researchers working on the same historical material, based on different dogmatic premises, therefore pose different problems, sort and establish facts in different ways and, of course, come to different conclusions about them. Therefore, in its positive meaning for religious consciousness, history necessarily goes beyond its own boundaries 4 . The second half of the 19th century was marked by the development of detailed research in the field of the history of religion, but accompanied by a weakening of the general philosophical spirit and the predominance of scientific dogmatism. Currently, under the pressure of new, counter-currents coming from militant “monism,” this religious historicism is undergoing a severe crisis, and it can be said that the fundamental basis of Rg. Vb. already undermined. A noticeable sobering occurs, the need for philosophical deepening is recognized. Prof. V. Bousset, one of the leaders of the religious-historical movement, openly seeks salvation in religious Ratio from the extremes of historicism 5 . "Reverence for the "historically past" is again approaching faith in external authority." "The danger of immersion in historicism and psychologism has noticeably approached. We, for more than a generation, have become completely impoverished in the new theology, despite all the flourishing of religious-historical research (Betriebes), with great systems of generalizing and guiding ideas" 6. The contradictory nature of religious historicism is becoming increasingly clear. But also the Rg series. Vb., of course, is by no means a completely adogmatic, purely scientific history of religion. Here these super-scientific, dogmatic principles were not openly formulated; the publishers obviously thought that the reader from the people, if he read this entire library and assimilates it, would himself unite this entire scattered mosaic into one picture, in other words, he imagined making that synthesis that the specialists themselves were not able to perform - “Old Testamentists”, “New Testamentists”, “historians of dogma”, etc. However, if we turn to books of fundamental importance (for example, Iesus, Unserer Gottesglaube, on the history of early Christianity, dogmas, etc.), we will be convinced that, in the shell of religious-historical research, a very definite Richlean dogmatics is promoted here in its newest shades, the so-called “liberal historical theology” or modern “Jesuism” (Iesuanismus)." Its distinctive feature is the denial of faith in Christ as the God-man, replaced by veneration of Rabbi Jesus, whose image everyone carves out for themselves in their own way using the religious-historical method and criticism of the text of the Gospels. Until recently, this trend reigned almost unchallenged in German universities, which is why the publishers of Rg. Vb., obviously, and included it in the composition of historical science itself. However, even if you take their point of view and believe that they wanted to give only historical science, then who doesn’t know to what extent these conclusions are shaky, controversial, and problematic, as the entire history of science teaches. Will even the most basic of its current foundations survive even in 10 years? Isn’t a revolution already being prepared in Old Testament scholarship, where Pan-Babylonians are arguing with Wellhausen’s school, who in turn are threatened by further research? And isn’t the same thing brewing in New Testament scholarship, where recently the historical value of John’s Gospel, hitherto denied, has so noticeably risen again? And does what now exist resemble unanimity? After all, if, for example, the editors of Rg. Vb. invited to write about the Gospel of John, the Epistles and the Apocalypse not the colorless Schmiedel, but such a first-class expert on the history of the canon as Prof. Tsang, then the conclusions of “science” would be diametrically opposed to what they are now presented. And doesn’t this really mean that papal infallibility is replaced by the infallible authority of science, or more precisely, by the opinions of a given scientific school or party? So the situation with the most fundamental foundations of the Rg enterprise is shaky and internally contradictory. Vb. Only on the condition that, along with scientific information, the spirit of free criticism spreads and, in particular, in relation to science itself, can it have a truly liberating and educational meaning, otherwise this puts on the bonds of a new slavery, a new pseudoscientific dogmatism is created. And woe to the country if living church tradition has become so impoverished in it that the only form in which it is available to it remains scientific preparations prepared by the religious-historical method. Everything that is most essential in religion is timeless, absolute, personal, and therefore it laughs at “religious-historical” justification. However, by setting aside the illegitimate claims of historicism in religion, we are far from belittling the importance of historical research in the field of religious worldview. No matter how different the individual trends may be in their conclusions, there still remains a vast, neutral field of historical study, and over the past 10 years it has enormously expanded our horizons. We now look at many things with completely different eyes, just as a person familiar with the methods and results of biblical criticism reads the sacred text differently than someone completely unfamiliar with them. And this expansion of horizons poses many new questions to our religious consciousness. The comparative historical study of religions forces us to reconsider the history of Christianity in its relation to “paganism” in a completely new way. We must learn to understand Christianity in history, and not outside it, and this should be expressed in a corresponding expansion of dogmatic teaching when this understanding penetrates into broad church circles. It cannot be denied that at present, the apparent or actual inconsistency of other scientific conclusions and the provisions of religious faith can cause doubts and crises. But the life of the spirit cannot go smoothly and evenly. New problems should be solvable, not eliminated. The path of scientific development, which opens up new worlds before us, is determined by its own logic and is just as providential as the path of history. It is not through ignorance and obscurantism that we must serve religion, which considers “blasphemy against the Holy Spirit” to be the greatest, unforgivable sin. The obvious and now merit of religious-historical science is that it brought closer and revived much that was already beginning to die out, albeit under the outer cover of canonical authority. This especially has to be said about the Old Testament. The best evidence of this is the again growing interest in it, expressed at least in the fact that a new critical translation of it edited by the recently deceased (almost working on this edition) Prof. Kautsch, one of many representatives of the Pauli type 7, is published in its 3rd edition in a short time. To understand the naturalness and inevitability of the arousal of this interest, it is enough to familiarize yourself with at least the masterful description of the prophet Elijah made by prof. Gunkel 8 in one of the books Rg. Vb. (Gunkel: "Elias"). Another, even more indisputable merit of the history of religion lies in the final overcoming of the rationalistic explanation of religion put forward in the age of enlightenment: religion can no longer be considered as an “invention of the priests” or anyone else’s invention at all; historical science has revealed both its independent nature and its deep roots in humanity. One can ignore the originality and independent significance of religion in history either out of ignorance or in the blindness of anti-religious fanaticism. These are the indirect results of the latest religious-historical research. However, they themselves are by no means connected with the Richlean dogma coming from Kant, and indeed they do not establish any dogma at all, especially on the main and central question of Christianity: “Who do people say that I, the Son of Man, am?” (Matthew 16:13). And if now this or that answer to this question is given in the name of science, we have here self-deception or direct deception, for in reality the answer is predetermined in the heart and in the philosophizing mind, while the scientific mind only fulfills what is entrusted to it by available means. II. The crisis of Christianity in modern Protestantism In the depths of Protestantism, two completely different directions are definitely emerging, it should be said, two religions: one is Christianity in the old Lutheran form, the other, although calling itself Christianity, is in reality a completely new religion - Jesuanism, based on the veneration of the prophet Jesus and the religious life revealed in him. The onslaught of the newest “mythologists” was supposed to further deepen this difference between Christianity and Jesuanism, pushing the former closer and closer to the Church and thereby forcing a revision of the very foundations of Luther’s Reformation, as a rebellion against the Church and the schism based on it, and at the same time forcing the latter to more strongly feel all the inconsistency and duality of the positions they defended. We have an interesting reflection of the main difficulties of “Jesuanism” in the speech of the Heidelberg professor E. Troeltsch, one of the prominent theologians of Jesuanism: Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben. 1911 (read at the Christian Students Conference in Aarau). The ideas expressed in this speech are so symptomatic of the crisis of Christianity in modern Protestantism, which by the force of things is increasingly degenerating into Jesuanism, that they arouse interest even beyond the personality of their author. The religious self-consciousness of modern Jesuanism speaks here through the mouth of Troeltsch. As the title indicates, Troeltsch's speech is devoted to the question of the significance for faith of the “historicity of Jesus.” This question does not exist at all for church faith with the dogma of the divine humanity of Christ and the divine character of the Church founded by Him, in general for the supranaturalistic understanding of Christianity, based on faith in revelation and redemption from sin through the death on the cross and resurrection of the Savior. This question is posed only for such an understanding for which “Christianity is a certain faith in God, a unique knowledge of God with a corresponding practical way of life, or, as they say, is a religious idea or principle... The Church is a community in faith or Christian knowledge of God, which, in caring for the development of this faith, can take any form and organization and, moreover, is always considered within the framework of purely human diverse and diverse organizations or can even do without them” (pp. 6-7). For Christianity, thus reduced to the individual “influence of God on the soul through the knowledge of God,” one really has to ask what significance the historical Jesus can have for it. The question has two sides. Firstly, the only reliable source of our knowledge about Jesus is historical science with its biblical criticism, which has now completely chewed up the New Testament text: as Troeltsch admits, “in view of the increasing complexity in the study of sources and under the influence of Semitic and classical philology, criticism has taken such a radical turn that it finally threatens the reliability of historical knowledge, apparently making it downright impossible” (p. 3). True, according to Troeltsch, “the statement about the non-existence of Jesus is undoubtedly monstrous (Ungeheuerlichkeit), as well as the statement about the unrecognizability of the main features of his sermon (not to mention even the problem of the “biography of Jesus,” which is recognized as insoluble) is a great exaggeration” (p. 4). However, this opinion of his may not be shared on purely scientific grounds, and, in addition, one must remember the unique nature of science, to which the historical foundations of faith are entirely entrusted here. Science turns everything into a problem, into a movement, into disagreements - diversity of opinions is the life of science. And how little one can rely on this shaky foundation in matters of faith is shown by the latest debate about the existence of Jesus, a question about which recently seemed beyond dispute and doubt. The question of the relationship between religious faith and purely scientific doubt is also very difficult for the church worldview, since it is not isolated from science (which at a certain height of culture is simply impossible). But it becomes completely hopeless for a view that wants to connect the fate of religious values ​​with the changing opinions of science, as all Jesuanism does, and Troeltsch does. For him, “the appearance of Jesus, the main features of his religious personality and his preaching must, as a historical reality, be established by historical-critical means, if only the symbol of Christ is to have a strong and strong internal foundation in the fact of Jesus” (p. 33). However, for Troeltsch, as for this entire movement, science can only establish facts; their religious meaning is interpreted by faith. But, one now asks, what use can faith make of such a vaguely and incompletely established fact as the life or “sermon” or “religious personality of Jesus?” And does such a faith, which reduces all religion to personal experience and personal knowledge of God, need historical support? Obviously, no, and here lies the main contradiction of all Jesuanism, which wants at all costs, obeying an unconscious religious need, to maintain a connection with Jesus, giving him either “pedagogical”, or “symbolic”, or historical significance for faith and sometimes managing to allegorically turn Rabbi Jesus into Christ and savior. This question has a whole history over the 19th century, but Troeltsch’s reasoning is the last word in this self-destruction of Jesuanism. Troeltsch has a negative attitude towards modern religious individualism, which is unable to rise to the level of churchliness. "This churchlessness and cultlessness (Gemeinschafts und Kultlosigkeit) is the true disease of modern Christianity and modern religiosity in general. Through this it acquires a fluid and chaotic, personally whimsical, enthusiastic and amateurish, intellectualistic character" (p. 25). Religion requires community and cult; this is a sociological law. In the awareness of this socio-psychological necessity, Troeltsch establishes that every religion must have its own prophet as the center of community and cult. In the same way, “the fate of Christianity is connected with the central significance of Christ in the cult” (p. 29). This is not a logical or historical, but precisely a socio-psychological necessity (p. 30). Therefore, “if we need a cult and a community, then we also need Christ as the head and center of the community” (p. 31). Is it not clear, however, that this religious utilitarianism, the veneration of Jesus in the name of sociological expediency, has no religious persuasiveness and is only an expression of the complete corruption of Jesuanism? This is religious cynicism, unnecessary for some, offensive for others. And, moreover, why was Jesus, about whom science can establish so little reliable, needed for such a role? Troeltsch himself is aware that his socio-psychological explanation has a more general meaning and is applicable not only to Christianity, but also to any other “spiritual-ethical” faith. Preference is given to Christianity for reasons, so to speak, of a religious-opportunistic nature. It’s just that, according to Troeltsch, the European-American world cannot expect any other religiosity other than Christian. This does not mean at all that Christianity is an absolute religion that will endure until the end of time. We cannot even answer this question now, because, speaking in principle, it is quite conceivable that Christianity in history will also be replaced by another, more perfect religion. In any case, according to Troeltsch, “Christocentrism” must be done away with in religion, just as with geocentrism in cosmology and anthropocentrism in metaphysics (p. 15). “God in Christ can only mean to us that in Jesus we have the highest revelation of God available to you and that we make the image of Jesus the focus of all the self-testimonies of God in our lives” (p. 50). Leaving aside the ambiguity and inconsistency of this concept of Jesuanism, which could be shown only with a detailed analysis, we note how completely non-psychological this religious utilitarianism is, although it goes under the flag of religious psychology. Is it really possible to preserve a traditional cult simply because it promotes liberation from painful religious individualism, like monthly friendly dinners or meetings of various societies? And what then become of those symbolic actions that were retained by Luther as remnants of the Christian sacraments? What significance does the Eucharist receive in modern Jesuanism? Another of his representatives, Prof., talks about this. Otto Baumgarten (Kiel) in a brochure with the characteristic title: Die Abendmahlsnot. Ein Kapitel aus der deutschen Kirchengeschichte der Gegenwart. 1911 (in the Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher series). “Eucharistic need” is statistically expressed in a significant decrease in the absolute and relative number of persons participating in the Eucharist (“participants”). This fact in itself, undoubtedly universal at present, characterizes only the general decline of faith, the religious crisis of our time. But for “modern” Protestantism, i.e. Jesuanism, there are still a number of specific difficulties associated with the complete uncertainty of the very meaning of the Eucharist. If each researcher constructs his own image of Jesus and interprets its religious meaning in his own way, then, obviously, each can have his own interpretation of the main sacred rite preserved in Lutheranism along with baptism - the “Lord’s Table”. And, therefore, there can be no talk of unity on its basis here. Baumgarten examines these internal difficulties in a special chapter “die Verstandesnöthe”, “difficulties on the part of the mind” (to which he adds difficulties on the part of conscience, and then also of a liturgical-aesthetic nature). The author also attaches enormous religious and social significance to this cult rite (obviously, the term “sacrament” is completely inapplicable here) and wants everything possible to be done to maintain its significance in the “community,” but his own proposals (“Abhilfeverauch der Abendsmahlnot”), dictated by the desire to adapt to modern mores and concern for spiritual comfort, only emphasize the religious hopelessness of this situation and all the inconsistency of this task is to retain the sacrament of the Body and Blood without faith in Christ. The situation with the question of church doctrine is equally hopeless. More than half of the pastors now belong to various shades of Jesuanism, and from the church pulpit they expound the worldview of one or another scientific school. There can be no talk of any unity or common symbol of faith. Recently, the case of Pastor Jatho-Fall, who was removed from the parish by a church court due to his pantheism, made a splash throughout Germany. This measure caused indignation among wide circles as an violation of freedom of preaching 9 . Of course, there is no place for pantheists in the Christian Church; the Monistenbund opens its arms wide to them. But is it possible to defend any church norm of doctrine under the dominance of Jesuanism of various persuasions? and where is the line that religious subjectivism must not cross? Jathofall therefore symbolizes the religious drama of modern Protestantism. The significant symptoms of religious self-consciousness in modern Protestantism, which we are talking about, once again illustrate our main idea, namely, that Christianity can only exist as a church Christianity or cannot exist at all. Modern Protestantism, which embodies the beginning of individualistic, non-church Christianity, is uncontrollably decaying before our eyes, despite all the desire to save it, despite all the sincerity, learning, and thoughtfulness of its individual representatives. What is happening in modern Protestantism is full of the deepest religious meaning and deserves the most serious attention. Christianity exists only in living, concrete church tradition, and outside of it only the science of Christianity remains, and the remnants of the old, kept from the Church by the Reformation. Of course, church dogma does not protect against the poisonous sting of modern scientific doubt; the question of the religious significance of scientific criticism, its rights and limits exists here too, although in a special formulation. But here science is not credited with the ability to definitively verify religious facts. One way or another, but by the force of things, by the very development of science and religious philosophy, the problem of the church is becoming more and more acute, and in this world movement of thought the great merits of Protestantism with its science, with its intellectual conscience; they are great even when it is given to him to testify to the truth only by the consistent revelation of error. The beginning of this century in the religious thought of Protestant countries and especially Germany was marked by special revival. The entire Protestant world was agitated by the agitation campaign undertaken by the Monistenbund, led by Arthur Drews, against one of the foundations of Christianity, the belief in the historical existence of Jesus. Hat Jesus gelebt? This is a question that has recently been the topic of heated debate in numerous national assemblies 10 and is being discussed in a whole literature of books and pamphlets, which has already grown and is ever increasing before our eyes 11 . It is difficult, of course, to say how long the public’s fickle attention will remain on these issues and whether this wave is already waning, but now this agitation gives the impression of a bomb exploding. What exactly happened? Has a new discovery been made that will revolutionize historical science? Or was a new idea born? Neither one nor the other. For anyone who has only followed the development of religious-historical science, it is clear that in the writings of Drews himself 12 and his associates - the most fanatical of them “pastor” Fr. Steidel 13 – there is nothing new in the scientific sense, except for errors. A philosopher by department and profession, Drews has never been an independent researcher in this field and is treated by specialists as an “unberufener Diletant” (in Harnack’s words). The very idea of ​​denying the historical existence of Jesus and interpreting the Gospel as a system of myths is not new either; this path was predicted by “Citizen Dupuy in the third year of the Republic,” 14 it was followed in the 19th century by Bruno Bauer and D. Strauss. However, only Drews and Co. made these ideas the subject of passionate and fanatical agitation and threw them into the crowd, of course, completely incapable of understanding subtle and complex problems, as the last word of historical science, and this by no means philosophical course of action, undertaken, in fact, only for the sake of spreading the religious-metaphysical ideas of Hartmannism, with which Drews was inspired, gives this whole campaign an element of quackery and demagoguery. In reality, it is not cold science, but ardent hatred of Christianity as a religion that guides here the preacher of the pantheistic religion of the “unconscious.” But, of course, such an enterprise could count on significant external success, for it flatters the prevailing mood of the time. This success can be judged by the fact that a number of prominent scientists considered it necessary to speak out not only in defense of the dignity of science, 15 but even more in defense of the people's soul. And at the same time, all the wealth of scientific forces of modern Germany was revealed once again, although it turned out to be unable to prevent the current quasi-scientific movement. We can now say without any exaggeration that scientifically Drews should be considered completely destroyed, if only scientificity were truly decisive here. In any case, for free and unprejudiced minds there is every opportunity to understand the issue from its scientific side. The radical mythologism of our day is a special case of the application of the general religious-historical method, which has recently received full rights of citizenship. “Religious syncretism” is now the key that unlocks all locks. The process of the origin and development of religions is likened to how other “dissertations” are compiled, when paste and scissors are the main methods of creativity, and seams and gluing are visible to the naked eye. Since Tübingen, Christianity has been considered a compilation of two sources, some attributing predominant importance to elements of Judaism, others to Hellenism. So, for example, Harnack in “History of Dogmas” states the “acute Hellenization” of primitive Christianity. In modern times, Christianity is usually portrayed as a mosaic compilation from many sources, some kind of religious-historical conglomerate. The program for the new direction was outlined in a small work by prof. Gunkel: “Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständniss des Neuen Testaments.” 1903. “Judaism... should be called a syncretistic religion... in the era of Christ it experienced a double influence, in the Western diaspora mainly from Hellenism, in the Eastern diaspora - from the East,” and therefore “Christianity, born from syncretistic Judaism, reveals important syncretistic features.” "Christianity is a syncretistic religion. Important religious motifs that came from foreign lands are preserved and illuminated in it - Eastern and Hellenistic" (pp. 34-5, 69, 88, 95). And this conviction became the guiding one for the entire new generation of historians. The newest discoveries in the history of the East, due to excavations, have provided new materials for religious and historical parallels, although they have not introduced anything fundamentally new. The question remains today in the same fundamental formulation that it had not only under Citizen Dupuis, but also in the era of the ancient apologists and fathers of the Church. In works of the religious-historical direction, parallels are diligently sought throughout history: the birth of Christ, 16 the most important events of gospel history, the passion of Christ, the resurrection, 17 “Paulinism,” images of the Apocalypse - numerous parallels are sought for all of this in order to once again confirm the general thesis about the syncretistic nature of Christianity. At the same time, not always enough intelligibility is manifested, and only now, under the blows of the agitation of Drews, who has the undeniable merit of leading this direction to absurdity, self-criticism awakens 18 and sobering up and some resignation sets in. Until recently, the method of religious-historical parallels was used primarily in order, according to the old Strauss recipe, to discard such features that did not fit into the “scientifically” carved out – each in his own way – image of the “historical Jesus”, and, however, this very possibility was not questioned. On the contrary, according to the prevailing opinion, “the time when it was still possible to raise in science the question of whether the historical Jesus existed has passed.” 19 And suddenly this very question: hat Jesus gelebt? finds itself back in the spotlight and becomes the subject of noisy discussion. Drews and like-minded people managed to upset the balance again. In recent years, a whole series of scientific theories have been put forward to explain Christianity without Christ, and they sharply contradict each other or mutually exclude each other. The late Bremen “pastor” Kalthof, who developed his “social theology” on the basis of the premises of economic materialism, resolutely denied the historical existence of Jesus. This talented Marxist theologian defended the thesis that Christianity originated in the movement of slaves in various places, mainly in Rome. Christ embodies the general ideal of a given era, is its projection in a personal image. “From a socio-theological point of view, the image of Christ is therefore the most refined religious expression of everything that was effective as a social and ethical force in a given era, and in the changes to which this image of Christ is constantly subjected in its expansions and limitations, in the fading of its old features and in its new illumination, we have the most subtle measure of the changes that occur in life from the heights of its spiritual ideals to the depths of its material vital foundations.” 20 What is interesting for social theology is the historically changing image of Christ. 21 Nothing interesting can be added to social theology by “The Origin of Christianity” (1909) by K. Kautsky, who, however, does not question the historical existence of Jesus, although he does not attach much importance to it. The third theologian from socialism, M. Maurenbrecher, 22 who seeks the historical roots of Christianity in the “Gospel of the Poor,” is distinguished in his constructions by the greatest caution and complexity, and is far from reducing to zero the significance of the very personality of its founder, much less denying his existence. Thus, there was no unanimity even within the limits of Marxist dogma - and here we have three different, competing and little agreed upon concepts of Christianity. Among the representatives of the mythological trend, perhaps the most expressive figure is the learned Assyriologist Jensen with his huge volume 23 “Der Gilgameschepos in der Weltlitteratur”. 1906. Such scholarship leads to sad reflections, and one involuntarily recalls K. Prutkov’s aphorism that a specialty is like gumboil. Such a flux for Jensen was his knowledge of Babylonian literature, in which he found a key that fit absolutely all locks, and saw the prototype of the entire Old and New Testaments, the Homeric epic and much more. It is impossible to convey not only the strangeness, but also the downright comical nature of this enterprise. To understand this, you need to get acquainted with the text of the 24th epic of Gilgamesh, this colorful and extremely interesting fragment of Babylonian poetry, bearing traces of deep antiquity, although not completely preserved (out of 3600 verses, only 2000 have not been preserved, and out of the remaining 1600, only 522 are quite clearly preserved). Here the adventures of the hero Gilgamesh and his friend Eabani are described, in which Jensen sees all sorts of Old and New Testament images. Jensen's general conclusion is this: "Jesus never lived on earth and never died on it, he is nothing more than the Israeli Gilgamesh, as a parallel to Moses, Abraham and countless other images of the saga. In our churches, in church and in school, in palaces and huts, we pray to the Babylonian god, the Babylonian gods." 25 Other mythologists look for Jesus in ancient pagan cults and try to establish the pre-Christian origin of this image. This is done, for example, by Robertson 26 . V.B. received particular fame here. Smith, Prof. mathematicians in Louisiana. His sketches under the general title “Pre-Christian Jesus” 27 provide another illustration of the meager means with which this task is now undertaken - alas! - a popular task. Smith's main idea is that Jesus is not a proper name, but a common noun (“the help of God”) and denotes the cult god of the Nazarene sect. This hypothesis is built on such a shaky foundation as one expression of the Acts of St. τὰ περἰ τοῦ Ιησού (Acts 19:1–7): this tells about Apollos, who knew only John’s baptism and had not heard of the Holy Spirit. And it is this expression that Smith considers to hide information about the old cult of the god Joshua. He carries out a similar operation with the name “Nazarenes,” which he derives (according to competent persons, completely arbitrarily) from the root of the verb “nazir,” to guard (he completely denies the existence of the Evangelical Nazareth). He explains the name Nazarenes, applied to Christians, by the existence of a sect of “guardians” who had as their patron a special pre-Christian guardian god, the pre-Christian Jesus. By this method it is possible to prove, on the basis of various expressions of the Gospel, the existence of any number of cults having the pre-Christian god Jesus. Those who want to find a detailed and completely devastating analysis of this “theory” will find it in Weinel or Joh. Weiss (work cited above). What is characteristic here is an extraordinary historical myopia. Indeed, even with greater evidence of his statements, Smith should have given an explanation of the history of all early Christian writing and the entire early dogmatic development of the church, and this, of course, would have revealed the hopeless difficulty of this undertaking. A break with the tradition of centuries, contempt for it is characteristic of him, as of this entire movement, which represents not only moral ugliness, but also scientific depravity 28. With the advent of demand, such works begin to appear like mushrooms after rain. The publishing company Diederichs in Leipzig specialized in this 29 . Drews’ pamphlet “Die Christusmythe” (230 pages) also appeared here. In this skillfully written “scientific” pamphlet, the reader takes a walk through the mythology of antiquity or, in the harsh but fair expression of one critic, finds himself in the “circus of mythological and religious historical kunststücks,” in which, among many, numbers that are already familiar to us are performed: Kalthoff, Smith, and others pass in a bizarre combination before the eyes of the reader. Historical data here alternates with completely unproven and fantastic statements, although they are surrounded by reservations: apparently, probably, etc., but in essence accepted as proven. However, from this unreliable and low-value material, a slender building is erected, hypnotizing with its architecture the layman intimidated by the “scientificness”. The surrogate of semi-science or pseudoscience, presented as science, is the greatest spiritual evil of our era, but nowhere does this scourge strike as painfully as in matters of faith, when discussing the central issue of Christianity in our little-faithful, but therefore superstitious and gullible time. In any case, for readers of Drews's pamphlet, we strongly recommend that they become acquainted with his scientific criticism, at least in the works of I. Weiss, Weinel, Meffert and others 30. I cannot reproduce here the full tortuous train of thought of Drews and will limit myself to a general description and individual examples. The first part of the book analyzes the “pre-Christian Jesus,” and the second sums up the results of New Testament criticism. The analysis uses, of course, the most powerful reagents available in the mythological laboratory, and, above all, the notorious astral method, with the help of which any of us can be turned into a solar or stellar myth. Family life in Joseph's house takes place in heaven, among the gods, and is transferred to earth only for the sake of disguise (77). The three magicians who came to worship the baby, whose birth “actually” signifies the birth of the sun at the time of the winter solstice, are nothing more than three stars in the belt of Orion (55). The baptism of Jesus in the Jordan is also “an earthly reflection of an originally astral event: and the sun begins its annual cycle with baptism, immediately after birth entering the signs of Aquarius and Pisces” (81). And the words of John the Baptist about Christ: “He must increase, but I must decrease” refer to the time of the pre-summer solstice, after which the sun begins to decline (82). The Transfiguration also takes on the meaning of “fiery baptism” and refers to the summer solstice, with Elijah and Moses corresponding to the solar gods (Helios) and the lunar gods. “Lamb of God,” Agnus Dei, is close to the Persian god of fire Agni, firstly, by the consonance of the Latin Agnus and Agni (11), and secondly, by the similarity of the symbolic designation of the lamb and Agni, who is depicted as a ram due to the location of the sun at the time of the spring equinox in the constellation Aries 31. Joseph the “carpenter” is the artist Hephaestus, therefore a god in disguise, Mary is the Mayan goddess, mother of Agni, etc., etc. This is either outright quackery or real psychopathy. Further, the reagent of comparative mythology is widely used, in particular, the hypothesis developed especially by Frazer 32 about the connection of the myth of the annually dying and resurrecting god (Attis, Adonis, Osiris) with the Christian resurrection. This rapprochement, in which all external similarities are carefully emphasized and all internal differences are forgotten, 33 is, of course, triumphantly repeated by Drews. The Passion of Christ turns (according to Frazer's fantastic construction, taken up by Robertson) into a dramatic performance, originating from the Babylonian festival of Zakeev (Saturnalia). On this holiday, one of the two criminals, dressed as a king (Haman of the book of Esther), after a solemn procession, was executed, and the other (Mordecai) was set free. This allegedly explains the custom of the Jewish holiday Purim. Drews sees the same dramatization, already transferred to the Easter holiday, in the story of the crucifixion of Jesus and the liberation of Barabbas. It is not at all surprising that regarding this fantasy I. Weiss calls out for “wissenschaftliche Sicherheitspolizei”! The cross, in which Kalthof saw the banner of slaves and the poor, in Drews turns into a symbol of fire and life, standing, naturally, again in connection with Agni and only later receiving its present form and meaning. This is the mythological code with which Drews deciphers the Gospel story. Christianity allegedly originated not in Jerusalem, but in Antioch, where the cult of Adonis especially flourished. But this is where an insurmountable difficulty begins for Drews. Let us assume that all his initial assumptions are correct and Christianity really arose on the basis of the most unbridled mythological syncretism. Reasoning theoretically, it should be assumed that in this boiling cauldron of mixing religions, an indefinite number of religious new formations could have arisen, which can be mathematically defined as the sum of possible combinations of a large number of elements. But there is still a huge distance between possibility and reality. How can we explain the implementation of this particular possibility? This is where hopeless failure awaits Drews. How to explain the history of early Christianity, which takes place already in the full daylight of history? and the entire New Testament history with its specificity and historical flavor? Why did the preaching of the Cross, “a temptation for the Greeks, but foolishness for the Jews,” choose this line not of the least, but of the greatest resistance? Why didn’t its preachers, to whom Drews is inclined to attribute even the conscious sweeping of historical traces, take advantage of all the elasticity of the mythologeme and make their task easier? How could the early Christian church, this world-historical deception or self-deception, as depicted by Drews, arise in the souls? And, finally, the most difficult thing: how can one historically explain the endowment of historical and human flesh with a mythological being, a god? Even from ancient times, we inherited for this case the theory of Euhemerus, according to which the gods are deified heroes, but according to the method of Euhemerism it is impossible to explain the opposite, i.e. no longer the deification of man, but the humanization of God. To this basic question we find no answer, or even worse than none, we find the following: “Judaism (=Judeo-Christianity) in general and in Jerusalem in particular needed a legal foundation in order to rest on it its own predominant position against the pagan Christianity of Paul: for this the founders had to enjoy personal communication with Jesus and even be chosen by him to their calling; and therefore he had to remain not only a god, but also had to descend to the historical reality... Very mundane, very practical reasons were therefore ultimately decisive for the transformation of the original god Jesus into a historical individual, and the center of gravity of his activity, the decisive fact of his life - his death and resurrection, which had the greatest significance for religious views, were transferred to the holy city of David, “the forefather of the Messiah,” and with him religious salvation was united in the minds of the Jews” (205-6). Truly the mountain gave birth to a mouse! But in this obvious impotence to explain the origin of the church, so brilliantly revealed here, one can see only a negative confirmation of its inexplicability by the natural forces of history. The new birth can only be stated, not explained, and attempts at this explanation concern only the periphery and not the center, the outer, not the inner being. Christianity was born without historical witnesses or chroniclers, on that winter night when choirs of angels sang the glory of God, and on that “sacred mystical night” when “Christ rose from the dead.” A new force has entered history, and only its development, and not its origin, can be studied by science. The picture depicted here of the militant campaign of anti-Christianity under the pretext of science can and, indeed, leads many into confusion and despondency. However, we should not lose sight of the other side of the matter. "There can be no more compelling testimony to the greatness of Jesus than the intense attention from all camps concentrated on the question of Jesus Christ. And the present Christological movement differs from the previous era in its positive religious motive" (Kiefl). It can be said that since the Christological debates of the era of the first ecumenical councils, this problem has not attracted such attention as it does now, in the age of economic materialism and capitalism, parliamentarism and social democracy, neo-Kantianism and natural science! IV. Christianity and mythology The question of the mutual relations between Christianity and paganism, which has become so prominent in the scientific and religious-philosophical consciousness of our time, now arises with particular force in view of the latest successes of religious-historical science, which has been enriched with new material thanks to Egyptian, Babylonian and Cretan excavations, the study of texts, and the development of philology. Our ideas about the historical course of the religious development of mankind have become extremely complicated and enriched, and, in particular, this must be said about the religious state of the Roman Empire at the beginning of our era. On the one hand, the fact of migration of gods and beliefs seems to be scientifically established. “The migration of beliefs is a general and constant phenomenon that repeats itself throughout the history of mankind,” says Prince. S. N. Trubetskoy. “Together with the gods, and sometimes in addition to them, rituals, forms of worship, and religious symbols are borrowed, with which certain beliefs, superstitions and religious ideas are associated.” 34 Naturally, in science there is a desire to go back to the primary sources of these beliefs, to search for their original homeland, from this need arises “Pan-Babylonism,” the explanation of the gods as personifications of heavenly bodies, and Jensen’s “theory,” and other similar attempts to cover with one hypothesis the entire mass of complex phenomena of religious history. On this same basis, the question arises about the relationship of Christianity to paganism and their mutual affinity. This question is by no means new, it appeared along with Christianity, and the early monuments of Christian writing, from the writings of the first apologists to the blessed. Augustine, are full of these themes, and this is understandable if we remember that Christianity had to declare a fight against the entire pagan world, which in turn was not limited to passive defense, but also went on the offensive. Therefore, it is difficult to expect here, in an atmosphere of struggle, an objective-historical, completely impartial attitude towards paganism; it was for them a living and dangerous enemy, and not a dead object of scientific curiosity. At the same time, they, of course, had the opportunity to penetrate deeper and more directly into the living essence of paganism than modern philologists and archaeologists. Paganism seemed to them to be demonic possession, and its myths and rituals were the invention of demons who, with an apparent semblance of truth, want to pervert it and turn it away from it. One can, however, observe different shades in relation to paganism, from complete irreconcilability, for example, in Tatian or Hermias with his “Mockery of Pagan Philosophers,” to a reconciling, synthetic understanding in St. Justin, philosopher of the 2nd century. and Clement of Alexandria of the 3rd century, who found rays of divine light in paganism and saw in the pagan righteous, like Socrates and Plato, Christians before Christ. But this soft attitude towards pagan philosophy did not extend to religion. It is remarkable that the apologists were not only far from recognizing any similarity between Christianity and paganism, but, on the contrary, were full of awareness of the fundamental dissimilarity, the deepest difference between them 35. And, as far as can be judged by the content of the apologies, the same was the attitude of the opponents of Christianity, who, as is known, accused Christians most often of atheism, i.e. in the denial of pagan gods and religions. In this era of the greatest confusion of religions and cults, and religious syncretism never repeated to such a degree, Christianity is not accused of being a syncretistic religion; on the contrary, its peculiarity is affirmed, its alienness to the entire pagan world; this is the basis of the enmity of, for example, Celsus towards him, who, judging by the passages preserved in Origen’s apology, wrote the most powerful and caustic criticism of Christianity not only for his own time, but also for our time. Currently, the state of affairs has changed, and the current enemies of Christianity, and with them many who consider themselves its friends, take the syncretic character of Christianity as an axiom that does not require proof, and the disagreements concern only the degree of this influence. Some go so far as to decompose Christianity entirely into myths, while others leave the central core intact, but decompose the atmosphere enveloping it. In this direction, towards the revelation of the religious syncretism of Christianity, scientific energy is now directed and research is being conducted. However, in addition to the accumulation of raw material related to this, there is also a fundamental aspect of the question about the meaning and meaning of the very problem of religious syncretism and about a research method that meets the requirements of scientific consciousness. Currently, the method of external and brute force parallelism is widely used in this area. A religious-historical preparation is prepared as follows: some feature or image of New Testament writing is taken and all sorts of parallels from other religions of different eras and peoples are sought, and, if there is at least some kind of religious similarity, syncretism is established on the basis of the similarity, i.e. or direct influence and borrowing, or, even more often, the general “mythical” nature of the image being studied. Thus, a lot of parallels were found to the entire gospel history from the Nativity of Christ to the Resurrection, 36 and Drews, in essence, only generalized and completed what is inherent in this method. But does the method of seizing individual features that are part of a different whole and have a certain meaning only in this complex have any serious scientific, and even more so religious value? After all, it is indisputable that, for example, the cult of heroes and the cult of Christian saints, communion in the Eleusinian mysteries and the Christian Eucharist, the death and resurrection of the astral or plant gods and the death and resurrection of Christ, Isis or the Great Mother and the Virgin Mary, the ritual of some pagan cults and Christian worship, etc., etc., may have a certain external similarity, but their religious content is so opposite or different, that one should, following the example of the ancient apologists, rather talk not about their similarities, but about their differences. Meanwhile, the latest religious-comparative literature is literally teeming with such comparisons and quasi-scientific conclusions based on such walks on Cook’s company tickets to the field of comparative mythology, and conclusions of paramount importance are drawn from them. We have now learned too much about ancient religions to lose our former disdain for them, but also too little to have a proper understanding of them as religions, i.e. the main thing is about their religious experience. For only by comprehending this experience can we truly come closer to understanding their forms and dogmas. And it must be said that if a European person still manages to penetrate into the religious world of the Hellenes and sometimes with a sensitive ear hear their prayerful whisper across the distance of centuries, this is a rare gift of comprehension that, for example, Nietzsche had, and of our contemporaries - Vyach. Ivanov, the far east, from where the pan-Babylonians want to derive all religious history, is covered in deep darkness. The philological-literary method that is used here in our literary era is, in fact, completely insufficient for the conclusions drawn. The ease and haste of these conclusions is explained most of all by the religious indifference or even the sovereign contempt of researchers for all religions equally, both syncretic and primitive, and this creates the psychological background of the entire trend. When reading literature on syncretism, I was more than once reminded of that chapter from Tolstoy’s “Resurrection,” where he describes an Orthodox mass as a person who completely does not understand the meaning of what is happening would describe it. If you look at myth and ritual with the same eyes as Tolstoy looks at Orthodox worship here, then you can establish any kind of rapprochement and syncretism. If we were to assume for a moment that Christianity died and was forgotten, and then excavations were carried out in Moscow, then what a triumph for lovers of religious syncretism would be the discovery here of the Kazan, Iverskaya, Tikhvin and other icons of the Mother of God, as well as saints belonging to different countries and eras, and to what extent they would actually understand little of the significance of what was found. And, on the other hand, how our ideas about the religious syncretism of the ancients would change if we knew how not only to collect, but also to understand the inner meaning of their cult and myths. Then conclusions based on Tolstoy’s method would not be so frequent, which are now found even among the most famous researchers. What could it mean, for example, what is being done by Frazer 37 and others. comparing the current celebration of Easter and the removal of the shroud on Good Friday to the feast of Adonis and what does it give for understanding the religious essence of both? Exactly as much as Tolstoy’s description of mass and everything that happens in it to understand the sacrament of the Eucharist. Or what is the point in the same Frazer’s likening the image of Aphrodite near the body of his beloved Adonis to the Christian Pieta, 38 and it is even suggested that these images could serve as a prototype for Christian art right up to Michelangelo! Without further ado, Isis is likened here to the Madonna, Attis turns out to be the firstborn of the resurrected, the prototype of Christ, the fir tree, the sacred tree of Attis, turns out to be the prototype of the Christian tree, etc. And such religious-historical sport makes it difficult to think about the specific history of religious syncretism, why it all appears either in the form of high school cheating, or meaningless collecting, or conscious borrowing. Examples of the latter, generally speaking, are possible and in some cases established, but they relate to the details of the cult and pursue one or another pedagogical goal: such, for example, is the establishment of the celebration of the Nativity of Christ on December 25, the day when the birth of Mithras was celebrated, or the construction of Christian churches on the site of idolatry churches, or the displacement of local gods by Christian saints, with the assignment of some special functions of these gods to them, 39 and etc. The name of syncretism is just as ill-suited to this as to the cases of appointment of religious processions on the same day by rival Catholics and Orthodox Christians in our Western Territory or the convergence in the design of churches and the Eastern and Latin rites, which is observed in areas with a Uniate population. There was a long struggle between Christianity and paganism, the reflection of which we see in the writings of apologists and can be traced in church life, and “when Christianity became a moral force, it left its mark even on its enemies.” The Phrygian priests of the Great Mother openly contrasted their celebrations of the vernal equinox with Christian Easter and attributed the blood shed on the taurobol to the redemptive power of the Divine Lamb. There are a series of very subtle problems of chronology and mutual dependence, so that it would be imprudent to solve them in bulk. No doubt they will receive a different answer in each individual case, and some will remain, I fear, forever insoluble. These are the judgments of one of the most competent historians of paganism, Cumont 40. External borrowing or syncretism often explains similarities that do not require any special explanation, but are quite understandable based on the logic of religious feeling in general and a given religion in particular. There is a certain psychological mechanism of religious life, independent of its content. Is it necessary to explain by borrowing that all more or less mature religions have churches, prayers, external cult, dogmas and rituals? Isn’t this the same necessity that explains the observed identity or affinity of images for expressing the same feelings or ideas: such is the symbolism of numbers and animals, the notorious dragon and snake, the great mother and the solar or plant god. Are these not just attempts to reveal the religious symbol that nature undoubtedly is for us? In such cases, it would not be the essential and basic content of the symbol or myth that would be subject to explanation from borrowing or on the basis of the migration of beliefs, but only those specific features of it, the presence of which alone allows us to talk about borrowing. Meanwhile, here, for the sake of straining out a mosquito, a camel is sometimes swallowed, and any similarity is explained by borrowing, and not by the independent and similar growth of religions. This general judgment could be abundantly illustrated with examples from the history of the Jewish religion and Christianity, where they are ready to admit all sorts of unproven, even downright fantastic influences (for example, even the Indian religion), but very little and reluctantly leave it to the original development of these religions. But even in those cases where the presence of religious syncretism can be indisputably stated, as, for example, in the Roman Empire at the beginning of the Christian era, in the era of widespread penetration and enormous influence of Eastern religions, the question is not exhausted by establishing this fact alone. The phenomenon of religious syncretism is by no means reduced to literary influence and borrowing, but presupposes religious assimilation, mutual attraction and internal adaptation, the selection of one and the rejection of the other. To truly understand the nature of religious syncretism, it is important not only what, but also how and why. For what reasons is one accepted and the other rejected? What religious need does this or that myth, symbol or ritual serve, perhaps only as a chance form of expression? And research limited to just finding religious and historical parallels misses the very essence of the problem. The religious syncretism that dominated the Greco-Roman world expressed very clearly the common thirst and hope of this world, the thirst for redemption and hope for a savior. And when “the light of the revelation of tongues” came into the world, it is natural that they often spoke about Him in the language of former hopes and expectations. Prof. F. F. Zelinsky once expressed that the ancient religions were the Old Testament for Christianity. Scientific research is increasingly revealing the truth formulated (even before Strauss) by Schelling, namely, that “Christianity existed before and outside of Christianity.” Old religious symbols were part of new religious formations, but in this new whole they changed their nature, lost their former meaning and were filled with new content. Is it appropriate in such cases to talk about syncretism in the sense of borrowing? A plant consists of certain elements of the soil and atmosphere, but can we say that it is composed of them, like a house of stones and cement, and is it not more correct to say that from them it forms its own and new body? In general, the mechanical understanding of the history of religious syncretism should be replaced by a more in-depth organic, real history of religion, applying the old critical methods and being aware of its religious, philosophical and metaphysical premises. In modern myth-making, the myth of “pure science” plays a large role. The supposed pure science is a fairy tale with which older children are now intimidated, and one of the nightmares that oppresses the spirit of modern humanity. There are reasons to doubt whether a pure, self-closed and self-sufficient science exists at all, but one cannot even doubt that the history of religions is not such. It is “not pure” and not free from prerequisites (it is not a voraussetzungslose Wissenschaft) already because it literally cannot take a step without the presence of ready-made religious and philosophical concepts, and these prerequisites pose questions, determine classification, and form the basis of its evolutionary constructions. For, as Schelling previously showed metaphysically, and in modern times Rickert develops epistemologically, historical development is conceivable only as a theological process, and all historical concepts have a clearly expressed theological character. In historical science, only its technique is objective or “pure” - and then to a certain extent: for example, philological criticism of texts, deciphering monuments, etc.; but all purely research, generalizing work is guided by a priori premises, “judgments of value,” which are reflected in the very establishment of the so-called “facts,” and even more “laws” and “conclusions.” If a researcher is not aware of this conditionality of his conclusions or forgets about them, he not only falls into bad, unscientific dogmatism, but simply falsifies science, ascribes to it something that does not really belong to it. And the area of ​​science that interests us, the history of religions, is especially full of such scientific falsifications. The history of religions inevitably has, in addition to general scientific a priori forms, also its relative a priori 41, not always expressed, but always present, and, moreover, very complex, including an entire religious metaphysics. The history of religion in general, and the history of Christianity in particular, is always and inevitably “confessional” and cannot be non-confessional, and not only in the narrow sense of various Christian confessions, but also in a broader sense of all possible faiths, including the militant atheism of encyclopedists and “enlightenmentists.” We currently have a whole series of such a priori concepts of the history of Christianity in relation to empirical science: church, in particular Orthodox and Catholic, Protestant of various shades, Marxist (Kalthof, Kautskv, Mauerbrecher), pantheistic (Drevs), enlightenment (most comparative mythologists), and recently even psychiatric. It would be instructive to illustrate this idea through a comparative analysis of the image of any historical era under different confessional prerequisites - such an experimentum crucis could easily serve, for example, early Christianity. Depending on various premises, not only problems, but often facts are determined here. After all, the main question of Christianity - about the Son of Man - is not resolved by scientific means and even beyond the boundaries of science, just as the main event of gospel history - the resurrection of Christ - is also accepted or rejected for reasons of religious metaphysics, and not historical criticism. And one view or another predetermines the path of purely scientific research and interpretation of the history of early Christianity. With one understanding, its beginning is associated with the appearance of the Risen One and the fact of the resurrection, with another, this story begins from an empty place that needs to be filled with something, and everyone who touches the corresponding literature knows how much effort of the mind and scholarship is used to solve the problems that arise in this case, what role, for example, is played in modern exegesis by fear of miracles and desire at all costs, not by washing, but by rolling, criticizing texts or cunning interpreting them, eliminating miracles from the Gospels. To justify such actions, it is considered sufficient to indicate that something or other does not correspond to “moderne Weltanschauung”, i.e. a set of certain philosophical ideas that express this “modern worldview.” But that there is nothing indisputable in all this, at least the following example shows: in modern Protestant theology, which is dominated by Kant through the school of Ritschl, with his rationalism and fear of miracles, in very recent years a new direction has appeared, which also calls itself modern, but modern-positiv (Grützmacher, Gunzinger, Kropacek, etc.), which shares all the basic dogmas of church Christianity, i.e. first of all, faith in the divinity of Christ and His resurrection, the birth of the Virgin, the dogma of the Holy Trinity. In turn, Drews considers his Hartmannian philosophy ultra-modern. But the point here, of course, is not this imaginary or real modernism, but the inevitability in the study of the history of religions of this complex religious-metaphysical a priori of one or another content. Of course, in the history of religions there is material that is completely objective and equally compelling for all points of view: the discovery of new excavations, the study of new monuments, in general, a raw pile of facts is obligatory for everyone, just as well-known mechanical methods of processing them are obligatory: whoever does not observe them sins against science in the elementary sense of the word, he either does not master the technology of science or does not have intellectual integrity. But when constructing scientific theories on the basis of processing the material, the personal a priori of the researcher comes into force. And historical science is not at all a magic box from which you can get more than what is put there, for example, lower a clay Babylonian cylinder with an image of a tree, a wife and a serpent, adding an image of the battle of Marduk with a dragon, and then get out of there a ready-made theory of pan-Babylonism. The science of history itself is only a set of methods for studying material, and scientific theories are built only about this material and relying on it, but they contain answers to questions posed on the basis of the general self-awareness of the researcher. I am not preaching by this scientific bias, as far as it is tantamount to intellectual dishonesty, but I am stating an inevitable, although often forgotten, convention of scientific knowledge: science in general, and especially historical science, exists only in man and for man, is essentially anthropological and in this sense “impure.” And a person, building a science, brings here his living soul, his faith, his philosophy, his will, and this is something that the modern prejudice of pure science does not take into account 42. From here it becomes completely clear that the same scientifically established facts, with their different apperceptions, receive different assessments and turn out to be the basis for different theories. I illustrate this idea with two examples. It has always been known, and recently it has become even clearer than ever, that the Christian gospel was heard at such a historical hour when the world was waiting for it most of all; all previous history led to Christ, who appeared in “the last days of these days.” But different conclusions can be drawn from this fact. Schelling, earlier than others, at the very beginning of the 19th century 43, formulated the idea that “Christ is a historical person whose biography was written before his birth,” and at the same time he immediately notes regarding death on the cross and resurrection that “to eliminate this fact, turning it into an allegory and, therefore, denying its reality, is historical madness, for this event created the entire history of Christianity.” (And in the later period of his philosophical development, in “The Philosophy of Revelation,” Schelling strives precisely to interpret Christianity as the final moment in a long process of religious development). A quarter of a century later, D. Strauss in his “Life of Jesus” used the same idea in order, according to the method of mythology, to empty the entire gospel history and present it as a system of myths strung on one thread - the biography of Jesus. Modern writers also proceed from the same understanding of the facts - Drews, who uses this idea to deny any significance to the personality of Jesus, and Johannes Weiss to extol his personality. In the name of “modern theology,” Weiss says: 44 “The rapid development of Christology has its basis in the fact that even before the appearance of Jesus, both Jews and Hellenists had a Christology, or at least material for Christology; and at the moment when the Messiah was found in the person of Jesus, disparate elements without a definite center were united like crystals around their grain ... Early Christianity took advantage of available forms and concepts to express the captivating impression of the personality of Jesus in a publicly accessible, but at the same time absolute and indisputable form: “New Testament Christology, according to Gunkel 45, is a powerful hymn that history sings to Jesus.” Here are different interpretations of the same fact - that Christianity was prepared historically, came into the world as a ripe fruit of history, and all of them, of course, can be defended by scientific arguments, but for everyone it is clear what a secondary role science itself plays here. Another example. The latest study of the religions of the East in connection with the Babylonian excavations has given rise to the so-called pan-Babylonism, an attempt to interpret the Old Testament, and also partly the New Testament religion as a system of astral myths reflecting the Babylonian worldview (Winkler, Zimmern). Not to mention the fact that recently the very factual foundations of this hypothesis have been questioned (Kugler), a completely different interpretation of them is possible, as shown by the example of such an authoritative Babylonist as Jeremias, who in the revealed affinity of paganism with revealed religion sees only new evidence of its truth. “The real world, into which the revelation of God in Christ entered, was not abandoned by God. God's leading towards redemption was not limited to religious development within Israel. God left people to go their own ways,” but “He was not far from each of them.” This truth contains the position from which we refute the thesis of the “religious-historical school” that Christianity should be a syncretic religion. Augustine says: “What is now called the Christian religion was already among the ancients and was never absent from the beginning of the human race until Christ came in the flesh; from then on they began to call the true religion, which existed before, Christian.” This bold, controversial word contains profound truth. This is the thought of ο Λόγος σπερματικός. "The divine seed is sown widely. In particular, the hope in the Redeemer is spread throughout the whole world, especially throughout the world of the East." The Fathers of the Church saw this with amazement, and some of them were inclined to regard pagan religious institutions as demonic imitations of Christian truths. This error is based on an incorrect assessment of ancient paganism, which is still deeply embedded in theology. “All theologians between the Hellenes and the pagans had a tradition about the essence of things in secret and the truth in riddles and symbols, allegories and metaphors,” says Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, V, 4, 21). In Christianity, what the cult of “initiates” strived for without ever achieving became a reality: 1) knowledge of God in the person of I. Christ; 2) confidence in life after death and in the resurrection of I. Christ from the dead 46. Prince expresses his point of view in almost the same words. S. N. Trubetskoy 47. Finally, it is possible that there is another interpretation of the mutual relations between Christianity and non-Christian religions, namely, the one undertaken by modern theosophy, which sees in all of them the same content under different symbols and strives to create a kind of religious Volapuk, and also under the label of scientificity. Theosophy truly resurrects ancient religious syncretism. It is therefore a mistake to think that the question asked of the disciples on the way to Caesarea Philippi: what do people say about Me, the Son of Man? was really decided by scientific rather than religious consciousness. Formally speaking, one can question the existence of any historical figure. It has already been indicated in the literature that one can just as easily question the existence of Alexander the Great, St. Louis, Napoleon with his 12 marshals, even Bismarck. The existence of not only Homer, but also Shakespeare, Moses and Joshua was seriously suspected, and, of course, nothing could be easier than turning Socrates or Pythagoras into a myth. And although actual scientific criticism has left no stone unturned from the quasi-scientific arguments of Drews, and in general there can be no more reckless enterprise than the denial of the historical existence of Jesus, which we do not find even among the worst enemies of Christianity (in Celsus, Porphyry, in the Talmud), nevertheless, such attempts are repeated from time to time and, of course, will be repeated. But they are rooted not in theoretical consciousness, but in will, in reluctance, in dislike that turns into enmity. Denying the historical existence of Christ is simply a form of blasphemy against Him or an expression of disbelief in Him. This is clearly clear in the example of Drews, who only now found it more advantageous to act behind the shield of historical science, but previously he did without this shield, and, due to the nature of his philosophical worldview, he does not attach serious, at least decisive, importance to it. As a follower of Hartmann, who subjected Christianity to arrogant and at the same time philistine criticism, 48 Drews has long been a convinced enemy of Christianity, which considers it to be a passed stage of religious consciousness, and for this he did not even need to deny the historical existence of Jesus, just as Hartmann did not deny it. In addition to the main work on the philosophy of religion 49, Drews published a two-volume collection of articles by various authors, "Der Monismus" 1907, the edge of which is also directed against Christianity. And in the final chapter "Die Christusmythe" he fully reveals his cards. Christianity for him is a harmful semi-Semitic graft that prevents Aryanism and especially Germanism from creating their own world religion, free from the outlived dualistic theism of the Semites, and Drews is waiting for the emergence of a religious genius, the messiah of a new religion, which, in reality, under the metaphysical rouge applied by Hartmann and his faithful disciple, hides the features of pale, tired Buddhism, or mystical pantheism in the spirit of Rich. Wagner. And, on the other hand, for those for whom Christ is not a historical figure of the past, but is known by living religious experience that certifies His existence with the highest degree of certainty, this very question cannot arise. For a true believer and one living in Christ, even the Gospels are not needed as historical evidence, and other historical evidence is not needed. Hearing Christ’s teaching about Himself as the bread of the animal, and about eating His Body and Blood, “many of His disciples said: What strange words! Who can listen to this?” And then "many of His disciples departed from Him, and came no more to Him. Then Jesus said to the twelve, “Will you also go away?” Simon Peter answered Him, “Lord, to whom shall we go? You have the words of eternal life” (John 6:60, 66–68). This story retains educational significance for the present time: now, as then, many leave, unable to bear these “strange words,” but others at the same time remain, because they know from experience that these are verbs of eternal life. But then, as now, disputes about Christ in its deepest being are not of a scientific, but of a religious nature. Therefore, when discussing the question of the relationship of Christianity to mythology, one or another philosophy of religion is of such primary importance. What is the general significance of the mythological process and is there a fundamental difference between revealed religion and “natural”, non-revealed one? This is the same question that at the dawn of Christianity faced its apologists and which at the beginning of the 19th century was posed in full force by Schelling in his “Philosophy of Mythology” and “Philosophy of Revelation”. Currently, these creations of a brilliant thinker are acquiring new freshness and meaning. If you see in myths empty fables, children's fantasy games or folklore, if you have no interest in their religious content, then the comparative study of religions comes down to only that religious-historical sport, amateur collecting, of which there is too much in modern science. On the contrary, if we see in pagan religions and their mythologies a genuine revelation, but only at its lower levels, although obscured and distorted by the “elements of the world” or directly by the forces of evil (a certain amount of justice should be recognized for this opinion of apologists), then the philosophy of mythology must pose the question of the mythological process as the path of revelation. It was this problem, of course, that Schelling posed to himself with the scientific means of his time. Initially, he considers religion to be faith in one God, who, however, is not yet one (genotheism as opposed to monotheism). “Humanity was doomed to polytheism in order to destroy faith not in the truly One, but in the one-sided One, or only relative monotheism” and in this sense it is “a transition to the better, to the liberation of humanity from a force that is beneficial in itself, but oppresses its freedom, all development and higher knowledge” 50, and therefore “polytheism is the path to truth, and to that extent true." “Polytheistic religions, taken individually, are false, but in the sense that every thing in nature, taken separately from the all-pervading movement or thrown out of the process and becoming a dead remnant, is not the truth, it does not have the truth that it has as a whole, as a moment of it... False religion, as such, is always a deadened and thereby rendered meaningless relic (Ueberbleibsel) of the process, which in in its entirety is truth. 51 Mythological development is a completely objective process. “It is a movement to which consciousness is actually subordinated. Even in the sequence with which one god replaces another, not arbitrariness reigns, but necessity” 52. “Mythology, as the history of the gods, therefore, true mythology, could only be generated in life, it had to be something experienced and tested” 53. In other words, “mythology is what it claims to be, a real theogony, the history of the gods, but since the real gods are only those whose basis is God, then the final content of the history of the gods is the birth, the real formation of God in consciousness, and the gods relate to him as separate generating moments” 54. In this sense, in one of his early works 55 Schelling expresses the idea that “the historical construction of Christianity, due to the universality of its idea, cannot be conceived without the religious construction of all history.” Vl. also expresses similar thoughts. Soloviev, at least in his early works 56, and the book approaches him. S. N. Trubetskoy 57. Vyach shares this same thought with us. Ivanov with his deep insights into the religious mysteries of Hellenism and a penetrating interpretation of the myth-making process. As for Schelling, for Vyach. Ivanov, "a myth is a memory of a mystical event, a cosmic mystery... Myth-making is the creativity of faith. The task of myth-making is truly "the revelation of invisible things" 58. One may not be completely satisfied with the way Schelling applied these general postulates to the interpretation of a specific mythological process, but these very postulates have, I believe, indisputable persuasiveness for religious consciousness and are nothing more than a repetition of the thoughts of Clement of Alexandria, and can be based on the direct instructions of the apostle. Paul (in his letter to the Romans and in his speech in the Athenian Areopagus). In developing his ideas, Schelling dwells, among other things, with special attention on the national character of mythologies and rightly sees in mythology, as an expression of religious self-determination, the inner core of being, the basis that predetermines the historical role and destinies of a given people 59 . Of course, Schelling encounters not only the fact of national differences in mythologies, but also their sometimes striking similarity. However, for him there was no need to explain this necessarily by borrowing or syncretism, because this can be explained both from the original unity of the human race in the era of monotheism, as well as from the content of the objective mythological process, which reveals, although in different aspects, a single truth. From this point of view, one can be completely calm about the religious and historical cabinets of curiosities, which contain parallels to the Christian Annunciation, the Virgin Birth, the Incarnation and the Resurrection: all these parallels do not demean, but exalt the truth of Christianity, which is the fulfillment of the aspirations of all humanity, and on this occasion one should remember the words of one of the most irreconcilable apologists, Tertullian, that the soul human being is Christian by nature. The real difficulty lies not in recognizing the connection between Christianity and paganism, but in drawing proper boundaries between them, which are completely erased not only by deniers of religion in general, which is quite natural, and not only by theosophical Esperantists with their religious Volapuk, but also by modern Christian theologians of Protestantism 60 . And this phenomenon is in a necessary connection with the fact that in Protestantism the idea of ​​the Church is increasingly being lost, while only in the light of this idea can a fundamental qualitative difference be established between the “natural” revelation outside the Church and the grace-filled and in this sense supernatural revelation given only to the Church, first the Old Testament, and then the New Testament, and what it contains as universal tradition. Whoever believes in the Church has a clear and fundamental criterion for distinguishing between these two types of revelation, pure and unalloyed truth and truth distorted and complicated by many refractions; he will not reduce it to only quantitative differences, as present-day Protestant theologians are forced by the force of things to do (and Schelling, in whose system the idea of ​​the Church does not receive its due significance, is not free from this weakness due to his Protestant limitations), for the difference is fundamental and qualitative, rooted in the very sources of knowledge of God. This difference can be captured by the following distinction. Of course, the rays of knowledge of God pour out from the one divine Logos, by whom everything was created and who is the light of the world. And in this sense, Schelling’s thought is correct that both paganism and Christianity contain the revelation of Christ, but in the former he is not yet revealed as Christ. Humanity can be involved in Christ in two ways: through corporate humanity, which is the soul of the world, and through personal direct communication with the incarnate Logos, the Lord I. Christ. The soul of the world is the cosmic recipient of the light of the Logos, conducting it into creation. In it and thanks to it, “the heavens will tell the glory of God and the firmament will proclaim the work of His hands.” The natural revelations of paganism in their successive stages are accomplished through the soul of the world, and in this sense all non-Christian religions are religions of the soul of the world. Their revelations, even their sacraments, their prophecies and divine services, speaking as a matter of principle, should not at all be suspected of their mystical authenticity; they have only a lower preliminary character. And, in addition, they inevitably become complicated and distorted due to the admixture of elements of a lower, natural order, for nature, with which the soul of the world is connected, in its present, extra-divine state, in its own way refracts and distorts the rays of divine light, and this disease of all creation is revealed both outside and inside man. This explains the inability of natural religions to quench religious thirst and the powerlessness of their sacraments to introduce a supernatural grace-filled life, hence these spells of polydemonism and orgiasm, a fatal curse that hangs on paganism and is defeated only by Christianity. 61 Paganism is a religion of sick humanity and sick nature, and all life processes here proceed abnormally and pervertedly. But at the same time, this is not a ghost and a deception, but a religious reality. And only the bias of modern researchers, carried away by particular similarities, prevents them from noticing the fundamental dissimilarity between Christianity and paganism in general and fundamentally. However, revelation through the world soul was possible and necessary only before the incarnation of Christ, and even then it was not the only one, for pure, revealed knowledge of God was also kept within the fence of Israel. Paganism after Christ dies not only historically, but also mystically. Religious creativity in paganism is drying up, the Old Testament is giving way to the new. Pentecost, the descent of the Holy Spirit on the Church and through it on all creation, is this new era in the history of revelation. A new religious perception of creation was made possible through Christ and in Christ, and this path is pointed out by the Christian saints in their new relationship to nature. Natural mysticism outside of Christ and besides Christ, magic and witchcraft, pantheism and the restoration of paganism acquire a clearly demonic or anti-Christian character and receive a new religious coefficient. It is also received by non-Christian religions that have survived to this day, which, losing their original spontaneity, re-define themselves under the influence of hostility to Christianity or rivalry with it. Therefore, by the way, there is a fundamental difference between the old, autochthonous Buddhism, which still remains such for the masses who live in it, and militant neo-Buddhism, striving to conquer the Christian world and under various guises, either philosophical (Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Drews), or theosophical, sneaking into Europe. In a similar way, the former Old Testament Judaism was reborn in a direction hostile to Christianity. Everyone knows the militant nature of Islam, the only world religion that appeared after Christ, in relation to Christianity. But it is also deeply different from old paganism and, in dogmatic terms, represents a religious return to Jewish or, more broadly, Semitic monotheism, approaching extreme anti-trinitarianism, Arianism and related heresies, so widespread in modern Protestantism. 62 Two armies are being organized in world history, a division of spiritual forces is taking place, and it is significant, and at the same time instructive, that the old question about the relationship of Christianity to paganism is receiving a new aggravation in our days, and at the same time the problem of the Church as an absolute criterion of truth and as the only bearer of grace-filled gifts is becoming more acute. And this whole Christological dispute that has flared up in our days ultimately boils down to the problem of the Church, as is easy to show. In the current clash of Drews, Kalthof and others with the dominant religious-historical school, the tragedy of Protestantism, all the internal contradictions of extra-church Christianity, are revealed with new force. Throughout the 19th century, German theology, with amazing diligence and perseverance, resolved one main task: on the basis of a critical study of New Testament writing, mainly the Gospels, to provide a scientific biography of Jesus (Leben-Jesu-Forschung). This task internally comprehends all the colossal work on New Testament philology, archeology, and exegesis that was produced by Protestantism. And yet, all this work did not lead – and could not lead – to indisputable results. Considered as historical sources, the Gospels, although, of course, leave no doubt about the historical nature of the events described, however, do not at all satisfy the requirements of protocol accuracy that are completely incorrectly applied to them. It is known how confusing and even contradictory the indications of place and time are, how difficult it is to establish the chronological and topographical framework of even the most important gospel events. But all these difficulties, which have no significance for the religious perception of the Gospel, are multiplied tenfold if one approaches its very content with a dissecting knife and tries to use it to separate the possible from the impossible, the historically conditioned from the unconditional, the mythical from the real, and to highlight the historical core of the Gospel narrative. Here there is boundless scope for all kinds of hypotheses and constructions, of which there are literally as many as there are specialists who have devoted themselves to this task. Based on these critical techniques, everyone carves out their own image of Jesus. A whole literature of such images has emerged, carried out through the crucible of armchair criticism and, what is much more important, armchair spirit and often impenetrable philistinism. As a result, a special sentimental and at the same time half-hearted cult of Jesus, the Nazareth prophet, was formed, what hostile criticism now calls Jesuanismus. The basis of this cult is, on the one hand, the denial of the divinity of Christ and the entire doctrine of the Incarnation, and on the other, the exaltation of the historical personality of Jesus and the recognition of him as the “only”, absolute phenomenon of history. He showed the Father in himself and in this sense is not only the greatest religious teacher, but also the savior of mankind. Not the religion of Christianity, but the religion of Christ himself and his relationship to God receives here the main, normative meaning. It is obvious that the entire Christian history before the advent of modern scientists is in their eyes a complete misunderstanding and even a delusion. There cannot be a more ahistorical direction than this “religious-historical” one, and a more radical break with tradition and morbidly individualistic intellectualism. And it is against this pale ghost of the “historical Jesus,” against the “Jesuanism” of liberal theology that the most powerful blows of the current mythological movement are directed. I think that liberal theology with its Jesuanism, if not yet killed, has received a mortal wound - it is unlikely that new “religious-historical” images of Jesus will appear soon, and this, of course, is for the benefit of religion. The sharp criticism of the mythologists showed that liberal theology sets itself a completely insoluble task, trying to separate Jesus from Christ and contrast them, cutting off church teaching. No matter how immeasurable its significance is, it is not fundamentally different from other types of church tradition, both written and unwritten. The Church establishes the authority of the Gospel, but not vice versa. And Christ is revealed in the entire life of the Church, in the entire totality of its traditions, rituals, sacraments, not in an abstract historical tradition, but in concrete, life-like self-testimony. And whoever is involved in the life of the Church and to the extent of his involvement, for him this most burning, but at the same time strange question does not exist: did Christ live, for He lives now in the fullness of church experience. Only in an atmosphere of church decay and religious decline could such a “problem” arise. However, for the triumph of truth, the complete disclosure of error is necessary. And in this sense, one can attach a positive significance to the current mythological movement in order to sharpen the question of the meaning of church tradition and extra-church evangelism and for the sake of its ideological radicalism, which undermines the prevailing half-heartedness. And another credit to the movement, and especially to Drews, is that he again put forward the metaphysical motive in religion and forced 63 theologians who had settled on neo-Kantianism to admit their weakness in this regard. Although in a negative way, it forces us to again focus on the unexplored depths of Christian metaphysics, which was completely neglected for the sake of the notorious historicism, entwined with neo-Kantianism. But from a broader historical perspective, both fighting sides seem to be only two stages on the same path, and this path is from the Christian religion of the Trinity God, transcendent to the world, but reuniting it with Himself through the free Incarnation of God, to the religion of the deferred, self-deified world, the deity immanent in the world, pantheism and man-theology. Drews openly and consistently preaches such a religion of pure immanentism. “The time of dualistic theism has passed,” he proclaims, “the fire of religion must flare up on the basis of pantheism” 64. On the basis of this religion, man must realize his divine nature, freeing himself from the boundaries of temporality. Man must become a god in the consciousness of his highest, true being, and thereby God will become a man. This is old Feuerbach, translated into the language of Hartmann's metaphysics and neo-Buddhism. That this worldview and worldview exclude Christianity is self-evident. It is much less clear that Protestant theology has long since embarked on this path of man-theology and pantheism, perhaps starting with Luther, who placed personal reason in religion above the church, conciliar reason, and his humanist associates, who openly restored ancient man-theology. This character of Protestantism has been hidden in history for a long time thanks to those remnants of churchism that were nevertheless preserved in the Reformation and have hitherto saved Protestantism from complete dispersion; This is also where Lutheran orthodoxy originates, which modern-positive theologians like Grützmacher now want to resurrect. But the admixture of man-theism becomes obvious in the latest Jesuanism, which is philosophically justified by Kant with his “Religion innerhald der blossen Vernunft”, prepared by his “Critics,” and receives scientific justification in modern historicism. Although his main idea, that the Jewish prophet Jesus achieved through his personal power the highest religious holiness and rightfully became the son of God, is always surrounded by reservations regarding the uniqueness and exclusivity of Jesus, nevertheless, here every line between Jesus and all other people is erased. Everyone can, and therefore must, become the same, and perhaps even higher, everyone is the same son of God in potential. In other words, man within himself has everything necessary for his deification; he is a man-god in potential. All Jesuanism necessarily leads to this, including our Tolstoyism, which, as a teaching, is undeniably man-theistic. But in such a mood, which is alien to the need for redemption and the feeling of one’s sinful distance from God, the recognition of an extra-mundane, transcendental God soon becomes an unnecessary luxury. God in me and in the world, the religious experience of the present, is absolutely enough, and there is no need for any grace interfering in this world, in my world, into which I will carry the fire of Prometheus. Theology of man is closely associated with pantheism and religious immanentism and becomes a conscious or unconscious struggle with Christianity. And Drews only explains what his opponents did not say or were not even aware of, reveals their innermost essence. Immanentism, the fatal isolation of consciousness by the natural given and the prevention of its breakthrough or expansion is generally a feature of our era, not only in religious consciousness, but also in philosophical consciousness, where neo-Kantian immanentism triumphs, and in scientific consciousness, where the dogma of the inviolability and continuity of the present laws of nature reigns. In this respect, it is the complete opposite of the era of the emergence of Christian dogma, when an equally common feature of the worldview was transcendentalism in paganism and Christianity, in philosophy and science. Then there was a tangible connection with another world, and it did not raise doubts about its existence. Now this connection has been broken, and the window has slammed shut. It was as if another mystical era had arrived. What is this: progress or regression? Night or day? This can be debated, but everyone needs to take into account the “sign of the times” and interpret it in their own way. This fact received solemn recognition at the last (5th) world congress of “free Christianity and religious progress”, which took place in Berlin from August 5 to 10, 1910. A number of speakers from different countries expressed their gratitude to German science: from England - Carpenter, from America - Peabody and Moore, from France - Bonnet-More, from Australia - Jones, from Holland - Groenewegen, from the Armenian Church - Ter-Minasyand. (See Protokoll der Verhandlungen, I Band. Hrsg. von M. Fischer und Fr. M. Schiele, Berlin-Schöneberg, pp. 95–148). Because editions Rg. Vb. and can be used for the purposes of anti-religious propaganda. They receive such significance even in Germany. G. Rickert; “Boundaries of natural science concept formation” Russian translation by A.M. Woden. St. Petersburg, 1904 This is now fully realized by such a luminary of historicism as Busset: “die Historie, wenn sie entschlossen bis zu Ende durchwandert wird, weist notwendig über sich selbst hinaus” (Prof. W. Bousset: “Die Bedeutung der Person Jesu für den Glauben”, in the minutes of the V Congress of the Free Christianity. vol. I, 294). See his confused but very characteristic discussions on this topic in the above-quoted report. W. Bousset: “Der religiöse Liberalismus” in the collection “Was ist liberal?” 1910, pp. 30, 22. Similar confessions are now made more and more often, they can even be found in the columns “Religion in der Geschichte und Gegenwart”. Wed. also judgments about the relationship between history and religion in Joh. Weiss: “Iesus von Nazareth Mythus oder Geschichte?” Tübingen, 1910, 23 pp. P. W e nel : “Ist das “liberale” lesusbild widerlegt?” Tübingen, 1910. passim, cp. also works by Troeltsch, for example, “Die Absolutheit des Christenthums und die Religionsgeschiohte”. Tubingen unde Leipzig, 1902. Die Heilige Schrift des Alten Testamentes. Dritte, völlig neu bearbeitete mit. Einleitungen und Erklärungen zu den einzelnen Büchern versehene Auflage." Tübingen (Mohr), 1910. In his report read at the V Congress of Free Christianity “Die Religionsgeschichte und die alttestamentiliehe Wissenschaft”, Gunkel, one of the most extreme representatives of historicism, by the way, says: “The general result of comparative study will, of course, be reduced not to the fact that the uniqueness of Israel and its religion will disappear, but to the fact that this particular religion will shine even more clearly in its amazing greatness. It will become increasingly clear to us that the God in whom we believe was closer to this people than to any other before it and next to it, that the fundamental truths (Urwahrheiten) of religion were revealed to the great religious personalities of Israel, which humanity can no longer forget without losing itself. For the impression that we often got before that this religion in its beginning will be completely primitive. Humanity has an immeasurably long history behind it before such a religion could appear. And perhaps one day the hour will come when the Christian community will realize that this research is capable of serving it: serving it in that it will make the treasures of the Bible sweet and dear in a new way, and in that the amazing picture of the history of biblical truth will appear before it more and more clearly.” (Protocol, I, 180). See, for example, Bericht uber den Verlauf des Jatho -Prozesse von Prof. O. Baumgarten (Evangelische Freiheit, Juli, 1911). See, for example, the report on the Berlin debate. Berliner Religionsgespräch. hat Jesus gelebt? Reden über „Die Christusmythe“. 1–10 Tausend. 1910. From the numerous books and brochures at my disposal I had the following: I oh. Weiss „Jesus von Nazareth Mythos oder Geschichte?“ Tubingen. 1910. Chwolson (recently deceased prof. St. Petersburg University): “Ueber die Frage: ob Jesus gelebt hat.” 1910. H. Zimmern: “Zum Streit um die “Christusmythe”. Berlin. 1910. N. Weinel · “Ist das “liberale” Jesusbild wider legt?” 1910. Frans Meffert: Die geschichtliche Existenz Christi“. 1910. K. Beth: “Hat Jesus gelebt?” 1910. A. Jülicher: “Hat Jesus gelebt?” 1910. Jansen et Cornils: “Hat Jesus gelebt?” 1910. Brepohl “Die Wahrheit über Jesus von Nazareth”. 1911. Grützmacher: “Jesusverehrung oder Christusgiaube?” 1911. C. Delbrück: “Hat Jesus gelebt?” 1910. Kieft: “Der geschichtliche Christus und die moderne Philosophie.” 1911. A. Jeremias: “Hat Jesus Christus gelebt?” 1911. A. Drews: “Die Christusmythe” (Diederichs). All quotes are based on the 2nd edition. 1910 (After this essay was compiled, the second part was published). Fr. Steudel: “Das Christusproblem und die Zukunft des Protestantismus.” 1909. His: “Wir Gelehrten vom Fach!” Eine Streitschrift. 1910 His: “Im Kampf um die Christusmythe.” 1910. Dupuis: “Origine de tous les cultes ou religion universelle”: Paris. L'an III do la Ger., 3 vols. Prof. I oh. Weiss burst out with the following bitter confessions: more than once I have been ashamed of our German science, which will take a long time to wash away this stain, ashamed that I have to deal with this nonsense; I’m almost ashamed even now that I have to speak before you on this matter.” (Johanne Weiss “Jesus von Nazareth.” Mythus oder Geschichte; p. 4.) For a summary, see E. Petersen: “Die wunderbare Geburt des Heilands.” 1909. (Relgesch. Vb.). For a summary, see M. Brückner: “Der sterbende und auferstehende Gottheiland.” 1908 (ibid.). “It is the duty of historical science to clear it of such chaff (like Robertson’s works: “Pagan Christs” and “Christianity and mythology”). Unfortunately, there is too much tolerance here. Anyone who finds parallels and increases the material is still welcome; this is understandable when it comes to the initial accumulation of material, but now one could go further and attach less importance to full hands and more to good scientific education” (Weiss, I. p. 54). Prof. Jülicher: "Geschichte d. christl. Rel.", in Die Kultur d. Uegenw. 2. A. 1909. S. 47. A. Kalthof: "Das Christus Problem. Grundlinien zu einer Sozial-theologie." 2. A. 1903. Pp. 86–7. Eg: “Die Entstehung des Christentums”. 1904. Pp. 147. Cp. W. Bousset: “Was wissen wir von Jesus.” 1906 and Kalthoff's reply under the same title. Max Maurenbrecher: “Von Nazareth nach Golgatha”, 1909. “Von Jerusalem nach Rom”. 1910. He was followed by a pamphlet entitled: "Moses, Jesus, Paulus, Drei Sagenvarianten des babylonischen Gottmenschen Gilgamesch. Eine Anklage wieder Theologen und Sophisten und ein Appell an Laien." 1909. It is available in French and German translations. To give an idea of ​​Jensen’s “method”, let us present at least a small excerpt from his comparisons (Moses, Jesus etc. 30–1). Robertson: "Pagan Christs. Studies in comparative hierology." 1903. His “Christianity and mythology”. 1900. "Der vorchristliche Jesus". Translation and foreword by Schmiedel. 1906. “They demand from us that we prove that Jesus was a historical person, while the matter must be about the complete destruction of a centuries-old tradition, against which in general there have never been any objections even from opponents, such as Tacitus, Suetonius, Pliny, Celsus, until Brother Bauer in 1841 and A. Kadthof in 1902. Amateurism does not underestimate tradition to such an extent. ignorance of ancient Christian literature. For ancient Christian literature has such coherence that it would be necessary to declare one monument after another inauthentic” (Weinel, I. p. 10). This includes the astral explanation of the Gospel by A. Nemoevsky: “God Jesus.” Also Himself. Lublinsky: “Der urchristliohe Erdkreis und sein Mythos.” Even the Assyriologist Zimmern, who is so inclined towards Drews, rejects his idea of ​​the unhistoricity of Jesus, as “unstatthafte Hyperkritik” (Zum Streit ub. die “Christusmythe. Einl.”), as well as Herrmann Schneider, who is close to him, “Kultur und Denken der Babylonier und Juden” 1910. This rapprochement is based entirely on the hypothesis that the ancient Babylonians were familiar with the phenomenon of solar precession and the movement of the sun through the zodiac. However, this hypothesis is already encountering serious objections from the Assyriologist Kugler. Cp. Meffert: "Die geschichtl. Existenz Chrisli." 72–4. 1. G. Frazer: “Adonis Attis Osiris.” 1907. The golden Bough Part. IV. However, the external differences are enormous, see comparisons y Ioh. Weiss. 1. c. 32–4, the orgiastic nature of these cults, the circumstances of death - Adonis from a boar, Attis from castration, the role of the beloved goddess: Ishtar under Fammuz, Aphrodite under Adonis, the Great Mother under Attis, Isis under Osiris, the autumn time of death and resurrection. Book S. N. Trubetskoy: “Sketches on the history of Greek religion.” Collection cit., vol. II, pp. 438 et seq. The Greeks "brought foreign gods from abroad or from the colonies, they were borrowed from foreign visitors, from merchants, sailors, slaves. From ancient times until the end of paganism, gods and their images were the subject of import and export. It is worth reviewing Roscher's mythological dictionary to see how many gods left traces on Greek soil. Thracian gods, Phrygian, Asia Minor, Persian had their own communities and sanctuaries on the islands and the mainland, penetrated into Greece, partly in their own national characteristics, partly in a Hellenized form” (ibid... p. 442). See “Works of Ancient Christian Apologists” in trans. prot. Preobrazhensky. St. Petersburg, Ι895 “The Works of St. Justin the Philosopher and Martyr,” trans. prot. Preobrazhensky. M., 1892 Wed. also in the history of the dogmas of Harnack, Loofs and others. Wed. for example, in the series Religionsgesch.Volksbücher: Petersen: „Die wunderbare Geburt des Heilands“, 1909. Ioh. Weiss: "Christus. Die Anfänge des Dogmas", 1909. M. Brückner: "Der sterbende und auferstehende Gottheiland in orientalischen Relgionen", 1908. A. Jacoby: "Die antiken Mysterienreligionen und das Christentum", 1910. C. Clemen: “Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments”, 1909. Ernst Lucius: “Die Anfänge des Heiligenkults in der Christlichen Kirche”, 1904, and many others. etc. Frazer. "Adonis, Attis, Osiris", 2nd ed. 1907, pp. 211–212. Ibid., p. 214. The same is repeated in Brückner: “Der sterbende und auferstehende Gottheiland”, p.18. Of course, this is a far cry from the identification of both as allowed by the Usener “Die Götternamen”. Bonn. l896 (cf. about him the article by Prince S. N. Trubetskoy: “The New Theory of Religious Concepts.” Collected Works, vol. II). Wed. also Luc i us: “Die Anfänge des Heiligenkultus”. Fr. Cumont: “Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain.” Paris, 1907, p. xii. The problem of the relative a priori is analyzed by Simmel in “Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie”. Dunkman's special work: “Das religiöse Apriori und die Geschichte,” Gütersloh, 1910, provides little clarification of the issue that interests us. The book rightly speaks about this. S. Trubetskoy: "In the area of beliefs, we are dealing not only with material facts... but first of all with the human spirit in its relation to external facts: to the universe, to the causes of things, to the spirit outside it. The central fact of religion is religious experience, i.e. faith in what is revealed to man in it. Therefore, in this area, no detailed study is possible without general psychological or religious-philosophical concepts. Any description of the external aspects of religion without attitude to the religious experience that lies at its basis turns religion into a simple collection of fables and rituals; the science of religion turns into mythology and archeology of cult... By proposing a complete system for explaining the beliefs of any people, the researcher involuntarily touches upon general phenomena and laws, general principles that determine the development of the human spirit, in which alone one can, of course, seek an explanation of religious history. That’s why the researcher moves, unnoticed for himself, onto the soil of philosophy, psychology, metaphysics” (“Studies on the History of Greek Religion,” collected works, part II, pp. 541–2). Schell i ng: “Philosophie der Kunst”, lecture given for the first time in 1802. Werke, I, V, 426. Johannes Weiss: "Christus. Die Anfänge des Dogmas". Tübingen, 1909, pp. 5, 84. Hermann Gunkel: "Zum religionsgeschichtl. Verständniss d. N. T." 94. Jerem i as: “Babylonisches im Neuen Testament”. Leipzig, 1905, p. 6. In various works: about the metaphysics of ancient Greece, about Logos, about Greek religion. Wed. essay by N. Arsenyev: “In the quest for the living God.” (From the history of religious thought of the ancient world). Moscow, 1910. Hartmann: “Die Selbstzersetzung des Christenthums und die Religion der Zukunft.” Die Krisis des Christenthums in der modernen Theologie. Die Religion als Selbstbewusstsein Gottes, 1906. Cp. also his books on the philosophy of Hartmann and on Plotinus. Schell i ng: “Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie.” Sämtl. Werke, II Abth., I Band, 1856, p. 139. Cp. Vyach. Ivanov: “According to the stars.” St. Petersburg, 1909, pp. 280–1. Schell i ng, 1. p., p. 125. Schell i ng, 1. p., p. 198. Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums. 1803. Neunte Vorlesung: über das Studium der Theologie. Sämtl. Werke, I, V, pp. 298–9. Solovyov’s student essay, now opening the first volume of his complete collected works, is entitled: “The Mythological Process in Ancient Paganism.” Wed. also “Readings on Divine Humanity”. Most clearly in “Metaphysics of Ancient Greece”. See the entire first section on Greek religion. “By the Stars,” pp. 281–3. “It is not the history of a people that determines its mythology, but, on the contrary, its history is determined by its mythology” (Werke, II, I, 65). “The Egyptians, the Hindus, and the Hellenes are organized differently, and upon closer examination it is not difficult to see that each of them corresponds in a certain way to the nature of its teaching about the gods” (ib., p. 108). A people in the real sense does not exist without mythology and without corresponding religious ideas, and, on the contrary, “neither divine nor human power can a people be formed from what was not originally born as a people, and where the original unity and community of consciousness is lacking, it cannot be produced” (p. 64). Kiefl has a good summary of the issue. Der geschichtliche Christus und die moderne Philosophie. Mainz, 1911. Christianity “contained within itself the only cure for the demonomania with which the peoples were possessed; it carried with it the only real exorcism that delivered the world from the “legion of demons” that it worshiped” (Prince S.N. Trubetskoy. The Doctrine of the Logos, collected works, vol. IV, p. 189). This affinity is emphasized in the monograph on Islam in the series Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher: Becker. Christentum und Islam. 1907. See Christusmythe, entire final chapter. "Das religiöse Problem in der Gegenwart".