Глава VII. Советская власть и Русская Православная Церковь в годы Великой Отечественной войны. 1941–1943 годы

Sunday June 22, 1941 was a special day for Orthodox believers. On this day, the feast of All Saints was celebrated, who shone in the Russian land. According to tradition, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow served in the Cathedral of the Epiphany in Yelokhov. Returning after service to his modest wooden house on Baumansky Lane, he learns the tragic news: fascist troops crossed the Soviet border, bombed cities and towns, and the first blood of the citizens of the USSR was shed. Silently he withdrew into the room-cell. After some time, he came out with the text of an appeal: “The pathetic descendants of the enemies of Orthodox Christianity want to once again try to bring our people to their knees before untruth, to force them through naked violence to sacrifice the good and integrity of their homeland, their blood covenants of love for their fatherland. But this is not the first time that the Russian people have had to endure such tests. With God's help, this time too he will scatter the fascist enemy force into dust. Our ancestors did not lose heart even in worse situations, because they remembered not about personal dangers and benefits, but about their sacred duty to their homeland and faith, and emerged victorious. Let us not disgrace their glorious name, and we, the Orthodox, are relatives to them both in flesh and in faith. The Fatherland is defended by weapons and a common national feat, a common readiness to serve the Fatherland in a difficult hour of testing with everything that everyone can. This is a matter for workers, peasants, scientists, women and men, young people and old people. Everyone can and should contribute their share of labor, care and art to the common feat” 187. This was an unequivocal call from the head of the church to his multi-million flock to show patriotism both in words and in deeds. The message also contained lines that directly related to the clergy. The clergy were called upon to encourage the faint-hearted, to console the distressed, and to remind the wavering of their civic and church duty. The position of “non-concern” with the circumstances experienced by the country and believers, and even more so the search for “benefits on the other side of the border,” which was equated with treason to the Motherland and the Church, was declared unacceptable for the pastor. The appeal was sent to dioceses, churches and parishes, evoking reciprocal patriotic feelings among millions of believers. In wartime conditions, from now on, at almost every divine service, Metropolitan Sergius addresses the theme of the people's war. On the evening of June 26, in the Yelokhovsky Cathedral, in front of a huge crowd of people, a prayer service was held for the victory of Russian weapons. The message of Metropolitan Sergius of June 22 was read out. At the end of the service, the Metropolitan, in his sermon, again turned to the patriotic feelings of the believers, calling on them to defend the Fatherland. This word clearly sounded a warning that the enemy was threatening Christianity, that he was carrying at bayonet not only slavery, but also “idolatry, the destruction of native Orthodox shrines and faith.” Therefore, every Orthodox Christian is obliged to resist the “invasion of idolaters.” On August 12, Metropolitan Sergius preaches during a service in the Church of St. John the Warrior. In a church crowded with people, he reminds them of the constant duty of the believer: to pray to the Lord to grant “strength, courage, patience in enduring the difficult trials of war” to all those who are engaged in “mortal combat with the enemy who attacked our homeland.” The patriotic messages of Metropolitan Sergius met with unanimous support from his multi-million flock. In letters to the Moscow Patriarchate, believers and parish priests reported on collections of funds, bonds, items made of precious metals, and various things held in churches, which they donated to the needs of the front and rear, to help wounded soldiers and families of Red Army soldiers. ...October 1941 was a difficult month for the country. The front approached Moscow, martial law and a curfew were introduced in the city. The first military fortifications and refugees appeared on the streets. There were persistent rumors about the possible surrender of the capital. By decision of the Moscow City Council, the evacuation of government offices, plants and factories began. Religious centers located at that time in Moscow were also included in the centralized evacuations: the Moscow Patriarchate, the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians, the Metropolis of the Renovationist Church, and the Old Believer Archdiocese. The decision to evacuate was announced to a representative of the Moscow Patriarchate on October 7. The location of the new location was presumably Chkalovsk, a city in the Kuibyshev region, or Ulyanovsk. Training began, but the departure date was postponed due to Sergius’ illness; after all, he was in his seventy-fifth year. In these difficult days, which seemed to him to be the last in the “earthly vale of weeping and sorrow,” the Metropolitan draws up a will and names a successor. The day of departure, October 14, coincided with the holiday of the Intercession. In his festive message, Sergius again calls on believers to fulfill their religious and civic duty with dignity, not sparing their lives to defend the Fatherland. By the evening of the same day, Sergius and his closest employees went to the Kazan station. A special train was formed on the sidings. Trucks and cars drove up to the carriages one after another, loaders and porters scurried about with trunks and bales. The usual bustle for a station reigned. The only unusual thing was that there were armed patrols around the train, carefully checking documents. They were led by a general dressed in the NKVD uniform. It seemed that he knew everyone who arrived at the train, unmistakably indicating to each of those who approached him where each carriage stood and what the shortest route to it was. Here's another car. An elegant, intelligent-looking man with the appearance of a film actor came out, wearing a fashionable autumn coat and a soft hat. Next to him is a gray-bearded, tall, heroic-looking old man. The first was Alexander Vvedensky, the renovationist first hierarch of Moscow and all renovationist churches in the USSR, the second was Metropolitan Vitaly, one of the renovationist ruling bishops. Standing next to them were a pretty, well-dressed young blonde and an elderly woman in a black dress who looked like a nun. A dapper young man with a mustache, resembling Alexander Vvedensky, and another young man with a red beard and wild, wandering eyes, who smelled of vodka, were bustling around near the luggage. This was the family of the renovationist first hierarch. In the carriage they entered, there were already fellow travelers: several modestly dressed people - the leaders of the country's Baptist church and an equally modest bearded man - the Old Believer Archbishop of Moscow and All Rus' Irinarh (Parfenov). As soon as we sat down, there was a commotion at the door, someone’s things were being brought in, someone was talking loudly near the carriage. And then the doors opened and, accompanied by several people, an old man of average height with a gray thick beard, wearing a golden pince-nez, dressed in a cassock and a monastic scufa, entered. – What a meeting! – Metropolitan Alexander rushed to him. Smiling, Metropolitan Sergius, and it was he, said: The last time they saw each other was in the fall of 1922. Then Vvedensky was a successful young archpriest, deputy chairman of the renovationist High Church Administration, and the “old man” was a member of the All-Russian Central Church. Now A.I. Vvedensky, no longer young and no longer successful, was the first hierarch of the Renovationist Church, and the one who entered at that time bore the title of patriarchal locum tenens of the Russian Orthodox Church. Next to Sergius stood a Petrograd comrade from Vvedensky’s youth, Metropolitan of Kiev Nikolai (Yarushevich). All of them now faced a long journey together into the unknown. Finally, at 16.40, the train slowly moved away from the station platform. Outside the windows, Moscow life continued, and in the carriage they were already thinking about what the path to the final destination would be and how soon they would get there. On the platform, someone was waving a handkerchief and wiping away tears, and cries of farewell could be heard. Military men, railway workers, ordinary people floated through the window... and no one paid attention, no one could have guessed that the train was taking the leaders of religious organizations of the USSR to the East. Slowly, only occasionally picking up speed, the train moved with frequent stops throughout the Moscow region. “Moscow has disappeared from view,” one of the participants in the move, Archpriest A.P. Smirnov, later recalled, “the train runs through the countryside. Stays for a long time in Ramenskoye. On the horizon lightning lightnings of barrage fire flash every minute. Messages about the Germans bombing many passenger trains come to life in my memory... Dark night. We are approaching Kolomna. Close to the Moscow River. The train goes along a high embankment. Assuming the possibility of the presence of enemies in the darkness - saboteurs and paratroopers, the train passes through this place quietly, as if at a walk, and stops in front of the bridge over the Moscow River. The guards accompanying the train go on reconnaissance, and finally the train goes into high gear." 188 But it was not only the external circumstances of the composition’s promotion that were alarming. On the night of October 16, Sergius suddenly became ill: his temperature jumped to almost 40 degrees, delirium. In anticipation of the worst, the patient was given communion. Metropolitan Nicholas, who was next to Sergius in these tense moments, later conveyed the words of the Metropolitan: “I am ready for death. May God's will be done in everything." However, a day later the disease just as unexpectedly subsided. When the train was in Penza, a military doctor came, examined the Metropolitan and said that his health was not a cause for concern and he could continue on. The people who were close to Metropolitan Sergius gradually calmed down. Late at night on October 19, 1941, Sunday, the train finally arrived in Ulyanovsk, at that time a small provincial town on the Volga that received thousands of evacuees. There were practically no plants or factories here, and the car was still a curiosity for the residents. But with the advent of evacuated factories and institutions, thousands and thousands of people, the life of this city changed dramatically. Everyone had to be provided with housing, work and food. For the first few days upon arrival, Sergius and those accompanying him lived in the carriage in which they arrived from Moscow. Then they found a small apartment in the city, where Sergius moved. The city authorities offered a separate mansion for the needs of the patriarchate, but it had to be abandoned due to the distance from the center and poor communication with it. The first cathedral service, in which the clergy who arrived in Ulyanovsk, headed by Metropolitan Sergius, took part, took place on October 26 in a small cemetery church. The church until recently belonged to the community of schismatic Gregorians, but the young hieromonk who served there repented and, together with the community, moved to the Patriarchal Church. Over the next month, religious services were held here regularly. However, due to its size, the cemetery Resurrection Church was not suitable for cathedral services, for which more and more believers gathered day by day, having heard about the arrival of the head of the Orthodox Church in Ulyanovsk. The search began for a more suitable church building. But this was difficult to do, since most of the churches operating in the city before the revolution were demolished. A giant statue of Lenin stood on the highest point in the city, where there once was a cathedral. The square was laid out on the site of the ancient Church of the Resurrection. Two city churches - Ilyinskaya and Germanovskaya - have not yet been demolished, although they have been inactive for a long time. However, they were so distorted that putting them in order seemed problematic. There was only one registered Orthodox parish, which had a very small church at its disposal. Other surviving religious buildings were either rebuilt and adapted for other needs, or remained neglected and neglected. There were no buildings that could be repaired in a short time and subsequently used for religious purposes. After a long and unsuccessful search, it was decided to convert the former church on Vodnikov Street (formerly Shatalnaya, 15), which was used at that time as a hostel, into the patriarchate. Repairs were made within two weeks. Believers brought icons, veils, and church utensils to the church in abundance. On the eve of the first service in the new building, Metropolitan Sergius addressed the flock on November 24 with the third patriotic message, “The hour of our victory is near.” “The Russian people, everyone who cares about our homeland,” it said, “now has one goal - to defeat the enemy at any cost. A true patriot will not tremble in his hand to exterminate the fascist invaders. The heart of a Christian is closed to fascist beasts; it exudes only destructive, mortal hatred towards the enemy” 189. On November 30, 1941, the main altar of the new church was dedicated to the most revered Kazan Icon of the Mother of God in the former Simbirsk province. The new church was named the Kazan Patriarchal Cathedral in the city of Ulyanovsk. On the second floor of the renovated building, chambers for the metropolitan were arranged. On December 19, Metropolitan Sergius entered them. The manager of the affairs of the Moscow Patriarchate, Archpriest N.F. Kolchitsky, also moved here. From now on, this house became the center of the Russian Orthodox Church for the long 22 months of evacuation. There is not much documentary evidence left of Metropolitan Sergius’s stay in Ulyanovsk. As eyewitnesses say, he maintained his usual daily routine, established from the day of his monastic tonsure: he got up at five in the morning; read the rules; took an hour-long walk in the fresh air, recommended to him by doctors; then he had breakfast and at nine o’clock in the morning began receiving visitors; then - consideration of urgent church matters. At three o'clock in the afternoon - a modest lunch, and after a short rest - reading incoming correspondence and preparing reply letters and church documents, reading the Bible - the so-called Bible lesson. In the evening there was a modest dinner, to which everyone who was in the house at that moment was invited and during which intimate conversations were held. And so on day after day. A particularly favorite place where Metropolitan Sergius walked in good weather and when his health allowed was the Volga slopes - the Old and New Crowns. It happened that during these walks, believers approached him: some shared their troubles and concerns, others asked for help. The Metropolitan talked with everyone, consoled and blessed everyone, and gave everything that was with him to those who asked. They remember that one day an unfamiliar woman approached him, as it turned out, a widow who had lost not only her husband, but also her children. Sergius wanted to give her money, but it was no longer there, and then he took off his hand and gave her his gold watch. In December 1941, the enemy was stopped near Moscow, the first military victories of the Red Army buried the hopes of the Nazi invaders for a repeat of the European blitzkrieg. In the liberated areas, one could see firsthand what kind of “new order” the fascists brought to the peoples of the Soviet Union, including in relation to religion, believers, and church organizations. Information about this was presented to Metropolitan Sergius, and he hastened to notify his flock about what was happening in the previously occupied territories: “The churches have been destroyed. For example, a unique monument of church architecture, the famous church in New Jerusalem, and a copy of the Church of the Resurrection in old Jerusalem were blown up. The ancient cathedral in Mozhaisk was blown up. Many churches were destroyed in the Kalinin region, in Vereisky, Borovsky and other areas; churches, hospitals and other charitable and cultural institutions were put on fire, and the sick and wounded Red Army soldiers who were lying there were burned alive. Along the streets there are gallows with corpses of citizens hanging on them, hanged, according to the bestial custom of the fascists, only “for the sake of alarming the population,” in other words, hanged obviously without personal guilt. Everything that can be taken has been plundered, everything that can be desecrated and polluted has been polluted with some kind of monkey rapture” 190. Being himself responsive to the troubles of people, Sergius called on believers to provide all possible help to both near and far. He was especially worried about the Leningrad flock. Receiving letters from the besieged city, he bitterly said: “We feel good here and at peace, but this is what it’s like for them, being in the hands of death.” When in the summer of 1942, caravans of ships sailed along the Volga, taking children of besieged Leningrad deep into the country, Sergius addressed the congregation from the church pulpit, asking for help for orphans. And people went and brought to the small, thin, innocent victims of the war the little they themselves had. The memories of people close to Sergius brought to us evidence of the prayerful help of the head of the church to his people. Here's one of them. At the end of January 1943, illness forced the Metropolitan to go to bed. And these were the days of decisive battles for Stalingrad. On the night of February 2, 1943, having overcome his illness, Sergius asked to be taken out of bed. Having stood up, the bishop with difficulty made three prostrations to the ground, sending thanks to the Lord. Sergius said to the cell attendant who was helping: “The Lord of armies, strong in battle, has overthrown those who rebel against us. May the Lord bless his people with peace! Maybe this beginning will be a happy ending." In the morning, the radio broadcast the good news about the defeat of German troops at Stalingrad. Sergius made sure that churches were opened not only in Ulyanovsk, but also in the suburban villages adjacent to it. In one of the surviving documents you can read: “To the Archpriest of Moscow A.P. Smirnov. I instruct you to go to the village of Poldomasovo, accept the keys to the local church, make a list of twenty and begin fulfilling your priestly duties pending discretion.” The house on Vodnikov Street received correspondence from dioceses, government agencies and from abroad; Bishops came with reports, and episcopal consecrations were performed here, meetings of church governing bodies were held, and plans were outlined for organizing church life in wartime conditions; For the first time, the metropolitan's messages to the flock were read out and from here authorized representatives of the patriarchate were sent to the liberated areas to organize church life. Letters were regularly received from Moscow from Metropolitan Nicholas, who temporarily ruled the Moscow diocese and maintained the necessary contacts with government and other authorities remaining in Moscow. The letters contained information about the most important events in the life of Moscow churches and about collections for patriotic needs. All this allowed Metropolitan Sergius to be aware of the main political, military and church problems, and to respond to them with his messages and appeals. Metropolitan Nikolai (Yarushevich) wrote to Sergius about the details of the life of his comrades, acquaintances, and relatives who remained in Moscow, about the house in which he previously lived and which he was forced to leave: “It is cold in the apartment: in the office it is 5 ° C, in my room (behind the partition) it is the same, and in the dining room it is 10 degrees. The firewood is running out, but I have already taken measures to find the next batch of firewood”; “Yesterday, having been invited to the Moscow Council, I learned that, according to our petition, the Moscow Council decided to provide the Patriarchate with the second (previously owned) apartment in house No. 6, that is, to provide us with the entire house. In the near future it is planned to free up the space of this second apartment for us. Of course, there will be renovations to be done, since that apartment is very neglected.” Metropolitan Sergius morally supported the flock who remained in the occupied territory and called on believers to participate in the partisan movement and help it. The message dated December 13, 1942 said: “Our people do not think of abandoning you. He does not tolerate the seizure of your regions by the fascists. Ready to make all sorts of sacrifices for the sake of his homeland, he will not lay down his arms until he drives the enemy away. Therefore, in the occupied regions, the enemy generally encounters not submission and cowardly subservience, but guerrilla warfare, which undermines his strength every day and gives him little less anxiety than war at the front. A participant in a guerrilla war is not only one who attacks enemy troops with weapons in his hands. A participant and one who delivers bread to the partisans and everything they need in their life of complete danger; who hides the partisans from traitors and German spies; who goes after the wounded, etc. God help you to contribute to the national cause everything that is feasible and available to everyone. Do not let the enemy feel like he is the master of your area and live well and safely in it. Let the rear for him be no better than the front, where our Red Army is crushing him, steadily driving the enemies closer and closer to our western border. The day is not far off when you will joyfully greet your liberating brothers." 191 In 1942, a widespread movement began in the Soviet Union to raise funds for the construction of aircraft, torpedo boats, and tanks. With the money of Soviet citizens - collective farmers, workers, Komsomol members, pioneers, youth - more than a hundred tank columns were built. On December 30, 1942, Metropolitan Sergius called on his flock to join the all-Union movement and donate funds for the construction of a special tank column named after Dmitry Donskoy. “Let our church column named after Demetrius Donskoy,” wrote the Metropolitan, “bear the blessing of our Orthodox Church and its incessant prayer for the success of Russian weapons. We will all be given the comforting knowledge that we will not stand on the sidelines, that we, according to our strength and ability, are participating in the holy cause of saving our homeland” 192. Already in February 1943, in a telegram to Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin in connection with the 25th anniversary of the Red Army, the Patriarchal Locum Tenens reported that six million rubles had been collected in a short time for the construction of a tank column and that he was continuing to collect the necessary funds. At the request of the All-Slavic Committee for the Fight against Fascism, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow in 1942–1943 addressed appeals to the Orthodox churches of Europe, to the clergy and believers, to soldiers from Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania who fought on the Eastern Front. Important events in the life of the church during the period when Metropolitan Sergius was in evacuation were the Councils of Bishops in 1942. In March, 11 hierarchs gathered in Ulyanovsk, almost all of whom were free and did not remain under occupation. The issue of the ecclesiastical responsibility of Bishop Polycarp (Sikorsky), who proclaimed the formation of a non-canonical autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which relied in its activities on the assistance and support of the German authorities, was discussed. The Council condemned the actions of Polycarp and did not recognize the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church. This confirmed the special appeal of Metropolitan Sergius to the Ukrainian flock adopted in February 1942 in connection with the formation of the autocephalous Orthodox Church. It spoke in detail about the apostasies of this pseudo-church, condemned the schismatic activities of Polycarp, for which he was subject to deprivation of the priesthood, and the ordinations he performed were recognized as graceless, and orders addressed to Orthodox parishes were not subject to execution. In his subsequent Easter address to the Ukrainian flock, Metropolitan Sergius explained the reasons and circumstances of the Council’s decision. Of no small importance was the fact that the position of the Moscow Patriarchate found understanding and support of the Eastern Patriarchs, which they reported in special telegrams. On September 22, 1942, 13 hierarchs participated in a meeting of the Council of Bishops and they discussed the behavior of four Baltic bishops, who publicly expressed support for the German occupiers by sending a greeting message to Hitler. The position of the Russian Church was expressed in the Definition of the Moscow Patriarchate. In it, the Baltic bishops were required to explain the fact of their political speech and take “measures to correct their deviation from the line of conduct obligatory for bishops under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate.” With the support of special agencies, the Definition of the Council spread throughout the occupied territory, undoubtedly complicating the position of Metropolitan Sergius of Voskresensky in his relations with the occupation authorities, with the population, with patriotic ordinary believers, and with partisan detachments. At the same time, in the Moscow Church of the Transfiguration, the elevation of the name of Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky), who was at one time the rector of this church, was stopped. A month later, Metropolitan Nikolai (Yarushevich) informed Metropolitan Sergius that “yesterday, on Sorrow, I served in the Church of the Transfiguration. No one there remembers Resurrection anymore, and all signs of reminders of it were immediately eliminated” 193. In the message of Patriarchal Locum Tenens Sergius (Stragorodsky) to the Orthodox flock of the Baltic states, the position regarding the misdeeds of the Baltic hierarchs was specifically explained. Metropolitan Sergius was especially outraged by the statements of Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky) about the “forced patriotic statements” of the patriarchal locum tenens: “The Baltic bishops (or those who led them with their hands) are trying to cast a shadow on me: I am writing my messages against the fascists and calling on the people to fight against them, forced to do so by the government. I will not remind you that our Patriarchal Church, starting with the late His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon and up to now, invariably recognizes the soviet power established by God in the USSR. Personally, for me, love for the Motherland and my people alone is enough to resist fascism and its enslavement of our country in every possible way, even without anyone’s requests, much less coercion. Let it be a shame for those who are trying to hide their cowardice under slanderous attacks against their native Church and me, its leader” 194. The patriotic position of Metropolitan Sergius did not go unnoticed by the occupiers in the Baltic states. On their instructions, the dissemination of the messages of Metropolitan Sergius of Stragorod was suppressed in every possible way. Anyone caught doing this or reading them was imprisoned. The Metropolitan himself was declared “enemy number one of the Reich” and, according to the plans of the invaders, immediately after their victory, as they hoped, he should have been arrested and shot. Metropolitan Sergius also spoke out with condemnation in relation to some other hierarchs and priests who found themselves in the occupied territory and went into the service of the Germans. In Rostov-on-Don, these were Archbishop Nicholas (Amasia) and the priests who were part of the diocesan administration he headed. A long stay outside of Moscow was extremely burdensome for Sergius. Since the summer of 1943, when a turning point in the course of the war clearly emerged and the enemy was driven back from the capital, the Metropolitan persistently raised the issue with the authorities about his return to Moscow. Finally, at the end of August, a message came about permission to return to Moscow. During the years of forced evacuation in Ulyanovsk, both Metropolitan Sergius himself and the hierarchs who visited him, during private conversations and during meetings of the Councils of Bishops, repeatedly addressed the topic of restoring the patriarchate in the Russian Church. It seemed to them that this would not only be a return to the traditional canonical structure of the church, but would also serve to increase the authority of Russian Orthodoxy outside the USSR, and within the country would contribute to the cessation of existing church schisms and movements and thereby strengthen the church. It is no coincidence that the people around Sergius in those years heard from him more than once: “The Orthodox Russian Church will not always be in such a deplorable situation ... we will still live to see the time of its flourishing and unification.” Now, on the eve of returning to Moscow, these hopes seemed unusually close. On August 31, the train on which Metropolitan Sergius was returning arrived at the Kazan station. The Orthodox believers of Moscow greeted the high priest, who was pining away from his flock, with honor. Among those who met were Metropolitans Alexy and Nikolai. Bishop Alexander (Tolstopyatov) of Molotov, who was present at this meeting, wrote down the following impressions about this day: “With undisguised joy, His Beatitude entered his modest chambers in Baumansky Lane. Everything was to his liking, everything was to his liking: the familiar furniture, the square with the iconostasis, the portraits of saints on the walls, and the living faces of the Muscovites dear to him.” Metropolitans Alexy and Nikolay informed Sergius of Stragorodsky that the “competent authorities” had offered a meeting with Stalin. In the discussion that took place, everyone was unanimous that we must agree and take advantage of the meeting to raise the most pressing issues of church life: convening a Council of Bishops, opening churches, monasteries, seminaries... Religion, church and the “new order” in the occupied Soviet territories In the occupied Soviet territory, it was planned to create a Reich Ministry for the Eastern Lands as the main governing body. A month after the start of the war, Alfred Rosenberg, an ideologist of the Nazi Party, who was directly involved in church issues and was the head of the foreign policy service of the NSDAP, was put in charge of it. As German troops advanced eastward, the occupied territories came under his control. The ministry was entrusted with the task of general management of the implementation of the religious policies of the Nazis. For these purposes, a special religious policy group was created in the ministry under the leadership of K. Rosenfelder. Its employees regularly traveled to the territories of the Reichskommissariat to familiarize themselves with the religious situation, prepared analytical materials, and made specific proposals for carrying out certain events in the church environment. In the conquered eastern territories, new administrative-territorial entities were created - Reichskommissariats. On September 1, 1941, the Reichskommissariats were created - “Ostland”, headed by H. Lohse and “Ukraine”, headed by E. Koch. They, in turn, were divided into districts, regions, districts, districts and volosts. Through these governing bodies, the ministry also intended to implement its vision of church policy in the east. However, the ministry’s possibilities for influence were quite limited, including due to the fact that Koch and Lohse, along the party line, reported directly to M. Bormann and primarily carried out his instructions. Added to this was the fact that church activities here were often carried out on the direct orders of A. Hitler and departments such as the Main Directorate of Imperial Security. In an effort to take control of the activities of religious organizations, the occupation authorities created departments for the management of church affairs under city governments. Their activities included the selection of church personnel, organizing the work of churches, scheduling church services, etc. It is worth noting that the Reichskommissariats had different attitudes towards the Russian Orthodox Church. In Ostland the situation was more favorable for her, which was largely explained by H. Lohse’s tolerant attitude towards her. In “Ukraine,” where the emphasis was on the formation of autocephalous Orthodox churches that had no connections or dependence on Moscow, the Russian Church was doomed to destruction. The documents of various German departments recorded the fact of significant religious revival in the Soviet territories occupied in the first months of the war. The Main Directorate of Imperial Security, for example, noted that “among the part of the population of the former Soviet Union liberated from the Bolshevik yoke, there is a strong desire to return to the rule of the church or churches, which especially applies to the older generation, while the younger generation looks at it with indifference.” In this regard, it was proposed to allow a “new class of preachers” into the occupied territories, trained and capable of “interpreting religion to the people,” free from national history, traditions and culture 195 . Similar evidence can be gleaned from materials received by the Moscow Patriarchate. For example, remembering the first months of the war, the psalmist of the Nikolo-Konetsk Church of the Gdov district of the Pskov region, S. D. Pleskach, wrote to Metropolitan Alexy (Simansky): “The Russian man completely changed as soon as the Germans appeared. Destroyed churches were erected, church utensils were made, vestments were delivered from where they were preserved, and many churches were built and repaired. There was paint everywhere. Peasant women hung clean towels they had embroidered themselves on the icons. There was only joy and consolation. When everything was ready, then they invited a priest and consecrated the church. At this time there were such joyful events that I cannot describe. Forgave each other's insults. Children were baptized. They invited us to visit. It was a real holiday, and Russian peasants and peasant women were celebrating, and I felt that people were looking for consolation here." 196 In the summer and autumn of 1941, many official documents were adopted by various departments, which were directly called upon to implement party policy regarding religion and the church in the east. Among them the main ones were: directive of the Chief of Police and SD R. Heydrich to the operational groups and teams of the Security Police and SD of July 2, 1941; instructions from the Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories to military organizations on the attitude to the religious issue in the occupied territories of the USSR dated August 3, 1941; order of the Wehrmacht High Command, signed by Keitel, dated August 6, 1941; operational order of the Main Directorate of Security Police and SD No. 10 “Attitude towards the church issue in the occupied regions of the Soviet Union” dated August 16, 1941; circular “On the understanding of church issues in the occupied regions of the Soviet Union” of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security dated September 1, 1941; order of the commander of the rear area of ​​Army Group South on the conduct of troops in religious matters in relation to the civilian population, dated October 2, 1941; operational order No. 13 of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security “Theological faculties in occupied Russian regions” dated October 15, 1941; Directive of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security “On the resolution of the church issue in the occupied eastern regions of the Soviet Union” dated October 31, 1941. All these documents defined a general approach to religious policy in relation to all religious organizations in the occupied territory, which was expressed in the following specific actions: limit the activities of the Catholic and Greek Catholic churches with the goal of their gradual liquidation; limit the Evangelical churches of the Baltic states, trying to “split” them into as many independent groups as possible; deny believers the return of former church property until a special study and subsequent resolution of this issue by the German authorities; suppress any political activity of all church organizations; not to allow clergy from the territory of the Reich into the camps of Soviet prisoners of war, allowing the prisoners of war themselves to select persons from among themselves to serve their religious needs; not to allow missionary activities of religious organizations from Germany and other neighboring states in the eastern territories. Considering the role of Orthodoxy, special attention was paid to events regarding the Russian Orthodox Church in the occupied territories. In its strategic plans, the leadership of the Third Reich focused on the destruction of the Russian Orthodox Church as a historical and national-cultural phenomenon of the Russian and other Orthodox peoples of the USSR. Its place was to be taken by the very “new” religion and state church, plans for the creation of which were hatched by the ideologists of Nazism. On this path, in relation to Orthodox organizations it was envisaged: not to interfere with or encourage the religious activities of the population at the local level; although not to prohibit the opening of churches; do not transfer religious property into the ownership of parish communities, providing it exclusively for rent; do not allow the opening of Orthodox religious educational institutions; prevent the unification of parish communities under the leadership of a single religious center oriented towards Moscow; prevent the emerging Orthodox dioceses from entering the jurisdiction of the Church Abroad; not to hinder the development of sectarianism that opposes Orthodoxy; demand from the Orthodox clergy political loyalty to the occupation regime and education of the flock in the same spirit; encourage the creation of independent national Orthodox churches in the territories of the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine; carefully study the activities of the “Living” (Renovationist) Church, without giving it the opportunity for extensive activities, since it was considered as an “organ of the Soviet government”; to allow only persons from among the prisoners of war to carry out religious activities in prisoner-of-war camps on Soviet territory. In general, the German authorities in the occupation zone sought to make maximum use of religious issues for their ideological purposes. The press, flooded with materials (including numerous fakes) about the “terror” unleashed by the Bolsheviks against religion and believers, at the same time strongly emphasized that the new government brings religious freedom. It is curious that, not wanting to give grounds for criticism of religious policy on the territory of Germany proper, Hitler, back in July 1941, by a secret order banned, for the duration of the war with the USSR, any activities against the church and even a simple survey of bishops without sanction from above. The occupiers persistently “recommended” that clergy in sermons and during church ceremonies express loyal feelings towards Hitler and the Third Reich, as well as hold special prayer services for the victory of the German army and the “salvation of the homeland” from the Bolsheviks. And at the same time, the slightest attempts by the clergy to introduce elements of a critical attitude towards political reality in the occupied territories into the life of the community were brutally persecuted. The German occupation authorities, taking into account the patriotic positions of the patriarchal locum tenens, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow and Kolomna, in every possible way prevented the activities of those priests and parishes who declared canonical subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate. The dissemination (oral and written) of any documents of Metropolitan Sergius was prohibited and persecuted. In the first months of the war, until a civil administration was formed in the occupied territory, the military administration played the first fiddle in church politics. She proceeded not so much from political and ideological goals, but from the specific military situation that was developing in the front line, and tried not to provoke conflicts with the civilian population and not to interfere with the spontaneous religious revival that manifested itself in the occupied Soviet territory. In confirmation, one can cite the words of the Reich Minister of Eastern Territories A. Rosenberg, which he said at the Nuremberg trials. In response to the question: “What was your attitude towards the churches under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Eastern Territories?” - he said: “After the entry of German troops into the eastern territories, the army, on its own initiative, granted freedom of worship, and when I was made minister of the eastern regions, I legally sanctioned this practice by issuing a special decree “On Freedom of the Church” at the end of December 1941.” 197 The Wehrmacht's assistance in opening churches, holding services and rituals, patronizing the clergy, missionary activities of the Catholic clergy, etc. in the occupied Soviet territories was also evidenced by documents received in Moscow, by the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks 198 . Immediately after the end of the summer campaign of 1941, a meeting was held in Berlin under the leadership of Gestapo chief Müller. The reports concerned the situation of Orthodoxy in the east and the Balkans, the relationship of the Orthodox Church with other Christian churches. The general position was expressed by one of the speakers, SS UnterSturmbannführer Vandesleben, who confirmed that there could be no talk of any re-establishment of the Russian Church “infected with Bolshevism” in the conquered eastern space. It was proposed in the internal policy in the East to do everything to maintain constant tension between Catholic and Orthodox parishes, to support religious minorities in every possible way as opposed to large churches and, in addition, to maximally introduce “a sufficient number of trusted persons” into religious groups to obtain information and maintain the struggle of all against all. In April 1942, in a circle of close associates, Hitler outlined his vision of religious policy in the east: the forced fragmentation of churches; forced change of the religious status quo in the occupied territories; prohibition of the establishment of any centralized religious bodies and centers; the formation of “puppet” religious governing bodies; use of religion and clergy for political purposes. “Our interests,” he said, “would be consistent with a situation in which each village would have its own sect, where they would develop their own special ideas about God. Even if in this case shamanic cults, like Negro or American-Indian cults, arose in individual villages, we could only welcome this, because this would only increase the number of factors crushing Russian space into small units” 199. The Russian Church Abroad hoped that with the beginning of the military campaign against the Soviet Union, it would be called upon by the Nazi leadership to directly participate in its religious policy in the occupied territory. A diocesan meeting held in January 1942 was devoted to developing a plan for “cooperation” with the state. Metropolitan Seraphim defined the position of the church as follows: “We can only stand on the side of the anti-Bolshevik powers. At the head of these powers is Germany. Therefore, we must pray for the victory of German arms and support the German army, regardless of what Germany’s intentions and goals are in relation to Russia” 200. The “Karlovak Church,” in anticipation of its “ceremonial entry” into the territory of the Soviet Union, was developing a plan for restoring the organization of the highest church authority in the USSR. Thinking of itself already on the territory of the USSR, the Church Abroad hatched plans of action in relation to certain groups in Russian Orthodoxy. The schismatic organizations included the renovationists, Lipkovites, and Grigorievites, with whom there could be no contact. Any relationship with Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky), who, as the “Karlovites” believed, had betrayed “the Orthodox faith in the form of a compromise with the atheists and subordination of the Church to them,” was also categorically unacceptable. The right of any other Orthodox autocephalous church, for example that of Constantinople, to participate in the “arrangement of church affairs in Russia” was also denied. The only force that could resolve the issue of higher church governance in Russia was called the Church Abroad, and its head, Metropolitan Anastassy, ​​was to become the temporary Locum Tenens of the Patriarchal Throne with the instruction to form a Patriarchal Synod and prepare for the holding of a Local Council (in Rostov or Stavropol) for the election of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia 201. But these hopes and plans of the Church Abroad were not destined to come true. The German authorities considered it politically more advantageous not to allow the emigrant clergy into Soviet territory, where they did not have serious social support, but hoped that the Orthodox clergy and believers of the “Tikhon” orientation had a sufficient reserve of hatred for communism and Soviet power and therefore would assist the German army in fulfilling its “historical mission” - the defeat and destruction of the Russian state, the Russian people. Moreover, the “Karlovites” did not give the opportunity to care for Soviet prisoners of war who were taken to German territory, they did not allow them to open a theological school or travel to the occupied zone. They were only able to obtain permission to organize the supply of religious literature, church utensils and other property necessary for worship to the occupied Soviet territories. Thus, the development of the religious situation and the practical church policy of the German command in the occupied territory were carried out without any cooperation with the Church Abroad. In the fall of 1941, the Ministry of Eastern Territories began to develop a law on religious freedom intended for the eastern territories, but faced opposition from Martin Bormann, who did not want unnecessary fuss about “freedom of religion.” The protracted conflict was forced to be resolved by A. Hitler, who invited Rosenberg and Bormann to his Headquarters. In the end, the Fuhrer took Bormann's side, considering that any promises of religious freedoms, as well as the adoption of a separate law on religious freedom, were unnecessary. In his opinion, it was enough for the Reich Commissioners to simply confirm the existence of religious freedom in some kind of propaganda proclamation. Rosenberg, executing the order of the Fuhrer, sent letters to the Reichskommissariat Ostland and Ukraine, which defined German church policy in the occupied territories. Its essence can be boiled down to four fundamental points: religious groups were strictly forbidden to engage in politics; religious groups should be divided along territorial and national lines; religious groups should not interfere with the activities of the occupation authorities; It was necessary to show special attention and caution to the Russian Orthodox Church, which supported the “national idea” hostile to Germany. Based on these letters, the Reich Commissioners of “Ostland” and “Ukraine” issued identical circulars in the early summer of 1942, defining the main aspects of the activities of religious associations and placing them under the control of the local German administration. By the fall of 1942, it became clear that the religious movement in the temporarily conquered territory did not fit into the political expectations of the occupiers; it was not possible to play the “religious card” in the desired political direction. The war dragged on, and the occupation authorities had to take into account religious associations as a long-term factor in the internal political situation in the east. On the one hand, it was necessary to find more effective ways and forms of “involving” religious organizations in the political support of the authorities, on the other hand, it was necessary to show greater public loyalty and tolerance towards them. Of course, it was a forced tolerance due to the prevailing military-political circumstances. Despite all the fundamental similarities in the church policy of the occupiers in the eastern territories, it still had distinctive features in relation to each of their Reichskommissariats. On June 30, 1941, Riga fell. The retreating Soviet troops were ordered to evacuate the Patriarchal Exarch in the Baltic States, Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky). It was not possible to carry it out, since the exarch wished to remain in the occupied territory and took refuge in a shelter. He left it only when the Germans arrived, but was arrested on the same day. The imprisonment turned out to be short-lived: after four days, Sergius was released and was able to freely engage in religious activities. The clergy and believers in the newly formed Reichskommissariat Ostland regarded this as evidence of an agreement reached between the metropolitan and the occupation authorities. But no one knew anything about its contents. Only gradually the contours of the agreement reached began to emerge. At a meeting of the Riga clergy, the Metropolitan announced that he remained “a novice of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky)” and maintained canonical obedience to the Moscow Patriarchate, proclaiming the name of the Patriarchal Locum Tenens Sergius during the service. At the same time, the Metropolitan made a number of public statements, based on which both he and the parish clergy should be politically loyal to the new government. Sergius (Voskresensky), being in the occupied territory, sought to solve two main problems within the framework of the leadership of his exarchate. The first of them is the revival of church life in the Baltic states, Belarus and the northwestern regions of the RSFSR. One of his main activities was the organization of the Pskov Orthodox mission in the northwestern regions of the USSR. It was created in mid-August 1941, and missionaries were sent there to revive church life in the Leningrad, Kalinin, Novgorod, and Pskov regions, where about two million people lived. The heads of the mission were successively priests Sergei Efimov, Nikolai Kolibersky and Kirill Zaits. According to researchers, the mission was able to open up to three hundred churches, in which more than 170 priests served. The activities of the mission were under constant control of the security police. Repeatedly, Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky) informed the German authorities about the activities of the mission and the political and religious situation on its territory. One of his messages in March 1943 talked about the relationship between the partisans and the local population. The Metropolitan was forced to admit that the population was increasingly supporting the partisans, including because of their loyalty to the church. Sergius could not help but note the facts of the negative attitude of German and Estonian military units towards the local population, when the premises of the church were occupied by military units, and all kinds of duties were assigned to believers. The political sentiments of the mission clergy were contradictory. There is no doubt that outwardly they had to testify to their loyalty to the new authorities, carry out their instructions to hold ceremonial services, conduct appropriate conversations with the population, inform the authorities about the actions of the partisans and people who sympathize with them, and recruit people to work in Germany, in the detachments of the Vlasov Russian liberation army. But in reality the situation was much more complicated. Many of the mission's parishes were located in territories where Soviet partisan detachments were operating, and protests against Soviet power were impossible. Another task to which Metropolitan Sergius paid close attention was the preservation of the unity of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Baltic states, since he considered its division along national lines unacceptable. But he immediately encountered the reluctance of the occupiers to help strengthen the sole church power of the pro-Russian exarch, as they believed. Sergius had to overcome not only the opposition of the occupation authorities, but also the church divisions that soon manifested themselves in the Baltic states. In Latvia, Metropolitan Augustine (Peterson) renounced his previous obligations to the Moscow Patriarchate and, announcing the restoration of the previous synod, turned to the Germans with a request to allow the restoration of the autocephalous Latvian Orthodox Church under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. But a small number of parishes followed Augustine, since in most of them the parishioners were Russian. In Estonia, however, everything took a slightly different turn. The Orthodox Church of Estonia split into the Russian Orthodox Church, consisting of thirty-eight Russian parishes and the Pechersk Monastery, and the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Metropolis. Metropolitan Alexander (Paulus) issued a circular on October 14, 1941, declaring himself the head of the Estonian Church, which included 119 parishes and the Pukhtitsa Monastery. In response, on November 5, 1942, Metropolitan Sergius, by his decree, prohibited Metropolitan Alexander from holding divine services and handed him over to the court of the Council. To which, on December 16, 1942, the synod of the Estonian Orthodox Metropolis declared its reluctance to have any communication with the Moscow Patriarchate. The German authorities recognized the fact of the schism and gave both churches equal legal status. The authorities gave the clergy and believers the right to freely choose jurisdiction. The fate of Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky) was at the center of controversy between the leadership of the Ostland commissariat and the Ministry of Eastern Territories. They had different attitudes towards the personality of Metropolitan Sergius, his church policies and the possible prospects of Russian Orthodoxy in the Baltic states. Back in October 1941, the head of the religious policy group of the Reich Ministry of Eastern Territories, K. Rosenfelder, went to Riga and Kovno to understand the general religious situation in the Baltic states, as well as around the Orthodox Church. He met with Metropolitan Sergius and the Orthodox clergy, with SD officers in charge of religious issues. The note he compiled proposed the following measures: limit the activities of the Catholic Church as much as possible, preventing the Catholicization of Russia; take a cautious position towards the Church Abroad, not allowing its representatives into the Baltic states; hinder the intentions of the Moscow Patriarchate to become a pan-church center in the east; to promote the formation of autocephalous Orthodox churches created on a national basis. Rosenfelder formulated his position regarding Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky) as follows: “As quickly as possible, remove the representative of the Moscow Church in Ostland, Exarch Sergius, from Ostland in order to completely eliminate Russian influence there. The SD is going to initially send the exarch to Kovno. The point of view of the SD is that, having removed the exarch from the main scene of events in Ostland, he should not be completely out of sight because of the very valuable information that they receive from him about the Moscow Church” 202. Until the summer of 1942, the Eastern Ministry remained in these positions, not reacting to the objections and proposals of the Ostland leadership. The conflict, which had been smoldering for a long time, was resolved on July 18, 1942, when at a meeting in the office of the head of the main policy department of the ministry, Leibbrandt, it was recognized that a complete division of believers along ethnic lines was no longer advisable, and therefore the Orthodox churches in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should remain Russian. In the future, they, as alien to the concept of living space, should be moved to the planned “Reichskommissariat of Moscow”. As a result, the existence of the exarchate was allowed, and Metropolitan Sergius was able to return to Riga. Immediately on July 23, 1942, a bishops' meeting was convened in Riga. At the insistence of the occupation authorities, the text of a welcoming telegram to Hitler was adopted and at the same time a statement was made public in which the episcopate decisively dissociated itself from the patriotic position of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) of Moscow. At the same time, it was decided to stop raising his name during ordinary services, which would henceforth be proclaimed only during hierarchal services as a symbol of the canonical connection with the Moscow Patriarchate. In August 1942, Sergius reorganized church administration in the Baltic states. The exarch administration of the diocese was abolished. The Latvian diocese was now governed by a bishop directly appointed by the metropolitan and subordinate to him, under whom a council of six priests was established as an advisory body. Under Exarch Sergius himself, an office was established for relations with the subordinate dioceses of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as well as an advisory body - the bishops' conference consisting of the ruling bishops and some priests at the discretion of the exarch. Defending before the German authorities the need to preserve his canonical connection with the Moscow Patriarchate, Sergius resorted not only to ecclesiastical, but also to “military-political and propaganda” arguments. In one of his memorandums to the department of the Reich Commissioner “Ostland” on “religious service to the troops of General Vlasov,” Sergius pointed out the inadmissibility of action on his canonical territory by representatives of the Church Abroad, which believers perceive as nothing other than schismatic and pro-German, which will lead to the rejection of the majority of believers from this church and from Metropolitan Sergius. Thus, the Metropolitan emphasized, the strength of “the impact of political proclamations that emanate from the Moscow Metropolitan and weaken, to the point of complete loss of any significance, the counter-proclamations that are issued by individual bishops or individual groups of bishops in the occupied territory will increase. If they do not recognize the canonical freedom of the bishop, then they will no longer believe his words. And if at the same time there is an assumption that he is calling for a fight against the Soviet Union not in church or Russian interests, but, in essence, in German interests, then he is lost - he will be branded a coward and a traitor” 203. Sergius admitted the possibility of creating a single church body in the occupied territory, but he thought of it exclusively as a body created on canonically impeccable grounds - that is, not having any connections with the Church Abroad - and relying on Orthodox bishops operating in the Soviet territories gradually “liberated by the Germans.” At the same time, Sergius did not believe that even after the war the Russian Church must necessarily preserve its unity, allowing for the possibility of “creating autocephalous churches on the territory of the previously united Mother Church.” For the occupation authorities, the arguments of Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky) seemed unconvincing, overly abstract, resting on church-canonical foundations to the detriment of the pragmatism of the current military-political situation in the Baltic states and the same pragmatic expectations of the Reichskommissariat Ostland. Of course, Sergius understood that political statements were expected of him, and he made them, and more than once. So, on March 15, 1943, he said, addressing believers: “Each of us must follow all the directives of the German authorities, because Germany is fighting primarily against the Bolsheviks. We must help destroy Bolshevism, and above all destroy it in the hearts of the people." The situation of Orthodoxy in Belarus can be judged from the testimony of the historian of the Belarusian Church, Bishop Athanasius (Martos). In one of his works, he wrote: “German troops found church and religious life in Eastern Belarus in a destroyed state. There were no bishops or priests, churches were closed, converted into warehouses, theaters, and many were destroyed. There were no monasteries, the monks scattered wherever they could, many died in exile and in prison. But the believers were in huge numbers” 204. At the very beginning of the war, when Western Belarus was occupied by the Germans and Metropolitan Nikolai (Yarushevich) could no longer exercise church governance there, Locum Tenens Sergius (Stragorodsky) appointed Bishop Panteleimon (Rozhnovsky) as his exarch of Belarus and elevated him to the rank of archbishop. After the occupation of Belarus by the Germans, Archbishop of Grodno and Vilna Panteleimon (Rozhnovsky) and Bishop of Brest Benedikt (Bobkovsky) arrived in Minsk. Metropolitan Panteleimon remained a strong supporter of the canonical connection with the Moscow Patriarchate. This position did not suit the Belarusian nationalists, who dreamed of creating a national Belarusian Orthodox Church, independent of Moscow. They established the Belarusian Metropolis and organized diocesan administrations in the regions of Belarus. The German command in negotiations with Panteleimon set the following conditions: the Belarusian Orthodox Church should be independent and not have any connections with church centers in Moscow, Berlin and Warsaw; the statute of the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox National Church must be approved by the occupation authorities; the church on the territory of Belarus must take the name “Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox National Church”, and its jurisdiction must be limited to the territory of Belarus; teaching of the Law of God and church administration are conducted in the Belarusian language, and church services must be conducted in Church Slavonic; the appointment of bishops must be carried out with the knowledge of the German authorities. Panteleimon accepted all the conditions presented, except one - canonical separation from the Russian Church. He explained the impossibility of this by the fact that the Belarusian Church has not yet been co-organized and can receive and formalize its branch only with the permission of the Mother Church. In March 1942, a Council of Belarusian Bishops was held, which elected Panteleimon as Metropolitan of Belarus. But contrary to the wishes of the authorities and Belarusian nationalists, the Council did not proclaim autocephaly and the elevation of the name of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) continued during services. At the insistence of the nationalists, the occupation authorities at the end of May 1942 removed Metropolitan Panteleimon from the administration of the metropolis. Church power passed to Archbishop Philotheus (Norco), who also opposed the proclamation of autocephaly. Under pressure from the occupiers and nationalists, the All-Belarusian Orthodox Council was held in August-September 1942, for consideration of which the issue of autocephaly was again brought up. Appeals were drawn up to the Eastern Patriarchs to recognize the autocephaly of the Belarusian Church. For unknown reasons, they were never sent to their destination by the occupation authorities. Church policy on the territory of Ukraine (Reichskommissariat “Ukraine”) was intertwined with German policy regarding the present and future of Ukraine. How they saw themselves can be concluded from the statements of E. Koch at one of the meetings of Reichskommissariat officials: “If these people work 10 hours a day, then they should work 8 hours for us. All sentimental objections should be disregarded. These people must be ruled by iron power so that they can now help us win the war. We liberated him not to make Ukraine happy, but to provide Germany with living space and its food supply” 205. The German administration, based on the need to destroy the Russian Church in Ukraine, actively supported church separatists and the creation of new church organizations. On August 18, 1941, a group of Orthodox bishops gathered in the Pochaev Monastery. The question of the fate of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was discussed. Two proposals were put forward: the first was to maintain relations with the Moscow Patriarchate and consider ourselves as part of the Russian Orthodox Church with the rights of autonomy; the second is to proclaim the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church. After a heated discussion, the final document nevertheless stated: “Until the Local Council of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine with the participation of the hierarchy, clergy and laity, consider our Church and its hierarchy in canonical dependence on the Russian Church” 206 . Thus, the autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) retained its jurisdictional connection with the Russian Orthodox Church. The church was headed in the rank of metropolitan and with the title of exarch by Metropolitan Alexy (Hromadsky). In Kyiv, occupied by the Nazis, in November–December 1941, Metropolitan Alexy regularly held meetings of the clergy subordinate to him. The messages of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) were also read out on them with a call to “fight the gang of damned Hitler.” The German administration soon identified these meetings. Several of the detained priests were recognized by the Germans as “NKVD agents” and arrested. Metropolitan Alexy was also detained for a short time. For the rest, the authorities limited themselves to taking signatures that they would refrain from any activities hostile to Germany. Initially, the creation of the Autonomous Church was supported and joined by Bishop Polycarp (Sikorsky), of which he notified Metropolitan Alexy in writing. However, Sikorsky soon takes steps to split the Autonomous Church. Metropolitan Dionysius (Waledinsky) of Warsaw also had a hand in this, who was the head of the Polish Orthodox Church, which arbitrarily proclaimed autocephaly, recognized by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Metropolitan Dionysius, in violation of church rules, intervened in the church life of the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. He appointed Bishop Polycarp “temporary Administrator of the Orthodox Autocephalous Church in the liberated lands of Ukraine” and simultaneously elevated him to the rank of archbishop. Archbishop Polycarp breaks with the Ukrainian Autonomous Church and takes the path of reviving the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, which operated in Ukraine since 1920 and self-liquidated in 1930. The Gestapo and occupation authorities were directly involved in these events in church life. In a conversation with Metropolitan Theophilus (Buldovsky) of Kharkov, the head of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church Polycarp (Sikorsky) recalled: “When German officials called me and ordered to restore the Ukrainian autocephalous church, I told them: “I will act sincerely, with all my heart, with fidelity and the conviction instilled in me by God that by his will the thousand-year reign of the most cultural nation of the world, led by its great Fuhrer, Hitler.” The complete destruction of the hated Soviet power is approaching, not only in Ukraine, but throughout Russia. I deeply believe that there will be no return for her. We must help our liberators eradicate the Judeo-Bolshevik poison from the consciousness of Ukrainians, the Germans themselves will do the rest. They began to destroy among the population everyone who resisted the German authorities and the new order. From the very first days of my activity, I ordered the clergy to serve thanksgiving prayers, to remember in worship the power of our liberators, to proclaim many years to the Fuhrer of the German state, to pray that the Lord would grant him victory over all enemies." 207 Polycarp Sikorsky issued a circular message to the flock, calling on them to be loyal to the German administration. In his appeals to the occupation authorities, he repeatedly expressed “for the great leader of the German people, Adolf Hitler, his wishes for complete spiritual and physical strength, as well as continued success for the final victory over the enemy of East and West.” In May 1942, the Autocephalous Orthodox Church under the leadership of Polycarp (Sikorsky) was recognized by the German occupation authorities. With their permission, churches and monasteries are opened, and parish life is revived. The Autocephalous Church, unlike the Autonomous Church, immediately established a close connection with the nationalist movement in Ukraine, primarily with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). For this organization, terror and intimidation of the population who refused to move from the Ukrainian Church to the UAOC became common; OUN members brutally tortured and killed the clergy and episcopate who did not want to cooperate with the UAOC. The authorities' policy towards the Autonomous and Autocephalous Churches followed the principle of “divide and conquer”, encouraging first one church and then the other. This line is based on the fear of being faced with a large, powerful Ukrainian church that does not support the occupiers and is oriented toward the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. At the beginning of the summer of 1942, the Reich Commissioner of Ukraine issued a circular detailing all aspects of the activities of religious associations and placing them under the control of the local German administration. The occupation regime allowed the activities of only religious communities loyal to the Reich. On the first anniversary of the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi troops, the Imperial Commissioner of Ukraine wrote in a directive to the leaders of the SS and police: “In Ukraine, just like in Germany, everyone can believe in their own way. We allow any religion and any church movement if it is loyal to the German administration and shows a willingness to help create a positive mood among the population and not do anything that would contribute to negative trends. We are not interested in disagreements among church movements among themselves, namely in religious matters. We only wish that polemics on these issues should not spread among the worldly masses, because it can disrupt the harmony necessary for common construction” 208. In 1942, E. Koch took several openly anti-Ukrainian actions: he closed all educational institutions except elementary schools and sent students and teachers to work in Germany; issued a decree dividing the Autocephalous and Autonomous Churches into several parts, placing them under the full control of the German administration, including in purely internal church matters. Such actions once again ran counter to the intention of the Ministry of Eastern Territories to support the unification process of Ukrainian churches in order to allow the Autocephalous and Autonomous Churches to hold a unification congress in the spring of 1943 in Kharkov. Despite Koch’s categorical ban, a meeting of the autocephalous synod was held in Lutsk on October 4–8, 1942. According to his decision, Exarch Alexy (Hromadsky) was also invited to sign the unification act of the Autocephalous and Autonomous Churches into a single church. He did this, but a couple of months later, under pressure from his supporters, he was forced to issue a decree canceling the unification act and finally consider this issue at the post-war Council of Bishops of the Exarchate. Ministry officials, trying to “reanimate” the rapprochement of the two churches, came up with the idea of ​​holding a meeting of the Synod of the united Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Kharkov at the end of December 1942, followed by the convening of an All-Ukrainian Local Council. But Koch once again opposed the idea of ​​unification, prohibited the bishops from traveling to Kharkov, and as a result, the Synod did not take place. The next attempt to hold a united Synod was planned for the spring of 1943 in the Pochaev Lavra. The political background of this idea is revealed by one of the notes (April 1943) of K. Rosenfelder to Minister A. Rosenberg: “The use of all forces in the East in the fight against Bolshevism also requires the involvement of the Orthodox Church. Therefore, the Orthodox Churches or Orthodox church groups should be allowed to convene a General Synod or Local Council against Bolshevism. This concession could better facilitate the use of the Church in German interests and create a favorable impression among the believing population” 209. But all of Rosenberg’s plans and projects were shattered by Koch’s rebellious position. It became clear that the implementation of the plans of the Ministry of Eastern Territories could become a reality only with the resignation of Koch. Rosenberg makes attempt after attempt to remove Koch. But they all ended in nothing, because he, having been appointed directly by Hitler, enjoyed his unconditional support. In May 1943, Hitler summoned A. Rosenberg and E. Koch to headquarters, trying to achieve their reconciliation. Rosenberg arrived with a project for the dismissal of the Reich Commissioner. But nothing came of it. Hitler, in essence, supported all of Koch's steps regarding the church issue in Ukraine. Thus, the attempts to create a unified Ukrainian Church were put to an end. Moreover, it was during this period that OUN detachments began military operations against German troops on the territory of Ukraine. Since this movement had close ties with the Autocephalous Church, the Germans refused to support it. The Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union in Wartime Conditions The Great Patriotic War required the mobilization of not only all organizational, financial, and material resources, but also moral, spiritual, and patriotic resources. For the party-Soviet leadership, ever since the All-Union Census of 1937, it was no secret that a significant part of the population of the Soviet Union classified themselves as believers. In the very first months of the war, the incorrectness and harmfulness of the state policy formed in the 1930s regarding religion and the church was revealed. Illusions about the successful and widespread “overcoming” of religion and the victory of the “godless movement” dissipated, giving way to the truth of life - there were millions of believers in the country who were unfairly limited in their ability to freely and openly satisfy their religious needs. Religious organizations and clergy of various denominations operating in the country could have significant potential for influencing this category of citizens. A tacit recognition of this fact is contained in the position of the state, which during the first two war years actually took a position of non-interference in the church life of the country. As a result, church-wide fundraisers and non-cult activities were permitted; there were no obstacles to public services and ceremonies; church publishing activities expanded; de facto religious centers were recognized and they were allowed to establish links with foreign religious organizations. For the first time after a twenty-year break, churches and prayer buildings began to open in various regions of the Soviet Union, although without legal registration. For example, in fourteen districts of the Yaroslavl region during 1942–1943, 51 Orthodox churches began to function - most of them were closed in the pre-war period administratively, without the adoption of appropriate legal decisions, although the keys to the buildings remained in the hands of believers. All public anti-religious propaganda was curtailed and the activities of the Union of Militant Atheists were stopped. On the contrary, publications about the patriotic activities of the Orthodox Church appeared on the pages of the official press. The first of them was published in the newspaper Pravda on August 16, 1941. After this, it became commonplace to post this kind of information not only about the Orthodox, but also about all other churches. The newsreels shown at the front and in the rear included footage of church services, appeals to the soldiers of the Red Army by the clergy, meetings of believers and clergy with icons of liberating soldiers, and religious processions. The vast majority of religious organizations in the Soviet Union took a position of condemnation towards those clergy who consciously went over to the side of the enemy and voluntarily became an instrument of ideological propaganda, helping to impose a “new order” on the occupied Soviet territory. According to the established pre-war tradition, information about the state of religious associations in the USSR and their patriotic activities was collected by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. If necessary, he entered into the highest party and Soviet authorities with a proposal to permit certain types of activities for religious organizations. He was also tasked with collecting information about the religious policy of the Germans in the occupied territory, the political position of religious centers, the behavior of the clergy and believers in the occupied territory and in the front-line areas. Information flowed from a variety of sources: NKVD units, intelligence agencies, the active army, partisan detachments, local party and Soviet bodies. The incoming information was concentrated, summarized and analyzed in the central office of the NKVD, and then the People's Commissariat brought it to the government and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and he also came up with initiatives to carry out certain actions against religious organizations in the internal regions of the USSR, in the occupied Soviet territory and even outside the USSR. By the end of 1941, the political significance of the religious issue was clearly evident both for the situation in the territory occupied by the Germans and for the internal political situation in the Soviet Union. It concentrated around the most painful problem: the relationship of the German occupation authorities and the Soviet state to the largest religious organization - the Russian Orthodox Church, whose members found themselves divided by the front and the outcome of the war largely depended on their political position. It seems that this is precisely what explains the fact that the Soviet state increasingly singled out Orthodox parishes from the total number of religious associations, providing them with an increasing degree of freedom and variety of religious and non-cult activities. Despite the state of siege in the capital, on Easter 1942, by order of the commandant of Moscow, unhindered movement throughout the city was allowed throughout the night. According to the NKVD Directorate for Moscow and the Moscow Region, more than 160 thousand believers gathered in operating Orthodox churches for Easter services. And, as noted in the department’s certificate, “the believing population and clergy reacted positively in connection with the religious holiday of Easter, as well as the received permission for the unhindered movement of the population of Moscow and the districts of the Moscow region on the night of April 4-5” 210 . The Orthodox Church is invited to participate in the activities of state and public organizations. On November 2, 1942, Metropolitan Nikolai (Yarushevich) was invited to join the Extraordinary State Commission to establish and investigate the atrocities of the Nazi invaders. The commission was tasked with witnessing and taking into account the damage caused by the invaders to the country's religious organizations, the facts of destruction and desecration of religious buildings, looting of church utensils, bullying, violence and murders of the clergy and believers. The reports, articles, messages and public speeches written by the Metropolitan conveyed a terrible picture of “destruction and death” left by the German invaders on Soviet soil. Even today they cannot be read without pain and anger. The Church took an active part in the work of the All-Slavic Committee for the Fight against Fascism, designed to promote the unity of the Slavic peoples, their transition to the side of the anti-Hitler coalition, and the unification of the efforts of social, including religious, anti-fascist forces in countries with a Slavic population. The committee was provided with materials on the topics “On freedom of conscience in the USSR”, “God blesses the people’s just war against the Nazi invaders”, “Participation of the clergy and believers in helping the Red Army”, “The Germans are the worst enemies of Christianity”, the authors of which were Metropolitans Alexy (Simansky), Nikolai (Yarushevich), Archbishops Luka (Voino-Yasenetsky), Photius (Topiro) and others. They were published on the pages of Soviet and foreign media, broadcast on the radio, and distributed in the form of leaflets in the occupied territory and in the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, in enemy units and in the front-line zone. In May 1943, Metropolitan Nikolai first appeared at the presidium of the III All-Slavic meeting in Moscow. In his speech, which was later published, he called for the unity of the Slavs in the fight against a common enemy. On the day of the second anniversary of the start of the war, in a special message “To the Slav brothers,” Metropolitan Nicholas wrote: “Brother Slavs! The hour of great events on the fronts has approached. Decisive battles are coming. Let there not be a single one among us who would not contribute with all his strength and capabilities to the victorious defeat of our common hated enemy both on the battlefields and in the rear, and with the powerful blows of the people's avengers-partisans. We will all be as one in the upcoming battles! God is with us, dear brothers!” 211 "Religious factor" outside the USSR Changes in the church policy of the Soviet state were noticeable not only to the Soviet people, they were reported to the Reich by the German army and intelligence agencies. Headquarters of the Security Police and SD (dated May 8, 1942): “In recent months, the Soviet government has increasingly restricted events hostile to the church. Recently there was even an announcement about the freedom of the church. All surviving churches have been opened and many people visit them. Divine services are held regularly, in which prayers are heard for the freedom of the Russian land” 212. Supreme Command of the Army (from November 1942): “Well aware of the great importance of the church leadership in Moscow for the Russian masses, the red side is now providing it with full patronage and using it for Bolshevik purposes. The German leadership, on the contrary, is very restrained in allowing the existence of the Russian Church in the occupied territories.” Headquarters of the Security Police and SD (May 1943): “Soviet propaganda managed to cleverly use the religious feelings of the population for its own purposes. The churches and the masses are increasingly being encouraged. As it became known from Moscow, the influx of residents into churches during Easter days was significant. This fact is very heavily used in propaganda and is spreading primarily among the allies” 213. Indeed, for the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, the issue of religious freedom in the USSR was very important. They all had to convince their population of the need to oppose Germany on the side of the USSR, and this could only be done by removing or significantly reducing public prejudice against anti-church policies within the Soviet Union. US President F. Roosevelt's plans to declare war on Germany were widely discussed in American society and had widespread support. However, they also encountered some opposition. As an example, we can cite the resolution of the American Council of Churches of Christ, which stated that US participation in the war on the side of the Soviet Union is unacceptable, because the Soviet Union is a godless state where religious freedom is not ensured. Public opinion polls showed that although the majority of Americans expressed hope for the victory of the USSR, at the same time, up to half of them opposed the provision of American financial and technical assistance to the Soviet country. F. Roosevelt, in his addresses to the leadership of the USSR, called for attention to the issue of expanding religious freedom, to do everything so that the widest strata of Soviet society could enjoy it. This, he said, would make it possible to overcome the negative attitude of the Senate towards the allocation of funds to help the USSR. The US President instructed his embassy in Moscow to collect and present materials on the real situation of various religious communities in the USSR. Cordell Hull, who was US Secretary of State during the war, writes in his memoirs about these days: “The President frankly explained to Umansky (Soviet Ambassador to the USA - M.O.) the significant difficulties in obtaining from Congress the necessary Lend-Lease notes for Russia due to the hostile attitude towards Russia on the part of some US groups that enjoy significant political influence in Congress. Pointing out that there are churches in Russia and that the 1936 USSR Constitution allows religion, the president said that if Moscow organized an information campaign in the United States about freedom of religion in the USSR, it could have a good educational effect. He further proposed that such a campaign should begin before the Lend-Lease appropriations bill was discussed in Congress and before the American mission led by A. Harriman arrived in Moscow to discuss Soviet military needs. Umansky said that he would look into this issue” 214. Arriving in Moscow at the end of September 1941, A. Harriman, in conversations with Stalin and Molotov, confirmed the US interest in liberalizing religious policy in the Soviet Union. His interlocutors perceived this with understanding. Soviet ambassadors in the countries of the emerging anti-Hitler coalition were instructed to convey to the public opinion of these countries that religious freedoms would be largely restored in the USSR. Publications in recent years suggest that it was at this time that the Soviet government entered into certain contacts with the Russian Church on the issue of delegating a representative of the Russian Church to America to inform the American public about the church’s position in the war and expand its contacts with the American public. At the request of the authorities, Metropolitan Sergius presented a certificate about the American Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Metropolitan convinced the authorities that the preservation of the diocese had not only ecclesiastical but also social significance in war conditions and would serve to “dispel various misunderstandings regarding both general Soviet policy and the actions of the Moscow Patriarchate” 215 . The Metropolitan considered it necessary to send to America as Deputy Exarch Metropolitan Veniamin (Fedchenkov), one of the representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate, who immediately took a position of supporting the USSR. It can be assumed that this candidacy meant Metropolitan Nikolai (Yarushevich). However, due to unclear circumstances, the US visa was denied. Correspondents from American publications repeatedly met with representatives of religious organizations in the USSR, publishing information about religious life in the country. At the end of December 1941, an Associated Press correspondent interviewed Archbishop Andrei of Saratov. The correspondent was interested in the following questions: how and how the church helps the state in the war; what is the relationship between the church and the state; whether there are restrictions on the activities of the church and whether new opportunities for church activities are open 216. The American president again addressed the issue of religious freedoms in Russia in late December 1941, when he was working on the draft “Declaration of 26 States,” which was supposed to be the formal completion of the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition. Roosevelt, in a conversation with the new USSR Ambassador to the USA, M. M. Litvinov, proposed and insisted that the phrase “freedom of religion” be included in the declaration. The Soviet side agreed to this, and the final text of the “Declaration of the United Nations”, published in the newspaper Izvestia on January 3, 1942, included the words: “...convinced that complete victory over their enemies is necessary for the defense of life, liberty, independence and religious liberty.” Another element of the USSR’s “information campaign” was the publication of literature about religious life in the country. At the beginning of March 1942, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria wrote in a memo addressed to Stalin: “It is known from official and intelligence sources that the Germans are trying to use the Orthodox Church and the clergy for their aggressive purposes. Exerting influence through the Church on the population of the temporarily occupied territories, the Germans spread slanderous fabrications about the position of the Orthodox Church in the USSR, as, for example, on February 9 of this year, German radio reported on the reprisals and murders of the clergy and believers, allegedly carried out by the Red Army after the liberation of the city of Mozhaisk from fascist-German troops. In this regard, the NKVD of the USSR considers it expedient to prepare and publish in the near future, by the workers of the Moscow Patriarchate, a book-album with materials exposing the Germans in their barbaric attitude towards the Orthodox Church and the clergy. The book-album is intended for distribution in church circles abroad, in the territory temporarily occupied by the Germans, as well as among believers in the USSR” 217. Stalin agreed, and in the shortest possible time the book was published in large quantities in several foreign languages. It spread in European countries and the United States, playing a significant role in changing the attitude of the population of these countries to the internal policies of the Soviet Union. On the eve of the first anniversary of Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, June 20–21, 1942, 15 thousand religious communities in the United States held special prayers for Russian Christians to support them in a just struggle against the aggressor and the growing movement in America in support of the peoples of the Soviet Union. According to a Gallup poll, in England, for example, already in July 1942, 62 percent of respondents believed that Russia was more popular than the United States, and in 1943, “Holy Rus'” became the theme of the year in the country 218. Sympathy intensified after the impressive victories of the Red Army at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43. During the war years, the authority of the USSR, which bore the brunt of the world war, grew immeasurably in all countries of the world. Sympathy for the fighting people changed the image of the Soviet state as a whole in the eyes of the world community. In June 1943, the decree of the State Defense Committee “On approval of measures to improve the foreign work of the USSR intelligence agencies” for the first time classified religious organizations abroad as the interests of Soviet foreign intelligence. It is clear that this had to be done on the eve of the liberation of Soviet territory and the development of foreign policy ties with allies and other countries. Thus, the patriotic position of the clergy and believers of the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations came into conflict with the stereotypes of those socio-political views that were instilled by official propaganda in the public consciousness on the eve of the war. Believers expected and demanded that the state take even more decisive steps towards the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious associations. The truth about religion in Russia. M., 1942. P. 16. Patriarch Sergius and his spiritual heritage. M., 1947. P. 238. The truth about religion in Russia. M., 1942. P. 413. Russian Orthodox Church and the Great Patriotic War. M., 1942. S. 11, 12. Odintsov M.I. Power and religion during the war years: State and religious organizations in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. M., 2005. P. 141. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 93. L. 19 vol. Quote by: Barabash T. A. The fate of the Russian Church during the war years: before and after the meeting with Generalissimo Stalin / Freedom of conscience in Russia: historical and modern aspects. M., 2004. P. 554. Regelson L. Tragedy of the Russian Church. 1917–1945. Paris, 1977. P. 508. See: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 92. Quote by: Barmenkov A.I. Freedom of conscience in the USSR. M., 1979. P. 120. Quote by: Nikitin A.K. The Nazi regime and the Russian Orthodox community in Germany. 1933–1945. M., 1998. P. 307. See: Shkarovsky M.V. The policy of the Third Reich in relation to the Russian Orthodox Church in the light of archival materials of 1935–1945: Collection of documents. M., 2003. Athanasius (Martos), archbishop. Belarus in historical state and church life. Minsk, 1990. P. 271. Quote by: Shkarovsky M.V. The policy of the Third Reich in relation to the Russian Orthodox Church in the light of archival materials of 1935–1945: Collection of documents. M., 2003. S. 307, 308. Quote by: Danilenko S. Pulpits of black lies / Atheistic readings. M., 1979. Issue. 10. P. 66. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 251. L. 12. Quote by: Shkarovsky M.V. The policy of the Third Reich in relation to the Russian Orthodox Church in the light of archival materials of 1935–1945: Collection of documents. M., 2003. P. 330. Moscow is military. 1941–1945: Memoirs and archival documents. M., 1995. pp. 215–217. Domestic archives. 1995. No. 2. P. 65–67. Moscow is military. 1941–1945: Memoirs and archival documents. M., 1995. P. 211. Church historical bulletin. 1999. No. 2–3. P. 277. Quote from: The Second World War in the memoirs of Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, Cordell Hull, William Lety, Dwight Eisenhower. M., 1990. P. 348. See: Church Historical Bulletin. 1999. No. 4–5. pp. 154–157. The truth about religion in Russia. M., 1942. pp. 120–122. Quote by: Damascene (Orlovsky), hieromonk. Martyrs, confessors and devotees of piety of the Russian Orthodox Church of the 20th century: Lives and materials for them. Tver, 1999. Book. 3. pp. 25, 26. See: Chumachenko T. A. Foreign policy activities of the Moscow Patriarchate. 1943–1946 /Freedom of conscience in Russia: historical and modern aspects. M., 2004. P. 574.