Книга четвертая

I. In the three preceding books, holy Ambrose, we have presented a whole series of considerations regarding the writings of Celsus; now, with the help of God in Christ (Jesus), we begin to dictate to you the fourth book in refutation of further objections (Celsus). And how I would like to have the ability to speak the same speeches with which the Lord addressed the prophet, as we read about this in Jeremiah: “Behold, I have put My words in your mouth. Behold, I have set you this day over nations and kingdoms, to root out and to destroy, to destroy and to destroy, to build and to plant” (Jer. 1:9–10). After all, we now precisely need words that would be able to “eradicate” from each soul the evil influence that is produced in it by the false arguments of Celsus or other similar teachings. We also need thoughts strong enough to “ruin” the construction of false opinions and, in particular, those of them that Celsus cites in his work, where he seems to be thinking of imitating the construction of those who said, “Let us build ourselves a city and a tower whose height reaches to heaven” (Gen. 11:4). But we also need wisdom, which can overthrow all greatness that rises above the knowledge of God (2 Cor. 10:5), and especially the impudent arrogance with which Celsus opposes us. However, it is not enough to just eradicate and destroy 324; we must, on the contrary, instead of what was uprooted and destroyed, plant plants that would be worthy of God’s agriculture (Rom. 7:14: cf. Jer. 1:10) - in place of what was destroyed, create a building for God and a church of the glory of God. Since God creates the good things that Jeremiah tells us about, then, therefore, we must ask Him to prepare for us words with the help of which we could build up the work of Christ and “plant” (Rom. 7:14: cf. Jer. 1:10) in the hearts the spiritual law (τὸν πνευματικὸν νόμον) and those prophetic sayings that relate to it (ἀνάλογον αὐτῷ). Our main task now is to refute further objections of Celsus - to prove the correctness and truth of the prophetic sayings that relate to Christ. For his part, Celsus in this regard is fighting on two fronts: he objects to the Jews, who claim that Christ has not yet come, and who, therefore, are still awaiting His coming, as well as to Christians, according to whose teaching Jesus is the Christ whom the prophets announced. Celsus says: II. “There is a dispute between the Jews and some Christians; some think that God or the Son of God will yet come to earth to make people righteous, while others claim that He has already come. The dispute is conducted in such a shameful manner that there is no need to stop for a long time to expose (the disputants). Celsus, apparently, speaks with a certain precision when he asserts regarding the Jews that not only some, but all of them think that someone else will only come to earth, while among Christians there are supposedly only a few who believe that (the promised Christ) has already come. At the same time, Celsus makes reference to those who, on the basis of the Jewish scriptures, assert that (the Messiah) Christ has already appeared, and then he also seems to know that some sects (αἱρέσεις) allegedly do not recognize Christ Jesus as foretold by the prophets. Above, we have already proven, to the best of our ability, that the coming of Christ was indeed predicted by the prophets. To avoid repetition, we here omit everything that could be said on this issue, although we could say a lot. I would like to ask you to pay attention to just one circumstance. If Celsus really wanted to maintain at least the ostensible thoroughness of his refutation both to the Jews who believe in the reality of prophetic predictions, and to the Christians who confess the already come Christ, then he would have to cite the very prophecies to which we refer: both Christians and Jews - in their disputes. Only in this case could it be possible to assume that he actually converted people who, in his opinion, were deceived only by probabilities (ὑπὸ τῆς πιθανότητος) 325, from a passion for prophetic predictions, and equally from the resulting belief that Jesus is really the (foreshadowed) Christ. But Celsus does not, in fact, cite a single saying of the prophets, although the latter spoke about Christ countless times 326 times - and all this either because they put Celsus in a hopeless position, and he cannot deprive them of their meaning, or because he himself was not clearly aware of exactly which prophecies concerned the person of Christ: he believes that one can directly reject any meaning behind these prophecies, without even providing evidence in favor of his statement - in favor of namely, that these prophecies have the force of probability alone (πιθανότητα). He does not even know that not all Jews share the opinion that the Christ they are waiting for 327 is God or the Son of God, as I already had occasion to talk about this above 328. In his opinion, it turns out that it is completely enough to refer only to our teaching that Christ has already come, and to the teaching of the Jews that He will come to accomplish righteousness (δικαιωτήν) (among people) - in order, on the basis of this reference alone, to accuse (our) teaching as “shameful”, “not worthy of even a thorough (μακροῦ) refutation.” III. This is the question Celsus asks: “What is the meaning,” he says, “should lie in such condescension of God?” Celsus does not know that, in our opinion, the purpose of the coming (of Christ) is twofold: first of all, it is to convert “the lost sheep of the house of Israel” (Matthew 10:6, 15:24), as they are called in the Gospel, and, secondly, to take away from them, due to their unbelief, what is called the Kingdom of God, and, excluding the ancient Jews from it, to give it away “a people bearing fruit” (other workers) (Matthew 21:43), namely, Christians who will render to God the fruits of the Kingdom of God at the time of each act - as the fruit of the Kingdom (of God). We could expand further on this issue, but what has been said is enough in response to Celsus’ question: “What was God’s purpose in such a descent (to earth).” Celsus himself gives another answer to his question, which, however, is in contradiction with the faith of the Jews and ours. He says: “Is it not for this purpose (God came down) to be able to know the deeds and aspirations of people?” But none of us has yet said that Christ came into the world “for the purpose of studying human life (ta' e'n a'nfrw'poi_s).” Meanwhile, Celsus, accepting as reliable that some actually said that (Christ descended) “for the purpose of studying human life,” then makes the following objection to himself: “Didn’t He know everything”? Then, as if having received an affirmative answer: “Yes, he knew,” he continues to ask: “So, He knew, but did not correct it, and did he not have the Divine power to correct it?” All this reasoning of Celsus is devoid of any meaning. For God always and in all periods, through His Word, descending into holy souls and preparing the friends and prophets of God, corrects all who listen to the teaching; and since the coming of Christ to earth, He has used Christian teaching for the purpose of correcting, of course, not those who do not want (this correction), but those who choose the best path of life pleasing to God. Actually, I don’t even know what exact method of correction Celsus is trying to establish when he says: “Wasn’t the work of correction available to His Divine power otherwise than on the condition of deliberately sending someone for this purpose?” Or perhaps he believes that God wanted to give people new concepts and contemplations, in order to thereby take away evil from them and instill virtue, and thereby completely correct them. Сообразна ли такая деятельность (Промысла Божия) с природой вещей, было ли это вообще возможно, – пусть это рассудит кто-нибудь другой; мы же, со своей стороны, можем только сказать: пусть это будет так, допустим возможность этого, но причем же тогда окажется наша воля (τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν)? How can one take credit for the inclination (of the will) towards the truth? How then can one praise the aversion to lies? Но если раз (воля) дарована и для нее возможно указанное состояние, и все в ней совершается в порядке вещей (πρεπόντως), то не будет ли тогда кто-нибудь другой с большим правом, чем Цельс, задавать, подобно ему, такие вопросы: да неужели Бог в самом начале не был в состоянии своей Божественной силой сотворить людей настолько добрыми (σπουδαίους) и совершенными, чтобы не нуждаться в исправлении, благодаря отсутствию в них от начала самых задатков зла (οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑποστάσης τῆς κακίας)? Но такие вопросы могут задавать без всякого смысла разве только простые и необразованные люди, а не человек, углубляющийся в самую сущность вещей. Moreover, this person knows that in relation to virtue it means losing its very essence if you deprive it of freedom (τὸ ἑκούσιον) 329 . However, resolving this issue may require an entire study. The Greeks also treated this issue quite a bit in their writings on foresight; Moreover, the Greeks were far from saying with Celsus: “God knew (things), but did not correct them; and their correction was not available to Him under His Divine authority”? We have touched upon these questions, as far as possible, in many places in our writings, 330 and the Holy Scriptures provide a satisfactory solution to them for those people who are able to understand it (Holy Scripture). IV. The same question with which Celsus approaches us and the Jews, we can ask him himself. We can say to him: teach us, dearest one, whether the Lord God knows what happens in man or does not know? If you recognize the existence of God and Providence, as can be concluded from your own writing, then it necessarily follows that God knows all this. If He knows, then why doesn’t He correct it? Or, perhaps, only we are obliged to indicate the reasons why He does not correct human affairs, although He knows them, and you, who in your writing does not appear entirely as an Epicurean and even pretends to believe in Providence, yet do not undertake to answer why God does not change the human deeds known to Him, and does not liberate the human race from wickedness by the power of His Divine power? But we, for our part, are not ashamed to assert that God at all times sends (special) men with the task of correcting people and that these men, thanks to the fact that God gives them, are living examples among people (λόγοι), attracting them to a better life. Moreover, the persons whom the Lord sends to such service differ from each other in many respects, and of them there are only a few who exclusively and completely preach the pure truth and work in the field of real correction of human souls, as can be said about Moses and the prophets. But above all these (actors) rises the great renewal (μεγάλη ἐπανόρθωσις) accomplished by Jesus (διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ). He was no longer satisfied with healing only the inhabitants of some particular corner of the earth, but - as far as it depended on Him (τὸ ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτῷ) - He granted healing to those living everywhere (τοὺς πανταχοῦ). After all, He came to become the Savior of all people (cf. 1 Tim. 1:10). V. Where our most noble Celsus got the further objection that he puts forward against us, I don’t even know. According to it, it turns out that we teach this: “God himself must come down to people.” From this, according to his opinion, it must follow that "God must leave His throne in heaven." But Celsus does not understand the power (δυναμιν) of God; he does not even know that “the Spirit of the Lord fills the world” and that “as he who embraces all things, he knows every word” (Wis. 1:7). Likewise, he cannot understand the following: “Do I not fill the heavens and the earth, says the Lord” (Jer. 23:24)? He does not even consider the fact that, according to Christian teaching, we all “live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28), as Paul says about this in his speech addressed to the Athenians; therefore, if it can be said that the God of all is immersed (συγκαταβαίνῃ) with His power (τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμει) together with Jesus in the lives of people, if also “the Word that was in” the beginning “was with God and the Word was God” (John. 1:1, 2), came to us, then He, however, does not yet lose or abandon His throne so that through this some place seems to become empty, and another, where He had not been before, becomes filled. The power and Divine being (θειότης) of God resides where it wills; it rests where it finds a place; Moreover, it does this without changing the position itself (τόπον), without making its place (χώραν) empty and without filling another place with itself. And when we say that He leaves one place and fills another, then in this case we are not talking about a place: we do not understand this expression in a roughly literal sense; By this we only want to express the idea that the soul of this evil person immersed in sin and vice is abandoned, and the soul of such a person who has embarked on the path of virtue or strives for perfection, or has already made success in it, is filled with the Divine spirit or becomes a participant in It. If, therefore, Christ descended to earth, or God came to people, then all this is not at all because (the condescension) was caused by any necessity - to leave his highest throne (ἕδραν μείζονα) and in this way make a general change (μεταβάλλεσθαι τὰ τῇδε), as Celsus imagines this when he says: “If you change even the slightest part here, then your whole world will collapse and perish.” If we really need to talk about changing someone as a result of the presence of the power of God and the condescension of the Word to people, then we are not afraid to affirm the position that the transition from a vicious state to integrity (ἀστεῖον), from intemperance to chastity, from superstition to piety is carried out in those people who have made their soul the dwelling place of the Word of God. VI. If you really want to listen to the most ridiculous objection that Celsus makes to us, then pay attention to his next words. He says: “assuming that God was unknown to people, He perhaps wanted to see something that was still lacking for His bliss, and on this impulse he wanted to let them know about Himself and at the same time find out which of them were believers and which were unbelievers: all this is exactly the same as with people who have just achieved wealth and want to boast about it. This is the base opinion they must have of God, since they attribute to Him such great pleasure in mortal ambition.” I admit that God was not known to bad people and wanted them to recognize Him, but not at all from the motive that He still lacked something, but then so that people, having learned about Him, could get rid of their distress (κακοδαιμονίας). And if He, with His ineffable and Divine power, condescends to individuals or sends them His Christ, then He does this not with the intention of testing who will turn out to be a believer and who will be an unbeliever, but so that the believers who have recognized His Divinity are delivered from all evil, and the unbelievers are deprived of the pretext for making a reservation, that they did not believe because they did not hear His teaching. On what basis does Celsus thus wish to draw a conclusion from our teaching in the sense that God, in our opinion, is like people who have just become rich and want to show off themselves? After all, it is not with the intention of boasting before us that God wants to reveal to us and inspire us with his immeasurable greatness (ὑπεροχήν); but out of a desire to instill in our souls the bliss that consists in knowing Him, He arranges it so that through Christ and the Word, which remains eternally with us, we enter into inner communion with Him 331 . So, Christian teaching does not attribute to God any desire for mortal ambition. VII. After such a comic (I just don’t know what it is for) objection, stated and refuted by us, Celsus then makes the following conclusion: “God does not need to be known for His own sake, but for the sake of our salvation He wants to give us knowledge about Himself, with the intention that those who accept this knowledge become virtuous (χρηστοὶ) and achieve salvation, on the contrary, they refute and through this reveal their malicious mood (πονηροὶ) were punished for this.” After Celsus has so decisively stated his position, he makes the following objection: “How is it that only after such a long period of time did God come to his senses, finally making human life righteous, and before He did not take care of this?” To this we answer: there is no moment when God does not have the desire to make human life righteous; this is the subject of His constant concern. That is why He always makes it easier for rational beings to enter the path of a virtuous and good life. At each specific period in the history of the human race (καθ' ἑκάστην γενεὰν) the wisdom of God descends into those souls that it finds saints and makes them friends and prophets of God. The Holy Scriptures tell us from every period about such saints who received the spirit of God within themselves and devoted all their strength, to the best of their abilities, to the conversion and improvement of the lives of their fellow men. VIII. In general, there is nothing surprising in the fact that in one time or another there were prophets who, thanks to their long and always firm and stable stay in the commandments of God, received the spirit of God (ἐν τῇ παραδοχῇ τῆς θειότητος) to a greater extent than other prophets who lived in their days either earlier or later. Equally, it is not surprising that with the advent of a certain time (τινα καιρὸν) something completely exceptional (ἐξαίρετόν τι χρῆμα) and special (διαφέρον) came down to the human race in comparison with the life of previous or subsequent generations. However, this point of teaching is distinguished by such mystery and depth that it becomes completely inaccessible to the humble understanding of the common people 332 . After all, in order to refute and resolve the objections Celsus made to us regarding the coming of Christ: “how is it so - only after such a long period of time did God come to his senses, finally, to make human life righteous, and before He did not take care of this?” - we should touch upon the history of the division (of nations) (Deut. 32:8-9) and indicate the reasons why “When the Most High gave inheritance to the nations and scattered the sons of men, then he set the boundaries of the nations according to the number of the children of Israel. For the portion of the Lord is His people; Jacob is His inheritance." We must also explain why one or another is born within certain certain boundaries and under the authority of the one who inherited these boundaries; why and on what sufficient basis (εὐλόγως) “His people became part of the Lord; Jacob is His inheritance”, why previously “His people were part of the Lord; Jacob is His inheritance,” but, on the contrary, later, in later times, the Savior heard the following speech from His Father: “Ask of Me, and I will give the nations for Your inheritance and the ends of the earth for Your possession” (Ps. 2:8). After all, the ways in which God leads human souls are different, the plans that He carries out regarding man are in connection and continuity with each other, which no one can explore or explain. IX. Celsus, of course, will not want to agree with the fact that after numerous prophets who worked to correct the people of Israel, Christ finally came to free the whole world from the fall - that Christ who did not have the need, as during the first dispensation 333, to resort to the help of whips, chains and torment to punish people. For when “the sower went out to sow” (Matt. 13:3; Luke 8:5; Mark 4:3), it turned out that only one teaching sermon (ἡ διδασκαλία) was enough to scatter the word (teaching) everywhere. X. Again, without reason and without proof, according to his custom, Celsus further accuses us of allegedly expressing ourselves about God without any reverence and respect. “It is clear,” he says, “that all this ranting about God is not based on a sense of holiness and reverence (before God).” And if we teach “about the need for punishment for sinners,” then these, in his opinion, “are only ways of intimidating ordinary people on our part - methods in which we ourselves do not believe.” That is why he equates us with those individuals who, during the mysteries in honor of Bacchus, display various monsters and ghosts. As for the mysteries of Bacchus 335, let the Greeks judge about them, whether these mysteries deserve any faith or not; Let Celsus and his comrades also listen (to the Greeks). For our part, we will only defend ourselves. Regarding this reference, we will give the following answer: we have set ourselves the task of promoting the correction of the human race, and we are trying to achieve this partly through threats of punishment, which, in our conviction, are necessary for everyone, and are also useful, perhaps, for those who will endure them (ἃς πεπείσμεθα ἀναγκαίας εἶναι ? partly we try to achieve - through the promise of bliss in the kingdom of God, for those who lead a virtuous life and through this become worthy of having God as their king 336. XI. Celsus further wants to show that our teaching about the universal flood or the destruction of the world by fire does not contain anything new and nothing unusual, that in this case we took on faith what we found in our Scriptures, while completely distorting the stories about these events available among the Greeks and barbarians. He says: “although they (the Christians) did not understand these stories, they nevertheless heard that after long periods of time, when the constellations again return to the place from which they descended, the world is destroyed by fire and covered with water, and that the last time, in the time of Deucalion, there was a flood, and that, therefore, the general alternation of things suggests the necessity of destroying the world by fire. This is where the source of their false opinion is! That is why they say that God will come into the world as a tormentor armed with fire.” And we will answer this objection. It seems surprising to me that Celsus, a deeply read man who shows himself to be an expert in many historical works, lost sight of the antiquity of Moses, whom some Greek historians trace back to the time of Inachus 337, the father of Phoroneus, whom both the Egyptians and experts in Phoenician history unanimously recognize as very ancient. Let Celsus also take the trouble to read the two books of Flavius Josephus about the antiquity of the Jewish people: here too he will find that Moses is much older than those writers who said that “after a long time there are floods and fires in the world” and which, in the opinion of Celsus, the Jews and Christians misunderstood, expressing, as a result of their misunderstanding of these legends about the ignition of the world, the position that “God will descend into the world as a torturer armed with fire." XII. Whether there are periods of time or not, and with them there are or not floods and fires that occur periodically, and whether the Holy Scripture teaches about all this, and especially in those places where Solomon speaks; “what has been, that will be: and what has been done, that will be done” (Ecc. 1:9) and so on: we do not intend to talk about all this in this case. It will only be enough to note that neither Moses nor some prophets - people of extreme antiquity - borrowed all their sayings and stories about the world fire from others. If we take into account the chronological sequence, then most likely (we must admit that) others misunderstood them and, not having accurately assimilated their expressions about these world events, for their part, allowed the fiction that the same events would always take place in a certain period, which in their essential and individual characteristics would not differ at all from the events of previous times. As for us, we do not place either a flood or a fire in close connection with the circulation of times and the periodic changes of stars; we say that the cause of all such world events is hidden in sin, which, due to the fact that it increases unusually, is purified by flood and fire. If the prophets, representing God as descending, put into His mouth the following words: “Do I not fill heaven and earth, says the Lord” (Jer. 23:24): then such expressions must be understood figuratively (τροπολογοῦμεν). It is God who descends from His own greatness and height when He arranges (οἰκονομεῖ) the affairs of people and especially the actions of sinners. And, as they usually say, teachers descend to the level of understanding of children, and wise men and people in general who have delved into the very essence of knowledge (τοὺς προκόπτοντας οὐ τῷ σωματικῶς), adapt to young people who have just begun to study philosophy, and as this does not imply, of course, bodily condescension: similarly, the saying of Holy Scripture about the condescension or ascension of God 338 must be understood not in the usual grossly sensual sense of the word. XIII. But since Celsus is trying to spitefully ridicule us, claiming that we are supposedly talking about “God descending into the world as a tormentor armed with fire,” since he thereby forces us to go somewhat deeper into the question posed, even if it was inappropriate in this case, we nevertheless intend to give here a few short remarks in order to prove to our readers that we are able to repel the ridicule of Celsus. Only after this we will move on to further points of his objections. In the Holy Scriptures we read that our God “is a giving fire” (Deut. 4:24, 9:3; Heb. 12:29), that “streams of fire proceed from His face” 339 (ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ), that He even enters “like a melting fire and like purifying lye” ( Malakh. 3:2), in order to purify 340 his people. Since God “is a consuming fire,” we ask: what is it that must be destroyed by Him? In our opinion, this is the wickedness of people and their deeds, which are figuratively called “wood, hay and stubble” (1 Cor. 3:12) - in a word, such things that God destroys like fire. It is about the evil (man) that it is said that he “erects wood, hay and straw” on a previously laid rational foundation. And if anyone proves to us that the (sacred) writer in this case thought differently than we do; if someone claims that an evil (man) on this basis allegedly builds literally “wood, hay and straw,” then this means that by this fire one must understand material, crudely sensual fire. If it is obvious that the name “wood, hay and straw” figuratively refers to the deeds of an evil person, then does not this also entail a direct answer to the question of what kind of fire should be meant here that destroys this kind of tree? The Apostle says: “it is revealed in fire, and the fire tries everyone’s work, what kind it is” 341; “Whoever’s work that he arranged survives will receive a reward. But if anyone’s work is burned up, he will suffer loss” (1 Cor. 3:13–15). By a deed that is burned, what else can be meant but that everyday deed that comes from sinfulness? Our God is, therefore, a “consuming fire” in the exact sense that we have indicated. He thus “enters like the fire of a furnace” for the purpose of purifying the rational nature, filled with the lead of wickedness and other impurities of matter (Ezek. 22:18, 20-22), desecrating - let me put it this way - the golden and silver nature of the soul. In the same sense, it is also said that streams of fire come from the face of God - i.e. to destroy the wickedness with which our entire (our) soul is filled. This answer is sufficient to the words of Celsus: “this is the cause of error; That’s why they say: God will descend as a tormentor armed with fire.” XIV. Let's see what Celsus says next with great boasting of this kind: “once again,” he says, “let us return to our reasoning and at the same time present even more evidence. Of course, I won’t say anything new, but only what has long been considered a generally accepted truth (πάλαι δεδογμένα). God is good, and beautiful, and blessed, He is in the best and most excellent conditions. If He descends to people, then in this case a change is necessary for Him: His goodness must turn into sinfulness, His moral purity (καλοῦ) into something shameful (εἰς αἰσχρὸν), His bliss into misfortune, His perfection into the greatest depravity. Who would want to experience this kind of change? Moreover, it is the nature of mortal nature to change and take on another form; immortal nature is such that it always remains the same. In any case, God could not take upon Himself such a change 342. It seems to me that there is no need to answer this objection (of Celsus) after I have outlined in detail how we need to understand the words of Scripture that speak of the descent of God into the conditions of human existence (πρὸς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα). This descent is possible for Him without change; contrary to the opinion of Celsus, we do not teach that (the descent of God) must be combined with a change of His “goodness into sinfulness, His moral purity into something shameful, His blessedness into misery, His perfection into the greatest depravity.” God remains unchangeable in His being (τῇ οὐσίᾳ) and condescends to human affairs only through His Providence and economy (τῇ προνοίᾳ καὶ τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ). And that God is unchangeable - we affirm this on the basis of the Divine Scriptures, where God speaks about Himself - in one place: “You are the same” (Ps. 101:28) and in another place: “I do not change” (Mal. 3:6). With the gods of Epicurus, however, the situation is completely different. They are made of atoms; they, therefore, by their very nature and composition can be subject to destruction, as long as they have not even tried to remove from themselves those other atoms from which they are threatened with destruction and destruction. And the god of the Stoics - since he is a body - only then acquires guiding significance for them for all existence, when the moment of destruction by fire comes for the world, but, on the contrary, God is dismembered in the world when a new world formation occurs 343. After all, all these (philosophers) with their natural mind could not rise to the idea of ​​God as a being, completely unchangeable, simple, uncomplicated and indivisible. XV. But the being who descended to people was “in the form of God” and, out of love for humanity, “made Himself of no reputation” (Phil. 2:6–7), in order to thus be able to be understood by people (χωρηθῆναι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων). But it does not follow from this that a change occurred with Him from good to evil, since He “committed no sin” (1 Peter 2:22), and His moral purity also did not change into something shameful, since He did not know sin (2 Cor. 5:21), He did not pass from a state of bliss to a state of disaster; for, although He “humbled Himself” (Phil. 2:8), through this He did not lose anything of His blessedness, since He “humbled” Himself for the benefit of our race. Likewise, His highest (moral) perfection did not at all turn into the greatest depravity; for how can His beneficence (τὸ χρηστὸν) and love for mankind be an expression of the greatest depravity? If a doctor sees all the horrors (of a diseased state) and touches purulent wounds in order to heal the sick, will you really say that as a result of this he is already changing from good to evil, from beautiful to shameful, or that he is moving from a state of well-being to a state of disaster? True, a doctor who looks at all the horrors (of illnesses) and touches purulent wounds is not completely immune from the danger that may arise from contact with such things. But He who is the healer of the wounds (cf. Luke 10:34) of our souls by the power of the Word of God, which abides in Him, was Himself out of any danger. And if Celsus thinks that the immortal God, the Word, could not perceive a mortal body and a human soul without a change and application occurring, then we ourselves will teach him that the Word in its essence (τῇ οὐσίᾳ) always remains the Word (cf. John 1:1) and does not experience 344 any suffering that depresses the body or soul. And only in order to adapt oneself to those who cannot bear the rays and splendor of His Divinity (cf. Matt. 17:2; Mark 9:3; Luke. 9:29), He becomes as if flesh (οἱονεὶ σὰρξ γίνεται) and conducts His conversations carnally (σωματικῶς λαλούμενος) until everyone (at first) receiving Him in such form, and then gradually raised higher by the Word (κατὰ βραχὺ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου μετεωριζόμενος), will not finally be able - so to speak - to contemplate His initial (and highest) image (τήν προηγουμένην μορφὴν θεάσασθαι). XVI. This is precisely how the images of the Word (τοῦ λόγου μορφαί) are different, in a certain way (οἱονεὶ), under which It appears to those who wish to become His disciples. The Word does this in accordance with the degree of receptivity of each of them: differently in relation to those who have just recently (ἐπ' ὀλίγον) began to more or less (ἐπὶ πλεῖον) successfully succeed (in the knowledge of His teaching), and differently - in relation to those who have already come close to virtue, and differently - in relation to those who stand already on the path to righteousness. But, of course, not as Celsus and his associates wish, our God was “transformed” (Matthew 17:2; Mark 9:2; Luke 9:28). If He, having ascended a high mountain, deigned to appear there in a different and much more majestic image compared to the one in which He was contemplated by those remaining below and who were unable to follow Him to the mountain, then all this happened because the eyes of these latter were still too weak to perceive the brilliance of this majestic and Divine Transfiguration of the Word. After all, they could hardly contain Him even in the form (in which He had previously appeared among them). That is why they, being unable to contemplate the greatness that He now possessed, could only say about Him: “We saw Him, and there was no appearance in Him that would attract us to Him. He was despised and humbled before men” (Isa. 53:2–3). – These are the remarks that I considered necessary to bring in as a rebuke to Celsus, who does not understand what is said in the (Gospel) stories about the transfigurations or changes in the image of Jesus, who cannot distinguish between the mortal and the immortal in Him. XVII. And is this Gospel story - especially if it is understood as it should be understood - not much more sublime than the legend of Dionysus, who only after being deceived by the Titans, overthrown by them from the throne of Jupiter and torn to pieces by them - only after all this again received a restored body and, as it were, came to life and then returned again to heaven? Or is it only the Greeks who are allowed to explain all this kind of fiction allegorically and classify them as legends about the soul (and its life), while for us every path to an appropriate interpretation remains closed, even if it finds harmonious consistency in the Scriptures, which are from the Divine Spirit abiding in pure souls? Celsus actually has no idea about the meaning (τὸ βούλημα) of our Scriptures. That is why he disputes in them only the meaning that he himself ascribes to them, and not the one that they have. If Celsus had only understood what would happen to the soul in the eternal life that awaits it, and had also formed an understanding of the essence of the soul and its origin, then he would not have found anything funny in the fact that the Immortal entered into a mortal body, and in any case not through that transmigration from one body to another, which Plato speaks of, 345 but in some other, more sublime way. Celsus would have seen a special expression of great love for people in the fact that (the Son of God) came down to convert “the lost sheep of the house of Israel” (Matthew 15:24), as Scripture mysteriously expressed it, to convert, I say, those sheep that had wandered from the mountains and to whom the shepherd came, as they say in some parables, leaving other sheep on the mountains that had not gone astray (Matt. 18:12–13; Luke 15:4). XVIII. Celsus dwells for a long time on what he does not even understand. Thus, he is, in fact, to blame for our repetitions of the same thoughts. We, for our part, did not want to allow anyone to think that we left part of his objections without appropriate research. This is what Celsus says further: “or God really changes,” as these (Christians) think, “into a mortal body, which actually cannot be allowed, as was proven earlier; or He does not change, but only makes those who look at Him believe that He is changing. If this is so, it means that He allows lies and deception. But lies and deceit are always evil, except perhaps when lies and deceit are used as a means of healing the sick, or to heal insane friends, or to avoid danger threatened by enemies. But the sick and the insane, again, are not the friends of God; Yes, God is hardly afraid of anyone, therefore, there is hardly any need to resort to lies in order to avoid danger.” This objection can be answered in two ways: one of them is given to us by the nature (φύσεως) of the Divine Word, which is God, and the other way we find in the soul of Jesus. About the nature of the Word I say: how in the body of a nurse food is transformed into milk in an adaptive way to the nature of the child, how, by order of a doctor, a sick person takes such food as can and should contribute to his recovery and restoration, and how strong and healthy people, on the contrary, are offered completely different food - similarly, God changes the power (δύναμιν) of His Word, which should nourish human souls, according to the degree of receptivity of each of them. That is why, according to the word of Scripture, some are given “pure milk of the word” (1 Peter 2:2), while others, weaker ones, are given only garden vegetables, and others, who are perfect, are given “solid food” (Rom. 14:2; Heb. 5:12–14). And in any case, the Word does not deceive its nature when it becomes nourishment for everyone according to the degree of his receptivity; it is not capable of any deception or any lie. If someone wants to associate the change with the soul of Jesus, which was united with the body, then we will ask such a person the question of how exactly he imagines this change. If he means in this case a change in essence, then we will say to this that a change cannot be allowed not only in relation to the soul (of Jesus), but also in relation to any other rational soul. If at the same time they still insist on a change on the basis that the soul, having united with the body, found itself, as it were, in a suffering position (πάσχει τι) due to the influence on it from the side of the body and from the side of the place to which it came: then we will ask what is strange in the fact that the Word, out of great love for mankind, deigned to bestow the Savior (λόγῳ καταβιβάζοντι σωτῆρα) to the human race? Moreover, previously none of those who promised to grant healing could accomplish as many deeds as that soul showed, which voluntarily (ἑκουσίως) out of love for our family descended into this vale of human misfortunes (εἰς τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας κῆρας). The Divine Word knows this, and everywhere in many places of Scripture speaks about it. It will be enough if we cite in this case at least one saying of Paul, which reads like this: “Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus. He, being the image of God, did not consider it robbery to be equal with God; but He destroyed Himself, taking the form of a slave and becoming in appearance like a man; He humbled Himself, becoming obedient even to the point of death, even death on the cross. Therefore God has highly exalted Him and given Him the name that is above every name” (Phil. 2:5–9). XIX. Others, if they wish, let them agree with the opinion of Celsus that “God does not actually change, but that to those who see Him, He only gives reason to think that He changes.” This objection does not concern us, since we believe that Jesus did not come only illusorily, but truly and truly came to people on earth. Nevertheless, we intend to present a refutation of these words of Celsus. Celsus! Don’t you yourself say that lies and deception are sometimes permissible as a means of healing? Is it strange that something similar happened in the case when He accepted the intention to accomplish the work of salvation (σῴζειν) using the same means? It happens that words seasoned with lies - as happens with doctors when they heal the sick - are sometimes more likely to correct morals than words corresponding to the truth. However, we are thinking of using this method only to protect others. So, there is also nothing strange in the fact that the one who heals sick friends also heals the human race that is dear to him using the same means: which are not used with a (bad) purpose and intention, but only in relation to the circumstances. Since humanity had lost reason, the Word had to use those means of salvation that He found useful for the insane when converting them to the path of rational life. Celsus says: “Only those who think to avoid danger from enemies do this.” But God, in any case, fears no one; He, therefore, did not need to deceive his enemies in order to avoid the danger threatening them. No one said anything like this about our Savior; therefore, it is completely unnecessary and vain labor to refute Celsus’s very objection. To the words: “neither a sick person nor a madman can, in any case, be a friend to God,” I already answered for others even earlier. There I said in rebuke (to Celsus) that the dispensation was accomplished not for the sake of sick and insane friends, but in order to accept into fellowship with God those who, due to illness of the soul and unnatural darkness of the mind, were still enemies. The Scriptures make it absolutely clear that everything that Jesus endured, he endured for the sake of sinners, in order to distract them from their sins and make them righteous (cf. Matt. 9:13; Mark 2:17; Luke 5:32; 1 Tim. 1:15; Heb. 2:15). XX. Then Celsus depicts, on the one hand, Jews arguing about why, in their opinion, the coming of Christ is expected only in the future, and, on the other hand, he also depicts Christians arguing among themselves about the coming of the Son of God to people as an event that has already happened. We, perhaps, will discuss these words of Celsus, but only, if possible, briefly. His Jews say the following: “since life is filled with all kinds of vices, it is necessary that God send someone who would punish the wrongdoers and bring everything back to purity, just as it was during the time of the first flood.” And since he further forces Christians to make some additions to what has been said, it is clear that he attributes the above words to them too 346. But what is strange about the fact that, in view of the spread of evil, someone should come who will cleanse the world and give everyone what they deserve? After all, it would be unworthy of God if He did not set a limit to the spread of evil and did not renew the world (τὰ πράγματα). And the Greeks themselves know that the earth is cleansed during certain periods through flood or fire. So Plato says in one place; “When the gods, who cleanse the earth with waters, bring a flood to the earth, then those living on the mountains 347,” etc. or, perhaps, when such speeches are heard from the lips of the Greeks, then they deserve attention and respect, and when we affirm the same thing that the Greeks praise, then this seems to him an insignificant opinion that no longer has any value? In any case, people who have the firm intention of reading all the (Holy) Scriptures in their sequential connection and with a certain thoroughness, can prove not only the deep antiquity of the men who dealt with these issues in their writings, but also the sublime character of their legends, as well as the internal connection and consistency of the individual parts of these legends (τὸ ἀκόλουθον αὐτοῖς). XXI. I don’t understand why Celsus is trying to equate the flood, which, according to the teachings of Jews and Christians, cleansed the earth, with the destruction of the tower (of Babel). Even if we admit that the legend of the tower, as it is read in the first book of Moses (Gen. 2:1-9), does not contain any sublime meaning, but, as Celsus thinks, should be understood literally 348, then even then it is not yet clear that the construction of the tower coincided with the cleansing of the earth. True, Celsus can still defend the opinion that the so-called confusion of languages ​​served to cleanse the earth. But, however, even regarding this circumstance, every scientist (ὁ δυνάμενος) can give a more or less detailed explanation, especially if he sets out to show what this narrative means, understood in the ordinary sense, and what in it should be classified as allegory. But since Celsus believes that Moses, who told the story of the tower and the confusion of languages, allegedly borrowed everything concerning the tower from his own distorted story about the sons of Aloe, it must be said that before Homer 349, in my opinion, no one even spoke about the sons of Aloe 350, and that the story of the tower told by Moses, as I am convinced, is much older not only than Homer, but also the invention of Greek writing itself. Who, one might ask, first distorted the story of another? Is he the author of the myth about the sons of Aloe - the story of the tower, or, conversely, who wrote about the tower and the confusion of languages ​​- the legend of the sons of Aloe? After all, it is clear to any unprejudiced reader that Moses is older than Homer. Likewise, in the tale of the destruction by fire of the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah for their wickedness, a tale placed by Moses in the book of Genesis (Gen. 19:1-29), Celsus sees similarities with the story of Phaethon 351. And in this case, Celsus made the same mistake: he did not take into account the antiquity of Moses. Meanwhile, the writers telling about Phaethon, apparently, lived even later than even Homer, who, for his part, lived later than Moses 352. But we actually do not reject the position that fire, which has the power of purification, will once destroy the world, that sin and vice will be cast out and that the renewal of the world will come again (cf. Isa. 24:1; Jer. 12:7, 40:8; Mic. 1:2; Zeph. 1:2, 3:8; Mal. 3:1); we even admit that we learned all this from the Holy Books - from the Prophets. Since the prophets - as we talked about this earlier 353 - predicted about many future events, through the fulfillment of many of their predictions clearly proved that they spoke the truth and that the Spirit of God dwelt in them, then it is self-evident that in relation to those predictions that have not yet been fulfilled, we must believe the prophets or, rather, the Spirit of God who (dwelt) in them. XXII. “The Christians,” Celsus continues further, “added some more details to the legends of the Jews. They began to argue that the Son of God had already been sent (to earth) because of the sins of the Jews and that the Jews experienced the wrath of God for punishing Jesus and feeding Him gall (cf. Matt. 27:34; Ps. 69:22).” Of course, everyone is free, at will, to denounce the legends (of Christians) as lies, but it is a fact that not even one full generation has passed since the Jews subjected Jesus to such suffering - the entire Jewish people were expelled from their place of residence. After all, Jerusalem, unless I’m mistaken, was destroyed 42 years after the crucifixion of Jesus 354. And nowhere do we find a legend from which it would be clear that the Jews, from the very beginning of their existence, when they were conquered by the strongest (peoples), for such a long period of time, were deprived of the opportunity to honor their God and perform sacred rituals (σεμνῆς ἁγιστείας καὶ λατρείας). And if sometimes it may seem that God is abandoning the Jews for their sins, then He again visited them (with His mercy) and returned them to their land, where they could then freely perform their divine services established by the law. As proof that there was something Divine and sacred in Jesus (θεῖόν τι καὶ ἱερὸν χρῆμα), we can point to the fact that it was because of Him that the Jews endured such great and numerous disasters for so long. And we affirm with complete determination that their kingdom will no longer be restored. After all, they committed an atrocity that surpassed all boundaries of vileness, plotting their intrigues against the Savior of the human race in the very city where they performed the rites established by law to God - these symbols of the great sacraments. That is why it was precisely the city in which Jesus endured all these sufferings that had to be destroyed to the ground, the entire Jewish people deprived of their place of residence and scattered throughout the world, and other (peoples) called to participate in the bliss promised by God. These other (peoples) are precisely the Christians, to whom the doctrine of true (εἰλικρινοῦς) and pure (καθαρᾶς) worship of God descended and who thus accepted new laws, adapted to the widespread and strengthened civil system (πολιτείᾳ) 355. After all, the previous laws were granted only to one people, ruled by kings under the influence of such domestic and monotonous conditions, which now completely and in all their content turned out to no longer correspond (to the new order of Christian life). XXIII. After this, ridiculing, according to his custom, both Jews and Christians at the same time, Celsus compares both “with a swarm of bats and with ants crawling out of their holes, and with frogs sitting by their swamp, and with earthworms gathered together in a corner of a dung heap and arguing among themselves about which of them turned out to be the most sinner, and asserting this position: only for us alone is God clarifies in advance and announces all His deeds, He provides only for us alone and squanders all His worries about us alone, abandoning the whole world, the entire movement of heaven, leaving the entire vast earth to its own will, only to us alone He sends His heralds and sends them tirelessly, concerned that we always remain in unity with Him.” Thus, in his imagination, “we are like worms who say: God exists, but only we occupy the closest place in relation to him, because He created us in everything like God and only all things are subordinate to us: earth, water, air, and stars - everything is for us, everything is intended to serve us.” The worms are us, obviously - he says this: “and now: when some among us have become sinners, either God Himself will come, or He will send the Son to cast the wicked into fire, and the rest of us, together with Him, will enjoy eternal life.” To all these speeches, Celsus also adds: “these disputes,” he says, “are still appropriate in relation to worms and frogs, but not in relation to Jews and Christians, who argue so much among themselves.” XXIV. To answer these accusations directed against us, we turn to people who share all such accusations with the following question: do you intend to equate all people, without distinction, in comparison with the superiority of God, to a swarm of bats, and to ants, and to frogs, and to worms, or perhaps to some people you do not apply the proposed comparison and consider them really to be people on the basis that they have reason and have established laws for themselves? And maybe you only want to equate Christians and Jews with all these animals because you don’t like their laws? You, of course, can give any answer to our question, but in any case, we will find something to answer you and will try to prove that such a comparison is inappropriate, no matter whether you apply it to all people, or only to Christians and Jews. Let us take for the first time your statement according to which all people, in comparison with God, as you say, should be placed on the same level as these pitiful animals on the basis that they are so small and insignificant that in no way can they be compared with the immeasurable greatness of God. But what do you mean by insignificance (μικρότης)? Answer me, good people (ὦ οὗτοι)! If you make this (insignificance) dependent on the body, then know that - reasoning sensibly (πρὸς ἀλήθειαν) - the body cannot yet be a criterion in determining what should be recognized as great and what is small. Otherwise, vultures and elephants will turn out to be more perfect than us humans, and this is because they are larger, stronger, and live much longer than us. But no reasonable person will insist that these unreasonable animals, only because of the size of their bodies, are superior to us. Actually, reason elevates rational beings above all irrational (animals). Of course, those pure and blessed beings who you call good geniuses, but among us are usually called Angels of God, will rebel against such a comparison, as well as all other beings who have a higher organization in comparison with people: after all, their rational nature has perfection (organization) and is endowed with virtues of all kinds. XXV. If you consider a person insignificant not for the body, but for the soul, on the basis that the soul is lower in dignity than all other rational beings, especially pure and holy beings, and stands lower than them because sin dwells in it: then why then should only the bad ones among the Christians and the viciously living among the Jews be recognized as a swarm of bats, and ants, and worms, and frogs, and not the wicked among the Jews? other peoples? If we adhere to this view, then all sinners, and especially those who have completely dissolved the waves of their passions, should preferably be considered before other people as a bat, a worm, a frog, and an ant. Suppose there were some orator like Demosthenes 356, and at the same time he would be as vicious as the latter, and his behavior would be just as dissolute, or, suppose there were some other person like the famous rhetorician named Antiphon 357, who in his book known as “On the Truth”, moreover, in expressions that we find in the work Celsus, rejects the doctrine of Providence: then, then, all such people would turn out to be no better than worms crawling in the corner of manure - manure, I say, ignorance and ignorance? In any case, no creature endowed with reason, no matter what its aspirations may be, without violating justice, can be equated to a worm for the simple reason that it still has aspirations directed towards virtue. After all, this desire for virtue, as if imprinted in the soul (ὑποτυπώσεις), does not even allow the thought of equating to worms those very creatures that are gifted with the ability to virtue (τοὺς δυνάμει ἔχοντας τὴν ἀρετὴν) and cannot even completely destroy the seeds of virtue innate in themselves (τὰ σπέρματα αὐτῆς). So, it is clear from here that not all people in general are worms in comparison even with God. After all, since reason owes its origin to the Word that resides with God (παρὰ θεῷ), then for a rational being (τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον) it is absolutely impossible to deny its kinship with God. It also follows from this that bad Christians and Jews, who in fact cannot even be considered Christians and Jews, even if they can be equated to worms lying in a dunghill corner, are in any case not preferable to the wicked from among other nations. If the very nature of reason does not allow such a comparison, then, obviously, we should not offend human nature, adapted to virtue, by comparing it with such animals, even if it sins out of ignorance. XXVI. If, because of the teaching (δόγματα), which Celsus does not like and which he, apparently, does not know at all, Christians and Jews, and not other people, turn out to be worms and ants, then we will invite our adversary to make a comparison of the doctrine, which, by general admission, Christians and Jews profess, with the teaching of other people. Then it will be clear to those who recognize some people as worms and ants that the comparison with worms, ants and frogs, in fact, will need to be applied to those who have lost true knowledge of God and, carried away by a false idea of \u200b\u200bpiety, began to believe this piety in the veneration of dumb animals or idols, or other creatures, the beauty of which, on the contrary, should lead them to admiration and veneration of the Creator these creatures. Then it will be clear that people - beings, so to speak, more noble than people - are actually those who followed the reason (of Revelation), who, having renounced stone and wood, and even silver and gold - these precious objects in the eyes of men - in a word, from all worldly beauty, ascended to the Creator of all things, who were imbued with hope in Him in the confidence that He alone can give satisfaction (διαρκεῖν) to all being, that He penetrates into the thoughts of everyone and hears the prayers of everyone - who therefore send their prayers to Him, and in their deeds they seem to feel Him as a spectator of all actions, and in their speeches they seem to fear His presence as a listener of all words for fear of uttering something displeasing to God. And is it really true that such piety, which cannot be broken either by labor, or by the fear of death, or by the convictions of reason, does not matter at all, if only so that people who take on such a feat are not equated with worms, which comparison could only be made in relation to the moment preceding such great piety? Is it possible, further, that all such people who overcome the lust of a shameful passion - a lust that weakens and upsets so many souls, do these people, only because they harbor the confidence in themselves of the impossibility of inheriting a fellowship with God, without striving to approach Him through abstinence, seem to you to be brothers of worms, relatives of ants, doubles (παραπλήσιοι) frogs? Is righteousness, this bright virtue, which is the basis of public law (ὁμογενὲς κοινωνικόν), which determines the attitude towards one’s neighbor, - the basis of justice, philanthropy and benevolence - no longer has any value so that the owner of such a virtue is not compared to a bat? On the contrary, aren’t those who indulge in unbridled passions, which many people are, who bring visiting corrupt women to the point of complete indifference and at the same time teach that such actions do not at all violate decency - aren’t these people, I say, the essence of worms wallowing in the mud? And such a conclusion is all the more fair if we contrast such people with those men who accepted the teaching - not to take “members of Christ” (1 Cor. 6:15, 19), not to take the body in which the Word dwells, in order to make them “members of a harlot” (1 Cor. 6:15) - to those men who learned that the body, this dwelling place of the rational soul and dedicated to God, the Creator of all things, is “the church of God” (1 Cor. 3:16, 6:19; 2 Cor. 6:16), inhabited by them, and that (the body) becomes such (a church) if the thought of the Creator remains pure and unsullied (καθαρᾶς) - to those men who are even afraid of desecrating the church of God through forbidden cohabitation (συνουσίας) and thus consider the exercise of abstinence as an essential part of the worship of God. XXVII. I'm not even talking about other vices that prevail among people - about vices from which, perhaps, even such men who seem pure in their philosophical convictions are not free. After all, there are many philosophers who, even in the field of philosophy, are not considered exponents of truth (οἱ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ νόθοι). I cannot only begin to talk about the fact that many such shortcomings 358 can be found among those who are not both Christians and Jews. I argue that it is precisely possible not to find such shortcomings among Christians, especially if you truly (κυρίως) examine what a Christian is. And if, nevertheless, there may be shortcomings (359), then it is not at all among those who have access to public meetings and come there for general prayers; shortcomings can only appear among those who have not yet been excluded from communication in prayers - among those who can get there completely unnoticed and remain undetected in the crowd. Consequently, we are not at all some kind of “heap of worms”, since by addressing the Jews, on the basis of their own Holy books, which constitute an object of faith for them, we can testify and prove that the Savior predicted by the prophets has already come, that God has abandoned the Jews for their greatest crimes, that, on the contrary, we, who have accepted the Word, place the best hopes in God, the basis of which lies faith in God and our life, free from all wickedness and vice and can lead us to fellowship with God (οἰκειῶσαι αὐτῷ) (Tit. 2:14). Consequently, not everyone who recognizes himself as a Jew or a Christian can simply say about himself: “the whole world and the movement of heaven” were created exclusively for our sake by God. But only those who - according to the teachings of Jesus (Matt. 5:8-9) - “pure in heart, and meek, and a peacemaker”, who can patiently endure dangers combined with piety, only such a person can rightfully trust in God and, if he is familiar with the prophets and understands them, at the same time say: all this to us, believers, God has revealed and announced in advance. XXVIII. In the mouths of Christians, who in the eyes of Celsus are worms, he also puts such words. “God left the care of the movement of the heavens, He left this entire vast earth to its own course, and only for us alone does He provide, only to us alone does He send His messengers and sends them strictly, taking care that we establish an eternal connection with Him.” It should be noted that Celsus thus forces us to say, in fact, things that we have never thought about. We have already read and are convinced that God loves everything that exists, and among the things He created there is nothing that would be the subject of His hatred, for He cannot be a hater of what was prepared for Him (Wed. Wis. 11:25). We also read the following saying: “You spare everything, because everything is Yours, soul-loving Lord. Your imperishable Spirit abides in everything. Therefore, little by little you reprove those who are mistaken and, reminding them of what they are sinning, you admonish them (Wis. 11:27, 12:1-2). How can we say that “God forsook care for the movement of the heavens and the whole world, despised this entire vast earth and only stops all his worries on us alone” - on us, who know that in our prayers we must always remember that “the earth is full of the mercy of the Lord” (Ps. 33:5), that “the mercy of the Lord is on all flesh” (Sir. 18:12), that the Lord is good and “commands His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the just and the unjust” (Matthew 5:45) and that He convinces us, if we want to be His children, to follow His example, and that He teaches us to do good to all people (cf. Matthew 5:44; Luke 6:35) to the extent possible. Scripture itself calls Him “the Savior of all men, and especially of the faithful” (1 Tim. 4:10); and of His Anointed One we read (in Scripture) that “He is the propitiation” (ἱλασμός) “for our sins, and not only for ours, but also for” the sins “of the whole world” (1 John 2:2). The passages cited (from Scripture) clearly state something completely different from what Celsus ascribes (to us). True, some of the Jews may hold somewhat other ideas of a restrictive nature, but in any case not Christians, who firmly know that “God proves His love for us by the fact that Christ died for us while we were still sinners” (Rom. 5:8). However, “hardly anyone will die for the righteous; perhaps someone will decide to die for a benefactor” (Rom. 5:7). Now Jesus, whom we call the Anointed of God, - this expression common to our Scriptures, - is preached to those who came for all sinners (1 Tim. 1:15), wherever they may be, - and, moreover, with the goal that sinners should leave sin and entrust themselves to God (Luke 9:20). XXIX. As for the expression: “God exists, but only we occupy the place closest to Him,” then perhaps Celsus really borrowed this expression from the lips of people whom he himself called “worms.” But then, it means that Celsus acts exactly like a person who wants to make the entire philosophical school responsible for an absurd thought expressed by some young man who went to the philosopher’s school for only three days and has already become proud in front of other people as being inferior to him (in philosophical education) and having no concept of philosophy. As for us, we know that there are many means that, in comparison with man, occupy a more honorable position. So we read in Scripture: “God became in the company of gods” (Ps. 82:1); but here we mean, of course, not the gods whom the pagans worship; for “all the gods of the nations are idols” (Ps. 96:5). Scripture tells us that God, who became “in the assembly of gods; He pronounced judgment among the gods” (Ps. 82:1). We also know that “although there are so-called gods, either in heaven or on earth, since there are many gods and many lords; but we have one God the Father, from whom are all things, and we are for Him, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we through Him” (1 Cor. 8:5–6). We also know that Angels occupy a higher position compared to people, and why people are equated with Angels when they reach the level of highest perfection. So it is said that after “the resurrection of the dead the righteous neither marry nor are given in marriage” (but become like the angels of heaven), they become “equal to the Angels” (Luke 20:35–36; Matt. 22:30). We “know” that there is also a distribution of all beings into categories, and of these some are so-called thrones, and others are dominions, others are powers, and others are principalities (Col. 1:16). From Scripture we know that we humans are much lower than those (Angelic powers) and can only cherish the hope of becoming like them all if we lead a godly life and act in everything according to the dictates of our faith. Finally, we read (in Scripture): “It has not yet been revealed what we will be. We only know that when He is revealed, we will be like Him, because we will see Him as He is” (1 John 3:2). If someone turns out to be the kind of person who will say: “God exists, but only we occupy the place closest to Him,” and if he expresses such words on the basis that he heard them from people who themselves do not know what they are saying, or - if they do know, they interpret the true teaching incorrectly, then I, for my part, could explain such words in the sense that we are people of this kind who have succeeded in knowledge, or - even better - succeeded both in knowledge and at the same time in virtue. After all, according to our understanding, all blessed natures have the same virtue 360. That is why we are commanded: “Be perfect as your Father in heaven” (Matthew 5:48). So, a good and honest person cannot at all be likened “to a worm” crawling “in the mud,” not a single pious person can be equated “to an ant,” not a single righteous person to “a frog”; Likewise, no person who has a soul enlightened by the quiet light of truth can be compared to a bat, without a clear violation of justice. XXX. It seems to me that Celsus did not understand the following passage (of Scripture): “Let us make man in Our image and in Our likeness” (Gen. 1:26), and only because of this, when referring to these words, he also brings out his “worms”, with which he puts into his mouth the words: “We were created by God, and are like Him in everything (πάντῃ).” But if Celsus had found out that there is a difference between the expression: “man was created in the image of God” and the expression: “created in the likeness”, if he had paid attention to the fact that according to Scripture God actually said this: “Let us make man in Our image and in Our likeness” - that God, therefore, created man in the image of God only, and not in the likeness either - then Celsus in any case would not have attributed to us the word that “We are completely like God.” We also do not claim that “the stars are under our control.” After all, only the resurrection of the righteous mentioned (in Scripture) - and what is meant by it, the wise men, of course, know - is equated (by the Apostle) with the sun, the moon, and the stars. The Apostle puts it this way: “There is one glory of the sun, another glory of the moon, another of the stars: and star differs from star in glory. So it is with the resurrection of the dead” (1 Cor. 15:41, 42). And in the ancient prophecy (Dan. 12:3) [ ]Daniel the same state of the righteous is meant. Celsus also ascribes to us the words that “everything is intended to serve us.” But he, perhaps, had never heard any of our sages really express themselves that way. He, perhaps, did not even know that, according to the commandment (of Christ), “the greatest among us must be the servant of all” (Matthew 20:26–27, 23:11). If the Greeks say: “The sun and night serve mortals,” 361 then in this case they find their expression beautiful, and they give it a well-known explanation. And if we say the same thing or something of the same kind, then Celsus is now already raising an attack against us and finds here a reason for objections. We, who, according to Celsus, are “worms”, allegedly said the following words: “since there are some people among us who have fallen into sin, God will come to us or send His Son to consign the wicked to fire, and only we, the rest of the frogs, will enjoy eternal life with Him.” So, look how Celsus, this venerable philosopher, plays the role of a jester and makes the doctrine of Divine justice, vengeance on the wicked and rewards for the righteous the subject of ridicule, mockery and witticisms! With all this, he also makes the following remark: “This dispute,” he says, “could still be allowed if only it were waged between worms and frogs, but not between Christians and Jews.” For our part, of course, we will not imitate Celsus; In the same way, we will not speak to his philosophers, who boast that they allegedly know the nature of all things, and, however, do not agree among themselves on the questions of how exactly the whole world came into being, how heaven and earth and everything that is contained in them were formed; how souls are governed by God, although they are without beginning (ἀγέννητοι) and not created by God, and also whether they pass from one body to another, or whether they arose simultaneously and together with the body, and then whether they remain (immortal) or not. Instead of welcoming and praising the aspirations of such people who devoted themselves entirely to the study of truth, one could simply subject them to ridicule and censure and say that they are, in fact, “worms that swarm in the dung heap” of this (earthly) human life and are so little proportionate to their strength that they speak about sublime things with such boldness, as if they actually understood them, and at the same time they try to assert that they precisely have comprehension and understanding of those things that no one can actually contemplate without special influx from above (χωρὶς ἐπιπνοίας κρείττονος) and without Divine help (θειοτέρας δυνάμεως). After all, how can none of the people know what is in a person except the human spirit living in him? Likewise, no one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God” (1 Cor. 2:11). But we have not yet reached such madness that human knowledge, understood in the ordinary sense of the word - knowledge that has as its subject not some base and ordinary questions, but is aimed at the study of truth - can be equated with the actions and aspirations of worms or some other similar (creatures). As friends of truth, we, on the contrary, openly testify of some Greek philosophers that they knew God, since “God showed it to them”; but only “they, having come to know God, did not glorify Him as God, and did not give thanks, but became futile in their speculations, and their foolish hearts were darkened; calling themselves wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like corruptible man, and birds, and four-footed creatures, and creeping things” (Rom. 1:19, 21-23). XXXI. To show then that Jews and Christians are no different from the animals mentioned above, Celsus goes on to say: “The Jews are runaway slaves who were expelled from Egypt, who never did anything of value, who were never even talked about and who were considered as nothing.” The fact that the Jews were by no means expelled slaves and were not Egyptians (by origin), but Jews who had just settled in Egypt - we have already talked about this above 362. If Celsus intends to base his position that the Jews were despised and put in nothing on the fact that almost nothing is said about their history by Greek writers, then we will tell him the following in response: if we delve into the consideration of the ancient civil system of the Jews, if we pay attention to the order of their laws, then we can come to the conclusion that they were people for whom earthly life was a reflection of heavenly life, who did not recognize any other God than God Almighty, who in their society did not tolerate any of the people involved in making idols. Indeed, there were no painters or sculptors in their land; they were delivered by the law itself from such people - and this is for the purpose that they would have no reason to allow the making of idols, which could mislead foolish people and distract the eyes of their souls from God (and chain them) to the earth. Among other things, they also had the following commandments: “lest you become corrupt and make for yourself any graven image, the image of any idol representing a man or a woman, the image of any livestock that is on the earth, the image of any winged bird that flies under the heavens, the image of any (creeping) creature crawling on the earth, the image of any fish that is in the waters below the earth” (Deut. 4:16–18). The law wanted them to adhere to the truth about every thing and not invent anything that could violate the truth and mislead them, being in fact either just a man, or in essence a woman, or a cattle, or a bird, or a reptile, or a fish. They further had a great and sublime commandment: “So that when you look up to heaven and see the sun, the moon and the stars, and all the host of heaven” 363, you are not deceived and do not bow down to them or serve them” (Deut. 4:19). How strict was the social discipline (πολιτεία) of the entire people, since the manifestation of any kind of effeminacy was prohibited among them! It is also worthy of surprise that they firmly observed the order, due to which they did not tolerate public women, who usually arouse sensual passions in young people, in their society. Their judicial power was in the hands of just people; They entrusted judicial duties only to such men who were known to have led an immaculate and virtuous life for many years; These men, for their moral purity, which elevated them above (ordinary) people, according to a custom that had long been established among the Jews, were called gods (cf. Ps. 82:1; Ex. 22:28). And it was necessary to see how the whole people indulged in wisdom: to practice listening to the Divine laws, they established the so-called Sabbath days and other holidays. And what else can we say about the establishment of their priestly service and sacrifices, which contained countless symbols, which were the subject of explanation for people who devoted themselves to their study. XXXII. But since there is nothing stable in human nature, this civil order was bound to collapse and be destroyed in a short time. That is why Providence, which accordingly directs everything that needs renewal (μεταποιήσεως), changed this praiseworthy order and, instead of the Jews, called believers from all nations and entrusted to them the holy faith of Jesus (τὴν σεμνὴν κατὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν θεοσέβειαν). This Jesus, who was not only gifted with the highest wisdom, but at the same time was a participant in the Divine nature (θείᾳ μοίρᾳ κοσμηθείς) and completely destroyed faith in earthly demons, who found pleasure in smoking incense, in bloody libations and in the fat of sacrificial animals and like the mythical titans or giants, distracted people from knowing God. Being beyond any danger from these (demons), who threaten with their machinations in general all good (creatures), He bestowed laws that give happiness to all who live in accordance with them. And now we no longer need to appease demons with sacrifices; on the contrary, we despise them from the depths of our souls, relying on the Word of God, which gives its help to everyone who lifts their eyes to God. And since it was the will of God that the teaching of Jesus should succeed among people, all the evil spirits’ plots remained fruitless, although they, for their part, made every effort to destroy Christians. They incited the kings, the Senate, all the rulers in general, and even the people themselves, who did not feel the evil and unrighteous tricks of the demons, against the Christian faith and its confessors. But the Word of God, despite all these obstacles, turned out to be stronger than all (the opponents); From the obstacles new forces seemed to emanate; the Word prospered more and more and continued to gather a harvest of souls. After all, this is what God wanted. These remarks, in fact, do not directly relate to the subject of the discussion, but nevertheless I consider them necessary. With these arguments I wanted to give an answer to the objections of Celsus, who, on the issue of the Jews, claims that “the Jews were supposedly runaway slaves expelled from Egypt, and that this people, so beloved by God, never did anything great and glorious.” And to the subsequent objections of Celsus, according to whom “the Jews were despised and treated as nothing,” I give an answer. The Jews were, so to speak, “a chosen race and a royal priesthood” (Cf. 1 Peter 2:9; Isa. 43:20; Exod. 19:6), which is why they avoided and distanced themselves from communication with other peoples for fear of corrupting their morals; they lived in complete safety under the cover of Divine power and did not, like other peoples, seek to acquire other kingdoms under their dominion; but at the same time, they were not so helpless that, with their small numbers, they remained open to intrigues (from enemies) and experienced the danger of being completely exterminated from them. And this state lasted for them only as long as their very way of life made them worthy of God’s help. But as soon as the life of the entire (Jewish) people became sinful and, as a result, it turned out to be necessary, through disasters, to turn them back to God, the Jews were abandoned by God both for a short and for a longer time - and all this until, finally, they were completely abandoned by God, when, during the period of Roman rule, they became the perpetrators of the greatest crime through the fact of the murder of Jesus. XXXIII. Immediately after this, Celsus attacks the contents of the first book of Moses, which is called Genesis 365. He says: “the Jews intended to connect their origin with the first offspring of deceivers and charlatans (γοήτων καὶ πλάνων ἀνθρώπων), and, as proof, they refer to vague and ambiguous expressions that they extracted from somewhere in a dark corner and reinterpret them uneducated and unreasonable people - despite the fact that for a number of centuries such things have never even been discussed.” In my opinion, here Celsus expressed very vaguely what he actually wanted to say. I even think that he deliberately allowed vagueness in this case, since he knew those solid foundations that directly indicate from which ancestors the Jewish people descend. On the other hand, he did not want to appear ignorant of what was said about the Jews and the origin of their tribe - on this so important issue. After all, there is no doubt that the three forefathers: Abraham, Isaac and Jacob were the ancestors of the Jews. And the names of these persons, if they were associated with the name of God, have such great power that not only among representatives of this people both in prayers addressed to God and in spells against demons - they are part of the formula: the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, but also in almost all spellcasters and all sorcerers 366. In sorcery books one often encounters just such an appeal to God and invocation of the name of God - and this serves as clear evidence in favor of the opinion that, being connected with these men, this invocation had special power in the fight against demons. I believe that this proof, with which both Jews and Christians substantiate the position that Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the forefathers of the Jewish people, were sacred men, could not have been completely unknown to Celsus, and if the latter passed it over in silence, it could only be because he was unable to dispute its force and significance. XXXIV. To all who call on God in this way, we ask the question: tell us, good people, who was Abraham, what characteristics did Isaac possess, what power did Jacob have, since calling on the name of God in connection with their names performed such miracles? From whom did you learn or could you learn what is told about these men? And who exactly took the trouble to portray their entire history and attribute to them in this story - either directly or indirectly - the power of miracles and glorify them themselves as miracle workers or, at least, give reasonable readers a reason to assume the great and miraculous properties and powers of these men? If you cannot name us a single historian - neither Greek nor barbarian - if you cannot show us even one story full of mystery (μυστικῆς ἀναγραφῆς) in which the life of those men would be depicted, then we will offer you a book called “Genesis” and which narrates the deeds committed these men, about those prophetic sayings (τοὺς τοῦ θεοῦ χρησμούς) with which God addressed them - and in this case we will pose the following question to you: if you use the names of these three ancestors of the (Jewish) people (in your spells) on the basis of what you have learned from experience great power of such invocations, then does not this alone already serve as obvious proof of the fact that the said patriarchs were Divine men (παρίστησι τὸ θεῖον τῶν ἀνδρῶν)? And yet, about these men we have the only source - namely, the Holy Books kept by the Jews. They also often resort to the following formula against demons and other unclean forces: “The God of Israel, and the God of the Jews, and the God who drowned the king of Egypt and the Egyptians in the Red Sea” (Ex. 5:1, 3:18, 5:3–4, 15:4). And these names and their meaning were conveyed to us, again, exclusively only by Jews, who in their native writing and in their native language told and explained all these legends. How could the Jews come to the point of connecting their family with these men, who in the eyes of Celsus are only charlatans and deceivers; how could they, without any shame, trace the beginning of their origin to such men? It is certainly true that their names are Jewish, and it is also true that the Holy Books of the Jews, in the Hebrew language and in Hebrew script, tell the story of these three men. And all this serves as sufficient evidence in favor of the position that the Jewish people have a family connection with these men. And to this day, Jewish names, closely associated with Jewish speech, are borrowed either from the Holy Books, or from those words and things that find their explanation in Jewish speech. XXXV. We invite anyone who has read the works of Celsus to judge whether he himself does not want to create a fog in his next words: “and they 367 tried to trace their origin from the first generation of charlatans and deceivers, citing as evidence dark and ambiguous expressions, the meaning of which is buried in deep darkness.” True, of course, these names are hidden and not understandable and clear to everyone, but for us their meaning is beyond doubt, although they are used by people who are alien to our faith. On what basis Celsus can reject them, I don’t even know, since he nowhere explains what exactly is ambiguous and unclear in these words. If Celsus really wanted to fight in this case in an honest and ordinary way, then he, in any case, would have to present the genealogy of the Jews, who, in his opinion, shamelessly boast of their descent from Abraham and his descendants, in full form, bring them to the relevant places and then, first of all, show what opinion he himself considers correct, and only after that should he decisively overthrow all false views on this issue by the power of the truth that he ascribes to himself, and by the arguments that he says in favor of this truth and reinforce it. But neither Celsus nor anyone else, with the most careful study, can explain the nature of these names, which are resorted to to perform miraculous actions (εἰς δυνάμεις), nor can they prove that the people themselves are worthy of contempt, whose names alone have such (miraculous) power, and even not only when they are pronounced by representatives of this people, but also by people of other nationalities. He, further, would have to show that since we falsely interpret these names and at the same time - as he thinks - we deceive the simple and ignorant people who listen to us, so, on the contrary, he, who does not want to count himself among the simple and uneducated people, is able to give these words a correct explanation. But Celsus, touching on the question of these “names with which the Jews connect their genealogy,” is content with only (unsubstantiated) remarks that “never for so many centuries has this question of names even aroused a dispute, and that only now the Jews are arguing with others on this issue.” Who these others are, Celsus also does not indicate exactly. So, we ask everyone who wishes to show us who exactly are those who are arguing with the Jews - and also to present at least some plausible reasons directed against the understanding that Jews and Christians have about these names, and then - who are those others who have presented an extremely wise and correct decision on these issues. We, for our part, are convinced that no one will be able to do this (indication), for it is clear that these names are taken from Jewish speech, which is used only by the Jews. XXXVI. Celsus further draws from non-biblical historical works those passages that are relevant to indicating the extreme antiquity of some peoples, such as the Athenians, Egyptians, Arcadians and Phrygians, who claim that among them certain people were born directly from the earth, and provide evidence in support of this assertion; after this, Celsus continues: “somewhere in a corner of Palestine, Jews gathered in a circle without any suitable education, without even the slightest knowledge that Hesiod and countless other divinely inspired men talk about similar things in their poems; These people invented such completely incredible and inappropriate legends, such as the fact that God allegedly formed man with his own hands, breathed a soul into him and formed a wife from his rib, that He then gave them both commandments, but that the serpent began to oppose them and achieved that they violated the commandments of God. They thus tell some kind of fable following the example of old women and at the same time act extremely criminally towards God; after all, they make God so weak from the very beginning that He could not even obtain obedience from the only one man he himself formed. This deeply learned and widely read Celsus, who exposes ignorance and lack of knowledge to Jews and Christians, at the same time provides clear and obvious evidence of how accurately he knows the time in which this or that Greek and barbarian writer lived. Thus “Hesiod 369 and countless other poets,” whom he calls “inspired men,” he considers more ancient than Moses and his writings - note: Moses, who, as is known, lived long before the Trojan Wars 370. So, it is not the Jews who turn out to be the inventors of incredible and ignorant fables about the birth of man from the earth, but precisely those “divinely inspired men,” as Celsus calls them - Hesiod and countless other poets - these men did not really know or even hear the most ancient and remarkable stories found in Palestine, and for their part wrote about the beginning of things all these so absurd stories, such as, for example, their theogonies, in which they to their deities attributed the birth and many other (absurdities). Plato acts absolutely correctly when he excludes Homer and all the compilers of similar tales from his (ideal) state as writers who only cause harm to young men 371. From this it is clear that Plato did not at all consider those men who left behind such stories to be divinely inspired. But the Epicurean Celsus - if only he really wrote two other books against Christians - apparently can judge this even better than Plato; however, perhaps he, too, only out of a desire to contradict us, calls them divinely inspired men, when in fact he did not attribute such a property to them at all. XXXVII. Celsus further reproaches us for allegedly admitting the idea “of the formation of man by God with the help of hands”; Meanwhile, in the book of Genesis, nowhere can one find references to the hands of God - neither where we talk about the creation of man, nor where we talk about his education. True, in Scripture there is an expression: “Thy hands created me and formed” 372 “me” (Job 10:8; Ps. 119:73), but it is given by Job and David, and if we began to find out what meaning is connected with these words (the writers) who give these expressions; what, further, is the difference between “creation” (ποιήσεως) and “dispensation” 373 (πλάσεως) and how in general the expression “hands of God” should be understood: then this would require a very long argument. Only those who do not understand these and all similar expressions of the Holy Scripture imagine the matter in such a way that we supposedly attribute to God the Almighty the same appearance as that of a person; According to them, we, therefore, must also think of wings in the body of God, since in Scripture, if we only understand its sayings literally (κατὰ τὸ ῤητόν), it actually speaks of such parts of the body as applied to God (Ps. 16:9, 35:7, 56:1, 60:4, 62:7). However, it is not our task now to explain all such expressions. Even earlier, in our interpretation of the book of Genesis 374, we had already explored this issue as far as was possible on our part. One can discern the usual bad methods (criticisms) of Celsus from his following expressions. In that place of Scripture where we talk about the education of man, it says: “and he breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul” (εἰς ψυχήν ζώσαν) (Gen. 2:7). But Celsus, in order to ridicule the expression “breathed into his face the breath of life,” without himself understanding the sense in which Scripture says so, maliciously gave these words the following phrase: “and so they composed 375 that God formed man with his own hands and breathed into him.” In this case, Celsus obviously had in mind the goal that anyone, thinking that God breathed into man as one blows a bellows, could laugh at the very expression: “breathed into his face the breath of life.” But these words have an allegorical meaning (τροπικῶς εἰρημένον) and require explanation; they convey the idea that God made man a partaker of His incorruptible Spirit, which is why Scripture says: “Your incorruptible Spirit abides in everything” (Wis. 12:1). XXXVIII. Having set out to show in a bad form everything that is said in (our) writings, Celsus mocks the following expression: “and the Lord God brought a deep sleep upon the man; and when he fell asleep, he took one of his ribs and covered that place with flesh. And the Lord God created a woman from a rib taken from a man” (Gen. 2:21–22), and so on. But Celsus does not cite that saying that could lead the listener to the conclusion that the given words are spoken in a figurative sense (μετὰ τροπολογίας εἴρηται). In this case, he did not even want to give any reason that he knew about the allegorical meaning of these words, although further 376 he himself says: “those educated from Jews and Christians, ashamed of these (words), try to explain them somehow in a figurative sense.” On this occasion, we could ask him a question: do you think that the fabulous story of your divinely inspired Hesiod about the creation of a wife - the story according to which this latter was given to people by Zeus as evil in the form of revenge for (stolen) fire 377 can be understood in a figurative sense, and if Scripture tells that a wife was taken from the rib of her husband when he was in deep sleep, and was formed by God: then this story, in your opinion I think it no longer has any hidden meaning? But it will hardly be fair if we consider the first story not as a funny fable, but even marvel at it as a philosophy expressed in the form of a fable, while we will only mock this last story (Biblical) on the grounds that it does not contain any deep meaning other than the literal one. If, just because of the bare letter of a saying, one must despise the deep thought contained in this saying, then, Celsus, see that your Hesiod, whom you call a divinely inspired man, does not have any more material that would deserve ridicule, at least in the following verses, where (Hesiod) writes: Thus began his speech, filled with anger, the ruler of the clouds, Zeus: You, son of Yanet, are the wisest of all, You rejoice that, having stolen the fire, you deceived my soul; But this will serve as a great punishment for you and future generations! I will give them evil as a gift for the fire: everyone will be this evil To cheer your souls, embracing your misfortune. He said - and the father of people and gods laughed. And he gave the glorious order to Hephaestus - as soon as possible Mix earth with water and give it the voice of a man, And also strength and appearance, like immortal goddesses, And the pleasant charm of a girl’s face; and then Athena He gave the order to teach her all kinds of work and the art of weaving; And Aphrodite will pour golden joy over her head, And strong passion and concern for bodily adornment; And give her a dog’s shamelessness, and a changeable disposition He orders Hermes, his ambassador and murderer of Argos. So he said - and everyone hastened to carry out the order of Zeus, Kronos's son. And in a moment the glorious Hephaestus creates a virgin from the earth, - The likeness of a bashful maiden, obeying the command of Zeus. The blue-eyed goddess Athena Pallas removed it, girding it. Around her are the Charita goddesses and the beautiful Pitho: They put gold necklaces around her neck. The long-haired Mountains clean it up with the flowers of spring, Pallas Athena took care of all the cleaning of the head. And in her chest is Hermes, the killer of Argos, He put in all kinds of lies, flattering speeches, and a changeable disposition. So Zeus the Thunderer ordered him. And he gave her a name The messenger of the gods, called her Pandora, Since all those who have dwellings on Olympus - Each one gave her his gift, to the suffering of energetic husbands 378, It’s also funny what he says next about the barrel. Once upon a time the human race lived on earth Without any evil, without any exorbitant labor, Without any diseases that bring death to people. But the wife, lifting the barrel with her hands, suffered great She scattered them everywhere and brought heavy worries upon people. Only Nadezhda did not know the grief and remained Inside the household chambers, under the opening of the barrel, and behind the door Didn't fly; even earlier she plunged suffering into the barrel 379 Now we turn to the one who sees a simple allegory in this story - regardless of whether he understands the writer’s idea in the allegory or not - and ask him this question. Is it really possible only for the Greeks to pursue their philosophical views in a hidden form, or perhaps also for the Egyptians and other barbarian peoples who boast that the truth is hidden in their mysteries? Whereas, in your opinion, the Jews alone, even their legislators and their writers, are the most foolish people? And this people, who are so loftily disposed that they can ascend to the uncreated being of God (ἐπι τὴν ἀγέννητον τοῦ θεοῦ φύσιν), have Him alone before their eyes and place all their hope only in Him - this people seems to represent the only exception in that he alone did not receive any display of Divine power! XXXIX. Celsus, further, makes the story of the serpent the subject of his ridicule. He says that “the serpent resisted the commandments given from God to man,” and this whole saying, in his opinion, “is some kind of fable, similar to those told by old women. At the same time, Celsus deliberately remains silent about the “paradise” of God, about which it is said that “the Lord God planted it in Eden 380 in the east,” and at the same time he is silent about the fact that God “made from the earth every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food, and the tree of life in the midst of paradise, and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil” (Gen. 2:8–9), and about everything else described in this a place that could lead a prudent reader to the conviction that all this, without violating decency, can be understood in a figurative sense (ou'k a'se'mnw_s tropologe'itai). That is why we intend to compare the story of Scripture with what Plato’s Socrates says about Eros in the Symposium and what is attributed to Socrates as the best of all that was said about him in the Symposium. This is what Plato says: when Aphrodite was born, the gods held a feast, in which, by the way, Porus, the son of Metis, also participated. When the feast was already over, Penia came in to ask for something in view of the feast taking place, and stood at the door. At this time, Porus, drunk on nectar—there was no wine yet—went to the garden of Zeus, where he fell asleep peacefully. Then Penia came to the idea that if she bears 381 sons from Porus, this will help her in poverty. So she lies down with him and conceives Eros. Since Eros was born on Aphrodite’s birthday, for this reason he is Aphrodite’s companion and serves her, at the same time he is by nature a lover of beauty, since Aphrodite is beautiful. And since Eros is the son of Porus and Penia, he received such an inheritance from them. Firstly, he is constantly poor and at the same time far from being slender and not handsome - contrary to what most people think about him - but lean, covered in lichen, barefoot and homeless, he sleeps without bedding right on the bare ground - both under the gate and on the street in the open air; having inherited his mother's nature, he always feels need. He reminds him of his father in that he plots intrigues against good and honest people; he is brave, even daring, distinguished by special importance, a passionate hunter, a constant inventor of all sorts of insidious plans, has a great inclination towards wisdom and tries to achieve it, he is a philosopher throughout his life, a skilled fortune-teller, compiler of magical drinks, a sophist; by nature he is neither immortal nor mortal, on the same day he also quickly blooms and lives if he achieves the fulfillment of his desires, and just as quickly dies, moreover, he always comes to life again, having in himself the inclinations of his father’s nature. At the same time, he constantly squanders everything that he manages to acquire, so that Eros does not experience deprivation, but does not acquire wealth. He occupies, as it were, a middle ground between wisdom and ignorance 382. If readers of such a story imitate the evil nature of Celsus - which Christians, however, will not do - then they will only laugh at the fable and mock Plato, that great man (τηλικοῦτον). If they examine all these legends, carried out under the guise of a fable, as is typical for philosophers, and thus understand Plato’s thought: then they will already be filled with amazement at the art with which, under the outer shell of a fabulous tale, he could not only hide from the simple crowd of people the great truths (δόγματα), obvious to him, but at the same time tell about these truths - since this was also included his task is to those people who are able to discover in mythical legends the truth that constitutes the authentic thought of the author, only put into the form of a fable. And I brought this fable from (the works of) Plato precisely because it talks about the garden of Zeus, and this latter, it seems to me, has some similarity with the paradise of God, just as Penia can be equated with the serpent mentioned in the book of Genesis, and Porus, against whom Penia plots, resembles the person against whom the serpent plots (Biblical). It is not known with positive certainty whether Plato reached such a legend, or whether - as some people think - he, during his journey to Egypt, having met there with people knowledgeable in the field of the secrets of the Jewish religion, received from these people some knowledge, of which he retained some of it (completely), and gave the other part a slightly different form for fear of offending the Greeks if he retained the entire philosophy of the Jews, who were not in good standing with other nations - partly due to the alienation of their laws, partly due to the peculiarities of their civil system. However, this is not the place to give explanations about Plato’s myth, and to enter into a discussion of history - about the serpent, about the paradise of God, and about all the other objects that are depicted there. We have already discussed all these points with the greatest possible thoroughness in our commentary (ἐν τοῖς ἐξηγητικοῖς) on (the book of) Genesis. XL. As for Celsus’s statement that Moses, in his work, allegedly acted extremely wickedly towards God, whom he made, moreover, at the very beginning, so weak and powerless that He was unable to keep in obedience even the only man whom He Himself created,” then on this issue we will give the following answer. To say this is, in fact, tantamount to blaming God for the existence of evil, because God could not keep even “one person” from this evil, which is why from the very beginning there is not at least a “one-of-a-kind person” who would come into the world not involved in evil. Just as those who consider it their task to defend the doctrine of Foreknowledge present many extremely solid arguments in favor of this truth, so the story of Adam and his fall is equally philosophically interpreted and understood by those who know that the Hebrew word Adam denotes man and that Moses expresses himself in general about man where he apparently speaks of Adam as a separate person. After all, “in Adam,” as Scripture testifies, “all die” (1 Cor. 15:22) and all are condemned “like the crime of Adam” (Rom. 5:14), so that Divine Scripture in this case speaks not so much about one person, but about the entire race (human). For although the curse applies only to the person of Adam, it nevertheless - as is clear from the whole connection (speech) - constitutes a universal destiny, and what is said to the wife, this applies to every woman without exception. In the same way, the expulsion of husband and wife from paradise and their dressing in skins, which God made because of the crime of people for those who have sinned, contains a deep and mysterious teaching, which is much more sublime than Plato’s teaching about the soul that lost its wings and fell here (to earth) until it grew something solid on which it could rely 384. XLI. Following this, Celsus says: “then (they try to tell us) about some kind of flood and about an unusual ark in which everything was contained, and about a dove and a raven who played the role of messengers, and in all these legends they, in fact, distorted the story of Deucalion and presented it in a frivolous alteration. I think that they did not expect that such work of theirs would come to light (of God), but they so artlessly told all these monstrous inventions to the children.” And here pay attention to the hatred with which, unworthy of a philosopher, this man rebels against the most ancient scripture of the Jews. He has nothing bad to say against the story of the flood; he does not dwell at all on what he could say against the ark and against its measurement; he does not even claim, like some others, that the ark, with its length of three hundred, its width of fifty and its height of thirty cubits, could not even supposedly accommodate all the animals of the earth - clean in the number of seven pairs, and unclean in four pairs (cf. Gen. 6:14, 15). In this case, he is content only with what he simply calls “astonishing and strange what everything was.” But what could be “funny” about the ark, which, according to Scripture, was built over the course of a hundred years, and with a length of three hundred cubits and a width of fifty, which is the measure of the foundation, at the end of its height, which has thirty cubits, had only one cubit both in length and in width? On the contrary, shouldn’t this whole structure, which resembles a huge city 385, be rather surprising, especially if we take into account the measure (of its volume), since its base was ninety thousand cubits in length and two thousand five hundred cubits in width? How could one not be surprised that the ark was distinguished by the special strength of its parts and could counteract the force of the stormy excitement that accompanied the flood. After all, it was held together not just with resin or any other similar substance, but very tightly lubricated with asphalt. Shouldn’t one, finally, be amazed at the fact that, according to Divine Foresight, a whole nursery of all kinds of animals was introduced there - inside (the ark), so that subsequently the earth could again have the seeds of all animals; (Isn’t it surprising) that God used a righteous man for this, who was to become the ancestor of all those who would be born after the flood. XLII. To show that he had read the book of Genesis, Celsus also attacked the story about the dove, although he could not give a single reason to support the position that this story was a simple fiction. In order to make the Biblical story appear funny - as is generally his custom - he then transforms the raven into a raven and thinks that Moses, who recorded this event, forged here, in fact, the Greek legend about Deucalion, unless one adheres to the view that the book (of Genesis), as he thinks, was not written by Moses at all, but was compiled by many others (authors). This conclusion, apparently, follows from his words: “they distorted and altered the legend of Deucalion,” as well as from his following expression: “they had no idea that all these inventions would come out.” But the question arises: how was it possible for them to convey their works to all the people and at the same time not think that all their tricks could be revealed, since they prophesied that such piety would be proclaimed to all nations? The expression of Jesus: “The kingdom of God will be taken away from you and given to a people bearing its fruits” (Matthew 21:43) - the expression that was directed by Him to the Jews, which could mean nothing else but precisely what He Himself, by His Divine power, will make the subject of universal knowledge (εἰς φῶς προαγαγεῖν) all Jewish writing (γραφήν), containing the secrets of the Kingdom of God? Yes, when they read the genealogy of the gods invented by the Greeks and the story of the twelve deities, they try to maintain respect for them through allegories; if they want to mock our legends, then they say that “all these are fables, which, due to their artlessness (ἀτεχνῶς), are suitable only for small children.” XLIII. Speaking “about inappropriate and untimely childbearing,” although Celsus did not mention the story itself, it is clear that he meant Abraham and Sarah in this case (Gen. 21:1–7). He also doesn’t like the “bickering between brothers”; here he alludes, of course, either to Cain, who plotted against Abel (Gen. 4:8), or to Cain and at the same time to Esau, who plotted against Jacob (Gen. 25:29–34, 27:18–29, 35:36). Celsus also criticizes the “sorrow of the father,” meaning by it, perhaps, the sadness that Isaac showed on the occasion of Jacob’s departure (Gen. 28:1–5), and, perhaps, the one that Jacob experienced because of Joseph, when the latter was sold to Egypt. When Celsus depicts “the deceit of mothers,” he obviously means Rebekah, who tried to ensure that Isaac’s blessing fell not on Esau, but on Jacob (Gen. 27:5–17). However, since we say that God Himself takes an intimate part in all such (phenomena of life), then what kind of absurdity, one might ask, are we allowing if we are convinced that His Divinity never departs from people who cling to Him with their honest and stable life? Celsus also laughs at “the riches Jacob acquired from Laban (Gen. 30:37–43),” not understanding in this case what the following words (of Scripture) are leading to: “and the weak cattle were given to Laban, and the strong ones to Jacob” (Gen. 30:42). Celsus also mocks the following expression of Scripture: “God gave his children donkeys, sheep and camels (cf. Gen. 13:2, 30:43, 32:14–15).” But at the same time he did not understand that “All these things happened to them as images” (τοπικῶς): “but they are described for instruction to us who have reached the last ages” (1 Cor. 10:11), - for our sake, I say, whose various morals, having become “strong” (Gen. 30:42), are arranged by the Word of God and are given as an inheritance to the one who is figuratively called Jacob. After all, the whole story about Laban and Jacob clearly points to the pagans who turned to faith in Christ. XLIV. Celsus strayed far from the meaning of Scripture when he asserted that “God gave wells to the righteous (cf. Gen. 28:2). He did not understand that the righteous do not prepare holes for themselves, but dig wells and try to find springs and sources of good water suitable for drinking deep underground; they understand in a figurative sense the commandment that commands: “Drink the water from your reservoir and the water that flows from your well. Let your springs (not) spill over the streets, streams of water over the squares; let them belong to you alone, and not to strangers with you” (Prov. 5:15–17). Often Scripture uses the depiction of actual events only in order to use them to indicate more important and deeper truths. It is in this sense that the story about wells, about marriage bonds and about various couplings (μίξεις) of the righteous, which are spoken of in Scripture, is given. It will be much more convenient to attempt to clarify these subjects in a special commentary on those very passages. And that the righteous really dug wells for themselves in the country of the Philistines - as it is written in (the book of) Genesis (Genesis 26:15) - this is confirmed by those wonderful wells that are shown in Ascalon 386 and which deserve attention due to their unusual shape, different from other wells. As for legal wives and slaves, they must be understood in a figurative sense - and such an understanding is not our invention: we adopted it from wise men who lived before us (ἄνωθεν). One of them, directing the listener’s mind to imagery, says this: “Tell me, you who want to be under the law, do you not listen to the law? For it is written: “Abraham had two sons, one by a bondwoman, and the other by a freewoman.” But he who is of a slave is born according to the flesh; and the one who is free, the one according to the promise. There is an allegory in this; these two covenants: one from Mount Sinai, the one who gives birth to slavery, which is Hagar” (Gal. 4:21–24; cf. Gen. 16:15; 21:3). And a little later he says: “And Jerusalem above is free; he is the mother of us all” (Gal. 4:26). Anyone who wishes to turn to the “Epistle to the Galatians” will understand what figurative meaning is given to the Biblical story about a relationship with a lawful wife and a servant. Scripture wants us to imitate in the actions of these persons not those actions that are considered carnal, but those spiritual actions, as the Apostles of Jesus usually call them (cf. 1 Peter 2:5; 1 Cor. 2:13, 14:1). XLV. After Celsus recognized the love of truth in the compilers of the Holy Books in those places where they do not hide even the inglorious, he should actually be inclined to the opinion that everything else in their stories with the nature of the miraculous is not the fruit of their own inventions. But he does just the opposite: the story of Lot and his daughters - instead of examining it in detail in its literal meaning and exploring its figurative meaning - he presents it as a legend, surpassing in its vileness the crimes of the Thyestaeans 387. In this case, there is no need to explore the deep meaning of the above passage of Biblical history - what Sodom means and how to understand the words with which the Angels addressed Lot, who was escaping from there, telling him this: “Do not look back, and do not stop anywhere in this neighborhood; flee to the mountain, lest you perish” (Gen. 19:17); or what Lot means, or what his wife “turned into a pillar of salt” means (Gen. 19:26) when she looked back, or what his daughters mean when they made their father drunk in order to become mothers from him. For our part, we will consider in this story only those few (details) that seem most inconsistent with common sense. The Greeks also examined the nature of both good and evil and indifferent things, and, while studying this question, came to the conclusion that actions, both good and evil, depend solely on the decision of the will, and that all those actions that are performed without the participation of the will are - according to their own teaching - indifferent, so that depending on how the will uses these actions: if it is good, then it deserves praise, and if it is bad, then it deserves blame. And in the place in their works where they talk about indifferent actions, they include among them the relationship (of Lot) with his daughters, although such a phenomenon should not exist in well-organized states. And to prove the indifference of such an act, they cite as an example a case when the entire human race perishes and only the sage and his daughter remain alive; At the same time, they ask whether it is appropriate in this case for the father to enter into marital relations with his daughter in order to protect the entire human race from death, which could occur with a different outcome. All such provisions are accepted by the Greeks as not causing any objections, and that school of Stoics, which enjoys great favor among them, shares such views; and if young girls who are taught the doctrine of the destruction of the world, but without sufficient explanation, as soon as they see that their city and whole country are destroyed by fire, and at the same time come to the decision that their father and themselves are the only ones capable of arranging so that the flame of human life will be fanned again, and, based on this opinion, wish to support the world in its present existence, then will their action in this case not be more shameful than the act of such a sage, who, according to the concept of the Stoics, can boldly, without sin, enter into cohabitation with his daughters, in view of the death of all people? I am not unaware that some were tempted by this intention of Lot’s daughters and considered such an act dishonorable and even said that it was from such a criminal connection that two cursed peoples came into existence - the Moabites and the Ammonites. But, in fact, in the Holy Scriptures there is no clear indication of whether such an act (of Lot’s daughters) should be accepted as a good deed or whether it should be condemned as a crime. Moreover, as elsewhere, admitting the reality of this act, one can understand it in a figurative sense, and thus have some grounds speaking in its defense. XLVI. Celsus further mocks the “hatred” - if I am not mistaken - of Esau against Jacob, that Esau who is portrayed in Scripture as an evil man (cf. Gen. 27:41-45). He attacks both Simeon and Levi for taking revenge for the violence inflicted on their sister by the son of the king of Shechem (Gen. 34:25–31), although Celsus does not provide an exact account of this incident. He also talks about “the brothers selling the sons of Jacob (Gen. 37:26–28, 36)”, and about “the sold brother Joseph (Gen. 34:25–31)”, and “about the father of Jacob, how his sons deceived him” when they showed him Joseph’s “coat of many colors” and convinced him that Joseph was killed, and how Jacob after that "mourned" even though Joseph was a slave in Egypt (Gen. 37:26–28, 36). Pay attention to how Celsus, only out of hatred, and not out of love for the truth, selects here all such facts, on the basis of which he intends to build his accusation against (Biblical) history. But from this story he deliberately excludes everything that could serve as proof of abstinence and does not touch at all, for example, the story of the same Joseph, whom a woman, revered by Celsus as a mistress, could not persuade either by requests or threats to reciprocate her love. We thus see that Joseph acted much better than Vellerophon, who is spoken of in history (Gen. 39:1-6), and preferred imprisonment to the loss of his chastity. Joseph, of course, was able to defend himself and begin a case against his accuser, but he generously remained silent and placed himself and all his affairs in the care of God. XLVII. After this, Celsus mentions - moreover, confusingly and darkly - “about the dreams of the chief of the butlers and the chief of the bakers, as well as the dreams of Pharaoh and their interpretation, which had the consequence that Joseph was freed by Pharaoh from prison and was elevated among the Egyptians to second place after Pharaoh (Cf. Gen. 40: 1-19, 41: 1-36, 40–44)". But what is strange about this story, even if we take it literally 388? Meanwhile, Celsus used this story as the basis for his accusation, moreover, in an essay to which he gave the title “The True Word,” but in which he did not even bother to expound the doctrine, but presented only accusations against Christians and Jews. Celsus also says that “the sold brother began to do good to his brothers who sold him, as soon as they began to experience hunger and were forced to go with the donkeys (to Egypt) for bread (cf. Gen. 42–44); but Celsus did not indicate how exactly his brother benefited them. He also talks about “restoring acquaintance” (Joseph with his brothers) (Gen. 45:1–4), but for what purpose I cannot even understand, and it is equally unclear in what, in fact, “the inappropriateness of this renewal of acquaintance” is revealed, according to him. Mom himself 389, it seems to me, could not have discovered anything in this narrative that could give rise to an objection to this story, which, in addition to its figurative meaning, contains a lot of sublime. He goes on to tell how “Joseph was freed from the slavery into which he had been sold, and later went out in great pomp to meet his father’s tomb [πρὸς τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς τάφον] (Gen. 50:4–14).” Celsus believes that this fact can also serve to incriminate us. At least, he inserts the following remarks here: “when from him” - it is clear that from Joseph - “this famous and Divine people of Judah took root in Egypt and increased to an enormous number, he was given the order to live somewhere apart and in inconvenient places to graze cattle.” As for the words of Celsus that “they were ordered to graze their flocks in despicable places,” these words were obviously inspired in him by his own hatred. He will not prove in any way that the Egyptian province of Hesshem (cf. Gen. 47:1–5, 27; Ex. 1:7) was truly “worthless.” Then he calls the exodus of the people (Jewish) from Egypt (Ex. 12:13) “flight,” but at the same time he passes over in complete silence the history of the exodus of the Jews from Egypt, which is recorded in the book “Exodus.” We gave all these examples in order to prove how Celsus, in order to accuse and ridicule us, deliberately chooses places that even in their literal meaning do not represent anything worthy of reproach. And he himself did not show what, in fact, is the insignificance (μοχθηρόν) that he sees in our Scriptures. XLVIII. Directing all his activities to express only hatred and hostile feelings towards the Jewish and Christian teachings, Celsus further says this: “the best of the Jews and Christians give all these things an allegorical interpretation; they are ashamed of this - and therefore resort to (the help of) allegory.” But if fables and fictions, serving to cover up the truth or for some other purpose, should be considered obscene stories, or only understood in the literal sense, then anyone can ask Celsus the following question: what kind of (fabulous) legends can be spoken of with the greatest right, if not the legends of Greek (mythology)? In this latter, the sons-gods castrate the fathers-gods; fathers-gods devour sons-gods 390, and the mother goddess gives the father of “husbands and gods” a stone instead of a son 391, the father dishonors his daughter, the wife puts chains on her husband, and she is helped by her own brother of the bound (husband) and his own daughter 392. And is it necessary to talk about those vile (ἀτόπους) legends that the Greeks have about their gods? The Greeks themselves are obviously ashamed of these legends, since they try to explain them allegorically. For my part, I intend to cite only the case of Chrysippus of Solensky, who, for his numerous scientific works, is considered the adornment of the Stoic philosophical school. This philosopher explains the picture that was in Samos and which depicts Juno satisfying the shameful passion of Zeus 393. This venerable and respected philosopher in his work says that matter absorbs the seed intelligence (τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους) of God and that it contains it within itself to decorate the Universe. In this Samian painting Juno represents matter and Zeus represents God. Because of this and because of thousands of other fables of the same kind, we do not want to call God Almighty Zeus, or even the sun Apollo, or the moon Artemis. We show pure reverence to the Creator and, while glorifying His beautiful creations, we are even afraid to desecrate Divine objects with our names (τὰ θεῖα). In this case, I like the saying of Plato, quoted in his Philebus, where he refuses to classify pleasure (ἡδονήν) among the goddesses. “So great, Protarchus,” he says, “is my reverence (δέος) for the names of the gods 394.” And in fact, we have such great reverence for the names of God and the names of His glorious creations that even under the pretext of tropological interpretation we avoid any mythological legend for fear of harming the young men. XLIX. If Celsus had read the Holy Scriptures without a preconceived purpose, then, of course, he would not have said that our books “do not even admit of allegory.” From reading the books of the prophets, in which the subject of description is, although history is, but not in the form of a coherent historical narrative, one can derive the conviction that all these historical passages are written down so that they can be interpreted allegorically, and that everything there is wisely provided with the intention of adapting them at one time and to the degree of understanding of the majority of simple believers, as well as those few who, if desired, would be able to penetrate into the very (hidden) meaning of things. All of Celsus’s arguments would still have some power of persuasiveness if the Jewish and Christian writers of our generation (σήμερον), known by Celsus as “simpletons,” had just for the first time begun to resort to the allegorical method of interpreting the Scriptures. But the fathers of the teachings themselves (τῶν δογμάτων) and the compilers of the Scriptures already began to use the tropological way of expressing thought in the Scriptures. Thus, only one assumption remains to be made: that such a figurative form is communicated to the Scriptures so that they can be understood allegorically (τροπολογεῖσθαι) according to the internal meaning contained in them. From a whole series of examples, I will dwell only on a few in order to show how unfoundedly Celsus ridicules our Scriptures when he claims that “they are completely unable to combine allegory in themselves.” Paul, the Apostle of Jesus, says this: “It is written in the scriptures: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing.” Does God care about oxen? Or, of course, is it said for us? So, for us it is written: for he who plows must plow in hope, and he who threshes must thresh in hope of receiving what he expects” (1 Cor. 9:9, 10; cf. Deut. 25:4; 1 Tim. 5:18). And in another place the same (Apostle) says: “For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh. This mystery is great; I speak in relation to Christ and to the church” (Eph. 5:31, 32; cf. Gen. 2:24). And in another place he writes: we know “that our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea; and they were all baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea” (1 Cor. 10:1, 2; cf. Ex. 13:21, 14:22). Then, when he interprets the story of the manna and the water, which - as it is written - miraculously flowed out of the stone, he says: “and they all ate the same spiritual food; and they all drank the same spiritual drink: for they drank from the spiritual stone that followed; and the stone was Christ” (1 Cor. 10:3–4; cf. Ex. 16:14–15, 17:6). And Asav, meaning to recall in the Book of Psalms the events described in the books of Exodus and Numbers, prefaces such a preface, explaining that these books contain the same “questions” and “parables” as in the Psalms. “Listen,” he says, “my people, to my law; incline your ear to the words of my mouth. I will open my mouth in a parable, and I will speak fortune telling from ancient times. What we have heard and known, and our fathers have told us” (Ps. 77:1-2). L. In addition, if the law of Moses did not contain anything hidden, then the prophet would not have said in his prayer addressed to God: “Open my eyes, and I will see the wonders of Your law” (Ps. 119:18). After all, he knew that a certain “veil” (cf. 2 Cor. 3:13-16) of ignorance hangs on the hearts of those who, when reading, do not understand what is hidden under the allegories. But this “veil” is removed when the grace of God is bestowed, when God hears the one who, having gathered his whole mind, has created everything that depends on his strength, who, as a result of long exercises, has become accustomed to turning his senses to distinguish between good and evil, and who constantly repeats in his prayers: “Open my eyes, and I will see the wonders of Your law.” And who, reading about the dragon living in the river of Egypt, and about the fish hiding under the scales of this dragon (Ezek. 29:3), or about the mountains of Egypt filled with the pus of Pharaoh (Ezek. 32:6), will not feel the urge to ask, who is this who fills the Egyptian mountains with impurities so disgusting to the smell, what kind of Egyptian mountains and rivers are these, about which Pharaoh says with such self-praise: “here are my rivers, I created them (Ezek. 29:3),” and who is this dragon, which must be understood according to the interpretation given about the rivers; What kind of fish are these, finally, hiding under the scales of the dragon? However, what need do I have to prove so much about something that does not need proof and about which it is said: “Who is wise to understand this?” who has understanding to know this” ( Hos. 14:10 )? I dwelled on this question a little longer, precisely because I wanted to prove, as Celsus unfairly claims, that “the most sensible of Jews and Christians try to give all such (legends) an allegorical interpretation, while there are some such legends that are not able to withstand allegories and seem to be nothing more or less than the most stupid fables.” But if this is so, then the Greeks actually have fables, which are not only stupid, but also extremely wicked. As for our legends, they are adapted to the large mass of ordinary people (believers) and to their understanding, whereas those who invented Greek fiction do not have this adaptation. That is why Plato rightly expelled all such fables and poems in his Republic 395. LI. It seems to me that (Celsus) only heard that there are works containing an allegorical interpretation of the law. In fact, if he had read (them), he would not have expressed this (objection): “all the imaginary allegorical explanations that they try to give them 396 are even more shameful and stupid than the myths themselves, since with absolutely amazing and incredible stupidity they combine things that cannot be connected in any way.” In this case, he apparently means the works of Philo 397 or even more ancient works - Aristobulus 398. But as far as one can judge from conjecture, Celsus did not read (these) books; Meanwhile, these books, in my opinion, are everywhere so successfully adapted (for conveying the thoughts of Sacred Writers): that even Greek philosophers could get carried away by reading them. In these books we find not only an elegant and polished style, but also thoughts, and teaching, and the proper use of those passages of Scripture that Celsus considers fables. I know that the Pythagorean Numenius 399, this best interpreter of Plato's works and a deep connoisseur of Pythagorean teachings, in his works everywhere cites excerpts from Moses and the prophets, and one can be completely satisfied with the allegorical explanations Numenius gives to literal passages. So, for example, in the work entitled “Epop” (Ἔποψ) or in the works “On Numbers” (Περὶ ἀριθμῶν) and “On Measure” (Περὶ τόπου). In the third book of his work on the highest good, he even cites a legend from the life of Jesus, however, without calling Him by name, and gives this legend an allegorical interpretation. Whether this interpretation is right or wrong can be said at another more convenient time; There is no need to talk about this here. He also tells the story of Moses, Jannes and Jambres 400. We present these facts, of course, not at all to boast; from them we only draw the conclusion that Numenius was much more disposed towards us than Celsus and other Greeks. His curiosity led him to study our (Scriptures) more closely; Moreover, he was interested in them not as some stupid writings, but because they revealed to him a special meaning in allegories. LII. Of all the works that contain allegorical expositions and explanations and, moreover, are written in a not entirely refined style, Celsus chose the weakest work, adapted, rather, for a large mass of simple believers to strengthen their faith and cannot have any influence on people more or less educated. He says: “This is exactly the kind of dispute between a certain Papis and Jason, which I read and which deserves not even laughter, but rather regret and contempt. For me, all this (nonsense) is not even subject to refutation: it is so clear to everyone, especially if someone has the patience and courage to get acquainted with all these scriptures. I consider it more desirable to study what nature itself teaches, namely, that God did not create anything mortal, that only immortal beings are His creations, and from these (come) corruptible beings. And the soul is a creation of God; the nature of the body, on the contrary, is different. In this respect, therefore, there is no difference between the body of a bat, worm or frog and the body of a man. They are all formed from the same matter and are equally susceptible to decay.” For my part, I would like nothing better than that everyone who listens to such arrogant statements of Celsus, who says that the work entitled “The Dispute of Jason and Papiscus” about Christ “is worthy not even of ridicule, but of contempt,” would take this work in their hands and have the patience and firmness to become acquainted with its contents. They would not have found anything in this book that could be “worthy of contempt,” and with the book in their hands they would have condemned Celsus. An impartial reader will not find anything in this book that excites laughter. This book describes a Christian arguing with a Jew based on the Jewish scriptures to show that the prophecies about Christ refer to Jesus. However, here the Christian’s opponent, not without firmness, responds to his objections and successfully maintains his role as a Jew. LIII. In fact, I am perplexed how Celsus can unite such things that turn out to be incompatible and cannot be found in human nature at the same time. But he allows precisely this shift when he says that this book is “worthy of both regret and contempt.” After all, everyone will agree that as soon as someone deserves pity, then he can no longer be an object of contempt when he is pitied, and vice versa - a hated person cannot be a subject of pity as long as he is hated. That is why Celsus, as he himself states, “is not disposed to refute such an absurdity,” he is of the opinion that “this absurdity is clear to everyone in itself, and as such, even before reasonable evidence is presented to him, he already discovers that it is “worthy of both regret and contempt.” However, we invite anyone who happens to fall into the hands of this defense of ours directed against the accusation of Celsus to be patient and read our Sacred Works and, based on their contents, as far as possible, form an opinion about what the purpose of their authors was, what their conscience is, what their state of mind is. Then it will be clear to everyone that there were people who defended their beliefs with fiery enthusiasm and that some of them gave clear indications that they saw with their own eyes the events they related, experienced them and recorded them because they considered them miraculous and worthy of recording, for the benefit and edification of subsequent readers. And no one, of course, will dare to deny that the source and beginning of all benefit is to believe in God Almighty, in all your actions to take care of pleasing Him, not to desire anything that could not be pleasing to Him Who will appear as the Judge of not only words and deeds, but even thoughts. And what other doctrine could make people (τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν) more active in a pious and virtuous life, if not the faith or conviction (διάληψις) that the Most High God knows everything that we say and do - even what we think? Let anyone who wants to show another path that can lead not one or two, but a whole multitude of people to conversion and improvement. Only in this case, by comparing both paths, can one decide clearly and definitely which path leads to a virtuous and wise life (πρὸς τὸ καλὸν λόγον)? Liv. Since in the words of Celsus cited by us, which constitute a simple transfer of a passage from Timaeus 401, there are such expressions in which the idea is conveyed that “God did not create anything mortal, and only immortal beings constitute His creation, while all corruptible beings are already the deeds of others (gods): the soul is the work of God, but the nature of the body is different, and in this case there is no difference between the body of a bat, a worm or frogs; after all, they are all formed from the same substance, and their perishability is the same,” then we wish to subject this point to at least a brief discussion. We intend to show that Celsus here does not directly and definitely express his Epicurean views, or, as they may say, he seems to hold even more sound views, or, even more correctly, he is an Epicurean (of Celsus) only in name. In view of the fact that he wished to express such positions and thus become in contradiction and go against not only us, but also the views of the school of Zeno of Cyttaea, 402 who enjoys far from little respect among philosophers, he would have to prove at the same time that the bodies of animals were not created by God and that such a great art, which is revealed in their creation, did not come from the highest mind (ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου νοῦ). And on the question of countless and varied plants, which are formed by an invisible force acting within themselves in such a lawful manner and are called into being for the great benefit of all human needs, and on the question of animals that exist to serve people - although, however, another primary reason can be indicated why they are, in fact, called into being - then on all these questions he should have presented not only bare provisions, but also indicated reasons why, in fact, some higher (τέλειος) intelligence cannot be admitted here, which endowed the substance of plants with all these many and varied qualities. And since he once already recognized the (lower) deities as the creators of all bodily entities and recognized only the soul as the work of the existing God, since he thus divided these great creative acts and attributed them to many creators, then how could he not show in this case, with the help of convincing and weighty arguments, these very differences between the gods and answer us the question why some of the gods create and form the bodies of people, and others, for example, bodies domestic animals, while others are the bodies of wild animals? And if he found that some of the bots are busy creating dragons, asps, basilisks, and others - creating all kinds of plants and herbs, then he should have understood and shown us the reason for such a division of labor. If he had subjected this question to careful examination, he might then have recognized the existence of one God, who created all things and created each of them for a specific purpose and service; or if he had not even come to this knowledge, then even then he would have found a way out, how to defend himself and give an answer against those who assert that it is indifferent to the nature of corporeal beings whether it is subject to corruption or not, and that there can be no nonsense in recognizing the doctrine that the whole world, consisting of dissimilar parts, is the work of a single builder, who arranged all the diverse kinds of things so that they serve for the benefit of the Universe. He, at least, should not have completely avoided such an important question, even if it turned out that he was not able to prove what he promised to tell us; he should have been completely silent about such a dogma, since, having charged us with a crime of simple faith, he himself did not want us to believe him only at his word, although he promised that for his part he would present not only bare propositions, but also give evidence (of them). LV. I say: if Celsus had taken the trouble and tried to read, as he puts it, the books of Moses and the prophets, then he would naturally have asked himself the question why the words: “God created” (Gen. 1:1, 7, 16, 21, 27) are used in relation to heaven and earth, and to what is called the firmament, and also in relation to the two great luminaries and stars and then in relation to the great whales and every soul of “the living creatures that the leading creatures have produced, according to their kind” (Gen. 1:21), and in relation to every (creature) that flies in the air according to (its) kind, and after this in relation to the cattle of the earth according to (their) kind and to all domestic animals according to (their) kind and to all (animals) that moves on the earth according to their kind and, finally, in relation to a person. The expression: “(God) created” (Gen. 1:27) at the same time is not used in relation to other things; about light, for example, it is simply said only: “there was light” (Gen. 1:3), and also in the story that all the water over the whole sky gathered in one place, it is said only: “and it was so” (Gen. 1:9). Likewise, in relation to the plants of the earth, Scripture says: “And the earth brought forth grass, grass yielding seed according to its kind and in its likeness, and a tree (fruitful) bearing fruit, in which is its seed according to its kind (on the earth)” (Gen. 1:12). And he (Celsus) could also know to whom all these addresses of God refer, which, according to the testimony of Scripture, are singled out to the end to designate all the separate parts of the world - whether they refer to any one or many beings. And Celsus, of course, would not so easily begin to accuse as unreasonable and without any deep meaning those stories that are contained in these books written by Moses, or - as we would better say - written by the Holy Spirit, who dwelt in Moses and endowed him with the gift of prophecy. After all, he is 403 better Knew what is, what will be and what was 404 - better than those soothsayers to whom the poets attributed the possession of such knowledge. LVI. “The soul is a work of God, but the nature of the body, on the contrary, is different; and in this respect there is no difference between the body of a bat, worm, or frog and the body of a man; for the matter from which they are formed is one and the same, and the perishability in them is the same.” This is what Celsus says next. To this we must give this answer. Since there is no difference between the body of a bat, a worm or a frog and the body of a person on the basis that they are formed from the same matter, then it is clear and self-evident that these bodies are no different from the sun, and from the month, and from the stars, and from the sky, and in general from everything else that can also be perceived only by the senses and is recognized by the Greeks as a deity. After all, all corporeal beings have the same matter at their base. And this latter by its nature (τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ) is qualityless and without a specific type and form (ἄποιος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος). Where, according to Celsus, it should receive its qualitative certainty from - remains unknown to me, since Celsus is absolutely not inclined to consider everything subject to decay to be the work of God. However, Celsus, backed to the wall, here perhaps expresses the intention to jump from Plato, 405, who takes the soul out of some kind of vessel, and find refuge with Aristotle and the Peripatetics, who recognize that the ether is an immaterial essence and constitutes the fifth nature, created differently from the other four elements (στοιχεῖα). But this view is strongly opposed by both Platonists and Stoics. And we, for our part, despite the contemptuous attitude towards us on the part of Celsus, will speak out against this opinion if we are required to explain the following words of the prophet, who says: “They (the heavens) will perish, but You will remain; and they will all wear out like a robe, and you will change them like a garment and they will be changed; but You are the same and Your years will not end” (Ps. 102:26–28). These remarks, however, already sufficiently subvert the statement of Celsus, who says that “the soul is the work of God, and that the nature of the body is different.” From this it clearly follows that there is still no difference between the body of a bat, worm or frog, on the one hand, and the body of an ethereal being, on the other hand. LVII. So, is it possible to agree with a person who himself holds a similar (absurd) opinion and also accuses Christians - is it possible to abandon the teaching that explains the difference in the body by the difference in their inherent external and internal qualities? As for us, we also know that “there are heavenly bodies and earthly bodies” (cf. 1 Cor. 15:40, 41), that there is one glory for the “heavenly” bodies, and another glory for the “earthly” bodies, and that the glory of the heavenly bodies is not the same, for “there is one glory of the sun, another of the stars”, and even in the stars themselves “star differs from star in glory” ( 1 Cor. 15:42). That is why we affirm that during the resurrection of the dead, which we expect, bodies change in their qualities. For what is sown in corruption will be restored to incorruption, what is sown in dishonor will be restored to glory, what is sown in weakness will be restored to power, a spiritual body is sown, and a spiritual body is raised (1 Cor. 15:43-44). In short, we affirm that the matter underlying things can take on all the properties that the Creator wishes to give it - and we have no doubt about this, as long as we accept Providence. Therefore, in our opinion, if God wants, then it is quite possible for matter to now have such properties and qualities, and then again take on others, even, perhaps, better and more perfect ones. And if the change of bodies takes place according to once established laws (ὁδοὶ ... τεταγμέναι) - and this since the world began to exist and as long as it will exist - and if during the destruction of the world, or - as our scriptures express it - at its death, a new order of things will come and other laws will operate, then I don’t know whether it’s not surprising at least that that even now from a dead human body comes a snake 406, which, according to popular beliefs, is formed from the brain of the spinal cord, and from an ox - bees 407, from a horse - wasps, from a donkey - beetles, and, finally, from many animals - worms. But Celsus, of course, here too will see evidence in favor of his assertion that not one of these things is a creation of God: he thinks that from certain qualities - I don’t know where they came from - other qualities are supposedly formed, but without any participation on the part of the Divine mind influencing the change of qualities in matter. LVIII. One more thing remains for us to say about Celsus, who claims that “the soul was created by God” and that “the nature of the body is different.” He seems to throw these words out not only without evidence, but also without any certainty. He did not even explain whether every soul in general is the work of God or whether this needs to be said only regarding the soul gifted with reason. We will tell him in response: if every soul is the creation of God, then, obviously, the souls of dumb and lower animals are also the creation of God. Then, therefore, the nature of every body must equally be different from the nature of the soul. And if he further says that “non-rational animals are more pleasing to God than we are, and that they have a purer knowledge of God compared to us,” then, apparently, he affirms precisely the idea that not only the souls of people, but also the souls of animals are the creation of God, and the latter even to a greater extent. This last conclusion follows precisely from the statement that “irrational animals are more pleasing to God than we are.” Let us assume that only “the rational soul is the work of God,” but, firstly, he does not explain this position at all. Secondly, from the vagueness of his statement that the soul was created by God, and from the explanation that in this case he is not talking about every soul, but only about the rational soul, the conclusion naturally follows that not every body has a nature different from the nature (soul). If not every body has a different nature, but at the same time every animal has a body consistent (ἀνάλογον) with its soul, then it is clear from here that the body of a creature whose soul was created by God has an advantage and is superior to that body in which the soul created by God does not dwell. In a word, in the end, Celsus’s statement that “the body of a bat, worm or frog is no different from the human body” will turn out to be a lie. LIX. And in general, it is unreasonable, on the one hand, to consider certain stones and buildings to be more pure or less pure in comparison with other stones and buildings on the basis that the first are intended to serve as a place of veneration of the deity, and the second - as a habitat for dishonest and rejected bodies, and at the same time not to assume any difference between some bodies from others, although in some bodies dwell souls involved in reason, and in others - souls deprived of this reason, in some - souls devoted to virtue, and in others - souls extremely mired in vices. This circumstance, without a doubt, gave some grounds to honor the bodies of people who distinguished themselves in the field of virtuous life with deification on the grounds that their bodies served as an abode for a virtuous soul, and, on the contrary, to abandon or dishonor the bodies of people who stained themselves with vice. By this I do not want to claim, however, that such a custom has sound reasons in its favor; but nevertheless, it proceeds, in the end, from the principles of sound thought. Is it really possible that the sage, after the death of Anytus 409 and Socrates, will be equally concerned about the burial of the bodies of both? It is unlikely that he would wish for both to build the same monument and the same tomb? I gave all these examples, bearing in mind the following words of Celsus: “and not one of them is the work of God,” where by the word: “of these” Celsus means the body of a man, and the snakes born from him, and the body of a bull, and the bees coming out of him, and the body of a horse, and wasps born from him, and the body of a donkey, and the beetles coming out of him. That is why I was forced to turn to the analysis of the following expression (Celsus): “the soul is the work of God, but the nature of the body is different.” LX. Then, further, Celsus says that “all the above bodies have a common nature, and at the same time it is the only one that alternately leaves and then returns again 410.” But from what was said earlier it is already clear that not only the bodies listed (by Celsus), but also the celestial bodies have a common nature. If this is so, then from here the conclusion also follows with sufficient clarity - consistent with the thought of Celsus, but hardly consistent with the truth - that “all bodies have a single nature, which departs in shifts and in a sequential order and returns again.” There is no doubt that this is precisely the opinion that belongs to everyone who considers the world to be perishable. But also those who hold the opposite opinion, i.e. those who do not consider the world to be perishable, even if they do not have a doctrine of the “fifth body,” will still try to prove the position that, in their opinion, “the unique nature of all bodies leaves and returns again in shifts and in a sequential order.” Thus, in this case, that which (apparently in its external, apparent form) perishes during the changes taking place in it also gains stability. For matter, which lies at the basis of all things, although it changes its properties, remains as something stable - according to the view of those who admit its uncreatedness (ἀγένητον). Of course, if it were possible to prove the doctrine of the non-eternity (οὐκ ἀγένητον) of matter and its (temporary) origin for certain purposes, then it would be clear that matter cannot have a nature capable of unchanging existence (διαμονῆς), which it could only obtain if it were uncreated. However, in view of the need to present refutations to Celsus’s objections, it is not the time for us to now decide questions of natural philosophy (φυσιολογεῖν). LXI. Celsus further states that “no being born of matter has immortality.” To this objection we can give the following answer. Since nothing born from matter has immortality, then one of two things: either the whole world is immortal and, therefore, it did not come from matter, or it is not immortal. If the world is immortal, as even those admit, according to whom only the soul was created by God and it originated from a certain vessel, then can Celsus provide us with at least proof that the world is not formed from formless and indefinite (qualitatively) matter, while maintaining at the same time the position that everything that comes from matter is by no means immortal. On the other hand, if the world, as formed from matter, is not immortal, then, one asks, will the world as such be subject to decay or not? If we assume the first, i.e. the corruption of the world, then isn’t it like that because it is not the work of God? But what then - given the corruption of the world - should the soul, which is the creation of God, occupy? Let Celsus answer this question. But perhaps he connects some other concept with the word immortality and thinks that the world is immortal in the sense that, despite its corruption, it retains immortality on the basis that it does not actually perish, although it may experience death. But then it is clear that the world, according to Celsus’s understanding, is something that at the same time turns out to be both mortal and immortal, since it contains both of these properties, mutually exclusive of each other. If a mortal must be immortal, then, then, that which is not immortal by nature will, in the proper sense, be called immortal because it will not undergo death. So, after such a distribution of concepts, in what sense does Celsus understand his position that “those things that originate from matter are by no means immortal”? Obviously, the thoughts that he expresses in his works turn out to be far from indisputable and irrefutable, if only they are subjected to more accurate research and testing. After Celsus expressed these provisions, he added the following remark to them: “sufficient explanations have already been provided on this issue. If anyone has the opportunity to further deepen his hearing and research, then he will, of course, achieve knowledge (truth).” We, for our part, allow ourselves to ask Celsus, what benefit can be derived from the fact that we, stupid people, according to Celsus’s concept, are at least somewhat attentive to his beliefs and follow his research? LXII. Then, following this, he presents several inquiries into the nature of evil; Moreover, he believes that what he said is enough to make this question obvious to us, on which a lot of careful research has been done in many, processed works, and from different points of view. He says: “evil in the being (of things), both in the past, and in the present and future, consists of no more and no less. After all, the nature of the Universe is and remains the same, and the origin of evil is always the same.” Apparently, Celsus, with some paraphrasing, borrowed these provisions from Theaeteus, where Plato puts the following speech into the mouth of Socrates: “It cannot be that evil disappears from (among) people, and also that it finds access to the gods 411,” and so on. But it seems to me that Celsus actually did not understand Plato enough, although he boasts that he embraced the truth in this one of his 412 works and expounded it in his work directed against us, entitled “The True Word.” After all, the words in Timaeus: “when the gods cleanse the earth with waters, 413” clearly show that in the earth, already cleansed by waters, there is less evil than there was before the cleansing. And we, when we say that there was once less evil, are in agreement with Plato - precisely with that passage from his Timaeus, where he says that “evil cannot be completely destroyed among people.” LXIII. In general, I do not understand why Celsus, admitting Providence - as far as this can be concluded from the expressions in his book - at the same time says that “there is always evil - no more and no less” and that it is always in the same, as it were, definite quantity. By this very (position) he destroys the beautiful teaching, according to which wickedness and evil are not introduced within certain boundaries and evil is considered infinite (ἄπειρα) by its nature (τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ). In addition, from the opinion that “evil has not been, is not, and will not be greater or less,” apparently, even the following conclusion follows: just as, according to the idea of ​​people who admit and defend the indestructibility and indestructibility of the world, Providence contains the elements (of the world) in balance and does not allow one of these elements to increase at the expense of the other, so that the destruction of the world does not occur in this way - so in the same way, the same Providence turns out to be both ruling evil and preventing it becomes larger or smaller. Celsus's view of evil can also be refuted by another method of proof, which is given to us by philosophers who have examined the question of good and evil and, on the basis of historical facts, have shown that public women, first outside the cities and covered with clothes, sold themselves to those who wanted them, and then became insolent and threw off their veils, but, however, continued to remain outside the cities, since the laws forbade them access here, and, in the end, they penetrated into the cities after depravity had reached even larger sizes. Chrysippus speaks about all this in his treatise “On Good and Evil 414”. Here you can also read that there were once special individuals, the so-called bisexuals, 415 who played both passive and active roles in satisfying the passions of all who turned to their services; subsequently they were destroyed by the guardians of public morality 416. This fact also serves as proof of the proposition that evil sometimes increases and sometimes decreases. And about many other vices that, due to excessive corruption of morals, have found access to people’s lives, it can be argued that these vices did not exist before. The most ancient historical legends, which tell of many human crimes, however, know nothing about such indescribable vices. LXIV. In view of all these and other similar facts, does not Celsus find himself in the ridiculous position of asserting that “evil can never manifest itself to a greater or a lesser degree”? Even if we assume that the nature of the Universe is always the same, it does not follow from this that the generation of evil always remains in the same position. Let us assume that the nature of this or that person is in itself the same, but his knowledge, thoughts and actions are not the same: in one case we see that he has not yet received the ability to use the powers of reason, in another case - evil comes into possession of reason, and this happens to a greater or lesser extent, and in another case - reason turns to the service of virtue, and in this respect it achieves either greater or lesser success, and sometimes reaches the highest stage of perfection and again after a relatively long or insignificant contemplation. The same thing, and even with greater right, can be said about the nature of the Universe; and it is one and the same in itself, but there are, however, things inherent in the world that are not always the same, and also not always homogeneous; for there is not always fertility, and there is not always a crop failure, but there is sometimes drought, sometimes rain. In the same way, there is not always the same fertility or crop failure for good souls: the flow of evil (in the spiritual world) sometimes flows more or less. Actually, people who want to examine all things with the greatest possible thoroughness must always keep in mind the fact that the mass of evil does not remain in the same position and depends on whether Providence preserves earthly things in their original state or whether it purifies them through floods and fires. And it is quite possible that such a cleansing will take place not only in relation to the earth, but also in relation to the entire Universe, when, with the intensification of wickedness in it, the need for such a cleansing becomes apparent. LXV. After this, Celsus says: “What is the origin of evil - it is not easy for a person ignorant of philosophy to know this. For the people it is enough to say only that evil is not from God, that it comes into contact with matter and has mortal beings as its habitat. Moreover, the circulation of mortal beings from beginning to end remains the same; in accordance with a firmly defined order of rotation, things always remain the same - in the past, in the present, and in the future. But by saying that “it is not easy for a person ignorant of philosophy to know the origin of evil,” Celsus seems to push aside the idea that for philosophers it is easy to achieve this knowledge, but for non-philosophers, on the contrary, it is difficult - therefore, although with great difficulty, it is still possible to know the origin of evil. We assert just the opposite: it is far from an easy task for philosophers to comprehend the origin of evil. They, perhaps, would never have received pure knowledge on this subject, if only through Divine revelation it had not been revealed to them what evil is and how it comes about, and how it should be destroyed. Without a doubt, ignorance of God is evil, and even greater evil is ignorance of the very way of worshiping God and piety in relation to God. And, of course, Celsus himself must admit that some philosophers did not possess knowledge in this regard: this is clear from the variety of sects that we find in the field of philosophy. In our opinion, it is impossible for anyone to know about the origin of evil who does not see evil in the assumption that piety and religious life are not at all affected or damaged by the laws established in various states, according to the way of government in them. The one who has not heard anything about the deeds of the so-called devil and his angels cannot know about the origin of evil - what the devil was like before he became one, and how he became the devil, and what is the reason for the circumstance that his so-called angels fell away with him (from God). Whoever wants to know about the origin of evil must have more accurate knowledge about the demons themselves and precisely about the fact that demons are God’s creation, but not as demons, but insofar as they are rational beings; Next, I must find out how it happened that they became demons, and, however, remained with their spiritual powers. In general, if there is any question that people have that requires careful research and is associated with great difficulties for our spirit, it is precisely the question of the origin of evil. LXVI. Then Celsus acts as if he comprehends a mysterious knowledge about the origin of evil, but only does not want to communicate it, so as not to say something beyond the cognitive powers of the common people; he expresses himself this way: “for the common people,” he says, “it is absolutely enough if we tell them that evil is not from God, but that it only adheres (πρόσκειται) to matter and (as it were) reigns (ἐμπολιτεύεται) in mortal beings.” That evil is not from God is, of course, true. Even Jeremiah, one of the prophets, clearly expresses that “Is it not from the mouth of the Most High that disaster and prosperity come?” ( Lamentations 3:38 ) 417 But that “matter reigns in mortal beings” and that it is the cause of evil - this, in our opinion, is no longer true. For every (man) will (ἡγεμονικόν) is the cause of the wickedness that abides in him. This wickedness is evil; hence, those actions that come from wickedness are evil and harmful, and strictly speaking, in our opinion, evil cannot be assumed in anything else. However, as I am convinced, this question (about evil) in its essence is such that it requires serious research and such preparation, which, perhaps, only one who has a spirit enlightened by the grace of God is capable of - only one whom God makes worthy of penetrating into the depths of this question. LXVII. I do not understand what benefit Celsus actually intended to gain when he began to write against us, putting forth such an opinion, which still needs numerous proofs, at least somewhat plausible, to confirm, as far as possible, the idea that “the progressive change of mortals (natures) from beginning to end remains the same and that from a whole series of definite rotations it necessarily follows that the past, present, and future (in these rotations) are always the same.” If this is so, then it means that our freedom of will is already violated. In fact, if from a certain order of rotations the conclusion necessarily follows about the constant triumph of the past, present and future in the progressive change of mortal natures, then it also clearly follows from this that Socrates will always be engaged in philosophy in the future, that he will always be accused of introducing (the cult of) foreign gods and for corrupting youth, that Anytus and Melitus will forever remain his accusers and that the judges of the Areopagus will always be condemn him to death with hemlock 418. Recognition of a strictly defined order in the cycles of mortals (natures) should equally lead to the conclusion that Phalaris 419 will always be a tyrant, that Alexander of Pheraeus 420 will always repeat all the same cruelties in imitation of Phalaris, whose condemned victims uttered cries in the entrails of a bull. If we allow such conclusions, then I do not know how freedom of choice can be preserved, how we can, on reasonable grounds, deserve praise and blame for our actions. If Celsus believes that “the cycle of mortals (natures) from beginning to end always remains the same” and that, therefore, “necessarily things always remain the same throughout the past, present, and future (moments of existence), then we can contrast Celsus with the following conclusion: from the order in the rotation (of things) so firmly established by him, it follows that Moses and the Jewish people will always leave Egypt and that Jesus will always come again into the world to do everything that He has already done not once, but an infinite number of times in successive changes of times. And even Christians, with strictly consistent rotations, will again be the same, and Celsus will again write against them the same book that he has already written countless times before. LXVIII. Celsus says: “only the forward movement of mortal beings in a series of strictly ordered rotations always necessarily remains the same in the past, in the present and in the future.” But the Stoics in most cases are inclined to the opinion that not only in the forward movement of mortals (beings), but also in the movement of immortal beings and even the gods themselves, the same thing happens. After the destruction of this world by fire - and this happened countless times and will happen countless more times - the order of all things, in their opinion, was and will remain the same from beginning to end. True, the Stoics try to soften the absurdity of this teaching. They say that with each rotation, people will appear again - I just don’t know in what way - and they will be completely similar to the people of previous times. So, for example, although Socrates will not appear again, someone will come who will be completely similar to Socrates; he will again take a wife who will not be at all different from Xanthippe; he will be accused by people who will be like Anita and Melita in everything. In fact, I cannot understand how this is so: on the one hand, the world always remains the same, one person is no different from another; and at the same time, things themselves are not the same, but only similar to each other. However, it is best for us to turn to a discussion of the sayings cited in this case by Celsus, and to an investigation of the views of the Stoics at another more convenient time; now it is completely untimely and pointless to dwell on these questions longer than necessary. LXIX. After this, Celsus continues: “also everything visible (ta' o'rw'mena) is not given to man (by God), but everything comes into being and is destroyed for the benefit of the Universe and one thing changes into another in the above manner." It would be completely unnecessary to dwell on the refutation of this position, since we have already refuted it earlier, as far as it was in our power. We also responded to the position (of Celsus), which contains the idea that “there is neither more nor less of good and evil in mortal beings.” As for the expression that “God has no need to correct his actions again,” we have already given our answer to these words of Celsus. If God makes improvements in relation to the world, if He cleanses it, for example, with the help of a flood or fire, then He does this not at all like an artist, whose work contains shortcomings and imperfections, but solely with the goal of containing evil and preventing it from spreading further. I hold to the belief that evil is completely destroyed by God at certain periods of time for the benefit of the universe. But after its destruction, whether this evil comes to life again or not is another question that deserves special study in another (more convenient) case. With all the new improvements that God undertakes, He only wants to correct the errors that have happened to His creations, and again bring into them what they lack. Although in the creation of the world all things were organized in the best and most perfect manner, God still had to apply medicines to those species that turned out to be susceptible to the disease of wickedness, and at the same time to the whole world, which to a certain extent turned out to be, as it were, polluted through this disease. And God, of course, cannot make mistakes on his own, and this will never happen to Him: at each specific moment He produces what He was supposed to produce in a changeable and perishable world. Just as a farmer at different times of the year undertakes different agricultural work in cultivating the land and the plants produced by the earth, so does God, Who directs the entire world order in such a way that separate years are distinguished here; but in each of these years He does something that promotes the welfare of the whole world. Only God alone is able to know this good in the most perfect way and bring it to fruition. LXX. Celsus gives several more such expressions on the question of evil. “If,” he says, “something seems evil to you, then it does not follow that it is actually evil; You, after all, don’t know what exactly is useful to you or others, or everyone in general.” This speech contains, perhaps, some sound thought, but fundamentally it proceeds from the idea that the nature of evil cannot be considered absolutely harmful, since for the entire Universe something that in each individual case appears to be evil can be good. Someone, having heard such words, may even understand them in a bad way and find in them a basis for bad actions, believing that his wickedness is useful or may be useful. But to such a person I will say: God, however, does not constrain the freedom of our will, He even takes advantage of the wickedness of evil people in ordering the Universe, turning the actions of evil people to its benefit; nevertheless, every bad person should be an object of contempt, because it is he who is the author of wickedness and deserves censure; although his actions may be beneficial to the Universe, he is away from such shameful benefit. Otherwise, about someone accused of crimes and sentenced to public works that are useful for everyone, one would have to say that he is doing something that is useful for the whole city; but he himself is burdened with such shameful work, which anyone, even the least decent person, would hardly agree to do. That is why the Apostle of Jesus Paul teaches us that even the worst people can turn out to be useful for the good of the Universe, although in themselves they will be counted among the rejected people; but that people who care about virtue will bring incomparably greater benefit to the Universe and therefore, as a reward for their merits, will be placed in the most glorious place. He says: “in a large house there are vessels not only of gold and silver, but also of wood and clay; and some in honorable, and others in low, use. Therefore, if anyone is clean from this, he will be a vessel of honor, sanctified and useful to the Master, fit for every good work” (2 Tim. 2:20-21). It seemed necessary to me to make these remarks in order to contrast them with the position of Celsus, who says: “If something seems evil to you, this does not mean that it is actually evil; for you do not know what is good for you or anyone else.” LXXI. After this, Celsus makes the subject of his mockery some passages of Scripture, without obviously understanding the meaning of their expressions, in which to a certain extent human thoughts and feelings are attributed to God, as well as angry expressions addressed to atheists and threats directed against sinners. Regarding these bullying, we must say the following. Just as we, when talking to small children, do not reveal the full power of our eloquence, but we adapt our speech to their weak cognitive powers, directing our words and actions so as to be useful in the education and instruction of children, in accordance with their childhood: so in the same way the word of God, apparently, prudently adapted the Scriptures to the degree of understanding of the hearers and proportioned the sublime character of the narratives to their benefit. About this particular way of expressing the truths concerning the question of God, in the book of Deuteronomy we read the following: “The Lord your God bore you as a man carries his son” (Deut. 1:31; cf. Acts 13:18). So, when Scripture expresses itself (about God) in a human form, it means the benefits that such a way of expression can bring to people. It would hardly be of benefit to the common people if God were to direct His utterances to them in a manner consistent with His greatness. But whoever intends to penetrate into the very depths (σαφηνείας) of the Divine Scriptures will find in them the so-called spiritual meaning (τὰ λεγόμενα πνευματικά), accessible to those who are called spiritual (τοῖς ὀνομαζομένοις πνευματικοῖς); and if such a (spiritual) person compares the meaning of sayings addressed to weaker people (πρὸς τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους) with the meaning of truths intended for more enlightened and insightful people (τοῖς ἐντρεχεστέροις), then he will see that both of these meanings 421 are often contained in the same place for those people who are able to comprehend (both meanings). LXXII. So, we talk about the “wrath” of God, but we by no means consider it a passionate feeling (πάθος). It is, rather, a more severe method of action used by God in order to correct people who have committed more or less serious crimes. And that, indeed, the so-called anger (ὀργή) of God and the so-called wrath (θυμός) of Him are educational means (παιδεύει) - which exactly the Scripture speaks of - all this is clear from the words of the sixth Psalm, which says: “Lord! Do not rebuke me in Your wrath, and do not punish me in Your anger” (Ps. 6:2; cf. 37:2). And also from the words quoted from Jeremiah: “Punish me, O Lord, but in righteousness, not in Your anger, so as not to diminish me” (Jer. 10:24). And if anyone reads the Second Book of Kings, then he will find there that the wrath of God prompted David to number the people (2 Sam. 24:1); and in the First Book of Chronicles the same action is attributed to the devil (1 Chron. 21:1). By comparing only these two places with each other, it will be clear to everyone exactly in what sense the word “anger” should be understood. The Apostle Paul says that all people were sons of wrath (of God), literally expressed like this: “and they were by nature children of wrath, like others” (Eph. 2:3). Anger in God is by no means a passionate feeling: every person brings it upon himself by his own sins. This understanding follows from the words of the same Paul, who says: “Or do you despise the riches of God’s kindness, meekness and long-suffering, not realizing that the goodness of God leads you to repentance? But because of your stubbornness and unrepentant heart, you are storing up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath and revelation of righteous judgment from God” (Rom. 2:4–5). How then can anyone incur wrath “on the day of wrath,” if by “wrath” one must mean passion? How can the passion of anger serve as an educational tool? And the Scripture, which gives us the instruction to never be angry 422 and which presents in Psalm thirty-six such a command: “Cease to be angry, and put aside wrath” (Ps. 37:8), and which says through the mouth of Paul: “you put aside everything: anger, rage, malice, slander, foul language” (Col. 3:8), - of course, did not attribute to God himself the passion from which it wants to free us. The words of Scripture about the wrath of God must undoubtedly be understood in a figurative sense (τροπολογεῖσθαι). This is clear from those words of Scripture where a dream is attributed to God, from which, wanting to awaken God, the prophet expresses himself: “Arise, O Lord, that you sleep,” (Ps. 43:24) and further: “As if from sleep, the Lord arose, like a giant overcome by wine” (Ps. 77:65). If the word “sleep” thus means something completely different from what should be understood by it in the ordinary sense of the word, then why cannot the expression “anger” be interpreted in a similar way? Threats, further, are actually a designation of those punishments that are prepared for wicked people. Similarly, in relation to a doctor, for example, we say in those cases when he addresses his patient with the following words: I will chop you up, burn you, if you do not follow my instructions, if you do not do this and that and do not behave in such and such a way. In general, we do not attribute to God any human passionate impulses (πάθη), we do not have any ungodly opinions about Him; We are far from mistaken, as long as we subject all such passages of Scripture to careful examination and, by comparing them with each other, interpret them in the manner indicated above. And those persons who with wisdom (συνετῶς) fulfill the duties of teachers of the word (πρεσβεύουσι τοῦ λόγου), have in mind exclusively only how to eliminate, if possible, the simplicity of ignorance (εὐηθείας) from their listeners and make them reasonable. LXXIII. Completely not understanding the words of Scripture about the “wrath of God,” Celsus further expresses himself as follows: “Isn’t it funny that a man, angry with the Jews, destroyed them all, young and old, and burned their city itself, so that after that they were no longer able to resist (him), and the Most High God, as they say, with anger and rage, with threats, sends His Son so that He would suffer all this (in this world).” So, if the Jews, having dared to act so cruelly towards Jesus, died, all of them, young and old, and lost their very city, then all these sufferings towards them were an expression of the anger that they brought upon themselves. This judgment of God, which descended on them by God’s determination, is called “wrath” in the native language of the Jews. As for the fact that “the Son of the Most High God suffered,” He suffered voluntarily for the sake of saving people (βουληθεὶς ὑπερ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων σωτηρίας), as we have already shown above, as far as we were able 423. Then Celsus continues: “but so that my speech is not limited to the Jews alone (which is not actually part of my plans), but embraces all of nature, as I promised to do, I intend to somewhat clarify what I said earlier.” Can anyone, even a limited person who is aware of human weaknesses, read these words of Celsus without becoming indignant at the boasting that he reveals in his desire to give an explanation “of all nature in its entirety,” and equally without becoming indignant at the self-praise that is revealed in the very title of his book 424? For our part, we will try to consider what exactly Celsus intends to tell us on the question “about his nature as a whole” - what are his “explanations” in this case. LXXIV. Further, Celsus devotes a lot of space to accusing us of the fact that, according to our teaching, “God created everything for man”; Based on the natural history of animals, on the facts of their discovery of signs of intelligence, he tries to prove that “everything was created just as much for dumb animals as for people - and for the latter no more than the former.” Celsus in this case seems to me to be similar to people who, under the influence of anger in their enemies, condemn what they praise in application to their friends. Just as hatred makes these people blind, and they, under the influence of hatred, do not even themselves notice that the accusations they level against their enemies are at the same time directed at their friends: similarly, Celsus becomes confused in his proofs. He does not notice at all that his accusations also apply to the philosophers of the Stoic school, who resolutely and not without reason put man and, in general, any rational nature above “dumb animals” and, for their part, affirm the position that, primarily for rational nature, everything was created by Providence 425. Thus, 426 it turns out that rational beings, with all the provided higher qualities of their nature, are, as it were, children, and beings devoid of reason and soul constitute, as it were, a shell that encloses a child in the womb. I, for my part, believe that just as in cities those who take care of trade affairs and the market consider it their duty to work only for people, although as a result of the abundance of food supplies, in this case something falls to the share of dogs and other dumb animals - in the same way, Providence primarily has in its care rational beings, but in such a way that at the same time, something created for the benefit of people falls to the share of dumb creatures. And just as anyone would fall into error if he believed that the prefects of the market care no more about people than about dogs, on the grounds that dogs also receive some share from the excess of nutritious products, in the same way - and almost to a greater extent even - on the question of the Providence of God in relation to rational beings, Celsus and all the opinions that share him fall into impiety, since they assert that “all these things in the very act of creation were the means nutrition not only for people, but equally for plants, trees, herbs and ears of corn. LXXV. And remarkably, Celsus brings to the fore the opinion that “thunder, lightning, rain are by no means the work of God,” and in this case it becomes even clearer on the side of Epicurean views. And only then does he continue: “even if we assume that God is the author of all these things, these things still serve as a means of feeding people no more than they also serve for plants, trees, herbs and ears of grain.” Moreover, like a true epicurean, he adds that these things are the product of chance and do not depend on Providence. If at the same time they serve as much benefit for plants, trees, herbs and ears of corn as they do for us, then it is clear that they are not the work of Providence in general, and also of that Providence that cares about us no more than trees, herbs and ears of grain. Both of these assumptions are clearly ungodly; and it would be stupid if we began to object to an opponent who accuses us of atheism and at the same time cites similar provisions. From what has been said, it is self-evident who exactly is an atheist. He then adds the following remark: “although we claim that all these things, i.e. plants, trees, herbs and ears of corn have grown for people, but why don’t you tell me that they have grown for people no more than for dumb animals?” So, let Celsus directly say that, in his opinion, all this great variety of earthly growths is by no means the work of Providence, but that all the various types and qualities (of these growths) owe their origin to a certain cohesion of atoms, which only by chance explains the similarity between all these types of plants, trees and herbs. Let Celsus openly declare that these plants were not called into being by any creative and formative Word (λόγος τεχνικός), that they do not owe their existence to Reason (ἀπὸ νοῦ), which surpasses all astonishment. But we, Christians, who honor the one God as the Creator of these things, give Him gratitude for the fact that He created these things - for the fact that He prepared for us such a beautiful abode (ἑστίαν), and through us also for the animals that serve us. “You bring forth grass for the livestock, and greens for the benefit of man, to bring forth from the earth food and wine, which gladdens the heart of man, and oil, which makes his face shine, and bread, which strengthens the heart of man” (Ps. 103:14, 15). And there is nothing surprising in the fact that God gave food to even the wildest animals. These irrational creatures, as some philosophers have expressed it, were created so that rational animals could exercise their thinking abilities on them. And one of our sages in one place puts it this way: “You cannot say: “What is this or what is this for?”, for everything was created for its own use; and it is impossible to say: “what is this and what is it for?” for everything will be revealed in due time” (Sir. 39:27, 22). LXXVI. Celsus, further, wishes to weaken the force and significance of the proposition that the plants of the earth were created first of all for us and then for wild animals. In this case, he adds the following remark to his previous words: “We,” he says, “get our food with great difficulty, with great labor and effort, watered with sweat, and for them (the animals), without any crops, the uncultivated land provides everything.” But Celsus does not want to understand that God created man as a being in need (of work), in order to give him the opportunity to exercise his cognitive powers everywhere, and through this not to leave him inactive, alien to such knowledge that leads to the arts; Only in this way, in order to satisfy his needs, was man brought face to face with the need to carry out technical research that could serve as a means of maintaining his existence and equipping his clothing. For for miserable people, who have no inclination to delve into the Divine mysteries or devote themselves to the study of philosophy, it was in any case much better to be in a helpless state and thus be forced to turn their minds to the invention of arts and crafts, than to enjoy everything in abundance and thereby neglect the abilities of their rational spirit. The lack of necessary means of subsistence prompted, in fact, the art of agriculture, and the art of producing wine, and the art of planting gardens, as well as the entire industry aimed at processing copper, to the invention of tools with the help of which it is possible to obtain food products necessary for life. The lack of clothing also explains the emergence of the art of weaving, wool processing and spinning, as well as the art of building houses - an art in which the human mind gradually reached the knowledge of architectonics. We owe the same lack of comfort in life to the emergence of both shipbuilding and the art of sailing ships, thanks to which it became possible to transport the works of some countries to others, where these works are not available. In general, in view of all these benefits, who would not be surprised at the special foresight of Providence in the sense that It created rational beings, in comparison with irrational animals that need everything. Unreasonable animals find ready-made food everywhere because they are deprived of the ability to perform the arts. That is why nature itself dresses them: animals have either wool, or feathers, or thick skin, or scales. This is what we had to say in rebuke to Celsus, in refutation of his words: “we obtain food for ourselves with great difficulty, with great labor and effort, pouring sweat, but to animals, without any crops, without cultivation, the earth supplies everything (necessary).” LXXVII. As if forgetting his intention to direct his accusations at Jews and Christians, Celsus further cites a verse from Euripides, which speaks of something completely different and contradicts his own view; challenging it with all his might, he devotes much labor and effort to proving at the same time its injustice. He says; “if you contrast with me the saying of Euripides that The sun and night - serve mortals 427, then I ask you: why us, and not the ants and flies? And for them the night serves as a time of rest, and the day - in order to be sighted and act.” From this it is clear that the idea of ​​the sun and other heavenly bodies serving us was expressed not only by some Jews and Christians, but was also carried out by the philosopher on stage 428, as some call him, the philosopher who listened to Anaxagoras’ lessons on natural philosophy. When this philosopher says that all things in this world should serve man, he, in fact, names a part instead of the whole, and by one rational being he means all beings. This is clear from his words: Both the sun and the night - both - serve mortals. It may very well be that for Euripides the sun means day, since day depends on the sun, which is why he goes on to explain that the things under the moon most of all need day and night, and that other creatures have such a need for them as the creatures on earth. Day and night, therefore, have a service meaning for mortals: they were created for the sake of rational beings. If ants and flies work only during the day and rest at night, if in this way what was created for people also benefits them, then it can no longer be said that day and night exist only for ants and flies; One cannot then even think that Providence, when creating day and night, had in mind something other than people. LXXVIII. Further, Celsus contradicts himself when he speaks of people in a sense favorable to them, namely, that irrational animals were created for their benefit. “If someone,” he says, “says that we are the kings of animals, because we hunt other living beings and eat them as food, then we will ask (such a person) the following question: why weren’t we, rather, born for them, since they also hunt us and devour us? True, we resort to nets and weapons against them, and some take dogs to help them when they go hunting for them; but in this case, nature itself gave them a weapon with which they can easily subjugate us to themselves 430.” But even here you can see what a strong auxiliary tool is given to us (humans) in the mind itself (σύνεσις), and what an enormous advantage this latter has in comparison with the weapons that animals apparently possess. Although in terms of bodily organization and strength we are far inferior to animals, and in terms of body size some of them are immeasurably higher than us, but with the power of our mind we conquer wild animals. When hunting, we even defeat elephants, which have such enormous strength; animals that are capable of becoming tame, we tame by gentle treatment, and against those that are not capable of becoming tame, or from the taming of which we cannot derive any benefit for ourselves, we protect ourselves and put them beyond the possibility of harming us - by the fact that we catch them and imprison them in cages whenever we want; and if the meat of such animals is suitable for our food, then we kill them as easily as domestic animals. The Creator, therefore, prepared everything to serve rational beings and their natural cognitive powers. For example, we use dogs, well, at least so that they guard our herds, and we use herds of bulls, goats and other domestic animals so that the bulls cultivate the land and pack animals carry heavy loads. We can say that lions, bears, leopards, wild boars and other wild animals are given to us in order to exercise the rudiments (σπερμάτων) of courage (ἀνδρείας) embedded in us. LXXIX. After this, Celsus turns his word to those who are aware of their superiority over irrational animals. He says: “According to your statement, God has given you the ability to catch wild animals and benefit from them. But we must note to you that in the natural course of things, before cities began to be built and arts appeared, and with them all these communities, various kinds of weapons and shields, people were captured by wild animals and devoured by them, but in any case, it was not the animals that were captured by people.” And here you need to pay attention to the fact that there is a big difference when people capture animals and animals predatoryly attack people. People gain the upper hand thanks to their intelligence, but animals, on the contrary, can only overcome people who do not use their intelligence to protect themselves from attacks from animals only through their brutality and rage. As for the position (of Celsus) that “before cities began to be built and arts and communities connected with them appeared,” I think that in this case Celsus himself forgot what he said a little earlier 431. According to him, “the world cannot be created and perishable, and only things on earth are subject to all the disasters of floods and fires, although not all of them experience their destructive influence at once.” But the defenders of the uncreated world, not being able to point to its beginning, naturally cannot determine the time when, in fact, there were no cities and no arts were invented. Even if Celsus wishes to be in agreement with our concepts and consigns to oblivion his own words spoken earlier, is he then able to prove that in the beginning “people were captured and devoured by animals, and not animals were caught by people”? Since the world is the work of Providence, since God rules the Universe, then it was necessary from the beginning to place the progenitors of the human race under the protection of higher beings; therefore, at the very beginning, a close connection (ἐπιμιξία) was established between the Divine nature and people. Even the Askrean poet was obviously aware of this connection, which is why he said; Then there was a common table, and a common resting place It was with the immortal gods and with mortal people 432 LXXX. And the Divine writings of Moses 433 tell us that the first people heard the Divine voice and Divine verbs 434 and repeatedly saw the appearance of the Angels of God coming to them. And it was quite natural that human nature at the very beginning of the world received help that strengthened it until it, together with the development of cognitive powers and the increase of all other virtues, together with the invention of the arts, was finally able to lead an independent and independent life and free itself from the constant help of those beings who, by the will of God, in some amazing way offered their service to people through their appearances. This clearly shows the falsity of the statement that “people at the very beginning were captured by wild animals and devoured by them, and that it was not the animals that were captured by people.” From here it clearly follows that the falsity of Celsus’s idea, which he expresses in the following words: “actually, in this case, God most likely subordinated people to beasts (and not animals to people).” God, of course, did not subject people to beasts; He, on the contrary, arranged it in such a way that people, by the power of their minds and with the help of artificial auxiliary means that they invented against animals, were able to keep them in their power. And without Divine help, people, of course, would not have had the opportunity to find salvation from animals, overcome them and become their rulers. LXXXI. This noble man 435 does not even pay attention to the fact that many philosophers have assumed the existence of Providence and the creation of all things by this Providence for rational beings; he even went so far as to destroy, in fact, those useful teachings in which Christianity is in complete agreement with the philosophers; he does not want to see how much harm is caused to piety by his opinion that in the eyes of God man supposedly has no advantage compared to ants or bees. He says: “if we assume that people have an advantage over irrational animals because they inhabit cities and enjoy all the benefits of civil society, have bosses and leaders, then all this does not mean anything: after all, ants and bees have the same thing. Bees have a leader whom they follow and obey; They have wars, and victories, and plunder of the vanquished; they have cities, and city suburbs, and a division of labor; they also apply punishments to the lazy and evil; They drive out the drones and are merciless with them.” Thus, Celsus completely missed the distinction that exists between phenomena that depend in their origin on rational power and mental abilities, and phenomena that do not depend at all on reason and are determined exclusively by the needs of external instinct alone 436. At the basis of these latter phenomena, in any case, there is no reason that would govern the actions (of irrational animals); they do not have such a reason. The Supreme (o' preobu'tato_s) king over all beings subordinate to Him, the Son of God, created irrational nature in such a way that it, since it is irrational, can only serve those beings who are worthy of receiving reason (λόγον). So, people formed cities with numerous arts and laws: civil structure, government and government between people - all these in the proper sense are so-called good qualities and actions, as well as those that are called so in an improper sense and serve only, if possible, as an imitation of the first. These are the qualities, in fact, that the best legislators had in mind when they introduced the best civil structure, government and governance. Of all the above-mentioned institutions, nothing similar can be found in irrational animals, although Celsus makes an attempt to assign all the names and institutions, such as the city, the civil order, the authorities and government - all these institutions indicating rationality and activities closely related to rationality, to also relate to ants and bees. But precisely in this regard, neither ants nor bees should be praised at all, because there is no sign of intelligence in their actions. But before the Divine Being (τὴν θείαν φύσιν) one should be filled with surprise for the fact that even irrational animals he bestowed some semblance of rational powers - and this, perhaps, in order to shame people, so that, looking at ants, they would become more industrious, become more vigilant in relation to objects useful to them, and, looking at the bees, they would learn to obey the authorities and take part in the concerns so necessary for the well-being of cities. LXXXII. And, perhaps, some semblance of those wars that bees wage among themselves is established in the teaching with what justice and orderliness wars should be waged, if only people need to wage them at all. As for cities and suburbs, bees don’t even have them; there are only depressions and hexagonal cells, which the bees occupy in turn - and all this again is for the benefit of people, who derive many different benefits from honey, using it as a cure for bodily illnesses and as a healthy nutritious agent. And those actions that are found in bees in relation to drones cannot at all be equated with those sentences that are applied in cities to bad and useless people, as well as with the punishments that such people are subjected to. One should, on the contrary, - as I have already said 437 - marvel at the Divinity in such actions (of bees). Part of the praise must also be given to the person who, as if assisting Providence, was able - with his own mind to comprehend everything and arrange everything (κοσμῆσαι) - to carry out not only the works of Divine Providence, but also the actions of his own providence. LXXXIII. Having finished his speech about bees, in which Celsus tries with all his might to humiliate not only us Christians, but all people in general - all our cities, civil order, authorities, government, all our wars in defense of the fatherland - he proceeds further to praising ants. And all this is only to equate people’s concern for food with the way of action of ants, to humiliate (human) foresight in case of winter as an action that supposedly has no advantage over the care that, in his opinion, is also the case with ants devoid of rationality. But wouldn't any simple person, who, due to his mental backwardness, is unable to penetrate into the essence of all things, thanks to Celsus to a large extent, begin to deviate from extending a helping hand to people who are languishing under the burden of life, and sharing hardships with them, since Celsus says that “ants help each other in bearing burdens when they notice the fatigue of one of their comrades.” Anyone who does not feel any need for scientific education (τῆς διὰ λόγου παιδεύσεως) and has never turned to its assistance will, of course, directly say: since we are no better than ants when we provide help to people languishing under the burden of the hardships they endure, then Why then should we do all this? In relation to ants - these unreasonable animals - at least there is no fear that they will become proud and arrogant if their actions and deeds begin to be equated with the actions of people. But people who, thanks to their inherent intelligence, can understand how low their sympathy and love for their neighbor are valued, through such speech can only receive harm - and in this case the blame will lie entirely with Celsus. After all, he himself does not understand how he deliberately turns his readers of his books away from Christianity - how he even draws sympathy from the hearts of non-Christians for those who bear the hardships of life that are difficult to overcome. Although he is a philosopher who should understand the duties of every person in relation to his neighbors (τοῦ κοινωνικοῦ), he, along with Christianity, overthrows all those good and beautiful qualities and properties (τὰ χρήσιμα) that are found in every person; whereas he should, on the contrary, - as far as possible - strengthen the good inclinations that are equally inherent in both Christians and non-Christians. And regarding the question that “ants tear off sprouts from the fruits they preserve and do not allow them to grow in order to thus obtain the opportunity to feed on fruits for a whole year 438,” then the reason for such actions on the part of the ants, one must think, lies not at all in their rationality (λογισμὸν), but in that mother nature common to all (παμμήτορα φύσιν) 439, which cares so carefully about unreasonable creatures that even the most insignificant (creature) is not left without attention and bears within itself traces of the intelligence inherent in nature (φέρον ἴχνος τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως λόγου). If Celsus, who often displays a tendency to think in Platonic terms 440, at the same time tries to show that all souls are the same 441, and that, therefore, the souls of people are no different from the souls of ants and bees, 442 then in this case he already speaks as a person, in whose opinion the soul is from the firmament of heaven (ἀπὸ τῶν ἁψίδων τοῦ ουρανοῦ) descends not only into the human body, but also into all other (bodies). Christians do not attach any credibility to such a view; after all, they know that the human soul is created “in the image of God” (Gen. 1:26, 27), and therefore they understand that a being created in the image of God is not able to completely (πάντη) lose its characteristic properties (τοὺς χαρακτήρας αὐτῆς) and accept others inherent irrational animals and created - I don’t even know - in what exact image. LXXXIV. Celsus further makes the following remark: “living ants allocate some special place to dead ants, which serves as a substitute for family monuments (πάτρια μνήματα).” To this we must say the following: the more Celsus extols irrational animals with his praises, the more - without noticing it himself - he glorifies the activity of the Word that created the Universe and thereby even more emphasizes the presence in people of a special energy (ἐντρεχείαν), multiplying through rational power (τῷ λόγῳ) those highest gifts that are endowed by nature unreasonable animals. And what do I say: “irrational animals,” since, according to Celsus, animals are by no means irrational beings, as everyone usually calls them? He is of the opinion that ants are not devoid of intelligence—he is the one who has pledged to talk about all of nature in general 443 and boastfully promised to tell the truth in the very title of his book. This is how Celsus depicts ants talking to each other444. He says: “if ants meet each other, then they talk to each other; that is why they do not go astray. They, therefore, have all-round rationality (λόγου συμπλήρωσις), have general concepts of all known truths, speak language and certain signs for suitable cases.” But when they speak to each other, they usually resort to the voice to express words; Even completely random names are often conveyed using voice. And surely such a conversation among ants will not, in the end, turn out to be the greatest joke in the world? LXXXV. To these considerations, Celsus was not ashamed to add a statement that would reveal to all posterity the absurdity of his teachings. He says: “Well, if someone looked from heaven to earth, could he find any basis for distinguishing what we do from what ants and bees do?” Yes, whoever looks, as he put it, “from the heights of heaven on earth and looks at the affairs and aspirations of people and ants” and at the same time pays attention, even if only to the bodies of people and ants, will he not notice in the first case the presence of an intelligent principle (τὸ λογικὸν ἡγεμονικόν), controlled in its activities reason (λογισμῶ κινούμενον), and in the second case - the presence of only an unreasonable principle (τὸ ἄλογον ἡγεμονικόν), which, based on external feeling and imagination 445, is set in motion by a known natural apparatus and mechanism? But it will be a complete inconsistency if someone who has directed his gaze from heaven to earth wants from such a distant space to pay attention only to the bodies of people and ants and at the same time does not want to take into account the very nature of the governing principle and the source of aspirations, namely, whether this source is rational or unreasonable. Once he has already perceived the source of all aspirations, then it is clear that he will also perceive the difference - exactly how much a person has an advantage not only over ants, but also over elephants. In fact, looking from heaven, he will not actually see anything in irrational animals, no matter how large their bodies may be; he cannot discover any other principle in them, except perhaps irrationality (ἀλογίαν), so to speak; in rational beings he will find the mind that people have in common (κοινόν) with Divine and heavenly beings, and perhaps even with God Almighty himself. This is why people are spoken of in the sense that they are created “in the image of God” (Gen. 1:26, 27); for the “image” (Cf. Col. 1:15; 2 Cor. 4:4) of God, the Almighty, is His Word (ὁ λόγος). LXXXVI. After this, as if trying more and more to humiliate the human race and reduce it to the state of dumb animals, as if wanting not to omit anything remarkable that is known about animals, he says that irrational animals also have knowledge of the secrets of magic; he proposes, in this way and in this respect, to deprive people of the right to their exclusively honorable position - the right to advantage over irrational animals. He puts it this way: “if people are so proud of their magical art, then in this respect they are in no way superior in wisdom to snakes and eagles. And these latter know many remedies against poisons and diseases, and even know the healing properties of some stones, which they use to heal their young. If such stones fall into people’s hands, the latter imagine that they have made some amazing acquisition 446.” And, firstly, I do not understand how Celsus called the word magic a simple acquaintance (ἐμπειρίαν) with certain antidotes, or - rather - that natural acquisition that seems to be inherent in animals; But the word magic usually has a completely different meaning attached to it. But perhaps Celsus, as an Epicurean, wants to generally devalue the use of art (magic) and recognize it as the property of those charlatans (γοήτων) who use it in their spells (ἐν ἐπαγγελίᾳ). Let us assume that people are too proud of their knowledge of such arts - no matter whether they are charlatans or not - but it does not follow from this that in this art snakes are incomparably wiser and more experienced than people. If they use hay to enhance their vision and make their body more mobile, then all this is determined by their natural needs, and not at all by the creativity of the mind (οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιλογισμοῦ) - this is a simple result of the structure of their bodily organism (ἐκ κατασκευῆς)• But when people achieve such knowledge, then in this case they are not - like snakes - dependent only on natural disposition, but are guided partly by experience, partly by learning, and in other cases also by the power of their creativity (ἐξ ἐπιλογισμοῦ) and knowledge (κατ’ ἐπιστήμην). And if the eagles, having found the so-called eagle stone, then take it to their nests to use it to treat their chicks, then how does it follow that they - as you think - are wise and even wiser than people who have experience with the help of their reason and after a whole series of conclusions, they invented the remedy that was given to eagles as an antidote by nature itself 447? LXXXVII. Let us assume that animals also know other medical remedies, but does it follow that it is not nature, but reason, that showed them these remedies? If reason were to invent means among them, then it would then invent not only this particular means indicated in snakes, but perhaps also a second and third, then another in the eagle, and so on in other animals, in a word, it would invent exactly as many of them as there are among people. But since now each animal, depending on the properties of its nature, has only a certain medicinal remedy, then it is clear that animals have neither wisdom nor reason, but only a natural disposition bestowed by the (Divine) Word 448 towards such things as are intended to serve as a means to their well-being (σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν). And if I had the desire to enter into a longer debate with Celsus on this issue, then I could cite a passage from the Proverbs of Solomon, where it says: “Behold, there are four little ones on the earth; but they are wiser than the wise: ants are not a strong people, but in the summer they prepare their food; mountain mice are a weak people, but they build their houses on the rock; The locusts do not have a king, but they all act harmoniously; A spider clings with its paws, but it stays in royal palaces” (Proverbs 30:24–28). But if I cited these words, it is not at all because I understand them in the literal sense; on the contrary, in accordance with the very title of the book, designated by the name Proverbs, I am trying to find what kind of figurative (αἰνίγματα) meaning lies in them. After all, it is the custom of men who interpret the Scriptures to classify those passages (of the Scriptures) that, in addition to the literal meaning contained in them, conceal another, mysterious meaning (Cf. above 4:38), into numerous types: Proverbs also belongs to one of them. That is why our Savior said, as it is written in the Gospels: “Hitherto I have spoken to you in parables; but the time is coming when I will no longer speak to you in parables” 449. Consequently, it is not these visible ants that are wiser than the wise, but those that are implied in the (hidden) form of the parable; The same must be said about other animals. Meanwhile, Celsus believes that “the books of Jews and Christians are distinguished by their unconditional simplicity and artlessness (ἀπλούστατα καὶ ἰδιωτικὰ βίβλια)” and that, therefore, “everyone who tries to interpret them allegorically (τοὺς ἀλληγοροῦντας), allow violence against the thoughts of their writers." So, from what has been said, I think it is clear that the objections and accusations brought by Celsus against us have no basis; his view and statement that “snakes and eagles are supposedly wiser than people” are empty and insignificant words. LXXXVIII. Celsus also wants to substantiate with many proofs the idea that the ideas that people have about the Divine are in no way more perfect than those that other mortal beings have in this regard, so that even “some dumb animals have knowledge of God.” But on this issue the most thoughtful men of all countries, both among the Greeks and among other peoples, come to the most opposite opinions. But here are Celsus’s own words: “If we only adhere to the opinion that man considers himself superior to all other living beings on the basis that he has the ability to form an idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Divine, then we allow ourselves to draw the attention of people who hold this opinion to the fact that many of the dumb animals have (the same) right to assign to themselves such an advantage. And it will be quite natural. Indeed, what could be more divine than foresight and insight into the future? And people learn all this from animals, and especially from birds. And it is precisely those people who delve into the readings (of birds and animals) who actually turn out to be soothsayers. If birds and all other animals adapted to divination, which God has endowed with this gift, give us instructions by signs, then all this, apparently, indicates their connection with God is closer, and their relationship to Him is closer, so that they themselves turn out to be the wisest and most God-loving. Learned people say that animals even conduct conversations among themselves and that these conversations, according to all data, are distinguished by greater holiness among them than ours; scientists supposedly understand these (bird) conversations and prove it in practice, namely: when they predict that the birds have revealed to them their intention to fly here and there, to do this and that, they actually carry out this (their intention), flying exactly there and doing exactly what they predicted in advance (to them) 450 . And it seems that there is not a single creature that would keep an oath so sacredly and faithfully and would have such great reverence for divine things as can be said about elephants - and all this is because, of course, elephants have knowledge of God 451.” It is necessary to pay attention to how here Celsus diligently collects opinions and presents them as if unanimous on such issues, in the solution of which philosophers not only among the Greeks, but also among other peoples, however, are far from agreeing with each other; all these philosophers, in fact, either invented it themselves, or learned from certain demons what concerns birds and other animals, from whom, as they say, some people allegedly learned divination. And firstly, there is still debate about whether the art of divination by birds or, in general, the art of divination with the help of animals exists or not. Secondly, there are those (scientists) who admit that by observing birds, it is true that one can know about the future, but observing birds itself is not the only reason underlying divination. Some claim that certain demons or gods who know the future accompany animals in their movements, that these demons direct - in birds their various flights and the various sounds that are emitted by them, and in other animals - their movements to and fro. Others again think that the souls of animals themselves are endowed with the highest degree of divinity (θειοτέρας ψυχας) and the corresponding ability, which, of course, is completely incredible. LXXXIX. But since Celsus, in the above provisions, intended to prove the idea that “dumb animals are both wiser and more divine than people,” then he should have, I note, first and thoroughly substantiate the position that this art of divination itself actually exists, then present solid and irrefutable evidence in favor of this position, then decisively refute the very arguments of people who do not allow this kind of divination, and equally - with the same decisiveness, not allowing for objections, to refute the views of people who claim that the movements of animals, which have the nature of divination, are guided by demons or gods, and, finally, to substantiate the idea that “the soul of unreasonable animals is supposedly more divine (the souls of people).” If only he had done and in this case shown himself to be a (real) philosopher, then we, of course, through this would have received a reason to turn to a refutation of all his assumptions within our power. And, first of all, we would turn to refuting the idea that “dumb animals are supposedly wiser than people”; we would then show all the falsity of his view, according to which animals seem to have a deeper religious concept of God (ἐννοίας τοῦ θείου ἱερωτέρας) in comparison with us, and according to which some conversations of a religious nature are attributed to animals (ὁμιλίας πρὸς ἄλληλα ἱερας). And now this very same (Celsus), who accuses us of believing in the Almighty God (τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ), we must (at his word) believe that the souls of birds supposedly have purer and clearer ideas and concepts about God than we, humans. If this is so, then it means that birds have clearer ideas about God than Celsus himself. And such a conclusion in relation to Celsus, of course, does not arouse surprise in us: so he persistently humiliates man himself! But here’s what’s surprising when applied to Celsus: his birds have more sublime religious ideas - I won’t say - compared to us - Christians and even Jews, who have the same Holy Scriptures with us, but in any case more sublime compared even to those that the learned Greek theologians have. After all, these (theologians) were people! According to Celsus, it thus turns out that the birds, who know and elevate the future, have a more thorough and profound knowledge of the Divine than Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. And we, therefore, must turn to the birds and choose them as our teachers. Since it is the birds - according to Celsus - who teach us about the future with the help of fortune-telling, it means that they actually give us a clearer concept of the Divine and free us from our ignorance in this area. It goes without saying that Celsus, with such an opinion, should have placed birds above people and went to the birds for teaching, and not to any of the Greek philosophers. HS. We must oppose only very little to the above provisions (of Celsus); we can limit ourselves to the most cursory remarks in order to show with what ingratitude he lavishes blasphemy (ψευδοδοξίαν) against his Creator. After all, Celsus himself is a “man,” but “being in the honor” (of being a man), he, however, “did not penetrate” (with his) “mind” (Ps. 48:13); That’s why he not only lowered himself to the position of birds and other dumb animals, which, in his opinion, have the ability of divination, but even gave them preference due to the fact that the Egyptians worship dumb animals as gods; Thus, on his part, he used all his efforts to ultimately subjugate himself and the entire human race to dumb animals, as having a comparatively lower and worse knowledge of the Divine. So, first of all, it is necessary to investigate and resolve the question whether or not the art of fortune telling with the help of birds and other animals exists, in the divinatory power of which he so believes. After all, the reasons for and against this faith, of course, cannot remain without attention and appropriate discussion. And these reasons boil down to the fact that, on the one hand, if the existence of such an art is recognized, there is a fear that intelligent beings would completely abandon the divination of demons and turn exclusively to birds for advice, and on the other hand, this fear is counterbalanced by the strictly attested fact that many, convinced of the divinatory power of birds, got rid of the greatest dangers. For now, we will agree that in fact there is an art - to recognize the future by the flight of birds, but, however, in order to then show everyone entangled in such opinions how great is the superiority of man over irrational animals, even those who have the prophetic power of broadcasting - how immeasurably high man stands over animals. So we say: if animals have a divine power to know in advance about the future, and it is inherent in such a great degree that they can, from their excess, communicate this power to people who want to know the future, then they, obviously, should have foreseen much earlier what concerns themselves - know what they need to beware of later - fly away from the place where people have laid snares and nets for them in order to catch them, or fly away from where the shooters are pointing arrows at them and aiming at them in flight. And if the eagles had foreseen in advance the intrigues that are plotted against their chicks by the snakes that crawl up to them and kill them; if, on the other hand, the eagles had foreseen in advance the intrigues on the part of people who captured chicks partly for fun, partly with the aim of extracting from them some useful and healing remedy; then, of course, they would not keep their chicks where they could face such great danger. In general, not a single animal would ever be caught by people, if only animals were actually “divine and wiser than people.” XCI. But here’s what (it must be said): if the soothsaying birds and some other irrational animals had divine power (θείαν φύσιν ἔχοντες), and divine knowledge, and knowledge of the future, if they were talking among themselves, as Celsus claims, then in any case they would begin to inform each other about such things, and then the bird about which he talks Homer, would not have placed her chicks where they, together with her, could become prey for the dragon, and in the fight about which the same poet speaks, would not have been captured by the eagle. About the first (i.e. bird) we read from the glorious Homer in his creation 452 the following: A great miracle appeared there - a dragon with blood-red spots on its back: The Olympian himself sent him to earth. Having crawled to the altar, he moved forward from below. Slowly he climbed onto the branches - onto a tall plane tree, Touched the very top of it, where at the very top There was a nest, and there were eight chicks of a little bird. They sat on high branches with their featherless wings They called their mother. But in vain they called for their mother by squeaking. The dragon grabbed them with his deadly teeth and devoured them, And the mother herself, who was shaking with a pitiful cry He grabbed his wings and sent them into the hungry belly. And suddenly Kronos, suddenly appearing, turned him into stone. We stood with amazement on our faces, And timidity overcame us - we were even more surprised Why is this creature a monster that is impossible to talk about? crawled to the shrine of the gods. About the other (i.e. the dragon) it is said 453 that: Now the bird appeared - as soon as they began to try to climb over - Soaring Eagle; he, sharp claws plunging into the bloody back The Great One, carried him through the air - to the left of that side, Where Troy's enemies tried to destroy the enemy's walls. But here he is, fierce, turning his mouth back; The teeth sank into the bird's high chest. Suffering from pain, she spread her claws, the snake She launched herself at Troyan and rushed along the air, Emitting a piercing scream. Trojans Everyone trembled, seeing these strange phenomena. And they began to believe that this misfortune was foreshadowed by Zeus. So, it means that only the eagle knew the future, but the dragon did not, although soothsayers also check their observations on this beast? How is this so? If the inconsistency of such a distinction is easily revealed, then why not refute the other position, which attributes broadcasting power to both (animals)? After all, if the dragon had the power of prophetic providence, would he not have been protected from what threatened him from the eagle? And many more cases of this kind could be found - such cases that confirm that animals do not at all have in themselves a soul with communicative power, but that they - as the poet and many other people think - are sent by the Olympian himself (Zeus) to see the light 454. In certain cases, Apollo also uses a hawk as a messenger, which is why the hawk is called the “fast-moving Apollo messenger 455.” XXII. In our opinion, in this regard, there are some evil spirits that belong to the category of titans or giants, so to speak - spirits who committed a crime in the face of the true God and the heavenly Angels, which is why they were cast out of heaven and now eke out their existence in a coarser bodily shell and in the impurities of the earth. But since they are still deprived of the qualities of the earthly body 456, they can have some insight into the future, and since all their aspirations and activities are aimed at inciting the human race to fall away from the true God, they choose as their place of residence the bodies of animals, the most predatory, the most wild, the most harmful, and direct them wherever they want and when they want: or they act on the imagination of certain animals and force them to fly and move there and here - and all this so that people, blinded by this broadcasting power, which they see in unreasonable animals, do not seek God, the Lord and the Almighty, do not care about true worship of God, but chain all their thoughts to the earth - to birds, dragons, foxes and wolves. People experienced in this kind of matter also had the observation that with the help of these animals 457 the most accurate (ἐναργέστεραι) predictions are obtained - and this is because demons over tamed animals do not have as much power as they have over those (wild animals), since these latter, in terms of malice, have the closest resemblance to demons. However, this malice, which is found in such animals, is not evil in the proper sense, but something only apparent - only a semblance of evil (οἱονει δὲ κακίαν οὖσαν). XCIII. If there is one thing in which I am especially amazed at the personality of Moses, it is precisely in this respect that the part of his work where he examines the various breeds of animals deserves special attention. Leaving completely aside the question of whether Moses learned from God what concerns the affinity of demons with each animal (from the category indicated above) and their similarity to each other in this respect, or whether he reached such recognition through his own wisdom (Cf. Lev. 2) - I will only note that Moses, when classifying animals, established a special sign by which should not all those animals that are considered seers by the Egyptians and other peoples be considered unclean, and on the contrary, consider all other animals in general pure. Moses classifies the wolf, fox, dragon, eagle, hawk and the like as unclean. And you will find that almost everywhere not only in the Law (Cf. Isa. 11:6, 65:25; Jer. 5:6; Ezek. 13:4, 22:27; Ps. 62:11; Joel 2:15), but also among the prophets 458 these animals are always presented as an image of all the worst, and that in the application to a wolf or a fox there is never any indication of their actions in a good direction. This is why I think that a certain class of demons has to some extent a definite connection with each species of animal. And just as among people there are some who turn out to be stronger than others - of course, I do not mean moral qualities here - so some demons, in the same way, within the limits of relationships that are essentially indifferent (ἐν μέσοις), can be stronger than other demons. Some of the demons use certain animals in order to mislead people according to the will of that (demon), who in our Scriptures is called “the prince of this age” (Cf. John 12:31, 14:30, 16:11; 2 Cor. 4, 4; Ignatius Bogon. Epistle to Eph. xix. 1); others (demons), through another type of animal, foretell the future. And pay attention to what extent the impurity of demons extends: some of them even use the services of a swallow to discover the future in this way! Now consider with yourself which is better to accept - either the opinion that God, the Almighty, and His Son excite birds and other animals to prophetic movements, or the opinion according to which all these actions are attributed to demons - these evil ones and, as the Holy Scripture calls them (τὰ ἱερά ἡμῶν γράμματα), "unclean spirits" (cf. Zech. 13:2; Matt. 10:1, 12:43; Mark 3:11; Luke 6:18; Acts 5:16, 8:7), which, despite the presence of people, however excite not people, but certain animals. XCIV. If in general “the soul of birds must be divine because through it the future is announced,” then should we not admit that in the case where predictions come from people, the soul turns out to be divine in those from whom we receive predictions? Therefore, that miller’s wife in Homer 459 who said about the suitors (of Penelope) will also be divine: Finally, for the last time they will have dinner 460. She must be divine, and not Odysseus - this friend of Homer's Athena, although Odysseus himself perceived and understood the foreshadowing that was given by the divine miller's wife, and rejoiced greatly, as the poet says: The wondrous Odysseus 461 was pleased with the prediction. Pay attention also to the fact that if “birds have a divine soul,” if they can perceive the Divinity with their senses or, as Celsus puts it, perceive “gods,” then it necessarily follows that we, humans, when we sneeze, we actually sneeze because in this case some kind of deity is acting in us, endowing our soul with communicative power. And this belief is even confirmed by many witnesses. That's why the poet says: He sneezed to the one praying, prediction 462 That’s why Penelope says the same thing: Or don't you see that my son responds to my words? XCV. But the true God (τὸ ἀληθῶς θεῖον) does not use dumb animals, or even people who happen to turn up, to predict the future; For this purpose, He chooses the holiest and purest souls of people, whom He inspires with His Divinity (ἅστινας θεοφορεῖ) and makes them prophetic. And if, therefore, there is any saying in the Law of Moses that excites astonishment, then it is precisely the following words given in the Law that should be classified (in the category of remarkable sayings): “Let there be no sorcery or fortune-telling among you” (Lev. 19:26), and in another place: “for these nations, whom the Lord your God will destroy from before Him, will listen to fortune-tellers and soothsayers, but He has not given you that.” The Lord your God" (Deut. 18:14, 12). Then he further adds: “The Lord your God will raise up for you a prophet from among your brethren” (Deut. 18:15). And since God wants, precisely through the fortune-teller, to turn his people away from fortune-telling, He, therefore, made the spirit in the person of the augur say: “There is no magic in Jacob and no sorcery in Israel; in due time they will say about Jacob and about Israel - this is what God wants to do!” (Num. 23:23) Knowing these and similar passages (of the Scriptures), we want to obey the following commandment, which contains a mysterious (μυστικῶς) meaning and says: “Keep your heart with all care” (Prov. 4:23), so that no demon enters the mind (τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ) our or any enemy spirit has not directed our imagination where it pleases. We, on the contrary, pray that “the light of the knowledge of the glory of God will shine in our hearts” (cf. 2 Cor. 4:6), so that the Spirit of God will dwell in our imagination and form in it images of Divine objects. For “as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God” (cf. Rom. 8:14). XCVI. In addition, you need to know that the providence of the future is not necessarily something divine in each individual case: in itself it is not good or evil and can fall to the lot of both evil and righteous (people) 464 . And doctors, for example, thanks to their medical art, also foreknow something, although according to their moral structure (τὸ ἦθος) they can even be evil. In the same way, helmsmen on ships, although they can be vicious people, based on long observation and experience, they know the signs that portend a storm and various changes in weather conditions. And it would not even occur to anyone to call them divine beings, especially if it concerns the fact that their life is morally tainted by vice. Therefore, the following saying of Celsus must be considered a lie, with which he asks: “Who can say that there is something more divine compared to foreshadowing and predicting the future”? His next opinion that “many of the animals arrogate to themselves the right to possess divine thoughts” also turns out to be a lie. After all, not one of the dumb animals has knowledge of God. It is then necessary to recognize as incorrect the position (of Celsus), according to which it turns out that “the relations in which dumb animals stand with God are supposedly much closer and closer (the same relations of people)”; for even the most insightful and learned people “are far from this connection and relationship with the deity,” especially if they are also in a state of depravity (φαῦλοι). Only those who are truly wise and worship God with a pure heart (ἀψευδῶς εὐσεβεῖς) “are in the closest communion with God.” But to such persons, according to our teaching, are our prophets and Moses, to whom, for his extraordinary purity, according to the testimony of Scripture, the following (divine) word was addressed: “Let Moses alone draw near to God, but let all the rest not draw near” (Ex. 24:2). XCVII. How godless, then, is the statement of this man, who raises an objection to us in godlessness, but himself says, as if, “irrational animals are not only wiser and more reasonable, but also more pleasing to God than people.” And who will not feel disgust when hearing from him such words that “dragons, foxes, wolves, eagle, hawk possess the love of God to a greater extent than can be said about the human race?” If all these specified animals are in greater reverence with God than people, then the conclusion follows quite consistently that they are loved by God more than Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras, Pherecydes and other theologians, whom Celsus himself extolled to the skies a little earlier 465. Here one could contrast Celsus with one of these wishes: if these animals are more kind and pleasing to God than people, then can’t you yourself - I am addressing this wish specifically to you - share with them their pleasantness to God and become like those who in your eyes are more pleasing to God than people. But let Celsus not take this wish in a bad way. Indeed, who would not want to become completely like those animals about which he confidently says that they are more pleasing to God than other creatures, so that he himself, therefore, can become as God-loving as they are? As for Celsus’ wish that “the conversations of dumb animals be considered more sacred” than ours (conversations), in this case he bases such a story not on the authority of any simpletons (τοῖς τυχοῦσιν), but on the authority of reasonable people. Reasonable people are actually good; for no one who is intelligent is evil. On this basis, Celsus expresses himself in this way: “and reasonable people assert that animals conduct conversations among themselves, and that these conversations, according to all data, are distinguished by greater holiness than ours; Scientists supposedly understand these (bird) conversations, and prove it in practice, namely: when they predict that the birds have revealed to them their intention to fly here and there, to do this and that, they actually carry out this (their intention), flying exactly there and doing what they predicted (to them) in advance.” But in truth, not a single “reasonable” person has ever made such a statement, not a single sage has said that “there are conversations among dumb animals that are more sacred than those of people.” If we delve deeper into the research of Celsus and pay attention to the consequences flowing from them, it will be clear that, in the course of his thoughts, “the conversations of dumb animals will turn out to be holier than” the sublime dialogues of Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato and other philosophers. But this opinion will be not only unlikely in itself, but also extremely absurd. Even if we admit the possibility that there are some people who understand the inarticulate sounds of birds and can determine from them where the birds will fly and what exactly they will do, then we will say that in this case demons inform people about all this with the help of well-known signs (συμβολικῶς) in order to mislead people, deviate their minds from heaven and from God and chain it even deeper to the earth. XCVIII. I actually don’t understand how Celsus learned that “elephants are faithful to the oath 466” and that “they are more reverent (πιστότεροι) than we are, and that “they have knowledge of God.” True, we know a lot about the nature and gentleness of this animal and, moreover, amazing stories, but I confess that I have not read anything about the fidelity of elephants to the oath. Even if by the meekness and seemingly trusting attitude of elephants towards people - thanks to which they once and for all fell under the power of man - we, together with Celsus, mean the loyalty of the elephants to the oath, then even then such a conclusion (of Celsus) will be false. After all, judging by the stories, there are, although rare, cases when elephants, which had hitherto seemed tame, began to show their original savagery again, so that they rushed at people and killed them, which is why, as useless, they themselves were doomed to be beaten. And if Celsus, further, in support of his position 467 that “storks,” as he believes, “are much more pious than people,” cites all the stories that are in history about these birds, how they love their parents and bring them food, remembering the benefits received from them: then in this regard we must replace that storks do this not at all out of a sense of duty and not because of their supposed inherent rationality, but because of the requirement of nature, which has configured them this way for a special purpose - to give an example through unreasonable animals by which people could learn gratitude in relation to their parents. If Celsus had paid attention to what a huge difference there is between actions performed at the request of reason, in the latter case 468, and actions that are the result of the blind attraction of nature (ἀλόγως καὶ φυσικῶς) - in the first case 469, then he would not have said, of course, that “storks are more pious people. Поставив себе как бы в обязанность – охранять права неразумных животных в области благочестивых чувств и представлять соответствующие этому доказательства, Цельс, далее, упоминает еще об арабской птице – фениксе, говоря, что «она по истечении многих лет, переселяется в Египет и несет сюда прах своего отца, заключенный в миртовый венок, и полагает его на том месте, где стоит храм Солнца 470 ». There is indeed a story about this. Но если даже признать этот рассказ правдоподобный, то самый факт можно легко объяснить естественным путем. Может быть, Божественное Провидение, создав столь великое множество и столь большое разнообразие животных, желало показать то чрезвычайное разнообразие, какое господствует в мире и в его составных частях и которое распростирается также и на птиц. Оно, может быть, и вызвало к бытию это единственное (monogene'_s) в своем роде животное собственно затем, чтобы дать повод людям удивляться не животным, но Тому, Кто их создал. XCIX. Ко всем указанным положениям Цельс в заключение присоединяет еще следующие слова: «итак, – говорит он, – все это создано не для людей, равно как и не для льва или орла, или дельфина, но так, чтобы этот мир как произведение Божие представлял из себя целое (ὁλόκληρον) и совершенное (творение) во всех своих частях. На этом основании все вещи так распределены, чтобы относились не друг к другу в отдельности» – как будто это второстепенная цель! – “but to all being in its entire composition (τοῦ ὅλου). Бог, конечно, печется обо всем мире (τοῦ ὅλου), и Его Провидение никогда не оставляет (без попечения) этого мира; никогда он не бывает также хуже, и по истечении известного времени Бог не обращает его опять к Себе. Он ничуть не гневается из-за людей, равно как (не гневается) также и из-за обезьян и мышей. Он никогда не грозит запретами 471 по отношению к этим существам, из который каждое продолжает сохранять свое место, указанное ему (Богом)». We will briefly give our answer to these provisions (of Celsus). I think that from the previous (my) reasoning the conclusion clearly follows that all things were created for man and, in general, for every rational being. After all, it was primarily for the rational animal that the creation of the world appeared and all things were created. Of course, Celsus will insist that they were created for man to the same small extent as for the lion and other animals that he mentions: but we, for our part, must say that God in any case created these things not for the lion or for the eagle, nor for the dolphin, but for the sake of the rational animal, and so that “this world, which constitutes the work of God, would be whole and perfect in all respects.” Of course, we also agree with this last expression (of Celsus), since it is beautiful. And God has care not only for the world taken as a whole, as Celsus thinks, but also for every rational being without exception, and for him in any case preferably than for the whole world (ἐξαιρέτως). And Providence will never leave the world (τὸ ὅλον) without its care; even if, due to the sinfulness of the rational creation, some part of this world should have become worse, then He still cares (οἰκονομεῖ) to accomplish its purification (καθάρσιον αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν) and, “after a certain time, to turn the world to To yourself." And God, of course, does not exude His anger on monkeys and mice, but on people who have transgressed the law of nature (τὰς φυσικὰς ἀφορμάς); He sends (His) judgment and vengeance (κόλασιν) to people, and it is to them that He threatens through the prophets and the Savior, Whom He sent for the entire human race, so that through threats those who heed (these threats) could turn (to God), and those who neglect the word of repentance would suffer a worthy condemnation (δίκας κατ' ἀξίαν), which God, according to his wise advice and will, out of the desire for the good of every person, had to impose on those who are in need of such difficult treatment and correction. But enough: this fourth book has already acquired extremely significant dimensions; finish our word in good time. May God help us through His Son, Who is God - Word and Wisdom, and Truth, and Truth (John 1:1, 4:6, 24, 30), and all that the Holy Scripture constantly proclaims about Him in its theology, with the help of His word, which descends into our soul and illuminates it - to begin the fifth book and finish it happily and with benefit for the listeners. those. refute objections Aim. those. mere glimpses of truth, without the meaning of accurate and reliable knowledge. μυρίαι ὅσαι – thousands of times, in the sense of an indefinite set. καταβήσεται, in fact, having to come and expected, according to the promises that are revealed in the Prophetic books. Compare Philo – Quod deus immut., p. H. Wed. above 1, LVII; 2, XXXV, LXXVIII; 3, XXVIII. πραγματεύεται διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀεὶ ἐπιδημίας τοῦ λόγου ἀναλαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν οἰκείωσιν. μὴ πάνυ τι φθάνειν δυνάμενον ἐπὶ τὴν δημωδεστέραν ἀκοήν. those. Christ as the Divine Teacher of Christianity. Βάκχος - frantic, mad, drunk, a Greek nickname for Dionysus, the god of fun. Wed. 4, XIII, XIV, LXIX. In his earlier works, Origen considered punishments only as measures and means of correcting a person and decisively rejected behind them the meaning of punitive measures on the part of God, the Judge and the Rewarder. As a means of correction, in his opinion, they can only have power and significance for cleansing fallen souls and bringing them back to their previous state of good disposition. In view of this, torment and punishment in the system of Origen’s teachings lose the character of eternity (the theory of the so-called apocatastasis). In the above passage, Origen, contrary to his earlier views, speaks out less decisively from the point of view of his theory of apokatastasis, and allows a somewhat smoother view of the punishment of sinners and the bliss of the righteous as measures of fair retribution for both on the part of God the Rewarder. The time of Inachus, the founder of the Argive kingdom in the Peloponnese shortly after the flood of Deucalion, is not clearly indicated by Greek legends. Perhaps Inachus was a contemporary of the Patriarch Isaac, or perhaps he lived a little later, as Origen admits. In this case, Origen does not touch upon the teaching about the mystery of the incarnation of the Son of God and speaks about the appearances of God to the human world without regard to the mystery of the Incarnation. Dan. 7:10, in Russian Synodal translation: a river of fire came out and passed before Him. χωνεύση, actually: melt. τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ δοκιμάσει – in Origen; τὸ πῦρ δοκιμάσει – in Russian. Synodal lane Celsus speaks, as it were, through the mouth of the Gnostics, who, from the point of view of their dualistic principles, taught that Christ, the Savior of the world, could not accept true human nature, but only a ghostly human body (Docetism). Hermias the philosopher, Christian apologist of the 1st century, in his work “Rockiness of Pagan Philosophers” gives a vivid description of those contradictory to the point of opposite ideas that pagan philosophers had on the issue of God, the world and man. Wed. Plato "Phaedo", p. XV; "Phaedrus", p. XXVIII; “State” X, 16; "Tim.", p. XIV. σαφὴς τυγχάνῃ – actually: it turns out (i.e. the legend of the tower) is clear in itself. This place reveals the extreme exegetical techniques of Origen, who was inclined to see in many Old Testament tales mainly a mysterious allegorical meaning, rather than actual history. Homer, Odyssey XI, 305–320; Illiad V, 385–387. Aloids - Ephialtes and Ot, sons of Ifimedea and Aloe, son of Poseidon. The legend says that the Aloids, who grew annually by a cubit in width and a fathom in height, in the ninth year of their life began to threaten the gods of Olympus themselves, trying to pile Ossa on Olympus, and Pellius on Ossa. Their tricks were interrupted by Apollo, who struck them with his arrows. Phaethon, son of Helios (sun god) and Clymene, daughter of Ocean. According to the mythological legends of the Greeks, Phaethon, a young man, having asked his father for permission to drive a solar chariot for one day, went astray and set the sky and earth on fire, so that Zeus was forced to strike him with lightning in order to save the world from destruction. The struck Phaeton fell into the Eridanus River. A more or less firmly established date for the life of Homer is considered to be around 880 BC, and Moses lived 1500 years BC. See above 1, XXXVI, XXXVII; 3, II-IV. Christ was crucified in 783 after the founding of Rome, which falls in 753 BC; the destruction of Jerusalem under the emperor Vesparian, through his son Titus, was in 70 after the Nativity of Christ. Origen thus gives an erroneous chronological date, probably influenced by Clement of Alexandria (cf. Stromata 1:21). By the word πολιτείᾳ Origen means, of course, not the contemporary way of life of the pagan state and society, but that new Christian system of social life, which, in his opinion, should replace the dying pagan society under the influence of the new life-giving religious and moral principles of Christianity. Demosthenes, the great Greek orator (born around 381 BC, died in 322 BC) took a prominent part in the Greek struggle against Macedonia. When Antipater defeated the Athenians, Demosthenes and his friends were put on trial and sentenced to death, which he hastened by suicide. Antiphon (born c. 480 BC, died in 411 BC) is the founder of a special school of rhetoric, in which mainly the oratory of the political style flourished. He is known as the author of many oratorical works and, by the way, as a compiler of rhetoric (τέχνη ῥητορική), which, however, has not survived to our time. the translator gives the word: “errors.” here from the translator: “there will be (among them) errors...” Wed. Cicero De Legibus 1, d, 25; Clement of Alexandria Stromat. VI, 14:114; Theodorite Grace, affect, curatio, disp. XI (de fine et judicio). Euripid Phöniss V, 546, cf. in Origen below IV, 77. in the Synod, the translation of the Bible used by the translator: all the beauty (kosmon) of heaven. from the translator: felt from the translator: “has an inscription.” Here, therefore, Celsus has in mind the Biblical story: Gen. Ch. 2–3 Hesiod is the oldest epic Greek poet, who probably lived either at the same time as Homer, or even before him. Born in Boeotia, in the city of Askra, which is at the foot of Helicon. Of his works, the following are especially remarkable: 1) Ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι (“Business and Days”) - largely conveying economic rules relating to agriculture, navigation, households, with the addition of the village calendar (ἡμέραι); 2) Θεογονία (“Theogony”, i.e. the legend about the origin of the gods) represents an attempt to harmonize various Greek legends about the gods, their origin, rank and order and the origin of the world. This is something like pagan religious dogma. Plato Republic. II, III, X ch. created - according to the lane. Bible used by the translator. By creation - according to the lane. Bible used by the translator. This refers to Origen’s special work “Commentary on the Book of Genesis,” which in large part has survived to our time; but in places related to the clarification of this issue, it is lost. from the translator: “folded.” Hesiod Ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι, V, 57 Hesiod Ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι, V, 53–82. Hebrew word meaning pleasantness, sweetness; here Eden is given as the name of the area where paradise was located (παράδεισος). Plato Συμπόσιον, ch. XXIII. κατὰ Ἐβραΐδα – in Hebrew; according to another edition: καθ' ἑλλάδα – in Greek; the difference in editions, however, does not violate the general meaning, since ἄνθρωπος (man) - in Greek and Adam (man) - in Hebrew give Origen the same basis for constructing a conclusion. Wed. in Plato Phadr. With. XXV. Wed. Origen on the book of Genesis, Homil. II, 2. Ascalon, one of the five main fortified cities of the Philistines, located on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea (2 Kings 1:20). Thyestes, son of Pelops, king of Pisa, and Hippodamea, grandson of Tantalus. Thyestes seduced Aeropa, the wife of his brother Atreus, and was expelled for this; Subsequently, after a series of adventures, Thyestes kills his brother Atreus and, together with his father Pelops, takes possession of the kingdom in Mycenae, where Agamemnon and Menelaus, the sons of Atreus, ruled. Mom is the personification of lies, son of the night. According to legend, he burst with anger when he could not find a single vice in Aphrodite. Wed. Hesiod Theogony, V, 164–182; 453–467. Ibid, V, 481–491; Homer Iliad, I, 544. Hesiod Theogon., V. 126–153; Homer Iliada I, 399. 400. Theophilus of Antioch “To Autolycus” III, 3:8; Diogenes Laer., VII, 1:136, 148; 7:187–188. Those. works of sacred writers. Philo was an Alexandrian Jew, born around 25 BC. He is remarkable because in his writings he presented the experience of combining the Old Testament Revelation with the philosophy of Plato; Moreover, he held the opinion that Plato borrowed his sublime ideas from the Holy Books of the Jewish people. In interpreting the Sacred Text, he followed mainly the allegorical method of interpretation. Aristobulus - a follower of the Peripatetic school, also a Jew from the tribe of Levi, teacher of King Ptolemy Philometor, lived in the first half of the second century BC. in Alexandria. Wed. 2 Tim. 3:8. Jannes and Jambres were the leaders of the Egyptian magicians. Wed. Ref. 7:10–12 "Timaeus" - a dialogue by the philosopher Plato; Wed "Tim." With. XXXI. Wed. Diogenes. Laert., VII. 1:147. Plato's dialogue "Timaeus", p. XIV. See Pliny Nat hist.. X, 66:188; Ovid Metamorfos. 15:4. Ibid, XI, 20. - Origen cites popular beliefs in order - on the basis, so to speak, of Celsus's own pagan mythology - to prove to him the truth of the divine establishment of laws governing the course of world life, both spiritual and physical - in all spheres of existence. Anytus is a wealthy leather merchant in Athens, who subsequently achieved a high social position in the struggle between democracy and aristocracy, one of the accusers of Socrates and, therefore, those responsible for his death. The idea is that a single physical organization common to all corporeal beings serves as the basis for all successively occurring changes and passages in the life of the physical world. Plato's dialogue "Timaeus" cap. III. Mentioned in Athenaeus IV, 15; XI, 3. Ἀγορανόμοι i.e. aediles, who performed police duties in the Roman state and issued laws protecting public morality. Evil or good will not come from the mouth of the Almighty (according to the translation of the Bible used by the translator). A poisonous drink made from hemlock. Phalaris, Agrigentine tyrant (565–549 BC), originally from the island of Astypalaia, near Rhodes, became famous for his cruelties. There is a well-known story about the copper bull, in which Phalaris ordered the people he condemned to be burned alive. Alexander, nephew of Polyphron of Pheraeus (in Thessaly), who killed his uncle and then became a tyrant in 369 BC. Known in history for phenomenal cruelty in the use of executions. those. the meaning is literal and spiritual. See above I, 54. 55. 61; II, 16. 23. i.e. Celsus' treatise "The True Word", against which Origen writes. Wed. Cicer. De natura deor. I, II. Eurip. Proniss.. V, 546; Wed above IV, 30. This was the name given to Euripides for his numerous moralizing sayings, which made him the favorite of all moralists. Even Socrates, for his moralizing sayings, put him above all other poets of the ancient Greek world. Wed. in Lucretius De rer. nat. V; on the contrary, Cicero (De nat. deor. 2:60) proves the royal position of man in the animal world. Wed. Hesiod, Fragmenta 218, in the Marcksheffel edition. Hesiod is called Askrean from his birthplace in the village of Askra in Boeotia, at the foot of Helicon. ὁ θεῖος κατὰ Μωϋσέα λόγος. θειοτέρας φωνῆς καὶ χρησμῶν (χρησμός) Revelation) ὁ γεννάδος, i.e. Celsus, so named here, of course, in an ironic sense. τῶν ἀπ’ ἀλόγου φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς ψιλῆς γινομένων. It can also be translated as follows: “and phenomena that are based on (obviously) irrational nature and only the desire for external well-being.” Wed. Pliny Nat. hist. XI, 30:109; Plutarch. De sollert. anim. c. XI. Wed. Clement of Alexandria "Pedagogue", II, 10:85. ὁμοειδῆ – identical; actually: of the same type, of the same nature. Wed. Plato Praedr., p. XXV-XXVI. Wed. Pliny Nat. hist. XI, 30:110; Plutarch De sollert. anim. c. XI. ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς καὶ φαντασίας ἀλόγως κινούμενον – sensory impressions (ὁρμὴ) and representations of images (φαντασία) as The lower cognitive abilities of animals are contrasted with the higher cognitive abilities of man, who knows things with reason (λογισμῷ). Wed. in Plutarch De sollert. anim., p. XX. Wed. in Pliny's Hist. nat. 10:3; 30:14; 36, 21. ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου γεγενημένη. The Word, the Divine Mind, is considered as the source and beginning of all being, with all its inherent qualities and properties. John 16:25: ἐν παροιμίαις – own. in parables, in the form of parables. Wed. Philostrata Vita. Appol. IV, 3. Cicero also speaks about the religious feeling of elephants (De nat. deor. I, 35:97; VII, 44): “elephants honor the gods, but people doubt whether there are gods”! Pliny (Nat. hist. VIII, 1:1–3. 5:13), as well as Plutarch (De sollert. anim., p. XVII), speaks especially persistently about fidelity to oaths among elephants. Celsus undoubtedly has in mind the views of these pagan scientists. Iliad II, 308–321; Wed Cicero, De divinit. II, 30:63, 64. Homer "Iliad" XII, 200–209. Wed. Homer "Odyssey" XV, 526. ἅτε γυμνοὶ τῶν γηΐνων σωμάτων τυγχάνοντες – actually: naked from earthly bodies. That. demons are attributed physicality, but more subtle, unearthly, alien to materiality. Those. the most cunning, ferocious ones discussed above. Those. in the Pentateuch of Moses. Wed. Homer "Odyssey" XX, 105. Homer "Odyssey" XX, 120; XVIII, 117. Homer "Odyssey" XVII, 541. Homer "Odyssey" XVII, 545. καθ' αὑτὸ γὰρ μέσον ἐστὶ καὶ πῖπτον εἰς φαύλους καὶ ἀστείους. Me'son is an average, indifferent action in the field of moral world order, acquiring its qualitative certainty only depending on the acting subject. See above 2, XX; Wed below 4, XLII-XLIII. Wed. Plin. Nat. hist. 1:3. Wed. Pliny Nat. hist. X, 23:63; Plutarch De solicit, atom. c. IV. Those. in application to people. Wed. Herodotus P. 73; Pliny Nat. hist. X, 2, 3–5; Pomponius Mela III, 8:83, 84; Tacitus Annal. VI, 28; Philostratus Vita Apoll III, 49. In patriotic literature, the legend of the phoenix is ​​also cited as a figurative expression of the idea of ​​​​the resurrection of the dead: cf. at Klim. Rom. Ad. Corinth. I, 25:2. from the translator: “restrictions” You might be interested in: