Liberty, Equality and Fraternity

Contents I. Freedom II. Equality III. Brotherhood There are hardly any other three words in the human language that would create so much confusion in concepts, send so much fog into human minds and spread so much disastrous deception among the masses of the people. At first, they served only as the motto of a political party of crazy people who dreamed of transforming humanity by force. But this motto little by little turned into a teaching, became a word of covenant, which even crazy governments gradually got used to throwing at the masses of the people, forgetting that the masses of the people, incapable of comprehending philosophical and political teachings in their entirety, accept the concept thrown at them from above not by reason, but by the passion and instinct of daily need and assimilate it to themselves with feeling and blind faith. So little by little the three seductive words became for the masses of the people a covenant of dreamy and uncertain bliss, which they consider themselves entitled to demand from the rulers; have become a banner under which any agitator can gather an unreasonable crowd for the overthrow of the existing government. From these words and concepts, some kind of special religion, vague, indefinite, was already formed; entering into rivalry, enmity, or alliance with the Christian faith, it therefore acquires new power over minds and today constitutes one of the most significant and subtle spiritual forces that many governments must reckon with. In France, having taken possession of the masses, this new religion has already led to the destruction of the state, which dreamed that it could cope with it with its own weapons. This religion is formed from time to time, with the help of philosophical schools, into certain forms, of which the most remarkable today is the so-called positive philosophy of Augustus Comte 1 and his followers. Grafting itself into other historical religions, it penetrates them and changes their essence. She managed to transform Christian teaching into a system of optimism while retaining some terms of church theology in a perverted meaning. She has already managed to penetrate deeply into politics and legislation and distort the concepts of the conservatives themselves about the most basic subjects and rules of government, so that under its influence the most inflexible conservatives act like the most furious radicals, to the overthrow of those very principles that they still proclaim by name, but which they no longer feel or understand. We can call this new religion humanitarian, the religion of humanity, as Augustus Comte foresees and calls it. Its fundamental belief is that the human race as a whole is called on earth to the realization of universal welfare and bliss, and that the direct path to the achievement of these destinies consists in the elimination of all restrictions on personal human activity in all its desires and manifestations, in the recognition of unconditional and essential equality between all human beings and in the brotherhood of universal mutual love. These are the dogmas of this new religion, for which many of its followers are ready to go to bloody warfare and ultimate extermination, because of which others would decide to destroy the universe with all its order in order to erect their banner on the ruins: “Liberté, égalité, fraternité, ou la mort!” 2. This teaching spreads quickly, in subtle ways, so that many of its philosophical opponents are unwittingly infected with it. It would be extremely important for the sobering of many positive minds to clarify the tenets of this teaching through a deep, impartial and complete analysis of them, clear not only to the specialists of the school, but also to the masses outside the school. There is no such analysis yet, although there are individual attempts to do so. One of the most remarkable experiments in philosophical polemics with humanitarian teaching is represented by an essay that appeared this spring, the title of which is written above. It belongs to the pen of the famous political thinker Stephen 3 in England and is directed mainly against the positions disseminated in the public by the works of John Stuart Mill “On Liberty”, “On Utilitarianism” and “On the Subjection of Woman”. Unfortunately, Stephen's book appeared after Mill's death, when the famous philosopher of freedom could no longer answer his opponent. Stephen begins his book with an analysis of the famous formula derived by Mill for determining the relationship of society to an individual in the circle of his personality. According to Mill, under one condition only or for one purpose alone, coercion or restriction of personal freedom is justified, in any way - physical force, legal prohibition, or the moral action of public opinion, precisely when it is required for self-defense, to prevent positive harm. Restriction of freedom is in no way justified by the desire for good, moral or material, for the constrained person. For the sake of his goodness or happiness, you can convince him, but not constrain him in any way; For coercion, it is necessary that an action be followed on his part that threatens harm to another person. This formula is excessively broad and in this form appears to be a paradox. Stephen's argument is directed against him. Both moral teaching, he says, and all possible religions have in mind the direction of human activity; But don’t both moral teaching and religion turn to hope and to the feeling of fear in the human soul, and to fear much more than to hope? Even criminal legislation with its penalties pales in comparison to the system of any moral and religious teaching. Fear of the law deters criminal acts; But for one case of this constraint, what countless others, in which a person is restrained by fear of the opinions of neighbors and neighbors - a moral sanction, or fear in view of the future life - a religious sanction; or fear of your conscience! And in the innumerable majority of all these cases, disapproval, or moral sanction, has absolutely nothing to do with the beginning of self-defense to which Mill points. Religious sanction, in its essence, cannot depend on it. Neither at the court of God, nor at the court of conscience can one say in justification: I did as I wanted, and did not harm anyone by doing so. Mill's position is also contrary to the structure of human nature. There is hardly a single good skill that could be acquired otherwise than through constraint, more or less burdensome. Such are the conditions of human life that in almost every action we are prompted and constrained by external circumstances. This law of life is applied in necessary cases by the legislator and by the leader of public opinion. The law, punishing for murder, for theft, serves as a substitute for private revenge, which would punish even more severely, and would execute blindly. If the law contained punishments for intemperance, drunkenness, and the like, then the same would have to be said about them. Freedom, according to Mill, Stephen compares with the sacred bull of the Indian Brahmins. The Brahmins, honoring the beneficial significance of cattle in agriculture, declared the bull a sacred animal. He cannot be stopped, no matter where he goes, whether he knocks down a fence, enters a shop and knocks over or eats all the goods. Killing him is a crime, even out of pity for his suffering. When a bull has fallen from a cliff and, having crashed, is unable to rise so that the kites torment him alive and peck out his eyes, it is still impossible to do violence to him (even if he dies on his own). Mill presents personal freedom as an inviolable state and the first law of existence, so that any restriction of it is allowed only in one, predetermined case, according to the abstract logic of the ideal law of freedom. To our author, the question of whether freedom is good or evil seems as irrational as a similar question about fire - is fire good or evil? Good or evil, depending on time, place, circumstances, so that a detailed answer about freedom, in which cases it is good and in which it is evil, would contain not only the entire history of the human race, but also a complete solution to all the questions that this history raises. All our knowledge in its present state is not sufficient to deduce, as Mill suggests, such a simple principle as would serve as an absolute guiding rule in the relations of society towards the individual in case of restraint or surveillance. We must limit ourselves to carefully checking each individual case in which constraint is expected. In this sense, Stephen makes the following points. Constraint is harmful: 1) when it has a bad, deceitful goal in mind; 2) when the goal is good, but the measure of constraint is not calculated to achieve the goal, for example, it produces only irritation; 3) when the goal is good, but the constraint exceeds the measure required to achieve the goal. Thus, destroying the construction of the idea of ​​freedom proposed by Mill and which is truly untenable when applied to reality, Stephen offers his own construction of the idea of ​​coercion or constraint. But strict logic forces him to be consistent in the development of this idea, and he himself, in generalizing the practical concept of constraint, falls into the same extreme as Mill fell in generalizing the ideal concept of freedom. Many deep truths and apt judgments are scattered in Stephen’s work, but in its positive part, in the conclusions that he draws from his teaching, cruel words are sometimes heard, about which one can say: who can listen to him? So, for example, in the matter of faith, Stephen admits coercion, as in all other matters, seriously pointing out that not a single religion was ever established without coercion. Not finding it possible to indicate any abstract criterion of truth for the sake of which coercion is justified or condemned, he attributes everything to the discretion, as required (expediency), of one or another public authority. The author, apparently, is a believer and has a deep understanding of faith, but in the conclusions to which he sometimes comes, one senses some kind of skepticism, as if Pilate’s 4 question is heard: what is truth? If constraint is allowed in matters of faith, then the author finds it all the more natural in freedom of opinion and reasoning. It is interesting to compare Mill's words in this case with Stephen's objection. Here's what Mill says: “Our social intolerance in itself does not kill anyone, does not eradicate opinions, but forces people to disguise opinions or refrain from active efforts to spread them. Among us, it cannot be said about incorrect opinions that they noticeably strengthen or weaken with each generation: they do not spread in breadth, but continue to flicker and smolder in the close circles of thinking people among whom they arose, and do not illuminate the general appearance of human affairs with either true or deceptive light. This maintains a state that is satisfactory for some minds, because it relieves them of the burdensome duty of judging and punishing opinions and at the same time protects, at least outwardly, the prevailing opinions from all confusion, although it does not decisively eliminate the possibility of acting with reason among the unbelievers infected with the disease of thinking. The tool is very convenient for maintaining peace in the environment of mental life and for maintaining all affairs and orders in their existing form. But we pay for this remedy at a high price - the loss of moral courage in the human spirit... How to calculate the enormous damage to the whole world from the fact that many gifted minds with weak character do not dare to give free rein to bold, strong, independent thinking only for fear that it will lead them to a conclusion that, in the general opinion, will turn out to be immoral or irreligious. This is what Mill says, obviously carried away by his absolute doctrine and not allowing even the rebuff that public opinion gives to a word that offends a moral or religious feeling. To demand that public opinion remain silent or submit in this case means to allow a kind of violence in favor of private opinion over public opinion, and, moreover, cheap violence, costing nothing to anyone who wants to say even a crazy and seductive word. “It seems to me,” objected Stephen, “that the publication of opinions about morality, about politics, about religion is an action of great importance; that the overthrow of opinions on which social order is established is an action that is inherently fraught with danger. I do not at all want to express by this that actions of this kind should not be undertaken at all; on the contrary, it should be done in many cases; but let the one who approaches them do it like a fighter, with weapons in his hands; It is indecent for him to be surprised and indignant that he meets fierce resistance at the gap through which he launches an attack. Mill's only reason for resenting public intolerance is that it prevents timid people from expressing unpopular opinions. In one old ballad there is a story about how a knight, lost in the mountains, ended up in an underground hall filled with enchanted knights: each of them lay motionless, in full armor, and next to each of them stood his war horse waiting... On a stone lay a sword next to a horn, and the wanderer was told that if he wants to get himself a battle army, let him choose one of two things - a sword or a horn. He chose a horn and blew it, at that moment both the knights and the horses - everything disappeared, and the wanderer found himself again on the mountain, in everyday life, and after him the words were heard on the wind: “That vile coward is not worthy of battle, He who himself, without taking a sword, calls others with a trumpet.” No one has the right to give a signal for battle until the first one draws his sword and is able to defend himself. When he himself is a fighter, let him blow his trumpet loudly, and if his sounds are worth listening to, a multitude will gather to him. Until a person himself has formed a detailed opinion about subjects of such importance, has not thought it over carefully, has not become convinced of its great significance and has not decided to risk declaring it publicly, until then, in all likelihood, this opinion is such that it is not worth declaring. Speculation about government, about morality, about religion is a subject of great vital importance, and not just a subject of idle curiosity.” In the moral sphere, Mill, following, of course, his principle, does not allow restrictions on freedom if the action, even if immoral, does not directly violate anyone’s defining rights. On this basis, from Mill's point of view, no preventive or restraining measures are allowed against a society pursuing an immoral goal, for example, the propaganda of debauchery, which is engaged in seducing women and young people into debauchery. Stephen refutes this strange theory, proving the essential importance of maintaining the moral idea in society at the height of the ideal. “People,” he says, “are like dogs in a pack: tied together and tearing in different directions. According to Mill, let them run wherever they want. It’s tempting advice, but let’s think that when everyone runs away, there will be an unevenness between them, and then no reasoning, no counting of votes will bring together those running and prevent those who run stronger and better from dragging the rest with them in their direction. In the moral sphere, as well as in religion, warfare and conflict between people are inevitable. Good and evil, good with good, evil with evil of a different shade - stand as enemies against each other: between them the struggle is real, essential and eternal. On the other hand, the incentives tending to unite people in kind reciprocity are even more numerous, even stronger than the separating impulses. This does not eliminate the struggle, but the motives of friendship and benevolence are combined with the struggle, which keep it within boundaries and do not take it to extremes. The main interest of life lies in the collision of these opposing impulses. Complete moral tolerance is possible only in such a case when people become completely indifferent to each other - this means the end of society... The main art of life does not consist in avoiding the fight, but in the ability to conduct it with the least offense for the fighters, who are still more likely to be friends than enemies among themselves, and not to over-exaggerate the importance of the subject that aroused the clash. So, the real business of tolerance is to soften, if possible, the inevitable struggle. But tolerance goes beyond measure and becomes unreasonable when it attempts to eliminate the struggle altogether, then it tends to the greatest of evils - to the establishment of indifference and solitude between people.” Pointing to coercion in the most terrible and decisive form of war, Stephen concludes that war inevitably appears to be one of the fundamental principles of national identity. War decides whether or not to be a nation and what it should be. It is decided what people will believe in, how they will live, what form their religion, morality, and whole way of life will take. War is the ultima ratio 5 not only for kings, but also for human society in all its forms. The war will finally decide the question of what share, great or small, will be granted to personal freedom in one place or another, at one time or another. From this great truth many conclusions flow, all of which converge to the following. Strength precedes freedom everywhere. Freedom by its very essence depends on power. Freedom, whatever it may be, can only exist under the cover of a powerful, well-ordered and reasonable government. It’s a tough word, you need to have a lot of courage to express it in view of the ideal of freedom to which the views of our century are turned with faith. But don’t recent events from Germany, France, Spain, and England itself, which by force developed for itself the current forms of civil freedom, tell us the same thing with striking force? The words freedom and liberty are used by enthusiasts in all possible meanings that anyone wants to give them. But the word freedom is most commonly used, says Stephen, when applied to popular government. When talking about freedom, people generally mean democracy, or that form of government that comes closer to democracy than what they currently have. Meanwhile, democracy, in its proper sense, does not at all consist in a definitive relationship to freedom. The degree of interference in personal rights and relations allowed by one or another government almost does not depend at all on the type of government, but depends on the space of the country, on the density of the population, on the people’s, experience-affirmed consciousness of mutual dependence on each other, on the national spirit and character, and the like]. To imagine that one can determine the true meaning of popular demands on the scales of logic is to deceive oneself with a dream. To understand the meaning of the enthusiasm aroused among the masses by freedom, a simple analysis of the word “freedom” is not enough. In poetry and in enthusiastic speeches of all kinds, this word means both more and less than a simple absence of embarrassment. It means the absence of precisely that constraint that seems difficult to those speaking about freedom, and at the same time means the presence of a special force, freely acting in the direction that seems desirable... Cries about freedom usually contain a general condemnation of the past and glorification of the present, since it is different from the past, and the future, since one can conclude about it similar to the present. In this sense, enthusiasm for freedom can hardly be reconciled with the consciousness of the importance of obedience and discipline in the broad sense of the word. When the spirit is filled with praise for the present time and success in resisting power, which is supposed to be insane and violent, in such a state it is no longer possible to realize that submission to a higher self with conscientious determination to act within the limits of legitimate necessity is a civic virtue, without which a great and lasting work is impossible... In practice, the frequent repetition of commonplaces about freedom leads to the fact that in ordinary minds, among the masses, a stubborn prejudice arises against obedience to anyone be that as it may, in the remaining classes of society the sad ability naturally develops - to surrender to the first who, possessing strong self-confidence and ardor, demands obedience. This feigned enthusiasm had already managed to shake and break most of the old forms based on subordination, and, of course, was not able to create new forms sufficient to replace the old ones. From all this follows the following practical conclusion. People who have the gift of enthusiastic speech should refrain from general glorification of freedom. They would have acted better and more conscientiously if, before becoming delighted with this or that occasion, they had asked themselves: what kind of freedom? Who should be given what freedom? Who should be freed from what embarrassment? – and would try to answer these questions in detail. The same advice, of course, applies to the general opponents of all freedom. Regarding the speech on freedom, the author turns to the works of two writers who present a complete contrast in their judgment on this subject - Buckle 6 and Demester 7. He agrees with neither one nor the other. Here are his apt remarks on the Buckle system. According to Buckle, the entire history of mankind consists of a continuous struggle between the spirit of skepticism, in which he sees progress and civilization, and the spirit of patronage, in which he recognizes nothing but darkness and error. Doesn't it look like someone would praise centrifugal force at the expense of centripetal force and call the latter a dark force striving to throw the earth into the sun? The same reasonable person, and on the same basis, could object: it’s not true, on the contrary, centrifugal force is the first and eternal harm. She madly strives to plunge the globe into space, into darkness and cold, and would succeed if our friend, the centripetal force, did not constantly attract the earth to the source of heat and light. Both opinions are nonsense: the earth moves in its orbit, which is the result of the mutual action of both forces. It surprises me that people can become so enthusiastic either from the result or from one or other of the causes that produce the result. Let's take the result. Let's say, in round numbers - 300 million Chinese, 22 million Indian natives, 200 million Europeans and North Americans and 100 million of every mixture in Central Asia, on the islands, etc.; To all this we add the library of the British Museum. This is the pure result of an immeasurably long struggle between human forces and all sorts of weights and pressures that needed to be eliminated or shifted. Enthusiasts of progress sing a hymn on this occasion, which I cannot understand. "Glory! Glory! The time is approaching when there will be 600 million Chinese, 500 million Indians, 400 million Europeans and God knows how many hundreds more of all kinds of black people, and on top of that - two British museums with a library in each.” But the end of this strange hymn is even more incomprehensible: “Yes! And if it were not for the damned bonds with which tyrants bind human strength, there would be 800 million Chinese, 700 million Indians and so on in the same size! What a misconception! But what will the force be, what will be left of it when you free this force, separate it from matter and from friction? Your strength will disappear into empty space. The whole democratic motto in its totality contains a fundamental contradiction, says Stephen. If human experience has been able to prove anything, it has proven beyond doubt that when constraints are brought to the smallest measure, when people are given the greatest possible share of freedom, the result is not equality, but, on the contrary, inequality that increases exponentially. Of all types of freedom, of course, the most important is freedom to acquire property. If a person is limited in this, then it is difficult to even imagine what kind of freedom remains behind him. All private property comes from labor for the benefit of the worker, and private property is the very essence of inequality. But suppose that every man has the right to unconditional equality with every other, since all are inseparably connected with each other, and that the products of the labor of each and every one are converted into a common capital, from which all equally receive their maintenance, the result will be a tangible consciousness of equality and fraternity, but freedom will have to be decisively excluded. Experience shows that this is precisely not only a theoretical, but also a practical difficulty and an insurmountable obstacle to the implementation in practice of all the plans created by the socialists. In only one sense can the republican motto be consistently understood and explained: if by the word freedom we mean democracy. The establishment of a democratic government with the recognition of universal brotherhood and with an equal distribution of property is a clear plan in the fullest sense, and no other meaning can be given to the motto when it is used in a serious sense and not in a rattle sense. But even in this case, the motto also has an addition: “Freedom, equality, brotherhood - or death.” These five words clearly signify the complete political system with all its practical consequences, its essence, the goals to which it is directed, and the punishment that threatens those who disobey its statutes. This system expresses in the most definitive form all the bitterness and rage that can accumulate in the soul of the most envious and malicious members of society, who have had no luck in living by choice, against their supposed oppressors. The poor say to the rich: we are now your rulers with the establishment of freedom, since freedom means democracy; and since all people are brothers and have the right to an equal share in the common capital, then give us everything you have, or you will be put to death. Let all those who are attracted by the brilliant republican motto ask themselves in conscience: is this what they mean by this motto and is this what they want? And if not, where do they draw the line between this and their concept? I think that anyone who has the intelligence to understand the extreme complexity of the problem will be convinced that the motto either leaves the problem far behind or contributes absolutely nothing to its solution. Of the three concepts corresponding to the words of the motto, Stephen finds that the concept of equality is the most enthusiastic and the least defining. Everyone understands something different about it. In most cases, this word serves as a vague expression of the envy of the have-nots towards the haves or a vague desire for a social state in which there would not be, as now, sharp contrasts between people in their material lot. This teaching is so vague and unsatisfactory that it is difficult to argue with it without resorting to repeating commonplaces. On this subject, the author also enters into an analysis of the doctrine of equality, as it is expressed in Bentham 8 and in Mill in connection with the doctrine of utilitarianism. He dwells in particular on the two main subjects of the equality Mill preaches: the equality of women with men and equality in the distribution of political power. Mill's theory on the question of woman is expressed in the following four propositions. 1. Justice requires that all people live as equals in society. 2. History shows that the progressive course of progress has constantly elevated humanity from the rule of the “law of force” to a state in which command on the one hand and obedience on the other seem to be exceptional phenomena emerging from the general order, which presupposes a community of equals with equals. 3. Just as "might is right" has lost its meaning in England and in many other countries in almost all the relations of life, so it should not extend to the relations between man and woman. 4. Many known facts confirm that this relation, in its essence, allows for such an equation. Stephen resolutely rejects each of these provisions. From the first proposition it follows that there is no inequality between human beings that could have an influence on the determination of legal rights and duties, and that, therefore, a just law should not imply inequality between people. Not true, Stephen replies. The law, if it needs to satisfy its purpose, if it is written in truth, must correspond as fully as possible to the existing state of society, the law must fit society, like a dress for a person, must be arranged according to its structure and purpose, as a surgical or orthopedic apparatus is arranged, when it is intended to support the body or direct its position. Therefore, whatever irregularities exist in the position of members of society, the law cannot ignore them. The existence of these irregularities, and very significant ones, is a fact obvious to everyone. The main ones are unevenness in age and gender. Mill himself is forced to admit the first unevenness, and therefore not only does not reject the need for education, but is rather disposed to exaggerate its importance. Meanwhile, what follows from this one unevenness? It follows that at the very entrance to life, command and obedience await a person and certainly, of necessity, extend their effect to the most important part of his life - until adulthood. It follows further that by the simple action of time, some people acquire an unequal, superior position in relation to others, which all centuries and all peoples, from the savage to the most educated, have tried in every possible way to combine with a feeling of respect and fear. The best part of the human race assigned the name of Father to the Divine, because with this name the concepts of love, respect and obedience are naturally connected. Without a doubt, the one who first uttered the word: Honor your father and your mother, may you live long on earth, understood more deeply and more perfectly what is needed for the strength of the people’s existence and well-being than the author of the motto about freedom, equality and brotherhood. If it is necessary to recognize the inequality of age and make it the basis of an inequality of rights of great importance, then how can we not recognize the inequality of sex on the same basis? But does it really exist? There are provisions that are extremely difficult to prove, because they do not require proof by universal evidence. All the details of the physical structure indicate the physical inequality of both sexes. Whatever Mill says about this, at least to the whole world, all these speeches will not refute the obvious truth that a man is stronger and stronger than a woman. This truth, recognized everywhere, in all centuries and peoples and under all circumstances, everywhere gave rise to the existing, well-known division of labor between man and woman. All these are facts that the law and public opinion cannot fail to recognize. Another question is: in what sense should it be recognized and to what differences should it lead in the legal position of a man as a man and a woman as a woman? Let's take an example. A man is required to undergo military service. The war begins - a transcription is made 9. Should women be subjected to it on the same basis as men? Whoever tells me what should be said, there is nothing more to say, because any argumentation is impossible. But whoever agrees that it should not, therefore recognizes the necessity of unequal treatment based on fundamental inequality; and if in one case there is this recognition, then by what line should it be limited? Let's take another example - education, a matter of great importance for the state. Should boys be raised with girls and taught the same? Should boys be taught sewing, home economics, and kitchen arts? Will girls play cricket, row and run as well as boys? Whoever says no already recognizes the inequality of gender and admits the inequality of upbringing. Let's move on to the central point of the whole issue - marriage. Marriage is one of those subjects that neither law nor moral opinion can avoid. How should both of them look at marriage: as a contract between equals, or as a contract between a stronger and a less powerful or weaker party, which in some respects presupposes the necessary subordination of the weaker to the stronger? I submit that the first opinion will be based on a deceptive assumption, and will necessarily lead to the most severe injustice to the woman. If the parties are equal, then it is inevitable to admit that marriage, like any contractual community, can be arbitrarily destroyed. The preachers of women's rights are extremely careful to avoid this delicate issue. Mill doesn't say anything about this explicitly in his book; although from the principles he accepted, according to strict logic, this very conclusion follows. If this is the law, then by virtue of it wives will truly become slaves of their husbands. A woman loses the qualities that attract a man much earlier than a man loses the qualities that attract a woman. The connection between mother and young children is much closer than their connection with the father. So, out of ten cases, in nine, probably, a woman who has lost her youth, with children, will be completely in the power of her husband, if it depends on him to break off the union whenever he pleases. This is one inequality that cannot but be borne in mind when defining a contract, if the contract is to serve the benefit of both parties. Here is another inequality. When a man gets married, for the most part he has settled down in life one way or another. His expenses, of course, increase, but he does not at all upset himself in the ways of obtaining his daily bread. On the contrary, when a woman gets married, of necessity (except for rare and exceptional cases) she loses the opportunity to engage in other work other than the home, and in this she cannot have other companions except one - her husband. Many more and very important articles can be pointed out, but these two are enough to convince us that a marriage contract cannot be equated to contracts between equals. Mill assures that in marriage there is not the slightest need for the use of power on the one hand and obedience on the other, unless the union turns out to be completely unsuccessful, in which case the best outcome for both parties will be to free themselves from such a union. These words of Mill prove that he does not understand at all what the essence of family power is and does not give himself this account of in what cases questions of decision and obedience arise between husband and wife. There is no dispute that a husband has no right to treat his wife as a slave, and harsh treatment can be a legal reason for divorce. In a completely different sense, the question of obedience arises between spouses who are in the best relationship of mutual love, and does not in the least violate this feeling, just as on a ship the commanding right of the captain does not in the least prevent him from being in a close friendly relationship with the senior officer. Let's take the following questions of home life: how can we arrange our lifestyle? Should I meet such and such people? Should I, my husband, decide to undertake such and such an enterprise, and if I do, should we move to live in another place? Should I send my son to college? Should I send my daughters to school or take a governess? Where to prepare my sons? On many such issues, the most agreeable spouses may disagree. What to do in this case? I argue that a wife should give up her opinion; must obey her husband and act as he decides, just like on a ship, when the captain gives the order to cut the masts, the senior officer is obliged to carry out the order, even if he disagrees and at least understands maritime affairs better than the captain. To look at this duty as a humiliation, as an insult - this is evil, this is what exposes not the spirit of dignity and courage, but a low, unworthy, rebellious disposition of spirit, a disposition that destroys everything in life for which it is worth living in the world. It is based on the idea that it is low to yield one’s will to another will, and in this I see the root of all evil, the denial of power, without which collective activity in nothing is possible. No matter what business people come together for a joint activity: whether to sew a pair of boots, whether to govern a state - there is neither a small nor a great matter in which someone alone would not have the power to decide, the power of the last word. This means the power to command and obedience. Of course, the one who gives orders at a given moment will be a madman if he deprives himself of the opportunity to take advantage of advice, if he stubbornly adheres to his own opinion in everything, if he only wants to decide and refuses to listen; but it is also practically true that he will be the more disposed to listen, the more importance is attached to his decision. So, it seems to me that the laws and moral rules on which the relationship between a man and a woman should be based should tend towards one goal: to ensure the common good of one and the other half of the human race, since both of them are connected by the closest and strongest ties and cannot have opposing interests, just as different members of one body do not have them, although they differ from each other in strength and purpose. Law and morality resolve this problem by recognizing monogamy as an indissoluble marriage, with the subordination of the wife to her husband and with the division of labor. Elaborating on the rest of Mill's assumptions, Stephen poses questions. Is it really the law of force, the right of the strong, abandoned and not in effect? Does this fact exactly promote equality? Is it fair that the entire course of recent events is aimed at eliminating this law of force? Force, the author answers, constitutes an essential element of any law. The law is nothing more than a regular force acting under special conditions and directed towards a known goal. So, the elimination of the law of force in no way means the elimination of the element of force from the law, for in that case the law itself would be destroyed. But when Mill speaks of the law of force, he apparently means force that is not governed by any law. He should have expressed this clearly, but in this case he would have fallen into obvious contradiction with the facts, for marriage law in the latest European legislation cannot in any way serve as an example of a force not governed by law. On the contrary, this is precisely an example of how the law most strictly curbs the most powerful of human passions. Can there be any doubt that the establishment of monogamy and the indissolubility of marriage really curbed the most ardent passions and the most capricious characters in the dark era and in the Middle Ages, and that this curb was extremely beneficial for all human society, and for women in particular. De Maistre quite rightly in this case gives credit to the medieval clergy for defending these fundamental principles of morality against the incessant attempts to trample and violate them on the part of kings and nobles in an era when the dominion of passion knew no bounds. There is no doubt that in all institutions, especially in those related to the law and government, there is a constant desire to eliminate differences, peculiarities and to simplify the law. There are many reasons for this, and the main one is that all human societies grow and change in morals and customs, etc., so that the previous institutions turn out to be unsuitable, and sometimes even lose their meaning in the new state of society. One of the most important changes, as Mill points out, is that the social position of a person and his attitude towards other people in the old days were determined by the state in which he was born, and in the consistent development of society, the natural attitude is gradually replaced by a free, contractual attitude. But does this mean that the force that was active in the previous state has completely disappeared? No, she only changed her form. In the fourteenth century Scotland, for example, presented a picture of complete rampant wild, disorderly force and public war of every kind; Nowadays Scotland is a calm country of industry, trade, and agriculture. Does this really mean that Scotland was then completely under the law of force, but now it is not subject to it at all? It would be a childish conclusion. On the same basis one would have to conclude that a disorganized ship with a rude and mutinous crew, spending their time fighting in the middle of the sea, is an expression of strength, but a steamship carrying hundreds of people to the edge of the universe so quickly and calmly that no movement is noticeable and no fuss is visible, does not express any strength. Now the force acts calmly and unnoticed, because no one doubts its presence, its direction, its superiority, which will crush all resistance in a moment. And it is in vain that they insist, Stephen continues, that the progressive movement of society from a state of nature to a contractual state promotes equality. I will not go into the essence of this change. Perhaps, in fact, that state of society is the most scientific and the most desirable, in which all relations between people are resolved in the form of payment of all kinds; one thing is certain, that what results from this is not the desired equality, but, on the contrary, inequality, and, moreover, in the harshest and least sympathetic form. Society turns into one vast machine, and all the forces of this machine are concentrated in one institution, which bears the title of public power and consists of the legislative and executive departments with the army and the police. The direction in which this force acts is determined by laws applying to all possible cases with ever-increasing precision and inflexibility. It is left to everyone to ask for the application of these laws to his needs at his best discretion. And these laws boil down to four articles: do not commit a crime, do not violate someone else’s rights, fulfill your contracts, use, along with all your own, what you managed to get for yourself. And is it possible to seriously assure, and not in the form of pathetic irony, that such a state of society favors equality, that it leads to the elimination of command and obedience, that it abolishes the action of force, and the like? What equality can there be between rich and poor, between fat and rich, between good and evil? In particular, what is the equality between a person with a good surname and good upbringing, the son of caring, intelligent, wealthy parents, and another, of low breed, without education, the son of parents who could not teach anything good and could not pass on anything good? It is true, of course, that in our time there remains little inequality in titles. True, we have reached the point where all of our political power is cut into many small shares, which we do not cease to triumphantly trim and will continue to trim down to such miniature pieces that each share will be devoid of any meaning. And with all this, real, significant inequalities of all kinds, in wealth, in talents, in feelings and concepts, and even in religious conviction, that is, in the strongest basis of duty, have never been so obvious as in our time. Hardly ever has the power of individuals over their neighbors and neighbors been defined by such sharp lines and accompanied by such ease and convenience in its exercise. The vague concept of universal equality is most definitively expressed in the theory of political equality. Undoubtedly, over the past generations, a transformation has been taking place throughout the world leading to a fractional division of political power. The prevailing theory of government preaches that every one should have a political vote, that by these votes a legislative assembly should be chosen, and that this assembly should manage public affairs through trusted men, who retain power as long as they have their confidence. This theory is developing and becoming more and more established. It is clear as day that it dominates and, in all likelihood, will dominate minds for a long time. How would a reasonable person with common sense judge it? I completely understand that it should be discussed critically, like any fact, impartially, from all sides; but here’s what I can’t understand: how is it possible to have a feeling of enthusiasm and reverence for her. And the enthusiasts of this system are countless. Take a sheet of any newspaper, look through any book of political content - everywhere, with a few exceptions, the success of democracy, the approach of universal voting, is greeted with a feeling close to religious enthusiasm. I don't recognize this delight. I will point out a circumstance that is usually left unattended. Write whatever laws you like, establish universal voting in the force of an immutable covenant - still it will be as far from equality as before. It turns out that political power has only changed its form, but its essence is the same. If you break it into many small pieces, what will come out of it? Only that whoever manages to put as many of these pieces into one pile as possible will be the ruler over them all. The one who will rule will be the one who, in one way or another, proves himself to be the strongest person. If the government is military, those qualities that make a man a great warrior will make him a ruler. If the government is monarchical, power will depend on the qualities that the monarch believes in an adviser, military leader, or administrator. In a pure democracy, the rulers will be those people who have in their hands the hidden springs of movement, with their friends; but between them and between their voters there will still be as little equality as between military leaders or ministers and all the subjects of the monarchy. Changes in the form of government significantly change the conditions of government and have very little effect on its essence. In one era - strong character, in another - cunning dexterity, in another - business skill, for some - eloquence, for others - the ability to use the concepts current in society and apply them to practical purposes - this is what at different times gives this or that person the way to climb on the shoulders of his neighbors and guide them in one direction or another; but at all times and under all circumstances, crowds, rows and heaps of people follow one or another leader who will unite them into his team. In short, the division of political power has no essential connection with equality, any more than with freedom. Whether it is good or bad, beneficial or harmful, is a question in itself, and can only be decided by considering the effect and effect produced by the institution. I am not discussing this issue; I insist on only one circumstance that people usually pass by because they don’t like it, it stings their eyes: namely, that popular institutions, whatever their red sides, have a weak and extremely dangerous side, so that they are in no way worth the blind worship and enthusiastic praise with which their establishment is usually greeted. I know that there is no way to fight this flow that is rushing across Europe, and I refuse to fight. The heights and waves are lifted and everyone and everything is carried away with them; but whoever is carried away by a mighty current will at least be allowed to remain silent and not sing a hymn of praise to the deity of the torn stream. I resent the universal vote because it perverts a law in which I deeply believe, the law of the true and natural relation between wisdom and folly. It seems fair to me that reasonable and kind people should rule over the insane and evil. So, I do not understand such a state in which the only purpose of reasonable and good people will be to preach to their fellow citizens; in which everyone, without distinction, is left to do as they please, and everyone is given a measured portion of sovereign power in the form of a vote. When they tell me that the consequence of all this should be the dominance of reason over force, I hear in all this the wildest fantasy that has ever taken possession of the minds of the human multitude. Philosophers have long been engaged in the analysis of moral ideas and looked for the source of the moral principle in man. The Stoics 10 and Zeno settled on the idea that the source of the moral principle - reason and a virtuous life - is nothing more than life in accordance with nature; a happy life is nothing more than a moral life, with the elimination of all action of sensual impulses. This system turned out to be untenable both in theory and in practice. Epicurus 11 undertook to correct it and supplement it. In his opinion, the motivations for human actions have their source not in reason, but in feelings, and all virtues are derived from one foundation - from benefit. As a result, he concluded, reason is not at all the source of virtue, but desire is the rule of life. Epicurus did not mean only a sensual desire, not a desire of the moment, but a higher, spiritual desire, directed towards well-being or happiness, in its highest and general meaning. Thus, Epicurus, through purified desire, reached the ideal of life, identical with Zeno’s teaching, in accordance with nature, in which happiness was based. This system, along with the system of the Stoics, turned out to be untenable, because in neither one nor the other there was room for a special moral impulse of human nature and a consciousness of moral duty. There's nothing new under the sun. Epicurus's teaching was destined to be revived in our time, in the footsteps of Bentham, in the newest system of utilitarianism. Mill was a preacher of the utilitarian principle, which, in his opinion, should serve as a replacement for the moral principle. Its basis is not the consciousness of personal duty, but a thought aimed at general well-being. Then it is recognized as unnecessary to resolve questions about good and evil, moral and immoral. “The basis of utilitarian morality,” says Mill, “is the social feeling in humanity, the desire to be in unity with those like oneself. It is the beginning of great power in human nature and is capable of intensifying over time. The social state is so natural, so necessary, so common to man that he cannot imagine himself otherwise than as a member of the social body. So, every condition essential to the social state is gradually grafted onto a person’s consciousness of the state in which he was born and which constitutes the destiny of a human being. Communication between people (except for the relationship between a slave and a master) is obviously possible only on the condition that the common interests of each and every one are taken into account. Communication between equals can only exist when the interests of each and every one are taken into account equally. With each generation, people are approaching more and more to a state in which it is impossible to live otherwise than on conditions of such equality... Strengthening social bonds with the healthy development of society strengthens in each individual the personal impulse to consider in everything the welfare of all other members of society. Little by little, the very feeling of it becomes identified with the thought of general well-being, and this thought acquires the meaning of instinct.” From Stephen's point of view, and in the court of common sense, such a theory cannot but seem like a dreamy idealization of human nature. Mill is convinced that if men are left free from all constraint and made as equal as possible among themselves, they will by nature act fraternally towards each other and act in harmonious union for the common good. It's a dream, says Stephen. Many people are completely evil, most are indifferent, and there are many kind people. Moreover, indifferent people turn first one way or the other, depending on the circumstances, and especially depending on whose side the power is on - the side of the evil or the good. Moreover, between all classes of people there are and always will be real reasons for enmity and quarrels, and even good people are often forced to be in hostile relations with each other, either because they have opposing interests, or because they find themselves in differences of opinion about the good itself. Admitting that the need for general well-being can serve as a measure of the moral principle, Stephen argues that this need and the moral rule corresponding to it can be determined, but not by the ideal of those people for whom the rule should be obligatory, but by the ideal of human life that the legislator of the moral code has in mind. What is welfare or happiness, there can be no unity in the general opinion about this. Happiness is an extremely vague concept, and to base a universal system of morality on this vague concept is to build a building on sand. But the legislator, the moralist, and every person, no matter who he is, is disposed to care about his own well-being and his friends’ well-being more than about the general well-being. Mill insists that “everyone ought, in strict justice, to regard his own and the general welfare as indifferently as he would as an impartial spectator.” In fact, it can be said that the life of every person is a constant negation of such impartiality: almost everyone spends his life considering ways to create well-being for himself and his loved ones, without introducing the well-being of other people into any calculation. Even more than that: such is human nature that it is impossible to distinguish and separate personal motives from social ones. Whenever we want to do something nice for others, we realize that it pleases us ourselves, and that’s where our desire comes from. A person is so closely tied to his own center that, speaking about his relationships with the closest people, one has to use terms that mean feelings of personal contentment or dissatisfaction. Man by nature cannot renounce his self, just as he cannot separate from his shadow. Humanity is also me, written in a huge letter, and love for humanity generally means jealousy of my concept of what people should be and how they should live. Anyone who does not love his own brother, whom he sees, is capable of imagining that he loves his cousin, who lives somewhere far away, whom he has never seen and will never see. The actual facts cannot be denied: self-love is the natural source from which everything comes, and the broadest forms of human benevolence, from which philanthropy itself takes its foundations. Mill is strangely mistaken when he thinks that this natural feeling of benevolence towards himself and towards his people can of itself gradually change character, rise into a feeling of general benevolence towards the human race, and in this form even acquire the meaning of a new religion, so deeply imbued with this feeling that Mill even fears that in time it may serve to the detriment of personal freedom! No, this is a dream. Utilitarian morality cannot assert its sanction within itself: it requires an external, higher sanction. It can find this sanction only in religion, that is, in the determinative consciousness of a religious fact, in the consciousness of the existence of God and the future life; in itself it is not able to be a religion obligatory for all humanity. It is difficult for us to imagine in the current situation a state of mind in which there is not only no positive faith in God and a future life, but there is not even a dubious assumption of the possibility of God and a future life. We cannot fully judge the consequences of atheism from the actions of people who were brought up in the belief that there is a God, or who grew up among a people who believe in God; but if such a state existed, then, of necessity, completely moral concepts would change, and especially a person’s ideas about his relationship to other people. I admit that some people, due to the special qualities of their spiritual nature, could remain with their current moral consciousness; but I am not at all fascinated by the new religion that these people could construct for themselves from the rules of simple morality. In my opinion, the disposition and ability to accept such a religion reveals not strength, but weakness of the spirit and is almost inevitably combined with self-delusion. No matter how perfect such a natural religion may be, it cannot lead a person beyond the point at which self-sacrifice begins. In daily life and in general terms we are not embarrassed by questions about universal brotherhood. A simple person reasons in a simple sense: “I wish good for myself, my family, my friends. I am devoted to the good of my fatherland. I try to do good to everyone who happens to. But if during my life I encounter people who want to treat me or my loved ones in a hostile manner, I know that I will treat them in a hostile manner. Show me a famous person with a famous business, and I will tell you who he is: my friend or enemy.” But a devotee of the natural religion of brotherhood cannot speak thus. He is obliged to love all humanity. Let him tell me why. But he cannot explain this. It cannot because he himself, for the most part, resolutely rejects the only fact on which such a doctrine could be based, namely, that God created all people and commanded them to love each other. And how to make people love each other without this is impossible to understand. This is the fundamental self-delusion of the doctrine. It takes a miracle. They want to assure us that this miracle can be accomplished by the power of progress and civilization. They say that with the increase in capital of all kinds, with the development of physical knowledge, with the general spread of the conveniences of life, the feeling of mutual goodwill will certainly increase. In reality, quite the opposite happens. The whole direction of modern civilization tends towards making it convenient for a person to be alone in his position and arrange his own interests; and with the development of freedom and equality this feeling must certainly increase. As every constraint is reduced to the smallest extent, all men will begin to approach the same flat level, and the power in each man to excite and attract imagination and feeling will diminish. In such a state of society there will, no doubt, be a great many meetings of all kinds and philanthropic associations, but there will be little excitement for patriotism or for the public spirit. Many commonplaces have been expressed to the effect that the feeling of patriotism weakens as luxury and comfort spread; but in all these speeches there is much more truth than in those general phrases that you now hear everywhere about the strengthening of love for humanity with the spread of civilization. Undoubtedly, civilization leads to the fact that people become hateful at the very thought of suffering or need, both in their own person and in the person of anyone else. Civilization disposes men to reason and talk with each other about the affairs of others in a spirit of mutual sympathy and courtesy with compliments, and from time to time with great indignation and rage; but from this disposition to love is still very far away. To tell the truth, the human race is a totality so huge, so diverse, so little known that it is impossible to love it with real universal love. Can you really imagine that you love some of its imaginary representatives, who, upon closer examination, turn out to be our dreams personified. Brotherhood cannot be a religion. Not a single property of human nature, not a single human passion, can constitute religion by itself. An individual property can be only one of many figures in religion. If you leave people to themselves, their properties, desires and passions will sooner or later find some level. Somehow a common life, a social institution, will be established. Change the relative strength of one passion or another, and the social structure will change one way or another. All this is not yet religion. Religion means the establishment and general recognition of a definitive doctrine about human life and about the mutual relations of people among themselves and to the world, a doctrine that should be a guide for life. Religion must necessarily contain not only a feeling element, but also a factual element; the factual element constitutes the essential basis on which the feeling is affirmed and by which its very property is determined. Without this foundation, religion cannot exist. Let us take four samples of belief 12. 1) Believe in everything that is contained in the Creed. Believe and live by this faith. 2) There is one God and Mohammed is his prophet. Live as Mohammed ordered. 3) All being is evil, and whoever has cognized the depth of the spirit, his only desire is to free himself from being. Here is a rule of life: if you live like this, you will soon be free. 4) The infinitely powerful Supreme Deity arranged you all into castes and gave each caste its own rules for life. Horrible executions await you if you do not live as your caste should. All nature is full of invisible forces residing in various natural objects. Worship them and pray. These are religions in the proper sense of the word. Each of them represents a system contained within itself, complete, containing positive rules that can serve as a practical guide for life. Not a single one of these provisions can be established by the doctrine that Mill calls the supreme sanction of morality. All that can be squeezed out of it is this: “Love all humanity. Nowadays there are already such impulses at work that sooner or later, someday will lead people to love each other.” It can be called good advice, it can be called prophecy, but it is not religion. If a person does not accept the advice, does not believe the prophecy, the words remain empty. They have no compelling force at all (in invitas), and the mass of people has always and everywhere consisted of those who are stubborn or at least indifferent to any religion. To give these words a compelling religious force, there is no other way than to combine them with a positive statement of fact relating to humanity and human life. What kind of fact will the humanitarian religion combine with these words? Except this: the human race is a huge collection of bubbles that constantly burst and disappear. No one created these bubbles and no one knows where they came from. Oh bubbles! Love each other with tenderness! Perhaps this is also a religion of its own kind, but what a pitiful one! “Let’s eat and drink, because we’ll die tomorrow!” “Don’t be too righteous: why destroy yourself”? Who is my brother? This question directly depends on another question: is there a God who provides for human society, is there Providence? If not, morality is a simple fact, nothing more. Some rules of external behavior actually promote human well-being. The supreme sanction of these rules is the personal taste of each. But if there is Providence, morality is no longer a simple fact, it becomes a law. Belief in Providence means that both the physical world and the moral world alike come within the sphere of conscious constitution and disposition; that people, members of the moral world, go beyond the limits of the material world in which they are placed, and that the law imposed on them is virtue, that is, the ability to act according to principles aimed at the well-being of people in general, and in particular to those types of well-being that relate to the abiding, eternal element of human nature... Of the two systems, one does not give any, the other gives a rational explanation to the consciousness that virtue is a duty of man. If the law of virtue is the law of God, then being virtuous is a duty. Where there is no legislator, there is no law; where there is no law, there can be no duty, although there may be a special natural disposition to do what would be duty-bound if there were law. This location may also be hereditary; but in any case, when a person realizes that the sense of duty in him is nothing more than a factual property that does not have a solid basis, and that it constrains him, is inconvenient for him, it is very easy for him to free himself from it. But it’s time to conclude our article on Stephen’s book. From everything that we have presented, the reader sees that this is a work of deep, strong and courageous thought, one of the most remarkable phenomena of this year in English literature. Not only in those sympathetic to the author, but also in radical journals, this book was met with serious respect. There is no doubt that an interesting debate will arise about it. In conclusion, we present the author’s last speech, which ends the book. “There is a talent that is worth all other talents taken together in human affairs. It is the ability to judge correctly from imperfect materials; we can perhaps call it the ability to correctly guess the truth. This ability cannot be taught by any rules; even with experience it is not always possible to obtain it. It is often associated with a certain sluggishness and even dullness of thinking and with the inability to express thoughts. The essential thing about her is that she sees things as they are, without exaggeration and without passion; but is it possible to see things as they are and as they are possible? Just open your eyes and look in the full breadth of your vision. All truly important questions are resolved not by argumentation from known premises to a necessary conclusion, but by a wise choice between several possible views on the matter. I think this idea is also true in relation to religious belief. It is possible to have several coherent, meaningful views on this or that subject, and all of them, since they are based on facts, can be plausible. By discussing with common sense the facts on which these views are based, and considering their connection with other objects, you can make it clear to yourself how many views you can form and which of them is the most plausible. When in this way the consciousness stops at several views on life that have an internal connection and a reasonable basis, a person remains to cope with the following questions: what do you think about yourself? What do you think about the world? Do you recognize yourself as simply a machine and your consciousness as the result of mechanical forces? Does the world seem to you to be simply an existing fact and nothing more? These are questions that everyone is obliged to answer for themselves as they please. These are the riddles of the Sphinx: no matter which way we go, we will certainly meet them. If we decide to completely ignore them and leave them without an answer, it is our will. If we give an indecisive answer, it is again our will, but in both cases it is our fear. If a person prefers to turn away completely from God and from the future, who can forbid him? There is no way to convince him otherwise, to clearly prove to him that he is wrong. On the contrary, if a person has made his choice in the other direction, no one can prove to him that he was mistaken. Everyone has the right to act according to his own best discretion, and if he acts differently, it is worse for him. We are all in the position of a traveler on mountain peaks, in a narrow passage, where a snowstorm blows from everywhere and the fog blinds his eyes. Paths can be seen here and there through the fog, but which of them is safe? To stand still means to freeze. Choose the wrong path and you will fall to death. And who knows which path is the right one? What should we do in this situation? “Be strong and courageous, do not fear or be afraid” (Deut. 31:6,7 – Words of Moses to Joshua). As much as you understand the truth, act in truth; As much as there is hope in your soul, live in all hope and accept with a strong spirit everything that will be your lot. And most importantly, do not be deceived by any dream and do not lie to yourself or others, but follow your path, wherever it leads, clearing your eyes and raising your head. Even if everything ended with death, it would be impossible to meet death with more dignity. And when not everything, then you will enter another country as a straight man, without sophistry on your lips and without any mask.” Comte Isidore Marie Auguste François Xavier (1798–1857) - French philosopher, sociologist, founder of positivism, founder of sociology as an independent science. Liberté, égalité, fraternité, ou la mort! (French) - Liberty, equality, fraternity or death. Stephen James Fitzjames (1829–1894) – baron, English lawyer, judge, anti-liberal writer. Pilate Pontius was the Roman ruler of Judea from 26–36, the judge of Jesus Christ, who sentenced Him to death under pressure from the Jews. Ultima ratio (lat.) – the last argument. Buckle Henry Thomas (1821 - 1862) - English historian, author of "The History of Civilization in England", chess player. Maistre Joseph-Marie de (1753–1821) - count, French Catholic philosopher, writer, politician, diplomat, supporter of political conservatism, Jesuit preacher among Russian high society. Jeremy Bentham, Jeremiah Bentham (1748–1832) - English sociologist, lawyer, theorist of political liberalism, founder of utilitarianism, one of the trends in English philosophy. Conscription (Latin conscriptio - recording, recruitment) - recruitment of the army through military service with the allowance of redemption and substitution. Stoicism (from the Greek στοά ποικίλη, lit. “painted portico”) is a philosophical school of Hellenistic Roman philosophy of the 3rd–2nd centuries. BC e., according to which a person should strive to be free from passions, be able to submit to inevitable necessity, while maintaining mental balance and tranquility. The founder of Stoicism is Zeno of Citium (346/336/333–264/262 BC), a student of the Cynic school. Stoicism retained its influence until the end of the ancient world. Epicurus (342/341–271/270 BC) - ancient Greek philosopher, founder of Epicureanism in Athens, author of the work “The Garden of Epicurus”, in which he developed the ethics of pleasures in combination with the doctrine of Democritus’s atoms. 1) Christianity, 2) Islam, 3) Buddhism, 4) Hinduism. – O.S.