Philosophy I.V. Kireevsky. Anthropological aspect

Contents Preface Introduction Chapter 1. Socio-psychological conditions and literary and philosophical context for the formation of views I.V. Kireyevsky § 1. Social and psychological origins and intellectual predecessors of Slavophilism § 2. The literary situation of the Pushkin era and the formation of the creative position of Ivan Kireyevsky § 3. Philosophy of history I.V. Kireyevsky in the context of historiosophical quests in Russia in the late 20s - 30s. XIX century Chapter 2. The formation of the anthropological position of I.V. Kireyevsky § 1. Anthropology of romanticism and patristics 1. General characteristics of romanticism 2. Basic anthropological concepts in patristics and romanticism 3. The doctrine of personality in German thought of the late XVIII - XIX centuries. and in patristics § 2. Early anthropological position of I.V. Kireyevsky § 3. Between romanticism and traditionalism. I.V. Kireevsky, P.Ya. Chaadaev, book. V.F. Odoevsky § 4. I.V. Kireevsky and the controversy of K.D. Kavelin and Yu.F. Samarina. Slavophilism and Westernism Chapter 3. Anthropology of the late I.V. Kireevsky. The doctrine of personality § 1. Anthropological issues in articles of the 50s 1. Man and culture 2. Philosophy and man § 2. Program of religious philosophy I.V. Kireevsky § 3. The structure of thought of I.V. Kireevsky. Correlation of basic concepts § 4. Faith and personality according to the teachings of I.V. Kireevsky Conclusion Bibliography I.V. Kireevsky (1806–1856) - a prominent Russian thinker of the first half and mid-19th century, one of the founders of Slavophilism. This book attempts a holistic interpretation of the philosopher’s legacy from the point of view of the formation of his anthropological ideas. The work also includes consideration of the main points of aesthetics, philosophy of history and culture of Kireyevsky, his teachings about the integrity of the spirit, personality and faith, compared with the corresponding ideas of German idealism and romanticism and patristics, in the context of the formation of Russian intellectual and spiritual culture of the 18th–19th centuries. The book is of interest to philosophers, theologians, historians of Russian philosophy and culture. Can serve as a textbook for courses discussing Russian literature and philosophy of the first half of the 19th century. Where there are some works, there is a historian simply cannot help but connect them with their lives the creator as two indissoluble halves Philosophical heritage of I.V. Kireyevsky (1806–1856) initially attracted me with its amazing compactness: it fit into only two pre-revolutionary volumes of publications by Koshelev or Gershenzon and one volume of Soviet editions by Mann or Kotelnikov. This, on the one hand, created the opportunity for truly scrupulous historical and philosophical study, and on the other hand, provided great scope for free variations of interpretive imagination. At the same time, and maybe even earlier - you can’t remember now - I became interested in the amazingly sympathetic personality of this wonderful man. Its characteristic features are: extreme seriousness, amazing focus on the inner world, a steady desire to overcome internal schism. At the same time, there is a strange disinterest in the external final result, or more precisely, a constant readiness to sacrifice this result to achieve an internal result. Finally, the story of the philosopher’s conversion, which immersed the researcher immediately into the very core of the spiritual life of Russia in the 19th century. All this could not help but attract attention, because it was approximately the same thing that many of the people of my generation were looking for at the end of the 20th century. But the main thing is that he showed me the possibility of such a unity of being and thinking that the desire to see this unity in the life and work of any philosopher became the basis of all my historical and philosophical studies. It seems to me that it is precisely these features of his, and not at all his Slavophilism, which is usually quite poorly understood and quite primitively interpreted, that make it necessary for us to turn to his thought today - when the thinker’s birth marks 200 years. One of the fundamental features of Russian thought - including in this concept not only philosophy, but also literature, theology and, in general, the entire set of intellectual practices characteristic of Russian culture - is its unique position between the consciousness of the New Age (in the form of Enlightenment and Romanticism) and church consciousness. Various currents of Russian thought moved in different directions between these two poles. Slavophilism was essentially the first influential movement that decisively turned towards the Church. Without breaking with modernity, these thinkers, according to the words of Fr. Vasily Zenkovsky, “they are looking in the church consciousness for an answer to all the complex and painful questions of life” [73, p. 186]. In the conditions of secularization and the accompanying process of disintegration of Christian spiritual culture, the Slavophiles acted as the heirs and bearers of the latter, managing not only to reproduce, but also to reflect and clarify the basic structures of the experience of human existence that substantiated this culture. The vector they set for a conscious return to tradition and overcoming the destructive one-sidedness of the attitudes of the Enlightenment takes on special significance now that the process of secularization has gone much further, calling into question not only this way of human existence, but also this very existence as such. Kireyevsky was, as is known, one of the founders of Slavophilism. Strictly speaking, Slavophilism as a philosophy begins with his 1852 article “On the Enlightenment of Europe in its Relation to the Enlightenment of Russia” 1 . Therefore, a comprehensive historical and philosophical reconstruction of his life and work allows us to examine this turn in sufficient detail and carefully. However, it must be added that this turn did not take place only in Russia. Rather, here we can talk about a certain decisive event in the spiritual history of mankind, about a historical project, no less fundamental than the project of the Enlightenment, but directed in the opposite direction: about a project of religious revival, carried out with the help of philosophy. Starting from the end of the 18th century, we can talk about variants of such a project in the form of French (de Maistre), German (Schelling, Baader, Jacobi), a little later - Italian (Gioberti, Rosmini), Indian, Jewish (Cohen, Buber, Rosenzweig), etc. religious philosophy. Preliminarily, so to speak, offhand, we can talk about several factors that made the philosophical component a necessary element of these return movements: firstly, the rational nature of the emerging secular culture, which required those who set out to consciously resist it to possess the appropriate intellectual skills. In addition, the participants in these movements, not seeing the possibility of simply denying the main achievements of the “secular” culture of the New Age, acutely felt the need for their radical rethinking on new, or rather “old”, grounds. Further, it should be noted that entry into the new religious community 2 emerging on the basis of this project was necessarily associated with a specific spiritual experience, “religious conversion.” This experience did not find an intelligible referent in the life world of a person in the secularized culture of the New Time. Moreover, in this form - in the form of a transition from radical theoretical or at least practical atheism to an active and conscious religious life - it did not find a match for itself in the traditional religious world. Hence, the need almost inevitably arose for a philosophical understanding of this experience and the associated new way of life for this culture. Finally, the same reasons also gave rise to the need for historiosophical reflection - understanding the course of the historical process as a whole, finding one’s place in this process. The growing pathos of this return movement fully determines the relationship between those historical situations of the 20s–30s and the 40s–50s. XIX century, in which Kireevsky was a very noticeable and active participant. This makes it possible to see in the characteristic features of his creative biography the significant, defining moments of this historical movement. From this point of view, the spiritual path of the thinker, on the one hand, and the evolution of his views, on the other, represent a kind of dual unity, a kind of integrity, the parts of which cannot be separated from one another. On the contrary, a certain logic of their interdependence turns out to be essential, which must be traced in each specific case. This, in turn, leads to an expansion of the context of consideration: the impossibility of isolating this dual unity from its immediate and more distant perspective of communication requires an analysis of the socio-psychological, historical, literary and philosophical circumstances of the various stages of Kireyevsky’s work, in particular the connection of his views with German romanticism and idealism, patristics and the Russian literary and philosophical tradition. Finally, the ultimate horizon of research is outlined through indications of the possibility of comparing Kireyevsky’s thought and spiritual path with various representatives of subsequent Russian and Western thought 3 . Anthropology should be chosen as the fundamental topic of such a comprehensive study of Kireyevsky. At first glance, this may seem strange: Kireevsky has almost no texts devoted to the problem of man in the sense in which it was posed by various directions of philosophical anthropology of the 20th century. In fact, most of Kireevsky's legacy directly relates to the problems of philosophy of history and culture, theory of knowledge, literary criticism and aesthetics. Some part of the “Excerpts” and individual statements in previous works are devoted to anthropology itself. Nevertheless, it is precisely this aspect of his work that, for a number of reasons, seems to be the most significant. Firstly, this fully corresponds to the thinker’s idea of ​​himself. Man and his structure, correlated with certain conditions of his life, the ideal image of a person in accordance with which one can build his life - all this has interested Kireyevsky from the very beginning of his creative activity. Secondly, and essentially, the approach of a particular thinker to this issue is explicitly or implicitly determined by the idea of ​​man, his nature, origin and capabilities that the given thinker possesses. The existence of this kind of semantic connection between anthropology and the philosophy of history, which was very clearly manifested in the history of Russian thought, was first pointed out by M. Scheler. Scheler’s work “Man and History” speaks of “five main types of human self-understanding”: “According to semantic laws, each of them is uniquely associated with a very specific type of historian, i.e. fundamental view of human history... For every historical concept has as its foundation a certain kind of anthropology - it makes no difference whether the historian, sociologist, philosopher of history is aware of it, whether it is known to him or not” [200, p. 73]. However, if we take a closer look at this relationship, it may not seem so straightforward. Rather, here we can talk about the relationship of correlation between complexes of anthropological and historical ideas. This relationship consists in the fact that the elements of the anthropological complex define a certain horizon of variations in the field of “historical”, and changes (even partial) of the former entail corresponding (but ambiguous) variations of the latter. This clarification is especially important when a specific study is undertaken in the field of the history of thought (especially non-European), where none of the five types indicated by Scheler is found in its pure form, and one has to deal with complex, composite, intersecting, but each with its own internal logic, systems of ideas, positions. Scheler defines philosophical anthropology as a universal discipline, “a fundamental science about the essence and essential structure of man” [200, p. 71]. This means that the anthropological position of the thinker and the fundamental intuition about man associated with it, characteristic of him, can be considered as the central point, as the connecting link of his thought. Consequently, it can be assumed that relationships similar to those just described should be established between anthropology and the philosophy of culture, aesthetics, theory of knowledge, etc. We will try to trace these relationships using the example of Kireevsky’s work. To do this, it is necessary, on the one hand, to discern, where possible, the anthropological foundations of the corresponding ideas, and on the other hand, on the contrary, tracing the evolution of these foundations, to move from the general anthropological position of the thinker to his particular theoretical developments, trying, if possible, to follow his own logic. In this way we will try to assimilate and reproduce the “philosophical act” (I. Ilyin) thinker, in order to “reveal his strength and his limitations” [77, p. 17]. Anthropology here means both our description of the situation, the position in the world (natural, social, spiritual) of a given person or community, as well as his (or their) experience of this situation and the teaching about man that expresses it, which in turn becomes the subject of reconstruction by the researcher. It makes sense to talk about the anthropology of a particular thinker (in this case, Kireyevsky) when all three of these levels are considered as an integral system, which is convenient to call an “anthropological position.” With this consideration, other elements of Kireyevsky’s thought: philosophy of history, philosophy of culture, theory of knowledge, etc., “in themselves,” so to speak, more thoughtful and complete, will nevertheless appear as more superficial layers, the connection between which can be fully clarified only through an appeal to his anthropology. Since anthropology reveals to us that layer of the philosopher’s thought where it is most connected with his way of life and spiritual experience, where it is directly aimed at their basic structures, this approach creates the opportunity to trace the development of Kireevsky’s life and theoretical position in their interrelation. In the most general form, these anthropological positions and their corresponding philosophies can be classified in terms of “transcendentalism” and “ontology.” The first of these positions is characterized by the recognition of consciousness as “the primary and determining principle in man” [73, p. 15], the desire to find a solid foundation of knowledge, the search for this foundation based on the experience of one’s “I” as the most reliable; the desire to build a categorical structure of the world, designed to ensure the successful action of the subject in it. The life attitude from which such a philosophical position grows can most closely be characterized as egocentrism, which presupposes not only the logical, but also the value primacy of my experience of my own mental life (my experiences) in relation to the experience of the world - regardless of spiritual or physical. For the second, “cognition is recognized as only a part and function of our action in the world, it is a certain event in the process of life, and therefore its meaning, tasks and its possibilities are determined from our general attitude to the world” [73, p. 15]. In the first case, the subject’s life practices are aimed at the comprehensive development of individuality, the goal of which is the greatest possible success of its enterprises. In the second, they are subordinated to one way or another understood service, which can be carried out only through communication, communication between co-workers, who thereby overcome the existing isolation of their individualities 4 . It must be said that Kireevsky himself was fully aware of the connections between a person’s lifestyle and his thinking. An abstract, “pure” thought is uncharacteristic for him. On the contrary, he constantly strives for an adequate understanding of his situation and for finding ways to resolve the vital contradictions and “intolerances” contained in it. This is where such a little noted feature of his texts stems, such as the high degree of autobiography inherent in them. They constantly contain direct or indirect reminiscences; one or another, but always quite specific life situations and collisions, are subject to reflection. Even in his first literary-critical experiments, Kireevsky always talks not only about the nature and meaning of certain works, but also about his personal experience of reading them, strives to describe them as events of his own inner life and through this then point out their social significance. His transition from transcendentalism to ontologism is associated with the constant presence and gradual growth of anthropological issues in his texts. He is interested not only in how this or that work of literature or historical phenomenon arose, not only in the act of their occurrence, but also in the subject, the author of this act. This quality was pointed out at one time by M.O. Gershenzon [52, p. 17] and V.A. Kotelnikov [101 p. 40]. At the same time, Kireyevsky, first of all, does not lose sight of his own subjectivity. In this regard, he turns out to be very close to understanding those features of anthropological knowledge that M. Buber once spoke about in “The Problem of Man”: “Philosophical knowledge of man is, in its very essence, the self-consciousness of man, and man can be aware of himself only on the condition that the cognizing personality, i.e. a philosopher engaged in anthropology recognizes himself as a person. ...For this purpose it is not at all enough to make one’s “I” an object of knowledge. He will be able to recognize the whole personality only if he does not lose sight of his subjectivity and does not turn into a dispassionate observer. But in order for the knowledge of human integrity to become possible, he must truly and completely enter into the act of self-consciousness... Moreover, he must expose himself to all the blows and accidents that are possible in real life. Here nothing can be learned by remaining on the dry shore and peering into the depths of the sea from afar” [31, p. 163–164]. All of the above presupposes an appeal not only to thought, but also to the historical situation of the thinker. His entry into the literary and philosophical process was naturally conditioned by the perception of anthropological positions and life practices characteristic of his time and his environment. It must be said that his attitude towards these practices was initially very free, which allowed him to make a kind of more or less conscious selection of the elements and features inherent in them, in order to purposefully, albeit gradually, form his own intellectual image, corresponding to his personal inner feeling. There is no doubt that this inner feeling was a concentrated expression of a very specific social need, which, however, did not prevent it from being an extremely personal and original response to its time. Since this process was based on a certain religious experience, the experience of conversion, for a more accurate description of it, it seems appropriate to use the terminology of the philosophy of religion of S.L. Frank, specifically designed to provide a categorical scheme for the ontology of religious experience. Human existence, according to Frank, is “immediate self-existence,” i.e. this kind of being in which it directly reveals itself to itself [191, p. 326–327]. However, this possibility of self-revelation is actualized, first finding itself as “I”, only in a meeting, in mutual revelation with the “you” correlating to it. Thus, it really goes beyond its limits, transcends itself “outside.” Frank writes: “Direct self-existence, experiencing itself surrounded by a certain broader, external to it and yet related to it, flowing into it “atmosphere”, in which it at the same time recognizes its own being, for the first time applies the moment of “mine” - which through the contrast with the “alien” acquires a special brightness - to its own being (and not only to things and phenomena with which it is somehow practically connected). But precisely because of this... “I” arises as “I” - simultaneously with “you”, as a point of reality, correlative to “you”, as a member of the simultaneously constituted unity “we”" [191, p. 355–356]. It is important to note here that this moment is typical not only for the period of early childhood, when the surrounding “atmosphere” is predominantly limited to the family circle, but also for any stage of a person’s life path. “Immediate self-existence”, as constantly, in interaction with many and different “you”, the actualizing potential of “I”, through the differentiation of “mine” and “alien”, reveals itself more and more deeply and thoroughly to itself, more and more clearly and clearly realizes its place in the unity of “we” 5. However, no subjectivity of the “other” takes me beyond subjectivity as such. As Frank says, it “does not provide the necessary rooting of my subjectivity in a certain objectivity - in reality, which, due to its relevance, has its own immanent significance and can be an unshakable, solid ground for me” [191, p. 387]. Direct self-existence acquires its relevance, becomes a personality, by “transcending into the inside”, when it “stands in the face of higher, spiritual, objectively significant forces and at the same time is imbued with them and represents them” [191, p. 409]. This self-deepening is possible only through the relationship to another and together with the other; it reveals the meaningful aspect of this relationship - in fact, what and for the sake of which this communication is carried out, what gives it meaning. From this point of view, a person’s life path appears as a search for this meaningful foundation, which has its own value and, because of this, is capable of giving value and meaning to human life. According to Frank, this path runs from the experience of one’s own “groundlessness, instability, inauthenticity of one’s being” [191, p. 393], through the consistent demystification of values ​​that claim to be the status of a “meaningful foundation”, but in reality are rooted in the social or even biological aspects of human existence, to the religious experience of acquiring (or not acquiring) “Sacred”, “Divinity”, “the primary source of truth and reality”, “the last foundation of my mental and spiritual life”. This “life-specific, incomparable with anything else, one of a kind” [191, p. 466–467), so to speak, the revelation of ultimate reality, addressed specifically to me, ultimately determines the place that the thinker occupies in the philosophical process, the greater or lesser originality and specificity of his position, revealed against the background of other positions, contemporary and preceding. This movement of the thinker’s “immediate self-existence” towards himself, carried out through interaction with diverse “you”, can be considered as the main engine of his creative biography in its first stages. However, from the very beginning, the emerging and disintegrating unities of “we”, in which he takes part in one way or another, by no means exhaust his inner life. Along with this moment of “transcending outward,” we can also detect a process of self-deepening, “transcending inward,” that is correlative to it, and over time it turns out to be more and more predominant, determining the directions of the thinker’s external activity and communication. At some point, this internal maturation bears fruit: the thinker reaches the utmost degree of clarity both regarding his own basic intuition and regarding the inadequacy of all the means of expression placed at his disposal by other positions. This moment, accompanied, as a rule, by complex life and creative collisions, revolutions, and sometimes mystical experiences, allows the thinker, so to speak, to “get ahead of his time,” to move from attempts to clarify and harmonize existing positions to the formation of his own paradigm. This means that in order to understand the logic of this separation, it is necessary to trace the semantic connections that are characteristic of those systems of ideas and anthropological positions within which the philosopher himself and his immediate and more distant surroundings initially work. This, in turn, let us say again, makes it necessary to carefully study the literary and social context of his activities, the surrounding “atmosphere” precisely in terms of “us” and “alien”, or rather, identifying “one’s own” through “alien”. A peculiarity of Kireevsky’s personality and partly his life circumstances is that this self-clarification was accompanied by a peculiar process of “internalization”, in which the purely internal, spiritual aspects of life over time gained increasing preponderance over the external aspects associated with their socially significant expression. His conversion is also connected with this: its consequence was a radical change in the position of philosophy in the system of his life activities and ideas. It had to give up its place as the leading activity and fade into the background - while religious practice itself, “smart doing”, was increasingly coming to the fore. It was philosophy, however, that was to remain the main form of explication of the results of this experience in a secularized culture, which Kireevsky considered as a predominantly rational culture. When describing this process, we will proceed from the presumption that literature, literary criticism, social and philosophical thought in Russia in the first half of the 19th century (as well as a number of other types of intellectual and artistic activity, for example theater) represented a unity that could only be dissected post factum and in the abstract. This unity was structured not so much by types of activities, which were not yet fully differentiated and were often mixed, but by “directions” - the creative and social positions of the authors. Speaking more historically and specifically, this work intends to consider the spiritual and creative evolution of Kireevsky from the romanticism characteristic of Russian literature of the 1st half of the 19th century to a different anthropological position, genetically connected with the theological, philosophical and ascetic tradition of patristics. Gradually, the problem of man as a subject of creative activity, history and culture, as a participant in the Divine-human relationship increasingly becomes the focus of Kireyevsky’s attention. In this respect, he turns out to be a successor to both the European and Russian philosophical traditions. A correct reading of his thought turns out to be important for understanding the logic of the formation of these traditions. The emergence of philosophical anthropology in the West in the 20th century and the constant interest in the problem of man in Russian thought confirm this. Therefore, it is here, in the Introduction, that it makes sense to briefly consider the history of anthropological issues among Kireyevsky’s predecessors in the West and in Russia. Certain ideas about the essence of man and the meaning of his existence, about his place in the world were constantly present in the thoughts of European philosophers of the New Age. However, an understanding of the problematic nature of the human and critical reflection specifically aimed at this area of ​​existence arose only sporadically. “The feeling of acute loneliness,” which M. Buber, not without reason, considered a necessary condition for a successful experience of self-knowledge, grew gradually, as secularization processes grew and the destruction of that harmonious image of the world where a person could feel “at home.” The desire to overcome this feeling one way or another motivated the thinkers of this era. Let us pay attention to those of them with which Kireyevsky in one way or another correlated his own position. Here we must immediately make a reservation that in his ideas about them Kireevsky was significantly conditioned by the historical and philosophical ideas of his time, primarily by such “philosophical” presentations of the history of philosophy as the lectures of Hegel (which he listened to in Berlin) and Schelling (“Munich Lectures”, “System of World Epochs”, “Philosophy of Revelation”, which he also knew firsthand). Forming his own position in its final form, Kireevsky correlated it, first of all, with the position of Schelling, and looked at European philosophical thought largely through his eyes. Following Hegel and Schelling, Kireevsky calls Descartes the founder of modern philosophy [3, p. 269; 49, с. 321; 201(2), с. 389]. The latter, first of all, dealt with the problem of the relationship between thinking and extended substance, reason and passions, as well as proof of the existence of God. Having lost consciousness of the immediate certainty of the objective world, Descartes acquires this certainty in his self-awareness. It is strange, however, that Kireyevsky, contrary to the recommendations of both of his authorities, unconditionally regards cogito ergo sum as a syllogism. However, it is possible that the general tendency of Schelling’s criticism of the rationalism of “negative philosophy”, the beginning of which, according to Schelling, was laid by Descartes, was reflected here. On the contrary, the position of man “in infinity”, his personal connection with the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, were the focus of Pascal’s attention [31, p. 169]. Kireyevsky is sometimes compared to him [17, p. 137], and he devoted a special sympathetic review to the publication of his “Thoughts”. Pascal's anti-rationalism, his repulsion both from the picture of the world that modern European science was creating before his eyes, and from Catholic orthodoxy in its Jesuit version, his personal inclination towards a solitary, near-monastic life, could not but arouse the sympathy of a Russian thinker close in aspirations. The problem of the essence of man, his destiny and salvation, as a path from slavery to affects to the freedom of “intellectual love of God,” in which at the same time God loves Himself, is also at the center of Spinoza’s “Ethics,” which had a great influence on the circle of wise men—the immediate environment for the formation of the young Kireyevsky. In Kant, the very word “anthropology” appears, in which he wants to see a fundamental philosophical discipline. According to Buber, Kant answers Pascal's question in the sense that the mystery of space and time with their frightening infinity is the mystery of man himself. Three main philosophical questions: “What can I know? What should I do? What can I hope for? they boil down to the fourth: “What is man?” [31, p. 159]. However, Kant does not create a systematic doctrine of man. Nevertheless, Kant's thought had a very significant stimulating effect on his contemporaries and successors. Among them, Kireyevsky’s horizons included, on the one hand, Schiller and Goethe, on the other, the romantics and Schelling, and, finally, Hegel. Goethe and Schiller certainly occupied a prominent place among the literary and philosophical reference points of the wise. In “Letters on Aesthetic Education” and in the article “On Grace and Dignity,” Schiller outlines the combination of problems of aesthetics, anthropology and philosophy of history, which then became a characteristic feature of Russian thought in the first third of the 19th century. In the same works, Schiller actively uses the term “personality,” which occupied a prominent place in discussions between Slavophiles and Westerners in the 1840s and 1850s. The ideal of a beautiful soul and the ideas of aesthetic education undoubtedly affected both the life practice and pedagogy of V.A. Жуковского и А.П. Elagina (and then Kireevsky himself), and on those methods of building one’s own personality that were practiced by the “archival youths” and their entourage. It was not without the influence of this circle of ideas that the mythologized image of Dm, which was so significant for the circle participants, was formed. Веневитинова. The same can be said about the ideal of a harmonious, integral personality, which was not so much preached as actually implemented by Goethe. The Lyubomudry, in contrast to other, more democratic movements of Russian romanticism, certainly preferred its desire for harmony with the world and holistic contemplation of both Byron’s rebellion and “objective” science. The connection between personality and its truth that he outlined corresponded not only to Kireevsky’s theoretical constructs, but also to his own sense of life 6 . The appeal of the romantics and Schelling not only to aesthetic, but also to mystical issues further expanded the horizon of consideration. But we will talk about this anthropology in more detail below, since its influence on Russian thought, and, in particular, on Kireyevsky, requires special consideration. Finally, in the young Hegel a general inclination towards anthropological thinking is quite clearly revealed. Through “clarification of the organic relationship of the abilities of the soul,” he seeks to comprehend “the unity of the integral person” [31, p. 175J. Kireyevsky certainly did not know Hegel’s early works, but the similarity of intentions is all the more striking. However, he most likely was familiar with the “Phenomenology of Spirit”, in which anthropological problems are presented very powerfully. In addition, it is impossible to agree with Buber’s opinion that in the work of the late Hegel, unlike the younger one, the anthropological question is “obscure, or even completely removed” [31, p. 176]. Kireevsky, who not only listened to Hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy, but also studied (presumably quite carefully) the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences 7, undoubtedly accepted Hegel’s formulation of this question. Here man is at the center of a comprehensive synthesis, here the philosophy of nature ends, here “the key to understanding the entire philosophy of spirit,” here the self-realization of the Concept takes place [77, p. 271–272]. Feuerbach, of course, had reasons for his “anthropological revolution.” Traces of this revolution are clearly visible in Russian thought long before Chernyshevsky, with his “Anthropological Principle in Philosophy.” In Herzen, Bakunin, Kavelin, Belinsky we see not borrowing from Feuerbach, but rather a creative use and further radicalization of the latter’s ideas. The appearance of “The Essence of Christianity” had a liberating effect on them and helped them find their own ideological and socio-political position 8 . Although these people in the 40s of the XIX century. were the main opponents of Kireyevsky and his Slavophile friends, the principles from which they proceeded were in the late 20s - early 30s. close to Kireyevsky. We will see what role his articles of that time played in the formation of their position. This means that Kireyevsky was most likely familiar with the thought of Feuerbach and other radical interpreters of Hegel - the Young Hegelians, and, possibly, Marx. This thought was certainly a significant point of departure for him. The consequence of this movement was that anthropological problems, the problem of personality, became the focus of attention of Russian philosophers in the mid-19th century. However, here, in Russia, they had their own prehistory. It is no coincidence that O. Vasily Zenkovsky calls “anthropocentrism” 9 the main characteristic feature of Russian thought [73, p. 16]. In the 18th century, Russian masons (Novikov, Lopukhin) and educators (especially Radishchev with his treatise “On Man, His Mortality and Immortality”) showed interest in the problem of man. Kireyevsky’s father and the entire environment around him were closely associated with Freemasonry (in the sense of Russian Freemasonry as an ideological movement), Lopukhin was his godfather, Radishchev’s works were also known and read in this environment, which was characterized by a mood of liberal opposition. At the age of 8, Kireevsky receives “as a gift from his grandmother” Lopukhin’s book “Some Features of the Inner Church” - a kind of metaphysics of the religious revival of man. Romanticism and Schellingism here in Russia had the same impact as in Europe - they contributed to the expansion of mental horizons. If the first generation of Russian Schellingians - Vellansky, Pavlov and others - are interested primarily in the philosophy of nature, then the next generation - the wise ones - switch to the philosophy of the spirit, and, consequently, man. This is also manifested in the philosophy of thinkers close to the philosophers, such as A.I. Galich, who “moved in the last period of his activity to the position of a kind of anthropology, including the philosophy of history” [81, p. 4]. It is no coincidence that his last work (1834) is called “Picture of a Man.” Close to them and N.I. Nadezhdin, who dealt primarily with aesthetic issues. Thus, the combination of aesthetics and philosophy of history with anthropology becomes characteristic of mid-century Russian thought. It is preserved in the work of a new generation of thinkers associated with the circles of Stankevich and Herzen. “The problem of a perfect personality completely absorbed his attention,” wrote M.O. Gershenzon about Stankevich [52, p. 194]. This problem came to the fore in the 40s and was solved differently by representatives of two opposing camps - Westerners and Slavophiles. It was Kireyevsky who had to clarify the Slavophil version of the development of this issue. At the same time, a version similar in content, although different in form, was developed by representatives of the philosophy of theological academies: F.A. Golubinsky (1797–1854) in lectures on “Speculative Psychology”, P.D. Yurkevich in the work “The Heart and Its Significance in the Spiritual Life of Man” (1860), V.N. Karpov. The artistic consciousness of Gogol, Zhukovsky and other Russian writers moved in the same direction. Thus, Kireevsky’s thought finds itself at the center of events in the history of Russian philosophy and literature of the first half and mid-19th century. Its careful study is necessary for a correct understanding of this story. Chapter 1. Social and psychological conditions and literary and philosophical context of the formation of views of I.V. Kireyevsky § 1. Socio-psychological origins and intellectual predecessors of Slavophilism There are authors (for example A. Dorn, V. Kozhinov) who trace the genealogy of the Slavophiles to Metropolitan. Hilarion or monk Philotheus. This seems pointless for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Slavophiles sought to perceive the “Old Russian Enlightenment” as a kind of integrity, to capture and revive its spirit, i.e., in completely new historical conditions. the underlying system of values ​​and principles. If they gave special preference to one of the ancient Russian authors (such as Venerable Nestor the Chronicler or Nil Sorsky), then before building this or that genealogy, it is necessary to pose and resolve the question: in what sense and to what extent can we consider them as the spiritual ancestors of the Slavophiles? Secondly, Slavophilism arises “after Peter”, i.e. indeed, in completely new historical conditions, as an alternative to the program of Europeanization of Russia based on traditional values. It arises as reflection, in the course of a rather tough debate, and arises as philosophy. The message it addresses to modern times combines two disparate, albeit interconnected, motives: the pathos of religious conversion and the pathos of a cultural return to the historical and ontological principles of national existence. It appears before us as one of the first forms of Russian religious philosophy, and from this position the question of its origins and predecessors must be resolved. What is important here is not the emergence of certain ideas that were part of the Slavophile program, but the genesis of Slavophilism as an integral phenomenon. From this point of view, the initial cause of its occurrence should be considered Peter's revolution, more precisely, the dialectic of its socio-psychological, intellectual and religious consequences. The combination of this consciousness with the opposite consciousness of the significance of the outstanding results achieved within the framework of these forms led the Slavophiles to the need for a philosophical understanding of the current situation. The program of Europeanization of Russian culture proposed by Peter meant at the same time its radical secularization, the reorientation of both creative and everyday life of people towards the values ​​of the “earthly city” 10. These values, previously only tolerant and occupying a subordinate place in the overall system, now come to the fore and become self-sufficient. “Old Russian enlightenment,” from the point of view of the Slavophiles, passes into its other existence, into a state of alienation, which, however, sooner or later must be removed 11. “Enlightenment” must return to itself enriched with new historical experience and at a new level of self-awareness. However, the relationship between Europeanization and secularization led to the fact that cultural return 12, an attempt to find in Ancient Rus' a starting point for the program of cultural renewal of Russia in the 19th century. turned out to be closely connected with religious conversion: consistently thought-out de-Westernization also meant desecularization. Thus, the concept of “enlightenment” significantly changed its meaning: European enlightenment, which until then was enlightenment par excellence, loses this privilege and becomes just one of many historical forms. By “enlightenment” we can now understand any unity of lifestyle and spiritual culture that characterizes any historical community. Among the Slavophiles, this concept takes on a pronounced anthropological overtones. The type of enlightenment is determined, first of all, by the nature of a person’s relationship with God, the world and other people; the ways in which these relationships arise; the goals that a person sets for himself, the values ​​that guide him in one way or another in his life. It was in the sphere of these goals and values ​​that Peter’s revolution initially took place, which then covered all public and private life. This Europeanization of Russia gave rise to diverse, more or less conscious “resistance movements.” These include, on the one hand, numerous popular movements and political speeches, on the other, a whole series of phenomena of intellectual culture, culminating in “Slavophilism” - a philosophical doctrine that analyzed the ontological, epistemological, axiological and social foundations, prerequisites and consequences of Europeanization and processes counteracting it, rooted in the original “pre-Petrine” Russia. This distinction between “instinctive”, socio-psychological, and “theoretical”, intellectual Slavophilism was carried out by A.I. Herzen [51(5), p. 134–135] and K.S. Aksakov [12, p. 183]. Both of them understood the first as the “dark” resistance of the people to the violent policy of Europeanization, and the second as its theoretical expression. However, if Herzen considered theoretical Slavophilism inadequate to instinctive, and therefore did not pay enough attention to it, then Aksakov, on the contrary, considered it the highest point of self-consciousness of instinctive popular movements, and therefore considered it necessary to trace its intellectual predecessors, as steps of the ladder along which this self-consciousness ascended. Below we will look at both sides of this process. Different segments of the population, which turned into estates after the reform, perceived the coup differently, but equally painfully. It was no coincidence that the Slavophiles saw behind the external passivity of the people the hidden resistance of the “Earth” to the coup, illegally and arbitrarily carried out by the “State”. However, the new system of values ​​was increasingly being introduced into the public consciousness, gradually acquiring an appropriate way of life. The old system, which lived in organic unity with the old way of life, gradually retreated to the lower strata of the population, consolidating there in a new, “preserved” form. Actually, when Kireevsky says that this “enlightenment of Russia” was preserved “in the morals, customs and way of thinking of the common people..., not yet processed by Western enlightenment” [3, p. 248–249], - he expresses nothing more than the “common place” of their concept repeated many times by the Slavophiles. However, in order to understand Slavophilism, its emergence and significance, this commonplace must be taken seriously and see in what perspective the history of Russia unfolds, from this point of view. So, this previous enlightenment continued to live and gave rise to “resistance movements” both in the peasantry and in other classes, passed on unconsciously, sometimes at the level of “bad” habits, without finding adequate expression. We will consider the attitude of various population groups to the new and old enlightenment, paying special attention to the connection of these relations with the genesis of the Slavophile project. So, Kireevsky says that the old enlightenment was preserved primarily in the common people, the peasantry. There it was stored and transmitted mainly at the everyday, pre-reflective, “sympractical” level, as a natural way of life, since, on the one hand, the peasants themselves did not strive for innovations, but rather repelled them, and, on the other hand, the gentlemen, protecting their privileges, did not seek to share with them the benefits of the new way of life 13. One way or another, Europeanization “did not reach” the peasants. Their way of life and “communal worldview” [155, p. 42] formed the basis of Slavophil theorizing. It is, perhaps, a generally accepted point of view, according to which the Slavophiles did not know the real life of the people and were in a state of some kind of blissful ignorance regarding the real situation of the masses. This point of view, based on an uncritical reproduction of the position of revolutionary democrats of all generations, can hardly be substantiated by an unbiased study. A number of facts and documents certainly do not fit into this concept. What to do, for example, with the already mentioned “Family Chronicle” by S.T. Aksakov? What to do with a number of works by his sons - K.S. and I.S. Aksakov, including works of an accusatory nature? Where to place Vera Aksakova’s diary from the Crimean War, all imbued with continuous prayer for the suffering people? And what to do with the activities of A.S. Khomyakova, A.I. Koshelev and Yu. F. Samarin in preparing the reform of 1861? This should also include the diary of I.V. Kireevsky and his correspondence with Rev. Macarius of Optina. In addition, the Slavophiles very convincingly returned the argument “from bias” to their opponents - Westerners, democrats, writers who belonged to the “natural school”. It seems to me that from the point of view of the history of Russian self-awareness, it would be much more productive to accept the exact opposite premise: let us imagine (even if this is some exaggeration) that the Slavophiles (and let this be their uniqueness), having made a cultural and religious effort associated with the movement of conversion, actually overcame the gap between the intelligentsia and the people, made the fundamental values ​​of their way of life their own, coordinating their will, feeling and thought with them. This, in turn, gave them the opportunity to break through to what A.M. Panchenko called “the heart of culture”, its “inalienable topic” [149, p. 255]. This set of religious, moral and artistic axioms (I am, however, far from thinking that this “heart of culture” allows for even a relative approximation to exhaustive formalization) was subsequently laid by them and their spiritual successors as the basis of all their life and cultural creativity. At the same time, they did not strive for simplification and self-abasement, but remained in their place: landowners and educated people, aware of their responsibility for the fate of the people entrusted to them and the country as a whole. But precisely because the Slavophiles managed to take this position, that somewhat neurotic combination of admiration for the people and a sense of guilt before them, which was characteristic of representatives of populist trends, was absolutely alien to them. In the “common people” Kireyevsky resolutely refused to see the “prototype of truth.” In the general conceptual scheme of Slavophilism, “nationality” was, although a very important sociological and aesthetic category, but still secondary in relation to “faith” and “Church”. If it was the vitality of the people that was supposed to ensure the fulfillment of the historical mission of the state, then this vitality itself depended on the truth of the faith that this people professed not so much in words as in their very lives. The merchants had a similar attitude towards Europeanization, who “save themselves from innovations in a daze.” Russian writers who strived for the most unbiased description of his life: A.N. Ostrovsky, N.S. Leskov, K.S. Aksakov – they record in it “the struggle of Russian life in its immobility with foreign life in its licentiousness” [12, p. 354]. Aksakov sees the reason for this in the class isolation of the merchants. The steadfastness and conscientiousness of the merchants' (especially in their Old Believer part) opposition to innovations is thus purchased at the price of the numbness of everyday life and, in general, the perception of Europeanization as a temptation. Moreover, in the consciousness of this “middle class”, on the one hand, it is identified with education in general, and on the other, with permissiveness. Peter's reform also greatly changed the position and self-awareness of the clergy not only in society, but also in the Church. It became not only one of the classes within the state, but also, in a sense, a certain category of employees within the bureaucratic apparatus. If the very term “Western captivity” became entrenched in our theology thanks to Fr. G. Florovsky 14, then this phenomenon itself was fully reflected in the dissertation of Yu. F. Samarin about Feofan Prokopovich and Stefan Yavorsky. Already this work (and especially in the later preface to the theological works of A.S. Khomyakov) provides sufficient grounds for judging both the degree of Western (i.e. Protestant and Catholic) influence on the consciousness of the higher clergy and on their theology, and the process of awareness of this influence by the church intelligentsia of the 19th century. and the problems that arise. However, in the Church, the guardian of the truth is the people, not the clergy, and the Slavophiles in this case acted on behalf of the church people as guardians, bearers and exponents of this truth. However, it was the clergy in the person of monasticism (Rev. Seraphim of Sarov, Paisiy Velichkovsky and their disciples) and bishops (Saints Tikhon of Zadonsk and Philaret of Moscow) that continued to be the bearer and custodian of genuine religious experience and patristic, mainly ascetic, theology. They influenced the Slavophiles, especially Kireyevsky, primarily personally. It was the personal holiness of the elders Philaret of Novospassky and Macarius of Optina that had a decisive influence on the conversion of Kireyevsky. And, having converted, he made the spiritual experience of the Church, realized in their person, the starting point of his thought, just as the starting point of Khomyakov’s thought, as V.V. Rozanov correctly felt, was worship, “the feeling of the Orthodox cult” [160, p. 461]. The discovery of holiness as a dimension actually present in human life gave them access to faith as the fundamental structure of human existence. The monastery, the spiritual center of which was the elder, gave Kireyevsky a model of human coexistence and became a starting point for understanding the way of life of the people, at the center of whose enlightenment he stood. In the triad “individual – community – people”, each moment was understood as a step in the embodiment of the transcendental reality of the Kingdom of God and at the same time a favorable environment open for this embodiment. Finally, speaking about the clergy, one cannot fail to mention the philosophers of Russian theological academies. These philosophers were, in a sense, predecessors and like-minded people of the Slavophiles 15. The example of Golubinsky, Sidonsky, Karpov and others, who came to the idea of ​​the peculiarity and originality of the very concept of Orthodox philosophy, personal communication with them, of course, supported and guided their secular colleagues. Although the ways of realizing this plan were very different - how different were the methods and temperaments of school teachers who had undergone strict academic training, and free writers-nobles, whose philosophical education (and self-education) took place in circles of like-minded people and secular salons. A feature of the nobility was a wide variety of attitudes towards the “St. Petersburg coup” [187, p. 82]. On the one hand, it was it that accepted Europeanization and became its conductor in Russia; Peter’s main efforts were directed towards it. The result of these efforts was the emergence of a secularized community, guided by the principles of the European Enlightenment, oriented primarily towards earthly goals and values, and possessing an amount of power sufficient to carry out these goals and realize these values ​​in its activities. On the other hand, however, we encounter here very different degrees of Europeanization. In literature, these differences and the associated conflicts among the nobility are reflected in the works of S.T. Aksakov, primarily in “Family Chronicle”. The whole spectrum is visible here - from the patriarchal simplicity of life together with the peasantry in the Bagrov family to complete or almost complete Europeanness, manifested in the gap, misunderstanding of this life, merciless exploitation and the corrupting influence of the new on the “common people”. Various movements of return took on the most conscious and acute character here. This was also facilitated by the growing conflict between the nobility and the bureaucracy. Already since the time of Catherine the Great, with a consistency worthy of better use, the most educated and humanistically-minded part of the nobility rejected participation in the affairs of governing the country and, in general, from any socially significant activity 16. Involuntarily, this activity took on a secret character, which led from the Masonic lodges of Catherine’s time to the Decembrist societies. This part of the Europeanized community, “alienated” from power, the “intelligentsia” in the narrow sense of the word, gradually formed a second, alternative to the government, educational center. Depending on how imperial power was perceived here—as tyranny or as an enlightened monarchy—more or less radical strategies for dealing with it were formed. In this context, gradually outgrowing its framework, Slavophilism was formed. The peculiarity of the position of the Slavophiles was that all possible options for relations between the authorities, the intelligentsia and the people looked to them equally Europeanized, “abstract” and, therefore, required radical rethinking. This rethinking entailed, as a rule, a change in social relations, so to speak, “in person,” which is why the Slavophiles were regularly subjected to repression by the government and obstruction by the intelligentsia 17 . Opposition to the government takes on an anti-European and patriotic direction if Europeanization is associated with “depravity and the decline of morals” (as with Prince Shcherbatov). Starting from the dominant Voltairianism, on the one hand, and the oppressive state apparatus, on the other, taking both as an expression of our Russian underdevelopment, she headed into the area of ​​mysticism and spiritual enlightenment. By developing and deepening patriotic issues, the intelligentsia came closer to realizing “the intrinsic value of national spiritual experience” [170, p. 6] and moved from patriotism in relation to the Empire to a deeper understanding of the life of the people and language. The first historian of Slavophilism to pay attention primarily to this aspect of its formation was K.S. Aksakov, who successfully applied Hegelian thinking patterns to the history of Russian thought. In various works of Aksakov, this movement of return is represented by the following series of predecessors of Slavophilism: 1) literary, linguistic and historical activity of Lomonosov (dissertation “Lomonosov in the history of Russian literature and the Russian language”, article “A look at Russian literature from Peter the Great”), who transferred the real need, the need for knowledge and poetic expression into the abstract sphere and, because of this, became in an insoluble contradiction with it [12, p. 160–164]; 2) fables - in which it was precisely thanks to their low position in the officially accepted system of genres that the Russian language spoke more or less freely for the first time - Khemnitser, Krylov; 3) Von-Visin’s comedies with their special bitter seriousness, in which “a negative feeling of consciousness of one’s apeness, one’s insolvency, fragility, and lies (“A Look at Russian Literature from Peter the Great”) broke through [12, p. 170–171]; 4) protests against the imitation of Boltin (in history), Shishkov (in the theory of literature and language), Griboedov (in literary practice - “Woe from Wit”) (“Letters on Modern Literature”) [12, p. 194]; 5) Karamzin’s literary activity, which went through several significantly important stages. Having overcome the “abstractness” of literature within society at the beginning of his activity, Karamzin, “starting history with Western concepts..., little by little he was transformed by Russian history, learned from it and in the end came to new convictions, disagreeing with the previous ones,” but close to the “Russian direction” (“About Karamzin”) [12, p. 172–185]. All this found its expression in the “Note on Old and New Russia” and had a powerful impact on the formation of creativity and beliefs of the young A.S. Pushkin; 6) the work of Pushkin, with his characteristic nationality, the activities of the Moskovsky Vestnik circle and, especially, the first period of literary activity of A.S. Khomyakov, according to K.S. Aksakov, directly precede the emergence of Slavophilism (“Review of Modern Literature”) [12, p. 188–190]. Another historian of Slavophilism, N.P. Kolyupanov, contrasted “Russian Messenger” with S.N. Glinka and similar Moscow patriotic journalism to St. Petersburg journalism, which expressed “the need to assimilate world culture.” In contrast and in addition to this latter, Moscow “had to take upon itself the processing of the culture received from outside on a popular basis.” [92 (1889), p. 314] Despite some artificiality of this division, it quite accurately captures those driving forces of mental life that led to the emergence of the “Orthodox-Slovenian direction.” The second movement, on the contrary, is associated with increased interest in the inner world of the individual and, at the same time, with alienation from the people and their life. The spirituality emphasized here has a specifically cosmopolitan, “abstract” (K. Aksakov) character. These are, first of all, the Masons of the century of Catherine - the Novikov circle, the mystics of the time of Alexander - the circle of Labzin, Speransky and others. The same Kolyupanov notes the similarity of the conclusions and problems of Novikov and Labzin, on the one hand, and the Slavophiles, on the other [92 (1889), p. 48, 175]. Slavophiles were associated with these circles also in terms of genre - in Russia it was the Freemasons who laid the foundation for secular religious writing. These one-sidednesses were encountered for the first time in the mid-20s of the 19th century in the circle of philosophers and in historiosophical research based on Schelling’s philosophy of history. The path of self-knowledge lies through the study of the history and life of one’s people. The category of “nationality” is gaining a strong place in literature thanks to the romantics. In Pushkin, literature for the first time really meets the people and their spirit; in his late work it is easy to see a bright anticipation of the emerging Slavophilism. Gogol, with his heightened spiritual interests, manages to capture and reveal the deepest aspects of people's life. However, Gogol fails to achieve a harmonious combination of spirituality and nationality. The influence of the above two movements can be traced in Slavophilism itself. Thus, the Slavophilism of the “Aksakov” version gravitates more toward the first. It pays more attention to issues of “nationality”, while spiritual life, undoubtedly very intense, is not brought to the fore, but remains in the shadows, determining first of all the very way of life of this family and much less the theoretical thought of its members. This tendency is already rooted in the personality and fate of Aksakov the father - friend, like-minded person and confidant of A.S. Shishkov, who at the same time sharply disagreed with Labzin's circle, which initially had some claims on him 18. The Kireevsky brothers were biographically closely connected with Catherine's Freemasonry and were strongly influenced by corresponding ideas. Their father, V.I. Kireevsky, was friends with N.I. Novikov and I.V. Lopukhin. I.V. Lopukhin was the godfather of Ivan Kireyevsky. The same Lopukhin had a serious influence on V.A. Zhukovsky, who for many years was for Kireevsky not only a teacher and literary mentor, but also an ideal person. After meeting Lopukhin in 1814, Zhukovsky’s poetry included the idea of ​​Providence “as the ultimate goal of hope, faith and truth... in close connection with the concept of friendship” [113, p. 65]. The symbol of the “star of hope”, important for Lopukhin, appears in an early poem by Kireyevsky from the essay “Tsaritsyn Night”. According to the explanation of L.J. Leighton "The 'Star of Hope' is a Masonic master who has achieved the highest values ​​of self-improvement, self-knowledge, self-sacrifice. The master's duty is to become a 'shining star of friendship'... he loves his brothers so much that he is ready to sacrifice himself for their salvation" [113, p. 64]. All these motifs and symbols are characteristic of the mentioned essay and the poem that concludes it. His stepfather, A.A., influenced Kireevsky in the same direction. Elagin, friend and comrade-in-arms of the Decembrist Batenkov, one of the first in Russia to accept the ideas of Kant and Schelling; and mother - Avdotya Petrovna, formed under the strong influence of Kireevsky's father, a friend of Zhukovsky, in the future - the owner of the Elaginsky salon. Grateful memories of her spiritual influence on young people were left not only by Slavophiles, but by such Westerners as A.I. Herzen and K.D. Kavelin [80, p. 320–335; 24, p. 491–498; 6, p. 390]. Such a characteristic feature of the life and work of I. Kireyevsky as an increased interest in the inner world of the individual goes back to these connections. In the combination of the concepts “faith” and “people”, Kireevsky was interested in precisely faith and its truth. Hence his “Letter to Moscow Friends,” where he criticizes the identification of nationality and common people, characteristic of K.S. Aksakova. But on the whole, the Slavophiles manage to achieve a completely harmonious combination of nationality, which they deeply embraced, and spirituality, which precisely because of this acquires for them, for the first time in the history of the Russian intelligentsia, a completely ecclesiastical character. § 2. The literary situation of the Pushkin era and the formation of the creative position of Ivan Kireyevsky In 1822, the Elagin-Kireevsky family moved from the family estate of Dolbino, Belevsky district, to Moscow in order to complete the education of their older children. This family immediately joins the “cultural community of the first third of the 19th century” (V.A. Kotelnikov’s term), becomes an organic part of this environment, an active force in it (Elagin salon). The real name of this environment is the Russian intelligentsia. This environment, according to L.A. Stepanova, “was similar to the community and the community at the same time, free inside and not indifferent to its composition and external relations. The cultural community, which had a special moral and mental atmosphere, was a set of spiritual and everyday connections of those layers of the Russian intelligentsia that were in the vanguard of “education” in the first third of the century” [175, p. 242]. It is this community that should be considered as the unity of “we”, within the framework of which Kireyevsky’s “immediate self-existence” carried out its formation towards “I”. Thanks to the indicated properties of this environment, Kireevsky’s formation took place not within the framework of one circle, but under the influence of the community as a whole. In live communication with representatives of various literary movements, he learned the fundamental moral, aesthetic and creative principles and methods of their practical implementation. Here the formation of the basic structures of his mental life takes place, which determined the way of his existence, his attitude to life, judgments, assessments and actions. This community was not some kind of amorphous formation. On the contrary, her powerful influence on those who in one way or another experienced her influence, the high level of life and artistic values ​​she created testify to a rich and contradictory inner life and structure. It seems that the element of such a structure here will not be a creative personality, although it was precisely such individuals who created and organized this environment around themselves, but a “literary and life program” that unites several such individuals with common creative and life principles with their readers, admirers, friends and adherents - the public. The nature of this program is understood here by analogy with the understanding of the “research program” by I. Lakatos [111, p. 16–30] 19 . The core of the program forms a common understanding of a person for its participants and a related idea of ​​the purpose of a creative person, the value and nature of his activity. On this basis, “heuristics” grows - a creative method and associated aesthetic and historiosophical views. This structure must, however, be supplemented with another, so to speak, layer, the “practical periphery”: creative ethics, realized in the socially significant behavior of the participants. In the mid-1820s, the basis of the creative life of the Russian intelligentsia was the competitive interaction of several such programs. Let's list them briefly first. 1) Decembrist - “civil romanticism” of Ryleev and Bestuzhev, the most famous publication is the almanac “Polar Star”. 2) Pushkin’s circle of writers is a “literary aristocracy.” The most famous publications are the almanac “Northern Flowers”, “Literary Newspaper”, “European”, “Contemporary”. 3) The circle of wise men and the youth surrounding it, philosophical romanticism. Publications – “Moskovsky Vestnik”, almanac “Mnemosyne”, “European”. 4) Democratic romanticism of the Polev brothers. Raznochinstvo. Publication: Moscow Telegraph. 5) Bourgeois-democratic program for the commercialization of literature. Main representatives: F.V. Bulgarin, N.I. Grech and others. Publication – “Northern Bee”. We will consider them as the basis for the self-determination of Ivan Kireyevsky, as well as from the point of view of their involvement in the genesis of later Slavophilism. 1) In the “civil romanticism” of the Decembrists there is an educational tendency, characteristic of all Russian romanticism [124, p. 19], manifested itself especially clearly. The ideas of the French Enlightenment: social progress, universal equality, natural law - they combined with the pathos of Byron's rebellious poetry - the tragedy of genius and exclusivity. As for Russian culture, here they turned out to be the heirs not only of Radishchev, but also of Catherine’s Freemasonry. We are interested here not so much in organizational succession (although it is no coincidence that one of the pre-Decembrist organizations was called the “Order of Russian Knights”), but in ideological succession. It is the main ideas of N.I. Novikov and I.V. Lopukhin: self-knowledge, self-improvement and self-sacrifice - were perceived by the Decembrists and read by them in a revolutionary civil key. From this reading, Russian revolutionary ethics arises - where the public good is the own need of a “critically thinking individual”, and the choice of means - revolutionary action - is justified by the readiness for self-sacrifice and the nobility of the goal - “the exercise of the people’s right to power usurped by the autocracy” [63, p. 13–14]. However, the revolution is carried out, although in the name of the people, but without them. In the struggle of the Decembrists against the autocracy, there was a complex combination of motives, among which not the least role was played by the struggle for a perfect individual to exercise his own right to power as such. These aspects of the anthropological position of Decembrism were inherited by subsequent generations of radical intelligentsia, who sought to implement an alternative to the government project of Russian enlightenment. The implementation of this project implied the popularization of the ideas of a “secret society” through art and inevitably led to the democratization of the literary process and the linking of art with commerce. Ryleev and Bestuzhev were inclined towards such a democratic magazine policy. At the same time, however, not only the publishing business became commerce, but, since literary affairs were made dependent on the votes of paying subscribers, literature itself, in part, also became commerce. A “literary goods market” (Vatsuro) arose, filled with Bulgarin, Grech [36, p. 27] and other “enlighteners” of the people 20. However, this policy also had another side. Ryleev and Bestuzhev, together with Pushkin, continue Karamzin’s line of eliminating the gap between literature and society; simultaneously with Pushkin, they begin the struggle to transform literature into a profession, and the community of writers into a public institution, enjoying certain rights and independent of book sellers, on the one hand, and from the government, on the other. For the first time in the history of Russian literature, they began to buy poetry and prose for Polar Star, refused the services of the bookseller Slenin and assumed all the costs of publishing the almanac. All these events were designed to ensure the seriousness of the demand for independence of literature and writers. However, freeing literature from one dependence, they placed it in another - dependence on the interests of the secret society. Another significant aspect of the Decembrist program was the struggle for national culture, especially against German influence in Russian society and at court. The symbolism of Ryleev’s “Russian breakfasts”: a decanter of Russian wine, heads of layered cabbage, rye bread - it is no coincidence that it is so reminiscent of the beards and Russian caftans of the Slavophiles of the 1840s. In their national pathos, the Slavophiles act as successors to Ryleev and his friends. Without being, however, concerned with “secret” interests, the Slavophiles think through their opposition to the West much more thoroughly and come to conclusions that are historically much more radical and philosophically much more significant. However, if the demand for independence of the writer was met with enthusiasm by the young Kireevsky (as we will see below), then the “fight against the West” did not find a response in the wise man, fascinated by German philosophy. Another thing is the second founder of Slavophilism - A.S. Khomyakov. Perhaps it was this “Russianness” that initially attracted him to Ryleev and other Decembrists, whose sympathy he carried throughout his life. The ground on which they converged was “a serious attitude towards life, contempt for secular vanity, the pathos of patriotism, freedom, human dignity” [192, p. 13]. There is no doubt that Khomyakov’s first artistic works are close to the Decembrist theme - the poem “Vadim” (1821) and the tragedy “Ermak” (1825–1826), which included motifs of freedom, love of freedom and tyranny. Khomyakov's poems were published in Polar Star. Thus, we can say that quite a lot connected Khomyakov with Ryleev and his group. But they were separated by fundamental ethical and political differences that stemmed from deep anthropological differences - the self-centered romantic idea of ​​​​one’s own exclusivity was initially deeply alien to him. Khomyakov contrasted the revolutionary ethics of the Decembrists with the principles that later became important features of the personal ethics of the Slavophiles: fundamental apoliticality, rejection of all violence and all “secrecy.” The records of the thinker’s daughter, M.A., have been preserved about the early clashes between Khomyakov and Ryleev. Khomyakova, made by her from the words of her father: ““Any military rebellion in itself is immoral,” Khomyakov argued. “You want a military revolution. But what is an army? This is a collection of people whom the people have entrusted to defend themselves. What kind of truth will there be if these people, contrary to their purpose, begin to dispose of the people according to their arbitrariness and become superior to them?” An angry Ryleev ran home in the evening” [106, p. 28]. However, “Slavophilism” by A.S. Khomyakov in 1825 cannot be considered anything more than a “vague desire for his native land,” which at that time was just beginning to take shape verbally in poetry and in polemics with the leaders of Decembrism. Characteristic given by K. Aksakov: “Soon understanding clarified the natural feeling and it was imbued with the truth” [12, p. 189] – should be considered very exaggerated. Khomyakov began systematically thinking through his position only in the second half of the 30s, after the publication of Chaadaev’s “Philosophical Letter”, in close communication with both Kireyevskys and other people of the Elagin circle. This process, the honor of initiating which, of course, belongs to Khomyakov, ultimately led to the formation of the “Orthodox-Slovenian direction.” But let's return to the Decembrists. Not only before, but also after December 14, 1825, their artistic, historical and philosophical achievements actively influenced the formation of new generations of writers - their ethical, civic, aesthetic, and, most importantly, creative positions. Even the fact of their defeat and absence was of great significance - for some it had a frightening and inhibiting effect, for others, on the contrary, it had an “awakening” effect. As N.Ya. correctly noted. Eidelman, “deprived of civil rights and speech - the Decembrists, nevertheless... significantly participated in the main Russian conversations” [211, p. 340]. In the public consciousness of that time, they were the main opponents of the version of Russian history and the form of historical experience that Karamzin offered to Russian society and which Pushkin’s circle inherited from him; the wise men borrowed many elements of the program from them, integrating them into the framework of their significantly different position; "Moscow Telegraph" continued their desire to form a democratic educational center; Bulgarin put this enlightenment at the service of government and commerce. The Elagin family was connected by family and friendly ties with some of the Decembrists and took an active part in efforts to mitigate the fate of the arrested Decembrists, especially G.S. Batenkov, Alexei Elagin’s comrade-in-arms in the war of 1812. Avdotya Petrovna’s phrase about Batenkov is typical: “He is innocent, just as innocent. What he wanted, every right-thinking person should want” |6, p. 394]. The dialogue with them is noticeable in Kireevsky’s early works - in the artistic essay “Tsaritsyn’s Night” (especially in the final poem about the seven stars) and at the beginning of the first article “Something about the character of Pushkin’s poetry” - where the call: “In our time, every thinking person... is obliged to express his way of thinking in front of the public”, followed by an unexpected addition: “unless, however, extraneous circumstances prevent it” [3, p. 43–44]. I think we have the right to see here a hint of the circumstances of the Decembrists 21. 2) The romanticism of the wise men had a pronounced philosophical character. This separated them from the poets of Pushkin’s circle, and the presence of pure aesthetic and theoretical interests separated them from the Decembrists. In a narrow sense, the members of the circle were Prince. V.F. Odoevsky, I.V. Kireevsky, D.V. Venevitinov, N.M. Rozhalin and A.I. Koshelev [103, p. 51]. In a broader sense, other authors who in one way or another communicated with D.V. can also be included in the circle of wise men. Venevitinov, collaborated in the late 20s. in the Moskovsky Vestnik and were guided by Schelling in philosophy and Goethe in poetry 22: V.P. Titova, N.A. Melgunova, S.P. Shevyreva, M.P. Pogodina, P.V. Kireevsky, partly A.S. Khomyakova. The Lyubomudry, having become acquainted with Russian interpreters of Schelling, moved on to studying his own works and, on this basis, began to develop their own views. They soon abandoned the idea of ​​​​creating a comprehensive philosophical system and moved on to more specific problems of aesthetics and the national identity of Russia. As already mentioned, in contrast to the university Schellingian scientists - Vellansky and Pavlov - the main interest was transferred from natural philosophy to the philosophy of spirit. They are distinguished from other programs by their isolation and some “esotericism”. This isolation, however, is of a completely different nature than in the “secret societies” of the Decembrists. Rather, it is a closed circle of initiates, or a philosophical school. The Lyubomudrovs are considered one of the educational opposition organizations that evolved from the Masonic structures of the times of Novikov and Catherine. They actually have such essential features of these organizations as working on their self-improvement (or, rather, talking about this work), the desire to develop education and the moral education of the people (in the case of wise men, it should be more about thinking through ways than about real educational activities), as well as, traditional for the intelligentsia in general, a negative attitude towards serfdom. However, enlightenment was not the goal of the wise men, just as it was not an end in itself for the Rosicrucians of the 18th century. Rather, it was a means to change a hostile social environment: the independent social, official and everyday behavior of the wise men caused a sharp reaction of alienation, was perceived as eccentricity and a manifestation of the “German (English, etc) spirit.” This was recorded by Kireyevsky in his unfinished (more precisely, just begun) novel “Two Lives”, and in the articles “The Nineteenth Century” and “Woe from Wit” at the Moscow Theater.” As for self-improvement, the studies of Sakulin, Gleason, and Layton speak (in my opinion, with excessive seriousness) about the mystical mood of the wise men, about their possible connections with the European esoteric tradition. Their goal was knowledge, philosophical and esoteric knowledge, giving power to reorganize the world. This implied the presence of revolutionary elements in their creative program. Venevitinov’s sketch “On the State of Education in Russia” (1826) can be considered the programmatic document of the wise men. This sketch anticipates in many respects the historical and philosophical debates of people in Pushkin’s circle in the late 20s – 30s. In terms of subject matter and the radical nature of the questions it poses, it immediately precedes Chaadaev’s “Philosophical Letters,” the main body of which was created in 1828–1830. However, the difference in Venevitinov’s thought lies in the complete absence of a religious component: the meaning-forming principle for the wise men was philosophy. Sharply negatively assessing the state of Russian education, the author proposes the following measures: “It would be necessary to completely stop the current progress of its literature and force it to think more than to produce”; “to remove Russia from the current movement of other peoples, to close from its gaze all unimportant incidents in the literary world” [41, p. 200]. In other words: lower the “iron curtain” over Russia and rebuild the entire edifice of culture on a new philosophical foundation, develop all types of creative and theoretical activity according to a single plan developed by philosophers. Such a project undoubtedly requires political reorganization, the creation of a new Platonopolis, modeled on the “State” or “Laws”. And science, art, and literature, according to Venevitinov, equally need a common unified foundation, which can only be philosophy, replacing religion here [41, p. 201]. The plan of the journal presented in the same article corresponds to this basic idea: “... it can generally be divided into two parts: one should present theoretical studies of the mind itself and its properties; the other can be devoted to the application of the same research to the history of sciences and arts” [41, p. 201]. According to this plan, the “Moscow Bulletin” was built in 1827–1830, according to the same plan, Kireevsky created the “European” in 1832, and the “Moscow Observer” was built in approximately the same way in 1834–1840. The utopian revolutionary spirit of the young philosophers reveals clear points of contact with the practical revolutionary spirit of the Decembrists. It is no coincidence that the wise men generally reacted with sympathy and enthusiasm to the news of the uprising and, after its defeat, decided to dissolve themselves. However, no matter how the controversial issue of possible membership of Dm. Venevitinov in the “secret society” and its ideological contacts with the Decembrists [81, her. 92–105], it is necessary to stipulate that his political dreams belonged to a completely different school of thought. The internal source of this revolutionary spirit was the very process of the formation of literature and philosophy in Russia, which formed the “society of philosophy”, and later the Stankevich circle, and other similar associations. Until this time, philosophy existed in our country either as one of the taught sciences, or as one of the dimensions of literary activity, its side effect. Not in the circles of the 30s, as Chizhevsky believed, but among the wise men, philosophy first became both “the main science and a special form of human existence” [199, p. 34]. They are the ones who stand at the origins of a continuous philosophical tradition in Russia. At about the same time as them at the Theological Academy, the same transition was made by Archpriest. F. Golubinsky, who begins teaching philosophy there in 1827. This is what distinguished the life and creative position of the wise men from all other positions. Professional literary activity was for them only a means of popularizing philosophical ideas; their main occupation was philosophy. It asserted itself through them as a special and higher form of being, consciousness, and activity in relation to literature, science and religion. They fought for the right of the philosopher to subject reality to the court of reason and to reorganize it in accordance with this court. This struggle underlay their attitude both to the authorities and to other literary programs, in particular to the Pushkin circle of writers. The differences concerned both creative positions and aesthetics. The poetry of the wise men was deliberately philosophical. This deliberateness distinguished it from the philosophical poetry of Pushkin, which was characterized by great freedom and naturalness [125, p. 98–117]. Lyubomudry gravitate towards the archaic - high style and some complexity of expressions. Like some Decembrists, they largely accept N.M.’s criticism. Karamzina A.S. Shishkov. Having accepted Pushkin’s historical and philosophical tragedy “Boris Godunov” with delight, wise men then cool off towards the work of the great poet; it seems to them too frivolous. Later, it was Kireyevsky, after more or less successful attempts by Venevitinov and Shevyrev [136, p. 15–22], it will be possible to find the key to understanding the ideological and creative basis of this poetry. The philosophical nature of the position of the wise men is of paramount importance to us. Thanks to him, Slavophilism was able to transform from a “feeling,” “mood,” “point of view” into a philosophically thoughtful and well-founded teaching. Their differences have already been noted in the literature: the closeness and secrecy of the Lyubomudrov and the fundamental openness and missionaryism of the Slavophiles, contempt for Christianity among the Lyubomudrov and the emphasized churchliness of the Slavophiles, etc. [106, p. 27]. Many of the characteristics of the wise men (politicization, opposition, penchant for utopias, orientation towards Western culture, etc.), of course, are much closer to the liberal wing of Westerners than to the Slavophiles. However, their genetic connection with the Slavophiles is beyond doubt: the Kireyevsky brothers, A.S. Khomyakov, A.I. Koshelev became leading figures in Slavophilism; S.P. Shevyrev and M.P. The Pogodins, despite all the differences, were close to them; book V.F. Odoevsky subsequently took a kind of intermediate position, nevertheless insisting on the deep uniqueness of Russia and the significance of its historical mission. For all of them, membership in the Venevitinov circle became an important stage in their spiritual and creative biography. The problem is that to transform a wise man into a Slavophile, it was necessary not only to change the intellectual position, but also to change the “form of being” itself, the transformation of a romantic circle into a “monastery in the world.” In other words: religious conversion. Nevertheless, one can point to a number of factors that, in my opinion, prepared this event. Affiliation with the aristocracy and Toryism played an important role here; high level of literary and philosophical culture; romantic focus on getting closer to the people, experiences of studying their life, way of life, culture “over the head” of the “eccentricities” of the secular and bureaucratic establishment that alienated them; an attempt to think through the national identity of Russia. It is precisely in the harshness of Venevitinov’s denial of Russian culture that one can see the possibility of a turn to Slavophilism: this denial is directly aimed, on the one hand, at the falsity of the position of the cultural establishment of Russian modernity, on the other, at the practice of uncritically borrowing the “external form” of Western culture. Under such conditions, consistent implementation of the requirement “to delve into the reasons that gave rise to our modern education” [41, p. 201], in the end, leads Kireyevsky to a radical revision of the legacy of Peter I. According to V.A. Koshelev, Slavophilism moved from feeling to theory thanks to polemics. However, the significance of a theory is determined by the level of theoretical culture of those who create it. The circle of wise men was for future Slavophiles both a school of polemics, and a school of introduction to world philosophical culture, and a school of self-knowledge and reflection. For the second generation of Slavophiles - K.S. Aksakov and Yu. F. Samarin - the same role will be played by the Hegelian circles of the 30s. It was the program of the wise men that became the starting point for the intellectual development of I.V. Kireevsky. In the first period of his creative activity (1827–1834), he will develop and modify precisely this program. His philosophical biography makes it possible to trace the patterns of development of this program, which contained both the basic principles of Westernism and the elements that prepared the Slavophile turn in Russian thought. 3) Positions of brothers N.A. and Ks. A. Polevykh and N.I. Nadezhdin, for all their differences, had such a common feature as democracy. Due to their significant weight in the journal polemics of the second half of the 20s - the first half of the 30s. these positions could not but play a certain role in the development of Kireyevsky. It is known that after Odoevsky and Venevitinov left Moscow for St. Petersburg, he became close to the Polevs’ circle, where they were also keen on Schelling. Then, after the appearance of the first articles by Kireevsky, Ks. Polevoy enters into an open debate with him and accuses him of “aristocratism” 23 . This democratic version of “Westernism” could rather repel Kireyevsky than attract him, but he could not ignore it, and the theory of “literary direction” formulated by Ks. Polevoy, was adopted by him. This concept was not only a tool of cognition, but also a tool for managing the literary process. It was intended to reveal an idea of ​​paramount importance for modernity, which literature was supposed to express [108, p. 7–9, 14–15]. This control could be carried out both from the outside (by the government or revolutionary organizations) and from within, in order to ensure the independence of literature as a social institution. In the first case, it could take on a more or less repressive character - especially when this control was not based on sufficiently deep knowledge, but was based on a priori premises and ideas about what literature should and should not be. A universal scientific and literary journal was to become a material instrument for such management and, at the same time, a new educational center. The first magazine of this kind was “Moscow Telegraph” br. Polevykh, which was subsequently clearly perceived as the immediate predecessor of Westernizing and revolutionary-democratic publications 24 . In the same way, Kireevsky could not help but take into account the literary achievements of N.I. Nadezhdin - first of all, his justification for “philosophical aesthetics” 25, and “the doctrine of the continuity and change of stages of world art” [42, p. 287–288]. Kireyevsky successfully applied the logic of the “internal laws of development of art” revealed by Nadezhdin in his critical works, building the tradition of Russian literature. Against this background, his “methodological” attempts (Mann) are of particular interest, aimed, on the one hand, at a precondition-free analysis and interpretation of the value content of literary creativity, and on the other, at greater compliance of both literature and criticism with the “demands of the current moment” [128, p. 92–94] 26, overcoming philosophical aesthetics in the articles published in the “European” and in the work “On Yazykov’s Poems” (published, by the way, in Nadezhdin’s “Telescope”). Something similar can be found in Slavophil literary criticism of the 40s. – from Khomyakov and K. Aksakov. So, formulating his life and literary credo in a famous letter to Koshelev in 1827, Kireevsky could not help but have Polevoy and Nadezhdin in mind: “I can be a writer, but contribute to the education of the people, isn’t that the greatest benefit that can be done to them?.. But having spent my whole life with the main goal of education, can I not have weight in literature? I will have it and give literature its direction... We will have a common goal - the good of the fatherland and a common means - literature" [3, p. 135]. The differences between Kireevsky, Polev, Nadezhdin and others were mainly in the content that they put into the concepts of “literature”, “enlightenment”, “direction”. This content was determined, in turn, by their literary and creative programs, by the basic values ​​that they embodied in their creative activities, and these latter, in turn, were determined by their idea of ​​man, his capabilities and the purposes of his existence. These ideas, however, had much in common. Together they substantiated and tried to realize that dual, simultaneously epistemological and ideological function of literary criticism, which would later become a characteristic feature of not only the literary, but also the philosophical process in Russia. 4) There is no doubt that the “bourgeois-democratic” position of Bulgarin and Grech could only repel Kireyevsky and play the role of a striking negative example in the development of his creative position and personal ethics. Between the Decembrists and Bulgarin there was not only an objective rapprochement, but also a personal connection: until December 14, Bulgarin acted as a literary ally and personal friend of Ryleev and Bestuzhev. “Polar Star” was advertised in “Northern Bee”; Bulgarin was well aware of the existence of the “secret society”, and although he, it seems, was not a member of it, he did not report it either. All this allows us to conclude that “bourgeois democracy” and the enlightenment of Bulgarin and Grech were a direct degeneration of noble democracy and the enlightenment of the Decembrists, and the entire movement of the “rooks” after December 14 (including direct cooperation with the III department) was a logical consequence of those first steps towards the commercialization and democratization of literature that were taken by Ryleev and Bestuzhev. N.Ya. Eidelman characterized this position as “an attempt to create a semblance of “mass culture” in its “pre-mass” period” [211, p. 331]. The uniqueness of Bulgarin’s position consisted in his rejection of freedom of creativity and inspiration as independent and guiding values, and in his open focus on government orders and commercial effect. Both Bulgarin’s connection with the III Department and the rejection of his program by the community of writers can be understood as literary events, as moments of the formation of Russian literature and that stream of Russian philosophical thought that was associated with the literary process. This is where the final self-determination regarding commerce and government takes place. Relations with both are introduced here within certain limits, beyond which is regarded as a violation of the unwritten code of honor 27 . 5) Thanks to this, by the end of the 20s of the XIX century. Russian literature is finally turning into an independent social institution with a huge burden - to be, in the words of Kireyevsky, “the only indicator of our mental development,” the most important, if not the only “indicator of education” and “the moral state of the fatherland” [3, p. 102]. Pushkin’s circle of writers managed to implement the life program of a professional and honest writer, opposing three equally dangerous attacks on creative independence: commerce, government and the “secret society.” This program was followed all his life by I. Kireevsky, who was at the center of the ideological and creative quest of this circle. Since the mid-20s. under the strong personal influence of Karamzin, the circle, which later became known as “Pushkin’s”, develops from the Arzamas society, opposing itself to the direction of the Decembrists, and the “trade” direction of Bulgarin, and Moscow journalism, expressing democratic (“Moscow Telegraph”) and conservative (“Bulletin of Europe”) tendencies. The basis of the unity of the “Pushkin circle of writers” was not “the artistic features of their work,” but also not “the closeness of their social views,” as M.I. believed. Gillelson [54, p. 12], but a commonality of creative principles and basic values. Such a community can guarantee the unity of a literary group even in the presence of quite serious aesthetic and socio-political disagreements. And such a commonality for the writers of Pushkin’s circle can undoubtedly be established. This can be seen, first of all, when comparing their program with the programs of the Decembrists and wise men. The Decembrists were characterized by the desire to put poetry and history in the service of citizenship. The nobility meant for them a sense of political responsibility for the fate of the Motherland. On the contrary, in the works of Pushkin and his friends, civic motives gave way to ideas about creative freedom and moral purity. Following Karamzin, they sought to remain faithful to the historical tradition, the flow of which the Decembrists openly sought to interrupt. The nobility here is the “literary aristocracy”, the bearer of historical tradition and the creator of national culture. Purity and freedom of creative search stood above political sympathies and antipathies. Here the task was set of educating society not through direct moral teaching and indulging the taste of the public, but through its gradual familiarization with genuine values ​​of an aesthetic order. Zhukovsky, Pushkin, Vyazemsky, Chaadaev and others were open to dialogue with the authorities to the extent that their conscience and self-esteem allowed it. However, the condition for this dialogue was for them to maintain personal and social independence. In this they were the disciples and heirs of Karamzin, who introduced this type of behavior in his relations with Alexander I and his court: “Your Majesty, you have a lot of pride... I am not afraid of anything, we are both equal before God” [121, p. 304–306]. With the slightest change in the situation, it was necessary to set the limits of these relations again and again. Zhukovsky, for example, could have been a mentor to the heir to the throne, but as soon as unreasonable, from his point of view, repressions fell on his other student - Kireyevsky and his magazine - the classes were immediately interrupted. Regarding the banning of “European,” Zhukovsky writes a whole series of letters to the august name, in which he justifies his client and substantiates his position, elevating his argument to the very peculiar philosophy of history that is immediately explicated. Thus, every socially significant act becomes a creative act, and social behavior is determined by a personal creative position, implemented in accordance with the specifics of the situation. Thus, each action acquires independence and completeness; it cannot be considered only as a means to achieve a noble goal, and, therefore, cannot be justified by it. These features of Pushkin's circle - the desire for integrity in the field of ethical-political, historical and aesthetic experience, for personal, social and creative independence - were inherited and developed by the Slavophiles. Their transition to religious thought (similar to the movement of Pushkin and Zhukovsky) can also be considered as a result of the desire to legitimately explicate and find a metaphysical justification for these basic principles: integrity and independence. Nevertheless, even in this circle, the idea common to the Enlightenment and Romanticism was preserved of the correspondence between the level of consciousness, reflexivity, and creative potential of an individual and the amount of power that this individual is called upon to have. The result of the attempt to implement these ideas in specific social practice was the transformation of a consciously developed type of social behavior into a specific “literary” utopia. In this regard, it is easy to notice a certain parallelism between the program of the Pushkin circle and the philosophers. In both cases, a person’s creative position determines the conscious choice of an unusual type of social and everyday behavior, which is then transformed into a specific (for the wise men, more radical) form of utopian consciousness. This parallelism was initially perceived as an alternative nature of programs. However, in the late 20s - early 30s. a fairly stable intersection of the Pushkin circle and the Moskovsky Vestnik group (i.e., the wise men) is formed - the two most promising programs for the development of both Russian literature and Russian thought. Efforts for rapprochement are being made, on the one hand, by Pushkin, Delvig, Zhukovsky, Baratynsky, and on the other, Prince. Vl. Odoevsky, Dm. Venevitinov and Iv. Kireevsky. In the first period of his activity (1827–1834), Kireyevsky will strive to synthesize these programs. His philosophical biography makes it possible to trace the patterns of their interaction. So, the formation of Kireyevsky as a writer and philosopher occurs at the intersection of the main literary programs and historiosophical opinions, and the formation of his soul - in communication with the best and most talented people of the era. Already his first work is the essay “Tsaritsyn’s Night”, written for the salon of the book. Zinaida Volkonskaya, reveals both his immersion in the system of images and themes, concepts and values ​​of his circle, and the independence of his thinking, and the originality of the interpretation of these themes, images and concepts. It is enough to note that the seven stars of the poem that concludes the essay - Faith, Songs, Love, Glory, Freedom, Friendship, Hope - refer simultaneously to the romanticism of Zhukovsky, and to the freedom-loving lyrics of Pushkin, and to the memory of the Decembrists (in 1826!), and to the esoteric studies of Russian masons of the time of Catherine. Already here we discover the interweaving of themes of aesthetics and philosophy of history, characteristic of Kireyevsky in the future. Following this, Kireyevsky’s first literary-critical experiments appeared in print. Their content and structure were once examined in great detail by Mann, Meilakh, Kotelnikov, and Morozov. They will interest us from the point of view of the close relationship between aesthetics and the philosophy of history, which we can observe in them and which will help us get to the actual anthropological issues. The central figure of this series of articles turns out to be A.S. Pushkin. Kireevsky here develops the interpretation of Pushkin’s work, which was started by Venevitinov. It is connected with the understanding of Pushkin as a national poet and with the perception in “Boris Godunov” of the beginning of a new stage both in his personal work and in the movement of all Russian literature. But compared to Venevitinov, Kireevsky takes a significant step forward, consistently expanding the scope of his subject: first of all, he tries (for the first time in Russian criticism) to embrace Pushkin’s work as a whole, to build a creative biography of the poet. He succeeds in this due to the fact that he considers it in unity with his spiritual development, understood within the framework of Schelling’s system of transcendental idealism. Kireevsky considers this dual unity of the poet’s creative and spiritual biography first “from the inside” as a self-sufficient whole, as an isolated phenomenon of people’s life (“Something about the character of Pushkin’s poetry”), and then as a moment of formation of the Russian literary, and more broadly, cultural tradition (“Review of Russian Literature 1829”). Finally, the third and most general stage of understanding Pushkin’s work, where it appears as a significant moment in Russian and European (and then this meant world) history, is the articles of the “European” - “The Nineteenth Century” and “Review of Russian Literature for 1831”. Thus, making the transition indicated by Kotelnikov “from literary critical assessment to the semantic side of the work,... to the values ​​that underlie a person’s worldview, beliefs and creativity, at the basis of social consciousness and national life” [101, p. 37], Kireyevsky does this in the light of the philosophy of history. The values ​​that illuminate a work of art and impart solidity and depth to the judgment of the critic are embodied in history, filling it with meaning and giving it direction; they shape people's life, giving it characteristic features and properties; they achieve self-awareness in the works of poets and the reflections of philosophers. Nationality turns out to be the connecting link between aesthetics and philosophy of history. Pushkin’s poetry turns out to be like the “keystone” (Schelling) of the entire “system” of the early Kireyev period. B.A. It was no coincidence that Meilakh noted that “Kireevsky’s initial theoretical positions are largely based on the study of the experience of Pushkin’s creativity” [136, p. 22]. At the same time, Kireevsky’s dependence on Schelling is also reflected here, in methodology (the principle of the triad) and in the philosophy of history 28. Already in “Something...” some provisions of the program of the wise men are subject to revision. Firstly, philosophical poetry is placed here at a lower rank than Pushkin’s “folk” poetry, and secondly, the destructive critical pathos of the “Byronic” period (the time of Pushkin’s maximum rapprochement with the Decembrists) is overcome by the same “nationality”. From rebellious individualism, Kireyevsky moves towards a more moderate creative and social position, moving after Pushkin, whose intellectual influence becomes even more noticeable in the second article. In the Review, the poet’s work appears as the final link in the tradition of Russian literature, giving new meaning to its entire movement: from Novikov, through Karamzin and Zhukovsky, to Pushkin. The last three are people of the same circle (“aristocrats”) and the same “direction,” but it was they, from Kireyevsky’s point of view, who carried out the movement of Russian culture and the self-awareness of the Russian people. Here it is important to recall that Kireyevsky speaks about nationality, remaining in the space of the post-Petrine “European-Russian enlightenment”, within the framework of Schellingian schemes for the formation of personal and transcendental self-awareness. The romantic unity of genius and the people, whose innermost life it is intended to express, will in fact turn out to be illusory - the very installation of genius and exclusivity already calls it into question, since it presupposes egocentrism as the basis of a life position. From this we can see how far this understanding is from the Slavophile - which implies a rejection of egocentrism and a transition to radically different positions both in life and in thinking. But, starting a conversation about “respect for reality,” Kireevsky embarks on the path of revising the legacy of the Decembrists and wise men. He does this under the direct influence and approval of Pushkin. Emphasizing his continuity in relation to Venevitinov, he significantly modifies the most utopian aspects of the program set out in the article “On Enlightenment in Russia.” Having said that “already at the first birth of our literature, we were looking primarily for philosophy in poetry” [3, p. 58], Kireevsky can no longer qualify Russian poetry as entirely sensual, mechanical, having freed itself from the “obligation to think.” From this follows a revision of the demand to “completely stop the current course of literature... to remove Russia from the current movement of other peoples” [41, p. 200] and again create Russian culture on a philosophically verified foundation and under the supervision of philosophers. Having found a pattern in the course of the movement of Russian literature and considering it as an expression of the original tradition of the Russian people, Kireevsky now, after identifying the “point of self-consciousness” of this tradition in the person of Pushkin (more precisely, in the period of his work that began with “Boris Godunov” and continued with “Poltava” 29), sets a new task for Russian culture: the creation of philosophy. “We need philosophy” [3, p. 68], he says. This means that it is necessary, put on the waiting list: the development of enlightenment naturally, from within, naturally leads to its appearance, and it, in turn, elevates this development to a new level of self-knowledge, to a new degree of freedom. For Venevitinov, philosophy was, as it were, introduced into culture from the outside, in a violent manner, as an external force, and therefore was thought of somewhat abstractly, as a general desire for self-knowledge, which for some reason is still absent in Russian culture. Kireyevsky concretizes the national aspects of philosophical discourse; he speaks of “our philosophy,” assigning German philosophy the role of a catalyst, not a source, a support, not a driving force. However, we must not forget that by “our” here we mean precisely “European-Russian”, and, therefore, the most important step leading to the emergence of Slavophilism has not been taken: the distinction between “European-Russian” and “Old Russian” education. It is important, however, that it is here, on the question of philosophy, that Kireyevsky specifically emphasizes the priority of Venevitinov and his merits. It is here that he differs most from Pushkin and Zhukovsky, who considered the passion for German philosophy to be something far-fetched and, in any case, premature for the current state of Russian enlightenment. Apparently, one of the hidden goals of Kireevsky’s first articles was precisely to force his older friends to reconsider this position, in which he partially succeeded. Thus, trying to connect or bring together the two most significant literary and creative positions for himself, Kireevsky puts himself in a position of creative dialogue with each. This will allow him to accumulate in his consciousness and express in his creativity their most characteristic features and at the same time gain a certain degree of freedom in relation to both. He cannot yet imagine at all where his demand for the creation of philosophy “from our life”, “from the dominant aspirations of our national and private life” will lead him [3, p. 68]. Kireevsky does not yet see this life in its own truth. In the perception of a literary critic and romantic, it is present only through a certain figurative and ideological series and the Russian literary language, the purpose of which is not so much to express this life in an adequate way, but to “enlighten” it, to introduce new, pan-European content into it. Thus, the possibility of entering another cultural space is excluded here, and the circle of “European-Russian education” remains closed, and this mediation of life by literature is an unconscious moment, a special case of misunderstanding of the gap between Russian and European-Russian enlightenment. § 3. Philosophy of history I.V. Kireyevsky in the context of historiosophical quests in Russia in the late 20s - 30s. XIX century It is in this cultural environment that ideas are initially formed and circulated, which later, in the late 30s - early 40s. will form the basis of Slavophilism and Westernism as opposing, sufficiently developed and substantiated philosophies of Russian history. This is also where the first version of Kireevsky’s philosophy of history takes shape, which found its most complete embodiment in the article “The Nineteenth Century.” The end of the 20s was the time of the posthumous publication of the last volumes of the “History of the Russian State” and the craze of Russian society for the problems of the philosophy of history. Here for the first time the demand for a philosophical approach to history is put forward. These ideas developed in two main directions. The first is Russian Schellingism, represented mainly by the wise men (although not only by them). The second is the historical ideas of Pushkin’s circle of writers. Both of them go back to Karamzin’s “History” as the first experience in comprehending Russian history as a whole. It was opposed by the experiences of other literary and creative programs, which differed from this main stream precisely in their one-sidedness. These attempts to give preference to the part instead of the whole destroyed the unity and integrity of the historical tradition. This was most clearly manifested among the Decembrists. This is exactly how N. Muravyov criticized Karamzin [141, p. 586–598]. In contrast to them, Kireevsky in “Review... 1829” managed to quite accurately capture the essence of Karamzin’s experience: “The closer to the present, the more fully the fate of our fatherland is revealed to him; the more complex the picture of events, the more harmoniously it is reflected in the mirror of his imagination, in this clear conscience of our people” [3, p. 60]. This desire of Karamzin to holistically embrace the historical tradition places him, as we have seen, among the predecessors of Slavophilism. Kireyevsky, who is in line with the “European-Russian enlightenment,” cannot yet fully appreciate this desire. However, he resolutely joins him. The first work written in the Schelling spirit was I. Sredny-Kamashev’s article “A Look at History as a Science” (Bulletin of Europe, 1827), where, by the way, history was called “anthropological science.” In the same year, Pogodin published his “Historical Aphorisms” in the Moskovsky Vestnik, which were written down, however, earlier - in 1823-1826. It is the philosophers who should be given the palm in relation to the philosophical understanding of Russian history in the context of world history. They were the first to recognize historical knowledge as a necessary moment of self-knowledge. When the task of self-knowledge of Russia, proclaimed by Venevitinov, passed into the constant practice of thinking people of that time, a whole spectrum of more or less bright and significant opinions and theories was formed, one way or another preceding either Westernism, or Slavophilism, or both together. The leading representatives of the Schellingian trend at the turn of the decade can be named, in addition to the wise men and Pogodin, who was close to them, Chaadaev (to the question of whose Schellingianism we will return), as well as N. Polevoy and his circle. The ideas of Schelling's philosophy of history spread in Russia through P.Ya. Chaadaev, on the one hand, and through the elder wise men - Prince. V.F. Odoevsky and D.V. Venevitinov – on the other. Kireyevsky drew from both sources 30 - precisely in the late 20s. he meets Chaadaev, who has just written Philosophical Letters. This acquaintance soon turns into friendship, which lasted until the death of both thinkers. The end of the 20s - the beginning of the 30s is the time of greatest closeness in their views. Along with Kireevsky and partly through him (more precisely, through the house of the Elagin-Kireevskys), these ideas were also perceived by M.P. Pogodin and N. Polev [138, p. 340]. Book Odoevsky probably knew nothing about “Philosophical Letters,” but in “Russian Nights” he comes to the opposite—optimistic—conclusions about Russian history. In the early 30s. he was already quite critical of “fanatical Schellingism” in Kireevsky’s “The Nineteenth Century” [3, 402]. Venevitinov, whose volume of philosophical and artistic prose was published posthumously in 1831, on the contrary, even earlier than Chaadaev, came to similar conclusions about the state of Russian enlightenment. Polevoy, who wrote his “History of the Russian People” in defiance of Karamzin’s “History of the Russian State,” drew harsh criticism from Pushkin, who, in a review of the second volume of this work, wrote: “Understand that Russia has never had anything in common with the rest of Europe; that its history requires another thought and another formula, like the thoughts and formulas derived by Guizot from the history of the Christian West" [154(7), p. 114]. However, not a single historical thinker of that time is free from this reproach. If young Schelling thinkers became acquainted with the ideas and image of Karamzin from his works and the stories of their elders, then the appeal to the history of figures in Pushkin’s circle occurred largely under the personal influence of the historiographer, and after him they fundamentally avoided “pure” theorizing. We find here a certain set of searches, ideas, opinions, always formed on one specific occasion or another: “...Vyazemsky’s monograph “Biographical and literary notes about D.I. Fonvizine" with handwritten notes on it by Pushkin and Al. Turgenev, Vyazemsky’s notebooks, Zhukovsky’s letters about the banning of “The European”, Denis Davydov’s notes on the Polish events of 1830–1831” [54 p. 47], – lists M.I. Hillelson is the main text of this group. Characteristic designations of the genre of these texts are: “notes”, “notes”, “letters”. They indicate that the authors did not study either history or philosophy systematically and professionally. This amateurism, however, also had positive sides: it allowed “literary aristocrats” to freely and critically regard the professional prejudices of “systematic” historians and philosophers. They managed to maintain this freedom even when they - like Chaadaev in philosophy and Pushkin in history - began systematic studies. Pushkin was the only one who eventually took up history professionally. However, at this time the greatest interest of writers of his class occurred in the problems of the philosophy of history and politics. Here there is not only a certain set of opinions about the past, but also, as already mentioned, an original social utopia, first formulated by Vyazemsky back in 1826 in a letter to Zhukovsky, whom he thought of as “the representative and representative of Russian literacy at the throne of the illiterate.” In accordance with this program, writers are “experts in social life, they should influence the cultural, and more broadly, the internal policy of the government of Nicholas I” [35 p. 10], determine the nature of enlightenment of both the high society and the common people. He saw the position of Karamzin under Alexander I as a precedent for this position of the writer. Both groups actively interacted with each other. Their representatives met constantly and exchanged opinions and ideas. It is enough to point out the relations between Chaadaev and Pushkin, Zhukovsky and Kireevsky, in order to understand the blurriness and formality of the distinction we have made. In reality, we are dealing here with a methodological difference, reminiscent of the difference between the creative method of Pushkin and the wise men. The Schellingians proceeded from theory and sought to build facts in accordance with it. For them, history was a drama played out according to a plan known in sufficient detail, from which any significant deviations were impossible. On the contrary, the writers of Pushkin’s circle considered excessive theorizing to be inappropriate both historically (since Russian education had not yet reached the appropriate level of development) and aesthetically, since it “dries out” the text. This point was noted by both Pushkin in his review of Kireyevsky’s first “Review”, and Zhukovsky (much more sharply) in his oral review of it: “A Procrustean bed again... You talk about us as you can only talk about Germans, French, etc.” [3, p. 396]. That is, the reality of the historical moment is distorted by the fact that it turns out to be forcibly squeezed into the “Procrustean bed” of a speculative scheme. This schematism was contrasted with a kind of empiricism, where the main role was played by intuitive and artistic methods of generalizing facts. The criterion for the significance of a historical fact becomes, as Watsuro writes, “not the empirical correspondence of the copy to the original, but the correctly found place for it within a certain integral system, its hierarchical correlation with other, essential and inessential facts of the general historical process” [35, p. 16–17]. The “artistic method of philosophical generalization” found here, with the help of which “the constancy of the situation of human and natural existence is revealed in a historical act,” is described by A.V. Eremeev in his work about Kireyevsky. The modern situation in the light of the experience of the past acquires additional depth, thereby History acquires the quality of a myth [67, p. 179]. The researcher finds similar structures in the literary prose of the young Kireyevsky, which indicates the convergence of the two approaches. This became possible thanks to the intuitionism of Schellingism and created the conditions for overcoming the strictly philosophical stage of literary criticism and for the creation of a Slavophile theory of historical knowledge, which combined an intuitive-empirical approach with broad speculative generalizations. All these events took place in a geographically very specific place - the house of the Elagins and Kireyevskys at the Red Gate. It was there, according to the memoirs of the famous scientist and writer of those years M.A. Maksimovich: “...we gathered on Sunday evenings, which remained memorable for everyone who took part in them. At the end of 1829, Pushkin visited here, and upon his return from the Transcaucasian expedition, he shook the friendly hand of his talented critic, Kireyevsky. Pushkin’s longtime friend P.Ya. was also constantly present here. Chedaev, with his Western preaching, and A.S. Khomyakov, who showered him with arrows of his Eastern wit. Then the controversial question arose about the relationship of Russian enlightenment to European, which later for Kireevsky was one of the main tasks of his mental activity and in the resolution of which he reached his great conclusions in the field of speculation" [6, p. 410]. Here, a very important reorientation of the attention of Russian thinkers from the era of the Time of Troubles to the era and activities of Peter the Great 31 takes place, which was very important for the genesis of Slavophilism. The difference in methods mentioned above did not prevent the fact that both groups gave approximately the same range of solutions to the “controversial issue.” In both places we can see both “Slavophile” and “Western” poles, between which there are various kinds of intermediate and synthetic ideas and opinions. Among the Schellingians we see how the harsh religiously colored (Catholic) Westernism of Chaadaev is secularized in Venevitinov and I. Kireevsky, softened and intricately intertwined with the motives of Russian messianism in the same Kireevsky and Prince. Vl. Odoevsky, in Pogodin passes into decisive Russophilism, which in P. Kireevsky and Khomyakov is combined with a completely conscious and principled confession of Orthodoxy. Among the writers of the Pushkin circle, to which Chaadaev can be classified with no less justification than the Schellingians, we find, following him, the civilized, cultural Westernism of Al. Turgenev and Prince. Vyazemsky, the conviction in the special path and calling of Russia in Zhukovsky and D. Davydov (the latter also sharply criticized the entire modern culture as based on the “all-consuming Self”) [54, p. 52–54] and, finally, the patriotism of the late Pushkin, combined with cultural and spiritual ties with the West that never weakened. All these opinions, without being formalized organizationally, exist in the single field of free thought created by Pushkin, independent of any external forces and influences, and precisely because of this independence, they become in opposition to the official Uvarov triad. However, already at this stage we see that the foundations of future directions lie not so much in the historiosophical schemes and constructions themselves, but in those relationships to culture and man - its creator, which brought these schemes to life. Thus, “Westernism” is already associated here with an idealized image of Western culture, faith in straightforward progress associated with the rationalization of life, and a fundamentally this-worldly ideal of life - all that will become the subject of a fierce internal struggle in Kireevsky. Even after his conversion, he was aware of his “belonging to the West,” but at the same time he discovered in the human heart “such movements, such demands in the mind, such a meaning in life that are stronger than all habits and tastes, stronger than all the pleasures of life and the benefits of external rationality” (“Response to Khomyakov”) [3, p. 146]. It is with such movements and demands that the beginnings of Slavophilism are associated with Khomyakov, and P. Kireevsky, and Pogodin, and Pushkin: this is religiosity, the desire for integrity and completeness of spiritual life and doubt about the universally valid character of Western culture and the very attitude of Western man to the world. In this vein of searches of the late 20s - early 30s. In the 19th century, Kireyevsky’s philosophy of history was also formed. Along with Chaadaev's, this is one of the most indicative and developed concepts of this time. It takes into account the main achievements of the philosophy of history of the wise men (systematic approach), Nadezhdin (combination of the philosophy of history and aesthetics), Chaadaev (contrasting Russia and Europe as meaninglessness and meaning). Kireevsky carries out a new synthesis, seeing the exceptional significance of the “Pushkin event” and giving antiquity a special status as a meaning-forming principle. This is due to the transition to the third stage of understanding the poet’s work and to changes in Kireyevsky’s views in 1829–1832. – on the way from “Review” to “European”. In the articles of “European” he will try to find Russia’s place in the dialectics of Western European enlightenment, in “the integrity of the moral life of enlightened Europe.” Before traveling to Europe (1831), everything seemed to him more or less simple: the development of Western countries had exhausted itself, Russia, having reached the European level of enlightenment in the person of Pushkin, must now master the spiritual wealth of the West, its historical experience (which he generally evaluates only positively), creatively rework it in the light of its problems, and then, “when all these benefits become ours, we will share them with the rest of Europe and pay all our debt a hundredfold” [3, p. 79]. The coming time brings with it a number of disappointments. During a trip abroad, he encounters the “lifelessness” of Europe. However, upon his return, the continuing and hopeless provincialism of the overwhelming majority of the Russian public is approaching him (“Woe from Wit” at the Moscow Theater”). The last problem at that moment especially worried Pushkin’s circle, since even in the best of times the number of subscribers of the Literary Gazette was compared to the subscribers of the Northern Bee as 1 in 10. For the first time, the precariousness and groundlessness of his existence was revealed to Kireyevsky. Its cultural environment turned out to be an insignificant bunch of “exceptions in constant struggle with the majority” [3, p. 118]. Kireevsky here describes the classic situation of a romantic, from which he begins to look for a way out, while still remaining within the same romantic framework. The search for foundations does not yet affect anthropology; it is carried out in the field of philosophy of history. The young thinker begins to sort through elements of European and Russian history. Is there a ferment in Russia that could master, transform and creatively develop the spiritual wealth of Europe? Alas, our “separate, Chinese-specific development... could not have universal human success, because it lacked one of the necessary elements of the worldwide progression of the mind,” namely, “the remains of the ancient world” [3, p. 96, 91], which played the role of the main meaning-forming principle in the history of Europe. The presence of this principle allows us to see the meaning and truth of even such unromantic traits as “coldness, prosaism, positivity, and in general, an exceptional desire for practical activity.” But “precisely from the fact that Life displaces Poetry, we must conclude that the desire for Life and Poetry have converged and that, consequently, the hour for the poet of Life has come” [3, p. 85]. Poetry, philosophy, religion and the entire European society as a whole are moving towards the ideal of “natural balance of opposing principles”, and “faith in this dream or in this truth constitutes the basis of the dominant character of the present time and serves as a connection between practical activity and the desire for enlightenment in general” [3, p. 88]. This creates a unique opportunity to build an integral culture, where the moment of alienation is eliminated, in which an integral person takes part in the fullness of his powers, in the direct connection with life, “which appeared to him as a rational and thinking being, capable of understanding him and responding to him, like the artist Pygmalion his animated statue” [3, p. 88–89]. So, the reconciliation of warring principles leads to the emergence of a qualitatively new culture, in which alienation is removed, and a person for the first time becomes a person in the full sense of the word. About ten years later, this same pattern of history will be reproduced by the Westerner K.D. Kavelin. It is characteristic that the schemes of Kavelin and Kireevsky, different in historical particulars, will coincide in their anthropological foundations, despite the fact that one was inspired by Schelling, and the other by Hegel and Feuerbach. It is not surprising that Kireevsky feels on the side of Peter, who introduced the desire for enlightenment (i.e., for such an ideal) “in the form of an external force, opposite to our former way of life, fighting with our nationality for life and death,” striving to “defeat it, subjugate it to its dominion” [3, p. 97]. Russian nationality seems to him “Chinese special”, and European enlightenment – ​​“enlightenment in the true sense of the word” [3, p. 96]. Criticizing “the accusers of the creator of the new Russia” [3, p. 98], Kireevsky opposes the entire “original” (V. Kozhinov), pre-Slavophile tendency in post-Petrine Russian history. He views the struggle of Pushkin's literary environment with the mass of an indifferent, semi-educated public as a continuation of Peter's reform. Twenty years later, his position would radically change: Peter’s main delusion would be that he “saw the source of enlightenment in Europe alone” [3, p. 250]. For Kireyevsky himself, the concepts of “universal” and “European” are no longer unambiguous. This will allow us to raise the question of the value of Peter’s coup, the genesis, relationships, fate and comparative significance of European, European-Russian and Old Russian enlightenment. But for now he writes as a successor to Karamzin and a follower of Pushkin. Pushkin and Zhukovsky, following Karamzin, turned to high society and the noble intelligentsia. This is where the ideas of “literary aristocracy” and the need for a writer to belong to “good society” stemmed. Kireyevsky adhered to the same thoughts in a letter to Koshelev: “We will return the rights of true religion, we will agree gracefully with morality, we will arouse love for truth, we will replace stupid liberalism with respect for the laws and we will elevate the purity of life above the purity of style” [3, p. 336]. Writers - high society - nobility - people - this is the scheme for the spread of the “natural light” of culture, the expansion of enlightenment, which is implied in this. The democratization of literature, begun by the Decembrists, continued by br. Polevy and Bulgarin, in a very short time jeopardizes all these plans. An abyss suddenly opens before Kireevsky, as well as before Chaadaev, and their life task turns out to be a utopia 32. Together with Chaadaev, he “openly admits the impossibility of finding the makings of a world-historical future in the Russian past” [178, p. 262]. In an amazing way, Schelling's providentialism saves him from complete hopelessness and allows him to create an optimistic (in contrast to Chaadaev's) concept of Russian history. According to Schelling, history is a necessarily two-way process: it combines the principles of rationality, freedom, consciousness, on the one hand, and irrationality, necessity, unconsciousness, on the other. The beginning of meaning, of thought, embodied in the remnants of the ancient world, transformed Europe and forcibly broke into Russia in order to defeat the unconscious inertia of narrow national principles here too. European history has already ended - hence the lifelessness of Europe, the “stupidity” of the Germans, etc. Russia becomes the arena of history and the leader in the movement of enlightenment, since its Europeanization is a necessary element of humanity’s movement towards the establishment of a “universal legal order”, which will crown history when, in Schelling’s words, “God comes” [201(1), p. 451, 466]. The non-Russian national still relates to the European-universal as the special to the general; there is no understanding of the qualitative specificity of Russia yet. According to Kireevsky: “Until now, our nationality was a rude, uneducated, Chinese-immobile nationality. Only foreign influence can enlighten it, elevate it, give it the strength to develop, and just as until now all our enlightenment has been borrowed by us from outside, so only from outside can we borrow it now, until we are equal to the rest of Europe. Where the pan-European coincides with our particularity, there will be born a truly Russian enlightenment, educated and national, solid, living, deep and rich in beneficial consequences” [3, p. 119–120]. This conclusion was made in the spirit typical of Westerners of the late 30s - 40s, for Chaadaev during the “Apology of a Madman” era, for Belinsky during the “Moscow Observer” era, for Herzen. The course of history, considered here as progressive progress, is determined by the development of enlightenment, and the level of enlightenment is determined by the progress of the movement of literature. From the previous, it is clear that the coincidence of the national with the European has already occurred in the person of Pushkin, in the last period of his work, which is designated as the period of “folk”, “Russian-Pushkin”, on the one hand, and the period of “poetry of reality” and historicity, on the other. For the wise men, Boris Godunov was the absolute expression of this trend. Venevitinov already spoke of it as an “exemplary work” [41, p. 208] on a global scale. Kireevsky develops this idea and concretizes it in his “Review of Russian Literature for 1831.” Literary scholars (Mann, Meilakh) recognize the analysis of “Godunov” in “The European” as a major achievement of Kireyevsky the critic. But we are more interested in the philosophical – methodological and philosophical-historical – content of this analysis. Methodologically, Kireevsky, refusing to judge the tragedy from the point of view of certain aesthetic theories of his time, makes an attempt at a presuppositionless approach, pure understanding, quite in the spirit of the pathos of presuppositionlessness that took place in German idealism: “... let's look at “Boris Godunov” with eyes unprejudiced by the system, and, not caring about what should be the focus of the tragedy, we ask ourselves: what is the main subject creations of Pushkin? [3, p. 106] Yu.V. Mann called this a philosophical overcoming of the limitations of philosophical criticism [128, p. 93]. In the same article, analyzing Baratynsky’s “The Concubine,” Kireevsky once again demonstrates the possibilities of philosophy and reveals the essence of the creative act in poetry as an act of meaning-making that does not need additional play of the imagination: “... to give space to the heart, he does not need to invent an unprecedented world for himself... in reality he discovered the possibility of poetry, because with a deep outlook on life he understood necessity and order where others see discord and prose” [3, s. 110]. Developing these approaches, perhaps not without the influence of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, in 1834, in the article “On the poems of Mr. Yazykov,” he came to results that anticipated Belinsky’s theory of pathos [ 128, p. 96]. The poet of reality has no prerequisites - neither should his critic have them - this is the key found by Kireevsky to the poetry of the late Pushkin, Baratynsky, Yazykov 33. This method makes it possible to directly raise the question of the meaning of a given work of art and, through this meaning, to turn to the value content of reality itself, various forms of social existence and consciousness, and the flow of people's life. It was here that the preconditions for the Slavophil revolution were laid. Even more important is the analysis of “Boris Godunov” from the point of view of the philosophy of history. Pushkin’s tragedy captures an extremely important point in Russian history for Russian consciousness in the first third of the 19th century – the Time of Troubles. Kireevsky’s novel idea from the essay “Tsaritsyn Night” is tied to the same era. Stepanov wrote that it correlates with both Pushkin’s tragedy and Karamzin’s “History” [175, p. 244]. “Here for the first time a Russian thought about Russia” [2(2), p. 147], - this formulation of Kireyevsky explains the interest of society in the Time of Troubles and the essential position for his philosophy of history that “from the time of Minin and Pozharsky, enlightenment in the true sense of the word began to spread among us” [3, p. 96]: here, for the first time in Russian history, thought arose and became isolated - the guarantee and possibility of enlightenment. In Pushkin, “Boris’s crime appears not as an action (that is, not as a fact - K.A.), but as a force, as a thought that takes the place of a dominant person, or passion, or action” [3, p. 106–107], i.e. as an ideal opportunity, in its implementation revealing itself as a necessity. Thus, the opposition between Europe and Russia disappears, understood by Kireyevsky as the opposition between “thought, religious or political,” and “a person, a private event, an impostor” [3, 96]. Now Pushkin and Baratynsky bring poetic meaning, one into the past, the other into the present, transforming a private event into a thought, and a string of events and persons into history. The past and present become meaningful as the unity of a historical process moving towards a goal referred to the future and overshadowed by values ​​born in the events of the past. Kireyevsky sees participation in this movement as a guarantee of the possibility of finding meaning both for himself and for the people of his era. The path to the universal, i.e. European enlightenment lies through its own history, and its comprehension and construction is determined by the mastery of the spiritual riches of Europe. So, attention turns to history and this is one of the important factors that determined the “Slavophile breakthrough”. However, despite the desire of thought to be unpremised, it remains bound by a number of prejudices, to overcome which will require some push from the outside, a radical change in the position of the personality of its bearer. Kireyevsky, however, remains within the framework of the philosophy of identity: in the person of Pushkin, the destinies of the brilliant poet and his people, the tradition of literature and the development of public consciousness, the history of the people and the history of mankind converge. The apparent completeness of these constructions should not blind us to the fact that they did not eliminate the actual gap between theorizing and practical activity, which was expressed in the complete impossibility of implementing the ideas developed within the framework of this romantic-Enlightenment paradigm. The reason here is not only in the tough position of the Nicholas regime in relation to the alternative center of education, but also in the very relation of these ideas to the reality in which they were supposed to be realized. Kireyevsky, as we have seen, keenly felt the opposition to this reality and was ready to take the most decisive measures to overcome it, but he did not understand the full depth and significance of the discrepancy, which was valid even at the level of language. “The connection of the individual with his people rests precisely in that center from which a common spiritual force determines all thinking, feeling and volition. Language is related to everything in it... and there is nothing that could remain alien to it” [209, p. 12], wrote G. G. Shpet. It is the linguistic unity of the Pushkin cultural community and the Russian people that can be questioned in the first place. Along with the formation of Russian literature as a cultural community and social institution, the formation of the Russian literary language takes place. According to B. A. Uspensky, its stabilization begins precisely with Pushkin. The three elements in whose struggle this language was formed - European, Russian folk and Church Slavonic - achieve balance in his work [183, p. 167–168]. The task of this language was “to ensure adequate transmission of the content that can be expressed in European languages” [183, p. 155] and its broadcast in Russia. Already at the level of language, Russian literature was connected with the principles of the Enlightenment (both as an era, and as an attitude of consciousness, and as a historical project), although it never completely broke with the church worldview and people's life. The problem of nationality now appears as a problem of expressing specifically national, special, “Russian” content in the Russian literary language, i.e. as the need to solve a problem opposite to the one that originally faced this language. Pushkin, as a people's poet, freely, simply “expressing himself,” expresses the people's life, the soul of the people. This poetry, the poetry of reality, is born from the depths of the poet’s soul, where he comes into contact with the “common spiritual force” and “forces” this force to speak out through himself. Thus, he makes it understandable to us, which is possible only due to the fact that he himself has gone a long way of searching and has been enriched by the European experience of semantic expression, along with the ideological and value content that essentially belongs to him. However, by this he involuntarily defines the boundaries of his own speech, as a “European-Russian” language corresponding to the “European-Russian enlightenment.” His skill was so amazing that those who followed him (including Kireevsky) could not doubt him. Meanwhile, personal spiritual experience persistently led Pushkin into areas beyond the control of his perfect, but closed and seemingly self-sufficient Alexandrian verse, requiring other, more open, freer forms. At the same time, his thought, primarily poetic, not strictly connected with any of the mental trends of that time, as free and open as possible, turning to Russian history, perhaps for the first time revealed its fundamental irreducibility to European forms. The beginning of a critical attitude towards the activities of Peter (“The History of Peter”, “The Bronze Horseman”) 34 can also be linked to Pushkin’s historical research. The deepening of the poet’s spiritual experience corresponds to his literary searches and experiments in the last years of his life: in the field of spiritual poetry, folklore, folk songs and fairy tales, historical genres, the active and conscious introduction of Slavicisms into speech, deliberate “folk populism” in letters to his wife - all this in the thirties, i.e. when the elder Kireevsky’s turn occurs. Gogol successfully spoke about the reason for both phenomena in his article on “the essence of Russian poetry”: “It’s a strange thing: we were still the subject of our poetry, but we don’t recognize ourselves in it... Our poetry did not express to us anywhere the Russian person completely, neither in the ideal in which he should be, nor in the reality in which he now is” [57, p. 261]. The problem of language, like the philosophy of history, thus leads us to the problem of man. Language turns out to be the bearer and exponent of certain forms of human existence, and the difference in languages ​​reveals a difference in these forms and the corresponding values ​​and ideas that cannot be eliminated by purely poetic effort. Therefore, we can talk about the failure of the “Russian-Pushkin period”: contrary to Kireyevsky, the “poetry of reality” was unable, “having penetrated deeper into life, to develop its ideal to greater significance,” to break out of the “circle of daydreaming” [3, p. 142]. Yes, in the person of Pushkin, Russia acquired a poet of European level and scale, the Russian cultural elite entered the family of European cultural elites as equals. But the gap between the people and the cultural community remained unbridged - not in the sense of democracy, but in the sense of “unanimity”. Behind the difference in languages ​​hid the opposition of lifestyle, emotional structure and value orientations, and, in the end, types of human structure, anthropology. The new spiritual experience of the Russian intelligentsia, associated with the concept of “nationality,” opened up new spaces for it both in the field of literature and in the field of philosophy of history. It was the Slavophiles, on the basis of the achievements of Pushkin, the writers of his circle and the wise men, who for the first time managed to realize and express these moments. Chapter 2. Formation of the anthropological position of I.V. Kireyevsky § 1. Anthropology of romanticism and patristics Kireyevsky's philosophy, as it developed towards the end of the thinker's life, represents an experience in the development of Christian anthropology. At its center is the phenomenon of faith, understood as “consciousness about the relationship of the living Divine personality to the human personality” [2(1), p. 274–275], as their complete appeal to each other. The key to this anthropology is the concept of “personality.” The human personality, according to Kireevsky, is at the center of the world: “For what is essential in the world is only a rationally free personality. She alone has an original meaning. Everything else has only relative meaning” [2(1), p. 274]. However, “personality” takes on such a significant meaning, in which the patristic understanding of man clearly shines through, only in “Passages” 35 of Kireyevsky and to some extent in his last, 1856, article “On the necessity and possibility of new principles for philosophy.” Moreover, only in “Excerpts” does philosophy for Kireevsky most definitely unfold into anthropology. However, even before this, in his later articles, which represent a rather bizarre interweaving of topics in the history and theory of culture, philosophy of history, history of philosophy, social philosophy and theory of knowledge, one can notice that it is man, as he is present in a certain culture, or rather the image of man, correlating with certain historical conditions, certain forms of his existence in the world, that stands at the very center of this interweaving. The presence of a clear hierarchy of such forms in Kireyevsky 36 suggests the existence of a well-defined, although not explicitly developed, anthropology that can be identified and described. However, the key word “personality” has not yet been found by the author at this stage, which makes us assume some evolution of his views, during which thought gradually took possession of its original initial intuition, which in turn led to a change in the explicitly explicit position. Kireyevsky’s thought moves as if between two poles, between two spiritual and intellectual traditions that are significant to him. One of them is the tradition of Western European philosophy, literature, art and mysticism, which merged into a single stream in German romanticism and idealism at the end of the 18th - beginning of the 19th centuries. It influenced Kireyevsky both directly and through intermediaries - Russian Freemasonry, Russian Schellingism, Russian literary romanticism led by Zhukovsky and others. The other is the religious-philosophical and ascetic tradition of patristics, the practical and theoretical (to a lesser extent) revival of which began at the same time, initially in monastic circles, and then penetrated both the secular intelligentsia and “in people." It must be borne in mind that the main material with which Kireevsky initially worked was a completely special tradition of Russian literature and the independent secular “intelligentsia” philosophy emerging in its wake (i.e., philosophy outside the framework of theological academies and universities, outside the direct control of the church hierarchy and government). The latter arises from the creative processing of data and methods of the European tradition on the basis of elements of ancient Russian church consciousness preserved in the secularized consciousness (albeit displaced to its periphery or existing in a transformed form) [73(1.1), p. 12–13] - and expresses what Kireevsky himself later called “European-Russian enlightenment.” Kireyevsky himself, in fact, belonged to him: his consciousness lived in reflection of his socio-political, ethical, aesthetic certainties. Having begun his creative activity as a romantic, Kireevsky gradually, under the influence of a number of negative and positive factors, moved from the romantic pole to the patristic one. He became disillusioned with the ideals of the Enlightenment and the ability of Western European culture to achieve the ideal of integrity of personal and public life he sought; lost faith in the possibility of transforming society through literary or philosophical means and abandoned the utopia characteristic of Pushkin’s circle of writers and philosophers. Not only in “European-Russian” life, but also in European life itself, he saw deep contradictions inherent in the very way of being of European man, who linked his fate with reason and, consequently, with philosophy; I realized that philosophy’s claims to the role of the highest meaning-forming principle are unfounded; the historicity and, therefore, transience of all forms of “enlightenment”. At the same time, he saw in his own soul such spiritual needs, the satisfaction of which is beyond the control of rationality, and dissatisfaction threatens to destroy the internal balance of the mental organism, and he encountered a new and hitherto unknown way of being, Christian asceticism (elders Philaret and Macarius), which both satisfied and corrected his own fundamental vision of human reality. Finally, close spiritual and intellectual communication with such personalities as A.S. Khomyakov, brother - P.V. Kireevsky and wife – N.P. Kireevskaya (who played, perhaps, a decisive role) - became a kind of catalyst in the sharp turn of his personal and philosophical fate. This position of Kireyevsky makes it necessary - for a correct understanding of his position and its formation - to clarify some of the basic features of the anthropology of each of the mentioned traditions. This is all the more important because often the same terms, for example “spirit - soul - body”, “mind - heart” and especially “personality”, have completely different meanings. 1. General characteristics of romanticism Speaking in the first chapter about the main aesthetic and literary positions of Pushkin’s era, we attached the name “romanticism” to almost each of them. At the same time, an unambiguous definition of the concept of “romanticism”, especially in such a context as “the influence of Western European romanticism on Russian literature and philosophy of the 1st half. XIX century." - seems to be an extremely difficult matter. Like many fruits of the “European-Russian enlightenment,” Russian romanticism, being an obvious result of borrowing, was at the same time an extremely unique phenomenon. We can talk about the influence of German, French, English, Italian and other romantic and pre-romantic literature, as well as the influence of various romantic literary and philosophical circles, their individual representatives, their way of life, everyday and mental skills and values ​​on the Russian cultural environment. Romanticism largely transformed this environment, having a comprehensive impact on it. They were looking for new literary forms, a new philosophy, and new forms of spiritual life and organization of everyday life 37. As a true representative of Russian society, Kireyevsky absorbed everything. At the same time, it was Russian romanticism that provided interesting, unknown in Europe, opportunities to overcome the difficulties and dead ends inherent in the romantic consciousness itself. One of these solutions was “Slavophilism”. To take all these points into account, the conversation about romantic and patristic anthropology will be preceded by a reconstruction of the typical structure of romantic consciousness. The reference point will be the romanticism of the Jena circle, as the most influential, the most studied and the most philosophical. Many works are devoted to romanticism, of which we focused on the works of V.M. Zhirmunsky, P.P. Gaidenko, P.M. Gabitova, E.A. Makhov, A. Karelsky. Let us first discuss one more important point. The fact is that the greatest thinkers who best expressed a number of essential definitions of romantic thought and at the same time had the most significant influence on Russian thought - Schelling and Hegel - were, especially the latter, in a very ambiguous relationship with romanticism, and to include them in it means to greatly, even excessively expand the scope of this concept due to the impoverishment of its content. It seems therefore more accurate to talk about the dual unity of romanticism and philosophical idealism, especially since a number of personalities generally attributed to romanticism (especially Fr. Schlegel and F. Schleiermacher) played, in turn, a very significant role in the movement of philosophical thought. So, in the most general form, romanticism can be called a spiritual movement that constituted a special era in European culture, which at the end of the 18th - beginning of the 19th centuries. opposed the rationalistic tendencies of the Enlightenment, while at the same time being in complex, dialectically contradictory relationships with it. Let us consider the internal logic of this movement, the disclosure of which, including in relation to anthropology, can make clear its influence on Russian thought. First of all, it should be noted that romanticism is not only a literary and philosophical, but also a religious and mystical movement. “Romanticism is a unique form of development of mystical consciousness, possessing such and such features characteristic of the age,” Zhirmunsky argued [68, p. 6]. It was here that Western European mystical traditions, both Christian and near-Christian, and Platonic, Hermetic and occult, had a huge influence on literature and philosophy. It is the unique combination of literary, philosophical and religious-mystical layers that constitutes a characteristic feature of the universalism of the romantics. Another such feature, closely related to the previous one, was the original combination of fragmentation, antitheticalness of consciousness with its integrity, organicity: “The romantic world - a “living organism” - lives by the relativization of internal boundaries and opposites” [133, p. 13–14]. These features distinguish romantic universality from encyclopedic universality - indifferent or hostile to religion, seeing neither internal contradictions nor the organic integrity of the world, dreaming of creating a mechanical, rationalistic, rather than organic, mystical, “system of nature.” At the same time, active participation in the literary, scientific, philosophical life of our time, and an enlightening attitude distinguished romanticism from pietism, occultism and other mystical movements with which it was genetically associated. According to P.P. Gaidenko, a specific combination of aestheticism, the principle of transcendentalism and irony created “that peculiar understanding of the world and attitude towards it, which was called romantic” [46, p. 78]. At the same time, aestheticism and transcendentalism presuppose pantheism as an essential feature of romanticism. The principle of irony sets the dynamics of his history, which takes place between the cultivation of these traits and continuous attempts to overcome them. Historically, they arise from the opposition of a man of art, a “genius”, to the vulgarity and mediocrity of everyday life of “burgher society”, which, after the era of the great bourgeois revolutions, became the bearer and homogenizer of the norms of freedom and morality. Hence the absolute concept of freedom and the “geniocentrism” (Karelsky) of the romantics [84, p. 26]. From this opposition, from the alienation of the creative personality from his immediate social environment, a close interest in a person (first of all, in himself), his feelings and experiences arose. Thus, romantics initially found themselves in a life situation of egocentrism, i.e. in a situation that justifies transcendentalism, however, they experienced this situation very painfully. Their own philosophical searches and hobbies stemmed from their understanding of this situation and attempts to overcome it. The first such hobby was the philosophy of early Fichte with its extreme subjectivism. It already gave grounds for identifying the empirical “I” (especially the “I” of the philosopher, but also the “I” of the artistic genius) with the transcendental “I”, whose activity creates the world of “not-I”, supported the orientation “to spontaneous, not mediated self-expression” of subjectivity. However, the world itself lost its reality here, which contradicted the artistic experience of the romantics and doomed them to total loneliness. The romantics, already alone in society, did not in the least want to “lose connection with the universe, its greater time and space, and never ceased to feel like a “microcosm in a macrocosm”” [133, p. 9]. The reception of Spinozism in German romanticism, which passed its way “from subjective idealism to absolute,” was connected with this circumstance. In Schelling, Schleiermacher, Fr. Schlegel, “Spinozism takes on a pronounced mystical, religious form.” For them, “Spinoza’s great achievement lies in his development and substantiation of the “philosophy of the world” - the philosophy of the infinite universe” [43, p. 52, 54, 56]. Their attempts to synthesize the systems of Spinoza and Fichte can be considered as a philosophical expression of the desire to overcome the original alienation and isolation of the romantics in the human world. From this synthesis more or less coherent systems of absolute idealism arose. At the center of these systems was a person, more precisely, an artist, mystic, poet, philosopher, in a word, a genius, a creator of culture. In his spiritual experience, a genius discovers his natural unity or identity with the fundamental principle of the world, with the unity of the world whole, each part of which bears the stamp of everything, but only he, who has reached the highest level of self-consciousness, is called upon to express all this, to participate in the life of the whole, not mechanically-materially or organically-unconsciously, but spiritually-creatively. Moreover, a genius calls upon himself and devotes himself simply due to the level of his genius, his self-awareness. This concept of “free self-initiation”, a clear expression of which we find, for example, in the “Ideas” of Fr. Schlegel [207(1), p. 363] is the most important thing that distinguishes romanticism from both positive religion and esoteric traditionalism. This whole, with which the romantic identifies himself and which he undertakes to represent, is called by him without distinction - the Infinite, the Universe, God. Connection with him is a feeling of dependence (Schleiermacher). The theistic interpretation of these names and this connection is rejected (at least at first) along with the “external tinsel of a noisy cult” simply because both are inherent in the “crowd” of respectable burghers. It was seen as either a “boring game of the mind”, or “the vulgarity of superstition”, or, what is especially interesting if we take into account the current definition of romance, “dreaminess”. Fr. Schlegel wrote: “And how could one deny you religion just because you probably wouldn’t have an answer to the question of whether you believe in God” (“On Philosophy”) [207(1), p. 342–343]. The feeling of Presence, the individual feeling of “quiet reverence” is opposed here as the basis and essence of religion to the “noisy” cult and “boring” dogma. Psychologically interpreted religiosity is clearly placed here higher than faith, as an ontological relationship to God. Romantics value in religion special experiences that cannot be reduced to anything else, which then serve as material for aesthetic experiences and reflections. This aesthetic attitude of the romantics to religion caused a stormy protest from Kierkegaard at one time. In this same way, Slavophiles differ fundamentally from the romantics. As we will see, they overcome romanticism precisely in that their “religious philosophy was consciously created as a church philosophy, i.e. based on church mystical experience." They are “characterized by an evolution from the romantic interpretation of religion as a thirst for faith and a sense of the infinite to Orthodox mystical ontologism” [173, p. 125, 127]. Kireevsky, with his constant appeal to the spiritual heritage of the Holy Fathers, is one of the brightest representatives of Slavophilism in this regard. In his quest for the whole, a genius, extremely alienated from bourgeois society, turns, in addition to Nature, also to the people, whose life becomes for him a source of inspiration and aesthetic experience. It was the romantics who were the first (after Herder) to turn to the study of folk culture. The people in their everyday life, on the one hand, are organically rooted in the universe, and on the other hand, and precisely because of this, they become the true bearer and creator of real culture, its folklore and heroic tradition. If modern culture, with its cult of rationality, is international and impersonal, then folk cultures are personal and unique. Each of them has its own “spirit,” which has its own specific tasks in history and mediates the relationship of the genius personality, as its exponent, to the universe. The people creating culture are in the general flow of human history; their historical task is a step for the realization of a universal human task. This means that joining the people was not only an aesthetic, but also a historical experience for the romantics. It stimulated their appeal to other eras and cultures, the awakening of their historical thinking. History, like Nature, became an ally of the romantics in their struggle. Their sense of the historical is correctly described by Zhirmunsky: “In what is for romantics the task of a personal path, they feel organically connected with the destinies of all humanity, with the development of the entire universe” [68, p. P2]. Comprehension of domestic and world history was understood as stages of personal self-knowledge, necessary stages in the formation of human self-awareness. However, the historicism of the romantics is permeated with their own aestheticism, associated with the principle of irony. Finding an organic kinship with any culture, with any historical phenomenon, striving for the most complete understanding of it, the romantic, from his egocentric “infinite point of view,” then saw its historical limitations and relativity. He accepted all opposites, taking nothing seriously as his own, as binding [46, p. 120–121]. These views, despite all the variations, were common to the romantics, Schelling and even Hegel. They also had a powerful influence on Russian romantics, stimulating their interest in the problems of the philosophy of history and the concept of “nationality” as a historical, social and aesthetic category. Connected with this philosophy of history is the social philosophy of the romantics, which is summarized by the same Zhirmunsky: “The Age of Enlightenment... dealt with abstract man and abstract humanity; Romanticism, on the contrary, proceeds from the understanding of individuality, and thereby it awakens all those complex dormant connections that connect such individuals in life... Romantics are unable to conceive of an existence separated from others... Living together, as a true element of development, determines, in general, their cultural ideal. Such a desire for organicity, such an initial connection of the entire human race, the entire universe... can only be justified mystically” [68, p. 113]. Romanticism lived by this organic connection. Not being able to implement it in full, he sought to cultivate it in a narrow circle of friends, combining this with a special kind of enlightenment. The abstraction, rationalism and alienation that dominated bourgeois society were contrasted with a special kind of intimate, “existential” communication, “community”, using the term N.A. Berdyaev, at the level of microsociety; “unanimity”, understood more as a common path to the search for truth than as an identity of opinions. This is clearly seen from the correspondence of the romantics: “Let us at least unite into one world, and you will see that there is a beautiful music of the spheres, and that we will all be happy” (F. Schleiermacher - Henriette Herz and Fr. Schlegel). “Fate brought me together with a man from whom anything can come out. I liked him very much, and I turned to him, for he soon opened to me the sanctuary of his soul. I now dwell in it and study it” (Fr. Schlegel - A.-W. Schlegel about Novalis) [133, p. 20; 207(2), p. 394] 38. This is how the cults of mystical love and friendship arise as ways to discover this organicity: “the eternal unity of the finite with the infinite is seen by the lover in the beloved being as an obvious miracle” [68, p. 89]. This leads to the formation of closed circles at the level of microsociety - the main form of the romantic community, which sometimes turns into a "secret society", usually revolutionary - as a degenerate form of such a community. In an effort to overcome its alienation, the circle rushes “out into the world”, starting educational activities, the main goal of which is to introduce the “masses”, the “public”, to the mystical experience of the members of the circle (a revolutionary society acts similarly, but more radically, striving to involve everyone in its experience at once) and to establish the correct correspondence between the level of self-awareness and the scale of activity and power of the members of society. Romantics are fighting for the right of a thinking person, a genius, not only to rethink the world, but also to reorganize it. We have already seen and will see again how these properties manifested themselves in the history of the Russian intelligentsia. This is the fundamental difference between a romantic circle and a monastery or community of the faithful, for which this initial alienation does not exist, which do not interrupt their connection with the body of the natural macro-society, but represent an institution that serves as a guide to the world of reality of the transcendental order (the Church, the Kingdom of God), including through educational (publishing and writing) activities, if they (like Optina Pustyn) are engaged in such. Slavophilism represented a certain transitional form from a romantic circle to a kind of “monastery in the world” [173, p. 130]. 2. Basic anthropological concepts in patristics and romanticism Let us now turn to a consideration of the basic anthropological concepts of patristics and romanticism. Let us dwell in more detail on the meaning of such concepts as spirit, soul, body, mind, heart. First of all, it must be said that in the Platonic dualism of the soul - an active, self-moving and “self-sufficient substance” and the body - its inert, movable “prison”, the Holy Fathers saw only psychological, phenomenal, and not ontological truth. They themselves preferred to consider a person as a “psychosomatic integrity.” Although the center of gravity of this wholeness lies in the soul, the body also acts as its necessary natural, albeit subordinate, component. Abba Dorotheus (a popular ascetic thinker in Rus', in the publication of whose works by the Optina Monastery (1856) Kireevsky was directly involved) compares the existence of the soul upon its departure from the body with being in a dark cell without food, sleep and communication, thus inverting the well-known Platonic maxim σῶμα–σῆμα [65, p. 147]. The life of the soul is expressed in the body. The body satisfies a person’s need to influence the world around him, transform it, and communicate with other people. The body participates in communion with God, prayer, the sacraments, is enlightened and sanctified by grace, and participates in the resurrection from the dead. The dogmatic basis of this “discourse of the body” is the doctrine of the incarnation of God and apophatic theology, which establishes the transcendence of God not only to the material world, but also to the spiritual world, His equal (for infinite) distance from all created things and at the same time His complete presence in everything (including in bodily reality). It is characteristic that the main object of ascetic action in Christianity is not the body and not the soul in itself, but precisely their totality; and the main task of asceticism is to establish the proper relationship between soul and body, and not liberation from the latter. Unlike patristics, romanticism, formed on the basis of Western Christian ideas about man, was strongly influenced by both Platonic and Cartesian dualism. The first was perceived by the romantics both directly (one of the most famous translations of Plato is by Schleiermacher) and indirectly through various versions of Western European mysticism. The second is through the prism of Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant and Fichte. The concept of “soul” does not have one stable meaning in romanticism. This is individual self-consciousness, and the “immortal soul” in the sense of Plato and Western Christianity, and the world soul, as the lowest stage in the formation of the intelligentsia, as universal sensuality - the result of the reception of Neoplatonism. Just as in Christian asceticism, the main subject of educational care in romanticism remains the soul, but the nature of this education changes significantly. The loss of a realistic idea of ​​original sin, Schiller’s idea of ​​a “beautiful soul” and self-centered opposition of oneself to the surrounding community, whose norms are perceived as fetters, leads to the replacement of ascetic self-restraint and self-denial with the desire for the most free development of all those potentialities of the soul that are perceived as creative. The main means of educational influence is aesthetic influence, ennobling, elevating and, naturally, cleansing the soul. At the same time, a creative person, as a rule, voluntarily, in the process of self-education, imposes on himself a number of restrictions, the purpose of which is to defeat the “philistine flesh” (A.P. Chekhov), the coarse, unconscious, animal, anti-aesthetic principle in a person, to rise to the highest levels of self-consciousness, to free and best prepare the creative principle in oneself for activity. These restrictions, however, are purely individual and situational: depending on the ideology of a particular romantic community, on the level of self-awareness at which a given romantic perceives himself to be, the ratio of limited and cultivated traits can change even to the opposite 39 . The body is relative to the soul; in the “eternal harmony of the universe” they are not “originally and eternally different” principles [207(1), p. 342]. This is a Christian motif among the romantics. In the very structure of the male and female body, the path of true life is indicated for people, the path to the realization of humanity itself, independent of the division of the sexes. But romantics also show the “dark” side of a different, platonic, attitude towards the body. Although it is beautiful, through participation in the soul, it is nevertheless perishable, and parting with it at some point may become desirable in order to achieve complete harmony with the universe. A striking example of such an attitude towards the body and death among the romantics can be the joint suicide of Kleist and his friend Henrietta Vogel, committed not out of despair, but, on the contrary, in a state of high harmonious joy, close to mystical ecstasy [181, p. 392–408]. The source of these very ambiguous differences lies not so much in theory as in differences in life practices, lifestyles and associated anthropological positions. Until now, we have reasoned within the framework of the “body-soul” dichotomy, but many Holy Fathers prefer the “spirit-soul-body” trichotomy, where “ψυχή, as the subject of personal (or rather individual. - K.A.) life, has in πνεῦμα its highest god-like principle” [72, p. 377]. Within the framework of the trichotomy, the soul as a subject and source of life is occupied primarily with the body, its adaptation to environmental conditions, “satisfaction of needs,” etc. [72, p. 227]. In contrast to the soul, in this sense, the spirit, as the beginning of reason, creativity and freedom, is occupied with higher types of human activity not related to bodily needs, or, in clearer language, is directed towards grief. It acts both as the principle of human likeness to God and as an organ of communication with God, as a conductor of divine energy in a human being. According to Rev. Maxim the Confessor (Kireevsky again participated in the work on the publication of his works by the Optina Hermitage), in a correctly constituted (before the Fall or after the restoration) man, the spirit, feeding from the Spirit (aka “mind”, whose true food is “spiritual knowledge”), feeds the soul and, through its mediation, the body, which does not need “sensual nutrition”, the body, which then becomes a guide to the world blessed energies of deification. In a real person, whose nature is perverted by the Fall and is subordinated to sensuality and “carnal desires,” these three principles act as rivals fighting for dominance, their confrontation introduces disorder into a person and gives rise to passions [66, p. 76–77, 80–82, 137]. Accordingly, the adjectives “spiritual”, “mental”, “carnal” denote the predominance of a person’s inclination towards one or another principle, a certain quality of life, a certain “intentionality” of his energies. Romanticism here also reveals interesting points of contact and divergence with patristic thought. We have already spoken about its rootedness in the philosophy of the New Time. Accordingly, cogito ergo sum is taken as the starting point here. Soul and spirit are considered as stages in the formation of the cogito, the thinking subject, i.e. “I” in the proper sense of the word. At the same time, the empirical “I” is considered only as one of the necessary stages in the formation of the transcendental ego (“intelligentsia,” as Schelling says), which, in turn, is only the penultimate step towards the complete identity of subject and object in the Absolute. It is in man - but not everyone, not everyone is called to realize this (unlike patristics, where everyone is called to deification), and who has reached a certain level of consciousness - the Absolute (aka the Universe - i.e. the world, but considered not as a set of empirically given objects, but as an organic whole) achieves its self-awareness (an important point that unites romanticism with idealism, including Hegel). From the point of view of the person himself, this looks like a revelation received and achieved by a spiritual person - a genius, a philosopher, a mystic - in an act of intellectual intuition. This is primarily the realm of the spirit. It is, in essence, also the area of ​​culture, for culture, according to Fr. Schlegel, is a necessary condition for the growth of human consciousness, and, at the same time, the place where creative intuition finds its completion in creativity, the place of residence of the highest values ​​that make a person human: “Only thanks to culture does a person become completely and everywhere humane and imbued with humanity”; she is “the Highest Good and the Truly Beneficial”; “The spiritual person as such resides only in the invisible world... He has only one desire on earth - to form the finite for the eternal, so no matter what his work is called, he will always remain an artist” (“Ideas”) [207(1), p. 360, 359, 358], i.e. the creator of culture, although, of course, the very concept of “culture” is rethought and elevated here. If in patristics the spirit primarily prays, then in romanticism it primarily experiences, improves and creates. The main task of man for the fathers is the purification and construction of the “inner man” and the achievement of likeness to God and knowledge of God through personal communication with God (which in no way implies selfishness, since it necessarily presupposes the restoration of true relationships with other people). The task of the romantic person, according to Schlegel, although formulated in the same terms - “purification” and “godlikeness” - but essentially means something completely different: “Every good person becomes more and more a god.” “God is wholly original and supreme, therefore, he is an individual in the highest potency. But aren’t nature and the world individuals?” (“Fragments”, “Ideas”) [207(1), p. 305, 359]. The Divine is conceived here not based on the reality of His Revelation, but as human and worldly, elevated to the highest conceivable level. Romanticism thus remains entirely within the framework of the logic of development, within the framework of transcendentalism. “Man is nature’s creative view of itself” [207(1), p. 358], writes Fr. Schlegel, summing up our reasoning. He likens the creativity of a genius to the productive ability of the universe. A genius creates himself, improves his spirit, ascending the steps of self-knowledge and self-dedication, so that later, through the abilities of the soul and body, he can create something else for himself - culture (religion, philosophy, poetry, etc.). Compared to the Age of Enlightenment, this is, of course, going inward; compared to the Fathers, this is still a concern for the external. The difference in the ultimate goals of human existence determines the different understanding of the main anthropological categories and their relationships. In the writings of the Holy Fathers - ascetics and mystics - the spirit is identified with the terms “mind” (νοῦς) (a Platonizing direction coming from Origen and Evagrius Pontus) or “heart” (καρδία) (a direction going back to the corpus of “Spiritual Discourses” attributed to St. Macarius the Great). According to the instructions of Zarin, “νοῦς and καρδία were used as symbols and concepts interchangeably” by Sts. Basil the Great, John Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa and the same Macarius, together with the “spirit”, to designate the “highest side of human nature”, the “sovereign” of the soul [72, p. 379]. Zarin sees here a desire to harmonize biblical and philosophical views. O. John Meyendorff, on the contrary, speaks not only of two systems of word usage, but “of two anthropologies, Plato and the Bible, between which, in order to lay the foundations of an internally consistent spiritual life, it was necessary to make a choice” [135, p. 192]. Kireyevsky's conversion can be considered in this sense as a choice that he made following the Holy Fathers, the choice of the biblical concept of man and his integrity, which includes not only spiritual and intellectual, but also psychophysical characteristics. There is a very clear parallel between the overcoming of romanticism in Slavophilism and the overcoming of Origenism in patristics - the same retention of idealistic problematics and terminology with their radical rethinking. It is interesting that after the synthesis of these directions in asceticism, the tradition of distinguishing between “mind” and “heart” again arises. This can already be seen in Rev. Isaac the Syrian (VII century), the great Syrian ascetic writer, who had (through translation from Greek) a great influence on Russian spiritual culture, well known to Kireyevsky (again, who participated in the publication of his works by the Optina Hermitage (1854)), as well as K.N. Leontiev, F.M. Dostoevsky and others. Works of the Rev. Isaac probably played a very important role in Kireyevsky’s conversion, and already in 1839 he refers to it as “the most profound of philosophical writings” [3, p. 152]. Rev. Isaac distinguishes between “purity of mind” and “purity of heart”: “For the mind is one of the feelings of the soul, and the heart embraces and holds in its power the inner feelings. It is the root, and if the root is holy, then the branches are holy, i.e. if the heart is brought to purity, then it is clear that all feelings are purified.” That is, apparently, the mind. But the mind is distinguished by self-activity and activity: “If the mind puts effort into reading the Divine Scriptures or works a little in fasts, vigils, and silences, then it will forget its previous way of thinking and achieve purity as soon as it moves away from a bad life” [78, p. 24]. Thus, “purity of mind” is, first of all, a new “way of thinking”, different from the previous, “bad” one. It is important here that even this way of thinking is not the result of exclusively intellectual work, but also of a certain ascetic effort that changes the very way of life, “living,” of a person. Here we are talking rather about “conviction” as “the result of a whole life,” which Kireevsky distinguishes from “opinion” as “a conclusion from logical considerations” [3, p. 281]. So, we are talking not only about the “system of the Christian worldview,” but about Christianity as a way of life, fundamentally different from “bad living.” Nevertheless, the mind itself “will not have constant purity,” continues the Rev. Isaac, - because as quickly as one is cleansed, one is also quickly desecrated” [78, p. 24]. “Purity of heart” does not simply require special ascetic effort. It is achieved only gradually, in the process of spiritual life, where a person not so much acts on his own as endures: “The heart achieves purity through many sorrows, deprivations, removal from communication with everything that is worldly in the world, and self-mortification for all this” [78, p. 24]. It is sorrows and hardships that purify the heart, provided that there is a correct attitude towards them, which is a matter of human activity, the activity of a purified mind that is trying to maintain this purity. According to many testimonies, the cleansing of the root occurs unnoticed by the ascetic himself, at a “pre-reflective level.” Here there is a change not just in the way of life, but in its quality, acquiring a new, divine-human dimension, which gives this purity special strength: “If it (the heart. - K.A.) has achieved purity, then its purity will not be defiled by anything small, it is not afraid of great, obvious battles, I mean terrible battles” [78, p. 24]. This entire passage clearly implies the well-known gospel commandment about the pure in heart who see God. Nevertheless, the heart sees God with the mind: “Whoever concentrates the vision of his mind within himself sees in himself the dawn of the Spirit. He who abhors all soaring of the mind sees his Lord within his heart” [78, p. 37]. “Inside” here means not only spiritual, but also experiential space. This vision of God with the mind in the heart is reminiscent of the well-known practice of “smart doing,” “bringing the mind into the heart,” “exercise in inner attention” (Kireevsky), which was spoken of by later ascetic writers, including Kireevsky’s contemporaries, Saints Ignatius Brianchaninov (1807–1867) and Theophan the Recluse (1815–1891). It can be assumed that the design, consolidation and dissemination of this practice necessitated new terminological distinctions. It remains to be seen in what relation these concepts stand to the di- and trichotomous division. Since the Holy Fathers did not strive for uniformity in their terminology, an attempt to construct a general scheme may be more productive here than an attempt to harmonize individual quotations. St. Isaac, for example, practically does not use the noun “spirit” in relation to a person, but he clearly distinguishes between “carnal”, “mental” and “spiritual” knowledge, which allows us to say that he rather adhered to a trichotomy, i.e. distinguished three levels, or rather, perhaps three degrees, qualities, forms, human beings and human life. At each of these levels, the mind and heart reveal themselves as correlative principles. The heart - as an existential basis - is pre-reflective, unconscious, passive, the source of life, feelings and passions. The mind is its conscious, active disclosure, possessing relative freedom and the ability to influence the basis. Thoughts are born in the heart and passions live, but it is the mind that fights them, accepts or rejects them, and is aware of the movements of the heart. The heart can be considered as the center of bodily life, the place and source of mental and spiritual feelings, experiences and states, the mind - as an active, conscious force, the ability for self-awareness, reflection, self-knowledge and knowledge of the world, discursive - at the level of the soul, intuitive-mystical, corresponding to faith as communication with God - at the level of the spirit. Their interaction and relationship at all levels, associated with the general aspiration of the human being (in this case, we can say - the heart), determine the “energetic image” of a person. Hence the concern of ascetics about their coordination, “bringing the mind into the heart” through attention. Romanticism, which came from the spiritual and artistic experience of its creators, just like patristics, was not intellectualistic philosophizing. On the contrary, he actively sought to include and comprehend everything irrational in man, primarily the area of ​​feeling as the basis of aesthetic experience. Much attention is paid to mental (ordinary, life) and spiritual (mystical, creative) feelings, experiences, sensations. In both, they try to find the infinite in the finite. It is to this area of ​​the heart that religion comes down - in its new, romantic understanding, substantiated by Schleiermacher. This is the religion of the infinite, as the center of culture, understood as a universal spiritual activity [44, pp. 74–75]. At the heart of this “religion of the heart” is a feeling - a feeling of dependence on the infinite universe. “For Schleiermacher, religious feeling is composed of the contemplation of the infinite and the accompanying emotional element” [68, p. 157]. This contemplation is an experience of the infinite, strictly individual for each person, more precisely, again, for each religious genius. Hence the conclusion about the truth of all religions and the possibility of an infinite number of their forms. It was said above that this psychologism of the romantics is a special case of Western psychologism in general, and is essentially different from the ontologism of the Slavophiles and patristics. Here you can also see the root of this psychologism - the understanding of the heart as a feeling, in contrast to patristics, where the heart is understood ontologically as the “place” of feelings, which includes the mind. Hence the opposition between mind and heart in romanticism. The area of ​​the heart is directly related to creativity as the unconscious productive activity of subjectivity. However, it would be wrong to reduce the romantic concept of creativity to the unconscious self-expression of the individual, especially given everything that has been said above about the romantic understanding of culture. “Man is something more than the color of the earth, he is reasonable, and reason is free, reason is nothing more than eternal self-determination in the infinite” (Fr. Schlegel). In creativity, a person makes a sacrifice, overcoming his finitude for the sake of the infinite. This is achieved in a liberating act of self-restraint, because “while the artist comes up with something with inspiration, he is in a non-free state” [207(1), p. 363, 282]. This self-restraint is achieved by reflective, limiting activity of the mind. The rootedness of romanticism in the tradition of transcendental philosophy can be seen here quite clearly. This teaching reaches its greatest systematicity in Schelling’s “System of Transcendental Idealism,” from where Kireyevsky borrowed it for his first articles. However, over time, significant changes occur in the usage of romantics. If initially, during the heyday of Jena and Heidelberg romanticism, they were characterized by a combination, and terminologically unclear, of the classical tradition of distinguishing νοῦς and διάνοια or intellectus and ratio, with the Kantian Verstand (reason) and Vernunft (reason), then subsequently, as the largest thinkers of romanticism evolved towards the religious worldview, significant changes are taking place in this word usage. So, for example, Fr. Schlegel and Schelling, in the later period of their philosophical work, returned to the pre-Kantian use of the word Verstand as the highest spiritual understanding, including intuition, comprehension of the whole 40. At the same time, although the terms Verstand and Vernunft are retained by Fr. Schlegel has some features of the corresponding Kantian concepts (Vernunft as a “reflective” and “inferential” ability; Verstand as the beginning of unity in the cognitive activity of thinking as opposed to the diversity of the sensory-perceptible world), however Verstand (together with will) refers to spiritual abilities, Vernunft (together with fantasy) to mental ones. In general, the relationship between them approaches the relationship between νοῦς and διάνοια in Greek philosophy. Fr. Schlegel writes: “According to more ancient usage, it is not the mind (Vernunft, ratio, διάνοια) that is common to everyone and the same everywhere, but the mind (Verstand, intellectus, νοῦς) is the place in a person’s cognitive ability where the highest insight occurs” [207(2), p. 418–419]. In this respect, Kireyevsky is close to Schlegel: he also criticizes “rational thinking” precisely because it “is abstracted from any personal peculiarity” and “is accessible to everyone” [4, p. 282]. For the Russian thinker, this concept goes back, on the one hand, to the late Schelling (who made a partly similar, but philosophically more grounded, evolution from romanticism to faith), and on the other hand, to the distinction between carnal, mental and spiritual knowledge by the Venerable. Isaac the Syrian and other Holy Fathers. Here it is appropriate to briefly trace the history of Kireevsky’s attitude towards Schelling, who was, of course, a much more relevant thinker for him than Fr. Schlegel, although the latter is much more revealing for demonstrating the logic of romanticism. This story is described in detail by E. Muller in the article “I.V. Kireyevsky and German philosophy". We will use his analysis. “In the “Nineteenth Century”... Kireevsky sums up Schelling’s Munich summer semester, presenting a summary of the lectures he heard in 1830 and the explanations he received from Schelling personally. Here he completely identifies his position with the position of the master. “In 1845, during the period of editing “The Moskvitian,” Kireevsky, in the article “Schelling’s Speech,” provides a compilation of a number of printed and handwritten texts” concerning the philosophy of mythology and religion of the late Schelling, “striking in its extreme authenticity both in terms of style and conceptual apparatus, and in terms of understanding and development of the problem.” In the discussion of the 40s, “he joins the “empirically” oriented faction of the anti-Hegelian party (late Schelling, Herbartians, Trendelenburg, Steffens), energetically leading a critical development of the problem of the relationship between idealistic philosophy and positive religion. But since this polemic is not aimed at breaking, but at searching for an initially reasonable philosophical solution to this antinomy, Kireevsky, who seeks such a solution, ultimately joins the supporters of the idealistic idea, striving to build an integral speculative system" [142, p. 118–119, 125]. In this he is also close to Chaadaev. But both Russian thinkers are characterized by a heightened understanding of original sin and its consequences, including for human mental life. They begin in Russia that “criticism of pure reason”, which will then be continued by Dostoevsky and Lev Shestov. The mentioned “empiricism” here leads to the fact that in recent articles and passages Kireyevsky “seems to be proposing to completely abandon the world of late idealistic philosophy of mind for the sake of spiritual-existential practice” [142, p. 129]. This, however, does not mean abandoning philosophizing or theorizing in general. Here, rather, practice opens up new possibilities, “beginnings” for philosophy, new dimensions of rationality itself. Within the framework of pure theorizing, Schelling went as far as possible. But, writes Kireevsky, his “Christian philosophy was neither Christian nor philosophy: it differed from Christianity in the most important dogmas, from philosophy - in the very method of cognition” [3, p. 331]. As Muller summarizes Kireyevsky’s thought, “Schelling failed because he did not notice the shift within the mind itself, which must take place when the mind ascends from purely logical knowledge to the knowledge of a believer” [142, p. 127]. The reason for Kireevsky's demarcation from Schelling, therefore, is not only epistemological, but also anthropological. Schelling failed not only due to his non-Orthodoxy and, of course, not due to insufficient criticality, but because, while trying to change his thinking, its methodology and premises, he did not try to change its quality, maintaining the habit of “abstract-logical thinking” [3, p. 331]. This is the last change, which creates the prerequisites for a satisfactory solution to religious and philosophical problems, but which is valuable, of course, not for this, but in itself, possible only as a result of practice that changes the very position of man in being - a step that Schelling never decided to take, remaining to the end a “pure thinker.” 3. The doctrine of personality in German thought of the late 18th – 19th centuries. and in patristics Now, since the doctrine of personality is at the center of the thinking of the late Kireyevsky, since this concept plays an important role in the Russian philosophical process of the mid-19th century in general, the need arises, in order to understand Kireyevsky’s position in this process, to turn to a comparative description of the doctrines of personality in German philosophy and romanticism, on the one hand, and in patristics, on the other. The anthropology of romanticism is closely related to what was developed by Fr. Schlegel's concept of irony. “The ironic subject is a highly reflective subject,” writes P.M. Gabitova [43, p. 85]. How does the mechanism of ironic reflection work? Let, in the process of creativity and self-knowledge, the subject in some way define himself in a certain work. An ironic attitude arises here if this definition, initially expressed with complete seriousness, is then objectified with the help of wit or paradox. Thus, the subject makes “himself an object, an object of his thinking” [43, p. 85]. This is achieved by discovering the definition opposite to the first (antithesis), and the collision of thesis with antithesis in a paradox, as a result of which both are subject to objectification, and the process can occur cyclically, repeating several times with an increasing degree of tension. As Fr. writes. Schlegel, “an idea is a concept brought to the point of irony in its completeness, an absolute synthesis of absolute antitheses, a constantly reproducing change of two struggling thoughts” [207(1), p. 296]. As a result, it is discovered that the thinker’s “I” stands outside and above these antitheses, it is deeper than them and is ready to endlessly produce new content. “The subject... knows how to again destroy all those definitions regarding right and good that he establishes for himself... Irony is aware of its dominance over all content” [49, p. 536–537], Hegel wrote, criticizing the ironic subject, noting his failure to achieve and substantiate objective knowledge and not taking into account his obvious achievements along this path. Hegel and the modern researchers who follow him do not take into account the original orientation of the romantics towards the synthesis of the subjective and objective, the finite and the infinite. They define irony “as a way of artistic expression of transcendentalism, i.e. discovery of the infinite superiority of subjectivity over the object created by it” [46, p. 58]. It seems that in this case P.P. Gaidenko somewhat weakens the romantic position, reducing it to aestheticism, denying the romantics ethical motivation, contrasting this aestheticism with Kierkegaard’s existential irony. A more precise position on this issue is taken by Zhirmunsky, who wrote about Schlegel’s “Lucinda”: ​​“The feeling of the infinite, manifested in love, reveals the holiness and significance of everything finite (i.e., that which was previously ironically destroyed. - K.A.). An individual person, having gone through the most individualistic paths, returns to world truth, to the historical path of humanity" [68, p. 90]. In other words, he restores all destroyed finite definitions when, in his personal spiritual experience, he sees in them, as well as in himself, manifestations of the infinite. This mystical moment of the romantic position compensates for irony and aestheticism. In their desire to test “infinity”, to experience in personal spiritual experience those spiritual formations on which modern civilization rests, the romantics were undoubtedly driven by ethical motivation, the “will to truth”, the desire for truth. In this respect, they can rather be brought closer to Kierkegaard, although the latter, of course, is much more radical. The real limitation of their position lies in the very nature of their mysticism - subjective and psychological, “spiritual”, striving for self-deification, uncritically accepting the data and premises of the Western European mystical tradition, which is very mixed in its composition. If Kierkegaard, by his own definition, sought to “think in the same categories in which he lived” (and here, as in the criticism of Hegel, interesting intersections between him and Kireyevsky, and the Slavophiles in general can be found), then the opposite can be said about the romantics: they lived in the same categories in which they thought. Because of this, the risk of falling into a new ironic cycle remains unsurmounted by the romantics. Mystical bonds of love, friendship, etc. bind really narrow circles of like-minded people who place themselves in a special position in society. In relation to others, the ironic attitude retains its force. The main thing for a romantic person is the discovery of one’s own infinity and the search for the infinite in the world. A.F. Losev defined romanticism “as the departure of a lonely and suffering individual into endless and unattainable distances,” bringing it closer to early Christian Gnosticism, and seeing in it the possibility of satanic “absolute self-affirmation” [116, p. 288, 304]. In asserting itself, ironic subjectivity believes that it ascends along the steps that Fichte described in his Ich-Philosophie: it rises from the empirical “I” through the “not-I” to the transcendental “I”. In this definition of personality, we move along a kind of apophatic path: “the true I constantly slips inside, beyond the limits of its objectivity and does not dissolve in the latter” [110, p. 17]. However, this apophatism, remaining within the framework of subject-object relations, thinking of personality in terms of self-consciousness, leads to vacuity, replacing, in Hegel’s words, “concrete peace” with “negative” [49, p. 536] and comes to despair: “Despair in thinking in truth, and in itself and for itself subjectivity, as well as the inability to make oneself firm and self-active, led the noble soul to rely on its feeling and look for something solid, lasting in religion” [49, p. 537]. Romantic religiosity appears here, therefore, as a disruption of the correct development of self-awareness, and, at the same time, as religiosity of the traditionalist type 41 (one is looking for the “solid” in being, and not the relationship to a living, personal Divinity). It arises either as a result of despair (in the case of honest recognition of one’s insignificance) - Schlegel’s Catholicism; or as a means of self-aggrandizement (in case of concealment) – Schleiermacher’s “religion of the heart” [49, p. 537]. From Kireevsky’s letters we know that, while abroad, he listened to Hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy, dedicated to the “newest philosophers” [3, p. 346], and, therefore, knew this interpretation of romanticism, which made extremely high demands on his own spiritual life. This point was reflected even in his last article, where the transition “from philosophy to faith” has universal significance only if it occurs “as a result of the correct development of consciousness”; it largely loses its meaning if it occurs as a result of a breakdown, “personal characteristics and extraneous influences” [3, p. 328]. Here again a parallel can be seen with Kierkegaard, who tried to show consciousness this path of “correct development” with his “existential dialectics”. “The ironic subject, recognizing everything objective as insignificant, tries to elevate only his own subjectivity” [43, p. 94], - Gabitova summarizes Hegel’s criticism of romanticism (as we have seen, not entirely fair). Hegel describes the extreme subjectivism of the romantics as a consequence of their egocentrism. He himself, however, overcoming subjectivism, does not go beyond the limits of transcendentalism and, therefore, egocentrism as a life attitude, using thought for self-affirmation as the most adequate means at a person’s disposal, a means that is directly related to his very essence. As I.A. summarizes the Hegelian position. Ilyin, “it is the individual soul that carries within itself that capacity for consciousness and will that is necessary for a substance in order to become spirit. Self-consciousness is a function of the individual “self” and only through it, through its thinking and cognition, can a substance acquire its highest level: become, through an act of conscience, a subject who has recognized its essence, or, what is the same, as subjective self-consciousness, see in itself the final moment of substantial existence” [77, p. 388]. “Ironic subjectivity”, romantic “unhappy consciousness” then corresponds to that level of self-awareness when the “noble soul”, striving for the universal, for union with substance, is afraid to sacrifice its “empirical egocentrism”, “to stop valuing the “formal side” of its “special” existence” [77, p. 389; 43, p. 95, 98–99]. This relationship of subjectivity and substantiality in Hegel only superficially resembles the relationship of “hypostasis” and “nature” in the Holy Fathers: subjectivity (personality) is identified here with consciousness, substance is understood, first of all, as social (although not class, as in Marx, but folk). “As a being, “free substance” has reality as the spirit of the people.” 42 A person who claims to be a person in the Hegelian sense, i.e., an individual who has truly identified his will in his self-consciousness with the will of the substance, for which “the personal spirit and the national spirit are one,” cannot help but “lead an absolute life in the fatherland and for the sake of the people” [77, pp. 398, 397]. Here is the root of the claims of the Russian Hegelians, primarily the Westerners and the writers of the “natural school” who followed them, for exclusive knowledge of the people and their needs 43 . Here is the root of similar, although tempered by churchism, and therefore, perhaps, more successful aspirations of K. Aksakov. This relationship of subjectivity and substantiality in a hidden form, as an unexplicit but effective premise, is present in almost all of Kireevsky’s early works, starting with “Something...” and ending with “Poems of Yazykov.” At the same time, the personality of this or that poet appears here as subjectivity, and as substance – this or that intersubjective community, or rather its “spirit”: the people, for example the Russian, its intellectual elite, “literature”, Europe, its “education”, and finally humanity as a whole. However, here, rather, the influence of German idealism in general is felt, i.e. Schelling, Hegel and their followers and disciples than any of them specifically (in The Nineteenth Century Schelling is given about a page (which is a lot for a work striving for inclusiveness), while Hegel is only mentioned among “all adherents of the identity system” [3, p. 86]. Such an understanding of substance as a transient historical community, a people, easily led to historicism as a form of relativism - for which E. Husserl reproached Hegel at the beginning of the 20th century [60, p. 6]. This historicism became Kireevsky’s fate in the mid-30s, leading him, as we will see, to a state of heartfelt skepticism. Subsequently, after his conversion, Kireyevsky was repelled by Hegel’s one-sided intellectualism and at the same time attracted by the rigor and consistency of his thought. Challenging the excessive “Slavophilism” of K. Aksakov, Kireevsky in his letter “To Moscow Friends” refuses to see in the “common people” the “direct embodiment of the truth itself.” Here, as in the requirement to clarify disagreements “in the concept of the relationship between the people and statehood” [3, p. 372J, his criticism is directed against the relapses of Hegelianism among his friends. However, in the same letter, he himself skillfully operates with the dialectic of the general and the particular, actively using the Hegelian logical apparatus. Schelling's anthropological position must have seemed incomparably more akin to Kireyevsky. In his opinion, Schelling fulfilled Hegel’s requirement: he “did not turn to Christianity, but moved to it naturally, as a result of the deep and correct development of his rational self-awareness” [3, p. 329]. In this case, this means that the dialectical movement of this self-consciousness was continuous, that Revelation entered into it with a “natural” necessity, not as a logical conclusion, of course, but as the satisfaction of an urgent need, as an honest answer to a correctly posed question. The honesty of the answer in this case lies in the fact that, being the only accurate one, it does not follow from the question as a logical conclusion, i.e. are precisely revelation that clarifies human reality, but enters it from the outside. It was Schelling who “realized and expressed” the “one-sidedness” and unsatisfactory nature of rational thinking [3, p. 328]. This was fully manifested in his anthropology. At the beginning of his philosophical journey, Schelling believed that “personality arises through the unity of consciousness,” but “consciousness without an object is impossible” [109, p. 82]. In Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, subjectivity and the ability to reflect are presented as the essential distinctive features of man: “His activity is necessarily directed towards objects, but just as necessarily it is directed towards itself. This is how it differs from a lifeless one, and this from a purely living being” [201(1), p.74]. Here Schelling, starting from Fichte's position, moves in the same direction as Hegel, as well as Fr. Schlegel and other romantics - from criticism (Kant, Fichte) through dogmatism (Spinoza) to absolute idealism as a synthesis of these directions. This plan, being a general point of reference, is, however, concretized by each in his own way (we limit ourselves here to anthropology). For Hegel, human subjectivity appears as only a stage (albeit a necessary one) on the path to the formation of self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit - Absolute subjectivity, identical with Absolute objectivity, the rational basis of the world, the Concept 44. According to Ilyin, “What we call the soul is the Concept,” creating its liberation in the body; it is realized in it and conquers it with its power” [77, p. 272]. Unlike Hegel, Schelling tries to overcome this position of absolute idealism, expanding the very idea of ​​human nature in the direction of its irrationalization. In “Philosophical Studies on the Essence of Human Freedom” he writes: “The principle raised from the foundation of nature that separates man from God is selfhood in him; however, in union with the ideal principle, it becomes spirit. The Self as such is spirit, i.e. man is spirit as a self-possessed, special (separated from God) being - this unification constitutes the essence of personality" [201(2), p. 112–113]. Moreover, if the romantics attached the main importance to feeling as the basis of the aesthetic, then Schelling, having paid tribute to this position and having discovered its limitations, turns to the analysis of the will and its role in the process of formation and self-determination of the individual. Thus, if for Hegel a person is rooted in the rational, ideal side of the world, with which he is connected through the substantial spirit of the people, then for Schelling, in addition to “unity with the ideal principle,” the personality is directly connected with the irrational basis of the world (for Hegel - only with the otherness of the Absolute Idea). This is where his freedom is rooted, understood as “self-determination of personal nature” [109, p. 130]. This personal nature is practically identified with the will, which determines a person to evil (self-will, i.e. “the desire, as a private will, to be what it is only in identity with the universal will”); or to good (if it is “really transformed into absolute will”) [201(2), p. 113]. This emphasis on the volitional principle is significant and brings Schelling closer to a patriotic understanding of man. The fundamental differences, however, are associated with the pantheistic tendencies of all (including the latest) variants of his philosophy, associated with the concepts of “world basis”, “nature of God”, etc. We saw above that Schelling never overcame transcendentalism in the theory of knowledge, which is undoubtedly associated with pantheism in ontology, since in a certain way it limits the spiritual experience of man and, accordingly, the vision of human reality. These differences could not but affect the interpretation of will. Will, understood as the will to self-determination, simultaneously flowing from the essence of man and re-defining it [109, p. 131], correlates with the natural will of patristics. But Schelling attributes to her the choice itself, self-determination between good and evil, while the Rev. Maximus of the Confessor, for example, it is initially good, and sin is the result of the action of another faculty, the “will of judgment.” This distinction remains outside Schelling's field of vision, due to which freedom is identified with necessity (as with Hegel), and personality with individual nature. Accordingly, the relationship between God and man is conceived here not as a personal relationship, but as a relationship between the positer and the posited, the aspiration and the limit. The pantheistic circle closes 45. Nevertheless, the very fact that Schelling emphasizes the will to explain evil and in the general understanding of man undoubtedly brings his thought closer to patristic. It is to these places in “Studies on the Essence of Human Freedom” that the remark from “The History of the Conversion of Ivan Vasilyevich” about the discovery by the Kireevsky spouses of parallelism between Schelling and the Holy Fathers can be applied, when I.V. was forced to admit that they had “much that he admired in Schelling” [2(1), p. 286]. Let us now consider the teaching of the Holy Fathers. M.A. Gartsev outlines the conceptual paradigm of patristic, Byzantine anthropology as follows: “Linking the identity of the human personality not only with the functional unity of consciousness or self-awareness, but also, in particular, with the pre-reflective hypostatic unity that forms the basis of personality, Byzantine thinkers were confident that man, as a psychosomatic integrity, which is a unique way of personal existence, is destined for a very special role in “cosmic liturgy"" [47, p. 84]. However, the outstanding patrolologist and theologian V.N. Lossky admits “that until now he has not encountered in patristic theology what could be called a developed doctrine of human personality” [118, p. 106]. He believes that the transformation of the concept of “hypostasis”, which was carried out by the Fathers of the 4th century. in relation to God, was not produced in relation to man. Although St. The Fathers (St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John of Damascus, St. Gregory Palamas) often use this word; it seems to mean to them simply "an individual of a rational nature" 46 . But this understanding of personality (as individual nature) cannot, Lossky shows, be maintained in the context of Christian dogma (especially the Chalcedonian creed), and there is reason to believe that the Fathers understood this. This is evidenced, in particular, by the fact that post-Chalcedonian dogmatic development was accompanied by a corresponding development of anthropological problems. I mean, first of all, produced by Rev. Maximus the Confessor distinguishes between natural and hypostatic will. It is in this case that the concept of “hypostasis” more or less approaches the modern understanding of personality. Hence the need to search for “a concept that can no longer be identical to the concept of “individual” and, nevertheless, is not fixed by any term, as a matter of course, but in most cases serves as an unexpressed justification hidden in all theological and ascetic teachings related to man” [118, p. 110–111]. Ultimately, Lossky defines personality as the “irreducibility” of a person to his nature. The relationship between personality and nature looks like this: “... there can be no talk here about something different, about a “different nature,” but only about someone who is different from his own nature, about someone who, containing his own nature, surpasses nature, who with this superiority gives existence to it as human nature, and, nevertheless, does not exist on its own, outside of his nature, which he “hypostatizes” and above which he constantly ascends...” [118, p. 114]. This someone (who, perhaps, it would be more correct to call not a hypostasis, but a subject, or, even more precisely, the author of certain acts, actions, deeds) is the one who makes the final decision, makes a free choice (θέλημα γνωμικόν), as St. John of Damascus in “An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith” [79, her. 220, 256]. At the same time, he is free to realize his natural will (θέλημα φυσικόν), expressed in desire, and initially good, but at the same time “first of all, in us, suffered from sin” [79, p. 220, 256 (60–61, 97)] in one way or another (good or bad) “Free choice is the preference and election of one of two things presented in opposition to the other.” This is the hypostatic property of each individual person, “the way of using will, vision and action, inherent only to the user and... distinguishing him from the rest” [79, pp. 220, 256]. (It should be noted that in all cases when St. John speaks about the will, he refers to St. Maximus the Confessor) 47. Associated with this realization is the “hypostatization” of nature, which Lossky wrote about. This possibility of “hypostatization”, transcendence of nature, i.e. freedom is connected with the fact that the hypostasis of a person correlates not only with his nature, but also with the Personality of the Divine. The psychosomatic unity of the human personality is conceived in patristics not as a static reality, but as a dynamic structure with original intentionality. This is revealed in the doctrine of “the image and likeness of God in man.” Most of the Fathers of the Church, especially St. Gregory of Nyssa, saw the image of God in man in his inherent rationality (i.e. participation in the ideas of Good, Truth and Beauty) and freedom: “... the image is similar to the prototype in order to be filled with all good. Consequently, we have in us the idea of ​​all beauty, all virtue and wisdom, and everything that is known to be of the best. One of all people needs to be free and not subject to any natural power, but to decide for himself as it seems to him” [58, p. 54]. Another essential feature of a person, according to St. Gregory, testifying to his “conformity with God” - the incomprehensibility, “non-contemplation” of his mind. Along with St. Gregory, especially St. John Chrysostom. The idea of ​​the image is extended by the fathers to the physical appearance and structure of a person, adapted to be carriers of these traits [58, p. 15–17, 21–22, 30–31]. The situation is somewhat more complicated with the ability to create, so important for romanticism and so dear to the heart of modern man. Perhaps only St. Gregory Palamas specifically highlights it as a special aspect of human conformity with God (in which one can see the desire to adapt the ideas of the impending Renaissance). However, if we understand creativity in a broader sense as the ability to spontaneously, without a sufficient external cause, change oneself and the environment, generating new, previously unexistent entities, situations, states of affairs, states of mind, etc., one can see that the Holy Fathers tended to see something similar as a distinctive feature of a person. This can be seen from the above quote from St. Gregory, and from the following words of Rev. John of Damascus: “the acting and doing person himself is the beginning of his own actions and is free” [79, p. 226]. Just like St. Gregory, Rev. John (here quoting Nemesius of Emesa) connects this freedom of man with his rationality [79, p. 227]. This same connection is also established by Kireevsky, for whom a “reasonably free personality” is the only thing essential in this world [5, p. 281]. In general, the totality of these features corresponds to the experience of the human personality that we find both in modern consciousness in general and (in the form of a more or less strict theory) in philosophical personalism (Kireevsky should be considered one of the predecessors of which, at least for Russia). It is unknown how familiar Kireyevsky was with the ideas of St. Gregory (the Russian translation was published only in 1861), but he probably knew the ideas of Basil the Great, John Chrysostom and the later ascetic writers who depended on them. It is known that Kireyevsky was going to write “The History of Ancient Christianity up to the 5th or 6th Centuries” [3, p. 425], therefore, he should have been familiar with the theological issues of this time. The indicated God-likeness of man creates the conditions for his movement towards God-likeness. At the same time, the “ability to decide” inherent in a person, freedom of choice, creates the opportunity for his movement in the opposite direction, from “hypostatization” to the “limit of decay”, “the place of dissimilarity” (Lossky) [118, p. 128]. The choice of direction is determined (as with Schelling) by the will, but the distinction between two wills, natural and hypostatic (as well as the rationality immanent in all stages of human action, forcing us to remember Hegel), allows us to preserve the reality of freedom at all stages of spiritual life (both higher and lower), since it excludes the possibility of predetermination of subsequent human actions by previous ones. In the patristic understanding there is no place for pantheism, characteristic of German thought: man, not produced or “posited” by God, but freely created by Him in His image and likeness, appears, as can be seen from the words of St. John, as a certain beginning, the limiting point of world existence. In this context of similarity and dissimilarity, personality and individuality can not only differ, but also be opposed, as does, for example, Metropolitan. Anthony (Bloom) in the article “On Self-Knowledge.” Here on one side we see “empirically observed individuals” who assert themselves through “opposition”, “denial of the other”. On the other there is an unobservable and unique personality that arises and lives “in the One who knows it, in God” through love, as a refusal of self-affirmation and exclusivity [14, p. 120–121, 127]. Thus, the rejection of personal being-with-God is transformed into some form of egocentrism, individual self-affirmation, perverting the main features of the image of God. Falsely used freedom turns into exclusivity and opposition to society and the world; the mind turns into discursive knowledge, which seeks a way out of the situation of doubt and fear by finding “methods” of self-preservation [78, p. 121]; the ability to rule - into the will to subjugate any other being and adapt to its forms, the tools of which are reason and creative ability, creating the appropriate image of culture and competing in the struggle for dominance both over the person himself and in the culture he creates (an example of this competition is the criticism of romanticism developed by Hegel). From this way of being, transcendentalism naturally grows as a philosophy that affirms the epistemological and value primacy of consciousness (my empirical consciousness, which, however, strives to acquire the universality inherent in the world consciousness, the transcendental subject). On the contrary, personal existence corresponds to loving unity in God with people and the world and comprehension of them in God and through Him. As O. Clément wrote, “following ascetic work, which provides a person with internal freedom, i.e. the possibility of love, contemplation begins. It includes two stages: “knowledge of existence”, “contemplation of nature”, i.e. contemplation of “the mysteries of the Glory of God hidden in existing things,” and only then direct communion with God” [87, p. 211]. There is also a statement from Rev. Maximus the Confessor: “Just as in the center of a circle there is a single point where all the radii converge, so one who is worthy of approaching God recognizes in Him a direct and non-conceptual knowledge of the essence of all created things” [87, p. 223). A similar image was used by the Holy Fathers (Abba Dorotheus, Pseudo-Dionysius) to designate the unity of people approaching God - the center of the circle [65, p. 94–95]. The dogmatic prerequisite for such anthropology is Christology, the doctrine that the meeting of God, the world and man, in which a person can acquire a personal way of being, occurs in Christ - the God-man and Logos of the world [87, p. 217]. If Kireevsky does not talk about this, it is not because Christ has no place in his system (as Gershenzon thought [52, p. 31]), but because it is possible that he is generally inclined to take the theological context beyond the scope of philosophical reasoning itself. However, he constantly talks about “faith.” Faith, as a personal spiritual experience, “the gate of the sacraments” (St. Isaac the Syrian), is the main condition for a person’s personal touch with the reality of the Incarnation. The existence of individuals, on the contrary, corresponds to disunity, the bad multiplicity of the “periphery” of the circle, where good “difference” turns into bad “separation”, where the war of all against all prevails, as a manifestation of the unlimited will to dominate, forced into the framework of the law through a “social contract” 48. In his articles, especially in the article “On the Nature of Enlightenment...”, Kireevsky tries to give a cultural reading of this dilemma: if European enlightenment is built on the principle of individualism, separation, “bifurcation,” “rationality,” then the ancient Russian, or more precisely Orthodox, enlightenment corresponds to the principle of personal existence, “integrity” and “reasonableness” [3, p. 290]. In the “Excerpts,” if we perceive them as something holistic, he proceeds to a direct presentation of the anthropological foundations of this teaching about the differences in types of enlightenment, but dwells primarily on the aspect of personal existence and its formation, especially at the moment of integration, the gathering of the personality through faith and its disintegration, in the absence of it. The teaching of the late Kireyevsky (and the Slavophiles in general), when trying to describe it in the form of a brief formula, reveals striking similarities with the teachings of the Holy Fathers. We have essentially the same structure: personality - Church - people, understood as the path to the realization of the Kingdom of God in the world, i.e. in culture (Old Russian Enlightenment, Christian Hellenism) and in Space (Russian Earth). This realization is not at all understood as chiliasm, but as a temporary renewal of the beginnings of human existence in the world, saying nothing about its final fate. This path is a necessary and sufficient condition for the messianic service of the people (Russians, Romans) and the state they created - the Empire (although Kireyevsky was perhaps the greatest statist among the Slavophiles 49, while others, especially K. Aksakov, were characterized by some anarchism). Disclosure of the various sides of this path is a condition for the justification of personal creativity, as a “living expression of the nationality,” imbued with churchliness. In all this, faith as the basis of the spiritual experience of the individual, precisely because of its truth and originality, is a condition for the vitality of the people. In both cases, the person and his faith, the original spiritual experience, the basis of Communion with God, serve as the foundation of the entire structure. Thus, we see that Slavophilism is moving closer to romanticism where they move in the same direction - from “modernity” to the common Christian sources of European culture. And vice versa, it overcomes romanticism where the latter fails to complete this movement. All of Kireevsky’s previous work steadily moved towards identifying these foundations. We now turn to the study of his attempts to comprehend these areas against the background of contemporary Russian thought. § 2. Early anthropological position of I.V. Kireyevsky What has just been said refers to the late period of Kireevsky’s work. But for our research to be complete, it is necessary to show what this anthropology grows from, to identify the starting point that he will subsequently have to leave - that ideal image of a person who inspired the author in the early period, and to indicate ways of radically changing this image in connection with the general spiritual evolution of the thinker. It seems that the decisive influence on the formation of Kireevsky’s position was exerted by the images of his four outstanding contemporaries formed in the mind of the thinker - Pushkin, Venevitinov, Zhukovsky and Baratynsky. On the one hand, his self-education in this early period of his creative life was based on imitation of them as models 50. On the other hand, reflection on their appearance, on their (as well as on our own) inner world, creativity and “place in life”, comprehension of the very fact of the appearance of such people (poet-thinkers) at such a time (the first third of the 19th century) in such a place (Russia) was the main topic of thought for the aspiring philosopher and literary critic. The basis of these reflections was the transcendental idealism of Schelling, perceived by Kireevsky in Venevitinov’s circle, and the general literary romanticism that was gradually being eradicated by him, with not only literature, but also a life program inherent in the latter. It was this program, discussed in the previous section, that set a very non-trivial identification of thinking and being. On the one hand, specific individuals are ruthlessly (though sometimes implicitly) fitted into a certain set of basic categories. On the other hand, specific individuals themselves, in the course of their life-building, sought to correspond to certain predetermined or selected patterns, which, in turn, arose on the basis of the categories in which the analysis was carried out. Thus, as already mentioned, in contrast to the existentialism of their contemporary Kierkegaard, the romantics “lived in the categories in which they thought.” And since these categories ensured their separation, elevated them in some way above the public - they were given a special status of esotericism and mystery, which extended to all philosophical knowledge as such. And the public itself was not ready to accept high philosophical speech - because of this, such a genre as literary criticism was intended for it. The only figure who did not fit into this scheme was Pushkin, who always diligently separated the image he created for the public and literary criticism from himself, consciously creating for himself a special literary biography, significantly different from the real one [120, p. 71]. Kireevsky knew Pushkin not only formally, as a critic with a poet, but also personally, as a follower and friend. He had certain rights to such closeness thanks to a large number of mutual friends and acquaintances, among whom, of course, Zhukovsky should be put in first place, and then Baratynsky, Chaadaev, Sobolevsky and others. He could thus partly see and partly guess not only the external, literary evolution of the poet, but also the internal, spiritual one. The image of the poet that existed in the mind of the thinker fundamentally did not fit within the framework of the means that the latter had at his disposal in order to reconstruct it. Pushkin did not fit into either the romantic system of images or the transcendental-idealistic system of categories. His image was not adequately reflected here, since at the heights of his creativity (literary, linguistic, life), the poet reached completely different dimensions of human existence and, embodying them, thereby partially revealed them to his contemporaries, who (including Kireevsky) did not, however, find a place for them in their linguistic space. The condition for the possibility of this breakthrough was, according to Yu.M. Lotman, “the rejection of romantic egocentrism and the psychological possibility of taking into account someone else’s point of view” [120, p. 99]. In his analysis of “Boris Godunov,” Kireyevsky notes the inability of both romantic and philosophical aesthetics to understand the meaning of Pushkin’s tragedy due to their “prejudice by the system” [3, p. 106]. There is no doubt that this desire to understand Pushkin, in addition to other purely internal - actually philosophical and spiritual reasons - influenced the sharp turn that Kireevsky made in the second half of the 30s. Venevitinov, on the contrary, fits the scheme almost perfectly. It is not surprising, therefore, that the text most characteristic of Kireyevsky’s anthropology of that period is associated precisely with him. This excerpt from the article “Review of Russian Literature of 1829,” dedicated to the posthumous publication of a collection of poems by the poet, can be designated conventionally as “The Lay of Venevitinov”: “Venevitinov was created to act strongly for the enlightenment of his fatherland, to be an adornment of its poetry and, perhaps, the creator of its philosophy. Who will ponder with love the works of Venevitinov (for love alone gives us complete understanding); who in these torn fragments will find traces of their common origin, the unity of the being that animated them; whoever comprehends the depth of his thoughts, connected by the harmonious life of the poetic soul, will recognize a philosopher imbued with the revelation of his age; he recognizes a deep, original poet, whose every thought is warmed by his heart, whose dream is not decorated with art, but the beautiful is born of itself, whose best song is his own being, the free development of his full, harmonious soul. For nature generously endowed him with her gifts and their diversity agreed with balance. That is why everything beautiful was dear to him; that is why in self-knowledge he found the solution to all the secrets of art and in his own soul he read the outline of the highest laws and contemplated the beauty of creation. That is why nature was accessible to his mind and heart: he could Like looking into a friend's hand. The consonance of mind and heart was the distinctive character of his spirit, and his very fantasy was more the music of thoughts and feelings than a play of the imagination. This shows that he was born even more for philosophy than for poetry...” [3, p. 66–67]. Here we are undoubtedly dealing with anthropology, i.e. with the doctrine of man, some idea of ​​what a man should be, what he essentially is and what he is. This anthropology is anthropocentric, in addition, it is egocentric. It is based on the idea of ​​self-improvement, self-renewal, self-construction of a person, gradually turning into God-building. It is subject to the logic of man’s development of himself “from below,” the logic of “the free development of his complete harmonious soul.” For us, studying the work of Kireevsky and comparing the early and late stages of this work, it is important now that it completely contradicts the logic of divine beatitudes: blessed are the meek, the poor, the weeping, the persecuted - i.e. those who do not have the opportunity to develop themselves - but they are truly blessed insofar as they open up the possibility for the action of the Other. This second logic, the logic of grace, “from above” requires renunciation of development in the name of service, renunciation of growth at the expense of another being in conditions where this “at the expense” is necessary for any growth. Self-development is inevitably doomed to remain only “life-in-culture,” which is opposed to Christian life in God, to which this self-development can never grow, since they are fundamentally incommensurable. These two logics constitute two opposing anthropological positions, which in turn form the basis of opposing paths of creative activity and cultural construction. As a result, a paradoxical situation arises in which in every cultural region into which Christianity invades, “there exists,” according to Fr. Vasily Zenkovsky - not one, but two cultures. There is a culture that wants to be faithful to Christ and see everything “in the light of Christ,” but there is a culture that grew up outside the Church, is afraid of the Church and is alien to it, and does not at all seek to look at the world in the light of Christ” [74, p. 75]. It is this opposition that determines the difference between Kireevsky’s early and late work; his life and philosophical feat lies in overcoming this insurmountable boundary. It is no coincidence, therefore, that both in the passage under analysis and in general in Kireevsky’s early works there is never any talk about God, although there is present, partly even explicitly 51, a whole concept of the philosophy of religion. The anthropology on which it is based is oriented within the framework of the “man-world” system, the elements of which are essentially isomorphic to each other. A person, or rather his “soul,” through “free development” brings into harmony his abilities, strengths, aspirations - in a word, activities, and through this achieves isomorphism, harmony with the world. Thus, a person gets the opportunity to understand the world through self-knowledge. At the same time, this isomorphism is primordial in the sense that both the human individual intelligentsia and nature are constituted (as they then said, “posited”) by the unfolding of the dialectic of the transcendental subject, which, according to Schelling, is “a continuous history of self-consciousness,” where the “parallelism of nature and intelligence” is revealed in “a sequence of stages of contemplation, through which the I rises to consciousness in its highest potency.” [201(1), p. 228–229]. That is, the higher the potency of consciousness, the higher the level of nature (being) can be comprehended by it, and in the end it is cognized as created by it, “produced”, and higher levels are recognized as external, having independent existence. As for the ideological content of “The Tale of Venevitinov,” three more points need to be noted in it: 1) The main relationship between man and nature is thought to be a cognitive relationship, i.e. they act as “intelligentsia”, subject and “nature”, object, and it is precisely this accessibility of nature for the mind and heart that is conceived here as the defining goal of knowledge, precisely because it seems to confirm their original identity. 2) A person finds himself at the center of the world he contemplates. 3) The world is known from its ideal side (the highest laws and beauty of creation). These three points taken together presuppose the philosophy of identity as the basis of the whole argument, especially in that version of it that is associated with natural philosophy, the “System of Transcendental Idealism” and Schelling’s “Philosophy of Art”. In Kireevsky’s interpretation (and, perhaps, in his own self-interpretation), Venevitinov as a poet is a genius precisely in the sense in which Schelling understands it [201(1), p. 474–475]. In it, the subjective and objective, respectively, conscious and unconscious activities of the intelligentsia “must absolutely coincide,” the desire for which lay already at the very beginning of the dialectical movement - in the desire for contemplation. Due to the originality of this desire, its perfect achievement also means the achievement of “infinite peace.” A genius, having reached the highest level that a person could reach, can, from its height, contemplate all previous development in himself as a kind of harmony and unity. This self-contemplation is philosophy - like a story about the journey that consciousness has made. A feature of Kireevsky’s presentation remains the absence of “special” Germanized philosophical terminology, the reasons for which have already been discussed. However, the author’s euphemisms are quite transparent: “mind” here corresponds to the subjective, conscious activity of the intelligentsia; “heart” – objective, unconscious; hints of intellectual contemplation and self-contemplation as a result of their highest coherence and unity are also quite transparent. The possibility of direct correlations of this kind suggests that the reason here is not only the above-mentioned esotericism, which tends to avoid ambiguity and certainty, but also something completely different, coming from another, Pushkin’s, circle of literary activity, the desire to create our own, “our” philosophical terminology. The development of such terminology must necessarily precede the development of philosophical problems proper. This is the task posed by the work of Venevitinov and all the activities of the wise men before Russian enlightenment, and this is the amendment made by Pushkin to this project. It is no coincidence that this development began precisely in the field of literary criticism - “our” philosophy begins with a reflection of “our” literary tradition. So, in self-contemplation, the world isomorphic to man (we have already clarified the nature of this isomorphism in some way) appears as the result of the dialectical unfolding of the opposing activities of the transcendental Self, the highest product of which is the poet, who discovers this as a philosopher, through the discovery and interpretation of the structure of the ego cogito. From this it is clear that the similarity of the paragraph following the “Tale of Venevitinov”, dedicated to the need to create “our philosophy” [3, pp. 67–68] with subsequent Slavophilism turns out to be imaginary - this philosophy is conceived as a continuation of Venevitinov’s work, i.e. remains within the framework of transcendentalism. The question of whether “our life”, from which “our philosophy” should be born, will not lead beyond these frameworks, cannot yet even be posed by Kireevsky. This moment remains within the framework of the single life and philosophical experience of romantic individuality, which substantiates egocentrism as a life position and transcendentalism as a philosophical position. In literature itself, only some features of Pushkin’s program, which was far from indisputable at that time, created qualitatively different possibilities. So, the position described above is characterized by a very definite understanding of man’s position in the world. Based on the primacy and self-evidence of the existence of the thinking subject, it very soon comes to discover the primacy of the thought itself, in relation to which the subject begins to act only as a carrier or exponent, a completely indifferent point of application. This is typical precisely for such subject-oriented thought as Kireyevsky’s thought was. In the depths of the subject being studied, in the “center of his being,” he strives to see what constitutes this center, that super-individual thought that a person carries within himself, which he expresses through his creativity. The fundamental principle of this thought, the one that binds the literary tradition together and builds it into a strict sequence, is what can be called the “dialectic of the formation of social self-consciousness,” the “stream of life” of which plays a major role in the formation of all phenomena of literature, enlightenment, culture in general, as expressions of this life, dialectical moments of the unfolding of the life of this spirit (the spirit here is precisely in the sense of German idealism, as a producing, developing self-consciousness some generality). Even when he (Kireevsky) is occupied with a separate personality (for example, in the article “Something about the character of Pushkin’s poetry,” where the poet’s creative biography is actually reconstructed), this personality appears before us as an exponent of the impersonal spirit, universal consciousness, embodying some of its moments, thoughts, categories (for example, “nationality”), in which this life is currently concentrated, and the interpreter of which is the critic-philosopher, in whose person this consciousness rises to self-consciousness. In the most mature work of this period, in the article “On Yazykov’s Poems” (1834), Kireevsky formulates the tasks of literary criticism as follows: its job “when analyzing poets is to determine the degree and peculiarity of their talent, evaluate their taste and direction, show as much as possible the beauty and shortcomings of their works...”. No actual hermeneutical efforts are made here - there is nothing to apply them to. “...But when an original poet appears, opening up a new area in the world of beauty and thus adding a new element to the poetic life of his people, then the duty of criticism changes. The question of artistic dignity becomes a secondary issue; even the question of talent is not the main thing; but the thought that animated the poet receives original, philosophical interest; and his face becomes an idea, and his creatures become transparent, so that we do not so much look at them as through them, as through an open window; we try to examine the very inside of the church and the deity in it that sanctifies it” (my italics – K.A.) [3, p. 137]. It is at this stage that criticism receives a hermeneutic task - the interpretation of a literary phenomenon in the light of the idea expressed in it. Here a comparison is possible with the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher, whose lectures Kireevsky listened to in Berlin in 1830. On the other hand, in the distinction between “poetmaker” and “poet” one can feel the influence of the distinction between talent and genius in Schelling’s “Philosophy of Art”: “Genius differs from everything that is only talent in that the latter has only an empirical necessity, which ultimately represents an accident, while the former - an absolute necessity. Every genuine work is absolutely necessary: ​​such a work of art, which equally could have existed and could not have existed, does not deserve this name” [204, p. 162–163]. What are the foundations of Kireyevsky’s hermeneutics? The church is a person, and the poet’s work is sanctified by his deity - the thought present in him. A “face” acquires its significance when it “becomes an idea”; a poet is significant when he rises to a thought that has an original, philosophical interest. Here there is undoubtedly a kinship with Hegel’s “History of Philosophy” (which Kireevsky, as has already been said many times, listened to in Berlin), where every significant thinker turns out to be the personification of a certain category, which in turn is nothing more than the moment of formation of the Absolute Spirit, and his “Aesthetics”, for which the beautiful is only the otherness of the true. In the programmatic work of this period - the article “The Nineteenth Century” - the relationship between thought and man, the bearer and exponent of this thought, is constructed in a similar way. Here this serves as the basis for the preference that the author gives to Europe in comparison with Russia: “Both here and there there is a struggle for nationality, independence and integrity; but there enlightenment is already developed, therefore, the banner of struggle, the goal of striving is always religious or political thought; here the place of thought is taken by a person, a private event, an impostor” [3, p. 96]. This last word is very significant. Although it is taken from Russian history, its meaning here is defined completely “to the European arshin” (the expression of M.P. Pogodin). Here the “impostor” is the one who does not have any thought behind him, and who is thereby deprived of the right to a place in the historical process, but, nevertheless, lays claim to it. Kireevsky here follows this idealistic scheme of history as the unfolding and interaction of thoughts and ideas. The general vector of this story is a movement from discord to harmonization, to integrity. In this regard, Kireevsky appears as the direct predecessor of the Westerners of the 40s. The understanding of the history of the West as a struggle between individuals and “parties” striving for power is hidden from him. He comes very close to it in his articles of the 50s: “... although the history of European states sometimes presents us with external signs of the prosperity of public life, in fact, under the social forms only private parties were constantly hidden, for their own private goals and personal systems, forgetting about the life of the whole state. Parties... They constantly fought in European states, each trying to overturn its structure according to its own personal goals. Therefore, development in European states did not occur by calm growth, but always through a more or less sensitive revolution. The revolution was a condition for all progress, until it itself became no longer a means to something, but the original goal of people’s aspirations” [3, p. 266]. Thus, what was previously “thought” now revealed itself as the “private opinion” of parties and individuals; what was previously seen as a source of harmonization of history now appeared as the basis of its fragmentation and disharmony. In 1856, Kireevsky goes even further and declares (in the spirit of the late Schelling distinction between negative and positive philosophy) historical laws - “imaginary laws of reasonable necessity” - “only laws of reasonable possibility,” attaching decisive importance to the “free will of man” [3, p. 313–314]. Equally curious are the words “private event” - the most terrible events fall here - meaningless, unenlightened by the light of the Absolute Idea: the story of Job, the internal tragedies of Kierkegaard, Chaadaev, the death of Pushkin, the fate of Kireyevsky himself. And yet, it is in these events that God’s personal relationship with man becomes truly tangible as a “personal revelation” 52, in which man receives a unique opportunity to respond to Him as an individual. But this experience could not yet find its place in Kireyevsky’s thought. However, as we have already said, the subjectivity of Kireyevsky’s thought is most clearly manifested in these early articles. Kireevsky here again analyzes not so much the state of culture as the position of the person creating it. This also applies to the understanding of integrity. The “purely practical” nature of the new enlightenment of Europe provides European man with the opportunity to complete not only internal, but also external life, more precisely, the completeness of external manifestation of internal life: “The man of our time no longer looks at life as a simple condition for the development of the spiritual, but sees in it together both the means and the goal of being, the top and root of all branches of mental and heartfelt enlightenment. For life appeared to him as a rational and thinking being, capable of understanding him and responding to him, like his animated statue to the artist Pygmalion.” The key to integrity here is that “private life is one with public life” [3, p. 89, 88]. Here one can see a combination of romantic (life as a being) and Hegelian (identity of subject and substance) influences, but it is much more important to see here a deep reflection of the personal experience of life abroad, in which Kireyevsky managed to overcome the sharply negative experiences of direct impressions that he reported in his letters. However, when this reflection is directed at the author’s own existence, it reveals his deep disharmony. This is evidenced by a bitter passage, which we can well consider autobiographical: “Otherwise - that is, when the enlightenment of general opinion is in disagreement with the basic opinions of enlightened people - life goes along one road, and the successes of the mind along another, and even in extraordinary people, who constitute an exception from their time, these two roads rarely converge and only at some points. And can one person create a special life for himself in the midst of a society formed differently? No, in the inner, spiritual, lonely life he will look for a complement to the outer and real life. He will be a poet, he will be a historian, a researcher, a philosopher, and only sometimes a man, for the field of his practical activity is concentrated in a close circle of a few” [3, p. 88]. A similar situation occurs in the article “Woe from Wit” at the Moscow Theater.” The existence of an educated person in Russian society appears in both cases as deeply split, and the reasons for this split are seen by the author in the abnormal conditions of existence, under which the free practical activity of this person turns out to be impossible. We see here the same split between the level of consciousness of the individual, the level of his power claims and his real capabilities. Kireyevsky as a true wise man Here he is fighting for the right of the philosopher to freely comprehend and intelligently reorganize the world in which he lives. This struggle makes him a mediator between the Decembrists and wise men of the 20s and the Westerners of the 40s. On the other hand, it was precisely reflection on his existence that would subsequently lead him to realize the deep internal contradictions of the culture of which he was a part, which he would later call the “European-Russian enlightenment.” The apotheosis of European culture itself was also short-lived. The ideal of harmony, “the natural balance of opposing principles,” turned out to be, as Kireyevsky feared, a “dream.” The results of the revolution of 1830 turned out to be extremely unsatisfactory in political, social, and spiritual life. Awareness of this became one of the driving forces of change in Russia and one of the motives for Kireyevsky’s own turn. This is evidenced by the autobiographical passages of his last articles. As B. Paramonov rightly noted, the rejection of “the hope of building an integral culture within the framework of the spiritual possibilities of Europe” became one of the motives for Kireyevsky’s transition to “Slavophile” positions [148, p. 12]. Disappointment in Western enlightenment was associated for him (as for many others) with a severe spiritual crisis, with disappointment in the chosen path of life in general. Reflection, which had been for a long time the main form of his spiritual life, revealed its baselessness. For some time he plunges into the element of skeptical denial, perceiving it as the main result of Western European thinking, the milestones of which are Descartes, Hume, Kant and the German classics. He comes up against the problem of intellectual intuition, which seems to him insoluble in a purely theoretical way, while practical paths are closed to him, as a pure thinker. Together with Western philosophy, he found himself in such a position “that it can no longer go further along its abstract rational path, because it has realized the one-sidedness of abstract rationality, nor is it able to pave a new path for itself, because all its strength lay in the development of precisely this abstract rationality” [3, p. 270–271]. This was precisely the reason for Kireevsky’s skepticism - a state that gripped him in the mid-30s, traces of which we find in the “Note on the Conversion of Ivan Vasilyevich.” He perceives his own unhappy literary and personal fate as a sign of a general, completely unbearable state of affairs. The life program that he so carefully created and built, combining the most relevant, from his point of view, elements of the most promising European and Russian philosophical and literary programs, turns out to be powerless to change anything in the world around him. Any attempt to practically implement these programs either fails or leads to the most unsatisfactory results - which is equally typical for Europe and Russia. For Kireevsky, this becomes a reason to revise the philosophical foundations of his position, to recognize them as unsatisfactory. Convictions developed through philosophical discourse turn out to be extremely fragile. At least in 1852, he “still vividly remembered that era in his own life when ... the process of artificial thinking sweetly quenched his thirst for mental calm” [3, p. 269]. At some point this era ended. The good-natured self-mockery with which Kireevsky admits this is very revealing - it suggests that when this era ended, he had no convictions left. There remains a need for conviction, a need for faith. However, having a need for faith and believing are two different things, and Kireevsky understood this very well. It is no coincidence that when he presented Schelling’s idea of ​​“historical philosophy” in The Nineteenth Century, he carefully left its religious meaning out of the picture. “Why am I unable to believe!” - he exclaims in a letter to Koshelev. “I would have thought then that... this heartfelt music is not my mood, but an echo, sympathy, physical sensation of someone else’s thought, but I don’t think so, because I don’t believe such miracles” [5, p. XXXV]. This romantic understanding of faith itself had to disappear in order to give way to a more sober and deeper spiritual experience. It is here that Kireyevsky encounters the phenomenon of holiness, the bearers of which were the spiritual mentors of his wife, elders Filaret of Novospassky and Macarius of Optina. Holiness appeared here as the world’s self-testimony to the reality and value of its own and Divine existence, to which a person can be attached not only speculatively, but with his whole being. The cognitive attitude towards the world and God ceases to be recognized by him as the only thing and even as the main thing. This was the path to liberation, to finding new ground under our feet. The former ideal of integrity again appeared before Kireevsky, but in a completely different form. His “practice” becomes spiritual life under the guidance of an elder and in-depth mastery of the patristic writings (introduction to Tradition) through participation in the translation and publishing activities of Optina Hermitage. His subsequent philosophy grows as a reflection of his comprehension of various moments of spiritual life. However, in the general structure of his life and activity, she now has a subordinate place. The result of this is a radical change in the thinker’s entire worldview and, in particular, his idea of ​​man, the place of man in the system of his thought. The significance of this issue is gradually but steadily growing. In “Excerpts” it is already clearly visible that it is anthropology, or rather even the doctrine of personality, that is in the center of his attention. § 3. Between romanticism and traditionalism. I.V. Kireevsky, P.Ya. Chaadaev, book. V.F. Odoevsky However, this does not happen immediately. The very nature of Kireevsky’s appeal did not contribute to the understanding of the new experience of life in terms of a personal relationship. Moving away from skepticism, he sought authenticity and strength. Therefore, the concept of “Tradition” is more applicable to its original interpretation as a certain, in its essential features socioculturally transmitted and inherited form of correlation by a person with the “Highest Principles of Existence”, expressed in the system of value systems of a given cultural community 53 . This correlation allows a person to orient himself in being, so to speak, “to position himself correctly.” And vice versa, refusal of such a correlation leads to disorientation of a person (and the cultural community corresponding to him), when his initially inherent features cease to be balanced by the consciousness of the whole, become excessively dominant and lead first to deformation and then to self-destruction of a given person or community. In articles of the second period (starting from 1839), Kireevsky constantly traces this logic, primarily using the example of Western Europe. In the 40s, the term “personality” was actively and successfully used by Westerners - Herzen, Belinsky and others, which compromised it in the eyes of Slavophiles. To take it on board, they needed to radically rethink it. In their traditionalism, the Slavophiles, as A. Valitsky pointed out, echo the trend of German romantic social philosophy of the second half of the 19th century, associated with the name of Tennis 54. At this point, quite unexpectedly, the common basis of the ideas of the Slavophile Kireyevsky and the Westernizer Chaadaev is revealed. We said that Chaadaev’s thought lay within the framework of Schelling’s philosophy of history. The constructions of Kireyevsky, Pogodin, Polevoy and others largely depended on it. According to Fr. V. Zenkovsky, Chaadaev’s work became an important motivation for the emergence of both Slavophilism and Westernism, as special philosophies of Russian and world history [73(1.1), p. 182–184, 186]. Of course, his philosophy existed in a single stream of Russian historical thought in the early and mid-30s, where his views, however, occupied an exceptional place in their originality, elaboration and level of theoreticalness. However, P.N. Miliukov, V.V. Zenkovsky, B.N. The Tarasovs associate Chaadaev, in addition to Schelling, also with J. De Maistre and other representatives of French traditionalism of the 19th century - ultramontanism 1138, p. 137–138, 143–144; 177, p. 180; 73(1.1) p. 166], and M.O. Gershenzon also with the occult mysticism of the popular German writer Jung-Stilling [53, p. 33]. However, to understand the internal logic of his thought, which is necessary to understand its relationship with Kireyevsky’s thought, is possible only from the essence of his own views, which stemmed, first of all, from his personal spiritual experience. B.N. Tarasov dwells in detail on the personal and ideological relations of Chaadaev and Kireevsky in the late 20s - early 30s, which he thinks of as the relationship of older and younger like-minded people, close to the relationship between teacher and student [177, p. 262–267]. Pushkin already understood well that Chaadaev’s philosophy of history was not something self-sufficient, but acquired its true meaning only in the general context of the system: “It seems to me that the beginning is too connected with previous conversations, with thoughts that were previously developed, very clear and undoubted for you, but about which the reader is not aware” [154(10), p. 838]. Its real source was, as is typical for Russian thought, the author’s reflection on his personal spiritual experience. And what is also typical for Russia, in this personal and deeply personal experience, the author found his consciousness rooted in intersubjective structures, and himself inextricably linked with humanity as a whole. At the same time (and here is the significant difference between Chaadaev and the late Schelling) man has no direct relation to the Absolute, which is completely (and here is the difference between Chaadaev and the romantics) transcendental to world and human existence. Only “world consciousness, which corresponds to world matter,” understood “as the totality of all ideas that live in the memory of people,” is related to God. Tradition is the form of existence of this consciousness, transmitting the original revelation through the centuries. “It is this Divine verb to the first man, passed on from generation to generation... that introduces man into the world of consciousness and turns him into a thinking being.” “The same action that God performed to extract man from non-existence, He uses now to create every new thinking being. It is God who constantly turns to man through other people” [194(1), p. 382, 385]. The goal of man is, therefore, to change his consciousness, to initiate to join the single universal consciousness embodied in the Tradition, to gain knowledge of the highest laws governing the spiritual world, just as the law of Universal Gravity and Repulsion governs the material world [194(1), p. 371]. “The Christian... is drawn to the heavenly tradition alone; distortions introduced into it by people are a secondary matter for him... the preservation of these foundations, their transmission from century to century, from generation to generation is determined by special laws...” [194(1), p. 353–354]. This knowledge is stored and transmitted in the initiatory organization. The fact that Chaadaev considered the Church to be such an organization, and identified initiation with sacraments, rituals and piety in general, is not of fundamental importance for us, since we are interested in the basic structures of his consciousness and thought and their general logic, and not in situational application. Thus, the center of gravity of Chaadaev’s views lies in his mysticism and philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of history - their most striking part - turns out to be a conclusion, as it were, from more general ideas. It is based on the main opposition between Tradition (spiritual culture - Judaism, Christianity, mainly in the form of Catholicism) and anti-tradition (sensual culture - mainly antiquity, India, China). History itself consists of the embodiment of their ideal structures into the real life of humanity - up to the final realization of spiritual culture, understood as the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. It is in this place that Chaadaev’s historical views reveal points of intersection and contact with the thought of Schelling and Kireyevsky. This occurs due to the identification of Tradition with reason, freedom and order, and anti-tradition with sensuality, necessity and chaos. (The closest analogue can be the understanding of Iran and Kushitism in A.S. Khomyakov’s “Semiramis”). However, if for Chaadaev the anti-culture of Russia represents a threat to the historical process (see, in addition to the “Philosophical Letters”, also the passage “L' Univers”), then for Kireyevsky its lack of culture only meant that it becomes the arena where this process takes place. This interpretation is more subtle and is probably closer to Schelling, but Chaadaev’s understanding is determined, as we have seen, not only by Schelling, but also has other, including non-theoretical, sources (however, Chaadaev also has more subtle and optimistic interpretations). If Chaadaev perceived history mystically, as a place of struggle between superhuman forces, as a projection of a metahistorical process, then Kireyevsky viewed these forces as the result of human activity. This does not mean that in the early period of his activity Kireevsky was completely alien to mysticism. On the contrary, one can only join the opinion of P.N. Sakulin, who wrote: “Mysticism should be considered one of the most significant trends in the mental life of this era... Chaadaev, Iv. Kireevsky and Odoevsky - it is these three who can be considered the largest representatives of Russian mysticism in the 30s, and each of them has its own specific characteristics; Odoevsky is closer to Kireyevsky than to Chaadaev” [161, p. 607–608]. Personal friendship and ideological closeness connected Kireevsky with Odoevsky since the time of the circle of wise men. The main features of their mysticism were formed under the influence of Russian Freemasonry and German romanticism. But Odoevsky’s occult interests remained, apparently, alien to Kireevsky, who probably preferred other, purely philosophical and ethical, means of self-improvement. In general, they sought more to achieve personal self-improvement and union with the universe than to achieve superhuman gnosis. Their mysticism is pantheistic in nature, and it was these features that distinguished them from Chaadaev. It has already been said that in the mid-30s. Kireyevsky goes through a difficult period of skepticism and then conversion. After this, he disagrees with Odoevsky. The latter’s interest in the “Philokalia”, in the problems of personality and the “believing mind”, as P.N. writes about. Sakulin [161, p. 614–616], - although it arose, perhaps partly under the influence of Kireevsky, but without religious conversion in the proper sense, essentially outside the Church, it had a completely different meaning. Fr. said this well. G. Florovsky: “It is interesting to compare the paths of I. Kireevsky and V. Odoevsky. In the initial prerequisites and stages they coincide... But Odoevsky never left the closed romantic circle. His theosophical and alchemical mysticism did not offer him an authentic and religious outlet. Odoevsky does not go beyond the limits of dreamy and mental speculation... From this close circle, Kireevsky came forward only by the force of “religious renunciation,” in the experience of faith” [187, p. 256]. At first, however, Kireyevsky interprets the “path of faith” in such a way that he unexpectedly draws closer to Chaadaev. This convergence is not in specific opinions, but in the very understanding of faith. Faith is understood by Kireyevsky so far (in the late 30s - early 40s) not as a personal experience of communication with God, but as a new order of life, organized in accordance with new beliefs. His main experience of this time was not so much a change of beliefs as a painful struggle with himself for a change in lifestyle. In the first work of the new period, in “Response to A.S. Khomyakov" (1839), he wrote: "... no one appreciates more than me those conveniences of public and private life that came from the same rationalism. Yes, to be frank, I still love the West, I am connected with it by many inextricable sympathies. I belong to him by my upbringing, my habits of life, my tastes, my controversial turn of mind, even my habits of heart; but in a person’s heart there are such movements, there are such demands in the mind, such a meaning in life that are stronger than all habits and tastes, stronger than all the pleasures of life, and the benefits of external rationality, without which neither a person nor a people can live their real life” [3, p. 145]. It is the reorganization of the life routine that Chaadaev recommends to the addressee of “Philosophical Letters,” E.D. Panova, and there is also no talk about personal communion with God: “Nothing strengthens the mind in its beliefs more than the strict fulfillment of all the duties related to them. However, most of the rites of the Christian religion, emanating from the higher mind, are an effective force for everyone who is able to penetrate the truths expressed in them” [197, p. 322]. Orthodoxy for Kireevsky and “Christianity” for Chaadaev appear primarily as a Tradition, organizing the life of individuals and nations and enlightening them through this with its “highest principles,” “the source from which all beliefs flow” 55. In the same article, Kireevsky writes: “The countless number of these small worlds that made up Russia were all covered with a network of churches, monasteries, and the dwellings of solitary hermits, from where the same concepts about the relations between public and private were constantly spreading everywhere. These concepts little by little had to turn into a general conviction, a conviction into a custom that replaced the law, arranging throughout the entire expanse of lands subject to our Church one thought, one view, one aspiration, one order of life” [3, p. 148–149]. We see here two chains: Church - people - Russia (the people develop the Russian Land under the leadership of the Church) and concepts - beliefs - custom (concepts developed in the Church pass into the “general conviction” of the people, and they are expressed in a uniform custom, stipulating the unity of the Earth, which is conceived here as “subject to” the Church). A similar scheme, only related to Europe and Catholicism, is also present in Chaadaev, while maintaining the same relationship of subordination. It is very possible that Kireyevsky (probably unconsciously) used Chaadaev’s scheme in his first Slavophile experiments, applying it to Russia with the necessary amendments and clarifications. However, in the same “Response to Khomyakov” Kireevsky sees the main disease of the West in the connection of rationalism with the “autocratic power of the individual” and the competition of individual wills and authorities. In 1842, in polemical correspondence with a follower of Chaadaev, who converted to Catholicism, Prince. Iv. Gagarin, Kireevsky’s main claim to the Catholic Church will be precisely its inclusion in this competition 56. The characteristic features of traditionalist anthropology are preserved in the cycle of works of 1845 associated with Kireevsky’s editorship in “Moskvityanin”. Here, first of all, the image of the monk from the review “Luka da Marya,” the work of F. Glinka, attracts attention. As a new attempt to create an image of an integral person in his essential features, it directly correlates with the image of Venevitinov from the “Review ... 1829”, which has already been mentioned. These two ways of being are completely different in their basic characteristics. Kireyevsky's early anthropology is anthropo- and egocentric. By placing himself at the center of the universe, a person (genius) makes himself its measure and point of reference. He strives to change his consciousness, to identify structures in it that are isomorphic to the world, to cognize it in himself and become its self-consciousness, but ultimately is unable to overcome the gap inherent in the subject-object relationship. The image of a monk is fundamentally different from the image of a poet. Here a person constantly stands, or rather, again and again puts himself before the “highest wisdom.” He knows himself and the world in relation to the Absolute Being present in the world through Holy Scripture and Tradition - the objectification of spiritual experience and knowledge of the Church. He submits his own experience and knowledge to their judgment: “In the silence of a solitary cell, a humble monk, renouncing all extraneous goals, not being entertained by the excitement of hopes and fears, the joys and sufferings of life, completely devoted himself to the study of the highest spiritual truths, combining speculation with prayer, thought with faith, the work of self-improvement with the work of self-knowledge, and thus trying not only with an abstract concept, but with all the fullness of his existence to drown in the comprehension of the highest wisdom revealed to him in the Divine Scripture and in the wise thoughts of the holy fathers" [3, p. 227]. Here, of course, there is already a teaching about the emerging integrity of the spirit. A person participates in the Tradition with his whole being, “with all the fullness of his being.” This is emphasized by the pairs of speculation - prayer, thought - faith, self-knowledge - self-improvement. If their first member relates to contemplation, to the level of consciousness, then the second – to activity, to “existential practice”. Here we can easily see what R. Guenon called the “initiatory moment”: gnosis, “the study of the highest spiritual truths” leads to decisive changes in a person, elevates him above the ordinary human level, leads him to a superhuman way of being. Moreover, unlike the self-dedication of the romantics, this change can only occur within a certain structure. Spiritual truths are thought of here as existing independently, as the ultimate ontological reality that can be touched by a person who seeks to identify himself with the Tradition. Thus, if for romanticism a person is primarily a genius, then for traditionalism he is a gnostic. In this case, the system of “spiritual truths” functions as a kind of myth, giving reality its final meaning and ordering the chaos of existence both outside and inside man. As can be seen from the above passage, the main task for Kireevsky remains the transformation of consciousness, understood here as “speculation”; “prayer” and “faith” are taken not in their actual sense (as anticipation and conversion), but as a designation of the active component of participation in the Tradition - necessary, but secondary, auxiliary (the same with Chaadaev). The mechanism of action of the Tradition appears here, in comparison with the “Answer of A.S. Khomyakov,” somewhat more complicated: “Little by little, listeners and disciples gathered around the humble monk, and around them were people from all classes of society. Speculation, to which the hermits from the world indulged, was both the basis and the crown of all thinking in the world. The upper classes, being in living and close contact with the monasteries and basing their beliefs on the same principles, developed in the matter of life relations the same concepts that in the matter of pure speculation developed in a solitary cell. The common people, having neither enough time nor enough means to form their own concepts, accepted them in parts, in fragments, but always imbued with the same meaning, from monasteries and from the upper class. Thus, the concepts of one class were a complement to the other, and the general thought held strong and intact in the common life of the people, constantly flowing from one source - the Church" [3, 227]. We are dealing here with a somewhat more complex scheme than the previous one: individual - community (monastery) - Church - people - Earth. Moreover, the Church acts as the grace-filled, spiritual life of the Earth, and the people with their classes act as its social life. Thus, the Church and the people appear as two dimensions (however, contrary to Fr. G. Florovsky, they were by no means mixed in the minds of the Slavophiles) of the same substrate - “Earth”, using the terminology of K. Aksakov. For Kireyevsky, this path of spreading “common thought” in “common life” is also the path of realizing the superhuman reality of the Kingdom of God in the world. The land into which this path ends appears as a concretization of the world where the people carry out their mission. The path itself is a justification for the universal significance of this mission. Its disclosure and description is a justification of the personal creativity of a writer, philosopher or preacher 57 “as a living expression of the people.” We will not trace the progress of the disintegration of this traditional structure, as Kireyevsky describes it. Let’s just say that, having traced it at the level of competition between “new” and “old” “education,” he then traces it again at the individual level, the level of the family and the “person” [3, p. 228–229]. So, the integrity of the inner life of a person of tradition corresponds to the integrity of the social structure. The basis of this integrity is no longer the power of the Church (as in “Answer to Khomyakov”), but the personal holiness living in Her, the “enlightenment” of the “humble monk.” The complex mechanism of the dissemination of “common thought” in “common life” is crowned by one person (although Kireyevsky does not yet use this word). These two features correspond both to the direction of Kireyevsky’s own thought (its subjectivity), and to the very essence of Christianity, for which such one-sided traditionalism, which inevitably, in our opinion, leads to Gnosticism and the mythologization of the Good News, is unacceptable. It must necessarily be supplemented by the sacrament of personal communication with God, which changes not only a person’s consciousness, but also the very way of his being. These features themselves already indicate that, despite the similarities with Chaadaev, and a number of similarities with traditionalism in general, Kireyevsky was never a traditionalist in the full sense of the word. Traditionalism appeared to him as a temporary form, inadequate to his basic inner intuition. At the same time, it probably corresponded to a certain stage of his own spiritual life and his understanding of the essence of spiritual life in general, since, as we have already said, his philosophy grew out of the reflection of this spiritual life. At this stage, his thought had not yet reached precision, had not yet found a word through which it could express itself according to itself. § 4. I.V. Kireevsky and the controversy of K.D. Kavelin and Yu.F. Samarina. Slavophilism and Westernism We have seen that Slavophilism and Westernism arose in the late 30s and early 40s as different philosophies of Russian history. These differences, as well as the atmosphere of polemics and disputes on the main issues of various competing life and creative programs, created the prerequisites for the theoretical and organizational formulation of these positions. However, for a long time no disengagement occurred, since the common values ​​of freedom of thought and creativity, the general opposition to destructive tendencies and forces were especially strong at that time. This situation persisted until the death of Pushkin. Its meaning is well conveyed by Kireevsky in “Review of the Current State of Literature,” the main article from the 1845 series: “... our literature could have full meaning until the end of Pushkin’s life, and now has no definite meaning” [3, p. 202]. That is, the death of Pushkin, despite all its social significance 58, introduced a moment of disorientation into free Russian literature simply by the fact that this literature was deprived of its recognized leader. The field of free thought created by Pushkin lost its center, thereby becoming open to outside influences. It is also clear from these words that the Slavophiles themselves clearly felt their continuity in relation to Pushkin and his literary program. It was around this time that a new group of figures, a new generation, joined into Russian literature, which includes members of N.V.’s circles. Stankevich and A.I. Herzen. In their spiritual development, they passed by the late Pushkin, who, according to N.Ya. Eidelman, never found a common language with them: they read it, but “did not want to understand” [211, p. 346] his later poems. Moreover, having learned the lessons of the Decembrists and the published part of Chaadaev’s “Philosophical Letters,” who (not without irony) sometimes called Herzen and Granovsky “his students” [177, p. 300], they brought with them a significant charge of a sharply negative attitude towards both the regime and the culture that made its emergence possible. The interaction of this generation with the previous one, which all took place in the same Elagin Salon, led to a theoretical (at first) and then to an everyday and organizational demarcation between Slavophiles and Westerners. Remark by V.A. Koshelev’s statement that Slavophilism arose from polemics is quite correct [105, p. 29]. His first evidence - Khomyakov’s article “On Philosophical Writing” - appears as a response to Chaadaev at the end of 1836. However, Kireevsky’s convictions had not yet taken shape by that time. The story “Island” (1838) and “Note on the direction and methods of primary education in Russia” (1839) give us the opportunity to trace the stages of formation of the “Orthodox-Slovenian direction.” In the same year, trying to influence young people, Khomyakov and Kireevsky created (again as part of a discussion) the first program documents of Slavophilism: “On the Old and the New” and “Response to Khomyakov.” Slavophilism appears here precisely as a philosophy of history and culture, imbued with a religious principle, having a solid epistemological foundation and proceeding from well-defined and reflected ontological and anthropological premises. The efforts of the older generation are not in vain - K.S. is drawn into the orbit of Slavophilism. Aksakov, Yu. F. Samarin, D.A. Valuev and others. But at the same time, Westernism emerges and takes shape as an opposition to young people, acquiring the features of a strict theory and full solidity somewhat later - in the early and mid-40s 59 . So, we can say that Slavophilism was based on the experience of Russian literature and the creative assimilation of the philosophy of Schelling (Kireevsky) and Hegel (K.S. Aksakov, Yu.F. Samarin), reinterpreted on the basis of the experience of Christian spiritual life in Orthodoxy. Westernism is based on the experience of literary and political opposition, interpreted within the framework of a more or less radically interpreted Hegelianism. As representatives of honest intelligentsia, they were united with representatives of previous generations by a common creative position - the desire for the sovereignty of Russian thought and Russian literature, the principle of the intrinsic value of artistic and intellectual creativity. The difference was that the Slavophiles sought to substantiate this position religiously, while Westerners sought to create social and political conditions for its implementation in social practice. By defending it, they separated themselves from the groups of the “official nationality”, which in St. Petersburg (F.V. Bulgarin) adhered to rather “Western” orientations, and in Moscow (M.P. Pogodin and S.P. Shevyrev) to rather “Slavophile” orientations, and more or less confidently carried out the government ideological order 60. This division itself contributed to a split in the ranks of the intelligentsia. So, a provocation was, for example, the sad story of Pogodin transferring his magazine “Moskvityanin” to Kireyevsky - the Slavophiles temporarily revived the dying magazine, but at the same time gave Herzen and Belinsky a reason to unite them in one position with the previous editors [104, p. 15–29]. In a similar way, K. Aksakov sometimes united “Domestic Notes”, where V.G. actively collaborated. Belinsky, with Bulgarin’s “Northern Bee” [12, p. 116]. The polemical sharpness of these rapprochements is evidenced by the fact that even Herzen (though already in “The Past and Thoughts”) noted a significant difference between Bulgarin and Pogodin precisely in relation to the sincerity of their convictions [51(5), 165]. All this led to the weakening of the original community of creative and ethical positions, to the devaluation of the unifying “nobility of convictions,” mutual reproaches and suspicions, and, ultimately, to the severance of personal relationships [104, p. 40–41]. Despite this, attempts to unite personal and creative integrity on a common platform did not stop, especially on the part of the Slavophiles. However, the fact that these attempts were not crowned with success was determined not only by external, but also by internal reasons, which revealed over time a significant divergence not only in theoretical but also in life positions. Behind the differences in philosophies of history were fundamental and irreconcilable differences in anthropology, different but equally deeply experienced understandings of man, his nature and tasks. We will see this in the example of K.D.'s polemics. Kavelin and Yu. F. Samarin 1847. Its history is briefly as follows: at the end of 1846, Sovremennik passed into the hands of V.G. Belinsky, N.A. Nekrasov and A.V. Nikitenko. At the beginning of the next 1847, it published programmatic articles: “A Look at the Legal Life of Ancient Russia” by Kavelin, “On the Modern Direction of Russian Literature” by Nikitenko and “A Look at Russian Literature of 1846” by Belinsky - containing both the main provisions of the philosophy of history and aesthetics of Westerners, and polemical statements about Slavophilism. Then Yu.F. Samarin “considered it necessary to write a detailed response to the article of his long-time acquaintance, which would express the point of view of the Slavophiles” [166, p. 569]. This answer, the article “On the opinions of Sovremennik, historical and literary,” was published in the second book of “Moskvityanin” for 1847. Belinsky and Kavelin answered Samarin - their articles under the same title “Answer to the Moskvitian” were published in the 11th and 12th issues of Sovremennik, respectively, in the same year. This controversy was considered in the works of V.K. Kantora, N.I. Tsimbaeva, E.I. Annenkova, S.N. Nosova. The prerequisites for considering it from an anthropological point of view can be found in the section of Zenkovsky’s “History of Russian Philosophy” dedicated to Samarin. The significance of this controversy in the history of Russian thought is very great. In Samarin’s article, for the first time, in a more or less systematic form, the historical, philosophical and aesthetic views of the Slavophiles were presented to the general public, and the prejudices associated with these views were also subjected to critical examination. The controversy as a whole revealed the importance of the concept of “personality” and stimulated its subsequent development by Kireyevsky, whose direct successor in this regard was later again Samarin [52, p. 119; 73(1.2), p. 30–31]. At the same time, it became an important stage in the Westernization development of this concept - by the same K.D. Kavelin, P.L. Lavrov, N.K. Mikhailovsky. In the 40s, the concept of “personality” was used mainly by Westerners - Kavelin, Herzen, Belinsky, while Slavophiles, on the contrary, criticized it. What was behind this concept? K.D. Kavelin is a convinced but moderate Westerner. In modern terminology, he is, of course, not a revolutionary democrat, but an obvious liberal. In the 30s - early 40s. it was formed under the strong influence of the Slavophiles, or more precisely, the atmosphere of the Elagin salon [80, p. 598–599]. This is probably why his thought always echoes the thought of Kireyevsky - both with “The Nineteenth Century” and with “Response to A.S. Khomyakov." His article “A Look at the Legal Life of Ancient Russia” can be considered a program document on the philosophy of the history of Westernism, a document that received the approval of the entire editors of Sovremennik, including Belinsky, who actively used Kavelin’s ideas in his articles. It is characteristic that the central concepts of this philosophy of history were purely anthropological concepts: “personality” and “man”. It was they who caused the most fundamental objections from the Slavophiles. The general logic of this philosophy of history can be presented as follows: the original patriarchal clan system (the thesis is, rather, prehistory) is decomposed under the influence of wars and other unfavorable moments, as a result of which it is replaced by a new beginning of history (history itself) - personality (antithesis) [80, p. 16–22]. At the same time, it is clear that the “peaceful” Slavs were essentially a non-historical people, and history was accomplished primarily by the Germans, who had a developed “sense of personality” [80, p. 22]. At the same time, in defining the basic principles of European culture, Kavelin in general (like Kireevsky in the “Nineteenth Century”) follows Guizot (Christianity, antiquity, barbarism), but distributes them in his own way: the first place is given to the Germans, and Christianity and antiquity perform the function of “ennoblement” [80, p. 21] 61. The historical tasks of both tribes, according to Kavelin, are completely different: the task of the Germans is “to develop a historical personality into a human personality,” i.e. fill the personality as a form with ideal content. The task of the Slavs is to “create a personality,” however, it is not clear which one - historical or human? Nevertheless, “both we and they had to go out and actually took the same road” - the transformation of the individual into a comprehensively developed person and “deep inner reconciliation” [80, p. 23] individuals among themselves - in this way a synthesis is achieved, however, referred to the future. In addition to the already indicated scheme, similarities with Kireevsky’s early ideas are seen here in other points. First of all, this concerns the interpretation of the difference between Russian and European history as a difference between nonsense and meaning. As in “The Nineteenth Century” and “Languages” by Kireevsky, the personal existence of a person is determined by Kavelin by the presence of the thought he represents, an idea, “in the name” of which the person “denies” all the ties that bind him - primarily ancestral and family [80, p. 48]. Ultimately, all these ideas turn out to be moments of formation of the thought about the infinite dignity of man. Thus, we are dealing here with a peculiar romantic interpretation of Hegel, close to Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians. Understanding Peter's reform as a transition from exclusive nationality to universal life is another point of intersection with the “Nineteenth Century” [80, p. 59–61; 3, p. 96–99]. The intersection of Kavelin’s thoughts with “Answer to Khomyakov” is also interesting - the connection of the concept of personality with the moment of alienation and the idea of ​​a social contract. In both Kireevsky and Kavelin, personality or “face” arises from the opposition of a person to the rest of the world, his previous habitat - the tribal system and establishes a new order of social relations based on a “social contract” [80, p. 21–22, 66; 3, p. 149–150]. Only for Kireevsky this process is equivalent to the triumph of the negative tendencies of European history, which he identifies with “rationalism,” while Kavelin, on the contrary, identifies history itself with this process, understood as a progressive movement from the race through the individual to the individual. Accordingly, if Kavelin largely follows Hegel in his understanding of history and in his understanding of man, then Kireevsky, on the contrary, takes a critical position in relation to the latter, although, as we will see in Samarin’s objections, in the mid-40s. Slavophiles have not yet pursued this line consistently enough. The similarity of the initial positions of Slavophiles and Westerners in understanding the main anthropological and historical categories probably explains the fact that Kireevsky in the first works of the Slavophile period avoids using the word “personality,” which is why his views during this period acquired a tinge of traditionalism, as was already mentioned in the previous section. It is the collision between Kavelin and Samarin that may lead him to realize the need to develop a Christian doctrine of personality. The inconsistency and vagueness in Kavelin’s interpretation of the concept of “personality” become the central objects of Slavophile criticism. For our topic, it is extremely important that all the purely historical questions and problems considered in this polemic - the baptism of Rus', the character of Ivan the Terrible, the transformation of Peter, the civil strife of the princes, etc. - refracted through the problems of social and religious philosophy, ultimately come up against fundamental differences in the understanding of man, his essence and purpose, which gather around the concepts of “personality” and “man”. But let's return to K.D. Kavelin. On the one hand, he makes an attempt to give a philosophical interpretation of the Christian understanding of personality, and, as we have just indicated, he follows here not so much Hegel as Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians: “When the inner spiritual world received such dominance over the outer material world, then the human personality should have received a great, holy significance that it did not have before... Thus, for the first time in Christianity, the idea of ​​the infinite dignity of man and the human personality arose” [80, p. 19, 20]. The concept of personality here is clearly linked to the discovery of the inner spiritual world of man and the affirmation of its absolute significance. Samarin points out the insufficiency of such an interpretation: “Your definition not only does not exhaust the essence of Christianity, it does not even exhaust its participation as a historical agent in the past destinies of mankind... this is only the negative side of Christianity... You have forgotten its positive side, you have forgotten that it replaces former slavery not with the abstract possibility of a different state, but with real duties, a new yoke and a good burden that are imposed on a person by the very act of his liberation” [166, p. 416–417]. Samarin tries to accept the rules of the game of his opponents and interpret Christianity in historical and social terms. Unfortunately, however, for him it turns out to be reduced to this plan, only Samarin’s result is the opposite of Kavelin’s: “Christianity introduced into history the idea of ​​the infinite, unconditional dignity of man,” you say, “a man who renounces his personality, we add, and subordinates himself unconditionally to the whole. This self-denial of everyone for the benefit of everyone is the beginning of a free, but at the same time absolutely obligatory union of people among themselves. This union, this community, sanctified by the eternal presence of the Holy Spirit, is the Church” [166, p. 417]. There is no doubt that Hegelianism is present in Samarin’s thought no less than in Kavelin’s, but in a different way: the whole appears here as something general, a synthesis in which the particular moments that make it up are sublated, i.e. individual persons, or as a substance, in identifying themselves with which individual subjects acquire self-identity. It cannot be said that Samarin completely reduces the mystical principle in Christianity. It was the presence of this beginning that allowed Kavelin in his “Response to the Moskvitian” to characterize his view of religion as “not modern” [80, p. 80] and thereby ignore the main idea of ​​his objection. However, for Samarin, the mystical element of Christianity is present only at the level of community, church life, while he lacks the personal mysticism of faith, communion with God and deification. This introduces a certain confusion into Samarin’s thought, as well as into Slavophilism in general. From the quoted passage it is clearly seen that Samarin, theologically, well understands the supernatural character of church life, however, the attempt to build on this basis not only a philosophy of history, but also a certain sociology of community leads to the fact that in further discussion this moment of supernaturalism is lost, although the author himself, apparently, always implies it. This gives Kavelin the opportunity in “Answer...” to ignore him and, without getting drawn into the theological discussion, accuse Samarin of utopianism and “complete disregard for reality” [80, p. 73–75]. The same vagueness creates grounds for further misunderstandings. On the one hand, these are accusations of naturalism from theologians (P.I. Linitsky, later Fr. G. Florovsky). The latter wrote: “Publicity and churchliness, despite all the similarities, these two orders are not commensurate with each other... In the Slavophile worldview, this incommensurability was not recognized and fully recognized” [187, p. 250–251]. On the other hand, the unfortunate typo - “belittling” instead of “reconciliation” - was not accidentally perceived by all opponents as a valid expression of Samarin’s position [166, p. 569, 575]; His lack of Christian teaching about the genesis of personality created the basis for such a perception. Kavelin follows Hegel further, trying to describe the transition of this principle of personality from the religious sphere to the “civil world” and connecting it with the Germanic tribe, which already had a “developed sense of personality” [80, p. 21]. However, revealing the genesis of personality among the Germans, Kavelin seems to forget his own words about the Christian beginning of personality and derives it from things completely opposite to Christianity - war, hostility, i.e. opposition, alienation of a person from the world and society. This genesis of personality sets a very specific image of it: Kavelin’s personality is a person who has a certain internal strength, proportional to his ability to reflect, thanks to which he consciously and creatively participates in the historical process, as the bearer of some idea. Thus, the concept of personality is linked to one or another, but always available, amount of power. This logic manifested itself not so much in theory as in practice, not so much in texts as in the actions of Westerners - both liberals and revolutionaries. Hence their fundamental opposition and politicization - the discrepancy between the level of consciousness and the available volume of power was experienced as a tragedy and gave rise to the demand for radical social reorganization. A striking example of this can be Herzen’s “Cursed be the reign of Nicholas forever and ever, amen!” [51(4), p. 150]. And in conversations, and in diaries, and in “Past and Thoughts” - Herzen carefully looks for political motivation in the activities of his friends-opponents, which causes only surprise and irony in the latter: “The funny thing is that they assume their feelings in us” (A.S. Khomyakov) [104, p. 43]. On the contrary, it was precisely this motivation for actions that was completely absent from the Slavophiles, who, even turning into “professional” politicians (like, for example, Samarin), remained writers and “social activists,” which was also determined by their opposition to the land, i.e. communities, and states. In this regard, Westerners acted as followers of the Decembrist and democratic platform, and Slavophiles - Pushkin’s, which makes us agree with the well-known thoughts of M.P. Pogodin, who built the tradition of Russian literature through “friendly ties” of senior Slavophiles “with representatives of the older generation before them, Pushkin, Baratynsky, Pletnev, as well as those who were associated with Zhukovsky, Prince. Vyazemsky, Dashkov, Bludov, Gnedich, Turgenev, etc.” and further through Karamzin, Dmitriev, Derzhavin, Kheraskov, Von-Vizin to Sumarokov and Lomonosov. [22, p. 467–468] 62. Defending the freedom of artistic and intellectual creativity of the individual from the encroachments of the “government”, i.e. states and churches, Westerners (and this is clearly seen in Kavelin, and Belinsky, and Herzen, and Bakunin) fall victim to their own excessive politicization: the “free personality” extolled by them in fact turns out to be largely an illusion of consciousness, since, before it has time to arise, it is already forced to sacrifice its freedom in the name of “party discipline”, “interests of the people”, etc. Slavophil criticism created the opportunity for exposure this illusion, which was finally consolidated later - in the concept of the “critically thinking personality” by P.L. Lavrov, and embodied in practice in the activities of revolutionary parties. The interests of literature were placed here in more or less direct dependence on the interests of the “secret society.” It was this politicization, coupled with the provocative activities of representatives of the “official nationality,” that ultimately led to a breakdown in relations between members of both circles in the mid-40s. It is precisely this, not just thoughtful, but deeply experienced understanding of personality that Westerners place as the basis for their philosophy of history and description of “legal life,” i.e., primarily, the external field of interhuman relations built on a contractual basis. It is not surprising that Christianity does not play any role in Kavelin’s further constructions - neither in Europe nor in Russia. It is precisely for this, for the omission of the “influence of Christianity and Byzantium,” which “could hardly have remained without influence on the development of personality and legal relations,” Samarin reproaches him [166, p. 433]. He understands this historical oversight as a consequence of Kavelin’s main, in his opinion, theoretical premise: taking for granted the idea that “consciousness is acquired by negation.” For Samarin, this is a manifestation of Kavelin’s dependence on German thought, or more precisely, on the same Hegel, an attempt to artificially impose European forms of development on Russian history. This methodological premise is strictly connected in Kavelin with another, anthropological premise, which is shared by Samarin, the thesis about the identity of personality and consciousness. Taken together they give the following picture: “reconciliation of personalities is the final goal; the path to it is enmity; the individual must certainly be aware of himself; consciousness is acquired by negation, not logical, of course, but by complete practical renunciation of all the relations that determine it” 1166, p. 424]. Samarin, having questioned the universality of the German way of personality formation “through negation,” tries to distinguish between “a personality with a character of exclusivity, placing itself as the measure of everything, creating its own definitions from itself (i.e., the German romantic personality. - K.A.), and personality as an organ of consciousness” [166, p. 423]. In his opinion, Kavelin’s mistake lies precisely in their inseparability, from which the inseparability of Germanism and humanity follows: “... the German only had to develop himself into a human being; the Russian had to first make himself a German in order to then learn from him to be a man.” But in reality, “Christianity introduced consciousness and freedom into the national life of the Slavs” [166, pp. 425, 443]. But Samarin himself did not even attempt to outline the genesis of the Christian personality, simply postulating its “free and conscious renunciation of its sovereignty” [166, p. 443] in the community. He did not consider the driving forces or conditions for the possibility of this act. He objected to Kavelin and Belinsky, contrasting “personality”, understood as reflexivity, with “man” as an integral subject, remaining within the framework of the natural existence of man and not reaching the level of “hypostasis”, i.e. again ignoring the Christian understanding of personhood. Together with an insufficiently developed distinction between the folk and church communal principles, this greatly weakened his position, creating the preconditions for its interpretation precisely in the sense of “belittling.” This leads to inaccuracies in the distinctions both authors make that are so significant for them, such as the distinction between the concepts of “personality” and “man” and “association” and “community”. According to Kavelin, the individual must enlighten his isolated existence with ideal principles and “become a man,” which in turn should lead to social reconciliation. This task faces both the German and Slavic worlds equally. For his part, Samarin criticizes the utopianism of this view: a person who arises from enmity will never become a person, she will withdraw into her self-affirmation. Association, i.e. a union of such individuals, based on a formal agreement, will never become a community, i.e. an alliance based on reconciliation and self-denial [166, p. 422–423]. Kavelin, in turn, criticizes the utopianism of Samara’s approach, pointing out the absence of an “absolute generic norm of personality” that she could recognize as superior to herself [80, p. 73–74], not noticing that this objection also attacks his own idea of ​​​​ultimate reconciliation. R.I. Ivanov-Razumnik rightly points out that the difference between them is the difference between the ethical (Slavophiles) and sociological (Westerners) approach [76(3), p. 111–112]. However, we are dealing here rather with different aspects of a single ideal, which reveal their utopianism in different ways. Circle of “conservative utopia”: Samarin points out that the ideal of community has already been realized in Slavic life; and the circle of “liberal utopia”: reconciliation, according to Kavelin, appears to be the final goal of history - in essence, as A. Valitsky rightly pointed out, they form the same circle [33, p. 180–191]. It was (and remains) impossible to break out of it while remaining within the framework of the search for a this-worldly social ideal. There was (and is) only one radical way out of this circle - an indication of internal, non-social sources and driving forces of personality formation and the eschatologization of the social ideal, i.e. a radical transfer of it from the natural social realm to the realm of supernatural, grace-filled church reality, which was ultimately accomplished by Kireyevsky. Chapter 3. Anthropology of the late I.V. Kireevsky. Doctrine of Personality § 1. Anthropological issues in articles of the 50s At the end of the 40s, Kireevsky moved away from active participation in public life [143, p. 12]. He lives mainly in the village, stays for a long time in Optina Pustyn, and takes an active part in its publishing activities. He is building a special house in Dolbino for his spiritual father, Elder Macarius, where he could come “to rest” from countless visitors and for scientific works related to translations of patristic works. The correspondence with the elder and the Diary 63, begun with his blessing, captured the main features of Kireyevsky’s life at that time: the ecclesiasticalization of everyday life; continuous work with the patristic heritage; merciless repentant introspection; constant struggle with large (selfishness, absent-mindedness) and small (smoking, chess) passions, combined with a clear consciousness of one’s powerlessness and, as a result, continuous prayer before the Face of God and calling on the help of higher powers; distrust of oneself, one’s judgment and assessment, combined with great respect and boundless trust in the spiritual experience and insight of the Rev. Macaria; the desire to maintain peace of mind and high performance in spite of the continuous stream of temptations, everyday failures and physical suffering. Along with this, he amazingly retains the consciousness of unity with his generation and social circle: the names of A.I. Kosheleva, A.S. Khomyakov, Venevitinov, S.P. Shevyreva, V.P. Titova, V.A. Zhukovsky, P.Ya. Chaadaev - constantly appear on the pages of the Diary. In general, however, we see that overcoming romantic egocentrism is achieved here through greater self-deepening, through turning to the ultimate foundations of one’s being and “mortifying one’s own self,” which Rev. speaks about in the parting preface to the Diary. Macarius. The ever-growing awareness that “the external is only an imprint, a mirror of the internal” leads Kireyevsky to an intense search for the “truth of inner life”, according to which the nature of his existence changes. Pure theorizing and reflection ceases to be the main spiritual activity of the thinker; its place is now taken by the existential practice of “invisible warfare,” the basic principles of which were formulated for him by St. Macarius in the said preface. These instructions are based on the words of Christ: “Learn from Me, for I am meek and lowly in heart: and you will find rest for your souls” (Matthew 11:29) 64. “...In all our work and undertakings, let us call on God’s help... The Lord seeks from us right faith and good deeds according to His commandments. ... May we remain in the Orthodox faith and obedience to the Holy Church and our shepherds and teachers. ... May we call upon our merciful Intercessor, the Queen and Mother of God, the Virgin Mary, the holy Angels, our guardians, and the holy saints of God, to help our salvation... Try to the best of your ability to have love for your neighbors, in thoughts, words and deeds, for love covers many sins, but it cannot be accomplished without humility and without mortifying one’s own self, and without love for one’s neighbors it cannot be fulfilled. The first commandment is love of God. And no matter what good we do, as stated above, we do not rely on it for our salvation, but we have hope in the Atonement of our Savior the Lord Jesus Christ, through His priceless Blood, and we remember that we are sinners and the Lord came to save sinners. In the hope of God’s mercy, let us always bring repentance with humility, and we will receive peace and tranquility in our conscience...” [5, p. 417–418] (italics mine. – K.A.) Reflection now occupies a subordinate, auxiliary position. On the one hand, it, as a skill of self-knowledge, as the habit of directing a cognitive gaze at oneself, participates as a tool in this practice, on the other hand, as a technique of theorizing, it serves apologetic purposes, since the nature of the secularized European-Russian enlightenment, from the point of view of Kireevsky, is such that it requires, as an apology of faith, philosophical reasoning that satisfies certain generally valid criteria. At the same time, it is already clear from what has been said that practice as such has certain philosophical implications. The object of concern for the subject of such practice is none other than himself, his own human reality, the hidden possibilities of which he reveals and cognizes. Thus, his thought is constantly directed towards this reality, and its content is largely determined by the nature of practice. Trying again and again on this basis to clarify his fundamental intuition about man, Kireevsky finally sees that it clearly takes him beyond all existing positions within the boundaries of his horizons. He begins to gather strength to create a “great work on philosophy.” The result of this work in external terms is a large number of letters (letters to A.I. Koshelev are of particular interest) 65, several “notes” and two articles - “On the nature of the enlightenment of Europe and its relation to the education of Russia” (1852, hereinafter referred to as “On the nature of enlightenment...”) and “On the need and possibility of new principles for philosophy” (1856, hereinafter referred to as “About... philosophy”). The latter was supposed to become an introduction to the aforementioned large work, from which only excerpts have survived, partially published after Kireevsky’s death in “Russian Conversation” (with an afterword by Khomyakov), and then in both Collected Works (edited by A.I. Koshelev - 1861 and M.O. Gershenzon - 1911). Already by the very title of the last article, Kireyevsky declares “the need and possibility of new beginnings for philosophy.” He is going to look for these principles in the religious and philosophical tradition of the Byzantine and Syrian Fathers of the Church, mainly of the ascetic direction. This principle is faith: “Faith, overcoming external education in the thinking consciousness of the people, from the very contact with it will produce its own philosophy, which will give another meaning to external education and imbue it with the dominance of another principle” [3, p. 322]. An example of such a believing philosophy could be the “Orthodox Christian philosophy” that flourished in the East, i.e. patristic creations. “The truths expressed in the speculative writings of the Holy Fathers can be a life-giving embryo and a bright signpost of the path” to the “new development of philosophy” and culture as a whole [3, p. 322–323]. However, Kireevsky is far from demanding a simple transfer of patristic thought into modern times. He sets before philosophy, first of all, a critical task: “But in order to understand the relationship that the philosophy of the ancient Holy Fathers can have with modern education, it is not enough to apply to it the requirements of our time; one must also constantly keep in mind its connection with education, which is contemporary to it, in order to distinguish what is essential in it from what is only temporary and relative” [3, p. 323]. Kireevsky considers the main distinguishing feature of modernity to be the social nature of enlightenment, which is associated with historical interest and the need to answer moral questions in the external life of man. In patristics, these questions “have not received a scientific conclusion,” “although the general principles for these relations are in its general concepts of man” [3 p. 325]. Thus, anthropology is understood here as the foundation for social thought and the philosophy of history, as its component. Already here, in the article, the task of highlighting the “essential” in patristic thought leads to the formulation of an anthropological problem. In the "Passages" we will see that we are talking primarily about a new doctrine of personality. Now, after considering the relevant Western European, patristic and Russian context, we can appreciate the real novelty of this teaching. In both articles – “On the nature of enlightenment...” and “On... philosophy” – there is a deep and comprehensive anthropologism and subjectivity. In the first of them, speaking about the relationship between types of enlightenment, Kireevsky constantly refers to the characteristics of human types, which, on the one hand, lie at the basis, and on the other, act as the results of the historical movement of a particular culture. These characteristics are never abstract, but are always substantiated by historical and even autobiographical material. Kireevsky makes his personal experience available to society - what he himself experienced and felt - but this experience under his pen becomes universally significant. In describing the situation of the “European-Russian enlightenment,” his attention is drawn primarily to the personality of Peter [3, p. 249–250], by whose will this new culture arose. In the description of the results of the “Western European Enlightenment,” where “centuries of cold analysis destroyed all the foundations on which the European Enlightenment stood from the very beginning of its development,” this analysis is personified in the image of “Western man,” intoxicated with his “destructive rationality,” the more “the more encompassing were the beliefs he destroyed,” believing that he “with his own abstract mind can immediately create for himself a new intelligent life and arrange a heavenly bliss on the land he re-educated”, not frightened by “terrible, bloody experiences” [3, p. 251]. But this image was taken by Kireyevsky not from Western, but from Russian life - this is a fairly accurate portrait of Belinsky and Herzen in the 40s, when Kireyevsky argued with their “Maratov’s love for humanity” in Moscow salons. He probably also meant his own hobbies from the times of the circle of wise men, the Moskovsky Vestnik and the European, although they were much less radical. In such a culture, which is based on rationality, philosophy must occupy a central place. “For for a person (my italics – K.A.), cut off from all other beliefs except faith in rational science, and who does not recognize another source of truth other than the conclusions of his own mind, the fate of philosophy becomes the fate of his entire mental life” [3, p. 252]. Here again this description can be extended to the Russian public; Kireyevsky himself experienced the brunt of this philosophical fate in the mid-1930s. But behind the logic of his personal spiritual biography, he sees the general logic of the movement of the human spirit. He introduces here the typical figure of a philosopher, “a worker of science, whose face is barely noticeable to the crowd surrounding him, and after twenty years the imperceptible thought of this imperceptible face controls the minds and will of this same crowd, appearing before it in some bright historical event. Not because, in fact, some armchair thinker from his smoky corner could arbitrarily control history, but because history, passing through his system, develops to its own self-awareness” [3, p. 251]. First of all, Kant comes to mind here. Then - Hegel, Schelling and their students, with whom Kireyevsky communicated in 1831 during his trip abroad. But there is another layer to this description. This is a vision of himself and his friends, their common philosophical task: having made an accurate conclusion, to bring the self-consciousness of Russian educated society - no less rationalistic than European - to the ideas of the Church and the people. This is followed by a description of the logic of Western behavior in a crisis situation. For Western Europe, caught in a vicious circle of rationalism, there is no way out [3, p. 253–254]. But the crisis situation there gives rise to a “change” in the “European-Russian enlightenment”: “...most of the people who followed the phenomena of Western thought, convinced of the unsatisfactory nature of European education, turned their attention to those special principles of enlightenment, not appreciated by the European mind, by which Russia previously lived and which are now still noticeable in it in addition to European influence” [3, p. 251]. The picture of subsequent historical research and appeals is also autobiographical, although Kireevsky, in his desire for universal significance, somewhat simplifies the picture. “Then Russian scientists, perhaps for the first time after one and a half hundred years, turned an impartial, searching gaze inside themselves and their fatherland and, studying in it new elements of mental life, they were amazed by a strange phenomenon: they saw that in almost everything that concerns Russia, its history, its people, its faith, its fundamental foundations of enlightenment and obvious, still warm traces of this enlightenment on the former Russian life, on character and mind people, - ... they have been deceived until now; not because anyone intended to deceive them, but because an unconditional passion for Western education and an unconscious prejudice against Russian barbarism obscured their understanding of Russia.” “Perhaps,” Kireevsky adds in the form of personal repentance, “they themselves, under the influence of the same prejudices, previously contributed to the spread of the same blindness” [3, p. 254–255]. At one time, Karamzin carried out a unique experiment in historical self-knowledge in Russia. Following him, the romantics of wisdom called for this, and Pushkin takes this path. We have already seen that historical research in Russia from the very beginning acquired a philosophical significance. The study of the history of the fatherland has become the basis for the self-knowledge of Russian people. This was especially pronounced in the late 20s and early 30s. However, comparing this romantic impulse with similar “returns” of Europeans, Kireyevsky sees its fundamental difference. First of all, Europeans were not ignorant of their origins. Their national cultures accumulated ancient pagan, ancient, and medieval roots. Addressing primarily one or another of them, the German did not cease to be a German, the Frenchman - a Frenchman. The only thing about which they were really in the dark was the pure Christian tradition, uncontaminated by lust for power and rationality, which was distorted in the 9th century 66 . Russia was in a different situation. Peter’s purely strong-willed, unencumbered by reflection and at the same time “passionate” act tore Russian educated society away from the traditional structure. The result was complacency and contempt for ancestors and “uneducated” contemporaries and total deception and “blindness” regarding one’s past. There was a gap in the history of Russia, which was filled only now, after the above-described “change” took place. With this “change” Peter’s time ended. In Russia, the opportunity has arisen to move along a different spiritual path - the path of bringing together the people and educated society, finding unity in faith and the spiritual foundations of culture. This change and this path were represented by the Slavophiles, who managed to make the breaking point the subject of their reflection; it was in their person that history developed “to its self-consciousness.” But it so happened that the possibility of a new spiritual path in Russia opened up a way out of the general impasse not only for “European-Russian” enlightenment, but also for Western European enlightenment. A breakthrough through “blindness” and deception led to an expansion of consciousness, “discovering those essential aspects of the spirit that found neither place nor food in the Western development of the mind” [3, p. 255]. In turn, this led to the clarification of the qualitative differences between Old Russian culture in relation to Western culture, but the “Old Russian enlightenment” itself was revealed not as a narrow national feature, but as a branch of a single Eastern Christian tradition, which was based on a special, qualitatively different from the Western experience of Christian life, not overshadowed by the lust for power and rationality 67. Subsequently, Kireyevsky will talk about “Orthodox-Christian education,” i.e. precisely about that pure patristic Christianity, the existence of which was “forgotten”, but to which, nevertheless, the West, in the person of its best representatives, did not cease to strive. Kireevsky devoted a whole series of articles to these quests of Western people back in 1845 (“The Life of Steffens,” “The Works of Pascal,” “Schelling’s Speech,” etc.), as well as significant sections of the article “On... Philosophy.” Here the pathos of universality is manifested, constantly inherent in the thought of the Slavophiles and, to the greatest extent, perhaps, in the thought of Kireyevsky. All subsequent analysis of the characteristics of Western European and Old Russian enlightenment, their comparison according to a variety of characteristics and areas of cultural and spiritual life, is carried out constantly taking into account the anthropological factor. The analysis of Roman education corresponds to the characteristics of the consciousness of a Roman, and the Arab - of a Mohammedan. The Western Church is characterized by the example of its largest representatives - Tertullian, Cyprian, Augustine [3, p. 259–263, 267]. The comparison of Western philosophy and patristic thought ends with a comparison of “ways of thinking,” i.e. again, a characteristic of the subjects of this thinking, “Western man” and “Orthodox man” [3, p. 274]. Then Kireevsky successively characterizes legal, communal, family, economic relations, gives a description of Western art and the moral system of European and Russian people. Man always finds himself at the center of these characteristics. Therefore, his final conclusion: “bifurcation and integrity, rationality and rationality will be the last expression of Western European and Old Russian education” [3, p. 290] – equally concerns the manifestations of these formations and their subjects-creators. That is, Kireyevsky’s concept of “education” or “enlightenment” includes not only aggregates of material and ideal cultural values, but also the people who create these values, their “structure.” Thus, in the structure of Slavophile thought, a central place belongs to anthropological problems: on the one hand, it opens the way to knowledge of the phenomena of culture and history, on the other, it reveals the rootedness of these phenomena in being through the medium of their creator - man. It is the essential, but historically changeable structures of human existence that turn out to be the point with which all particular manifestations of “education” are correlated, i.e. this type of culture. Man and the culture he creates are correlated with each other; they are the conditions for the reproduction of certain stable, characteristic features of each other. They form a single system. Figuratively speaking, this system is a circle, in the center of which stands a person with his characteristic position in existence, and on the periphery is a set of manifestations of culture, correlating in radii with the center. This system is not closed: horizontally it interacts with other similar systems; vertically - participates, through the center, in the Divine-human relation. Various forms of this relationship, including those where its personal character remains unconscious or obscured, play a decisive role in the formation of the structure of the center - i.e. human creator. Thus, they set the characteristic features of various systems. In this system, feedback also operates: on the one hand, the free will of a person is capable of decisively influencing the elements of culture, and even the central, Divine-human relationship, on the other, the elements of culture in one way or another influence a person and the way of his existence. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the basis of Kireyevsky’s ideas about the falling away of the West lies, as a kind of structural model, in the biblical narrative of the Fall, which occurs this time within the framework of a new, reborn humanity. Initially, however, the vertical dimension of this system is by no means in the foreground for Kireevsky; moreover, he does not immediately begin to interpret it in terms of a personal relationship. In his articles beginning in 1839, the thinker was much more concerned with developing a horizontal dimension associated with the philosophy of culture and history. Only in “Passages” does he move on to an analysis of the vertical dimension, to the philosophy of personality and faith. It was already indicated above that initially the vertical relationship is interpreted by him as Tradition, i.e. a form defined in its main features, stable, reproduced in history, in which a person relates himself to the “Higher Principles of Existence.” This correlation allows a person or a cultural community to orient themselves in being, while the refusal to correlate leads to disorientation of a person (and a cultural community), when the initially inherent features are no longer balanced by the consciousness of integrity, become excessively predominant and lead first to deformation and then to self-destruction of this type of person and culture. Kireyevsky traces this through the example of pagan Roman and Western European Christian “education.” In general, in 1839, and in 1845, and in 1852. we are talking about the contrast between traditional and anti-traditional society and the human type. The structure of the tradition in 1852 is roughly the same as in the articles of 1839 and 1845. 68 Kireevsky is still looking for words to express his basic intuition about man. The idea of ​​a single source of human being, of a certain unifying and defining principle is expressed here quite clearly. There are even attempts to describe the life of consciousness and a holistic person of this type, but so far they all describe it in connection with certain “external” cultural moments. We are talking about the “internal integrity of self-consciousness”, “the primary desire for the integrity of being internal and external, public and private, speculative and everyday, artificial and moral.” According to Kireyevsky, “Russian people always connected every important and unimportant matter with the highest concept of the mind and the deepest center of the heart” 69 [3, p. 283, 284, 290]. The word “personality” appears here [3, p. 265, 281–282] in the limited context of comparing the legal consciousness of Russian and European education, i.e. in the same plane in which the dispute between Kavelin and Samarin took place. It has not yet received comprehensive significance. However, the individual here has an undoubted superiority over the impersonal ideal structures of laws: in contrast to the West, “in the structure of Russian society, the individual is the first basis, and the right of ownership is only its accidental relationship...” In contrast to Rus', in the West, “every noble individual sought to become the supreme law of his relations with others,” which correlated with the war of all against all, “the violence of conquest” (3, pp. 258, 264–265) as the main social condition and, ultimately, led to the enslavement of the individual by ideal structures that arose as a result of reaching agreement on the basis of a social contract. Thus, there is no reason left for Westerners to be optimistic about the place of the individual in the West. As part of the historical and legal dispute, Kireyevsky tries to clarify the Slavophile position so that its interpretation in the sense of “degrading” the individual becomes impossible, and to find the place of the individual in Russian history. He agrees here with the position of his brother, P.V. Kireevsky [3, p. 277]. At the same time, Kireyevsky is trying to raise the historical discussion to a new level of theoreticality: the difference in the attitude of the individual to ideal structures and in the nature of interpersonal relationships is the basis for the difference between cultural types and the dynamics of historical patterns inherent in them. In its critical part, Kireyevsky’s thought genetically goes back to the tradition of self-criticism of European culture, then represented by romanticism, and Schellingism, and ultramontanism, and Fr. Baader. Various representatives of this tradition - Fr. Baader, Schelling, J. de Maistre showed a clear attraction to Russia and Orthodoxy. Kireevsky's peculiarity was his orientation towards the patristic ascetic tradition and the associated understanding of the integrity of the spirit and human personality. All this makes his thought comparable to later representatives of this tradition. For France, we can talk about such thinkers as L. Blois, C. Peguy, G. Marcel, E. Mounier. Particularly interesting are the similarities between Kireevsky’s thought and the “Integral Humanism” of J. Maritain, where the dynamics of the decomposition of Western culture, starting from the Renaissance, appears as the result of the gradual rationalization of the “mystery of man” and the replacement of the Christian understanding of the human personality with a humanistic one, leading it to decomposition and enslavement by material elements. Among the German thinkers, first of all, it is necessary to name, oddly enough, E. Husserl and his “Crisis of European Sciences,” where philosophy appears as the basis of the spiritual life of “European humanity,” but the way out of the crisis is seen in a return to classical transcendentalism. If the article of 1852 stated the crisis of European culture, which is based on its philosophical thought, then the article of 1856 quite naturally turns to the crisis state of philosophy itself, in which the state of culture as a whole finds its concentrated expression. The unity of the historical, cultural and philosophical process is viewed here from a new angle: “This rational thinking, which has received its final expression in modern German philosophy, connects all the phenomena of modern European enlightenment into one common meaning and gives them one general character” [3, p. 295]. However, although modern philosophy is characterized by the “uncontrollable striving of thought towards unbelief,” philosophy as a whole, its character, is closely related to religion and stems from it. “But the direction of Western philosophies was different, depending on the confessions from which they arose, for each special confession necessarily presupposes a special attitude of reason to faith. The special relationship of reason to faith determines the special character of the thinking that is born from it” [3, p. 296–297]. This applies not only to Christian confessions. Kireevsky, as usual, seeks to generalize his thought: “... the nature of the dominant philosophy depends on the nature of the dominant faith. Where it does not come directly from it, where it is even its contradiction, philosophy is born from that special mood of the mind, which is imparted to it by the special character of faith” [3, p. 316]. Thus, the nature of philosophy turns out to be more or less strictly connected with the spiritual state of the philosophizing subject, with his faith 70. Although Kireevsky talks about thinking, its laws, character, etc., he makes it clear that this thinking is by no means self-sufficient, that it is one of the energies of the human being. It depends on him, and, in turn, determines his state: “For it is not individual truths, logical or metaphysical, that constitute the final meaning of any philosophy, but the relationship in which it puts a person to the last sought truth, the internal demand into which the mind imbued with it turns. For every philosophy in the fullness of its development has a double result, or, more correctly, two sides of the final result: one is the general result of consciousness, the other is the dominant demand that arises from this result. The last truth on which the mind rests also points to the treasure that a person will seek in science and in life” [3, p. 306]. Thus, philosophy has an anthropological source and an anthropological conclusion - it arises from self-knowledge and, at the same time, shapes a person, determines his way of life and actions, “its innermost music... accompanies all the movements of the soul of a person convinced by it” [3, p. 306]. By its very nature, philosophy plays a dual role in history. First of all, it destroys. This destruction is beneficial: “...Greek philosophy appears in the life of mankind as a useful educator of the mind, freeing it from the false teachings of paganism and, with its rational guidance, bringing it to that indifferent state in which it became capable of accepting the highest truth” [3, p. 305]. But this came at a high price. Under the leadership of Aristotelianism, which in the ancient pre-Christian world belonged to “all the moral and mental power of enlightenment” [3, p. 305], antiquity reached complete moral insignificance and “a general lack of internal originality.” “There was no longer any salvation left for man on earth. Only God Himself could save him” [3, p. 308]. Kireyevsky sees an analogy between the pre-Christian and modern state of affairs. The rationalistic “enlightenment of the West, by the force of its own development, will destroy the power of its other teachings and will move from false beliefs in Christianity to indifferent philosophical convictions, returning the world to the times of pre-Christian thinking... Then for the dominance of true Christianity over the enlightenment of man, at least an external possibility will be open” [3, p. 311]. The same analogy, almost identity, is established between Aristotelianism and Hegelianism. Both philosophies have a similar moral role to play. But at the same time, a new role for philosophy in general is becoming clear. In the absence of a higher truth, its distortion or falling away from it, philosophy remains the only tool for searching for truth. Thus, along with Aristotelianism there were Stoicism and Platonism, along with scholasticism - mysticism, along with Cartesianism - the ideas of Pascal and Fenelon, along with Hegel - Schelling. The history of philosophy, and with it the entire history of the West, appears in Kireevsky not just as a history of falling away and sliding into the abyss, but also as a history of return, at least of its preparation. This creates special moments in the history of the West, “when the course of things stands, so to speak, in the balance and one movement of the will decides one direction or another” [3, p. 311]. Such an understanding becomes possible thanks to a new, “voluntaristic” interpretation of human history. With its critical edge, this interpretation is directed against “idealism”: “... we would form a false concept of the development of human thinking if we separated it from the influence of moral and historical chance. There is nothing easier than to present every fact of reality in the form of an inevitable result of the highest laws of rational necessity; but nothing distorts the real understanding of history so much as these imaginary laws of rational necessity, which in fact are only the laws of rational possibility. Everything should have a measure and stand within its boundaries. Of course, every minute in human history is a direct consequence of the past and gives birth to the future. But one of the elements of these minutes is the free will of man" [3, p. 313–314]. The existence of such turning points is part of the essence of Western history |3, p. 314]. Kireyevsky lists several such moments. The first - at the end of antiquity before the Coming of the Savior, the second - before the fall of the West, associated with the name of Pope Nicholas 1; the third - at the beginning of the Reformation, associated with the name of Luther; the fourth is modern, when the West again faces a choice: either “the unlimited dominance of industry and the last era of philosophy,” associated with the reduction of man and his reality to “one physical personality,” or “an internal change in basic beliefs,” “a change in the spirit and direction of philosophy, for it now contains the entire knot of human self-awareness” [3, p. 315–316]. Such a change is possible, since next to the education of Europe lies “Orthodox education”, which is close to it in its main characteristics (Christianity and the heritage of antiquity, transforming the barbarian elements), ready to experience a new flourishing. Its characteristic features of Orthodox believing thinking and the special relationship between reason and faith may well form the basis of a new Christian philosophy, striving to rework and subjugate the main achievements of secular rationalistic culture and thereby reach a new stage in the development of Christian civilization. The “fragmentary” rationalism of Catholicism, limited by the external authority of the hierarchy, and the more complete rationalism of Protestantism are opposed in Orthodoxy by holistic believing thinking, combined with the “inviolability of the limits of Divine revelation,” based on internal authority: “In the Orthodox Church, Divine revelation and human thinking are not mixed; the boundaries between the divine and the human are not crossed either by science or by the teaching of the Church" [3, p. 316–317]. How can one imagine their interaction? The teaching of the Church is understood here as “the highest ideal to which only a believing mind can strive, the final edge of the highest thought” [3, p. 317–318], the superintelligent principle of thinking, i.e. living spiritual experience. This is where the concept of “internal authority”, so important for the theology of the Slavophiles, comes from. “Orthodox thinking does not seek to arrange individual concepts in accordance with the requirements of faith (as in the West. - K.A.), but to raise the mind itself above its ordinary level - it seeks to raise the very source of understanding, the very way of thinking to sympathetic agreement with faith” [3, p. 318]. The first task of a believing thinker, therefore, becomes not a logical, but an ascetic task: “The first condition for such an elevation of the mind is that it strives to collect into one indivisible integrity all its individual forces, which in the ordinary situation of man are in a state of disunity and contradiction; so that he does not recognize his abstract logical ability as the only organ of understanding the truth; so that the voice of an enthusiastic feeling, not in agreement with other forces of the spirit, should not be considered an unmistakable indication of the truth; so that he does not consider the suggestion of a separate aesthetic meaning, regardless of the development of other concepts, to be a true guide to understanding the higher world order; so that he does not consider the ruling love of his heart, separately from other demands of the spirit, as an infallible guide to the comprehension of the highest good; so that even the inner verdict of a conscience, more or less purified, he does not recognize, without the consent of other rational powers, as the final verdict of the highest justice; but to constantly search in the depths of the soul for that inner root of understanding, where all individual forces merge into one living and integral vision of the mind” [3, p. 318]. This is one of the most famous fragments from Kireyevsky's texts, 71 which, however, is almost always interpreted not entirely correctly, as relating exclusively to the theory of knowledge. In fact, it also has an anthropological meaning. Moreover, it seems that in order for its epistemological interpretation to be correct, it must be preceded by an anthropological interpretation. In fact, the enumeration of those cognitive abilities that claim autonomy and a “sovereign” (in the patristic expression) place in the general structure of the human being in no way claims to be complete, to give an exhaustive and strict description of these abilities. We are talking here, rather, about various concepts of man, widespread not even at the level of theories, but at the level of everyday and artistic consciousness. Without much difficulty they are divided into two groups. The first includes the “abstract logical ability”, with which the rationalism of German idealism and the “internal verdict of conscience” are correlated at the theoretical level, judging by the context, clearly correlated with Kant’s “autonomy of practical reason”; to the other - “enthusiastic feeling”, “aesthetic sense”, “love of the heart”, representing various movements of romanticism and irrationalism, which can hardly be identified precisely, since it is difficult to draw a strict distinction between them. If we approach this passage from the point of view of the structure of a human being, then with some stretch, taking into account, of course, the entire characteristics that Kireevsky gives them, we can try to identify the “enthusiastic feeling” with the emotional sphere; “aesthetic sense” with the contemplation of beauty and purposefulness in works of art and in nature, roughly corresponding to Kant’s “Critique of Judgment”; “love of the heart” with the field of axiology in the broad sense of the word (and the word “heart” in this case clearly has a general romantic, and not patristic or Pascalian meaning), “internal verdict of conscience” - with the field of ethics in a narrower sense. It is interesting that, while characterizing cognitive abilities, including feeling, Kireevsky does not mention the actual sensory, perceptual experience. This is probably due to his general repulsion from the reduction of man to a single “physical personality”, which was characteristic of the 18th–19th centuries. This indirect criticism of materialism will then become open in Khomyakov and Samarin. All this gives Kireyevsky’s thought a touch of Platonism, if not at the level of ontology, then at the level of the theory of knowledge in any case. This anthropological analysis allows us to clarify the actual epistemological meaning of the place in question. It is obvious that we are talking here about the problem of intellectual intuition in the form in which it was already posed in German idealism. “In a state of fragmentation and contradiction,” these forces actually gain the opportunity for autonomous existence, which leads them to a “struggle for power” both within the framework of individual human existence and within the framework of culture. This fallen state of man is characterized by the fact that the internal interconnection and interdependence of these energies and abilities, as well as the corresponding philosophical disciplines and areas of knowledge, becomes unobvious to the thinker who is himself immersed in this state. Thus, creative activity and aesthetics, for example, seem to have no ethical and epistemological prerequisites and consequences (this gap and tragic attempts to overcome it constitute a characteristic feature of Gogol’s work [75, pp. 104–106], later - K.N. Leontyev); behavior, will and ethics - respectively, aesthetic and logical (Belinsky, various versions of revolutionary ideology, later - Tolstoy); science, logic and theory of knowledge - aesthetic and ethical criteria (“because the conclusions of reason are independent of whether I want them or not,” said Herzen in a dispute with Khomyakov in “Bylom i Duma”) [51(5), p. 158]. Although already in Kant practical reason and the ability to judge act as cognitive abilities, their connection with theoretical reason and among themselves seems very problematic. Kireevsky writes that “Kant... from the very laws of pure reason deduced indisputable proof that for pure reason no evidence of the highest truths exists” [3, p. 270]. This means that the highest regulative ideas of pure reason - the ideas of man and his freedom, the world as a whole and God - are inaccessible to human knowledge, since purely intellectual intuition - “mental contemplation”, as Kireyevsky translates Kant’s and Schelling’s term Intellektuell Artschauung 72 - is impossible for humans. It is these ideas that are the main objects of intellectual intuition. The problem of their knowledge, posed by Kant, continued to confront subsequent German thought. This problem remained associated with holistic cognition, the integral activity of the mind, in its difference from fragmentary, insufficient, one-sided reason [3, p. 326]. Schelling asserts the possibility of intellectual intuition. Its place in his philosophy is constantly increasing. Kireevsky in a special note draws attention to this fact [3, p. 329]. Hegel, without denying the possibility of knowing the ideas of pure reason, replaces intellectual intuition with the principle of dialectical ascent from the abstract to the concrete. “The object of thought, coming to the sight of the mind, is itself transformed from type to type, from concept to concept, constantly growing into its fullest meaning” [3, p. 327]. In the mentioned note, Kireyevsky notes the identity of the systems of Hegel and the early Schelling. In this case, “sight of the mind” belongs to the field of rationalism; it serves Kireevsky to characterize the dialectical method, which itself reveals its one-sidedness. He “appeared before rational consciousness as one negative side of knowledge, embracing only possible, and not actual truth, and requiring, to supplement it, another thinking, not supposedly, but positively conscious and standing as much higher than logical self-development as a real event is higher than simple possibility” [3, p. 327–328]. Kireevsky expresses here the requirement of “ontology”, characteristic of Russian philosophy in general, which expresses “the inclusion of knowledge in our relationship to the world, in our “action” in it” [73(1.1), p. 16]. Ontology here is opposed to transcendentalism, which proceeds from the primacy and autonomy of human abstract cognitive activity, i.e. what Kireyevsky called “rational or abstract thinking.” “Mental contemplation” corresponds to positive, real thinking, i.e. intellectual intuition. According to Kireyevsky, faith, which gathers the mind into integrity, is the condition for the possibility of intellectual intuition: “And for the understanding of the truth in this collection of all mental forces, the mind will not bring the thought that lies before it, successively and separately, to the judgment of each of its individual abilities, trying to agree all their verdicts into one common meaning. But in integral thinking, with every movement of the soul, all its strings must be heard in full chord, merging into one harmonic sound. Inner consciousness that in the depths of the soul there is a living common focus for all individual powers of the mind, hidden from the ordinary state of the human spirit, but achievable for the seeker and alone worthy of comprehending the highest truth - such consciousness constantly elevates the very way of thinking of a person. original integrity, and with this admonition encourages a return to the level of higher activity" [3, her. 318–319]. This is precisely why he explains Schelling's failure. We have already mentioned this above, now we will go into more detail. The thinkers are divided, first of all, by the difference in anthropological positions: if Schelling remained a pure thinker, then Kireevsky moved to the position of a practitioner who, nevertheless, did not break his connection with philosophy and opened up new horizons in it, thanks to his spiritual life. “Convinced of the limitations of self-thinking and the necessity of Divine revelation stored in tradition, and at the same time of the necessity of living faith as the highest rationality and essential element of knowledge, Schelling did not turn to Christianity, but moved to it naturally, as a result of the deep and correct development of his rational self-awareness, for in the depths of the human mind, in its very nature lies the possibility of consciousness of its fundamental relationship to God” [3, p. 329–330]. But this did not yet mean overcoming transcendentalist attitudes, since the path from possibility to reality, from the sphere of pure thinking to the sphere of spiritual practice, remained untraveled. “Having become accustomed to abstract logical thinking, ... Schelling did not pay attention to that special image of the internal activity of the mind, which constitutes a necessary accessory of believing thinking” [3, p. 331]. It is in this regard that Kireevsky arises in this article the concept of “personality”: “Although the mind is one and its nature is one, its modes of action are different, as well as its conclusions, depending on what degree it is at and what thought lies at its beginning, and what force moves and acts on it. For this driving and animating force does not come from the thought that is before the mind, but from the innermost state of the mind it proceeds to the thought in which it finds its peace and through which it is already communicated to other rational individuals” [3, p. 331]. Here the idea of ​​the anthropological foundations of this or that method of philosophizing reaches a high degree of generalization. The pattern of relations between thought and the thinker here is the opposite of what we saw in Kireyevsky’s early articles. If there a person acted as an exponent of thought, here thought is a means of expressing the power emanating “from the internal state of the mind,” the mind of a “reasonable personality.” The personality here has an active force, energy that serves to communicate with other individuals through thought and word and carries out contact with the world. However, in general this concept remains insufficiently clarified. How personality relates to “integrity,” “faith,” and other important concepts remains unclear, although the idea of ​​a “root relationship with God” is already appearing. All this becomes clear only in the “Passages,” to the understanding and interpretation of which we will soon turn. § 2. Program of religious philosophy I.V. Kireyevsky When reading Kireyevsky’s “Excerpts,” what first strikes the eye is their language. This language is not very characteristic of traditional philosophical exposition. In addition to the fragmentation, which seems to occur not only from the fact that the author simply did not have time to complete the entire text, the author’s rather peculiar handling of terminology also attracts attention. The question arises: do we even have the right to attribute this type of thinking to the field of philosophy and its history? Of course, a reference to Pascal, with whom Kireevsky is often compared (for example, N.S. Arsenyev) [17, p. 238] and which is firmly included in all “History of Philosophy”, in this case it is more than appropriate 73. But this indication alone is not enough. A fundamental solution to the issue is needed. As a thinker, Kireevsky again and again raises the question not about the relationship between a person’s personal self-consciousness and his God-consciousness (a question characteristic of the idealistic philosophy of religion, Hegel and Schelling), but the question about the relationship between man and God. Does his thought have a sufficiently distinct philosophical character? A well-founded doubt quickly grows and takes on a much more general form: is religious philosophizing even possible? We are talking, of course, not about philosophy that simply has in mind religious issues or appeals to God as some kind of ultimate justification, but about philosophy carried out in a space that, according to many, is not characteristic of it - in the space of believing thinking. Does it have meaning and right to exist? Isn't this a simple contradiction in terms, hiding behind it a certain intellectual and spiritual emptiness? Similar questions arise from both religion and philosophy, and in both cases the answer is often negative. Isn’t religious philosophy simply a veiled theology, specially dressed up and hidden in some kind of ambush with the aim of capturing the souls of thinking people? A church trap for intellectuals, and also philosophically dishonest, since it must necessarily accept dogmatic religious premises on faith? – Philosophers ask these questions. Is not religious philosophy simply a plausible pretext for dogmatic freethinking, a hidden ambush of intellectuals, set up by them in the church fence to catch unwary souls? – These are the questions that believers ask. However, is this doubt really so all-encompassing? Can we not discover its historical source and thereby indicate the limits of its competence? The origins of this idea of ​​​​the uncrossable line separating philosophy and theology go back to the intellectual discussions of Arab and Western European thinkers of the 12th–13th centuries. It crystallizes and takes on the status of something self-evident in Thomas Aquinas, who, making a distinction between philosophy and theology, separated the “natural light of reason” (philosophy) and theology, understood as revealed knowledge of what transcends human reason. This division, along with the isolation of the sphere of “natural law” as a kind of independent “third city,” gives impetus to the process of secularization, the separation of Christianity and culture [74, p. 10–11]. As a result, philosophy turns to the sphere of the “natural”, “worldly”, which more and more strives for self-justification. At the beginning of the New Time, the concept of a universal science, which fundamentally excludes everything supernatural as unknowable, arises and determines all further philosophical thought. It either opposes itself to theology, or simply ignores it, or considers it as a symbolic expression of the same natural order of things. This understanding of the state of affairs has, to one degree or another, affected Orthodox theology. Let us consider, for example, the article by Vl. Lossky "Faith and Theology". At its very beginning, Lossky introduces the distinction between “silent knowledge as genuine theology” and “theology as a teaching that can and should be expressed in words” [119, p. 149]. He seeks to distinguish theology as wisdom - σοφία or φρόνησις - from this knowledge - γνῶσις - and from “ordinary ἐπιστήμη” - science and reasoning, i.e. philosophy. Knowledge, as the “sacrament of the future age,” is self-sufficient, but theology (in its idea) feeds on it, tries to express it and points to it. This is a new, different from ἐπιστήμη, use of word and thought. It is born from ontological participation in the presence of the One who reveals himself to us, i.e. out of faith. Thus, it belongs to the essence of theology that it is believing thinking, and faith here does not simply determine the range of premises, concepts and images with which this thinking deals, but “revives the mind,” i.e. essentially determines all his activity, so to speak, merges with it into a single whole. The analogy with the Western way of thinking here is that philosophy and science are thrown beyond the bounds of believing thinking into the realm of ἐπιστήμη, the essence of which, accordingly, is that it is unbelieving thinking, in the extreme case, only seeking that meeting, that relationship, which for theology is initial and determining. Is it possible under such conditions to have a strategy that saves the concept of religious philosophy? First of all, in my opinion, it is necessary because it represents the only possible way to overcome secularization processes. From what has been said, it is clear that its main feature should be the awareness of religious thinking not only as its subject, but also as its basis and source, as its essential characteristic: it should be not only a strategy for constructing a philosophical theory, but also a conscious strategy for the religious life of a Christian thinker. One of the possible strategies of this kind, although not fully implemented, but nevertheless quite clearly outlined, seems to be the idea of ​​​​Orthodox philosophy that we find in Kireyevsky. His principled position and approach are quite clearly different from those of a mystical theologian or ascetic, theologian theorist, or religious scholar. The latter is quite obvious. He is not involved in collecting and explaining facts of religious life. Even when he describes specific religious experiences and states of consciousness (although he has little actual “religious” specificity), he does not try to systematize and evaluate them, and does not look for suitable social or psychological explanations. Its task is to describe and understand the meaning. We are dealing with reflection directed at oneself, with intellectual contemplation of the life of one’s own consciousness and the structures that are subject to it. What he describes are the structures of this particular consciousness and the ways of being-in-the-world of this particular being, which, thanks to the philosophical nature of this reflection, appear in this description, at the same time, as universally significant. His thought differs from the position of a practical theologian, mystic or ascetic in the degree of its theoreticality. He does not simply operate with concepts, he tries to clarify them or, at least, establish the field of their applicability. Although Orthodox asceticism and mysticism were the basis of his thought, although what he says often resembles what mystics and ascetics said - his predecessors and contemporaries (for example, St. Ignatius Brianchaninov, Theophan the Recluse, etc.) - he says this as a philosopher. For them, the main thing is spiritual meaning and effectiveness, for him it is clarification of semantic connections and relationships. Of course, Kireevsky had deep respect for the practice of “smart doing” and the “Jesus Prayer”, for the way of life of ascetics and contemplatives; moreover, he clearly tried to implement the elements of this practice in his own life, but besides this, he was also concerned with the semantic, philosophical reading of their results. Kireyevsky's text differs from the ascetic text in that it is not intended to be used as a guide to action: it only shows what this action can mean as a certain form of human existence. If ascetic leadership is based on experience and is focused on the particular, the individual, on a specific situation that arises during spiritual warfare, then Kireevsky’s text seeks to find in this particular semantic and value aspects that can be generally significant, revealing the essential aspects of human nature. The position of the theologian-theorist still remains. What is he doing discussing relevant topics? First of all, by analyzing the relevant texts of Holy Scripture and the Holy Fathers and teachers of the Church, their followers and researchers. He tries, in correlation with his personal spiritual experience, to identify from them the true teaching of the Church and communicate it to the “external” world (apologetics) and the “internal” people of God (preaching, catechesis). In contrast, the philosopher analyzes and builds, first of all, his own consciousness, “his own system of thought” (V.V. Bibikhin). If his construction is interesting to others, then he is lucky. Ultimately, he comes to the limit of human knowledge, to an increasingly clear identification of the boundaries of the comprehensible and incomprehensible, the describable and the indescribable. He moves towards the ultimate foundation and in this movement he is ready to revise any concept or established idea. Actually, it is in the course of this revision that he manifests his special philosophical attitude of consciousness, which differs from the everyday, and from the scientific, and from the theological. Its first point of reference is the direct data of consciousness, which must be seen, analyzed and somehow ordered, which is less possible the higher and more subtle level of consciousness that is to be considered. Another point of reference for a thinker (in this case, Kireevsky), which allows one to define his position and approach as “philosophical,” is the philosophical tradition with which he identified himself, which he criticized, which he referred to. This tradition, which understood itself in a certain way in the context of the era, thereby gave our author some certain self-understanding. This is the tradition of Western European and emerging Russian philosophy, in relation to which we can call Kireevsky a philosopher, just as in relation to the tradition of Russian literature, to which he also belonged, we can call him a writer. After his conversion, both relationships changed, but were not interrupted; moreover, the author did not seek to interrupt them and completely retained his status as a philosopher and writer, although in his own understanding and being the status of these activities changed. Kireevsky’s appeal itself also had a philosophical motivation. This was due to the fact that he assessed the situation in contemporary Western culture (the article “On the Nature of Enlightenment...”) and in philosophy (the article “On... Philosophy”), the core of this rationalistic culture, as a dead end. In an effort to eliminate a number of internal contradictions inherent in their self-understanding, he consciously sought to change this self-understanding. It seemed necessary to introduce “new principles” into the tradition, change the system of its references and references, introducing a new series of names (Holy Fathers), and further, give it a new “place in life” between “faith” - the spiritual experience of the individual and the Church, on the one hand, and “enlightenment” - the holistic system of culture of a given time - on the other [3, p. 321]. In order to clarify these points, let us again compare Kireevsky’s thought with the thought of the prominent Russian theologian of the 20th century V.N. Lossky. Despite the century separating these thinkers, such a comparison will be both indicative and correct. Correct - due to the fact that their initial ideas, life attitudes and positions in the general process of the history of thought reveal significant similarity - both are Orthodox thinkers striving to actualize the patristic heritage in the spiritual situation of our time, with the greatest possible rigor in following the dogmatic, canonical and intellectual tradition of the Church. Indicative - because it is this closeness that highlights the specifics of their thoughts: philosophical for one, theological for the other. Let us turn again to Lossky’s already mentioned article “Faith and Theology”: “Faith, as an ontological participation included in a personal encounter, is the first condition of theological knowledge” [119, p. 153]. We will see that the understanding of faith as personal communication, as a relationship between individuals, constitutes the cornerstone of Kireevsky’s thought (although he prefers to talk about “consciousness of relationship” - we will say why below). “Here we need an internal restructuring of our cognitive abilities, conditioned by the presence of the Holy Spirit in us” [119, p. 153]. For Kireevsky, the connection between faith and such a restructuring of not only cognitive abilities, but also the entire human being is also undeniable. Moreover, both thinkers, who lived a spiritual life in the Orthodox Church, tried to actually implement what they wrote about. However, further making a distinction between theology and philosophy, Lossky gives, from my point of view, an overly narrowed and impoverished idea of ​​the latter. Philosophy appears to him as only a theoretical philosophical discourse, only externally connected with the way of life that a given thinker practices. This leads to the fact that in the field of faith, philosophy is actually deprived of any rights, except one - to ask a question 74: “If the pinnacle of philosophy is a question, then theology must answer it with evidence that the transcendent has been revealed in the immanent incarnation” [119, p. 157]. He devotes several pages to revealing the inconsistency of philosophy in matters of knowledge of God and comparing the theological and philosophical ways of thinking and speaking. Philosophers could not rise above this or that idea of ​​God, an intellectual construct that, at best, can claim to be some intuitive glimpse of His true essence. Lossky says: “Theology comes from fact - from revelation. Philosophy, which discusses God, proceeds not from fact, but from idea. For the theologian, the starting point is Christ, and He is the completion. The philosopher rises to a certain idea, starting from another idea or from a group of facts generalized by the idea. For some philosophers, the search for God is an internal necessity of thinking: in order for their worldview to be consistent, they need God to exist” [119, p. 154]. A philosopher starting from an idea can only “construct the idea of ​​God,” but not know Him Himself as a person. If he, nevertheless, makes a claim to knowledge of God, it is up to the theologian to show him his place, which Lossky does with his characteristic consistency. But isn’t Kireyevsky saying the same thing, and even in a more harsh form? “In many systems of rational philosophy we see that dogmas about the unity of the Divine, about His omnipotence, about His wisdom, about His spirituality and omnipresence, even about His trinity, are possible and accessible to the mind of an unbeliever. He can even admit and explain all miracles accepted by faith, bringing them under some general formula. But all this has no religious significance only because rational thinking cannot accommodate the consciousness of the living personality of the Divine and Her living relationship to the personality of man” [2(1), p. 274]. That is, philosophy as a discourse can master not only individual ideas, but also almost the entire content of church teaching, and yet have no religious significance, remaining at the level of ideas. However, for Kireyevsky, philosophy is by no means reducible to idealism, no matter what forms it may take. The circle of development of Western European philosophy is exhausted in the philosophy of identity of Schelling and Hegel (see the article “On... philosophy”). Schelling's attempt to break through this circle was directed simultaneously in two directions: backward, in the sense of criticizing previous rationalism; forward, in the sense of an attempt to create a positive philosophy based on the analysis of the Holy Scriptures (philosophy of revelation) and “the real God-consciousness of all humanity, as long as it preserved the tradition of the primitive revelation to humanity... in the mythology of ancient peoples” |3, p. 330] (philosophy of mythology). Kireyevsky welcomes this plan, but states the failure of its execution and notes three reasons for this failure: the uncertainty of preliminary conviction, the arbitrariness of interpretation of sources and, most importantly, the fact that “Schelling did not pay attention to that special image of the internal activity of the mind, which constitutes a necessary accessory of believing thinking” [3, pp. 330–331]. It was this third point that was for him an indication of a different path of philosophical reflection, one that is not covered by Lossky’s definitions. His path is the study of the internal logic of believing thinking, based on the direct data of consciousness and general church experience. “And in any case, the way of thinking of the mind of a believer will be different from the mind that seeks conviction or relies on abstract conviction. This feature, in addition to the firmness of the root truth, will consist of the data that the mind receives from holy thinkers, enlightened by higher vision, and that desire for internal integrity, which does not allow the mind to accept dead truth as living, and finally, that extreme conscientiousness with which sincere faith distinguishes the eternal and Divine truth from that which may be the opinion of a person or a people" [2(1), p. 273]. The subject of philosophy here becomes human experience, realized in the horizon of faith, as the defining fact of human consciousness and existence. Therefore, when Kireevsky speaks of faith as consciousness, this constitutes the first level of description or, in modern language, the phenomenology of believing consciousness. This is not transcendentalism, the remnants of which Fr. V. Zenkovsky, but a necessary transitional step to the ontology of faith, to which this phenomenology refers and into which it turns out to be included. Lossky, as a theologian, states the “restructuring of cognitive abilities” - the result of the action of the Holy Spirit in a person - and for him this is the fundamental prerequisite for theological discourse, theological position and approach. Kireevsky is trying to describe this restructuring based on his own experience and tradition, i.e. is at a fundamentally different level of understanding and generalization of these data. In connection with the above, Kireevsky’s plan emerges approximately as follows: to build a phenomenology, ontology and epistemology of a believer, i.e. create a certain doctrine about a person in a situation of faith (anthropology) (“to realize the full scope of one’s faith”), and demonstrate the general significance of these constructions in the context of the philosophical tradition. The further task of philosophy is to “realize... all its relations to other areas of the mind” [4, p. 283], take an intermediate position between faith and science [3, p. 321]. It is here that the grounds arise for distinguishing philosophy into a special sphere of knowledge. This is primarily due to the ever-deepening process of secularization of culture, especially with the dominance of scientific rationality and the concept of philosophy as a scientific doctrine and an ever-growing complex of social problems. In this sense, Kireyevsky speaks about the place of philosophy: “The development of philosophy is conditioned by the connection of two opposite ends of human thought: the one where it interfaces with the highest questions of faith, and the one where it touches the development of sciences and external education” [3, p. 321]. Philosophy acquires special significance when the faith of a people and its external education are opposite and hostile to each other. In this case, he sees two possible outcomes: “Either education will supplant faith, or faith, overcoming this external education, will produce its own philosophy from its very contact with it, which will give a different meaning to external education.” Kireevsky considers the initial patristic era to be an example of a successful solution to this problem, when “not only science, but also pagan philosophy itself turned into an instrument of Christian enlightenment and, as a subordinate principle, became part of Christian philosophy” [3, p. 321–322]. Thus, by abandoning claims to philosophical knowledge of God, avoiding a new construction of the idea of ​​God and speaking about Him exactly as much as is necessary so that the word “faith” does not become meaningless (here anticipating Lossky’s demand for the apophatism of Orthodox thinking), Kireevsky opens up new possibilities for Christian philosophizing. And in this respect, Kireyevsky in many ways anticipates the philosophical conversions of the 20th century - I mean, first of all, M. Buber, G. Marcel and others. M. Buber wrote in “The Eclipse of God”: “After all, a philosopher, in order to actually carry out this conversion, would have to refuse to involve God in any conceptual form in his system; Instead of containing God as a certain object among others, and precisely the highest among them, his philosophy, both as a whole and in its parts, should point to God, however, without interpreting Him Himself” [31, p. 369]. Similarly, G. Marcel in his “Metaphysical Diary” refused to “consider God as a structure” [130, p. 28]. The difference between Kireevsky and this group of thinkers is that the rejection of speculative theology and turning to the study of human reality primarily did not mean for him a disdainful attitude towards his confessional affiliation. At the same time, Kireevsky’s thought differs from the mainstream direction of subsequent Russian religious philosophy led by Vl. Solovyov, which, with rare exceptions, was unable to avoid the temptation to construct religious metaphysics 75. Thus, it is impossible to conclude that the implementation of this plan took Kireevsky beyond the framework of the philosophical tradition. Moreover, the very fact of this plan and the experience of its implementation undoubtedly belong to the field of the history of philosophy and are the facts of this history, which have an important meaning in it, going beyond the framework of the Russian philosophical process. This position of Kireevsky - a philosopher, seriously, i.e. “existentially”, in the Kierkegaardian sense of the word, occupied with religious issues, largely determines his approach to word and language as those realities with which he inevitably encountered and the resistance of which he overcame when trying to express his thoughts. The very transition from transcendentalism to ontologism, which was just mentioned, presupposes very specific linguistic difficulties, which we will talk about later. Therefore, accusations of Kireevsky - a student of Zhukovsky, friend and collaborator of Pushkin, Baratynsky and Yazykov - of bad Russian language (by Pisarev, Dorn, etc.) are unfounded. The same reasons, that is, the specific nature of the reality with which he dealt, do not allow us to look for strict unambiguity and certainty in him. We can only try to find and express that unity of common meaning, “inconceivable by external definition” [3, p. 331], which he himself somehow did not lose sight of and which determined everything for him. The work of the historian in this case turns out to be inseparable from the work of the hermeneutic philosopher, pursuing the goal of “understanding oneself and being” (P. Ricoeur). In studying Kireevsky’s philosophy, there are three paths that we would like to avoid: looking for contradictions in the author, as Pisarev, Soloviev, Dorn, Gleason and a number of Soviet researchers did; Having chosen your favorite formula, build on it some kind of mental building that could be attributed to it with one degree or another; impose on him categorical definitions such as “theist - pantheist”, “secular - ecclesiastical”, “right - left”, etc. Of course, it is impossible to completely avoid them, but it is necessary to remember that accepting one of them as a guide to action means dooming yourself in advance to not understanding what the author actually wanted to say and what does not fit into any conventional categories. At the same time, Kireevsky does not give us any reason to consider any of his statements or definitions not worthy of attention. Rather, their totality sets a certain horizon in which the author’s thought finds its expression with its inherent field of uncertainty, which, at the same time, is also the space of possible interpretations. We will try to reproduce this horizon, clarifying, to the best of our ability, the basic words with the help of which this thought is expressed, in their mutual connection. What Kireyevsky said about the word in general is quite applicable to all of them (which means that he was fully aware of this feature of his language): “The word, like the transparent body of the spirit, must correspond to all its movements. Therefore, it must constantly change its color, in accordance with the constantly changing cohesion and resolution of thoughts. In its iridescent sense, every breath of the mind should tremble and respond. It must breathe the freedom of inner life. Therefore, a word, ossified in school formulas, cannot express the spirit, just as a corpse does not express life. However, while changing in its shades, it should not change in its internal composition” [2(1), p. 273–274]. This unity of “internal composition” is what we will try to find, and what remains unified in the variations that are given by different passages. Many of these passages can be considered as the independent beginning of a hypothetical book or article, as attempts each time to express one’s thought in a slightly new way. All of them outline slightly different perspectives for considering the same “center of being” of the thought of the late Kireyevsky - which justifies the concern for their coordination as a search for this center. Now, after all these preliminary remarks, we can finally get to the heart of the matter. § 3. The structure of thought of I.V. Kireevsky. Correlation of basic concepts Let us consider a number of basic words, the clarification of which can give a holistic picture of I.V.’s philosophy. Kireevsky at the last stage of its formation. From the above it is clear that these words can be called concepts only conditionally; we are not talking here about concepts in the logical sense. Personality. Faith. Materiality. Believing thinking. Abstract thinking (rationalism). Internal integrity of thinking. Orthodox Christian education. Clarification of these words, the search for the foundations of Kireevsky’s thought, perhaps, will show us its central link - the thought of a person, one or another self-understanding of which is born from one or another living experience of the person who thinks this thought. “Materiality” is the most general “concept” on this list. It always, even in the early period of creativity, was of great service importance for Kireyevsky. And then and later it denoted the main subject of his thought, what his intention was directed at, what was in the center of his attention, what was closest to the foundations of his philosophy. At the same time, “essentiality” is a delimiting concept, a reduction tool that allows you to find what can serve as the first basis. It is also the criterion of this foundation. It is the essential, and not just the self-evident and immediately given, that should serve as the beginning of thought. This does not mean that the essential is not self-evident and not immediately given, but it does mean that it also presupposes something more. This suggests two possible interpretations of the essential – axiological and ontological. This principle must have priority either in the order of significance or in the order of being (or both). Testifying to its own being and value, it must at the same time justify any other being and other value. Here is what Kireevsky says: “For abstract thinking alone, the essential is generally inaccessible. Only materiality can touch the essential” [2(1) p. 274]. This means that materiality has its own criterion. To rely on it, you yourself need to become significant, change your ontological status. A new area of ​​thinking opens only together with a new area of ​​being. Kireyevsky continues: “Abstract thinking deals only with the boundaries and relationships of concepts. The laws of mind and matter, which constitute its content, do not in themselves have significance, but are only a set of relations” [2(1) p. 274]. That is, they are not in themselves; they are the relations between what is essential. All the work done by German idealism and French enlightenment remains in this circle of abstraction. So, what can be described as a set of relations is not essential. But thought, striving to break out of the boundaries of abstract thinking (transcendentalism), seeks only the essential, the non-relative, that which “is the essence in itself.” Thus, the essential is interpreted in an ontological sense. This does not mean that the axiological dimension is not considered here. But in order to be significant, you have to be. Kireyevsky does not consider the essential as “substance”. “Substance”, being a term of abstract thought, nevertheless describes a certain relativity. Substance is something to which properties and qualities belong, unthinkable without them. She answers the question “what?” and therefore does not bear the character of exclusivity that is prescribed by “essentiality.” With the help of the concept of “substance” as a causa sui, abstract thought tries to grasp the essential and introduce it into its world 76 . We said that “essential” is a tool of reduction. Everything else is subject to this reduction, so to speak, “non-essential”, i.e. that which exists in relation to, “by participation” in, it. After finding the essential, it must be constituted on its basis, and in such a way that the essential does not lose its character and does not become relative to the abstract. So, what is essential? Kireyevsky answers this question in the same passage, making a leap and immediately calling him by name: “The only thing essential in the world is the rationally free person. She alone has an original meaning. Everything else has only relative meaning” [2(1) p. 274]. However, already here, at the very beginning, thought is again in danger of falling into abstraction. You can try to think about personality in an abstract manner, to look at it from the point of view of rationalism (abstract thinking). This would mean introducing it into the framework of correlation: “But for rational thinking, a living personality is decomposed into abstract laws of self-development (Schellingian-Hegelian dialectics. - K.A.) or is a product of extraneous principles (Marxism, psychoanalysis and the like. - K.A.) and in both cases loses its real meaning" [2(1) p. 2741 - the meaning of the unconditional, one might say, absolute beginning - the primordial element of being called to rule and the only possible beginning of Christian thought. It is obvious that “personality” is thought of here as it is thought of in the patristic religious-philosophical tradition, in contrast to the free beginning of voluntary acts, as essential, and nature (including individual nature), as relative. Kireevsky defines personality as “reasonably free.” In this he follows, as we have seen, John of Damascus, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom and other saints. Fathers. But the transrationality of personality postulated by Kireyevsky in this passage seems to conflict with this attempt to define it. Is there not, therefore, something from nature mixed into the apophatic ontology of personality? But first, let’s ask ourselves the question: what is the general meaning of the definition in relation to such a structure as personality? This cannot be an indication of the genus and species, since this reality, being extra-natural, stands outside of any objectivity. If “man himself is the beginning of his actions” [79, p. 226], as Damascene says, then each personality is original, it precedes objective existence and in this respect does not belong to any kind of objective existence. Consequently, a type of “personality” cannot be distinguished from any genus by indicating its corresponding characteristic. We can only say that each personality has its own unique characteristic, exsistentia incommunicabilis (Dune Scotus), which distinguishes it from all others - a specific way of being and acting. It is impossible to point out a common characteristic of all individuals. Each of them is precisely itself, communicating this selfhood to all nature subject to it. Being a beginning, personality is always present in any attempt to define it. Moreover, she herself, it is this very person who makes such an attempt, inevitably, due to her transrationality, losing herself. How this happens, Kireevsky just pointed out: they are trying to “decompose” it “into abstract laws of self-development,” or “produce it” from “extraneous principles.” Only by moving to that mental operation that G. Marcel called “reflection of the second stage”, to “the movement of renewal, which consists in the awareness of what is fragmentary and even, in some sense, doubtful, in a purely analytical approach and in an attempt to restore at the level of thinking that concrete that before we saw in some way fragmented or dispersed” [132, p. 165], i.e. Having asked the question of who is this person who gives the definition, the person can try to return to himself. Such a return to oneself is often in one way or another correlated with one or another form of religious conversion - either as its starting point, or as an attempt to comprehend it. We can see various options for such a return in the works of M. Heidegger, G. Marcel, M. Buber, P. Ricoeur, S.L. Franka, L.P. Karsavina, Fr. Georgy Florovsky and other thinkers of the 20th century 77. In the works of these and some other thinkers we find a number of similar thought structures and moves, similar to those that we find in Kireyevsky. However, the latter’s experience indicates that the success of this return is ultimately determined by belonging to the Church and life in it. To the above-mentioned question, the person does not receive any answer other than “I myself,” and does not find in the world any source of this answer other than himself. To a first approximation, we can say that the levels of this “I myself” can be different; it can designate both one or another degree of individualization of nature, and the personality itself. This is how the immediate self-awareness of the individual is restored. All the mediating links - laws and principles - that had destroyed it, disappeared, adding nothing to our knowledge about it. This does not mean that they added nothing to our knowledge of human nature. All definitions apply only to it. But since human nature is always organized in one way or another by the personal principle - even if the self-consciousness of this principle is absent - all definitions that try to capture the “phenomenon of man” will inevitably contain a flaw where human freedom will be hidden. Freedom and reason manifested themselves here during the formation of individual self-awareness. The personality of human existence ultimately means his freedom. As E. Mounier wrote, “freedom... is not the existence of the individual, but the way through which the individual is everything that he is” [140, p. 82]. Reason, capable of reflection and contemplation, turns out to be the main instrument of its self-constitution. Reason and freedom act not as properties or definitions of personality, but as those properties of human nature that make possible for it a unique way of existence - personal. To clarify Kireevsky’s thought, it is appropriate to recall again his reasoning about Descartes from the article “On the Nature of Enlightenment...”: “He thought that he had decisively thrown off the bonds of scholasticism; however, without feeling it himself, he still remained so confused by them that, despite all his brilliant understanding of the formal laws of reason, he was so strangely blind to living truths that he considered his inner, immediate consciousness of his own existence not yet convincing until he deduced it from an abstract syllogistic conclusion” [3, p. 269]. Of course, cogito ergo sum is not a syllogism, but Descartes’ hesitations on this score are very indicative. Being here is mediated by thinking: consciousness of being follows consciousness of thinking and is not experienced as such. That finding of oneself, which is undoubtedly present in this act, remains purely mental, which is what Kireevsky records, striving for “immediate consciousness of one’s own being”, for pure self-contemplation. This self-contemplation presupposes a certain integrity of the being, the unity of being and consciousness, therefore it is higher than the self-consciousness of the cogito, which is present only in thinking and, as it were, replacing actual being with the thought of it. In this case, we are talking, of course, not about personality, but about individuality. This gives Kireevsky a reason for some self-irony: “Perhaps even now there are thoughtful people who assert on it (the syllogistic conclusion - K.A.) the certainty of their existence and thus calm their educated need for firm convictions. At least, the writer of these lines still vividly remembers that era in his own life when such a process of artificial thinking sweetly quenched his thirst for mental peace” [3, p. 269]. Thinking is called here “artificial” in the sense that it does not follow any internal necessity, tries to connect what is already connected by existence, to connect what is already inseparable, and as a result loses sight of this “natural” connection. It is also “artificial” because it tries to replace “natural” immediate self-consciousness; it is separated from the integrity of the human being, “abstracted” from it. Thus, clarifying the “essential” as “personal” leads us to the need to clarify what “abstract thinking” is, corresponding to the non-personal way of being. Kireevsky makes the main demarcation with him in the field of religious philosophy. The following passage is structured in such a way that the first and second parts of its two paragraphs clearly correlate with each other: “Therefore, abstract thinking, touching on objects of faith, in appearance can be very similar to its teaching; but in essence it has a completely different meaning, precisely because it lacks the sense of essentiality, which arises from the internal development of the sense of the integral personality. In very many systems of rational philosophy we see that dogmas about the unity of the Divine, about His omnipotence, about His wisdom, about His spirituality and omnipresence, even about His trinity, are possible and accessible to the mind of an unbeliever. He can even admit and explain all miracles accepted by faith, bringing them under some special formula. But all this has no religious significance, only because rational thinking cannot accommodate the consciousness of the living personality of the Divine and its living relationship to the personality of man” [2(1) p. 274). To understand the nature of abstract thinking, it is necessary to find out what it is distracted from. This requires further clarification of the meaning of “essential”. “The meaning of essentiality... arises from the internal development of the meaning of an integral personality,” reminds Kireevsky. “Abstract thinking” is opposed to “faith,” although “in appearance” may turn out to be “similar to its teaching.” But we still don’t know what faith is. The following explains where the similarities lie: in dogma. The difference, however, is in the most essential: “rational thinking cannot accommodate the consciousness of the living personality of the Divine and its living relationship to the personality of man.” There is an obvious parallel here with Pascal’s exclamation: “The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is not the God of philosophers and scientists.” The God of Abraham enters into a personal relationship with man. The “meaning of essentiality” is finally clarified as the Divine-human dialogue, the original, living relationship of individuals. A strange thing becomes clear: dogmas, the core of the teachings of the Church, may not have religious significance if behind them there is no real spiritual life of the one who fills and organizes his consciousness with them. They receive such meaning only if they grow out of a person’s spiritual experience. Kireyevsky insisted on this before, especially in his pedagogical works: “Note on the direction and methods of the initial education of the people in Russia” (1839) and “Note on teaching the Slovenian language together with Russian” (1853). 78 In the latter he wrote: “... the essence of religious knowledge lies not in dogma, not in symbol, but in living sympathy with the spiritual life of the Church” [48, p. 152). Here, in “Passages,” the philosophical foundations of this position of the thinker are clarified. So, “consciousness about the living personality of the Divine and Its living relationship to the personality of man,” as “the meaning of the essential,” “arises from the internal development of the meaning of the integral personality.” A person’s self-consciousness, having “reached” the level of personality, then “outgrows” it and reaches a new level - consciousness of the Divine-human relationship as the basis of this personality. This attitude is faith. And since abstract thinking is also non-believer (cf. the words of L. Shestov: “Not a single philosopher believed in God”), then consciousness, which, by internal necessity, has reached this “consciousness about” (Husserl), is a believing consciousness. It is the logic of this consciousness, corresponding to the personal way of being of a person, that Kireyevsky is trying to understand. Although the “unbeliever mind” can talk a lot about God and dogmas, and even speak “correctly”, this speech will remain alien to faith, will be devoid of “religious meaning”, since it will be based not on a free attitude, but on a “formula”. Thus, the word of St. Basil the Great is justified: “The devil is a thief, and he divulges our teachings to his preachers” [34, p. 265). So, the “essential” is “faith” as consciousness about the relationship between the personality of God and the human person, and thinking that loses sight of this consciousness as essential becomes “abstract thinking,” the essence of which, therefore, is that it is unbeliever. Thus, faith and believing thinking enter into the circle of our reasoning, as new, not yet clarified basic words. If faith is only “consciousness about” - a constant phrase used by Kireevsky - the entire process that led to it, and it itself appears as pure thought, an immanent development of self-consciousness, not going anywhere beyond its boundaries and not sending away. Such a purely transcendentalist result would perhaps be satisfactory in German philosophy and in general in a culture trying to secularize Christianity, to treat it as some kind of “value,” but it cannot satisfy a representative of the “Orthodox-Slovenian trend.” And indeed, we find a solution to the bewilderment in the following words from a passage dedicated to the Holy Fathers: “For the truths they expressed were obtained by them from inner direct experience and are transmitted to us, not as a logical conclusion, which our mind could draw, but as the news of an eyewitness about the country in which he was” 12(1) p. 272]. This is the “logic” of revelation: no amount of mental effort will allow a person to draw a “conclusion,” which, however, is the only adequate answer to the question asked of him. The human mind by itself cannot come to God-consciousness, unless God Himself reveals itself to it and it becomes an “eyewitness.” This direct internal experience of Kireyevsky, following St. Isaac the Syrian, calls it faith. So, the Holy Fathers “speak about the country in which they were.” This country opens up in faith, about which Kireyevsky says: “Faith is not a trust in someone else’s assurance, but a real event of inner life, through which a person enters into essential communication with Divine things (with the higher world, with heaven, with the Divine)” [2(1), p. 279]. The ontological nature of this event is emphasized here: being an event of inner life, it radically changes a person’s position in being, opens up a new reality for him. Following Kireyevsky, we are trying to grasp, as it were, two sides of this reality. With one, a person, as it were, comes to faith himself, brings his self-awareness to it by moving according to his own internal logic. This is the methodological requirement made by Kireevsky (following Hegel, as we remember) to the philosopher’s address. On the other hand, faith is an event of inner life that relates to the whole person, a direct experience of personal revelation, which a person himself fundamentally cannot achieve. It is the indication of the immediacy of this experience that allows us to see these two sides in their unity and integrity. The Divine directly reveals itself in the mind of a person, or rather, reveals to him His presence in him, enlightens this mind with Himself and, radically changing the position of a person in being, elevates him to the consciousness of Himself as a person (this has already been discussed in the sections devoted to the anthropology of patristics). But this happens in the mind and mind of a person, without losing its conscious activity. This activity manifests itself in the fact that the mind, enlightened by the presence of the Divine, “naturally” comes to faith as a complete, active turn towards Him, and turns it into the basis of all its activity, into the significant background of every act of its consciousness. Here a person finds out that his very personal self-awareness can live only by this faith and on its basis. It is not constituted by itself, but as a preliminary condition of faith, by the real presence of God even before we become aware of this presence, which itself is recognized only by the “eyes of faith.” Cause and effect are confused here in the most paradoxical way; the object itself and our consciousness about it are practically inseparable. In other words: it is in faith, understood as a relationship to the personality of the Divine, that a person’s personality arises, and at the same time, faith itself arises on the basis of the self-awareness of a person as a person. Faith, as a two-way relationship, presupposes, on the part of God, revelation, the invasion of Divine energies into human reality, and on the part of man, complete recourse and openness to these energies. We deliberately introduce here the basic intuition, the terminology of “essence” and “energy”, which is absent from Kireyevsky, but which refines and clarifies it, which goes back to St. Gregory Palamas is 79. We find some basis for this in the fact that Kireevsky clearly prefers to talk not about “God”, but about “Divinity” or “Divine things”, as something that is open to the world and man and interacts with them, and in which, in fact, the Divine personality manifests itself, as a hidden essence possessing active energies. This terminology helps us understand what, in fact, is the difference between the Orthodox ontologism of the Slavophiles and the transcendentalism and psychologism of the romantics. This question is significant, since in both cases the Divinity is localized “inside”, “immanently” - does this not remove the very question of the reality of the “object” of faith? Apparently, “inside” here does not mean “immanent to consciousness.” It means rather the co-presence of the real-transcendent Absolute with the equally real human being, who discovers this co-presence in his inner experience 80 . In this sense, we can say, like S.L. Frank 81, about “transcending inwards” [190, p. 386J, bearing in mind the whole convention of the spatial metaphor “inside - outside”. So, the “essential” as a “personality” is conceptualized here as arising in the horizon of “faith” - a living relationship between the Divine and human personalities, in which the human personality is first constituted as a structure of being and self-consciousness. This structure defines the very type of human thought as “believing thinking” in contrast to rationalistic, “abstract thinking”, the essential feature of which is unbelief as a fallout from the basic relationship of faith. Considering the issues of “faith” and “personality,” Kireevsky tries to trace both the logic of the formation of this complex structure and the logic of its life. The first at the level of theology can be correlated with asceticism, work, πράξις, the second - with faith, speculation, θεωρία. It can be assumed that reflection on these two main states of Christian spiritual life should have determined the construction of Kireyevsky’s philosophy. Here we will be interested in a number of passages that begin in Gershenzon’s edition with two headings: “The relation of faith to reason, or what degree of knowledge constitutes faith? Various relationships of internal self-consciousness to the knowledge of God” [2(1) p. 279]. It is obvious that the development of a certain typology is planned here, which, however, remains unfinished. Kireevsky only outlines a number of its main features or degrees. The starting point is “the consciousness of the all-pervading connection and unity of the universe,” which “precedes the concept of a single cause of existence and arouses the rational consciousness of the unity of the Creator.” Further, this knowledge about God as the only Creator deepens through the knowledge of his attributes, which is also born from the contemplation of creation: “The immeasurability, harmony and wisdom of the universe guide the mind to the consciousness of the omnipotence and wisdom of the Creator” [2(1) p. 279]. In fact, we are talking here about what in pre-Kantian “rational theology” was called “proofs of the existence of God.” Kireyevsky, completely in the patristic spirit, preserved in high scholasticism, speaks of them as the paths leading our mind to God: they “excite”, “guide the mind”, send it to the consciousness of God, without the compulsion inherent in logical proof 82. All our knowledge about the world is thereby involved in the process of knowledge of God, in the movement of man along the path to faith. However, the result of such “natural” knowledge of God turns out to be limited and “abstract”. The boundary of faith is uncrossable for him, and only by crossing it can one see how the abstraction of knowledge is drawn into the integrity of faith, from which it was originally “abstracted.” Then it becomes possible to say that knowledge relates to faith, as a part relates to the whole, or, using a comparison popular at the beginning of the 20th century, as potential infinity to actual infinity. But it is not faith itself that is called upon to speak and testify to this, and not science, as a representative of “knowledge,” but philosophy, as Kireevsky speaks about in the article “On... Philosophy”: “Philosophy is not one of the sciences, and is not faith. It is the general result and foundation of all sciences and the conductor of thought between them and faith” [3, p. 321]. In the new context, the opposition between faith and external education as two types of thinking, each of which seeks to “rework” the other in its own spirit, becomes more specific. The instrument of “processing” in both cases is philosophy. In this duel, two outcomes are possible: “either education will supplant faith, giving rise to philosophical beliefs that correspond to itself; or faith, overcoming this external education in the thinking consciousness of the people, from the very contact with it will produce its own philosophy, which will give a different meaning to external education and permeate it with the dominance of another principle” [3, p. 322]. This is how the place, purpose and essence of Christian philosophy is conceived - it faces the tasks of understanding and interpretation, i.e., essentially, hermeneutical tasks. If modern hermeneutics, represented by, for example, P. Ricoeur, sets itself the task of exposing the illusions of consciousness by interpreting symbolic series, while relying on the work done by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, then Christian hermeneutics can add to this another fundamental task: exposing the illusions of unbelieving consciousness by deciphering the specific symbolism inherent in it 83. Russian religious philosophy has already begun this task, starting with Yu. F. Samarin - the direct successor of Kireyevsky - and then, especially in the person of Vl. Solovyov (see his studies on Comte and Nietzsche), S.N. Bulgakov (works on Feuerbach, Herzen, etc.), L. Shestov 84, etc. But let's return to the passages in question. Contemplation of the external world, “contemplation of creations” (Rom. 1:19) can tell us, as already mentioned, only external, abstract knowledge about God, which corresponds to an equally abstract self-consciousness. The danger of abstract thinking, which the thinker himself experienced, is that it leads to false reassurance, as can be seen from the quoted passage about Descartes. The fight against this false reassurance, against “complacency” is the most essential aspect of the activity of the Slavophiles, especially K.S. Aksakova. This pathos echoes, on the one hand, romantic rebellion, and on the other, with such important moments of patristic asceticism, such as the teachings about delusion, thoughts and passions. In Kireyevsky’s “Excerpts,” this idea receives additional, anthropological, illumination: “Thinking, separated from the heart’s aspiration, is just as much entertainment for the soul as unconscious gaiety. The deeper such thinking is, the more important it seems, the more frivolous it actually makes a person. Therefore, serious and powerful study of science is one of the means of entertainment, a means of getting rid of oneself. This imaginary seriousness, imaginary activity, disperses the true one. Secular pleasures do not work so successfully and not so quickly” [2(1) p. 280–281]. This is how the Russian philosopher thinks of the result of the desire of abstract thinking for self-sufficiency. Beginning in 1839, Kireyevsky developed various aspects of this issue in various works. Following him, these topics were addressed by F.M. Dostoevsky and especially L. Shestov, who made the theme of the philosopher’s flight from himself one of the main ones in his work. This passage can also serve as one of the examples of the hermeneutic function of Christian philosophy, which was mentioned above. Such deification of one's own mind leads to the loss of the integrity of the human being and the destruction of personal self-awareness. Having fun in one way or another, a person is “distracted” from the original ontological relationship, from faith. Thus, he inevitably falls into objective thinking within the framework of subject-object relations. His own “I” finds himself at the center of the world, it becomes the final criterion of truth and lies. Thus, egocentrism is established as a life position, and transcendentalism as a philosophical position. But at the same time, it is at the heights of its activity that the mind has a chance to recognize its own limitations. This happened with Schelling, Steffens, Pascal and others, and it also happened with Kireyevsky. Here, in “Passages,” he judges from the heights of the world of faith that was opening up to him, and therefore, as if in retrospect, he speaks of the insufficiency of not only scientific, but also philosophical thinking for its acquisition: “But unity, omnipotence, wisdom and all other concepts of the Divinity of the first cause, which the mind can extract from the contemplation of the external universe, do not yet inspire in it that consciousness of the living and personal self-essence of the Creator, which gives the essentiality to our mental relationship to Him, shifting the very internal movement of our thoughts and feelings towards Him from the sphere of speculative abstraction into the sphere of living, responsible activity” [2(1) p. 279]. Within the same typology of various types of knowledge and their relationship to faith, Kireevsky notes the existence of a gap between knowledge, as a set of parts, potential infinity, and faith, as a whole, as actual infinity. Thus, a new breakthrough of “internal self-awareness”, a breakthrough of a person to himself, is necessary. It cannot be accomplished by one’s own human strength, but it entails a significant change in man’s position in relation to God and the world. In order for abstraction to be replaced by materiality, a rupture of logical structures and connections of consciousness is necessary; Revelation is necessary, the special logic of which has already been discussed. Knowledge of the external world is here necessarily joined by knowledge of the internal world: “This consciousness, which completely changes the character of our God-thought, and which we cannot extract directly from just contemplation of the external universe, arises in our soul when independent and steady contemplation of the internal and moral world is added to the contemplation of the external world, revealing to the vision of the mind the side of the highest vitality in the highest considerations of the mind” [2(1) p. 279]. It’s all about the same “transcendence into the inside.” This passage combines two aspects in Kireevsky’s approach to man, about which Kotelnikov wrote: “The first is a sober and uncompromising analysis of the real ethical personality in oneself and in those around us... The second is a unique theory of personality, a theory of a person’s conscious spiritual life” [99, p. 15]. The results of analysis and contemplation of the inner world become the data of the theory. In Kireyevsky’s late work one can easily notice features that characterize the consciousness of a new, still nascent stage in the development of Russian literature, associated with the names of L.N. Tolstoy and F.M. Dostoevsky. For Kireevsky himself, this moral consciousness is a necessary stage of the “striving for holistic thinking” that lies at the basis of “Orthodox Christian education.” This “integral thinking” should in no way be confused with the ideal of “integral knowledge” that B.C. subsequently strived for. Soloviev. Kireyevsky means, first of all, an act, or a sequence of acts of consciousness, the logic of his life. Solovyov speaks of a “system of knowledge,” a hierarchical organization of the entire body of human knowledge, headed by free theosophy. The problem of internal restructuring of the bearer of this knowledge remains, as it were, in the background (although, of course, it is not absent), while for Kireevsky this particular problem turns out to be central. Knowledge about the external and internal world serves only as steps along which a person ascends to his main goal - faith and holistic thinking. Hence the constant mutual misunderstanding between Solovyov and his followers, on the one hand, and the spiritual and philosophical heirs of Slavophilism, on the other 85. “This striving for mental integrity, as a necessary condition for understanding the highest truth, has always been an integral part of Christian philosophy. From the time of the Apostles to our times, it has been his exclusive property. But since the fall of the Western Church it has remained predominantly in the Orthodox Church. Other Christian confessions, although they do not reject its legality, do not consider it a necessary condition for understanding Divine truth” [2(1) p. 275]. Thus, faith and unbelief, as two fundamental anthropological positions, “religious attitudes” (S.L. Frank), one associated with the “affirmation of metaphysical monism”, i.e. “integrity”, and the other – “dualism” [190, p. 418], i.e. “duality” 86 determine those images of a person, the levels of his self-awareness, the ways of his thinking and the types of culture he creates, “education”, which they are based on. § 4. Faith and personality according to the teachings of I.V. Kireyevsky We can now begin to examine and interpret the passage, which, occupying a central place in its importance, may seem both to be a kind of summation of all the work done in the "Passages" and another attempt to restate the main idea: “Consciousness about the relationship of the living Divine personality to the human personality serves as the basis for faith, or, more correctly, faith is that very consciousness, more or less clear, more or less immediate. It does not constitute purely human knowledge, does not constitute a special concept in the mind or heart, does not fit into any one cognitive ability, does not relate to one logical mind, or heartfelt feeling, or the inspiration of conscience: but embraces the entire integrity of a person, and appears only in moments of this integrity and in proportion to its completeness. Therefore, the main character of believing thinking is the desire to gather all the individual parts of the soul into one force, to find that inner center of being, where reason, and will, and feeling, and conscience, and the beautiful, and the true, and the amazing, and the merciful, and the entire volume of the mind merges into one living unity, and thus the essential personality of man is restored in its pristine indivisibility. It is not the form of thought that comes to the mind that produces this concentration of forces in it; but from mental integrity comes the meaning that gives real understanding of thought” [2(1) p. 274–275]. Here we are faced with the question of the relationship between self- and God-consciousness of man. The first thing we are faced with here is another, and fundamental, “definition” of faith - the main word that characterizes, according to Kireyevsky, this relationship: “Consciousness about the relationship of the living Divine personality to the human personality serves as the basis for faith, or, more precisely, faith is that very consciousness, more or less clear, more or less immediate.” This definition reflects a very significant fluctuation in Kireevsky’s thought, so significant that he not only thought it through, but also included it in the text, probably considering that it reflects important semantic nuances of the problem itself. This hesitation concerns the problem of the relationship between faith and direct experience of Communion with God. The distinction between them, at first drawn quite clearly, is then almost destroyed, but it becomes possible to talk about degrees of immediacy, i.e. as if about the degrees of faith itself. Rev. Isaac the Syrian distinguishes, without separating, faith and “spiritual knowledge”, and connects them with the direct presence of the Holy Spirit, acting in a person and enlightening him from the inside [78, p. 128, 130–132J. Following this teaching, Kireevsky focuses on the “immediacy” of the experience of Communion with God, and, therefore, faith, as “consciousness about” this experience, which precisely because of this immediacy cannot be separated from experience. One can try to interpret Kireyevsky’s thought in such a way that the experience of Communion with God is not the relationship of beings itself, since it, as such, cannot be interrupted due to the very concept of the relationship between created and uncreated nature and due to the irrevocability of the sacrament of baptism for a Christian; but “more or less immediate” “consciousness of relation”, i.e. a conscious attitude (and others cannot have a living attitude of individuals, insofar as they are individuals), which was demanded by many Holy Fathers (especially St. Simeon the New Theologian). This conscious, and therefore already interpreted, experience “serves as the basis for faith.” We thus have a structure of three levels: the attitude of individuals (experience) - consciousness about it - faith. Then this structure is reduced, not without hesitation on the part of the author: “or, more correctly, faith is that very consciousness.” This reduction is precisely intended to retain the element of clarity and immediacy of experience, while at the same time preserving its “consciousness.” Thus, Kireevsky strives to ensure his stay in the element of two traditions at the same time - Orthodox spirituality and Western European philosophy, and so that the latter finds in the first its new, but at the same time, original foundation. The interpretation of experience by consciousness does not mean its unreality; symbolism does not negate reality and spontaneity. In the act of faith, a person deals precisely with the reality of the Divine Person, but if he thinks that his experience exhausts this reality, he is mistaken. The hermeneutic circle that arises between experience and its interpretation means, in this case, not the total constructedness of experience, but its ability to endlessly deepen. If, however, our experience of communication with God is initially interpreted by our consciousness, and, at the same time, it is direct experience, then with the introduction of degrees of immediacy the question arises about the relationship between immediacy and consciousness. The matter seems to be like this: there is a certain experience of a person that is fundamental and determining for his way of being. This experience, being reflected, is interpreted by consciousness as “the relationship of the living Divine personality to the human personality.” This consciousness serves as the basis for faith 87. When we, following Kireyevsky, say that “faith is that very consciousness, more or less immediate,” this means two things. Firstly, in the act of faith, the Divine personality is present directly, without being identified, at the same time, with the “subject”, or better yet, with the “author” of this act - the human person. Perhaps it would be even more accurate to say that the act of faith, according to Kireyevsky, is the work of two personal co-authors - God and man, in which both are present directly and to the extent of their integrity - always relative on the part of man (“more or less”) and always absolute on the part of the Divine. If we talk about the act of faith as an act of consciousness, the Divine personality becomes the subject of his intention, a direct given of consciousness. Secondly, this means that this intention cannot be fully realized, but only “more or less,” as it turns out later, to the extent of the integrity of the human being, to the extent of the realization of the personal principle in it. Taken together, both of these provisions again refer us to the teaching of St. Gregory Palamas on the distinction between essence and energy in God, and the absence of appropriate terminology rather confirms the unity of Kireevsky’s thought with the main line of Orthodox tradition. According to Kotelnikov, “Kireevsky creates his own anthropology, philosophically explicating those ideas about man that carried the Optina experience and the traditions that feed it” [102(3), p. 7]. We can say that the teaching of St. Gregory represents a theological interpretation of the same experience, the philosophical generalization of which is outlined here by Kireevsky 88. So, if the first part of this dilemma seems to remain completely within the framework of traditional idealistic discourse, then the second clearly refers beyond its limits, since consciousness, which has God Himself as the subject of its fulfilled intention in His energies, is radically different from that which is explored in transcendental idealism. It is clear that such consciousness has its own special logic and refers to completely different conditions of existence, primarily to the integrity of the human being. This being, the being of the individual, has for Kireyevsky a self-authenticity, which, as the passage about Descartes testifies, is only clouded and hidden by the illusions of consciousness. If he talks about faith as consciousness, it is because it is necessary for him to include transcendental idealism, understood as broadly as possible, as a philosophy of consciousness, or as “the sphere of rational abstract thinking” [3, p. 328], into his reasoning. To do this, he creates appropriate projections of concepts, and is engaged in translating concepts from one language to another and back. Considerable difficulties also arise due to fundamentally different requirements for the formalization of philosophical language and varying degrees of terminological development. The key concepts of the new philosophy in the language of the old must fail: elude precise definitions, raise questions, thereby opening doors to new areas of existence. This is precisely the concept of “faith” here, considered as an act of consciousness. “It does not constitute purely human knowledge, does not constitute a special concept in the mind or heart, does not fit into any one cognitive ability, does not relate to one logical mind, or heartfelt feeling, or the inspiration of conscience, but embraces the entire integrity of a person and appears only in moments of this integrity and in proportion to its completeness” [2(1) p. 275]. We move here to a new characteristic of personality and faith, which can be called “existential.” This characteristic is integrity and the desire for the completeness of this integrity. It complements the previous, “intentional” characteristic, and, taken together, they can be called “total appeal” - a word that, it seems to me, best reflects the essence of Kireyevsky’s teaching. The more complete a person’s appeal to God, the more forces and sides of his personality participate in this conversion, the more integral his spirit appears in this act, the more immediate is the “consciousness of the relationship of the living Divine personality to the human personality,” the more alive is faith. Only an integral person in the unity and uniqueness of his personality can stand before God face to face, see Him as He is. Here the question of immediacy and interpretation is removed - interpretation arises from direct experience as the only possible one, as its adequate description, which, at the same time, leaves the possibility for further theorizing. This theorizing, however, was not something valuable in itself for him. The main task of believing thinking was a practical task; it was understood by the philosopher precisely as a practice aimed at an ontological change in the thinker himself: finding the “inner center of being,” restoring “the essential personality of man in its primordial indivisibility” [2(1) p. 275]. It is very interesting that Kireyevsky’s dictionary has remained unchanged since 1830. Even in the “Review of Russian Literature of 1829” he wrote about the “center of being” of Zhukovsky’s poetry [3, p. 59]. But at the same time, the direction of his attention has changed in the most significant way: it is now directed not outward, to the phenomena of culture and nature, but to the inner world of man. Of course, man and his inner world not only were not ignored by the romantic Kireevsky, brought up in the cultural environment of the Pushkin era, but were constantly in the focus of this attention. He, however, could not consider them otherwise than as something ultimately secondary, derived from the life of the spirit of the people, the world spirit, the ideal universe or any other supra-individual structures of created existence. Now, after conversion, Kireevsky’s main intuition finally receives the opportunity for full disclosure - in the doctrine of the intrinsic value of the human personality as the ultimate beginning of the created world. In the center of this person’s being are contained all his ideal wealth, all the “logoi of existence,” to use the word Rev. Maximus the Confessor. This special method of believing thinking was contrasted by Kireyevsky to the method of “Roman theologians and philosophers”, for whom “it seems that it was enough that the authority of Divine truths was once recognized, so that further understanding and development of these truths could already be accomplished through abstract logical thinking” [2(1) p. 275]. This opposition is not accidental - Kireyevsky’s text itself cannot be correctly understood without turning to the spiritual tradition to which the author belonged - to the spiritual tradition of Orthodoxy. When we say that believing thinking is understood by Kireyevsky as practice, we mean not only the general meaning according to which any philosophizing changes the consciousness and the very way of existence of its subject (this was significant for the early stage of Kireyevsky’s work), but also a more specific meaning. Kireevsky’s description has a number of similarities with the very specific and specific practice of Orthodox spirituality of “smart prayer” with its “bringing of the mind into the heart” - “a special process of concentration, concentration or centering of consciousness” [195, p. 95]. Many people have written about the heart in Russian philosophy; it is enough to name the names of P.D. Yurkevich and B.P. Vysheslavtseva. In their understanding of the heart as the “center of being” of the human personality, they follow Kireyevsky (although the latter rarely uses this word - apparently because of its inherent romantic associations). We have already spoken above about the understanding of the “heart” by Rev. Isaac the Syrian, let us now present some more evidence from Kireyevsky’s contemporaries and later authors. This is what P.D. wrote in his article on the meaning of the heart (1860). Yurkevich (1827–1874), a younger contemporary of Kireyevsky, a representative of spiritual and academic thought: “...sacred writers definitely and with full consciousness of the truth recognized the heart as the focus of all phenomena of human bodily and spiritual life.” “In the heart of a person lies the basis that his ideas, feelings and actions receive a peculiarity in which his soul is expressed, and not another, or they receive such a personal, privately determined direction, according to the strength of which they are expressions not of a general spiritual being, but of an individual living, truly existing person.” “The concept and clear knowledge of the mind, insofar as it becomes our mental state and does not remain an abstract image of external objects, opens or makes itself felt and noticed not in the head, but in the heart; it must penetrate into this depth in order to become an active force and engine of our spiritual life” [212, p. 73, 82, 86]. Yurkevich is a philosopher, like Kireyevsky. The data of Holy Scripture that he uses in this article is for him evidence of the spiritual experience of its authors, just as for Kireevsky it is the writings of the Holy Fathers. Both of them are rooted in the same tradition, although they belong to different branches of it: hence the great similarity of their results. I mean, first of all, the doctrine of the “focus”, of personality and its “immediate self-consciousness”, of the internal sources of human thinking [212, p. 91, 82–83], etc. Let us give further evidence from ascetic writers, contemporaries of Kireyevsky. We will see that at his level and language, in his mode of speech, he expressed the same consciousness of the Church as they did. So, for example, St. Theophan the Recluse (1815–1894) wrote in “Letters on Spiritual Life”: “The mind, remaining in the head, by itself wants to settle everything in the soul and manage everything..., it chases after everything and only suffers defeats” [185, p. 182]. Here again it is appropriate to recall Kireevsky’s criticism of Western theology (the methods and rationalistic spirit of which were largely borrowed by the Orthodox theological school) 89: “In this logical presentation, from the abstract rational understanding of dogmas, moral demands were also heard, as an abstract conclusion. A strange birth of the living from the dead! A wise demand for power in the name of a thought that itself does not have it” [2(1) p. 275–276]. “The only way out is according to St. Theophan - the mind should not remain in the head, but descend into the heart" [185, p. 182]. That is, the modern thinker comments, the mind “ceases to be a head activity (pure theorizing, reasoning - K.A.), external to the “heart”, but actually moves to it, uniting with it together” [195, p. 96]. M.A. can also be mentioned here. Novoselov 90, a little-studied but interesting thinker and church leader, who at the beginning of the 20th century headed the “Circle of Those Seeking Christian Enlightenment,” to which such thinkers as Fr. P. Florensky, S.N. Bulgakov, V.F. Ern. Novoselov repeatedly refers to Kireyevsky in his writings. From his point of view, “school theology” “in its extreme schematism, absolutely does not see the living human soul with its demands, torments, doubts. It does not take a person with his existing spiritual requirements and does not elevate him, carefully and soulfully nurturing him, to the highest level of self-awareness and well-being” [147, p. 50]. This clearly correlates with the above lines of Kireevsky, who himself was quite critical of contemporary theology: “We do not have a satisfactory Theology,” he wrote to Koshelev in 1853 [92(2), p. 100]. The main reason for this criticism is the lack of an anthropological dimension. Even more striking is the presentation of the stages of a life of grace in St. Ignatius Brianchaninov, one of the most brilliant and significant spiritual writers associated with the Optina Hermitage and the tradition before. Paisius Velichkovsky: “From the blessed action of the Holy Spirit in man, at first an unusual silence begins to breathe in him, a deadness appears to the world, to the enjoyment of its vanity and sinfulness, to services in the midst of it. A Christian is reconciled to everything and everyone through a strange, humble and at the same time high, spiritual reasoning (emphasis added - K.A.), unknown and inaccessible to the carnal and spiritual state. He begins to feel compassion for all humanity and for each person in particular. Compassion turns into love. Then his attention begins to deepen during prayer: the words of prayer begin to make a strong, unusual impression on the soul, to shake it. Finally, little by little the heart and the whole soul will move into union with the mind, and after the soul the body itself will be drawn into this union. This prayer is called Clever when pronounced with the mind with deep attention, with the sympathy of the heart; Heartfelt, when it is pronounced by the mind and heart united, and the mind seems to descend into the heart, and sends up a prayer from the depths of the heart; Mental, when it is done with the whole soul, with the participation of the body itself, when it is done from the whole being, and the whole being is made as if by one mouth saying a prayer” [30(2), p. 218]. Here thinking (spiritual reasoning) comes very close to prayer, and this additional evidence allows us to conclude about the nature of such thinking. The main tool for this self-assembly of a person is attention. Its result is the formation of new “principles of organization and mechanisms of the work of consciousness, in which mental and spiritual energies form a single structure” [195, p. 95]. It is the formation of this new unified structure that Kireyevsky describes in his passage. On the basis of faith as a state of complete turning towards the Divine and through attention, believing thinking, like prayer, collects all the spiritual forces of a person, thereby restoring the unity of the human personality, destroyed by the Fall. Personality can be restored only within the horizon of turning to the Divine Personality. It seems undoubted that the practice of internal attention, bringing the mind into the heart, became here the starting point of the philosopher’s thought, who tried to generalize its results and show their general significance from the point of view of the doctrine of man. “It is not the form of thought that comes before the mind that produces this concentration of forces in it, but from mental integrity comes the meaning that gives real understanding of thought” [2(1) p. 275]. This is how Kireyevsky ends his passage somewhat mysteriously. This means: thought as a certain incidental content of consciousness in itself is powerless, no matter how deep, sublime, beautiful, amazing, desirable, fair or merciful it may be. A thought coming from outside and imposing itself on the consciousness cannot reunite all the scattered powers of the mind and capture the person entirely. Only by gathering together, uniting with the heart, “experiencing” a thought, making it “its own,” as if “giving birth” to it, the believing mind is able to give the thought its real meaning in its integrity, to unfold the thought completely, with all its prerequisites and consequences, to their “ever-changing cohesion and resolution” [5, p. 280], in all the strength of its pathos. Here it is appropriate to turn again to Yurkevich: “The problems that thinking solves originate in their final basis not from the influences of the external world, but from the drives and irresistible demands of the heart... the vitality and depth of our thinking and consciousness lies in that spiritual being, the appearance of which we know by direct internal experience only in our heartfelt drives...” [212, pp. 82–83]. Kireevsky has already made attempts to describe the activity of holistic consciousness 91 . However, until now the connection of this feature - integrity or systematicity - of Orthodox or religious thinking with a person’s personal self-awareness has not been demonstrated with full clarity. Only with the clarification of “faith”, as precisely personal, and therefore striving to become complete, a person’s turning towards God, opening the way for the action in a person of the Divine energies that gather him, does it become possible to establish this connection. In the context of Russian literary and philosophical disputes of that time, this meant giving an answer to Westerners with their developed theory of personality (see Chapter 2, § 4). In his teaching, Kireevsky revealed the paths and driving forces of the genesis of personality in its Orthodox understanding (what Samarin lacked), and made this understanding significant in a specific historical situation. For him, this meant the final mastery of his own original intuition, the final return to himself. If we now return to the beginning of the commented passage: “The consciousness of the relationship of the living Divine personality to the human personality serves as the basis for faith,” we will see that the term “personal self-consciousness” that we constantly used does not fully correspond to what Kireyevsky would like to say. After all, the situation here is not such that a person first realizes himself as a person, and then, realizing himself as such, enters into some kind of relationship with the Divine personality. The author’s thoughts are more consistent with something else: a person realizes himself in a situation where a Divine personality enters into a certain relationship with him, and a person who finds himself in such a situation at the same time turns out to be a person (although, of course, he does not necessarily call himself this word). It is this moment, when a person with his whole being experiences not his relationship to God, but the direct and purposeful relationship of God to himself, that is the moment that constitutes the human personality. This moment is preceded by the work of self-gathering of a person, connecting the mind with the heart, acquiring unceasing prayer, which, like faith, is not only our relationship to God, but also (which is already realized post factum) God’s relationship to us - which the author emphasizes in his definition. But this work of self-assembly has not only an internal aspect, to which our attention has been devoted so far, but also an external aspect, so to speak, behavioral. The following passage is mainly dedicated to him: “Theological studies are not possible for everyone, not necessary for everyone; not everyone has access to the practice of philosophy; It is not possible for everyone to constantly and specially exercise that inner attention which purifies and gathers the mind to a higher unity; but for everyone it is possible and necessary to connect the direction of his life with his fundamental conviction of faith, to agree with it the main occupation and each special task, so that every action is an expression of one aspiration, every thought seeks one foundation, every step leads to one goal. Without this, a person’s life will have no meaning, his mind will be a calculating machine, his heart will be a collection of soulless strings in which a random wind whistles; no action will have a moral character, and there will actually be no person. For a man is his faith” [2(1) p. 276]. N.F. passionately and unfairly argued with the doctrine set forth in this passage. Fedorov, who accused Kireevsky (and after him all the Slavophiles) of being abstracted from the real matter and being partial to the “liberties of the nobility.” This passage is clearly divided into three parts. The first talks about the lack of need for most people both in special theoretical studies - theology and philosophy - and in undergoing special existential practices, i.e. “exercises in internal attention”, which were discussed above. This specifically "inner" aspect or path of spiritual life is therefore not seen as obligatory for everyone. However, further, in the second part, it is said that “for everyone it is possible and necessary”: about the “direction of life”, about “occupations”, “deeds”, “actions”. Moreover, these seemingly “external” things turn out to be most directly connected with internal ones. Kireevsky poses a new task here: organizing a new space of life. It embraces internal and external life, the entire integrity of man in the broadest sense. This space is organized and centered in a certain way (“connect the direction of your life with your root conviction of faith”) - and it is organized not egocentrically, but on the “object” of faith of the author of this space. It appears dynamically directed towards this Object (“every step leads to one goal”). This space can only arise in a favorable spiritual environment - in the Church. This is revealed in a series of passages devoted to the Church - and, accordingly, to the doctrine of conciliarity. Although Kireyevsky does not use this Khomyakov term, he writes about “the spiritual communion of every Christian with the fullness of the entire Church.” “Every moral victory in the mystery of one Christian soul is already a spiritual triumph for the entire Christian world” [2(1) p. 277–278]. It is thanks to the Church that a complete change in a person’s life position, complete repentance is possible; it is here that a person’s turn to God finds its completion: “And there is no such undeveloped consciousness that cannot be imbued with the basic conviction of the Christian faith. For there is no mind so dull that it cannot understand its own insignificance and the need for a higher revelation; There is no heart so limited that it cannot understand the possibility of another love, higher than that which earthly objects arouse in it; there is no conscience that does not feel the invisible existence of a higher moral order; There is no such weak will that could not decide on complete self-sacrifice for the highest love of his heart. And faith is made up of such forces. It is a living need for redemption and unconditional gratitude for it. This is his whole essence. From here all subsequent development of the believing mind and life receives its light and meaning” [2(1) p. 276–277]. Repentance, Greek μετάνοια, “change of mind,” brings a person to the Church, where he can strive towards his goal not alone, but in spiritual communion with both his contemporaries and the Holy Fathers, without whose spiritual experience he cannot do in acquiring his own [2(1) p. 278]. It is no coincidence that V.V. Zenkovsky says that “for Kireevsky’s thought, the central concept is the concept of spiritual life” [73(1.2), p. 12], although we will not find this phrase in the philosopher. This radical change in a person’s life position (the transition from egocentrism, from “fearful self-love” to “magnanimous self-sacrifice” [2(1) p. 277]), the creation of a new way of life, which finds its expression not only in the internal structure of the human spirit, but also in the external structure of human life, is carried out through this dispensation. This path also presupposes theology (as a clarification and deepening of the basic conviction of faith); and philosophy (as a link between faith and life); and attention, since we are talking about “every action”, “every thought”, “every step”. In other words, a person’s extremely responsible and serious attitude towards his faith already contains in its very concept the idea of ​​its integrity, the person’s embrace of the entire totality of church ministries and practices, which does not, of course, negate the in-depth development of those to which a given person feels a special calling. All of the above is expressed, as if by contradiction, in the negative part of the passage. “Without this, a person’s life will not have any meaning, his mind will be a calculating machine, his heart will be a collection of soulless strings in which a random wind whistles, no action will have a moral character and there will actually be no person. For a man is his faith.” This part also gives a completely definite, but opposite to the desired image of a person who has reached the limit of disbelief and therefore is extremely disintegrated. The meaning of the word “faith” here seems to expand beyond the boundaries of a purely religious attitude. It is consonant here with the description that A.S. gave in his “Semiramis”. Khomyakov: “Whether it is dark, whether his concept is clear, whether he brings his worship to the eternal truth, or to a fleeting ghost, in any case, faith is the limit to his internal development. He can no longer leave her circle, because faith is the highest point of all his thoughts, the secret condition of his desires and actions, the extreme line of his knowledge. In it is his future, personal and social, in it is the final conclusion of the fullness of his rational and universal existence” [191, p. 22]. Faith here is the dominant around which a person gathers his energies. At the same time, this is the horizon of his activity and his consciousness, the limit to which he strives and beyond which he cannot go. Finally, this is an act that reveals to a person this or that reality in its significance, the act by which a person accepts the revelation of this reality and responds to this revelation. This expansion does not cancel the religious understanding of faith as the proper meaning of this word. On the contrary, these considerations lead us to the foundations of the philosophy of religion of the Slavophiles, the characteristic features of which were subsequently outlined by Yu. F. Samarin in “Remarks on M. Muller’s essay on the history of religion.” At the heart of this philosophy of religion is the concept of “personal revelation” as “the conscious and deliberate influence of God on human life,” giving a person the opportunity to “experience in the deepest depths of his individuality the sensation of the presence of God” [167, p. 521]. In a more generalized form, it is possible, following S.L. Frank, define the concept of “revelation” as “active self-disclosure, self-discovery, emanating from the revealing reality itself, aimed at “me” and precisely thereby constituting and revealing this reality to me as “you”” [190, p. 353]. Then faith, in the understanding of the Slavophiles, turns out to be an act opposite to revelation: the one by which any “I” perceives the revelation of any “you”. It is this relationship that determines the level of “immediate self-existence” (S.L. Frank) - individual or personal - which opens in a person’s self-awareness. The reality that is revealed in the act of “consciousness about the relationship of the living Divine personality to the human personality,” due to its absoluteness, is incomparable with any types of relative, created, cosmic reality. Due to the supercosmic, “essential” significance of man himself, only the revelation of transcendental reality, the “personal revelation” of God Himself, can ensure the completeness and stability of the integrity of his individual nature, with which the being and self-awareness of his personality is connected, and create the widest possible horizon for its “internal development.” All of the above may create the impression that Kireyevsky simply seeks to impose on the potential reader his vision of the spiritual path of the human person. However, in my opinion, this is not the case. In his texts concerning the relationship between faith and personality, Kireevsky pursues a very specific and purely philosophical goal: to describe a certain area of ​​​​human experience using language adequate to it. Since this sphere turns out to be fundamental from the point of view of its impact on the entire human existence, its “development” leads to a rethinking of all other spheres of this existence, to the emergence of a new type of human self-understanding and corresponding onto-epistemological concepts. In the 40–50s. XIX century namely I.V. Kireyevsky was considered a philosopher par excellence among Slavophiles. The posthumous publication of “Excerpts” brought this aspect of his activity to a worthy conclusion. And it is no coincidence that at the same time the first attempt to think through the essence of the thought expressed by him in these “Excerpts” was made by his closest like-minded person and friend, A.S. Khomyakov, in the article “Concerning passages found in the papers of I.V. Kireyevsky. The basis of this thought is, according to Khomyakov, “the requirement of spiritual integrity for correct understanding and the recognition of the relationship of faith to reason, not as an alien, but as a lower element, or otherwise to an element that finds the fullness of its existence only in faith” [193, p. 263]. However, such an idea of ​​the relationship between spiritual integrity, faith and reason becomes possible for Kireevsky and A.S., who followed him in this regard. Khomyakov and other Slavophiles, thanks to a certain well-thought-out concept of faith and the related concept of personality. It is precisely the concepts of personality and faith, as the relationship between the Divine and human personalities, that seem to me to be the point from which the entire subsequent philosophy of the Slavophiles “grows.” If this point is defined correctly in this study, we can expect that this will make it possible in the future to carry out on its basis a holistic reconstruction of the thought of the Slavophiles in its various manifestations - not only philosophical, but also theological, aesthetic, social, economic, etc. This applies to both the theoretical research of the Slavophiles and their practical activities. Here we can only outline in very general terms the individual lines of this reconstruction. Considerations have already been expressed above regarding the Slavophil philosophy of religion, as well as the philosophy of history and culture of these thinkers. In the field of aesthetics, the holistic way of perceiving the world, inherent in a person existing in unity with the believing people, gives a corresponding - epic - character to her creative acts, which at the same time express the specificity of popular perception. Hence the Slavophile assessment of Gogol, so close to his self-understanding; a theory of nationality that stands at the intersection of aesthetics and social philosophy, but has deeper, mystical origins. I.V. Kireevsky, A.S. Khomyakov and their Slavophile collaborators also undertook a number of more specific studies and projects, for a full understanding of which the attitude discussed above plays a key role. Their economic and sociological concepts, in particular those related to the reforms of 1861, are the practical application of conclusions from their central religious and anthropological concepts. They rely on the concept of the peasant community as a “world”, i.e. that specific place where specific relationships are realized between individuals - participants and co-authors of this community, united in “self-denial” by the unity of faith. On the scale of the state, the totality of communities constitutes the people, living in the same unity. Faith (in the broad sense of the word, i.e., regardless of its truth) provides the specific perception of the world by each people. The truth of faith ensures the vitality and creative potential of the people. This also includes the problem of relations between the Church, society (“Earth”) and the state, which is so relevant in our time. While remaining generally faithful to the patristic ideal of the “symphony” (this is, strictly speaking, Justinian’s ideal, ecclesiastical and legal), the Slavophiles - I.V. Kireevsky, A.S. Khomyakov, Yu. F. Samarin, K.S. Aksakov - gave various options for solving this problem. Slavophiles, in particular I.V. himself. Kireyevsky in his “Passages”, is responsible for the development of some ethical problems - the concept of “conscience” and its place in the general structure of consciousness, the dialectic of justice and mercy, the beginning of an interesting “intentional” theory of behavior. It is also necessary to point out the psychological, socio-psychological and pedagogical potential of the doctrine of personality, the development of ideas of conciliarity and community. However, when addressing these Slavophile ideas in this aspect, it is necessary to observe certain methodological precautions - in particular, to strictly distinguish between the ontological and psychological levels of description and consideration. Kireevsky, of course, does not have this distinction, since in his time psychology as a special science did not yet exist. Nevertheless, his ideas can be used in the development of such problems as the formation of personality, its self-identification, adaptation in society, and the transformation of the human personality. The last problem was at the center of the psychological research of many Russian writers, primarily N.V. Gogol, V.A. Zhukovsky, F.M. Dostoevsky. This entire body of heritage of the Slavophiles was continued by many Russian and some foreign thinkers. Without a doubt, it should not be considered as a complete and complete system, but as a sketch or a series of sketches. Rather, all individual research can be united by a certain general approach, a method of considering any reality as some complex integrity, organized around that central reality that cannot be lost sight of - a person of a certain image. This holistic, “systemic” approach forms the basis of “Orthodox-Christian education”, acting as a hierarchically organized structure, with elements in the form of faith, philosophy, science and various areas of creative activity, the relationships between which were thought out by the Slavophiles quite consistently. Faith here does not appear as a dogmatic premise imposed from the outside, which can be expressed in a judgment like “God exists and He is such and such.” Being, first of all, an integration of personal experience, it rather determines the internal nature of acts of contemplation as the basis of creative and cognitive processes. All these developments determine the enduring value of the theoretical heritage of the “senior Slavophiles.” At the same time, the spiritual path of each of them forms an integral part of Russian spiritual culture. All of the above assumes that these people themselves managed to achieve the realization of this image of a person in themselves in the course of their spiritual lives. The fact that the grave of the Kireyevsky brothers is located in the Optina Hermitage next to the graves of the great elders can serve as confirmation of these words. Our reconstruction of the life and creative path of I.V. Kireyevsky is finished. Since the “Conclusion,” like the “Preface,” is nothing more than a reason for reflection, we will try to summarize here some results, both general and more specific. We have clearly tried to outline the main features and stages of the philosophical biography of the Russian thinker. An attempt was made to determine the place and significance of I.V.’s creativity. Kireevsky in the philosophical and literary process in Russia in the situations of the 20–30s and 40–50s. century before last. At the same time, I would like this study to draw the reader’s attention to a very significant and significant turning point in the history of thought in general: the moment of the birth of religious philosophy. The most significant characteristic features of these situations are more or less steadily reproduced throughout the New Time - both in Europe and in other cultural regions covered by the expansion of the European Enlightenment. The more straightforwardly this expansion 92 is carried out, the more crudely the policy of rationalization is pursued, the more intensely the ideas of romantic protest against the principles of the Enlightenment are perceived. However, romanticism, with all its originality, retains a number of points of dialectical dependence on the Enlightenment, due to which it should be considered as a kind of transitional stage, at the exit of which we can observe either the radicalization of the Enlightenment paradigm associated with the revolutionary movement, or a decisive return to a religious way of seeing and mastering the world that overcomes secularism. There is, therefore, some logic according to which there is a rebellion against this expansion. This logic, which can manifest itself in very different ways depending on specific historical circumstances, represents the internal logic of the development of philosophical thought. This development is carried out, as a rule, through “negative dialectics”, i.e. like a revision. So, the uprising occurs in the field of thought as a more or less radical revision of the basic premises of the Enlightenment and European secularism in general, during which a certain set of possibilities that are realized in history arises. Various versions of religious philosophy represent, from my point of view, the most radical and vital version of this kind of revision. It is clear that it is impossible to refuse to model the internal logic of the philosophical process without the very concept of the history of philosophy crumbling and never being realized. As Prince rightly pointed out. S.N. Trubetskoy, a historian of philosophy needs to “think of its development as meaningful, purposeful and therefore holistic” [179, p. 34]. However, pure internalism in the spirit of Hegel, for which “the sequence of systems of philosophy in history is the same as the sequence in the derivation of logical definitions of ideas” [49(1), p. 92], is, of course, impossible to implement. In fact, since the revision of a given position can go in several different directions, one of the tasks of the historian is to explain why in each given case this particular path is chosen and not another. The first explanation that somehow suggests itself here is a reference to a set of socio-psychological factors designed to explain and reconstruct the motivations for certain changes in the intellectual creativity of the thinker. But even taking these factors into account, the thinker still has the possibility of choice, the final act of which remains not covered by them. At the same time, this choice can hardly be considered completely arbitrary. From this point of view, A. Bergson’s idea about the original intuition of the thinker, which finds its clarity in overcoming such obstacles as the existing philosophical language, habitual paradigms of thinking, etc., becomes relevant again. The ontological conditions of this intuition have already been discussed in the Introduction. In order to take into account all these factors in this work, it turned out to be necessary to trace the spiritual path and creative biography of the thinker in their unity, to indicate their ideological and socio-psychological prerequisites, and the conditions of their formation. Based on what has been done, it is possible to propose a new, more detailed than was done before, periodization of the life and work of I.V. Kireevsky: 1) mid-20s – early 30s. – the period of “philosophical aesthetics”; 2) 1832–1834 – “value” period; 3) 1834–1838 – “skeptical” period and conversion; 4) late 30s - mid 40s. – “traditionalist” period 93; 5) from the mid-40s. until death (1856) – the “Optina” period associated with the formation of the doctrine of personality. We have traced the trends in Russian life and thought that led to the emergence of Slavophilism as an ideological movement with which Kireyevsky’s thought was most closely associated; vital, literary and historiosophical searches for the cultural community of the Pushkin era, to which I.V. belonged and the consciousness of which was expressed and explored. Kireevsky in the first period of his creative activity; the formation of his own initial position in the field of aesthetics and philosophy of history. The evolution of his anthropological position is connected with the anthropology of romanticism and patristics, the historiosophical searches of his colleagues - P.Ya. Chaadaeva, book. V.F. Odoevsky, Westerners and Slavophiles. We sought to more clearly and distinctly imagine the place of I.V. Kireevsky in this search, and on this basis to reconstruct the ideological, socio-psychological and existential motives of his conversion. This system of positions and programs significantly determined the situation in the 40s and 50s. XIX century, forms the foundation on which a new and now final position of Kireevsky “going into the gap” is built. In turn, the results obtained by I.V. Kireevsky in articles and excerpts of the 50s, form the basis of Slavophilism, which in the subsequent works of A.S. Khomyakova, Yu. F. Samarin and K.S. Aksakova declares itself not only as a social movement, but also as a certain philosophy. Studying the final version of this anthropology, associated with the teachings of I.V. Kireevsky about personality, outlined in the last articles of the thinker and which found its most vivid expression in his “Passages,” requires a more attentive attitude to the thinker’s texts than is usually done. In this regard, the focus of our attention was on the anthropological aspects of his ideas about culture and philosophy and, most importantly, on clarifying the essential features of his project of religious philosophy. This also includes an attempt to outline ways of correlating anthropological issues with the themes of philosophy of history, culture, knowledge, etc., characteristic of Slavophiles, as well as correlating this anthropological position in general with other more or less related projects. The study allows us to draw the following conclusions: An analysis of the socio-psychological origins and ideological positions of the intellectual predecessors of Slavophilism indicates that this movement was a philosophical expression of the values ​​and aspirations of layers of Russian society that ideologically and ideologically opposed Peter’s coup. It was the Slavophiles who first managed to achieve a harmonious synthesis of nationality, which they deeply embraced, and spirituality, which thanks to this acquired a completely ecclesiastical character among them. Thought of early I.V. Kireevsky appears as the result of the transformation of the program of the wise men under the influence of participants in Pushkin’s circle of writers and then the transition from the aesthetic assessment of literary works to the problem of the value content of the consciousness of their subjects - creators and readers; as a “Western” synthesis of aesthetics and philosophy of history, in the center of which is the figure of A.S. Pushkin, and is based on the methodology of F.V.Y. Schelling. The complex, but outwardly harmonious relationship between aesthetics and the philosophy of history, which characterizes the first stage of Kireyevsky’s work, comes to its collapse due to the discovery of internal inconsistency and limitations of his anthropological position, which goes back to Russian philosophical romanticism - in many ways similar to the romanticism of the Jena circle - and German classical idealism. Early anthropological position of I.V. Kireevsky is close to German romanticism and idealism; it precedes later Russian Westernism. Its characteristic features are: anthropocentrism and egocentrism in life, transcendentalism in philosophy. It grows out of an attitude toward human self-improvement, which easily turns into self-deification. At the same time, a person matters here insofar as the thought he is called upon to express in his life and his work is significant. Since achieving internal integrity and building an integral culture on this foundation turns out to be impossible, I.V. Kireevsky comes to skepticism, a way out of which he finds through a meeting with Orthodox ascetics, who revealed a fundamentally different type of person. I.V. Kireyevsky strives to overcome the dead ends of Russian thought of that time - traditionalism (P.Ya. Chaadaev), conservative (Slavophiles) and liberal (Westerners) utopianism - by revealing internal, non-social sources of personality formation, and eschatologizing the social ideal. The general structure of his thought of this time (individual - community - Church - people - Earth) is understood by him both as a way to spread the basic values ​​of Orthodox enlightenment, and as the path of the Kingdom of God in earthly reality, the final implementation of which is, however, beyond the scope of history. In articles of the 50s. there is deep anthropologism, subjectivity and a large degree of autobiography. Man and the culture he creates form a single system, the parameters of which are set through the relationship of its center - man - with a higher principle, with God. In its critical part, Kireyevsky’s thought goes back to the tradition of self-criticism in European thought, which makes it comparable to both its predecessors - Fr. Schlegel, Fr. Baader, Schelling, J. de Maistre, and with subsequent thinkers - G. Marcel, J. Maritain, E. Mounier, M. Scheler, E. Husserl (the period of the “Crisis of European Sciences”), etc. From the point of view of I.V. Kireevsky, in the crisis state of philosophy, the crisis of European culture as a whole finds its expression. Philosophy has an anthropological nature - its character is associated with the state of the philosophizing subject. Kireevsky moves from transcendentalism to ontologism: if in his early articles man was only an exponent of thought, idea, now thought appears as one of the creative energies of the human personality. Thus, he sets before the Christian philosopher, first of all, tasks of an ascetic order. According to I.V. Kireevsky, faith and unbelief, as two fundamental anthropological positions, determine different ways of human existence, levels of his self-awareness, ways of thinking and the types of culture he creates, which they are based on. On the basis of faith as a state of complete turning towards the Divine and through attention, believing thinking, like prayer, collects all the spiritual forces of a person, thereby restoring the unity of the human personality, destroyed by the Fall. The realization of this is possible only in a favorable spiritual environment - in the Church, through repentance and properly organized spiritual practice. Thus, Kireevsky’s thought really occupies an intermediate position between contemporary Western philosophy (mainly German) and patristics in the sense that, starting from transcendentalism, understood as broadly as possible as a philosophy of consciousness, he strives to include its main achievements in the experience of new, ontological thought. In general, this work can be considered as an attempt to reduce the main content of the thought of the Slavophiles - the philosophy of history and culture, aesthetics, theory of knowledge, etc. to their anthropological foundation, as it was gradually revealed in the philosophy of I.V. Kireevsky. The task of further research can be considered as constituting this content on the basis of the fundamental conceptual structure of “personality - faith”. 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About the heavenly hierarchy. St. Petersburg, 1997. 189. Florovsky G., prot. Byzantine fathers of the 5th–8th centuries. M., 1992. 190. Frank S.L. The Incomprehensible // Frank S.L. Essays. M., 1990. 191. Khomyakov A.S. Op. in 2 volumes. T. 1. M., 1994. 192. Khomyakov A.S. About old and new. M., 1988. 193. Khomyakov A.S. Complete set of works. T. 1. M., 1904. 194. Khoruzhy S.S. Diptych of silence. M., 1991. 195. Khoruzhy S.S. Analytical Dictionary of Hesychast Anthropology//Synergy. M., 1996. 196. Tsimbaev N. I. Under the burden of knowledge and doubt (ideological quest of the 1830s) // Russian Society of the 30s. XIX century Memoirs of contemporaries. M., 1989. 197. Chaadaev P.Ya. Complete works and selected letters in 2 volumes. M., 1991. 198. Chernyshevsky N.G. Essays on the Gogol period of Russian literature // Selected works. M.; L., 1950. 199. Chizhevsky D. I. Hegel in Russia. Paris, 1939. 200. Sheler M. Selected works. M., 1994. 201. Schelling F.V.I. Essays. T. 1–2. M., 1987, 1989. 202. Schelling F.V.Y. System of world epochs. Tomsk, 1999. 203. Schelling F.W.J. Philosophy of revelation. T. 1–2. St. Petersburg, 2000, 2002. 204. Schelling F.V.Y. Philosophy of art. M., 1966. 205. Schiller F. Works. T. 6. M., 1950. 206. Shichalin Yu.A. Antiquity – Europe – History. M., 1999. 207. Schlegel Fr. Aesthetics. Philosophy. Criticism. T. 1, 2. M., 1983. 208. Shpet G.G. Essay on the development of Russian philosophy // Shpet G.G. Essays. M., 1989. 209. Shpet G.G. Internal form of a word. Sketches and variations on themes by Humboldt. M., 1922. 210. Schubart V. Europe and the soul of the East // AUM. 1990. No. 4. 211. Eidelman N.Ya. Pushkin. From biography and creativity. 1827–1837. M., 1987. 212. Yurkevich P.D. The heart and its significance in the spiritual life of man according to the teachings of the word of God // Yurkevich P.D. Philosophical works. M., 1990. 1. Muller E. Russian Geist in europaischer Krise. Ivan Kireevskij. Koln, 1966. 2. Cristoff A. The Third Heart. Some Currents and Cross-Currents in Russia 1800–1830. Paris, 1970. 3. Cristoff A. An Introduction to the nineteenth-century Russian Slavophilism. A Study in Ideas. Vol. 2. I. V Kireevskij. Paris, 1972. 4. Gleason A. European and Moskovite. Ivan Kireevsky and the Origins of Slavophilism. Cambrige (Mass.), 1972. 5. Koyre A. La Jeunesse d' Ivan Kireevskij // Le Monde slave. 1928. No. 2. P. 213–238. 6. Rouleau F. Ivan Kireevski et la naissance du slavophilisme. Paris, 1990. Another founder of this movement, A.S., points out this in his “Letters on Philosophy to Yu. F. Samarin”. Khomyakov, who, undoubtedly, can be called the “first Slavophile” in purely historical order [193, 290]. This characteristic is significant in all three respects. This is undoubtedly a community, albeit a very specific one, recognizing itself as such in the person of many of its members, but not being in any sense of the word an organization (in connection with which one could talk about a whole series of such communities corresponding to different versions of the project, if clear boundaries could be drawn between them). It is religious because it arises on the basis of religious experience, in theological language - on the basis of the invoking grace of God, to one degree or another accepted by human freedom. Finally, it is new because it arises at a very specific stage in the religious history of man - as a reaction to the processes of secularization associated with the New Time of European history, thereby, in a sense, “after” it. This does not mean that this process has no analogues in the history of religion. On this matter, see [ 182, p. 8–9]. Here I largely follow the method described by I. Taine of “finding the whole by which a given artistic (in our case, philosophical - K.A.) work is determined and explained.” Believing that this kind of explanation can in no way be exhaustive if it does not at the same time try to understand the author’s own intuition, irreducible to any context, I, at the same time, think that outside of those three “wholes” that Taine points to - the integrity of the entire activity of a given author, the circle of his closest like-minded people, the cultural world surrounding them - not a single work can really be understood. One way or another, the nature and content of our reconstruction of the conceptual scheme of a work or an author is, without a doubt, determined by what exactly we will accept as such a “determining whole.” In understanding these relationships, I largely follow thinkers such as V.F. Earn, S.L. Frank, Fr. V. Zenkovsky, M. Heidegger. Realizing that this topic requires a much more thorough study, which is impossible within the framework of this study, I, however, risk using here this opposition of “transcendentalism” and “ontology” and the modes of human existence that justify them as one of the fundamental prerequisites: it plays a key role in comparing the anthropological positions of romanticism, idealism and patristics, as well as in describing the dynamics of Kireyevsky’s position and Russian thought of his time in general. See about this: [171, p. 169–173], where the corresponding unity of “immediate self-existence” and its “atmosphere” is designated by the term “event community” and a psychological interpretation of the corresponding processes throughout human life is given. Unfortunately, despite the obvious dependence of the authors’ concept on Frank’s philosophical psychology, his name is mentioned in the work only in passing. See, for example, [169, p. 74–78], about personal connections between Goethe and members of the Venevitin circle, in particular S.P. Shevyrev, see: Zhirmunsky V.M. Goethe in Russian literature. L., 1937. See his letter to his stepfather, A. Elagin from Germany, with an enthusiastic review of the “Encyclopedia”: “Here you will find as much curiosity as all the latest German literature taken together does not represent” [3, p. 348]. “... away with tongue-tied language and allegories, we are free people... we don’t need to clothe the truth in myths!” - says Herzen about his impression of reading Feuerbach [51(5), p. 24]. This book made a similar impression on Marx and Engels [32, p. 166]. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say “anthropologism.” On the connection between Europeanization and secularization in Russian culture of the 17th–18th centuries. see: [149, p. 79–210; 187, p. 82–128; 73, p. 55–62]. The use of Hegelian jargon in this case is quite appropriate - the Slavophiles used the corresponding concepts and, most importantly, the very forms of thinking, not simply because they did not know others, but because they found them completely adequate to historical reality. For an analysis of the phenomenon of return in relation to European culture, see: Shichalin Yu.A. Antiquity – Europe – History. M., 1999. On the attitude of the Europeanized “public” to the “people”, see, for example: Aksakov K.S. A look at Russian literature from Peter the Great. Not inferior to Herzen in accusatory pathos, Aksakov exposes the contemptuous attitude of the “enlightened” public towards the “dark” people as a necessary moral condition for their exploitation [12, p. 156–157]. For example: “And the circumstances were such that the historical fate of Russian theology in the 18th century was decided in a dispute between the epigones of Western post-Reformation Roman and Protestant scholasticism” [187, p. 97, also see p. 101, 146, etc.]. See: Nikolsky A. Russian spiritual-academic philosophy as a predecessor of Slavophilism and university philosophy in Russia // Faith and Reason. 1907. No. 11. Not at all due to malicious intent: an attempt to quickly implement a program of humanistic reforms was fraught with destabilization of the entire state system. The enlightened liberals and revolutionaries, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, demonstrated a particularly touching unity in the well-known story of wearing beards and national costumes: for the former it became a favorite subject of jokes, while the latter simply banned them. See in Memoirs of S.T. Aksakov’s chapters “Meeting with the Martinists” and “Memories of A.S. Shishkov" [13 (2), p. 131–226] This concept, with certain modifications, is applicable, in my opinion, to any rational human activity and, perhaps, to any of its activities in general, to the extent that it is rational. In the history of literature and art one can find patterns similar to those described by Lakatos in connection with the competition of research programs in science (a progressive shift, progress and regression of programs requiring rational evaluation, the invention of ad hoc techniques, etc.). Due to the nature of artistic and philosophical activity, these programs should be called in this case not research, but creative. Their fundamental principles, always with a certain degree of incompleteness, are expressed in the manifestos of artists and the theoretical works of critics close to them and largely determine their artistic method. However, these theoretical declarations should be taken with a certain degree of distrust. A reconstruction based on an analysis of direct artistic and life practice should be considered more reliable. At the same time, I do not want to say that the “internal history” of literature and art will be exhausted by the patterns that can be discovered with this approach. About business and personal connections of F.V. Bulgarin with the Decembrists, see below. The fact that such an attitude towards those convicted for political reasons was some kind of life principle is evidenced by the fact that in 1831 I. Kireevsky organized a collection of money for those convicted in the case of N.P. Sungurov [51(4), p. 146]. Around 1825, many of them almost simultaneously entered the service of the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Analysis, reading and inventory of ancient columns” attracted little attention from young people, and most of their service time was spent in conversations and writing fairy tales. “The archive became known as a gathering of “brilliant” Moscow youth and the title of “archive youth” became very honorable,” which A.S. took advantage of in “Eugene Onegin.” Pushkin [103, p. 50]. The history of the relationship between Kireevsky and Polevoy is described in sufficient detail, although somewhat tendentiously, in his “Notes” by Ks. Polevoy [155, p. 151–154, 319–323]. He also wrote a sharply negative review of Kireevsky’s first “Review” (Moscow Telegraph, 1830, No. 2, pp. 203–232) In a letter to his stepfather, Kireevsky says that for the “European” (by the way, also a magazine with a Westernist orientation), he accepts a “telegraphic plan” (i.e., “Moscow Telegraph”) [128, p. 123] – but in essence “European” is, of course, much closer to “Moskovsky Vestnik”, although it is clearly more “exoteric” and literary. In the distinction between romantic (the Polev brothers, Bestuzhev) and philosophical (lyubomudry, Nadezhdin) aesthetics in Russian thought of the 20-30s. XIX century I follow S.V. Mannu (128, pp. 7–8]. It should be noted that during the re-release of “Russian Philosophical Aesthetics” in 1998, Yu.V. Mann quite significantly changed the chapter devoted to Kireyevsky, actually replacing it with his own preface to the 1979 edition of his works. At the same time, a number of interesting ideas regarding the method of literary criticism of Kireyevsky, in particular, comparing it with the “theory of pathos” by V.G. Belinsky, unfortunately, disappeared. As a result, we have to use the first (1969) edition of the book. When in 1855 P.V. Vyazemsky, appointed deputy minister of education of Russia, in an article about the Paris Exhibition spoke about the “prosperity of literature” during the reign of Nicholas I, this caused an immediate reaction from Kireyevsky: “First of all, we expected from you a word of conscientious truth.” In a long and bitter letter, the philosopher asks: “Help me erase the scratch from my precious stone,” meaning the spiritual image of Vyazemsky the writer, precious to himself. It is symbolic that this letter turned out to be one of Kireyevsky’s last socially significant actions [3, p. 376–382]. For more information about this, see my article “Pushkin’s work in the interpretation of the early Kireyevsky” (Bulletin of Moscow State University, Ser. Philosophy, 1994, No. 3). Which correlates with another trend in Venevitinov’s legacy, represented by his articles on “Onegin” and “Boris Godunov” [41, pp. 143–151, 204–208]. Along with them, one should most likely name his stepfather, A.A. Elagin, whose acquaintance with Schelling’s works occurred during the campaign of 1814. It is known that he translated “Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism.” However, it is impossible to say anything specific about Elagin’s views, including his philosophy of history. It was again anticipated by Karamzin in “Note on New and Old Russia,” which K.S. Aksakov characterized it as a document immediately preceding the “Russian direction”. Hence the great closeness of Kireevsky and Chaadaev in these years, noted by B.N. Tarasov [177, p. 262, 265] (see also Chaadaev’s letter to Kireyevsky in 1832 [197 (2), pp. 74–75]. This attitude of Kireyevsky is directly developed by Belinsky: in article 4 of the series “Works of Alexander Pushkin” Kireyevsky is not named, but the theory of literary criticism developed by Belinsky clearly revolves in the same circle of ideas: “No demands, no pre-prepared concepts and questions, no passions, much less predilections, should be introduced into the world of the poet” [26, p. 566]. As already indicated, the “late” Pushkin appears here as the heir of the “late” Karamzin. The name was given by A.S. Khomyakov (see his article “On excerpts found in Kireevsky’s papers” - afterword to the publication in “Russian Conversation” immediately after the author’s death) and then reproduced in the publications of Koshelev and Gershenzon. See, for example, [3, p. 270, 3311. To what has been said, it must be added that the active search for a new synthetic art in Russian aesthetics of the 20–40s. XIX century, which, as a rule, were carried out under the sign of overcoming romanticism, in fact constitute a necessary feature of the romantic paradigm. Therefore, the anti-romantic statements of such authors as Nadezhdin or Belinsky should not be taken at face value: in fact, they serve the purpose of settling scores with literary predecessors and opponents, and the content of the concept of “romanticism” is consciously or unconsciously reduced in accordance with this goal. In addition, see: [206(2), p. 406, 408]. Related to this is the phenomenon of “pure artistic morality” described by J. Maritain in “The Responsibility of the Artist”: aesthetic disinterest and contemplation here lead to experiments “with the goal of using the spell of poetry to impart innocence to the very things that are forbidden by God” [127, p. 191]. We see a similar change in Schelling’s “System of World Epochs” [202, p. 114]. Here and below, traditionalism will be understood mainly as a certain type of religious life, for which traditionalism as a current (more precisely, a set of currents) of thought serves only as a more or less adequate expression. Traditionalism in this sense arises post factum of secularization, as its brainchild and an attempt to overcome it through the search for the sacred foundations of human existence. At the same time, the search is conducted not from the point of view of the truth or value of the content of religious experience or doctrine of a given tradition, but from the point of view of its satisfaction with the formal criteria of “traditionality”, its possession of the form of sacred tradition. It is this form itself that should ensure the strength and constancy of these foundations. In modern times, on this basis, a wide variety of schools of thought arose, sometimes very different from each other. Let's name only J. De Maistre, Baader, P.Ya. Chaadaeva. In the 20th century The most famous, of course, is the direction associated with the name of R. Guenon. And their claims to absolute knowledge in general. The mystical interpretation of Fichte and Hegel is led by M.A. Bakunin to this recognition: “My personal “I” has acquired an absolute... my life, in a certain sense, has become identified with absolute life.” At the same time, he talks about the need to “get closer to Russian reality.” Quote according to [73(1.2), p. 51]. An idea that caused violent protests from Belinsky in his famous letter to Botkin. When I wrote this, I was not yet familiar with the System of World Ages and the Philosophy of Revelation - my knowledge of Schelling's late work was limited to Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom and The Philosophy of Mythology. Now it seems to me necessary to admit that in his criticism of the ontological proof of the existence of God, Schelling largely overcomes pantheism (and Kireyevsky undoubtedly knew this criticism). It is no coincidence that in his last article the Russian thinker does not substantively criticize Schelling’s ontology, but rather his style of thinking, his discourse, which remained the same despite the conversion he experienced. Moreover, the word “hypostasis” can be used by them to designate individual inanimate objects, and on a par with “human hypostases.” Rev. John of Damascus in the Philosophical Chapters speaks of hypostasis as simply a “single”, something that should “exist in itself and be contemplated through sensation or actually” [79, p. 83–84]. O. John Meyendorff, archimandrite. Cyprian Kern and Fr. Georgy Florovsky notes the exceptionally good nature of natural will. See [134, p. 306–307, 308–309; 85, p. 233–234, 189 pp. 215–217]. See about this from Kireevsky in “Response to Khomyakov” [3, p. 149–150]. This is clearly evidenced by recently published documents: “What changes would I like in Russia at the present time?” and “Note on the attitude of the Russian people to the tsarist power” [5, p. 27–31, 49–82]. In this regard, Kireevsky’s attitude towards V.A. seems especially important. Zhukovsky, who was not only a personal friend and “guardian angel” of the Elagin-Kireevsky family, but also played a huge role in raising its younger generation. For Kireevsky, his life practice not only in childhood and adolescence, but also later remained, as it were, a real embodiment of that Schillerian idea of ​​​​the ideal person, who established the “inner harmony” of sensual and spiritual nature, harmoniously uniting the “beautiful soul” and the “sublime way of thinking,” which F. Schiller formulated in “Letters on Aesthetic Education” and in the article “On Grace and Dignity.” Let us give the definition of religion given by Kireyevsky in the article “The Nineteenth Century”: “No, religion is not one ritual, and not one belief. For the full development of not only true, but even false religion, the unanimity of the people is necessary, sanctified by vivid memories, developed in unambiguous traditions, intertwined with the state structure, personified in unambiguous and nationwide rituals, reduced to one positive principle and palpable in all civil and family relations” [3, p. 87]. This definition and associated characteristics of the movement of religious ideas in Europe in the 19th century. It shows quite clearly that, fully aware of the importance of religion for the development and life of culture, Kireevsky personally refuses to take any active part in it. The question of the truth of religion is bracketed by him not only methodologically, but also personally, existentially. Here I use a later term by Yu. F. Samarin, which arose, however, under the influence of Kireevsky’s later teaching on faith [167, p. 505, 515]. For a more complete definition of tradition, see: Averyanov V. Three aspects of tradition. M., 1988. On traditionalism, see also above - footnote 48, p. 109. However, it should be noted that for Slavophilism traditionalism can be considered either as one of the stages of formation, or as one of the elements of a broader doctrine. About the fact that Kireyevsky’s Slavophilism was associated with the “problem of national-religious tradition,” see also the SI article. Bazhov [20, p. 13]. Their correspondence was published in the journal “Symbol” (No. 3, 1980, pp. 157–174, No. 4, 1980, pp. 171–187, No. 5, 1981, pp. 152–158). See Kireevsky’s review of “The Prayer of St. Ephraim the Syrian” and “On Sin and Its Consequences” by the Right Reverend Innocent (1845) [2(2), p. 123–127]. N.Ya. wrote about the social significance of Pushkin’s dying behavior as a defense of the honor and dignity of a private person, writer and citizen. Eidelman and M.Yu. Lotman [211, p.375; 120, p. 178–180]. Perhaps we can agree with the opinion of A. Valitsky, who limited the existence of classical Westernism in 1842–1848: from the polemics of V.G. Belinsky with K.S. Aksakov about “Dead Souls” before the death of Belinsky and Herzen’s transition to the position of “Russian socialism” [33, p. 186–187]. Although it is impossible, of course, to equate “Moskvitian” with “Northern Bee” precisely because of the sincerity of the first. About the difficulties associated with identifying the true position of M.P. Pogodina and SP. Shevyreva wrote to V.A. Koshelev in the article “Slavophilism and official nationality” [167, p. 122–135]. Belinsky turns out to be closer to Kireevsky in this regard [80, p. 5461. Wed. famous sayings of F.M. Dostoevsky (Pushkin - “the beginning and chief of the Slavophiles”) and V.I. Lenin (“The Decembrists woke up Herzen”). Stored in: RGALI, f.236, op. 1, storage unit 19, published in: [5, p. 417–448]. Following Rev. Macarius, we present the Gospel text in Slavic; other quotations from Holy Scripture that the elder cites in the said preface are omitted in further citations. Printed by M.O. Gershenzon in PSS, 1911, vol. 2, also N.P. Kolyupanov in “Biography of A.I. Kosheleva." [92(2), p. 80–102]. Kireevsky here refers not only to the adoption of the filioque, but also to the activities of Pope Nicholas I (858–867), who broke relations with the Patriarch of Constantinople, St. Photius and involved the Western Church in the struggle for the redistribution of relations of secular power in Europe. On this matter, Kireyevsky speaks in great detail in his correspondence of 1842 with Prince. Iv. Gagarin - who passed under the influence of P.Ya. Chaadaev into Catholicism as a representative of religious Westernism (see: Symbol, 1980, No. 3, pp. 157–174) In this consideration of Catholicism and Protestantism as successive stages in the development of rationalism, inherited by Western Christianity from ancient (mainly Roman) paganism and logically leading to the rationalism of the Enlightenment and other forms of modern unbelief, the Slavophiles were united. This is clearly seen from the polemical works written in French by A.S. Khomyakov, written simultaneously with Kireyevsky’s articles, and from the preface by Yu. F. Samarin to Khomyakov’s theological works (1862). This is easy to verify by comparing the descriptions of this structure in [3, pp. 148–149, 227, 275]. For the concept of the heart, see below, chap. 3, § 4, and above, ch. 2, § 1.2. As an approach to the history of philosophy, this idea was subsequently very productively implemented by the book. S.N. Trubetskoy in such works as “Metaphysics in Ancient Greece”, “Course on the history of ancient philosophy”, “The Doctrine of Logos in its history”. See for example [179, p. 55–57]. Wed. discussion on the same subject in Kireevsky’s “Diary” (entry dated August 24, 1852) [5, p. 422]. Here, however, the anthropological issues are expressed much less clearly, and the first place is taken by the problem of the relationship between faith and knowledge, as different forms of belief in the cognitive abilities that generate them. The correctness of such a translation was pointed out in the preface to his translation of the “Critique of Pure Reason” by such an outstanding Kant expert as N. O. Lossky [85, p. VIII]. See also: Tarasov B.N. "Thinking Reed" The life and work of Pascal in the perception of Russian philosophers and writers. M., 2004. pp. 325–344. The source of this obviously narrowed idea of Lossky about philosophy can be seen in his desire to dissociate himself from the previous generation of Russian thinkers (Fr. P. Florensky, Fr. S. Bulgakov, N.A. Berdyaev, S.L. Frank, etc.) who defined themselves precisely as religious philosophers. It is characteristic that Kireevsky generally correlates philosophy not with theology, as a science, but with faith, as a holistic religious experience. However, to consider this trend of Russian thought exclusively as “philosophical discourse” seems to be a deeply erroneous simplification. Russian philosophy can be compared with ancient philosophy in the sense that here, as there, the deep connection between “primary existential preference,” a way of life, a vision of the world and philosophical discourse designed to reveal and rationally justify these moments is especially obvious. See about this Ado P. What is ancient philosophy? [9, p. 17–19]. Kireevsky, without a doubt, knew Schelling’s criticism of the ontological proof in “World Epochs”: its essence is to point out the replacement of the historical and free relationship of God as the Lord of being to the world and man with a logical relationship, respectively, a necessary one, a relationship between infinite and finite substances that occurred in the philosophy of modern times [202, p. 54–55]. The point is not whether they used the word “personality” as a philosophical term, i.e. whether they were "personalists" in any sense or not, but whether the appropriate structure was present in their thought. About this side of his activity, see: Gvozdev A.V. The concept of the “whole spirit” I.V. Kireevsky and his pedagogical views [48, p. 139–148]. Oh St. Gregory Palamas and his teaching about “essence” and “energies” in God and man, see: Meyendorff I., prot. The Life and Works of St. Gregory Palamas. Introduction to learning. St. Petersburg, 1997, Cyprian (Kern), archim. Anthropology of St. Gregory Palamas. T.2. Paris, 1937, Vasily (Krivoshein), bishop. Ascetic and dogmatic teaching of St. Gregory Palamas // Vasily (Krivoshein), ep. Theological works. Nizhny Novgorod, 1997. Such an approach opens up the possibility of a completely different religion from the idealistic philosophy, which is based on the verifiable fact of God's personal revelation to man. Some essential aspects of this philosophy of religion were outlined by Yu. F. Samarin in the already mentioned “Remarks on the work of M. Muller on the history of religion [167, p. 492–523]. For more information about this, see my article: Antonov K.M. Philosophy of religion Yu. F. Samarin // Religious Studies. 2004, No. 2. Frank's thought, especially his interpretation of the concept of “personality” [190, p. 409–413) and the relationship between faith and unbelief [190, p. 418], reveals a number of interesting intersections with Kireyevsky’s thought. However, his excessive methodologism, the desire to embrace all of reality with a single method of “transrational monodualism,” and too bold an invasion into the realm of the “divine” do not allow him to avoid a certain touch of “pantheism,” which is unacceptable for Christian thought, faithful to the tradition of the Church. See about this [7, p. 373]. However, it should be noted that in both the Middle Ages and modern times (for example, by Leibniz or Hegel, in Russian philosophy by V.D. Kudryavtsev-Platonov and N.O. Lossky), these proofs were considered not only as ways of inducing the mind to think about the Creator, but also as arguments that have logical significance. At present, this issue also cannot be considered finally resolved. In this regard, P. Ricoeur limits himself only to stating the positive significance of this atheistic hermeneutics for the Christian consciousness itself: freeing it from mythological illusions, it makes it more conscious and responsible. See eg. Ricoeur P. Conflict of interpretations. M., 1995. P. 202 ff. See about this my articles “Elements of psychoanalysis in the philosophical journalism of S.N. Bulgakov" // Philosophy of Economics. 2002, No. 2 and “The work of F. Nietzsche in the interpretation of L. Shestov. The problem of atheism" // Historical and philosophical yearbook 2000. M., 2002. Although in some of Solovyov’s followers we can observe an obvious desire for a synthesis of both directions - for example, in Prince. S.N. Trubetskoy and S.L. Franca. Of particular interest in this regard is also Fr. P. Florensky, whose concept of unity and, accordingly, the ideal of integral knowledge (“organic thinking”), is combined with a doctrine that clearly goes back to the corresponding ideas of Kireyevsky about the historical variability of the mind, the dependence of its mode of action on both the subject and the spiritual state of the subject [186, p. 821–826]. Although, of course, the degree of correspondence of Kireyevsky’s thought to Frank’s thought should be the subject of special study. This is discussed in more detail in the aforementioned work by Yu. F. Samarin, according to whose thought, the very content of the idea of ​​God includes a person’s perception of influence on His part as a certain fact, the acceptance or rejection of the reality of which forms the basis of faith [167, p. 505]. Kireevsky knew at least some (mainly, apparently, ascetic) works of St. Gregory. In any case, Rev. Macarius sent him some kind of manuscript, about which Kireevsky wrote that in it “there are some very dark passages” [5, p. 320]. For the possible origin of this manuscript, see [5, p. 547–548]. Among the Slavophiles, this idea was pursued with particular persistence by Yu. F. Samarin in his dissertation on Stefan Yavorsky and Feofan Prokopovich, and further in the Preface to the theological works of A.S. Khomyakova. Following him, this was discussed in the 19th–20th centuries. wrote by many theologians, philosophers and spiritual writers. In 2000, he was glorified by the Russian Orthodox Church as a new martyr. For example, in the article “On ... philosophy” [3, p. 318–320, 327–328, 331]. The affirmation of the principles of the Enlightenment was often considered in philosophical literature as a kind of spiritual expansion, aggression, not only in relation to non-European cultures, but also in relation to the life world of European man. In addition to the widely presented criticism of the modern era emanating from the religious camp, it is worth noting the works of representatives of the Frankfurt School, of which the most famous are “Dialectics of Enlightenment” by M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno and “One-Dimensional Man” by G. Marcuse. The word "traditionalist" is placed in quotation marks here for the reasons given in Chapter II. A number of letters from Kireevsky I.V. was also published in the magazines “Russian Archive”, “Russian Literature” (1966. No. 4), “Symbol”, Nos. 3–5 (correspondence with Prince I.S. Gagarin), 17 (letters to Elder Macarius).