Against Hermogenes
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The essay “Against Hermogenes” (45 chapters, 204-208) was written by Tertullian against the painter and philosopher Hermogenes, who spread his dualistic teaching in Carthage and argued that the world was created from eternal, uncreated matter. In his opinion, a threefold origin of the world is possible: either the world came from the very essence of God, or was created by God out of nothing, or was formed from ready-made matter. He tried to establish his teaching on the authority of Holy Scripture.
At the beginning of the work (chap. 1-18), Tertullian develops philosophical and religious grounds against the provisions of Hermogenes; then (chap. 19-34) he proves the insufficiency of the arguments he puts forward from the Holy Scriptures and, finally (chap. 35-45), proceeds to analyze his biblical arguments. Recognizing the absoluteness of God, Tertullian denies the co-eternity of matter with Him and proves the creation of the world from nothing.
*The title of the work in Latin is Adversus Hermogenem.
Chapter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
Usually, for the sake of brevity, we refute heretics by citing their later origin. For since the teaching of truth, which denounced even future heresies, appeared earlier than others, all later teachings will be considered heresies, since they were predicted by the more ancient teaching of truth. The teaching of Hermogenes is completely new. And to this day he himself is a worldly man, a heretic by nature, and even inveterate; he considers talkativeness a gift of speech, arrogance a determination, and slander against anyone a duty of a clear conscience. In addition, he draws indecent images, constantly changes wives, observes God’s commandments regarding the satisfaction of desires, but forgets about art. Doubly dishonest, both with brush and pen, he completely betrays the laws of God and the world. A bad sign can also be seen in the coincidence of names: after all, that same famous Hermogenes from apostolic times was not very zealous in fulfilling the instructions of the teaching.
But let us leave aside the personality of Hermogenes, since we are mainly interested in his teaching. At first glance, he recognizes Christ as God, but portrays Him in such a way that doubt arises: is this the God of Christians? Moreover, Hermogenes does not recognize the main work of God at all, denying that He created the universe out of nothing. Turning from Christians to philosophers, from the Church to the Academy and the Portico, Hermogenes borrowed from the Stoics the idea of equating matter with God, which, thus, itself always existed, unborn and uncreated, having neither beginning nor end, from which God subsequently created everything.
And so, having started his picture with such a shadow, and a completely hopeless one, this painter painted it with the worst arguments. He assumed that God created everything either from Himself, or from nothing, or from something, so that after he showed that God could not create either from Himself or from nothing, from here he could conclude that it would remain: God created from something, and this something was that very matter. So, Hermogenes denies that God could create from Himself, because whatever God created from Himself would be a part of Himself. On the other hand, He does not decompose into parts, since He is Indivisible, Unchangeable and always One and the same, since He is God. Further, if He had created anything from Himself, it would have belonged to Himself. Every thing that arose and that He created must be considered imperfect, because it arose from a part and from a part He created. If, being everything.
He created everything, then it would have to be that He was and would not be everything at the same time, because it would have to be both that He should have been everything, that He should have created Himself, and that He would not have been everything, that He would have arisen from Himself. But it's too difficult. After all, if He existed, then He would not, because He was. And if he did not exist, he would not have created, since he would have been nothing. He, who will always remain, did not come into being, but exists forever and ever. Consequently, He did not create from Himself, He Who did not have the conditions and opportunity to create from Himself.
Then Hermogenes argues in the same way that God is not able to create out of nothing. For this, Hermogenes defines God as the Good and All-Good, Who desires to do good and all-good insofar as He Himself is such. And He does not want or do anything that is not good or all-good. Therefore, it follows that only good and all-good things should come from Him, according to His own character. However, there is also evil created by Him, although not at His discretion, and not at His will, since at His discretion and desire He would not have done anything inappropriate and unworthy of Himself. Therefore, what He did not of His own will must be assumed to be completely as a result of the harmful influence of some other cause, no doubt - matter.
To this proof Hermogenes adds something else. God has always been God, and even Lord, and never not-Lord. But in no way could He always be Lord, just as He was always God, unless there had previously and always existed something of which He was always Lord. From this it follows that matter was always co-inherent with God the Lord.
I will hasten to refute this idea of his in order to teach understanding and overcoming his other arguments, since he made this addition with the intention of those who do not understand. So, we believe that the name of God was always with Himself and in Himself, but the name of the Lord was not always. But each of these names presupposes a different state of its denoted. “God” is the name of the substance itself, that is, divinity (divinitas), while “Lord” is not the name of substance, but of Divine power or power (potestas). Substance has always had its name, which is “God”. Only later does the conversation come about the Lord, namely, as something incidental. For as soon as that which began to be affected by the Divine power of the Lord appeared, it was thanks to the manifestation of the Divine power that from that very moment He became and began to be called Lord. In the same way, God is the Father, as well as the Judge. However, He is not always the Father and Judge, because He is always God. After all, He could not become either the Father before the appearance of the Son, or the Judge before the creation of sin.
There was a time when there was neither sin nor the Son, who made God Judge and Father. Likewise, He could not become Lord before that through which He became Lord. Originally He could only be God, still intending to someday become Lord through what He would create for Himself to serve, as in His time. He will become both a Father through the Son and a Judge due to sin.
Perhaps, Hermogenes, from your point of view I am indulging in idle talk? But we are greatly supported by the Holy Scriptures, which distinguishes between both names and introduces each in its own time. After all, he immediately uses the name “God,” which has always existed: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth” (Gen. 1.1). And then, until He created what He was going to be the Lord of, Scripture uses only the name “God”: “And God said,... and God created,... and God saw (Gen. 1.3-4), and nowhere until then “Lord.” But when He completed the creation of everything and, most importantly, of course, man himself, who, in fact, had to comprehend the Lord and just give Him a name, then Scripture already added the name of the Lord: “And the Lord God took the man [whom] he had created, and the Lord God commanded Adam" (Gen. 2.15-16). So, He Who until then was only God became Lord from the time when He had the one whose Lord He was. was. For He was God in Himself, and for creatures he became God at the same time as Lord.
Consequently, if Hermogenes believes that matter always existed because the Lord always existed, it will follow that nothing existed, since it is known that the Lord always existed. Perhaps, for those who do not understand - and among them Hermogenes shows the limit of misunderstanding - I will add something else and, in addition, I will use his own weapon against him.
Since Hermogenes denies that matter is born or created,” then, I believe, it is impossible to apply the name of the Lord to God in connection with matter, for it is necessary for that one to be free which, having no birth, does not have a parent, so that it is not obliged to anyone and therefore is not subordinate to anyone. Thus, as soon as God exercised His power over it by creating from it, from that moment on matter receiving the Lord God proves that He was not Him until He did so.
I will begin again to talk about matter precisely from the fact that God created it, although it appears as unborn, uncreated, eternal, without beginning and end. After all, what else could be the highest property of God, if not eternity? Does eternity have any other property than always being in the past and future due to the fact that it has neither beginning nor end? If such is the property of God, it must belong to God alone, Whose property it is. But once eternity is attributed to another, it is no longer the inalienable property of God, but is divided between Him and that to which it is attributed. After all, although there are those who are called gods, both in heaven and on earth, yet for us there is only one God the Father, “from whom are all things” (1 Cor 8.5-6). It is all the more necessary that among us, that which is an inalienable property of God belongs to God alone. And, as I have already said, eternity would not be an inherent property of God if it belonged to another. After all, if God exists, then it is necessary that something unique exists and that it belongs to [Him] alone.
What should be the only one, if not something with which nothing can compare? What is primordial, if not that which is above all, first of all, and from which everything is? Because God alone owns eternity, He is God. And since only He alone owns it, then only He alone exists. If someone else owned it, then how many gods would exist, how many would have that characteristic that allows them to be gods!
So, Hermogenes introduces two gods, since he considers matter equal to God. But God must be one, because only the highest is God. Nothing can be the highest except one of its kind. And something to which something is compared cannot be one of a kind. If eternity is attributed to matter, it is recognized as equal to God.
But God is God, and matter is matter. And yet, can a simple difference in names prevent comparison if the same property is attributed to the objects they designate? Even if their nature is different, even if their form is not the same. As long as they have the same property, they have the same meaning. God is not born. Is it really possible, in this case, that matter was born? God is eternal. Isn't matter eternal? Both without beginning, both without end. Both are equally creators of the universe: both the One who created and the one from which He created. After all, matter cannot but be considered the creator of everything that the universe consists of. What will Hermogenes answer to this? That we should not hastily compare matter with God, even if there is something in it that belongs to God, since it itself, not possessing everything, does not claim complete equality? How did Hermogenes manage to leave more to God, so that it would not seem that he had given everything that belonged to God to matter?
“At least,” Hermogenes will say, “despite such properties of matter, let God retain both power and substance, thanks to which He is considered the One, the Only, the First, the Creator, and the Lord of all.”
The truth, defending monotheism, demands that everything that belongs to God belongs only to Him alone. Thus, if everything belongs to only one, it will belong to Himself, since on the same basis the existence of any other god is not allowed, since no one can have anything that belongs to God. “Consequently,” you say, “we have nothing from God?” On the contrary, we have and will have, but according to His and not our will. We can even become gods if we are worthy to be those about whom He announced: “I said: you are gods, and God became in the assembly of gods” (Ps 82:6). But this can only happen by His grace and not by our abilities. For He alone has the ability to create gods. He also makes matter a property that connects it to God. And if she received from God what belongs to Him, I mean the property of eternity, then can we believe that, although she has something in common with God, she is not God?
And how can we understand this when Hermogenes says that matter has something in common with God, and at the same time insists that this common thing, which he does not deny as a property of matter, belongs only to God?
Hermogenes says that only God has the power to be the One, the Only, the First, the Creator of everything, the Lord of everything and incomparable to anyone. But he also attributes the cause of all this to matter. But the same God once called the gods as witnesses and swore with Himself that no one else would be like Himself. But Hermogenes will make Him a liar. After all, matter will be like God: uncreated, unborn, having neither beginning nor end. God will say: “I am first” (Isaiah 41.4, 44.6). But how can the First be the One to whom matter is coeternal? After all, there can be no inequality among the co-eternal and the contemporary. Or is matter also first? God says: “I... Alone...stretched out... the sky” (Isaiah 44.24). But no, not alone: that too stretched out, from which He stretched out. When Hermogenes asserts that matter exists without violating the properties of God, can’t we argue in the same way that God exists without violating the properties of matter? In the end, they have common properties. Therefore, it will be true for matter that it exists alone, but together with God, with God it is the first, since God is also The first one is with her.
And she is incomparable with God, since God is incomparable with her. And together with God she is a creator and together with God she is a mistress. Thus. God possesses not all, but some properties of matter. Hermogenes did not leave anything to God that he did not attribute to matter. So it is not matter to God, but rather God is equated to matter. And so, when what we recognize as the properties of God - that He always existed, without beginning, without end, and was the First and Only, and the Creator of everything - is also attributed to matter, I ask: what is it that matter that is different and alien to God and therefore peculiar only to it, because of which it cannot be compared with God? If all the properties of God are found in it, this is a sufficient basis for further comparison.
If Hermogenes asserts that matter is less and lower than God, and therefore different from Him, incomparable with Him, as greater and higher, then I object, for the eternal and ungenerate accepts no diminution and humiliation, because it is eternity and ungeneracy that make God such as He is, and in no way less and not subordinate, but, on the contrary, greater and superior to all. After all, just as everything else (which is born and dies and therefore is not eternal, being hostage to both the end and the beginning) allows what God does not accept, that is, derogation and subordination - since this other thing is born and created - so God does not allow this because he is neither born nor created at all. The same is the position of matter.
So, we affirm that of the two eternal essences, ungenerated and uncreated, God and matter, which on a common basis equally possess that which admits of neither diminution nor subordination - that is, eternity - neither can be lesser or greater, neither lower or higher, but both are equally great, equally exalted, equally possessing that unshakable and perfect happiness, whose name is eternity. And let us not draw closer to the opinion of the pagans, who, if they are ever forced to recognize God, immediately want to subordinate other gods to Him. Divinity has no degree, since it is unique in its kind. If it were also in matter, just as ungenerated, uncreated and eternal, then it would be entirely inherent in both, since it can in no way be inferior to itself. So, in what way will Hermogenes dare to make a distinction, and also to subordinate to God matter, eternal to the Eternal, unborn to the Unborn, creator to the Creator, having the right to say: “And I am the first, and I am before all things, and I am the one from whom are all things. We are equal.
We were at the same time, both without beginning and end, both without creator and master. Who subordinated me to the co-temporal me and the co-eternal God? If because He is called God, then I have my name. But I am God, and He is also matter, since both of us are what each of us is”?
And so, Hermogenes, believing that matter is not equal to God and thereby subordinating it to Him, in fact even puts it above God and, rather, subordinates God to matter, when he believes that God created everything from matter. After all, if He used a part of it to create the world, then the matter that provided Him with the means of creation turns out to be above Him, and God seems to be subordinate to the matter whose substance He needed. After all, no one can help but feel the need of someone whose property he uses; no one can disobey someone whose property he needs in order to enjoy it; so that no one can be less than the one whose property he uses, and no one, allowing the use of his own, can be superior in this to the one to whom he gives the opportunity to use.
So, matter itself did not need God, but provided itself to God, who needed it, rich, abundant, noble - the worst, obviously, and weak, and unable to make out of nothing what he wanted. She actually did God a great favor, so that He now has someone who recognizes Him as God and calls Him Almighty. Although, how Almighty is He if He is not able to create everything out of nothing? Of course, matter also gained something for itself. So she too can now be recognized together with God, equal to God, and moreover, a helper. If only it were known not only to Hermogenes, but to the heretical patriarchs and philosophers. And it is hidden from the prophets and apostles to this day. However, I think – and from Christ.
Hermogenes cannot claim that God used matter to create the world as the Lord. After all, He cannot be the Lord of a substance co-eternal with Him. Rather, the use was reciprocal (and not emanating from His power) precisely because, seeing evil in matter. Nevertheless, he was forced to use it. This was forced by His own mediocrity, which prevented Him from creating from nothing, as well as by weakness. After all, if He treated matter (in which he saw evil) with all the power of the Lord, then, being the Good God, He would first of all make it good, so that, if we were to use it, it would be good, and not evil. However, although He is good, He is not the Lord; This means that by using the matter that He had, He showed His dependence and agreed to the conditions of the matter, which He would have corrected if He had been Lord. This is how one must answer Hermogenes when he asserts that it was precisely because of His dominion that God used a matter-thing, which, moreover, did not belong to Him, and therefore was not created by Him.
This means that evil comes from Himself; if He did not increase evil, not being its Creator, then He definitely condoned it as the Lord. If matter does not belong to God (after all, evil is not characteristic of Him), then God took advantage of someone else’s: either by borrowing, if He is weaker than matter, or by robbery, if He is stronger. After all, there are only three ways to acquire someone else’s property: by right, through courtesy, and as a result of robbery, that is, by right of ownership, by loan, and by violence. Since the right of property does not belong to God, Hermogenes can choose the most appropriate for him only from the last two ways: to create the universe through a loan or violence. But isn’t it better for God to decide not to create anything at all, rather than to create as a result of a loan or violence, and, moreover, out of evil? Really, even if the matter were the best, He would consider it worthy to create Himself from someone else's property, even good? It would not be very reasonable on His part to create the world for His glory and at the same time reveal Himself as a debtor to someone else’s and, moreover, not a good substance.
“Well,” says Hermogenes, “was it really necessary for God to create out of nothing, so that evil would also be attributed to His will?” Indeed, great is the blindness of heretics who use such reasoning when they either want to believe in another God, good and all-good, since they consider the Creator to be the producer of evil, or they place matter next to the Creator in order to derive evil from matter, and not from the Creator. After all, no God should be exempt from the question of why, not being the author of evil, He can be considered the one who, although not Himself created evil, nevertheless allowed its origin from someone and somewhere. Therefore, let Hermogenes listen while we discuss the meaning of evil in another respect, and at the same time about what he has. nothing happened with this objection.
After all, although not the culprit, they consider that God to be an accomplice of evil, who, a century before the creation of the world, suffered the evil of matter, which, as a good rival of evil, should have been corrected. For He either could have corrected it, but did not want to, or He wanted to, but in fact could not, being weak. If He could, but did not want to, then He Himself is evil, since He patronized evil. And therefore God is already considered the author of evil, although He Himself did not create it. For if God had not wanted evil to exist, it would not have existed. But God Himself acted as if He did not want evil to not exist. What could be more shameful? If He wanted the existence of something that He Himself did not want to create, then He acted against Himself. For, on the one hand, He wanted the existence of that which He Himself did not want to create, on the other hand, He did not want to create that which He wanted to exist. It was as if he wanted his existence as good and as if he did not want his creation as evil. Without creating it, He declared it evil, but by allowing it, He declared it good. By allowing evil instead of good and not decisively eradicating it, God is its protector. Evil by free will is worse than by necessity.
God will become either a servant of evil or its friend if He merely communicates with the evil of matter, not to mention creating anything from its evil.
But how does Hermogenes convince us that matter is evil? He, of course, cannot help but call evil what he attributes evil to. But we determined above that the eternal cannot be belittled and subordinated, so as not to be considered lower than another, co-eternal with it. Hence we now assert that evil cannot be a property of matter, since matter cannot be subordinated to it, because it cannot be subordinated to anyone at all, since it is eternal. But since it has been established elsewhere that the highest good is that which is eternal (as God is; thanks to which He is the only one of His kind while eternal, and therefore good while God), then how can evil be inherent in matter, if it, as eternal, must be considered the highest good? Or if that which is eternal can also contain evil, then evil can also be conceived in God. And without reason, Hermogenes is proud that he delivered God from evil, if, by attributing it to matter, he thereby admits it as a property of eternity. And, of course, since the eternal can be considered evil, then evil will then be invincible and irresistible as eternal.
And do we, after all, labor in vain in removing evil from ourselves? Then God prescribes and commands this in vain. Moreover, God instituted the court in vain, in any case unfairly intending to punish those for whom, unlike evil, an end is inevitable - when the viceroy of evil, the devil, before being thrown into the abyss of the abyss, will be betrayed to the fire that God has prepared for him and his angels; when the Revelation of the Sons of God will free creation from evil, which is everywhere subject to vanity; when, as a result of the restoration of the innocence and integrity of creation, domestic animals will make peace with wild ones and children will play with snakes; when the Father will cast down the enemies, especially the creators of evil, at the feet of the Son. Thus, if evil has an end, then it must also have a beginning. Matter will also have a beginning, since evil has an end. For what is attributed to evil also belongs to its other form - matter.
OK then! Let's believe that matter is evil and even very evil, at least by nature. We believe that God is good and supremely good - also by nature. Further, nature should be considered constant and unshakable, unshakable both in the evil of matter and in the good of God and, of course, incapable of transformation and unchangeable. Because if in matter nature changed from evil to good, then it could then change in God from good to evil. At this point, can anyone say: “Therefore, the sons of Abraham will not come from the stones, and the offspring of the serpents will not bear the fruit of repentance, and the sons of wrath will not become the sons of peace, if nature cannot change?” Without thinking, you point to these examples, O man. For with matter, which has no beginning, everything that has one is incomparable: stones, snakes, people. Of course, the nature of the latter, having a beginning, can also have an end. Matter, do not forget, is defined once and for all as eternal, uncreated and unborn.
And therefore we must believe that it has an unchangeable and untransformable nature, even in the opinion of Hermogenes, which he contrasts with ours when he denies that God could create from Himself, because what exists eternally does not change. Which, of course, will be lost if, as a result of change, something comes into being that did not exist, and thus eternity disappears.
So, the eternal God cannot become other than what He always was. With this definition I will strike Hermogenes a well-deserved retaliatory blow. I also condemn matter when, from it, evil, and even very evil, God creates good and even very good things: “And God saw that the things he had created were good, and God blessed them” (Gen. 1.21–22), - of course, because they are very good, and not because they are bad and very bad. This means that matter allowed changes, and if this is so, it lost the state of eternity, that is, it died in its previous form. But eternity cannot be lost; if it were possible, it would not be eternity. Consequently, it cannot allow changes, since being eternity, it cannot change in any way.
Now the question is: if only good was created from matter, which could not in any way be the result of its change, then where does the seed of good and best come from in the bad and worst? Of course, neither a good tree produces bad fruits (just as there is no God except the good one), nor a bad tree produces good fruits (just as matter does not exist except the worst). And if we attribute to it something like the germ of good, then it will no longer be of a monotonous nature, that is, bad in general, but dual, that is, both bad and good nature. And then the question is asked again: can there be anything in common in good and bad, light and darkness, sweet and bitter? After all, if the opposition of both, good and evil, could coincide and the nature of matter would become dual, replete with one and other fruits, then good itself would no longer be attributed to God, so that evil would not be attributed to Him, but both types, borrowed from the properties of matter, would relate to it.
Under this condition, we owe God neither gratitude for good nor hatred for evil, for He did nothing according to His natural properties, and this clearly proves that He retreated in favor of matter.
Although they say that God, given a favorable arrangement of matter, and at the same time, according to His will, could produce good, as if accidentally borrowing good from matter, this, of course, is also shameful, since He also creates evil from it. Having created evil clearly not according to His will, God turned out to be a slave to matter, unable to do anything other than create from evil. Of course, He did it reluctantly, because He is good. And out of necessity, if reluctantly. And by virtue of servitude, if necessary. What is more worthy, to do evil out of necessity or out of good will? Of course, He created out of necessity, if from matter; and if from nothing (ex nihilo), then according to His will. And it is completely in vain that you try to present God as innocent of evil. Because if He created from matter, then evil is attributed to the one who created, since it was He who created. On the contrary, if He created out of nothing, then it would no longer matter from what exactly. Thus, it matters how He created - so that He created in the manner most appropriate for Him.
And it is most fitting for Him to create according to His will rather than out of necessity, that is, out of nothing rather than out of matter. It is also more worthy to consider God a free creator of evil than a dependent one. Any power suits Him better than insignificance. Thus, if we agree that matter has nothing good, and God, if He created anything good, created it by His power, other questions will arise in the same way. Firstly, if good was not inherent in matter at all, then it was not created from it, because matter was completely devoid of it. Then, if not from matter, then, therefore, it was created from God. If not from God, then, therefore, it was created from nothing. This is the only way out for Hermogenes' reasoning.
But if good was created not from matter (because it was not in it as evil), and not from God (because nothing could have arisen from God, as Hermogenes determined), then it turns out that good, as if it did not come from anyone, was created from nothing - therefore, not from matter, and not from God. And if good comes from nothing, then why not evil? Moreover, why not everything from nothing, if something from nothing? Unless the Divine power, which produced something out of nothing, was insufficient to produce everything. And if good came from evil matter (if not from nothing and not from God), then it came as a result of the transformation of matter, contrary to the resolutely rejected change of the eternal. Thus, no matter what good consists of, Hermogenes is ready to deny that it can consist of anything at all. It is necessary that it come from something from which, as he believed, it could not come.
However, if evil therefore did not come from nothing, so as not to belong to God (for it will seem to be created according to His will), but from matter, so as to belong to that from whose substance it was created, then here, as I said, God will be considered the creator of evil. For although He, with the same power and will, should have produced from matter everything that is good, or only good, He did not create everything as good, but even as something evil. In any case, either He wanted evil to exist - if He could prevent the existence of evil - or He was not able to make everything good if He wanted and did not.
Meanwhile, it does not matter whether God became the creator of evil out of weakness or according to His will. Or was there any meaning that, although He could create good, being Good, He still created evil, as if He were not Good? Why didn't He create only in accordance with His own essence? What was the need for Him, after completing His work, to take care of matter and do evil? So that He, the One and Only, would be recognized as good for good, and matter would not be considered evil on the basis of evil? Good would flourish more without the influence of evil. After all, Hermogenes also disputes the arguments of some who claim that evil was necessary to give brightness to good, understood as the opposite of evil. So, there was either no reason to create evil at all, or, if some other reason forced the introduction of evil, why could it not have been created out of nothing? For the same reason would excuse the Lord, so that He would not be considered the author of evil, which now excuses evil when He creates it from matter - if there is an excuse at all.
So, wherever you look, everywhere you come across this question, which those who reproach God for evil do not want to answer, having made many unworthy conclusions, but without examining the essence of evil and without understanding whether to attribute evil to God or to separate it from Him.
So, having previously defined this subject (to which, perhaps, we should return again in another place), I establish that good and evil must be attributed either to God (if He created them from matter), or to matter itself (from which He created), or to both of them (if He who created and that from which He created owed each other), or to One one, and the other the other. After all, there is no third thing except matter and God. In turn, if both belong to God, He will turn out to be the creator of evil. But God, being good, cannot be the creator of evil. If both belong to matter, then matter will even seem to be the mother of good. But being entirely evil, matter cannot be a source of good. If both belong to both, then matter will thereby be equated with God, and both of them will become equal as equally involved in evil and good. But matter should not be equated with God, so that there would not be two gods. And if one thing is for One, and the other is another, then, of course, God is good, and matter is evil.
After all, it is impossible to attribute either evil to God or goodness to matter. But creating good and evil from matter, God creates with it. If this is so, then I don’t know how Hermogenes could get out of it, who, no matter how He created evil from matter, either by His will, or by necessity, or by reason, does not consider God the creator of evil. Further, if the creator of evil is the very One who created the creation - of course, in union with matter, which provided Him with substance - then there is no longer any reason to introduce matter as the source of evil. For, despite this, God turns out to be the creator of evil thanks to matter, although it was allowed so that He would not be considered the author of evil.
Thus, after eliminating matter (assuming that there is no need for it), it becomes clear that God created everything from nothing. And it doesn’t matter whether we consider all evil from the moment of its appearance (whether it is evil or not) - and whether, by the way, what you consider to be evil is evil. For it is more worthy for Him to produce according to His will, creating evil out of nothing, than according to someone else’s order, if He created from matter. Freedom, not necessity, belongs to God. I prefer that He Himself wanted to create evil, rather than that He could not help doing it.
Monotheism requires the recognition of the following provisions. There is only one God provided that He is the One – the Only One. One is the only one only because there is nothing with Him. And He will be the First because everything is after Him. So, and everything after Him, because everything is from Him. And from Him, because from nothing. It is important that all this does not contradict the meaning of Scripture: Who has known the thought of the Lord? Or who was His adviser? Or who did He ask for advice? Maybe someone showed Him the path of understanding and knowledge? Is there anyone to whom He owes a favor? (Rom 11.34–35). Of course there are none. Since there was no force, no matter, no being of any other substance next to Him. And if He created from something, He would have to receive from this itself both a plan and an explanation for it, as the path of understanding and knowledge. And then He would have to create in accordance with the quality of the thing and the natural characteristics of matter, and not according to His will. So He would have created evil not according to His will, but in accordance with the nature of the substance.
If God needs matter to create the world, as Hermogenes believed, then God has matter that is much more worthy and convenient, information about which should be sought not from philosophers, but from the prophets, that is, His Wisdom (sophia). In the end, she was the only one who knew the thought of the Lord. Who knows what belongs to God and what is in Him, except the Spirit who is in Him? (1 Cor 2.11). And Wisdom is Spirit. She was God's advisor. It is the path of understanding and knowledge. God created from her, creating through her and with her. When He strengthened heaven,” she says, “I was with Him. When He strengthened the high clouds on the winds and when He confirmed the sources of what is under the sky, I was with Him and helped Him. I was the one He rejoiced in. And I rejoiced daily in His presence, when He rejoiced in ordering the universe and enjoying himself among the sons of men (Proverbs 8.27–31).
Who would not rather recognize it as the source and beginning of everything, the true matter of all matters: not subject to corruption, not changing its state, not tossing about in vanity, not ugly in appearance, but native, own, ordered and appropriate, which God could well have a need for, still needing His own, and not someone else’s? As soon as He feels that she is necessary for the creation of the world, he immediately conceives and gives birth to her in Himself. “The Lord,” she says, “made me the beginning of His ways for His works. Before the ages He founded me, before He created the earth, before He established the mountains, before He gave birth to me, before... the abyss... I was born” (Proverbs 8.22–25).
So, Hermogenes must admit that the statement about the birth and creation of even the Wisdom of God is made so that we believe: there is nothing unborn and uncreated, except God alone. After all, if within God that which arose from Himself and in Himself was not without a beginning - first of all, His Wisdom, born and created at the moment when it began to act in the mind of God for the creation of the world - then much less could anything that was outside of God not have a beginning. If indeed the same Wisdom is thought, is the Word of God, without which nothing is created, just as without Wisdom nothing is put into order, what is it that, along with the Father, could be ancient and thereby more ancestral than the Son of God, the Word of the Only Begotten and First-Begotten, not to mention the fact that the uncreated is more powerful and the uncreated stronger? For that which did not need any creator in order to exist will be much higher than that which needed any creator for its existence.
Therefore, if evil is not born, [but about good], that is, about the Word of God, it is said: “For He vomited out the most blessed Word” (Ps 44.2), - I do not know whether evil can be produced from good, strong from weak, that is, unborn from begotten? This means that Hermogenes prefers matter to God, preferring it to the Son. “For the Son is the Word, and God is the Word: ... I and the Father - one” (cf. John 1:1, 10.30) Unless the Son indifferently agrees that the one who is equal to the Father be preferred to Him.
But I will also turn to the authentic books of Moses, with which, however, the opposing side tries in vain to support its premises, so that it does not seem that it is drawing from the wrong place. She established the meanings of some words in such a way as is the custom of heretics - to confuse the simplest things. After all, they want the very beginning in which God created heaven and earth to be something substantial and corporeal, and that it could be interpreted into matter. We insist on using each word in its own meaning and assert that the “beginning” (principium) is nothing more than the “beginning of action” (initium), and this word is suitable for everything that begins to exist. After all, nothing that has to appear exists without a beginning, for the beginning itself comes for him when something begins to arise. Thus, principium or initium are words for “undertaking” (inceptio), and not names of any substance.
And if the original creations of God are the heavens and the earth (which God created first of all in order to lay the true beginning of His creations), since they were created first, then Scripture rightfully begins with the words: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth” (Gen. 1.1). In the same way it would be said: “In the end God created the heavens and the earth,” if He created them after everything. And if the beginning were some kind of substance, then the end would be some kind of matter.
But, of course, a certain principle can be substantial (substantivum) for some other thing that must arise from it. So, for example, clay is the beginning of pottery, and a seed is the beginning of a plant. But if we use the word “beginning” in the sense of a substance, and not a temporal sequence, then we specifically add the name of the thing that we take as the beginning of another thing. If we say, for example, as follows: “In the beginning the potter made a basin or an urn,” the “beginning” here will in no way mean matter. Indeed, in this phrase I called “the beginning” not the clay, but the sequence of actions, for the potter first made the basin and the urn, intending to do the rest after that. So the word "beginning" will refer to the order of actions, and not to the origin of substances. I can interpret “beginning” in another way, finally, not from the designated object. Thus, in the Greek language, the word “beginning”, that is, denotes primacy not only in sequence, but also in power, hence both the authorities and the authorities are called “archons”.
Therefore, in accordance with this meaning, “beginning” can be used to denote primacy as well as power. After all, it was by virtue of primacy and power that God created heaven and earth.
But so that the Greek word does not receive any other meaning than the beginning, and the beginning does not allow anything other than the action of “beginning,” we must also recognize as the beginning the one who says: “God created me, the beginning ... for her to make His way, for His works” (Proverbs 8.22). After all, if everything was created thanks to the Wisdom of God, then God, having created heaven and earth “in the beginning,” that is, beginning His activity, created them in His Wisdom. Finally, if beginning meant matter, then Scripture would not express it “in the beginning God created,” but “from the beginning,” since God would then create not in matter, but from matter. About Wisdom one could say “in the beginning.” For He first began to create in Wisdom, in which He created by reasoning and ordering. And even if He was going to create from matter, then He would first have to, by reflecting and arranging, create in Wisdom. After all, if it was the beginning of the ways, it is precisely because reflection and arrangement are the first work of Wisdom, paving the way to activity with the help of reflection.
This testimony I rightly extract from Scripture, which, while showing God the Creator and what He created, says nothing about what He created from.
In any activity, three main points are essential: who does what arises, from what it arises. Therefore, in the correct description of an activity, three names must be indicated, denoting the person (persona) of the Creator, the created and the matter of the created. If matter is not indicated, but the work and the Creator of the work are indicated, then it is clear that He produced from nothing. Otherwise, if He produced from anything, it would be indicated from what exactly. Finally, I add the Gospel to the Old Testament. From it it should be all the more clear that God created everything from some kind of matter - for there it is precisely explained that with whose help He created everything. In the beginning was the Word, precisely in the beginning in which God created the heavens and the earth. “And the Word was with God, and the Word was God... All things were created; through Him, and without Him, nothing was created" (John 1.1-3).
Therefore, if the Creator, that is, God, and the created, that is, everything, and through Whom, that is, through the Word, are shown here, would not order also require that we declare that from which, with the help of the Word, everything was created by God, if it were created from something? Thus, what did not happen, Scripture could not declare. And this very silence says enough that there was nothing, because if there was something. Scripture would say so.
In response, you will, of course, object: anyone who considers the universe to be created from nothing simply because it is not clearly said that everything is created from matter, should be wary of the opposite side’s assertion that the universe was created from matter, since it is just as clearly not said that everything is created from nothing. Of course, some of the opponent’s arguments can be easily turned back on him. However, this cannot be done quickly and fairly where there is a difference in the subject itself. Therefore, I maintain that although Scripture did not openly declare that everything was created from nothing, or, on the contrary, from matter, yet there was no such need to openly indicate that everything was created from nothing, as would have arisen if the universe had been created from matter. For what is created from nothing is considered to be created from nothing until it is indicated from what it was created; thus it is not in danger of being mistaken for being made from something when it is not shown what it is made from. What arises from something else - if it is clearly stated that it is from something else, but is not openly declared from what exactly - is exposed to two dangers.
First, it may appear to be created out of nothing, since it is not stated what it was created from.
Secondly, even if it has such a property that it cannot help but appear to be created from something, there is still a danger that it (while it is not precisely stated what it is created from) may appear to be created from something other than what it actually is. Thus, if God created everything out of nothing, then Scripture need not add that He created out of nothing. And if He created from matter, then it would be necessary to indicate in any way that He created from matter. For the first could easily be understood even if nothing was said about it, but the second would be doubtful if it were not stated.
And therefore the Holy Spirit established for His Scripture such a rule that, when something arises from something, it tells both what arises and from what it arises. “Let the earth,” He says, “bring forth the former grass, sowing seed according to its kind and in its likeness, and... a fruitful... tree, bearing... fruit,... in which there is seed in its likeness. And so it happened. And the earth brought forth herbaceous plants, seed-bearing, after their kind, and... fruitful... trees, bearing abundant fruit, in which there is seed... after their likeness” (Gen. 1.11–12). And again: “And God said: Let the water bring forth reptiles... living creatures and birds that fly over the earth in the firmament of heaven. [And so it happened]. And God created... great... fish and every living thing... creeping... living creature that the water brought forth, according to their kind” (Gen. 1.20–21). And then: “And God said, Let the earth produce living creatures according to their kinds, cattle and creeping things and wild beasts after their kinds” (Gen. 1.24).
So, if God, producing other things from created things, declares through the prophet and says what and from what He created (although we could assume that all this was created from something, and not from nothing, for something was already created from where the rest could come), if the Holy Spirit took upon Himself the care of our instruction, so that we would know what came from where, would He not have told us both about heaven and earth, from what they were created, if they were obliged to the origin of any matter? Then it would no longer seem that He created them out of nothing, since until then that which it might seem to have been created from was not created. He created. Therefore, by indicating the origin of that which was created from something, He thereby implies that something was created from nothing, the origin of which He does not indicate.
So: “In the beginning... God... created... the heavens and the earth” (Genesis 1.1). I bow to the fullness of Scripture, for it shows me both the Creator and the creation. And in the Gospel I find quite a lot about the Creator’s helper and mediator – the Word. I still haven’t read anywhere that everything is created from some kind of material substance. Let the school of Hermogenes claim that this is written somewhere. And if it is still not written, then let him beware of the troubles that are destined for lovers of fiction and slander.
But Hermogenes reinforces his reasoning with the following words from Scripture: “The earth was invisible and unsettled” (Gen. 1.2). To do this, he assigns the name earth to matter on the grounds that, in his opinion, earth was created from matter. And “there was” he aims at the same thing, as if earth-matter had always existed before, unborn and uncreated, invisible and unprocessed, because he wants matter to be formless, disordered and discordant. I will refute these ideas of his one by one. But for now I want to answer him this way. Let us assume that the existence of matter is proven by these provisions. But does Scripture really say that if it existed in the first place and possessed the indicated properties, that something was created from it? Yes, nothing like that is said. Therefore, if matter existed, it was only because she herself, or rather Hermogenes, wanted it. It could exist, and yet God did not create anything from it. Perhaps because it is indecent for God to need anything. That is why, probably, it is not shown that He created anything from matter.
“In that case,” you will object, “there would be no need for matter.” No, she is really needed! The world may not have been created from it, but heresy was created! And perhaps what is much worse is that heresy is not created from matter, but rather, matter itself is created by it.
I now return to individual cases which Hermogenes thinks indicate the existence of matter. And, first of all, I want to deal with names. After all, we find one of the names (“earth”) in Scripture, but not the other (“matter”). Consequently, the question arises: if the name of matter is not in Scripture, then on what basis is the name earth, denoting a substance of a completely different kind, adapted for it? The name of matter, accompanying the name of earth, must somehow be specially highlighted so that I know that the name of earth simultaneously serves as a name for matter, so that I do not relate it only to the substance whose proper name it is, and so that, finally, I could not (even if I wanted) connect it with some other type of matter and, in any case, with matter in general. For that thing to which a common [for many] name is assigned does not have its own, for it does not give anything to this thing and can be assigned to any other.
Therefore, although Hermogenes declared that matter has a name, he must still prove that matter has the same name as earth, so that the two names of matter do not thereby contradict each other.
So, Hermogenes claims that the mentioned passage of Scripture speaks of two lands. One is that God created in the beginning, and the other is the matter from which He created and about which it is said: “But the earth was invisible and not cultivated.” And if I ask which of the two should be given the name of the earth, the answer will be given that the one that is created borrows the name from the one from which it was created. For it is more plausible for descendants to be called by the name of their ancestors than for ancestors to be called by the name of their descendants. If this is so, then another question arises: is it legal to require that the earth that God created borrow a generic name from the one from which He created it? After all, I hear that Hermogenes and other heretics, supporters of matter, have a formless, invisible and unsettled earth. But I myself see this one of ours: she inherited from God beauty, splendor, and well-groomed behavior. Therefore, it was created quite differently from the one from which it emerged. And being created differently, she could not be united in name with the one from which she differed in her condition.
If the proper name of the notorious matter was “earth,” then our earth, which is not matter, being created in a completely different way, can no longer accept the name of earth, alien and unacceptable in its properties. On the other hand, created matter, that is, our earth, seemed to have a common origin and name with its source, matter. But not necessarily. After all, the dishes, although they are made of clay, I will not call clay, but dishes. And electr, although it is an alloy of gold and silver, I will still call it not silver or gold, but electr. If something changes its properties, it also loses its previous name, because the name and the property are closely related. And how different our earth is in its properties from the supposed earth, that is, matter, is clear from the fact that the Book of Genesis testifies that it is good: “And God saw... that... it was good” (Genesis 1.31). The Hermogenian land seems to be the source and cause of evil. Finally, if our earth borrowed its name from the Hermogenes, why did it not inherit the name “matter” from it?
Moreover, the sky and everything else, if it consists of matter, must also bear the names “earth” and “matter.” But enough about the name earth, under which Hermogenes tried to introduce matter, although everyone knows that “earth” is the name of one of the elements, which is first taught by nature, and then by Scripture. Otherwise, you will have to believe Silenus, who, according to Theopompus, convinced King Midas of the existence of Another World. However, he also assured of the existence of many gods.
But for us, God is one and one earth, which He created in the beginning. Beginning to set forth the order of her creation, Scripture first of all reports that she was created, and then speaks of her properties. In the same way, it is said about the sky, first of all, that it was created: “In the beginning... God... created... the heavens” (Gen. 1.1), and then adds about its structure: “And He separated the water that was below the firmament, and the water that was above the firmament, and God called the firmament heaven” (Gen. 1.7–8). Namely, about the structure of the very thing that He created in the beginning. In the same way about man: “And God created man... in the image of God he created him" (Genesis 1.27). Then Scripture adds how God created him: "And God created... man from... the earth and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul" (Genesis 2.7). This is how you need to start a story: first make a preface, then depict the subject; first name and then describe.
Therefore, it would be strange if Scripture suddenly reported the form and properties of that thing that it did not mention at all and did not even indicate its name, that is, matter; it would first tell what it is, rather than show whether it exists; her image would be painted, but her name would be hidden. But it seems more likely to us that Scripture has placed here a description of the thing whose creation and name it previously mentioned. Is it possible to understand in any other way the words: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, but the earth was invisible and unstructured” (Gen. 1.1–2)? Is this not the earth that God created and about which the Scriptures have sufficiently communicated? After all, the connecting part “zhe” is specially used here, like a clamp connecting the train of thought into a single whole: “the earth.” With this word Scripture returns to the land it has just spoken of and connects the thought. If you remove the “zhe” from here, the connection is broken. And then, of course, it may seem that the words: “The earth was invisible and unsettled” were indeed spoken about another earth.
But you, indignantly raising your eyes and hands to grief, cut your hand through the air and declare: “She was!” - as if she had always existed (of course, unborn and uncreated). And therefore, of course, one should believe that this earth is matter. But I will answer simply and without any embellishment: about any thing you can say “it was,” and even about something that was created, that was born, that once did not exist and that is not matter. After all, about everything that has existence (no matter where it has it, either through a beginning or without a beginning), one can also say, since “it is,” “it was.” Whatever the original form of the verb is suitable for definition, the modified form of the verb will be suitable for narration. “There is” is the original form for definition, and “was” is for narration. But in the present case, all this is the intricacies and tricks of heretics. They create a problem from simple and well-known words. Of course, the very important question is, did the earth that was created “exist”?
And, of course, it is necessary to discuss whether it is appropriate for the earth that was created to be invisible and unsettled, or for the one from which it was created, so that “it was” can be attributed to the one that really was.
However, we will prove not only that the indicated properties were suitable for our land, but that they were not suitable for that other land. After all, if naked matter prostrated itself before God, without, of course, being separated from Him by any elements (since there was nothing yet besides it and God), then, without a doubt, it could not be invisible. For although Hermogenes claims that darkness was inherent in the substance of matter (we will answer this statement in its place), darkness is visible even to man - that is, he sees that it is dark - not to mention God. In any case, if it were invisible, then in no way could its property be known. How, then, did Hermogenes know that it was formless, disordered and restless, if it was hidden because it was invisible? And if this was revealed by God, then Hermogenes must prove it. I also ask if she could be called unsettled? After all, of course, that which is imperfect is unsettled. And, of course, only that which has been created can be imperfect. And what is not fully created is imperfect. “Of course,” you agree.
– Therefore, matter, which was not created at all, could not be imperfect. And if she could not be imperfect, then she could not be unsettled. Since it did not have a beginning, since it was not created, then it was devoid of primary imperfection. After all, primary imperfection is characteristic of the beginning of action. Therefore, only the earth that was created deserved the name “uncreated.” For as soon as she was created, she received a reason for imperfection before she became perfect.
After all, God accomplished all His deeds in a certain order: first he created the world from raw elements, and then, as it were, he sanctified it with decorations. Thus, God did not immediately fill the light with the brilliance of the sun, and did not immediately tame the darkness with the joy of the moon, and did not immediately decorate the sky with stars and constellations, and did not immediately populate the seas with animals, and did not immediately endow the earth itself with the ability to bear fruit. But first He gave it existence, and then filled it so that it would not remain empty. So, in any case, says Isaiah: “God... did not create it so that it would be empty, but so that they would live on it” (Isaiah 45.18). So, she had to achieve perfection after being simply created in the beginning. Meanwhile, she was invisible and unsettled. It is unsettled because it is invisible. And since it is inaccessible to sight, it is not well-appointed in other respects. She was invisible because she was still surrounded by waters, like a cover of birth fluid.
In the same way, our kindred flesh is born. Therefore, David sings like this: “The earth belongs to the Lord and all its abundance, the circle of the earth and all who inhabit it. He founded it on the seas and established it on the rivers” (Ps 23.1-2). After the waters were separated and filled the earth’s depressions, the dry land was exposed, which until then was covered with waters. From this moment it becomes visible, according to the word of God: “Let the waters be gathered into one let the dry land be visible" (Genesis 1.9). “Let it be visible,” He said, “and not: “Let it be.” For it was already created, but, being invisible, was waiting for the opportunity to become visible. The dry land, since it was supposed to appear after the separation of the liquid, is earth: “And God called the dry land earth” (Gen. 1.10), and not matter. And now, having reached perfection after this, the earth ceases to be considered unsettled from the moment God said: “Let the earth bring forth the former a herb that sows seed after its kind and after its likeness, and a fruitful tree that bears fruit, in which there is seed after its likeness” (Gen. 1.11).
And also: “Let the earth produce living creatures according to their kinds, cattle and creeping things and wild beasts... according to their kinds” (Gen. 1.24).
So, Divine Scripture has fulfilled its plan. For to that which it at first represented as invisible and unsettled, it gave visibility and perfection. After all, it was not matter that was invisible and unstructured, since in this case it would then have to become visible and perfect. So, I want to see matter if it has become visible. I want to get to know her, who has become perfect, in order to receive from her both the former herbal and fruitful tree, and to use the animals for my benefit and service.
But in reality there is no matter anywhere. And the earth - here it is in front of us. I see her, I enjoy her, after she has ceased to be invisible and unsettled. Isaiah speaks very clearly about it: “Thus says the Lord who made the heavens, that God who revealed the earth and created it” (Isaiah 45.18). Of course, He revealed the same one that He created. How did He show it? Of course, with His word: “Let the dry land be visible” (Gen. 1.9). Why does He command it to become visible, if not because it was not visible before? And so that not to leave it empty, making it visible. So, all this proves that the earth that we inhabit was created by God and shown by Him, and that there was no other earth in an unstructured and invisible state, except that which was both created and shown. Therefore, the expression: “The earth was invisible and unstructured” (Gen. 1.2) refers to the one that God created along with the heavens.
It seems that Hermogenes’ opinion is also favored by the following words: “And darkness was upon the face of the deep, and the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters” (Gen. 1.2), as if these mixed substances were proof of the existence of the Hermogenes chaotic mass. But such a clear division of the certain and distinct elements, distinguishing separately the darkness, the abyss, the Spirit of God and the water, allows us to decide that there is nothing either mixed or uncertain due to confusion. Moreover, when each of them is assigned a special position: darkness above the abyss. Spirit above the water, then the mixture of substances is denied and their special arrangement indicates their difference. Therefore, it would be extremely unreasonable to speak seriously about matter, which is represented as formless, that it is formless due to the many names of forms, without indicating what, in fact, constitutes the essence of mixture. For formless matter must in any case be represented as unique. After all, everything that is formless is, of course, uniform.
But everything that is mixed from different things is formless, and its only form, being a combination of many forms, thereby consists in the absence of form. But matter either had in itself those forms (species) in whose names it can be known (I mean darkness, the abyss, Spirit and water), or it did not. If it had, then how can you pass it off as formless? If it did not have it, then how can it be knowable?
However, one can also grasp the fact that, according to Scripture, God created in the beginning only heaven and earth, and nothing like that is said about the forms mentioned above. And since their creation is not said, they belong to uncreated matter. Let us also answer this picky reasoning. Divine Scripture would say quite enough if it introduced us only to the highest creations of God, heaven and earth, which, of course, also have their own dispensations (suggestus). For heaven and earth it was, first of all, darkness and the abyss, Spirit and water. The earth, of course, includes the abyss and darkness. After all, if the abyss is under the earth, and darkness is above the abyss, then, without a doubt, both darkness and the abyss are under the earth. And under the sky were the Spirit and the water. After all, if the water is above the earth that it covered, and the Spirit is above the water, then both the Spirit and the water are equally above the earth. And what was above the earth was, in any case, below the sky. And just as the earth lay on the abyss and darkness, so the sky lay on the Spirit and the water and embraced them.
There is nothing new in the fact that only the containing (as the sum of everything) is called, and by it the content is also understood (as its part). So, if I say: “The city built a theater and a circus; the stage, they say, was such and such, and there were statues over the canal, and an obelisk rose above everything,” then, if I had not said that these parts were built by the city, wouldn’t they have been built together with the circus and theater? Is it because I didn’t add that these parts were also built, that they were in those built objects that I spoke about above, and could be understood by the objects in which they were located? But let's leave this example as a human one. I will take another, more significant one, from Scripture itself. “God,” it says, “created man from... the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul” (Gen. 2.7). Here Scripture names the face of man, but does not say that it was created by God. After this, Scripture speaks of skin, bones, flesh, eyes, sweat and blood, without also indicating that all this was created by God. What will Hermogenes say to this?
Maybe the human members are also related to the mother, since, being created by God, they are not listed by name? Or were they also created during the creation of man? Likewise, the parts of heaven and earth were abyss and darkness, Spirit and water. If parts of a body are created, they are implied when the name of the body is given. No element can not be part of the element in which it is contained. And in the sky or in the earth all the elements are contained.
Hitherto I have given answers in accordance with the Scripture itself, since, at first glance, it here proves the creation of the bodies of heaven and earth alone. It, of course, knew that there are people who are capable of recognizing their parts from bodies alone, and therefore at the very beginning it spoke briefly. However, Scripture also foresaw stupid and cunning people who, disdaining tacit understanding, demanded special words for the creation of parts. Because of such people, Scripture also teaches in other places about the creation of separate parts. For example, we have Wisdom, which says: “I was born... before... the abyss” (Proverbs 8.24), so that we know that the abyss is also begotten, that is, produced, for we also produce children by giving birth to them. It does not matter whether the abyss is produced or born, since in both cases a beginning of being is attributed to it, which would not be attributed to it if matter were meant by it. The Lord Himself speaks about darkness through the mouth of Isaiah: “I am the one who created the light and created the darkness” (Isaiah 45.7).
About the Spirit - in the same way Amos: “He makes thunder and creates the wind and proclaims to people his Anointed One” (Am 4.13), showing that God created a spirit that was intended for the created earth, which hovered over the water - the manager, inspirer and life-giver of the universe. God is Spirit; but here the spirit does not mean, as some think, God Himself, for the water would not be able to support God. Here the same spirit is meant, from of which the winds are made, as Isaiah says: “For the spirit went out of Me, and I made every breath” (Isaiah 57.16). The same Wisdom says about water: “When He strengthened the springs that are under the sky, I was with Him as an artist” (cf. Proverbs 8.29–30).
So, when we prove that the mentioned parts were created by God (although in the Book of Genesis they are only named without mention of creation), the opposing side will most likely answer us: “Of course, they were created, but from matter. So the words of Moses - And darkness was over the deep, and the Spirit of God hovered over the waters - glorify matter. In other places of Scripture those parts are shown separately which are made of matter.” So, just as the earth was created from earth, so the abyss was created from the abyss, and darkness from darkness, and spirit and water from Spirit and water? But, as we said above [ch. 30 formless if it contained forms, so that other forms could be created from them. Unless they were not different, but arose from themselves, if indeed something that has the same names could not be different. But then God’s creation could have turned out to be useless, because something that already existed would have been created. It was more fitting for God to create what did not yet exist. So, I conclude.
If Moses wrote: “And darkness was upon the face of the deep, and the Spirit of God was upon the face of the waters” (Gen. 1:2), referring to matter, then (when in other places it was said that these forms were created by God) it should have been mentioned that they were created from the very matter that Moses had already spoken about. And if he meant precisely these forms and did not mean matter by them, then, I ask, where is it said about matter?
But while Hermogenes found matter among his colors - he could not find it in the Holy Scriptures - it is enough that the creation of everything by God is firmly established and the creation of everything from matter is not at all established. Even if it existed, we would believe that it was created by God. For we firmly hold that there is nothing unbegotten except God. This statement can always be doubted until, called to the judgment of the Scriptures, attempts to establish matter cease. To put it briefly and to the point: I find nothing created except what was created out of nothing. And if something is created from something else, then it comes from what was created. So, for example, from the earth - plants, fruits, livestock and even the human body; from water - swimming and flying animals. These kinds of “beginnings” of things produced from these beginnings I can call “matter.” But they themselves were created by God.
However, in the end, the fact that everything came from nothing can be convinced by the Divine plan, according to which everything will again turn into nothing. “For the heavens will be rolled up like a scroll of books” (Isaiah 34.4) and will never again be together with the earth from which it was created at the beginning of the universe. “Heaven and earth will pass away,” says the Lord (Matthew 24.35). “The first heaven and the first earth passed away, and there was no place found for them” (Rev 21.1). For what has an end, then, of course, loses its place. So David says: “The works... of Your... hands... the heavens, and they will perish.” But if He changes them like clothing, and they are replaced (cf. Ps 101.26-27), then the change will be destruction for the previous state that they they will lose when they change. “And the stars will fall from the sky, just as a fig tree, shaken by a strong wind, drops... its... unripe fruits” (Rev 6.13). “The mountains will melt like wax at the presence of the Lord” (Ps 97.5) when He rises to overthrow the earth. “Likewise,” He says, “I will... dry up the swamps, and they will seek water and will not find it; also there will be no sea” (cf. Isa 2.19, 42.15, 41.17).
If anyone thinks that these words need to be understood differently, in a spiritual way, he still will not be able to eliminate the truth of the future: everything will be as it is written. For if these are prototypes (figurae), they must necessarily mean what exists, and not what does not exist. For only that which itself has the property of being used for such a comparison is suitable for comparison.
Now I return to the statement that everything was created from nothing in order to return to nothing. From the eternal, that is, from matter, God would not create anything mortal. From the great He would not have created the small, for Whom it is more fitting to produce the great from the small, that is, from the transitory - the eternal, which He promises to our body. And He decided to place this guarantee of His strength and His power in us, so that we would believe that He even raised the universe from nothing, as if dead, and made it existing from non-existent.
Although it would not be necessary to discuss the other states of matter, for first it would be good to establish that it exists at all, we will proceed from the fact that it supposedly exists, so that it becomes all the more clear that it does not exist, since its other states do not exist, and thereby Hermogenes recognizes his contradictions. “At first glance,” he says, “it seems to us that matter is corporeal. When examined by the “correct mind,” it turns out to be neither corporeal nor incorporeal.” What kind of “correct reason” is this, which does not communicate anything correct, that is, nothing beyond doubt? For, if I am not mistaken, every thing must be either corporeal or incorporeal (for I can admit that something can be incorporeal, but only in relation to substances, while the substance itself is the body of every thing). And besides the corporeal and the incorporeal, without a doubt, there is nothing third. But now let there be a third, which was discovered by this “correct reason” of Hermogenes, representing matter as neither corporeal nor incorporeal. But where is it? What is it like?
What is it called? How is it described? How is it understood? Is it the only thing that “reason” declared, that matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeal?
But here he says something to the contrary. Or, perhaps, Hermogenes encountered a completely different “mind”, declaring that matter is partly corporeal, partly incorporeal? So now, in order for matter to be neither one nor the other, it must be considered both? Now it will be both corporeal and incorporeal, contrary to the voice of the aforementioned “correct reason”, which is completely unaware of its words, as, indeed, is the other, newly-minted “reason”. For he wants the corporeal in matter to be that from which bodies are formed, and the incorporeal to be the uncreated movement. “After all, if,” he says, “only a body existed, then nothing incorporeal, that is, movement, could appear in it. And if matter were completely incorporeal, then no body would arise from it.” How much more correct is this “reason”! But if you, Hermogenes, draw your lines as correctly as you reason, then there is hardly a painter more reckless than you.
For who will agree with you to consider motion the second part of substance - it is not substantial, since it is not corporeal. It is rather an attribute (accidens) of substance and body; both action and impact, both sliding and falling, and movement. After all, if something is moved by something else or by itself, its action is movement and, of course, is not a part of substance, as you are trying to assert, turning incorporeal movement into incorporeal substance? matter. In the end, everything moves either by itself, like living beings, or thanks to something else, like inanimate ones. However, we will not call either a person or a stone both corporeal and incorporeal, although they have both body and movement, but we attribute to everything one form of one and only corporeality, which is characteristic of substance. And if they are characterized by incorporeality or their actions, or exposure to actions, or activity, or aspirations, then we do not consider these to be their constituent parts.
So, what is the use of representing motion as a constituent part of matter, if it does not refer to the substance of matter, but only to its properties? And if you wanted to imagine matter as immobile, would immobility really be its second part? Thus, motion is not part of matter. But we’ll probably talk about movement somewhere else.
For I see that you are again returning to that “mind” of yours, which usually did not tell you anything reliable. After all, just as you introduce “neither corporeal nor incorporeal matter,” now you add that it is neither good nor bad, and prove it in the same way. “After all, if,” you say, “she were good, then, having always been such, she would not require a Divine dispensation. And if she were evil by nature, she would not accept the transition to the better. And God would not be able to apply anything of His good fortune to her, since such is her nature, and would work in vain.” These are all your words. You should remember them in another place and not try to introduce anything contrary to them. But since we have already discussed above the ambiguity of good and evil in relation to matter, now I will answer only this one statement and proof of yours. I don’t want to say that here you should assert anything definite: they say, matter is either good, or evil, or something third!
But I would like to note that here too you do not adhere to what you proclaimed earlier, that is, that matter is neither good nor evil. You refuse this statement of yours when you say: “If she were good, she would not require her dispensation by God.” Thus you declare her evil. And when you add: “If she were evil by nature, she would not have allowed the transition to the better,” you imagine her to be good.
So you have established that matter is within the limits of good and evil when you declared that it is neither good nor evil. But in order to refute the evidence with which you are trying to confirm your opinion, I will also put the following against you: if matter were always good, then why wouldn’t it want to become even better? That which does not strive from good to become better does not really desire good. In the same way, if matter were by nature evil, then why could it not be transformed by God, as the more powerful? How can He who is able to transform even the nature of stones into the sons of Abraham (cf. Matt. 3:9)? Therefore, you not only equate God with matter, but even subordinate to it the One by whom the nature of matter could be overcome and transformed into a better one. But you do not want matter to be evil by nature here either, and you will deny that you have admitted this in other places.
I will speak about the position of matter in the same way as about the measure of its movement, in order to show your error. You subordinate matter to God and, in any case, give it a place that you place below God. Therefore, matter is located in some place. And if in a place, then within a place. If it is inside a place, then the place within which it is located limits it. If it is limited, then it has a boundary line, which you, since you are still an artist, must recognize as the boundary of every thing whose boundary line it is. So, matter will not be limitless, which, while it remains in a certain place, is limited by it, and, while it is limited, endures it as a limit. But you want it to be infinite and you say: “And it is infinite because it always exists.” And if one of your students asked for an explanation, you, of course, would want them to consider matter infinite in time, and not in bodily extension.
However, in your opinion, in fact it is physically limitless, physically immeasurable and indescribable; this is clear from the following words: “Therefore,” you say, “not all of it is created, but only parts of it.” Consequently, it is unlimited in space, and not in time. And you expose yourself to error by making it limitless in space, but at the same time attributing to it a place and confining it within the place and the boundary line of the place. I don’t know why God didn’t create it entirely, either as a result of impotence or envy. So, I am looking for that very half of it, which was not created entirely, in order to find out what it is like in its entirety. After all, God had to reveal her as an example of antiquity for the glory of creation.
But if we assume that matter is limited (as you correctly imagine) by its changes and transformations, then it will be both comprehensible, “since it,” you say, “was created by God,” and divisible, since it is impermanent and changeable. “For its changes,” you say, “show its divisibility.” But here you go beyond your own statements, which you applied to the Face of God (Persona Dei), arguing that God did not create it from Himself. For He who is eternal and abides forever and is therefore immutable and indivisible cannot fall into pieces. If matter is considered equally eternal, having neither beginning nor end, then it cannot undergo either division or change for the same reason as God. Placed with Him in eternity, she must inevitably share with Him the properties, laws, and states of eternity. Likewise, when you say: “Any part of it has everything that is characteristic of any other part of it, so that the whole is known in parts,” you, of course, mean those parts that originated from it, which are visible to us today.
So, how do they possess the properties of all other (and, therefore, previous) parts, if those that we see today are different from the previous ones?
Further, you assert that matter has been transformed for the better - from the worst, of course - and you believe that the best carries within itself an example of the worst. It was disorderly, but now it has been arranged, and do you want it to be possible to get an idea of the disorder from the arrangement? One thing cannot be a mirror image of another thing if there is no similarity between them. No one, sitting at the barber's, saw a donkey instead of himself in the mirror, except the one who thinks that the well-appointed and decorated matter in our universe corresponds to the shapeless and unkempt. What is formless in the world today and what, on the contrary, is formed in matter so that the world becomes a mirror image of matter? The Greeks call the world an ornament; how can it be an image of unadorned matter and how can you assert that the world (as a whole) is known from parts? After all, in this whole, of course, there will be something that has not undergone transformation.
Consequently, this unsettled, mixed and disordered cannot be cognized in the delimited, well-ordered and ordered, which does not deserve to be called parts of matter, since due to the change that has occurred it has lost its former appearance.
I'm going back to the movement to show how unreliable you are in everything. You say: “The movement of matter was disordered, mixed and violent.” For comparison, you offer a pot boiling and splashing in all directions. But how can you say otherwise in another place? When you want to portray matter as neither good nor evil, you say: “Consequently, matter, being below and possessing uniform motion, does not incline too much either towards good or towards evil.” If the movement is uniform, then it is not violent, does not bubble, as in a boiling pot, but ordering and moderation occurs: it naturally stays between good and evil, not leaning in either direction and oscillating, as they say, “at the midpoint.” This is not restlessness, this is not confusion and disorder, but moderation, restraint and uniformity of movement, which does not deviate in one direction or the other. It is clear that if it turned this way and that, or more in one direction, it would deserve the reproach of disorder, unevenness and turbulence.
Further, if the movement leaned neither towards good nor towards evil, it certainly took place between good and evil. And from here it becomes clear that matter is prone to limitation. Therefore, her movement, inclined neither to good nor to evil (for it turned to neither one nor the other), was limited to both. But when you say that the motion of matter did not tend towards one or the other, you posit good and evil in a certain place. After all, matter, which was in a certain place, did not deviate either here or there, and did not deviate to places in which good and evil were located. And if you claim that good and evil are in some place, that is, you make them spatial, then you thereby make them corporeal. For what is in any place must first of all have corporeality. The incorporeal does not have its place unless, being in the body, it coincides with the body itself. Not inclining towards either good or evil, matter did not incline towards them as corporeal or spatial. So, you are mistaken if you think that good and evil are not substances.
After all, everything that you give a place to, you turn into substances. And you indicate the place by making the movement of matter dependent on both areas - good and evil.
You've scattered everything pretty much, otherwise on closer inspection it would have become obvious how contradictory everything is. But I collect and compare what is scattered. You assert that the motion of matter was disordered, and you add that it tends toward formlessness; and then, in another place, that she desires to be ordered by God. Does the one who strives for formlessness want to obtain form? Or does she who desires to receive form strive for formlessness? You do not want to seem like someone who equates God with matter, and, moreover, admits that it has a commonality with God. You say: “It cannot be that she does not have something in common with God, since He adorns her.” However, if she had something in common with God, she, being through community a part of God, would not need Him to adorn her, unless God Himself could receive adornment from matter, having something in common with it. But if you believe that there was something present in matter, as a result of which God had to decorate it, then you thereby subject God to necessity.
And what you make common between them is that they move by themselves and always move. Why do you think that matter is less significant than God? Full divinity requires the following: freedom and an eternity of movement. But God moves proportionately, and matter disproportionately. However, both One and the other are Divine due to free and eternal movement. However, you allow matter more: it can move in a way that is not allowed to God.
In addition, I will note the following about movement. Comparing matter with the contents of the pot, you say: “The movement of matter before being put in order was as follows: mixed, restless, elusive to the eye due to excessive seething.” Then you add: “The movement of matter stopped so that God could bring it into order, and the disordered movement became perceptible thanks to its slowness.” Above you attribute turbulence to the movement, here – slowness. Notice how often you change your mind about the nature of matter. Above you say: “If matter were by nature evil, it would not allow transformation for the better, God would not be able to put it in order and therefore would work in vain.” Consequently, you expressed two thoughts here: matter by nature is not evil and its nature cannot be changed by God. However, completely forgetting about this, for some reason you say: “But as soon as she received a dispensation from God and was adorned, she abandoned her nature.” But if it was transformed into good, then, of course, it was transformed from evil.
And if, as a result of God’s improvement of her, she renounced her nature, then she renounced the nature of evil. Consequently, before her improvement she was evil by nature, and after her transformation she was able to leave her nature.
But now I need to show you how you think God worked. Here you are completely moving away from the philosophers, but also from the prophets. For the Stoics teach that God permeates matter like honey through a honeycomb. And you say: “God created the world not by permeating matter, but only by his appearance and approach to it. In the same way, everything beautiful acts by its mere appearance, and by its mere approach it acts as a magnet.” But what does God, who creates the world, have in common with beauty, which wounds the heart, or a magnet, which attracts iron? After all, although God appeared to matter, He did not wound it, like beauty does the heart; although he approached, he did not connect with her, like a magnet with iron. However, consider that your examples are suitable. Of course, if God created the world from matter by appearing and approaching it, then, of course, He created it from the moment when He appeared and from the moment when He approached. Consequently, if He had not created before this moment, then He did not appear to her and did not approach her. But who will believe that God did not appear to matter, even as being consubstantial with Him in eternity?
And who will believe that God is removed from her, Who, according to our teaching, is everywhere and appears everywhere, to Whom, according to Daniel, even inanimate and incorporeal creatures sing praises? How large is the space that so separated God from matter that He could neither appear nor approach it before the creation of the world? He probably came to her from distant countries when he first decided to appear and approach her.
On the other hand, the prophets and apostles also do not teach that the world was created by God only by His appearance and approach to matter, because they did not name matter at all. They report that in the beginning Wisdom was created, the beginning of the paths to His works. Then the Word appeared, through Whom everything was created and without Whom nothing was created. Finally, the heavens were established by His Word and all their powers by His Spirit (Ps 33:6). This is the right hand of God, these are both His hands, which He labored and raised. “The heavens are the work... of... Thy hands,” says the Scripture, “with which He measured.” He measured the heavens with His hands, and the earth with the palm of His hand (Ps. 101.26; Is. 40.12). Therefore, do not flatter God that He produced such numerous and significant substances with His one glance and His approach alone, and did not create them with His own strength. For Jeremiah says this: “God, creating the earth in His own wisdom, and... spreading out the heavens... with His... understanding” (Jer. 51.15).
Gen 2.2). He did both of these things according to His will. If He created this world only by His appearance and approach, then did He really, having created, cease to appear and cease to approach? On the contrary, as soon as the world was created. God even began to appear and be present everywhere more often.
So, you see how the universe came into being thanks to the activity of God, who created the earth with His own powers, arranged the universe with Wisdom and spread out the sky with Reason; He did not just appear and approach, but used His great abilities: Wisdom, Strength, Reason, Word, Spirit, Power. He would not have needed all this if He had created the world only by His appearance and approach. All this belongs to Himself, and not to some sensory-perceptible matter. What belongs to Himself is invisible and, according to the Apostle, has been known from His creations since the creation of the world. For who has known the Mind of the Lord, about which the Apostle exclaims: Oh, the depth of wealth and wisdom! How incomprehensible are His judgments and mysterious are His ways! (Rom 11.33)? What else could this mean if not that everything was created from nothing? All this can neither be comprehended nor explored except through God alone. This cannot be comprehended in any other way, that is, if it is comprehended and studied from matter.
So, just as there is no doubt that no matter existed (if only because it is not appropriate for it to be “such” as it is represented), it is equally obvious that everything was created by God out of nothing. Perhaps, Hermogenes, describing the state of matter as he himself was in - unsettled, mixed, stormy, with dangerous, rapid and seething movement, presented an example of his art - depicted himself.
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