The third refutation of the iconoclasts
Третье опровержение иконоборцев
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Some of the most important works in defense of icon veneration and refutation of the heresy of iconoclasm are 3 short treatises by St. Theodore Studite "Refutations of the Iconoclasts" ("Antirrhetics").
The treatise "The Third Refutation of the Iconoclasts" (circa 818) was written to refute the position of the iconoclastic patriarch John VII Grammar.
In 4 chapters of the work, the following theses of heretics are refuted: about the depiction of Christ in bodily form (chapter 1); that the Christ described has an artificial image (chapter 2); about the one and indivisible worship of Christ (chapter 3); about the unity of likeness and worship in Christ the prototype and His icon (chapter 4).
St. Theodore emphasizes that the possibility of depicting Christ is inextricably linked with the dogma of His true Incarnation. The denial of icon veneration, in his opinion, leads to heresies that belittle or deny the fullness of the human nature of Christ (for example, docetism), and thereby undermine the basis of Christian salvation. The icon of Christ is irrefutable evidence of His real coming in the flesh.
The author explains in detail the fundamental difference between worship, which is due only to God, and veneration, which is given to holy icons as images, but at the same time refers to the prototype. The veneration given to the image is a bridge to the glorified person depicted in the icon.
St. Theodore the Studite proves that the image has a real, although non-identical, connection with the prototype. Through the icon, grace-filled communication occurs with those who are depicted on it, which makes the icon not just an illustration, but also a means of communication with God.
The author cites the testimony of the Church Fathers, showing that icon veneration is not a new introduction, but is an integral part of the apostolic and patristic Tradition. He also touches on the negative spiritual and ecclesiastical consequences of the iconoclastic heresy, which not only distorts the teaching of Christ, but also deprives believers of grace.
* Title of the work in Greek: Αόγοι αντιρρητικοί τρεις κατα εικονομάχων.
* Title of the work in Latin: Antirrhetici adversus iconomachos.
It is said about David, the writer of psalms, that he defeated the foreigner Goliath with one blow of a stone (1 Sam. 17:49–51). I, inexperienced in the struggle, adding this third blow of the word to the two previous ones, wish to defeat the foreign wisdom of the iconoclasts, even if this attempt was beyond my strength. When discussing this subject, I will use some conclusions that are not distinguished by skillful weaving according to the rules of Aristotle’s science, as well as idle talk, but based on simpler speech, on the power of truth. And perhaps this work will turn out to be quite useful for readers: for those in the know, it can give rise to a wiser study, and for the ignorant, it presents some basic principles to help the correct view, which is now very much suffering from the raging iconoclastic heresy. Since a clear separation is pleasing to the reader, I will divide the word into four chapters, and in each chapter I will present provisions aimed at the same goal.
1. On the depiction of Christ in bodily form.
2. That the Christ described has an artificial image in which He is contemplated, just as [the image itself is contemplated] in Christ.
3. That the worship given to both – Christ and His image – is one and inseparable.
4. That Christ, being the prototype of His image, has the same likeness and the same worship.
Chapter I. On the depiction of Christ in bodily form
1. General concepts (κοιναί ἔννοιαι) are equally recognized by everyone. So, for example, when the sun is above the earth, it is day and not night. Also: a rational animal, mortal, capable of thinking and knowledge is a person 1. And one more thing: every body that has a triple dimension and density, which receives color and touch, is describable. How does it seem to you, dear ones? Is this the body that received the Word of the Father made man? If we admit this, then we must also agree that in any case it exists and is describable. And if we reject this, then there will be no difference in this compared to how to say: when the sun is above the earth, then it is not day, but night; or: a rational animal, mortal, capable of thinking and knowledge - not a person. But thinking and speaking in this way is characteristic only of the insane. It is unwise to talk with crazy people. Therefore, we do not [address] a single word to those who are voluntarily deaf, but only to those who have hearing to hear.
2. [Col. 392] Vision takes precedence over hearing both in place [in the human body] and in [time] of sensory perception. After all, usually everyone first sees something, and then proceeds to listen to what he saw. Isaiah, for example, saw the Lord sitting on a throne of glory, surrounded by and glorified by six-winged Seraphim (Isaiah 6:1). Likewise, Ezekiel sees the chariot of God, the Cherubim (Ezekiel 10:1). And the divine disciples first saw the Lord, and then wrote the word [the Gospel about Him]. If this is the case and you, as you begin to investigate more precisely, to the extent you can find written evidence (λογογραφία), leading in conclusion to an image (ἱστορία), then it is absolutely necessary, in order to destroy the image of Christ [on icons], to first destroy the written evidence of Him. As soon as the second [image] is drawn, then the first must first be drawn.
3. If indescribability (ἀπερίγραπτον) is a property of the essence of God, then describability (περίγραπτον) is characteristic of the essence of man; Christ has both 2 and, therefore, is known from two properties related to [these two] natures. And is it not blasphemous to say that He is indescribable in body as well as in spirit, since with the destruction of His describability His human nature is also destroyed?
4. In those objects whose properties (ἰδιότητες) are not identical, the essences [will be] different. The property of the Deity (ἰδίωμα θεότητος) is indescribability, incorporeality, absence of external appearance and form. [The property] of humanity (ἀνθρωπότητος) is describability, tangibility, measurability of three kinds. If Christ consists of two natures, then, of course, He is both indescribable and describable. If He has only one of two properties, then it means that He would be of only one essence, the property of which He has - and this [to think] is impious.
5. If indescribability destroys describability, as if both were not combined in Christ, then it is absolutely necessary that intangibility destroys tangibility, as well as everything else that is opposite in each of His two natures. If this is impious, then it would be impious to say that He is indescribable by virtue of His Incarnation.
6. If Christ is indescribable, then He is not subject to suffering, for dispassion is on a par with indescribability. But Christ endured suffering, as Scripture says (1 Pet. 4:1); therefore, He is describable.
The sayings the Lord created Me, the beginning of His ways into His works (Prov. 8:22) and before all the hills He gave birth to Me (Prov. 8:25) serve as proof of two natures in Christ - indescribable and describable.
7. If the saying the Lord created Me, the beginning of His ways in His works, refers to humanity, and the words before all the hills give birth to Me speak about the deity, then it is necessary that the One who says this, as a created one, should be describable, and as an uncreated one should be indescribable. [Col. 393] And if, as a result of the describability of one, the other could become describable, that is, with the created - the uncreated, then it would be absolutely necessary for one to pass from indescribability into describability, and the other from describability into indescribability, and each of the two natures would mutually transfer one to the other what is characteristic (οἰκζῖον) of it and would be deprived his inherent natural and incommunicable 3 private properties (φυσικόν καὶ ἀκοινωνητον ἰδίωμα), and, finally, none of the natures would have been preserved in Christ in reality due to an empty transformation - and this is absurd.
Other - through reduction to the absurd
8. If we understand the saying that the Lord created Me, the beginning of His ways, not in the sense that the Word changed into flesh as a result of the union of divinity and humanity that took place, but in the fact that [the Word] became flesh, remaining in the greatness of the Divinity inherent in Him, then in the same way, when we say that Christ is described, we believe that He did not turn into describability, since He is God, but only appeared like us, because he became a man. And if [as a result of] description [indescribability] turned into describability 4 , then it means that the nature of the Divine changed in the act of perceiving the flesh, and this is absurd.
9. To say the Lord created Me means the same as saying: “The Lord gave Me a shape.” If, due to the fact that it is not written “The Lord created Me” or “The Lord clothed Me with a body,” it cannot be said that He did not do this, then in the same way, due to the fact that it is written that the Lord created Me, everyone who wants to think correctly should understand the same thing with the fact that “He gave Me the outline.” For creation, even for those who understand little, is a property of [limitation and] 5 outline.
10. If Christ, as you say, is indescribable, then He is indescribable not only in divinity, but also in humanity; therefore, humanity is [in your opinion] Divinity, for in whatever objects the properties are identical, the nature is the same. But [Christ] truly consists of two natures, and therefore of two properties; therefore, by denying describability, human nature can also be destroyed.
11. If every image (εἰκών) is an image of either a form (μορφῆς), or a figure (σχήματος), or a type (εἴδους), as well as a color (χρώματος), Christ [had] this, since, according to Scripture, the image of a servant (μορφήν δούλου) took on and in appearance (ἐν ὁμοιώματι) becoming in the likeness of men, becoming like a man (Phil. 2:7), and had a dishonest and humble appearance [more than all the sons of men] (Isa. 53:2-3), and this all means body, which means He is depicted in this outline of His likeness (ἐν τῇ περιγραφῇ της ὁμοιώσεως καὶ αὐτοῦ).
12. Just as indescribability, intangibility, and formlessness belong to the properties of one order, so describability, tangibility, external form, and everything else that is opposed to one another belong to one order. [Col. 396] Therefore, if Christ is indescribable, since He is a man, then He should be called both intangible and formless, since both are of the same order. If this is absurd and cannot be separated one from the other, just as indescribability [cannot be separated] from intangibility and formlessness, then it is necessary that the tangible be also describable - so that, due to His indescribability, we do not recognize Him as intangible (ἀφηλάφητον), and this is wicked.
13. There are many types of description: volume, quantity, quality, position, places, times, external forms of the body; but in relation to God [all] this is rejected, since there is no Divine in any of it. Christ, having become human, finds himself within the boundaries of this. For the immense one was conceived in a virgin’s womb; infinite – perceived a certain value 6; Divine - takes on a certain appearance; [being] out of position - standing, sitting and reclining at the table; superspatial – placed in a manger (Luke 2:7); existing before [all] time - becomes twelve years old as he advances in age (Luke 2:42); having no image (ἀσχημάτιστος) was contemplated in the form of a man (ἐν τῷ σχηματι ἀνθρώπου); incorporeal, He, having taken on a body, said to His disciples: take, eat, this is My body (1 Cor. 11:24). So, One and the Same is both describable and indescribable: indescribable according to Divinity, but describable according to humanity, although the most wicked iconoclasts do not want [to admit this].
Other - according to the Gospel comparison
14. If no one has ever seen God, as the Only Begotten Son of the Father, He Himself, being God, revealed (John 1:18), then how does He say to the blind man who received his sight: you have seen Him, and He speaks to you (John 9:37)? So, One and the same is both visible and invisible, but He is invisible by indescribable nature, since that which is indescribable is invisible, but we see by what is described to humanity, because apparently what is described is true.
Objection from the Iconoclasts
15. If Christ miraculously took on the flesh in his own Hypostasis, then it is indescribable, as denoting not any [individual person], but man in general. How is it possible for it to be tangible and depicted in various colors? Empty speech and false invention.
If Christ miraculously accepted the flesh in His own Hypostasis and it in Him, as you say, is indescribable, as denoting not any individual, but a person in general (τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον), then how did it exist in Him? After all, general properties (τά καθόλου) have existence in individuals (ἐν ἀτόμοις), as, for example, humanity exists in Peter and Paul and in the rest [representatives] of the same genus 7 . And since individual individuals do not exist, then man in general is destroyed. [Col. 397] Therefore, humanity would not exist in Christ, Humanity if it did not exist in Him, as if in some (ὡς ἐν τινὶ) [individual person]. It remains for [you] to say that He was incarnated in representation. But because of this, He could neither be tangible nor be depicted with various colors. But this is the reasoning of the [heretic] Manichaeans.
16. General properties (τά καθόλου) are contemplated by the mind and thinking, and particular ones (τά καθ’ ἕκαστα) - by the eyes that see what is perceived by the senses. So, if Christ had perceived our common nature, which is not contemplated in an individual person (ἐν ἀτόμῳ), then He would have been visible only by the mind and tangible only by thinking. But He says to Thomas: You believed because you saw Me; Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed (John 20:29). And again: reach out your hand and place it in My side; and do not be an unbeliever, but a believer (John 20:27); He compared what is subject to the senses with what is perceived by the senses. So, Christ is accessible to perception by the external senses—touchable and visible with bodily eyes, and therefore He is describable.
17. When speaking about a person in general, I mean the general essence. By adding “some” (τίς) [person], I mean a person (ὑπόστασις), a specially existing being of the designated [person] and, so to speak, an outline made up of certain properties by which those participating in the same nature, such as, for example, Peter and Paul, differ from each other. So, Christ, having told the Jews and now you seek to kill Me (John 8:40), could have pointed to man in general, if He had only said Man. But He added the same truth to your verbs and thereby pointed to His own Hypostasis, or Person. For the word izhe (ὅς) in its meaning is equal to the word “some” (τίς). Therefore, if Christ also assumed a general nature, then, of course, such a nature as is truly contemplated in the individual [individual man] (ἐν ἀτόμω); and this is the possibility of His describability.
18. Man in general is a common noun 8 (προσηγορικὸν ὄνομα); if someone [is called], for example, Peter or Paul, then this is a proper name (τὸ κύριον). Together with his own name, he can also be called a common [or common noun] (καθόλου) name. For Paul is also called a man, since he has properties in common with individuals of the same species; since he is distinguished by hypostasis 9, he is called Paul. Therefore, if Christ, having become man, was called in Scripture only God and man, then it means that He perceived only our common nature, regarding which it had already been proven that if it is not contemplated in an individual person, then it does not exist. But Gabriel says to the Virgin: and behold, you will conceive in your womb and give birth to a Son, and you will call His name Jesus (Luke 1:31). Consequently, Christ is called not only a common noun, but also a proper name, which distinguishes Him by 10 hypostatic features (τοῖς ὑποστατικοῖς ἰδιώμασιν) from other people; as a result of this, He is described.
19. If, as you say, Christ does not mean an individual [man] (οὐ τὸν τινά), but man in general, then how does He say to His disciples: Who do people say that I, the Son of Man, am (Matthew 16:13)? [Col. 400] Consequently, He is one of people like us, although [at the same time] God. One of the Trinity. Just as in the latter respect He differs from the Father and the Holy Spirit by filial properties (τῷ ὑϊκῷ ἰδιώματι), so in the first He differs from all people by personal [hypostatic] properties (τοῖς ὑποστατικοῖς ἰδιώμασιν) and therefore we will describe.
20. If, as you say, Christ does not mean an individual person, but man in general, then how does He say to the Jews: whom are you looking for? They answered him: Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus says to them: Is it I (John 18:4–5)? So, who Christ is can be seen from His own name - Jesus of Nazareth. If He is someone (τίς), then He is describable, since He is characterized by personal properties.
21. Objects of the same kind in relation to essence constitute one thing, hypostatically (ὑποστατικῶς) 11 they differ from each other, that is, such and such an object exists and such and such an object exists. Therefore, if Christ were not a separate person (οὐ τὸν τινά), but signified, as you say, man in general, then he would not be different from another person. How, however, He says to Peter: therefore the sons are free; but, so that we don’t tempt them, go to the sea, throw a fishing rod, and take the first fish that comes along, and when you open its mouth, you will find a statir; take it and give it to them for Me and for yourself (Matthew 17:26–27)? So, Christ differs from Peter and, paying the didrachm in the same way, can equally be described as denoting a separate, special person, although He assumed a common essence.
22. If the Word took human nature into its own Hypostasis, which is invisible and has no external image, then if It were depicted by means of an outline, another Person would be introduced into the Hypostasis of Christ. To preach the duality of Persons in Christ is impious and in accordance with the heresy of Nestorius.
Resolution of this objection
If we were to say that the flesh received by the Word has its own hypostasis, this objection would be plausible. But since we, in accordance with church teaching, confess that the Hypostasis of the Word was the common Hypostasis of both natures 12 in which human nature received its hypostatic being 13 with properties (ἰδιωμάτων) separating it from other [creatures] of the same kind, it is natural that we can call the same Hypostasis of the Word indescribable in nature Deities and described
in relation to the essence corresponding to us 14, which has existence not in a separately existing and not in a specially described person, in addition to the Hypostasis of the Word, but in this very Hypostasis, so that [human] nature does not find itself outside the hypostasis (ἀνυπόστατος); in it [that is, in the Hypostasis of the Word], as in a separate Person, it is contemplated and described.
23. If the iconoclasts, in order not to introduce another person into the Hypostasis of Christ, began to say that She is indescribable in humanity, then there would be an absolute necessity for them to recognize the one nature of the Word (μίαν φύσιν Αόγου), [Col. 401] united from two natures and indescribable, due to the fact that one of the properties (ιδιότης) [that is, a property of human nature] has disappeared; but this is consistent with the opinion of the acephalians 15 and Apollinaris 16.
24. If the iconoclasts, in order not to introduce another person into the Hypostasis of Christ, began to say that She is indescribable in humanity, then it means that He did not perceive humanity truly, but in the likeness and image of the flesh (ἐν ὁμοιώματι καὶ σχήματι σαρκὸς); and this is the teaching of the Montanists 17. If He truly accepted humanity, as He confesses, then the Hypostasis of Christ is describable - not according to the deity, Whom no one has ever seen (cf. 1 John 4:12), but according to the humanity in Her (Hypostasis), contemplated in Christ. Otherwise, how could He be a Mediator between God and people (cf. 1 Tim. 2:5), without preserving intact the properties of each of the two natures of which He consists?
25. “Where” (ποῦ) means the place to which the body is limited. Not only the body is describable, but also the place surrounding it, since only that which, as unlimited, is outside space, is indescribable. Therefore, if Christ is indescribable, then He not only is not a body, but is also outside of space. How does He Himself say: the bread that I will give is My flesh (John 6:51)? And again, to Andrei and another disciple, who asked Him: where do you live? (John 1:38), He answered: He said to them: go and see. They went, says [the evangelist], and saw where He lived (John 1:39). So, we describe Christ, since he took on a body, remains at home, returns home and leaves home.
Other. There is an apparent contradiction [of the describability of Christ] in relation to His indescribability, since Scripture says: you have heard the voice of His words, but you have not seen an image except the voice (Deut. 4:12)
26. If Moses says about the God of all: you have heard the voice of His words, and you have not seen an image except a voice (Deut. 4:12), and Isaiah, in turn, says: I have seen Him, and not in the name of appearance or kindness, but His appearance is dishonorable, more humble than all the sons of men (Isa. 53:2-3), then how does this agree with one another, unless one contradicts the other?
In both places we are obviously talking about the same thing: one denies that the Divinity has likeness, since the Divinity is invisible and therefore unlike; another asserts that the same Lord, having taken the form of a servant (Phil. 2:7), was seen in an image (ἐν εἴδει) similar to ours. And as a result of this, He is describable in body, although in deity He is indescribable.
Otherwise - in interrogative form, through reduction to the absurd 18
27. If Christ is indescribable, and Isaiah says about Him: a man who is in the plague and knows to endure illness (Is. 53:3), then I ask you: is that which received the blow a body or incorporeal? If it is incorporeal, then it means that it is a ghost of the spirit; [Col. 404] if the body, then how is it indescribable when it is characterized by three dimensions and density and has the ability to receive wounds?
28. If Christ is indescribable, then how does He Himself say: I put My cloaks on wounds and My cheeks on blows, but I did not turn My face away from the cold of spitting (Isa. 50:6)? All these are properties of describability: the back is scourged, the cheeks are subject to blows, the face is subject to spitting. So, if He truly suffered, then the one who says that He is indescribable is lying.
29. If Christ is indescribable, how can He Himself say: I have dug my hands and my nose. Have you cut up all my bones (Ps. 21:17–18)? The indescribable cannot have such a nature that it would be possible to pierce or count bones. However, He says that His hands were indeed pierced and the bones were numbered; and the affirmation of this is the recognition of describability.
Other – for philosophical consideration
30. Line – a length without latitude, enclosed between two points; from it the outline begins. The figure (σχήμα) consists of at least three lines; from it [is made] a body formed from various figures and limited by space. So, the indescribable is alien [to all this] and has no relation even to a point, much less to a figure, space and body. Consequently, if Christ is indescribable, then He will turn out to be neither in a certain external image, nor in space, much less in the body. But in appearance He became like a man, according to the words of Scripture (Phil. 2:7); He was limited by space, living in Nazareth, and became flesh, as the evangelist says (Matthew 2:23; John 1:14); therefore, He is describable.
Other – from comparison with the Gospel
31. If Christ is indescribable, then how can the Forerunner say: behold the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world (John 1:29). The indescribable cannot be seen, much less pointed with a finger. If Christ was subject to this, then He was within the boundaries of the outline, as if depicted by a finger. So, let us describe Christ.
Other, given in the form of bewilderment
32. If Christ is indescribable, then He would not consist of two natures - deity and humanity, since He would not have the property of one [of the two], since describability is characteristic of humanity. If Christ consists of two natures, then how is it that He, having [these] natures, does not have their properties?
Different - compared to the heresy of the theopaschites.
33. If it is impious to assert that the Divinity suffered along with the flesh due to the fact that Christ was crucified according to the flesh, for this is the teaching of the theopaschites, 19 then it is equally impious to say that, due to the describability of the flesh, the Divinity is also describable with it, for [this is the teaching] of the iconoclasts, which is all the more impious because the flesh is closer to the Divine by natural unity 20 than the relation to the flesh of its drawn shadow.
An objection, as it were, from the iconoclasts
34. If Christ [consists] of two natures, then how can you, when speaking about depicting Him, depict something other than what He consists of, if only your speech is true? Since in one of the two an error is made, because the indescribability of the Divine nature does not lie in human describability, it means that to depict Christ is impious 21 .
With any image, it is not the nature of [the object] that is depicted, but [its] hypostasis 22 (ὑπόστασις). For how could nature be depicted, which was not visible in hypostasis? 23 For example, Peter is not depicted in the sense that he is a rational being, a mortal, capable of thinking and knowing, 24 since this defines not only Peter, but also Paul, and John, and everyone else of the same species, but is depicted only to the extent that he, together with the general definition (τοῦ κοινοῦ ὅρου), differs from other people, having some particular features (ἰδιώματά τινά), such as: an aquiline or blunt nose, or curly hair, or a good complexion, or beautiful eyes or anything else that characterizes his inherent appearance (ἰδέα). Then, although it consists of soul and body, not a single property (ἰδίωμα) of the soul is reflected in the appearance of the image (ἐν τῷ εἴδει τοῦ χαρακτῆρος). And how could this be, since the soul is invisible?
So it is in relation to Christ: He may be portrayed from the wrong angle, that He is simply a man, although at the same time He remains God; but insofar as He, differing in personal properties (τοῖς ὑποστατικοΐς ῖδιώμασιν) from all those like Him, was crucified and in this form [depicted]. So, Christ is described by Hypostasis 25 (ὑπόστασις), although by divinity he is indescribable, and not from the side of those natures of which He consists 26 .
35. If, as you say, Christ cannot be described, lest He should be diminished in glory, then He would not have been conceived in a virgin’s womb, lest He suffer dishonor. If He, without being subjected to dishonor, was conceived, then all the more, like a baby conceived in the womb, He can be described without shame.
Other – through reduction to the absurd 27
36. Everything that happens is not a species (εἶδος), which has the meaning of a general 28 (καθόλου), for the latter is invisible, devoid of form and figure, and therefore indescribable; As for a separate object (individual) (ἄτομον), it usually consists of private features (ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων), is visible, moves and speaks, and therefore is described, as, for example, James, John. If Christ is indescribable, then He is invisible, does not speak with articulate speech, does not have a tongue or lips, does not eat food, does not drink, does not sleep, does not stay awake, does not do or experience anything else that is [available to] each person individually. If Christ admits to all these [properties], then how is He indescribable? [Col. 408] This means that the sacrament of the Economy cannot be recognized only in the imagination.
37. If those [objects] that are of different kinds and unequal essence, along with their essences and properties (ἰδιότητες) are different, for example, among deity and humanity, then how is it that Christ, consisting of these [natures], is not [found] in them, although each [concrete] essence differs from the others by its own peculiarity (ἰδίωμα)? If He [is] in these [properties], then it means that One and the same is both describable and indescribable.
38. Truly 29 properties of entities (ἰδιώματα τῶν οὐσιῶν) [are] also signs (γνωρίσματα) of those [entities] whose properties they serve: indescribability is characteristic of deity, and describability is characteristic of humanity. So, if Christ [consists] of both [essences], then, consequently, He is both describable and indescribable. If He is indescribable, then He is not truly a man, just as He is truly God. But He, of course, in the true sense is a man and, therefore, in the true sense we are describable.
39. If the Son is the unchangeable image of the Father, 30 so that the Father becomes visible in the Son, according to the Scriptures, he who saw Me saw the Father (John 14:9), then it is necessary to recognize that He who comes from the indescribable Father is Himself indescribable. For, otherwise, how could the indescribable be contemplated in the describable? So Christ is indescribable 31 .
Resolving this based on equal consideration
If the one who comes from the indescribable Father is indescribable, then it is clear that the one who comes from the describable Mother is describable, unless, of course, one is understood in the true sense and the other in a false sense. If both are true in the One Christ, then He has the properties of both births, 32 being indescribable and describable.
40. If the prototype (ἀρχέτυπος) appears in the image (εἰκών), then the image must correspond to the prototype in everything. Christ is clothed with a body (ἐνσώματος); therefore, the Father is also clothed with a body, according to Whom He received the image. If this is absurd, then let him, in any case, be indescribable, like the image of the Father, 33 for the Father is indescribable, because he is incorporeal. Since Christ, as He Himself said, is the Son of Man (Luke 5:24), do not be surprised that He is described. After all, we can describe every person because he is in the body - and this is true.
41. If regarding the bodily form (ἐνσώματου ἰδέας), as you claim, Christ said: He who has seen Me has seen the Father (John 14:9), then it is absolutely necessary that He by nature should have everything that the Father has, for [only] in this case He will be His exact image (ἀκριβὴς ὁ χαρακτὴρ) (see Heb. 1:3). The Father has no image, no appearance, He is indescribable. So does Christ. For how could that which has no form appear in one that has a form, or that which has no image in one that has an image? [Col. 409] or in the volumetric – the immense? If this is ungodly, then it would be ungodly to say that Christ said in relation to the bodily form: He who has seen Me has seen the Father (John 14:9). It remains [to admit] that He said this in relation to the [invisible] image (μορφή) of the deity, which is true.
Objection - as if on behalf of the iconoclasts
42. If, they say, Christ were simple, 34 then He would be describable, for describability is a property of the simple. But since He is not simple, for One and the same is both God and man, He is indescribable.
If, in order to deny that Christ is simple, they call Him indescribable, then, of course, [one should recognize] Him as incorporeal: usually, in the same way that the describability and imageability of [an object] is known, in the same way one learns that [this object] is a body. For when these [properties] do not exist, it is necessary to reject the existence of [the body] to which they relate. But Christ, of course, had both a body and an image (σχήμα), and therefore, He is also characterized by describability.
43. If, due to the fact that Christ was not simple, 35 He is also called indescribable in humanity, then confusion of what is incompatible is allowed here, that is, the describable is mixed with the indescribable, although the latter is a property of the Divine nature. But which [objects] have mixed properties (ἰδιώματα), those obviously have [mixed] natures. If it is impious to say or think, 36 then, consequently, Christ was not simple, although He is describable by body; in general, if it is describable, the immiscible should not be mixed 37 .
44. The indescribable is simple and uncomplicated, as alien to any position [in space] (θέσεως). If Christ were not describable, then, being dual 38 and complex, He would lose the image and reality (σχημα καὶ χρῆμα) of duality and complexity. But He is actually recognized as dual and complex, and therefore describable - and this is true.
45. The male and female sexes can only be found in bodily forms, since in that which does not have a body, no difference (διαφορᾶς) characterizing one or the other [sex] is noticeable. Therefore, if Christ is indescribable as being outside the body, then He would not have the above distinction. But the One born of the prophetess, as Isaiah says (Isaiah 8:3), was a male child, and therefore also described.
46. Of the bodies, some can be divided mentally - namely those [bodies] that are intangible and therefore indescribable; others are divisible in fact - these are precisely [bodies] dense and tangible and therefore describable. So, if Christ took on an indivisible body, then it is indescribable. But in fact, He took on a divisible body, for the God-speaking Luke says: After eight days, when He should have been circumcised (Luke 2:21). [Col. 412] If He was circumcised, then, therefore, we will describe what is true.
47. If all those bodies are indescribable, which are indivisible and intangible, then how can Angels be describable when they are incorporeal? So, those who can be described are together and clothed with a body. If they are incorporeal, then, consequently, they are indescribable.
Compared to the gross body, the nature of Angels is incorporeal; in comparison with the Divinity, she is neither incorporeal nor indescribable 39 . Therefore, the apostle says: There are heavenly bodies and earthly bodies (1 Cor. 15:40). What is incorporeal in the proper sense is unlimited and indescribable; this can only be accepted in relation to the Divine nature. The angel is limited by space and therefore we describe it. When he, having appeared in Nazareth, exclaimed to the Virgin: Rejoice (Luke 1:28), then he was no longer [at that time] in another place. The Word of the Father, conceived in the womb of the Mother of God, was present there and was above all. And therefore, as God, He is indescribable, as well as unlimited, although as a man born of the Virgin, He is describable.
48. If He Who, being the image of God, is also indescribable from the aspect of the image of a servant, which He took (Phil. 2:7), then this image would not be different in comparison with the image of God, since indescribability is characteristic of this latter image. If there is another [image], moreover, of the same essence as us (ὁμοούσιος), then how did He not also perceive the properties (ἰδίωμα) of the one whose image He took? So let us describe Christ, as we do, whose image He took.
49. If by virtue of which Christ as a man is describable, that by virtue of which He, as God, is indescribable is subverted, then it is absolutely necessary [to recognize] that by the actions and words of Him as a man, that which He, as God, utters and works miracles is destroyed. If here one is not destroyed by the other, but both remain within their own boundaries in the One Christ, consisting of two natures, then, consequently, even there the indescribability will not be destroyed by the indescribable.
Other - from comparison with Divinely inspired Scripture
50. Talking with the Jews, the Savior says the following: before Abraham was, I am (John 8:58). In turn, the evangelist says: Genealogy of Jesus Christ, the Son of David, the Son of Abraham (Matthew 1:1). How then is he who exists before Abraham to be the son of Abraham? Or will we understand that one thing is obviously said in relation to the deity, while the other is said in relation to humanity? The same should be assumed regarding the describable and indescribable, because one does not destroy the other in the One Christ, cognizable from both [natures] 40 .
51. If every mediator occurs between two persons opposing each other, and has at his disposal the separate rights of both parties, [Col. 413] then it is absolutely necessary that Christ, who is the mediator between God and people (1 Tim. 2:5) and, by righteous judgment, united, as if in natural unity (εἰς ἑνότητα φυσικὴν συνάπτοντα), two extremes (deity and humanity), was indescribable in spirit 41, but in body we can describe. Otherwise, having accepted one of the two, that is, indescribability, and not preserving the other unharmed, describability, he ceases to be a true mediator.
52. If Christ, as a man, died, then no dishonor was inflicted on Him, as God, and His image, as characteristic of man, cannot offend Him. If this is an insult, the greater the dishonor - death itself 42.
Objection - as if from the iconoclasts
53. Portraying Christ is a matter inconsistent with the Divinely inspired Scripture and is prohibited by it. For it says: And the Lord spoke to you on the mountain from the midst of the fire: You heard the voice of His words, but you did not see the image (ὁμοίωμα), only the voice (Deut. 4:12). Therefore, erecting an image of Christ is contrary to Divine prohibitions.
Those who say this are deliberately deaf, since they do not understand why in the Divinely inspired Scripture both the image (ὁμοίωματος) and any idol image (εἰδωλικοῦ ἰνδάλματος) are completely prohibited. [This is prohibited] because we are talking about the Divine nature. The deity is not characterized by quantity and appearance (ἄποσόν τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον), and It does not resemble any image. But [we are talking] not about the Word taking on essence in our image (μορφὴ). For if this were so, then how does the evangelist say: And when He prayed, the appearance of His face changed, and His clothes became white and shining (Luke 9:29)? And so, it means that He, without form, had a form (εἶδος) or likeness (ὁμοίωμα); he who did not have an image received it and, alien to quantitative [quantity], found himself in its conditions. And since He had a face determined by certain properties, then, therefore, Christ, by His bodily appearance, is describable, just as He is indescribable by His invisible essence.
54. As the one who gave birth is, so should be what is born from her. The Mother of Christ is describable, and therefore Christ, as Her Son, is describable, although He is God by nature. If He is indescribable, then He would not be consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος) with His Mother [according to His humanity]. Hence His Mother would not be a Mother - and this is absurd.
Objection - as if on behalf of the iconoclasts, based on a comparison of the apostolic [saying]
55. Everyone will understand that to portray Christ is an invention of idolatry, for in one place the apostle speaks as follows: and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image (ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος), like corruptible man 43 ... and they worshiped and served the creature instead of the Creator (Rom. 1:23, 25).
[Col. 416] Indeed, the iconoclasts, to use apostolic words, fell into a perverted way of thinking - their senseless hearts were darkened; calling themselves wise, they became fools (Rom. 1:21–22); not understanding either what they say or what they affirm (1 Tim. 1:7). After all, if the apostle, in the sense of the prohibition to depict Christ, said: and the glory of the incorruptible God was changed into an image similar to corruptible man (Rom. 1:23), then it means that he does not confess that [Christ] became like men. How does he say in another place: He, being the image of God, did not consider it robbery to be equal with God; but he made himself of no reputation, taking the form of a servant, becoming in the likeness of men, and becoming in appearance like a man; humbled Himself, becoming obedient even to death, even death on the cross (Phil. 2:6–8)? So, he contradicts himself, now denying that God became like men, now claiming that He was in the likeness of men. But away with the absurdity! One thing was said to the idolaters, who changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image like corruptible man, and birds, and four-legged animals, and reptiles...
they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served the creature instead of the Creator (Rom. 1:23, 25). Another thing was said to believers, to whom, as we believe, the Word of God and the Father, who exists in the image of God, was likened to him - not insofar as He is equal to God, but insofar as He emptied Himself, took on the image of a servant and became in appearance like a man - and this is the property of describability.
56. If we constitute the Body of Christ, and individually are members (1 Cor. 12:27), and our head is Christ, then according to the members
and the chapter, of course, must be describable. If Christ is indescribable, then we cease to be members of His Body, since we are subject to the property of being describable. But how can one not recognize this as an extreme degree of unreason?
Another - to the saying: I am the vine (John 15:1, 5)
57. If, as [Scripture] says, the Savior is the vine, and we are the branches, then, obviously, the branches, in comparison with the vine, do not belong to a different nature (οὐκ ἑτεροφυῆ). If this is true, then how will the vine be indescribable when the branches are describable? After all, a vine is recognized by its branches.
58. Objects of different kinds (ἑτερογενῆ) and different natures (ἑτεροφυῆ) cannot have the same properties (ἰδιότης). After all, no one can say that fire tends downward and water upward. But [these objects] have different both the logos of essence 44 (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) and the way [of manifestation] of properties (τῆς ἰδιότητος τρόπος). And since Christ [consists of natures] heterogeneous and not consubstantial, namely, of divinity and humanity, therefore He is known through two properties (ἰδιωμάτων). In one way He is indescribable, in another way He is describable. With the destruction of the property (ἰδιότ'ητος), the essence characterized by it is destroyed along with it.
Chapter II. [Col. 417] That the described Christ has an artificial image in which He is contemplated, just as [the image itself is contemplated] in Christ
1. The artificial comes from the imitation of the natural (κατὰ μίμησιν τοῦ φυσικοῦ τὸ τεχνητὸν), it would be impossible to talk about anything artificial if the natural did not first exist. So, there is an artificial image (τεχνητὴ εἰκὼν) of Christ, just as He is a natural image (φυσικὴ εἰκών) 45 of the Mother who gave birth to Him. If one of the two is true and the other is false, then He would not be naturally the One who gave birth [to Him] and would not have an artificial image similar to the first, and this is absurd.
2. The image has a similarity (ἐμφέρεια) with the prototype, but the natural [image] [has it] naturally (φυσική φυσικῶς), and the artificial one – artificially (τεχνητὴ τεχνητῶς). And the first, both in essence and likeness, does not differ from the one of whom he is a reflection (ἀποσφράγισμα); so Christ in divinity [has similarities] with His Father, in humanity - with His Mother. The second image [artificial], being identical in its likeness, is alien to the essence of the original; This is precisely the relationship in which the image of Christ is to Christ Himself. So, an artificial image of Christ is possible, with Whom it has similarities.
3. If Christ, since He is the natural image of the One who gave birth, has an artificial image, so that, as far as possible, He does not deviate from His likeness (ἐμφέρεια), then He can have an artificial image insofar as He is the image of the invisible Father. If this is [so], then the Divinity is not beyond description - and this is wicked.
The iconoclasts, mixing through great foolishness that which cannot be mixed, do not know how to give to each birth 46 the qualities inherent in it, by virtue of which Christ is both describable and indescribable. Since [He] comes from the indescribable Father, He, being indescribable, cannot have an artificial image. Indeed, to what likeness 47 could the Deity be likened, the image (ἴνδαλμα) of Which in the inspired Scripture is completely prohibited? Since Christ was born from the described Mother, naturally He has an image corresponding to the maternal image (εἰκονουργία). And if He did not have [an artificial image], then He [would not have been born] from the described Mother and, therefore, would have had only one birth - obviously from the Father; but this is an overthrow of His Economy.
4. If the indication of the image is related to the prototype and if it is impossible that if the prototype exists, the image also does not exist, according to the word of the Lord: whose image and inscription is this? (Matthew 22:20), and He added to those who asked Him: therefore render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's (Matthew 22:21) - then, therefore, Christ, as having become like us, has an artificial image attributed to Himself due to the likening resemblance (τῆς ὁμοιωτικῆς ἐμφέρεια). If He does not have an [artificial image], then He is not what is called - [is not] Christ. [Col. 420] But Christ in the truest sense is and is called. Consequently, He also has an image, the offering of worship to which passes to Himself and is never broken by the division of glory.
Another on [saying]: Let Us create man in Our image and likeness (Gen. 1:26)
5. The [circumstance] that man creates is a matter that the arrangement of images (εἰκονουργίας εἶδος) is in some way a Divine matter. Since the image is described from the prototype 48, then Christ, being a man, although at the same time He is God, can be depicted - not in spirit, but in body. If He is depicted in one of the two, then, of course, He also has a corresponding image (εἰκών), as evidence of the similarity (ομοιότητος) with Him.
6. If Adam, the first man, is described by his external appearance, then it means that Christ, the second Adam, being God and man, must equally be described by his bodily appearance. But if the earthy one is like the earthy one, so are the earthy ones; and as is heavenly, such are also those who are heavenly (1 Cor. 15:48), and we, being such [that is, heavenly], are depicted, then, therefore, Christ, as the Principal and Leader of salvation (cf. Heb. 2:10) of all, is the prototype of His own image.
7. If God does not need any help and cannot experience any suffering, then how does the apostle speak about Him: He, in the days of His flesh, with a strong cry and with tears offered prayers and supplications to Him who was able to save Him from death; and was heard for His reverence; although He is the Son, yet through suffering
skill in obedience (Heb. 5:7–8)? Isn't it obvious that the Ethereal One
Having taken on flesh, he became alien to suffering and [at the same time] subject to it, has no need and [at the same time] needs, just as he became both indescribable and describable. If we describe, then, therefore, there is a corresponding image, as evidence of similarity with Him.
Chapter III. That the worship [given] to both - Christ and His image - is one and inseparable
An objection to this, as if on behalf of the iconoclasts
1. If everything that happens in the likeness of another completely lacks equality with the prototype (τοῦ πρωτοτύπου ἰσότης), and in relation to glory it occupies second place, then it is obvious that Christ and His image are not identical (οὐ ταυτὸν) in relation to worship. And since there is a difference in this, then the worship (διάφορος ἡ προσκύνησις) which is offered is also different. This means [worship of icons] is the cause of idolatry.
Resolution of this [objection]
The prototype is not present in the image essentially (οὐ κατ' οὐσίαν). For otherwise they would begin to say that the image is a prototype, just as the prototype, in turn, is an image; however, this is impossible, because the definition of the nature of each of the two is special; but [the prototype is in the image] in the likeness of its being (τής ύποστάσεως ομοιότητα), and this does not constitute another basis for the definition. Therefore, it must be accepted that the image lacks equality with the original image and is inferior to its glory, not in likeness, but in difference of essence (τὴν τῆς οὐσίας οιαφορὰν) 49, [Col. 421] which cannot accept worship, although the one depicted on the icon is worshiped. So, another worship is not introduced, but there is one and the same [worship] of the icon in comparison with the prototype, according to the identity of the likeness (κατὰ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς ὁμοιώσεως).
2. It is not the essence of the icon (τῆς εἰκόνος οὐσία) that serves as the object of worship, but the image of the prototype imprinted on it (χαρακτὴρ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου), since the essence of the icon is not worshiped. Likewise, it is not the substance [of the icon] that is the object of worship, but the prototype, conceived together with the image (χαρακτὴρ), but not with the essence. If [the object of worship is] an icon, then the worship [rendered] to it is the same as the prototype, just as their likeness is the same. So, when an icon is worshiped, then [this] does not introduce any other worship than the worship of the prototype.
3. For those objects whose essential properties (οἱ χαρακτῆρες) are different, their worship is different, and if the essential property (χαρακτὴρ) is one, then their worship will be one. But the “character” of the icon in relation to the prototype is one 50 ; therefore, worship is one.
4. Everything that is not equal is other than what is equal; and everything that
inferior in glory, there is something else in comparison with what [in glory] takes precedence. These are two [objects], not one. And in which subjects there is equality, in those primacy is eliminated; and in which there is identity, the first of them and the second are excluded. But, of course, the image of a king is also called a king - and yet not two kings, and, as [Basily the Great] says, neither the power is cut, nor the glory is divided 51. So [worship] is one, and no other worship is introduced; when veneration is given to an icon of Christ, it refers to Christ. Although the icon is obviously diminished and inferior in glory to [Christ] - in terms of essence.
5. Even if we do not recognize that the icon depicts the same image in comparison with the prototype due to the lack of art [of the work], then even in this case [our] speech will not contain absurdity. For worship [is given to the icon] not insofar as it deviates from the similarity [with the prototype], but insofar as it represents a similarity [with it], since in a certain respect the icon represents an image identical with the prototype, and not two worshiped [objects], but one and the same, and the prototype [accepts the worship that is given to] the icon, just as [the veneration shown] in relation to the image of the cross, [refers] to the Life-Giving Cross itself, although even here the image does not show the same similarity compared to the prototype - in terms of length and width or in some other respect, due to the fact that the cross is depicted in different ways. For the image of the cross can be seen small and large, wider and narrower, having blunt or sharp ends, with an inscription and without an inscription.
I'm not even talking about the changes and convexities of the ends of the cross, and then about the various patterns [with which the manufacturers decorate the images of the cross]. But nevertheless, even with such differences, there is one worship - to him [that is, the image] and the prototype; obvious, since the same similarity (ὁμοιότης) is seen in both.
Other – based on example
6. [Col. 424] If, at the sight of an image of a cross, worship is given to the Life-Giving Cross and there are no two worships, because there is no other worship of the essence of the image 52, then it is necessary [to recognize] that there are not two worships even when Christ is worshiped in His own image, because there is no worship of the essence [that is, the substance] of the image, but one and the same worship of Christ, although in His image.
7. If, due to the fact that the Son differs from the Father, and He differs only in the filial property (τῷ ὑΐκῷ ἰδιώματι), there is no obstacle for Him to be of the same essence and worship with the Father, then due to the fact that the image differs from the prototype, it differs in the meaning of the essence, there is no obstacle for it to be of the same likeness and worship with the prototype. Just as there Christ differs from the Father in hypostasis, so here He differs from His own image in essence.
8. If the image has a different worship in relation to its own prototype, then how is this [the latter] visible in it [that is, in the image] and it in the prototype? For, without a doubt, we will not contemplate the image (εἰκών), for example, of Peter in Paul and, in turn, no one will see the image of Paul in the image of Peter. Like appears in like (τὸ ὅμοιον ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ), and that which is far from mutual similarity can never appear in each other. The image of Peter appears in Peter, just as Peter appears in his own image. Consequently, the image of Christ does not have different worship with [Christ] Himself, but a common worship, as similar [to Him] and similar to Him (ὁμοπροσκύνητος καὶ αὐτόμοιος).
[Col. 425] Objection – as if on behalf of the iconoclasts
9. If only one God should be given worship by us and the Angels, then how can the worship given to the image and Christ be one, when, as it is agreed, worship is given to one in relation 53 (τῇ σχέσει) [between them], while to the other - by nature (τῇ φύσει)? Consequently, there are two worships - in one Christ due to the worship of the image - and this is wicked.
If, due to the fact that we offer worship to only one God, we should not worship the image of Christ, since two worships would be introduced instead of one service 54 [worship of God], according to the duality of the image and the prototype, then, consequently, there will be double worship - the Father and the Son due to the duality of the Hypostases. If we say this impiously, for [worship] is one and the same, precisely in accordance with the singularity (μοναδικὸν) 55 of nature, then, consequently, there is one worship of both Christ and His image, in accordance with the unity of the hypostatic likeness (τῆς ὑποστατικῆς ὁμοιώσεως), but not the difference of natures.
10. It speaks of the relationship 56 (σχέσις) [between the prototype and the image], insofar as it [the image] exists in the prototype, and as a result of this, one is not separated from the other, excluding, of course, only differences in essence. Therefore, since they say that the image of Christ has in its own outline the appearance (διαγραφῇ εἶδος) of Christ, then its worship [has] one with Christ, and not different.
11. How can the identity of the worship [rendered] to Christ and His image be preserved, since it is given to Christ according to nature (φύσει), and to the image - according to its relation [to the prototype] (θέσει). For it is absolutely necessary to affirm that in no respect can anything that happens by nature be varied. Otherwise, nothing prevents us from saying that worship is given to the image according to nature, and to Christ - according to attitude - and everything turns out to be confused.
The solution to this is through mutual questioning
And how, most respected, could the identity of worship in relation to Christ and His image not be preserved, if the image is the likeness of Christ and reveals Christ in itself? After all, without a doubt, it is well known and everyone agrees that no one, for example Thomas, can be seen in the image of another, for example Luke. There is no one who, having seen Thomas, could say that he saw Luke. The proof of similarity lies in identical qualities (ἐν τοῖς ταυτεμφερεσιν), and not in those that differ from each other in their characteristic property (τῷ χαρακτηριστικῷ ἰδιώματι). So, if this is true and whoever sees the image of Christ sees Christ in it, then it is absolutely necessary to understand that the image of Christ together with Christ has both the same likeness and the same worship.
12. That which is in some respect similar to [a known object], and participates with it according to that in which it is similar. And what is similar in all respects participates entirely in worship. The Son is like the Father in everything, just as he is consubstantial [with Him]; therefore, we worship Him with Him. The image of Christ is similar to Him only in relation to His hypostatic likeness; therefore, accordingly, it participates with Him in worship.
13. If the one who sees the image sees in it the likeness of the prototype, then it is absolutely necessary [to recognize] that the one who worships the image worships in it the appearance of the prototype. If there is one similarity, then the worship of both is also one.
14. If His imprinted image also participates in the worship given to Christ, then how does He Himself say: I will not give My glory to another (Isaiah 42:8)? Therefore, [the image of Christ] does not participate [in His worship]; if it does not participate, then a [reason] is given for idolatry, since a second worship is introduced in relation to the image.
The image of Christ is not anything other than
Christ, except, of course, for the difference in essence, as has been proven many times. Hence, the worship of him is the worship of Christ, since the substance of the image is not in any sense given worship, but only of Christ, depicted on it in his likeness. And in which [objects] there is one similarity, they obviously have one worship. So Christ does not give to another the glory in His own image, in which He, [Col. 428] or rather, accepts it, since substance in comparison with likeness is something different. Without a doubt, the image inscribed in the likeness on different substances remains the same; but He could not remain unchanged on various substances, unless on the condition that he has nothing in common with them, but is only united by thought with those [substances] on which he is located.
15. If God is spirit, as it is written, and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and in truth (John 4:24), then how come you do not introduce evidence of idolatry, since you affirm that Christ, in addition to worship in spirit, must be worshiped in image, although He is God?
Who will not be surprised at the iconoclasts filled with madness,
who do not distinguish that the dogma of the Economy appears to be different in comparison with the dogma of theology 57, in relation to which the saying should be understood: we must worship in spirit and in truth? For God and the Father, being a spirit, is recognized as worshiped in the Holy Spirit and in the Truth - His Only Begotten Son. As for the worship of Christ in the image, then [here] we are talking about the Economy [of salvation], since Christ, although he is spirit, since He is God, is also flesh, since He is a man. The image of His bodily form, although represented in the likeness of matter, is inseparable from Christ, just as a shadow [is inseparable] from its own body; and worship is given not to the substance of the image, but to Christ depicted on it, with Whom the Father and the Holy Spirit are worshiped together.
Chapter IV. That Christ, being the prototype of His image, has one likeness with him, as well as [one] worship
1. The prototype and the image are one in hypostatic likeness 58, and by nature they are two [objects], but not in the sense that one was divided into two likenesses, because otherwise they have no communication and relationship to each other; and not that the same thing is called by a double name, so that sometimes the prototype is called an image, and sometimes the image is called a prototype. For the prototype will always be called the prototype, just as the image will be called an image, and one will never turn into the other. Although the situation is this way and the number of [objects] is two, however, both have one similarity (ὁμοίωσις) and, accordingly, the similarity has [one] name. For example, the image of a king is also called a king, and, however, not two kings 59. If this is so, then it means that [there must be] one worship of the image of Christ together with Christ, as the prototype [of the image].
2. If Christ, having for His image the meaning of a prototype, exists, as they say, by nature (φύσει), and the image [has meaning] by institution (θέσει) 60, then how [are] at the same time [the One who exists] by nature, and [that which happens] by institution? For at the time when Christ was visible, His inscribed image was not received. This means that since they are not simultaneously 61, then worship is not one [Col. 429] due to the difference in a certain period of time, after which [His] image appeared after Christ.
Every body is inseparably followed by its own shadow, and no one in their right mind can say that the body does not have a shadow. But just as in the body one can see the shadow that follows [it], and in the shadow the previous body, then in the same way no one can say that Christ does not have an image, if only the body received a certain form in Him. But even here one can see in Christ the abiding image of Him, and in the image - Christ, contemplated as a prototype. And since both exist together, it is proven that when Christ was accessible to vision, then His image was contemplated by the power of possibility 62 (εἰκών), and then it was transferred to any substance that could be imprinted.
3. Although the One who exists by nature and that which [arises] by institution are not together, just as Christ is in relation to His image, but since the image [of Christ] existed in reality even before it was made artificially, it means that it could always be seen in Christ. Just as, for example, a shadow is always co-present with a body, even if it has not received its form from a sun ray; in the same way, that which [exists] together is not outside the similarity - of course, Christ and His image.
4. The prototype and the image are intercorrelative 64 and are presented [in the position of] as if double and half. The prototype, of course, contains an image in itself, in relation to which it is the prototype; and the double, in any case, carries within itself also the half, in relation to which it is called double. The prototype, of course, would not exist if there were no image 65; and the double could not exist if something were not thought of as half: what is together is both thought and exists together. Therefore, since they are not separated by any period of time, the worship of one and the other is not different, but the same for both.
5. The prototype and the image in some way have existence in each other, and with the destruction of one of them, the other is destroyed together, just as with the destruction of the double, the half is also destroyed. So, if it is impossible for Christ to exist, while His own image did not actually exist, but, on the contrary, even before it was made artificially, it was always in the prototype, then, consequently, he destroys the worship of Christ who does not confess that worship should be given to His image in Him.
6. What is similar in some respects (προσεοικός), in another respect, on the contrary, is dissimilar; for example, the image is similar to the prototype in terms of similarity, but in terms of nature it is dissimilar. Consequently, the image is not entirely the same as the prototype. In view of this, worship in relation to both is not entirely and one and the same. If it is not complete, then it is absurd to say that the worship of both is one.
[Col. 432] To the extent that the image is similar to the prototype, it participates in the whole worship similar to it (ὁμοιωτική προσκύνησις), without adding the substance on which it is located to the worship; The nature of the image lies in the fact that it is identical with the prototype in terms of similarity, but differs in the meaning of the essence - which is why the name depends on one name. And if [the image] were entirely [like the prototype], then, of course, what is called the prototype would lose its meaning. In reality, the image is similar to the prototype in its complete similarity, and not in nature. And therefore [there must be] complete and one similar worship to both.
Other – based on theological example
7. Although in essence the Son is similar to the Father 66, yet the Begotten is not like the One who gave birth and is not [like Him] the Coming One: what is contemplated in relation to the Divine nature 67 differs in mutual relation. There is one Divinity in Three Persons (ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ χαρακτῆρσιν), as one and worship, and natural identity does not become unequal due to differences in personal characteristics (τῶν ἰδιοτήτων). The same thing [is noticed] in the relation of the image to the prototype. Although due to the difference in essence, more than one worship is given to one and the other, especially since the substance of the image is not given worship, although the one depicted is contemplated on it, however, by the identity of the hypostatic similarity 68 [worship] is one and the same, identified according to the same and complete similarity (ἐμφέρεια) between one and the other - just as in relation to the image of the cross and the cross itself The worship of the Life-giving Cross, [rendered] to the image, does not decrease in comparison with the Life-giving Cross due to the difference in nature, but is completely equal due to the complete similarity with the prototype.
8. If the image [existed] in Christ as a prototype, and before it was transferred by art to any substance, then it would be in vain to draw it, since it is enough to contemplate [it] and worship in [Christ] Himself.
Of course, it is true 69 that the image of Christ was in Him, as in a prototype, even before it was received through art. After all, that which has not yet received an image at all is not a person, but some kind of half-baked creature (cf. Ex. 21:22–23: LXX), and, of course, nothing can be called a prototype if it does not have an image on the substance transferred from it. Therefore, if Christ is recognized as having the value of a prototype, like every other individual person, then it is absolutely necessary [to recognize] that He also has an image transferred from His outer appearance and imprinted on some substance, so that He does not cease to be a man if He is not visible and revered through the likeness represented in the image.
9. Another is a seal (σφραγὶς) and another is a printed image (ἀπόμαγμα); however, even before imprinting, the imprint [is] on the seal. But the seal would not be valid unless it was depicted on some substance. Accordingly, Christ would have to be recognized as inactive and invalid if He were not visible in the depiction of art. But even to think this is absurd.
10. [Col. 433] If someone looking at the seal and its imprint (ἐκμαγεῖον) notices that the appearance of both is similar and unchanged, then it means that the image is on the seal before the imprint. [The seal] proves its dignity when it is used to make an imprint on many and varied substances. In the same way, although we believe that in Christ, as having a human form, His own image is found, yet when we see Him portrayed in various ways on matter, then we praise His greatness more than once. And if His imprint (ἀποσφράγισμα) did not transfer to the substance, [this] would deny that He has a human appearance.
11. The image in relation to the prototype both exists, and is contemplated, and serves as an object of worship - due not to the identity of the essence, but to the unity of similarity, by virtue of which the worship is one (ἑνικὴ προσκύνησις) to both, and not divided by the difference of natures.
12. If the shadow, which is always present with it, cannot be separated from the body, even if it is not revealed, in exactly the same way His own image cannot be separated from Christ. But just as the shadow from the action of a sunbeam becomes clearer and more visible, so the image of Christ becomes clear to everyone when it is imprinted on [various] substances.
13. Since our Savior now dwells in heaven, His likeness should not be erected; for the holy apostle says: we walk by faith, and not by sight (οὐ διὰ εἴδους) (2 Cor. 5:7).
Species (τὸ εἶδος) is also called something that differs from the genus 71, such as, for example, man in general; species (εἶδος) also refers to the image (μορφὴ) of everyone, by which we differ from each other; regarding this, the apostle has no speech here. But by vision here we should mean a direct vision (αὐτοψία) of future things, surpassing present ideas (παρόντα ἰνδάλματα). For, having said: we walk by faith and not by sight, he adds: we wish rather to leave the body and be with the Lord (2 Cor. 5:7-8). And in another place again: Now we see as if through a dark glass, fortune-telling, but then face to face; Now I know in part, but then I will know, even as I am known. And now these three remain: faith, hope, love (1 Cor. 13:12–13). So, he says that we walk by faith, in which, as in a mirror, we see face to face without error the truth of future [goods]. Then, his goal was not aimed at destroying the image of the bodily appearance of Christ - listen to what he says about this in another place, and moreover, after the ascension: O foolish Galatians!
Who deceived you not to submit to the truth, you, who had before your eyes Jesus Christ as if he were crucified before your eyes? (Gal. 3:1). [Col. 436] If we believed so much that we seemed to see the crucified Christ Himself, then it is natural that we are not mistaken, as long as we always begin to portray Him. After all, what, due to absence, is contemplated by the mind, would cease to be perceived by the mind, if at the same time it could not be visible and sensuous - through description 72.
Wed: Rev. John of Damascus. Philosophical chapters, 7. – Ed.
Literally: “from both.” The TFS adds: “nature”, although we are talking, rather, about essences. – Ed.
There was no “unreported” in TFS. – Ed.
In TFS: “What if the indescribable changed at the moment of describability.” – Ed.
The words in brackets are not in the Greek text. – Ed.
In the original: “he became τρίπηχυς” - “three cubits in size.”
Wed: St. Basil the Great. Letter 38, 2 // St. Basil the Great. Creations. T. 2. P. 503. – Ed.
That is, general, denoting human nature in general, as a set of known properties and qualities. – Ed.
In TFS: “personal characteristics”. – Ed.
The TFS added: “[or personal].” – Ed.
In TFS: “and in its individual properties.” – Ed.
See the definition of faith (oros) of the IV Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in 451 - Ed.
In TFS: “having taken on human nature.” – Ed.
In TFS there is ambiguity: “like us.” – Ed.
The general name for Monophysites is Orthodox; literally it means "headless." Appeared after the defeat of the Monophysite hierarchy in Egypt by the Orthodox in the 5th-6th centuries. – Ed.
Apollinaris of Laodicea (the Younger) (c. 310–390) is the founder of the Christological heresy of Apollinarianism. This heresy placed excessive emphasis on the unity in Christ in the form of the one nature of the incarnate God the Word, so that humanity in Christ, according to Apollinaris, was devoid of mind, the place of which was taken by God the Word as the Divine Mind. – Ed.
Rev. Theodore or his copyist made the mistake of confusing Montanism with Manichaeism or Gnosticism. – Ed.
In TFS: “to absurdity.” – Ed.
Theopaschites were heretics who accepted the possibility of God suffering in Christ. – Ed.
This expression “natural compound” (ἕνωσις φυσική) Rev. Theodore uses it rather in a negative sense, as used by the Monophysites-theopaschites, to illustrate that the theopaschites turn out to be less heretics than the iconoclasts. – Ed.
This argument contains the thesis that by describing the human nature of Christ, icon-worshipers “divide” Christ in two, that is, the description of Christ is untrue due to the indepicability of His deity; By describing the humanity of Christ, it is impossible to describe His divinity. – Ed.
In TFS: “the object itself in its particular features.” – Ed.
In TFS: “in a separate subject.” – Ed.
The properties of human nature are listed that are inherent in all people - hypostases, specific representatives of the human race, thought of in general and abstractly. – Ed.
In TFS: “according to personal existence.” – Ed.
Rev. Theodore wants to say that in Christ the icon painters depict not His human nature, separately from the Divine, but His Hypostasis. – Ed.
In TFS: “valid”. – Ed.
This expression about the Son - “the unchanging image of the Father” has been very common among the holy fathers of the Church and church writers since the time of St. Alexander of Alexandria (“Epistle on the Arian Heresy” (PG. T. 18. Col. 561B)) and St. Athanasius the Great (“Message that the Council of Nicaea...”, 20 (PG. T. 25. Col. 449C)) and meant the perfection of the Son in divinity and was synonymous with consubstantiality. See also: St. Gregory the Theologian. Word 38, 13; 45, 9 // St. Gregory the Theologian. Creations. T. 2. P. 447; 563. – Ed.
An obvious mistake in this reasoning of the iconoclasts is the substitution of the concepts of the Son of God and Christ (the Son of God made man). The Son of God does not reveal the Father in Himself, having the same invisible nature as the Father, but in His Incarnation by the works that He performs in the flesh. Therefore, the iconoclasts replace the thesis about the indescribability of the Son with the thesis about the indescribability of Christ, which is incorrect. – Ed.
St. spoke most clearly about the two births of the Son of God (one pre-eternal, according to divinity, and the other in time, for the sake of the salvation of people, according to humanity). Cyril of Alexandria in polemic against Nestorius, who denied the motherhood of the Blessed Virgin. – Ed.
That is, an invisible spiritual image in accordance with the pre-eternal birth from the Father, and not the birth from the Virgin, which gave the visible image. – Ed.
The TFS adds “man” in this and the following paragraphs, which is not confirmed by the Greek text. This speaks of the simplicity of Christ as a Person. – Ed.
Christ in Orthodox Christology of the 6th century. some authors called it “one complex Christ”, due to the presence of two natures in Him. – Ed.
The confusion of natures was identified with the heresy of Monophysitism, the condemnation of which was also recognized by the iconoclasts. – Ed.
In TFS: “that which is incompatible.” – Ed.
The TFS added: “[according to the composition of nature].” – Ed.
A discussion on the same topic (the corporeality or incorporeality of Angels) arose in the 19th century. in Russia between two famous Church Fathers - St. Theophan the Recluse and St. Ignatius Brianchaninov. – Ed.
In TFS: “knowable in both [natures].” – Ed.
That is, according to His deity. – Ed.
The death that Christ nevertheless accepted for our salvation. – Ed.
The Church Slavonic text here better conveys the combination of important “iconographic” terms than the Synodal translation (in the likeness of the image of a perishable person). – Ed.
In TFS: “the cause of essence.” – Ed.
By humanity; Christ, as the Son of God, is also the natural Image of the Father, about which Rev. Theodore wrote earlier. – Ed.
For the two births of the Son of God, see note. us. 302. – Ed.
In TFS: “to what equal image.” – Ed.
In the Greek text: “an image from an image.” – Ed.
Of course, the substance of the icon.
This refers to a property due to which there is a similarity between the image and the prototype, despite the known differences between them. – Ed.
See: St. Basil the Great. About the Holy Spirit 18, 45 // St. Basil the Great. Creations. T. 1. P. 135. – Ed.
That is, the material from which it consists.
In TFS: “as an image.” – Ed.
According to the teaching of Orthodox theologians and icon venerators, service (λατεία) is rendered only to God (and not to saints, icons, relics). – Ed.
In TFS: “according to unity.” – Ed.
In TFS: “Appearance”. – Ed.
That is, with the doctrine of God in Himself. On the difference between the concepts of “theology” and “economy”, see: St. Basil the Great. Creations. T. 1. P. 214; T. 2. P. 459. – Ed.
In TFS: “according to the likeness inherent in each of them.” – Ed.
Wed: St. Basil the Great. About the Holy Spirit 18, 45 // St. Basil the Great. Creations. T. 1. P. 135. – Ed.
In TFS: “in its relation [to the prototype].” – Ed.
In TFS: “not together.” – Ed.
In TFS: “image”. – Ed.
In TFS: “according to arrangement.” – Ed.
In TFS: “whatever of the subjects they relate to.” – Ed.
This is a somewhat “weak” sounding argument, since it is quite possible to imagine an object that has no similarity. Rather, it would be worth saying that the prototype would not be called a prototype if it lacked an image. – Ed.
In TFS: “Although in relation to essence the Son is equal to the Father.” – Ed.
In TFS: “that which is contemplated united in the Divine nature.” – Ed.
In TFS: “the similarity inherent in each of them.” – Ed.
In TFS: “fair”. – Ed.
In this case, species is a logical category subordinate to the category of genus. See: Rev. John of Damascus. Philosophical Chapters, 9–10. – Ed.
In TFS: “images”. Next in Min’s edition follows the pious poem “Epigram of Constantine, who rewrote the book of Theodore,” prayerfully addressed by a certain copyist Constantine to the Venerable. To Theodore, probably after the death of the latter: An intelligent source of all-wise teachings, Flowing with streams of Orthodox dogmas, You truly show all mortals, father, For this sake, cover me, Constantine, with your prayers. – Ed.